[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 6-2 decision, the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person, they were prohibited from rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks against government abuse.
Justice Abe Fortas participated in oral argument but retired before the Court rendered its decision.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Members of the University Committee to End the War in Viet Nam (Protestors) were protesting at a speech by President Lyndon B. Johnson at Central Texas College in Killeen, Texas. After being attacked by the gathered crowd, the Protestors were arrested and charged with disturbing the peace. The Protestors sued and asked that a three-judge panel be convened in the district court to overrule the disturbing-the-peace statute since it violated their First Amendment rights. That court found the statute unconstitutional but stayed the injunction that would prevent enforcement of the statute until the next session of the Texas legislature, so that the legislature might enact a constitutionally permissible statute. However, the Texas legislature did not enact a new statute at its next session, and the court took no further action. Lester Gunn, the local sheriff, appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Gunn based his appeal on the Three-Judge Court Act, which allows direct appeals to the Supreme Court from orders granting or denying an injunction by a federal court of three judges.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Potter Stewart wrote the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that, since a clear and specific injunction is vital when a federal court is asked to nullify a law enacted by a state, it is also vital for direct Supreme Court jurisdiction under the Three-Judge Court Act. Without a specific order granting or denying an injunction, it is impossible to know with certainty what a district had decided, and thus the Court’s jurisdiction must be narrowly construed.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the opinion of the district court should be considered a declaratory judgment invalidating the Texas statute. While he agreed that the Three-Judge Court Act did not provide jurisdiction, Justice White noted that Gunn was still entitled to have the opinion reviewed by an appellate court. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined the concurrence.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun took no part in the decision.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Arkansas legislature passed a law prohibiting teachers in public or state-supported schools from teaching, or using textbooks that teach, human evolution. Epperson, a public school teacher, sued, claiming the law violated her First Amendment right to free speech as well as the Establishment Clause. The State Chancery Court ruled that it violated her free speech rights; the State Supreme Court reversed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Seven members of the Court held that the statute violated the Establishment clause. Writing for the Court, Justice Abe Fortas stated that the law had been based solely on the beliefs of fundamentalist Christians, who felt that evolutionary theories directly contradicted the biblical account of Creation. This use of state power to prohibit the teaching of material objectionable to a particular sect ammounted to an unconstitutional Establishment of religion. Justice Fortas wrote, "The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment." The two other members of the Court concurred in the result, writing that it violated either the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (because it was unconstitutionally vague) or the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) applied for, and were issued, a search warrant to assist in uncovering evidence of defendant William Spinelli conducting illegal gambling activities. In the affidavit required for the warrant application, the FBI agents stated the defendant was known to "local law enforcement officials as a bookmaker." The FBI related in the affidavit that agents had tracked defendant Spinelli for five days, and that on four of the days, Spinelli was seen crossing into St. Louis, MO, entering an apartment at 1108 Indian Circle Drive. Finally, the agents offered that they "had been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The informant's tip, even when corroborated with the FBI's observations from their surveillance, was not sufficient to provide a basis for a finding probable cause when using the two-pronged test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). (Abstract prepared by Blaine Schmidt.)


[Unknown Act > Facts]
These are two consolidated cases involving the same Respondents. William Johnson and Jonathan Klosek (husband of Julia Klosek) were employed by Nacirema Operating Company as longshoremen and Albert Avery was employed by Old Dominion Stevedoring Company. Johnson and Avery were injured and Klosek was killed during separate accidents that occurred while on the dock unloading a ship. The Deputy Commissioners of the United States Department of Labor denied claims by the men and their families under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (the Act) because the injuries did not occur “upon the navigable waters of the United States” as required under the Act. The district court upheld those decisions and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 5-3 majority, reversed the Fourth Circuit. The Act’s language determines coverage by the location of the injury, navigable waters, rather than rather than an individual’s status as a longshoreman performing maritime contracts. While the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act extends admiralty tort jurisdiction to ship related injuries on a pier, it does not extend the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the Act was status oriented and covered all injuries sustained by longshoremen in the course of their employment. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A jury convicted Alex Evans of murder. The prosecution presented 20 witnesses who described Evans’ participation in the murder. A prison inmate testified that one of Evans’ conspirators in the murder said “we wouldn’t be in this now” if it weren’t for Evans. Evans’ counsel questioned the inmate, but still argued that Evans’ right to confrontation was violated because they could not confront the conspirator. The judge overruled Evans’ objection citing a Georgia statute that allows admission of conspirator’s statements against co-conspirators. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction.
Evans filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Georgia statute violates Evans right to confrontation because it is broader than the rule used in federal conspiracy trials. The court found no “cogent reasons” for the Georgia hearsay exception.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a four justice plurality, delivered the judgment of the court. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia hearsay exception did not violate the confrontation clause merely because it was slightly different from the federal rule. The accomplice’s statement was not crucial in light of the other evidence, and Evans’ counsel had full opportunity to cross-examine all of the prosecution’s witnesses. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, adding that admission of the accomplice’s statement was a harmless error if it was an error at all. Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result, writing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper standard for reviewing rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing that admitting the accomplice’s statement denied Evans his right to cross-examine all witnesses against him. Even if the statement fell within a genuine hearsay exception, it should not be introduced unless the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Justices Hugo L. Black, William O. Douglas, and William J. Brennan joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A group of federal agents entered Colonnade Catering’s (Colonnade) New York premises to search for resealed liquor bottles, possession of which is a violation of federal tax law. After searching for some time, the agents asked Colonnade’s president, Salvatore E. Rozzo, to unlock a locked liquor storeroom. Rozzo refused and asked the agents if they had a search warrant. The agents responded that they did not need one. When Rozzo continued to refuse to unlock the storeroom, the agents broke the lock, entered the storeroom, and seized 53 bottles of liquor and two funnels.
At trial, Colonnade moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search and argued that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision and held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless administrative inspections. Therefore, the statutes, which authorize federal agents to enter any building or place where objects subject to a liquor tax are kept “so far as it may be necessary” in order to examine them during the day or business hours, do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court also found that the statutory provisions were equivalent to a warrant given their clarity and narrow scope.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court argued that business owners have a constitutional right to go about their business without unreasonable official entries onto their property. However, emphasizing a long history of liquor industry regulation, the Court stated that Congress has broad powers to fashion standards for reasonable searches of licensee’s businesses. The Court did not find the statute unconstitutional, but interpreted the statute’s imposition of a $500 fine on licensed liquor dealers who refuse to permit federal agents to inspect their liquor to mean that the fine was the only remedy available to the government upon a licensee’s refusal to grant entry.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the term “so far as it may be necessary” authorized the search and that the statutory penalty was enacted merely to encourage compliance by licensed liquor dealers. Because Congress could not have intended to allow licensed liquor to avoid confiscation of their liquor for a relatively small $500 fine, the fine does not mean that liquor dealers can opt out of the statutory inspection. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Hugo L. Black wrote that the statutes do not expressly declare forcible search and seizure illegal and thus implicitly authorized the seizure in this case. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the separate dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Willie E. Williams was convicted for theft of credit cards, checks, and papers worth less than $150. He received the maximum sentence for petty theft in Illinois: one year of imprisonment and a $500 fine. If Williams was unable to pay the fine (and an additional $5 in court costs) at the end of his sentence, he would remain in jail to “work off” the fine at a rate of $5 per day.
While in jail, Williams petitioned the trial court to vacate the “work off” provision of his sentence. Williams argued that he did not have any money or property with which to pay the money portion of his sentence, but he would pay if released after one year and allowed to get a job. The trial court held that Williams’ ability to pay might change by the end of his sentence and dismissed his petition. Williams appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois and argued that the denial of his petition violated his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that there was no Fourteenth Amendment violation.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Illinois law was impermissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause because the latter ruling would place a substantial burden on states to create a system of individualized fines. Additionally, the Equal Protection clause allowed judges to substitute their opinions for those of the legislature, while the Due Process Clause placed legislation that deprives an individual of his right to remain free under higher judicial scrutiny. Justice Harlan determined that the state interests in forcing someone without assets to “work off” their fines as opposed to using a payment plan or other alternative are administrative convenience and better crime deterrence, but that these interests cannot justify depriving poor individuals of their liberty.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A government informant, Harvey Jackson, wore a concealed radio transmitter and engaged in four conversations with defendant White at three different locations: Jackson's house, a restaurant, and Jackson's automobile. Government agents listened to each of the radio transmissions, thereby overhearing defendant White make self-incriminating remarks regarding his involvement in multiple narcotics transactions. Jackson was unavailable during the trial, so the prosecution offered the testimony of the agents who had conducted the electronic surveillance as evidence.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The testimony of government agents, relating conversations between a defendant and an undercover informant, overheard via electronic surveillance, is admissible, despite the informant's unavailability at trial. This case expanded the principle announced in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). (Abstract prepared by Blaine Schmidt.)


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, established by the Social Security Act of 1935 and jointly funded by the state and federal governments, provides financial assistance to children of families with little or no income. Under the program, each state computes a "standard of need" for each family. In Maryland, the standard of need increased with each additional member of the family, but became incrementally smaller, with an upper limit of $250 per month. Linda Williams, a single mother, and Junius and Jeanette Gary, husband and wife, were Baltimore residents and parents of eight children each. They objected to Maryland's means of calculating standard of need on the ground that it discriminated against larger families, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They also argued that the calculation conflicted with the stated purpose of the program as laid out by the Social Security Act. They filed suit against Edmund P. Dandridge, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare, and several other state officials. A U.S. District Court originally ruled the Maryland regulation violated both the Social Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause. On reconsideration, the court altered its ruling and based its judgment entirely on constitutional grounds but nonetheless struck down the provision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-3 opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court concluded that the Maryland provision violated neither the Social Security Act nor the Equal Protection Clause. Relying on the precedent set in King v. Smith (1968), which described the program as "a scheme of cooperative federalism" and gave the state "undisputed power" to calculate standard of need, the Court concluded that "nothing in the federal statute...forbids a State to balance the stresses that uniform insufficiency of payments would impose on all families against the greater ability of large families...to accommodate their needs to diminished per capita payments." Similarly, the Court rejected the families' equal protection claim, noting, "[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Thus, because Maryland's provision was "rationally based and free from invidious discrimination," it was constitutionally valid. Justice Stewart took care to note that while "claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every measure," the Court could rule a provision invalid based only on its constitutionality, not on its wisdom.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Frederick Walz, the owner of real estate in Richmond County, New York, brought suit against the New York City Tax Commission, challenging property tax exemptions for churches. Walz alleged that the exemptions forced him, as a taxpayer, to indirectly contribute to those churches.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the exemptions did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that the purpose of the exemptions was to neither advance nor inhibit religion; no one particular church or religious group had been singled out to receive tax exempt status. Unlike direct subsidies, which would have unduly entangled the state with religion, tax exemptions created only "minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches." The Court noted that "benevolent neutrality" toward churches and religions was "deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Mae Wheeler was a 75-year-old widow who lived solely on her welfare check and monthly Social Security payment. On August 30, 1967, the San Francisco Department of Social Services learned that Wheeler had received the proceeds from her late son's veteran insurance policy. After a county welfare supervisor called Wheeler, the Welfare Department began withholding Wheeler's welfare check pending an investigation. Wheeler requested a hearing and for the restoration of her payments until her cause could be heard. Wheeler did not get the restoration of her payments, but she ultimately prevailed in her claim and had benefits restored several months later.
Wheeler along with other similarly-situated people were granted class action status, and the class claimed that California welfare termination provisions deprived the class members of their constitutional due process rights by terminating welfare benefits before having a full and adequate hearing. A three-judge District Court for the Northern District of California held that the California procedure for pre-termination review satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court reviewed the California court's opinion


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court held that the California welfare termination regulations did not satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause because they did not afford recipients an evidentiary hearing or allow the recipients to offer evidence or confront opposing witnesses. The Court reversed the lower court's opinion.
Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Black. In his opinion, the justice stated that the administrative regulations regarding welfare was in an early stage of development and that the Court should allow the administrative processes to develop before burdening them with a heavy-handed constitutional ruling.
Justice Stewart also filed a dissenting opinion, where he stated that the procedures the state followed for terminating welfare payments did not violate the Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
North Carolina charged Henry Alford with first-degree murder. That charge carried a possible sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty. Alford agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a second-degree murder conviction. When Alford took the stand, he testified that he was innocent and pled guilty to avoid the death penalty. The judge ensured that Alford made his decision freely after consulting counsel. Alford maintained his guilty plea, and after receiving evidence of Alford’s extensive criminal history, the judge sentenced Alford to the maximum 30-year sentence.
After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain post-conviction relief, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied relief on the grounds that Alford’s guilty plea was entirely voluntary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the plea was involuntary because its primary motivation was the fear of death.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional violation where the defendant concluded based on competent counsel that it was in his best interest to plead guilty. The court saw no difference between a defendant who maintains his innocence with a plea bargain and one who admits to the crime.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a concurrence, agreeing with the majority, but expressing a belief that United States v Jackson was wrongly decided. Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that the threat of the death penalty should be a factor considered when determining whether a plea was voluntary. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Sara Baird graduated from law school at Stanford University in 1967 and passed the bar examination in Arizona. Among the questions asked by the Arizona Bar Committee, she answered Question 25, which requested that she list all of the organizations to which she has belonged since the age of 16. She declined to answer Question 27, which asked whether she “had ever been a member of the Communist party or any organization ‘that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.’” Because she did not answer that question, the Committee did not process her application any further. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Baird’s petition for the Bar Committee to show cause why she should be denied admittance to the State Bar of Arizona.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the First Amendment protection of freedom of association prevents a state from denying a person access to a profession based on the exercise of that right. In order for a state to investigate a person’s beliefs for the sake of employment, the state must show the inquiry is necessary “to protect a legitimate state interest.” The Court held that the petitioner had already provided the Bar Committee with enough relevant information about her membership in associations.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that such a state inquiry must distinguish between being a member of an organization and actively supporting the actions of an anti-governmental group. He also held that the question on the State Bar Application was unconstitutional because it was clearly used to deny admission to the Bar based on objectionable beliefs.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion. He argued that the First Amendment allows a state to make inquiries into the beliefs that will directly impact a professional’s ability to perform the duties of the job. Because a lawyer is an officer of the court, beliefs regarding the government are relevant to the Bar Committee’s inquiry. He wrote that, although being a lawyer is a privilege and not a right, nothing indicated that the Bar Committee would have refused Baird admission to the Bar had she answered the question in the affirmative. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that state Bars had a legitimate interest in preventing applicants who wish to overthrow the United States government from practicing law. He argued that there was no constitutional basis to prevent a state from making relevant inquiries into beliefs that could influence an applicant’s performance of his/her duties.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A juvenile court judge declared 17-year-old Clarence DeBacker a “delinquent child” and ordered him committed to the Boys’ Training School for forging his father’s signature on a check and attempting to pass it off as legitimate. Before the hearing, DeBacker had requested a jury trial, but the judge denied the request. The Nebraska Juvenile Court Act denies juveniles a trial by jury. Instead of seeking review of his sentence, DeBacker flied for state habeas corpus, arguing that the juvenile court violated the Sixth Amendment when it denied him a jury trial. The Nebraska District Court dismissed the petition and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. On appeal, DeBacker argued that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Duncan v Louisiana and Bloom v Illinois entitle him to a jury trial.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No answer. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted. DeBacker’s hearing took place before the Court decided Duncan and Bloom. Those cases only applied prospectively, so they did not apply to DeBacker. The Court could not answer DeBacker’s second question because he had not objected to the standard during the criminal hearing. DeBacker also failed to show that the judge would have ruled differently under a different standard
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, expressing that the Duncan and Bloom decisions should apply retroactively. Justice Hugo L. Black also dissented, writing that the “prospective only application” of constitutional decisions amounted to a judicial amendment to the Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Martin Robert Stolar was admitted to the New York Bar in 1968. In his application, he answered several questions about his social, religious and political affiliations. When Stolar applied to the Ohio Bar in 1969 he supplied the Ohio Bar Association with all of the information from his New York Bar application. The Ohio Bar also subjected Stolar to an oral interrogation where they asked questions relating to whether he was associated with any organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the government. Stolar refused to answer those questions and the interrogation committee recommended that he be denied admission to the Bar. Stolar had nothing in his record, other than refusal to answer the questions, that showed that he did not have the necessary good character for admission to the Ohio Bar. The Ohio Supreme Court approved the committee’s recommendation without opinion.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Though they could not agree on an opinion, five members of the court agreed that the Ohio Bar’s questions violated the First Amendment. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the judgment of the court, holding that the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of association and prohibition against a state penalizing a person for their membership in a particular organization made the Ohio Bar questions improper. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment, writing that the questions were improper under prior Supreme Court precedent.
Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the Constitution did not require a state to admit someone to practice law who believed in violence. The Ohio Bar questions were properly designed to discover whether an applicant expected to actively support illegal violence. Justice Harry A. Blackmun also dissented, stating that the judgment should be affirmed based on Stolar’s refusal to answer the questions. Chief Justice Warren Burger, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent. Justice John M. Harlan separately dissented, arguing that the Constitution does prevent a state bar association from denying admission based on theoretical beliefs in a right of revolution, but it does not require admission of someone who seeks entry for the purpose of doing away with the orderly process of law.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Joseph Waller stole a mural from the St. Petersburg City Hall. The city charged and convicted him in municipal court with two ordinance violations. Based on the same acts, Waller was prosecuted and convicted in the Circuit Court of Florida for grand larceny. On appeal, Waller argued that the municipal court and subsequent circuit court prosecutions put him in double jeopardy. The District Court of Appeal of Florida rejected this argument and upheld the conviction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous court, vacated the circuit court conviction. The Supreme Court held that Waller was put twice in jeopardy because the circuit court charges were based on the same acts as the municipal court charges. State and municipal courts are part of one sovereign judicial system. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred, but noted that state and federal governments should not be considered separate sovereignties for double jeopardy purposes. Justice William J. Brennan also concurred, writing that double jeopardy bars a second trial for charges arising out of the same acts unless the case falls within an exception to the “same transaction” rule.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Gladys Boddie was a married resident of Connecticut receiving welfare benefits. She filed for a divorce in New Haven County Superior Court. However, Boddie was not given a hearing because she had not paid the filing fee under Section 52-259 of the Connecticut General Statutes. Given her welfare status, she was unable to pay the fee. Her requests for fee waivers were also denied. Boddie and others who were denied divorces under Section 52-259 challenged the fee requirement in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. They alleged that the fee requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court upheld the requirement. Boddie appealed to the Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the District Court and held the fee requirement unconstitutional. In a majority opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan, the Court recognized the importance of "access to the courts" for Boddie, as state court was the only method of obtaining a divorce in Connecticut. While the Court acknowledged Connecticut's interest in conserving limited resources and preventing "frivolous litigation," this interest was not a "sufficient countervailing justification." Therefore, Connecticut's refusal to allow Boddie to proceed with her divorce was "a denial of due process" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas concurred in the result. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in part.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Robert M. Brady pleaded not guilty to kidnapping. After learning that his codefendant confessed and would be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty. The crime had a maximum penalty of death, but a U.S. statute allowed the death penalty only if the verdict of a jury recommends. The judge sentenced him to 50 years in prison. The sentence was later reduced to 30 years. 8 years later, Brady sought relief in U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming his guilty plea was not voluntarily given because the possibility of the death penalty coerced his plea. The district court denied relief and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, finding that Brady changed his plea because of the codefendants actions. The court held that an intervening decision United States v. Jackson, which held the death penalty unconstitutional because it imposes an impermissible burden on an accused’s Fifth Amendment right to not plead guilty and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, did not apply.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for five members of the court, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that United States v. Jackson does not require every guilty plea to be overturned when fear of death was a factor in the plea. The voluntariness of the plea is determined by considering all of the relevant circumstances. While Brady may have been partially motivated by a desire to avoid the death penalty, the guilty plea was voluntarily made with the advice of competent counsel. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment and substantially all of the opinion, but expressed his belief that United States v. Jackson was wrongly decided. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the result, because there was no evidence that fear of the death penalty played a substantial role in Brady’s decision. Justice Brennan also expressed that the court’s method of analysis was unclear. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company filed applications with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for a proposed merger of themselves and three subsidiaries. The ICC decided that the merger would result in savings, improved service, and more efficient use of the railroad’s facilities. These benefits were outweighed, however, by the potential loss of jobs and lessening of competition. The ICC later reopened its investigation, focusing on the amount of savings the merger would produce. This time, the ICC approved the merger, concluding that the proposed savings were more important. Several railroads filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the ICC failed to give proper weight to the decrease in competition the merger would produce. The district court affirmed the ICC decision. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the ICC’s decision. The savings, service improvements, and conditions agreed to by the merging railroads far outweighed the loss of competition. The court also upheld the ICC’s decision on the ratio for the exchange of stock that would take place during the merger. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
African-American citizens of Greene County Alabama filed a class action against the Greene County, Alabama Jury Commission, alleging racial discrimination in the selection of potential jurors, and the Governor of Alabama, for appointing an all-white jury commission in a predominantly African-American county. The class members alleged that they were qualified for jury service but never summoned. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief declaring that the Alabama statute governing jury selection was unconstitutional and enjoining future enforcement of the statute. The Alabama statute provided that potential jurors should be “generally reputed to be honest and intelligent” and “esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound judgment.” The district court held that the Jury Commission did not follow the Alabama statute and systematically discriminated in preparing jury lists. The court ordered a new list created in compliance with the Alabama statute and constitutional principles. The court declined to invalidate the statue or compel the Governor to appoint African-Americans to the jury commission. This case was heard on direct appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court held that, while the jury commission itself discriminated against African-Americans, the Alabama statute did not. The statute made no mention of race and was capable of being applied in a non-discriminatory way. Seven justices agreed that the Governor did not need to appoint African-American jury commissioners because the class failed to prove discrimination in the selection of the existing commissioners. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment and the opinion, but noted that the majority opinion does not imply that the U.S. Supreme Court had the power to vacate the Governor’s jury commission appointments or order him to appoint African-American commissioners.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented in part, arguing that, while he would not order the Governor to appoint African-American jury commissioners, the jury commission system should be struck down because it did not provide for proportional representation of the races.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Through several treaties, the United States granted the Choctaw and Cherokee Nations several million acres of land in what is now Oklahoma. The Cherokee Nation sued the State of Oklahoma and several corporations for leasing gas, oil, and mineral rights to the river beds of the Arkansas River within that land. The Choctaw Nation was allowed to intervene to claim that the riverbeds of Arkansas River within their land grant belonged to them. The district court ruled against the Indian Nations, holding that the land grant did not convey rights to the river beds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a 4-3 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the United States granted the Indian Nations rights to the riverbed of the Arkansas River where it was completely within the boundaries of the granted land and where it formed the border. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, writing that only the continuation of discrimination would justify denying the Indian Nations their claim.
Justice Byron R. White dissented, stating that the United States had a policy against conveying rights to the beds of rivers, and had expressed no intention to go against that policy. Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent. Justice John M. Harlan did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1911, U.S. Senator A. O. Bacon conveyed land to the city of Macon, Georgia through a testamentary trust for the purpose of providing a park for white persons only. The city operated the park in that manner, but after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, people of all races were permitted to use the park. The managers of the park attempted to have the city removed as the trustee because it could no longer legally enforce racial segregation. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of African American citizens who intervened, holding that the public nature of the park required that it be treated as a public institution subject to the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of who owned the park. The trustees of Bacon’s estate then moved for a ruling that the trust was unenforceable, because racial segregation was no longer permitted, so the property should revert to Bacon’s heirs. The trial court granted the motion, holding that racial segregation was an integral part of the trust, so the court could not simply amend the trust. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Lewis F. Black, writing for a 5-2 majority, affirmed the Georgia court. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia court did no more than apply well-settled principles of Georgia law. The court had no alternative but to end the trust under Georgia’s racially neutral trust laws. There was no indication that the Georgia judges had any discriminatory intent. The fact that the park managers and heirs may have had a discriminatory motivation in pursuing the dissolution of the trust did not create an Equal Protection Clause violation.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that Bacon’s will left all remainders and reversions to the city, not his heirs and the purpose of the will was to dedicate the land for municipal use. Amending the trust to allow the park to be used by everyone would carry out that purpose better than allowing the land to revert to Bacon’s heirs who would close the park. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also dissented, arguing that closing a public facility because the public authority that owned it could not keep it segregated violated the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
John Kelly, acting on behalf of New York residents receiving financial assistance either under the federally-assisted program for Families with Dependent Children or under New York State's home relief program, challenged the constitutionality of procedures for notice and termination of such aid. Although originally offering no official notice or opportunity for hearings to those whose aid was scheduled for termination, the State of New York implemented a hearing procedure after commencement of Kelly's litigation.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that states must afford public aid recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing before discontinuing their aid. Noting that welfare benefits are statutory entitlements, rather than "privileges," the Court weighed welfare recipients' need for procedural due process against the competing considerations of the possible harm they might suffer from discontinuation and the government's interest in summary adjudication. The Court concluded that state interests in conserving administrative costs are not sufficient to override public aid recipients' interest in procedural due process. With respect to New York's newly implemented hearings, the Court found them deficient insofar as they did not permit recipients to present evidence, be heard orally in person or through counsel, or cross-examine adverse witnesses.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
W.M. Webb and other commercial fishing companies owned fishing boats that, according to established custom, were manned by independently contracted captains and crew. The company that owned each vessel was responsible for equipping it and hiring a captain, who then hired a crew. At the completion of each shipping expedition, the boat docked at a fish-processing plant, where the captain and crew were paid based on the volume of their catch. There was no guarantee that they would be paid if they did not catch fish. The commercial fishing companies determined at which plants the boats would dock and generally in what areas they would fish. The captain and the crew were responsible for the day-to-day running of the boats and expeditions.
The commercial fishing companies paid employers’ taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and claimed refunds for the taxes due on the earnings of the captains and crews. They then sued for the refunds in district court, which held that the companies were entitled to the refunds. The district court held that the captains and crews were not “employees” for the purposes of the statutes because the amount of control the companies exercised over the boats was not enough to create an employer-employee relationship. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no indication in the language of the statutes that Congress intended to hold maritime activities to a land-based common law standard. Rather, resorting to the common understanding of maritime jurisprudence minimizes the uncertainly in trying to apply common law to maritime practices. Under maritime standards, employees typically have much broader discretion than land-based employees, so the type of control the commercial fishing companies exercised over their boats can still constitute the type of legal relationship the statutes require.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, ordered school districts across the country to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.” However, nearly fifteen years after this order, many school districts, including schools in Holmes County, Mississippi, were either still segregated or saddled with laws making it very difficult for full integration to take place. In the summer of 1969, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi entered an order allowing the schools in Mississippi to continue using “freedom of choice” laws, which allowed parents to choose which school their children attended. The petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on July 23, 1969. That court, in a per curiam decision, reversed the lower court, but required the school districts to create and submit alternate plans by August 27, 1969. The petitioners then appealed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court held that it was the obligation of every school district to immediately terminate any and all segregated school systems and to only operate integrated schools. Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals should not have allowed any more motions for additional time to desegregate because, in the Court’s opinion, the standard of allowing “all deliberate speed” for desegregation was no longer constitutionally permissible.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
John Henry Coleman and Otis Stephens were convicted of assault with intent to murder. The primary evidence against them was the identification by the victim, Casey Reynolds. He identified the pair in a police lineup at the Birmingham City Jail. During this lineup, the police had Coleman and Stephens say certain phrases that Reynolds remembered his attackers saying. Coleman and Stephens also did not have counsel at their preliminary hearing. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, rejecting augments that the lineup was so suggestive that it likely caused a misidentification, and that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage of prosecution where the defendants were entitled to the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied review.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, No. In a 5-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion vacating the convictions. The Supreme Court held that Reynolds' identification of Coleman and Stephens did not stem from a prejudicial police lineup. The Court also held that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage, so the defendants were constitutionally entitled to counsel. The Court remanded the case to determine whether denying counsel created an unfair prejudice against the defendants.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a concurrence, expressing that the right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than on the basis of holding a fair trial. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence, also expressing that the right to counsel is guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurrence, stating that requiring counsel for preliminary hearings might induce courts to eliminate preliminary hearings all together.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a partial dissent, stating that the convictions should not be overturned unless Coleman and Stephens can show that they lost favorable testimony during the preliminary hearing that otherwise would be preserved. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissent, expressing that the Constitution does not guarantee assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a separate dissent, also stating that defendants are not entitled to counsel at a preliminary hearing. Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
New Orleans police officers had a warrant to arrest Donald J. Vale on narcotics charges. While staking out Vale’s home, the officers saw Vale come out of the house and do what they thought was a drug deal. The officers arrested Vale outside his home and told him they were going to search the house. The officers did not have a search warrant. During the search, the officers found narcotics in a back bedroom. This evidence was admitted at Vale’s trial where he was convicted. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The court rejected Vale’s argument that the narcotics evidence was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-2 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the house was not “incident to the arrest” because the arrest took place outside. The State also failed to show evidence of an exceptional situation where a warrantless search would be acceptable. Admitting the narcotics evidence was in error because they were the fruits of an illegal search.
Justice Hugo L. Black dissented, arguing that a search is proper when officers reasonably believe that someone might destroy the narcotics evidence if the search were postponed to obtain a warrant. Chief Justice Warren Burger joined in the dissent. Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On March 27, 1964, Elliot Ashton Welsh II was ordered by the Selective Service to report for physical examination after having been classified I-A and available for military service. Walsh requested and filed application for conscientious objector status. On his form, Welsh specifically indicated that his objection was not rooted in religious belief; he responded "No" where the questionnaire asked if he believed in a supreme being. An appeal board rejected his application. Welsh refused to appear for induction and, on June 1, 1966, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court ruled in United States v. Seeger (1965) that conscientious objector status was not reserved to individuals of a traditional religious background. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that because Welsh denied any religious foundation for his beliefs, whereas Seeger had characterized his pacifist beliefs as "religious," Welsh's conviction was valid.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-3 plurality opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court declared a registrant's characterization of his beliefs as nonreligious to be "a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption." According to Justice Black, the term "religious" is broadly scoped, and denying conscientious objector status because of a refusal to use the term "places undue emphasis on the registrant's interpretation of his own beliefs." The Court therefore reasoned that conscientious objector status applies to "all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
At age twelve, Samuel Winship was arrested and charged as a juvenile delinquent for breaking into a woman's locker and stealing $112 from her pocketbook. The charge also alleged that had Winship's act been done by an adult, it would constitute larceny. Relying on Section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provided that determinations of juvenile's guilt be based on a preponderance of the evidence, a Family Court found Winship guilty, despite acknowledging that the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship's appeal of the court's use of the lower "preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof, was rejected in both the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and in the New York Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court found that when establishing guilt of criminal charges the strict "reasonable-doubt" standard must be applied to both adults and juveniles alike. The Court noted that by establishing guilt based only on a "preponderance of the evidence," as is customary in civil cases, courts were denying criminal defendants a fundamental constitutional safeguard against the possibility that their fate be incorrectly decided due to fact-finding errors. The Court concluded that mere variations in age among criminal defendants will not suffice to warrant the use of different burdens of proof so long as they all face loss of liberty as a possible sentence.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Serafim Karalexis owned and operated a movie theater in Boston that was showing a movie entitled “I am Curious (Yellow).” The film was produced in Sweden and is about a girl’s search for identity and her relationship to the contemporary social and political problems of the time. During the course of the film, she takes a lover, and the film shows their explicit sex scenes, including scenes of oral sex. Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett H. Byrne determined that the film was obscene because it appealed to a “prurient interest in sex,” was offensive to community moral standards, and had no redeeming social value. He charged Karalexis with violating a state statute that prohibits the exhibition of obscene films.
Karalexis sought an injunction in district court in order to prevent this prosecution and future ones under a law that he argued violated the First Amendment protection afforded to such films..The district court held that the law was likely unconstitutional and granted the injunction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a per curiam opinion that represented a 5-justice majority, the Court held that the law did not represent a threat to any constitutional rights that could not be defended in an individual court case.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented. He argued that it was appropriate for Karalexis to seek federal relief from the law after he was already convicted on the obscenity charges, because clearly the trial did not defend his constitutional rights. He also argued that the district court erred by granting an injunction before the film was determined to be obscene. Justice Byron R. White and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.
Justice William O. Douglas did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The United States sued to condemn over 250 acres of W.G. and Mary Reynolds land for use in the Nolin Reservoir Project. The Fifth Amendment authorized this type of taking as long as the government provided “just compensation”. The Reynolds’ claimed that the original project did not contain 78 of the acres the United States tried to claim. A jury awarded the Reynolds’ $20,000 as compensation for all the land taken. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury instructions referred to matters disclosed outside the jury’s presence. Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected the United States’ argument that the “scope of the project” issue was a question for the judge to decide, not the jury.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The judge should decide; general area. In a 6-2 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion vacating the lower judgment and remanding to the district court. The Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71A(h) provides that the jury is limited to deciding amount of just compensation. The trial judge should decide all other issues. The Court also briefly confirmed that the scope of the project includes any land that will likely be used according to early plans. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, stating that there is no reason to prevent the jury from deciding issues of fact, such as the scope of the project, on which its verdict will rely. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1967, the state of Florida passed legislation to allow six-member juries in criminal cases. Johnny Williams was tried and convicted for robbery by such a jury. Williams, lost in a Florida appellate court; he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court held that "the 12-man [jury] requirement cannot be regarded as an indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment." The Court found that the purpose of the jury trial was "to prevent oppression by the Government," and that the performance of this role was not dependent on the particular number of people on the jury. The Court concluded that "the fact that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance 'except to mystics.'"


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In November 1961, the Civil Rights Commission released the fifth volume of its report for the year. One section of it focused on police brutality and made reference to the Supreme Court case Monroe v. Pape. The case was based on allegations that Detective Pape and other officers broke into the Monroe apartment, assaulted the Monroes, and took Mr. Monroe to the police station where he was held for ten hours without being charged or advised of his procedural rights. A week after the report was released, Time Magazine published an article that quoted extensively from the report’s coverage of the allegations without ever explicitly stating that they were allegations rather than findings.
Pape sued Time, Inc. for libel in district court and Time moved for dismissal. The district court granted the motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. In the intervening time, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, which stated that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his or her official conduct unless there is evidence the statements were made with actual malice. This decision became the basis for the district court granting summary judgment for Time, Inc. The Court of Appeals again reversed, and held that a jury must decide whether actual malice was present. After the third trial, the district court granted Time, Inc.’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed for a third time and held that the issue of actual malice was one for the jury to decide.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Time article was reporting on the Commission’s description of the allegations Monroe made against Pape, of which there was no inherent truth value. By not including the word “alleged” or a synonym, Time adopted one of multiple available interpretations, which is not enough to create a jury issue of “malice” under New York Times v. Sullivan. The Court held that the Time article reflected an error in judgment, not a reckless disregard of the truth, and the statements are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that the Supreme Court’s judgment of the specific facts of this case is unwarranted. He argued that, if the Court were to treat each case in this way, it would quickly become ineffective as a judicial body. He also argued that doing so would result in an overreach of the Court’s power that would infringe on the states’ rights to regulate defamation laws.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Willie Griggs filed a class action, on behalf of several fellow African- American employees, against his employer Duke Power Company . Griggs challenged Duke's "inside" transfer policy, requiring employees who want to work in all but the company's lowest paying Labor Department to register a minimum score on two separate aptitude tests in addition to having a high school education. Griggs claimed that Duke's policy discriminated against African-American employees in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. On appeal from a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Court of Appeals found no discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. After noting that Title VII of the Act intended to achieve equality of employment opportunities, the Court held that Duke's standardized testing requirement prevented a disproportionate number of African-American employees from being hired by, and advancing to higher-paying departments within, the company. Neither the high school graduation requirement nor the two aptitude tests was directed or intended to measure an employee's ability to learn or perform a particular job or category of jobs within the company. The Court concluded that the subtle, illegal, purpose of these requirements was to safeguard Duke's long-standing policy of giving job preferences to its white employees.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A group of black Mississippi citizens filed for damages against two white Mississippi citizens pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section 1985 subsection 3 which protects against conspirators interfering with the civil rights of others. R.G. Grady, a citizen of Tennessee, was driving the plaintiffs in the suit along a public highway, when the defendants, acting under the misconception that Grady worked for the organization Civil Rights for Negroes, allegedly pulled their truck into the path of Grady's car, causing him to stop. The defendants were accused of forcing Grady and his passengers to step out of the car and preventing their escape. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant James Calvin Breckenridge proceeded to beat Grady and the plaintiffs in the head with a club, injuring them. The defendants also threatened the plaintiffs verbally and pointed firearms at them. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, basing their decision on a previous case, Collins v. Hardyman. This case limited section 1985 subsection 3 to apply only to conspiracies somehow related to state laws or state officials, to avoid possible conflict with the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court concluded that section 1985 subsection 3 covers conspiracy among private parties, uninvolved in official government business because three indicators pointed to that conclusion: the actual text of the law, the law in relation to the parent law upon which it was based, and the way in which the law had been interpreted in the past. The Court found that the conspirators must intend to deprive someone from a particular demographic group of equal rights to be in violation of section 1985 subsection 3. When these requirements are met, Congress can punish conspirators while acting in compliance with section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment without the limitations of Collins v. Hardyman. Finally, the Court ruled that, in the civil suit, the defendants did conspire to commit the assault with the purpose of infringing on the plaintiffs' legal rights because of their race. And, the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries as a result. Thus, the previous judgment is reversed.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided construction grants to church-sponsored higher educational institutions. The grants were to be used for the construction of non-religious school facilities. The Act also stipulated that twenty years after the grant had been given, schools were free to use the buildings for any purpose.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing that subsidizing the construction of facilities used for non-secular purposes would have the effect of advancing religion. The Court held that the church-related institutions in question had not used their federally-funded facilities for religious activities, and that the facilities were "indistinguishable from a typical state university facility." The Court also held that the Act did not excessively entangle the government with religion, noting that college students were less susceptible to religious indoctrination, that the aid was of "nonideological character," and that one-time grants did not require constant state surveillance.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Harris was arrested for making two sales of heroin to an undercover police officer. Before receiving the Miranda warnings, Harris said that he had made both sales at the request of the officer. This statement was not admitted into evidence at the trial. However, Harris later testified in Court that he did not make the first sale and in the second sale he merely sold the officer baking powder. Harris' initial statement was then used by the prosecution in an attempt to impeach his credibility.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Miranda decision did not mandate that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case must be barred for all purposes from the trial. The Court reasoned that the shield provided by Miranda could not be "perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances." The Court found that the speculative possibility that police misconduct could be encouraged was outweighed by the value of admitting the statement into the impeachment process.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district courts' equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness, and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate "starting points" for solutions; 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts; 3) non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim corrective measures, were within the courts' remedial powers; and 4) no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to particular schools.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with "FUCK THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR" The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged under a California statute that prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct." Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an opinion by Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides, there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. Harlan recognized that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." In doing so, the Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas).


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A judge issued a warrant to search Roosevelt Harris’ residence based on a federal tax investigator's affidavit. The affidavit stated that Harris had a reputation with the investigator for being a trafficker in illegal liquor, and a local constable located illegal whiskey on Harris’ property. The constable had purchased whiskey from Harris in the past and feared for his life if his name were revealed. When police searched Harris’ residence, they discovered illegal non-tax paid liquor. At trial, the district court admitted the evidence obtained during the search, and Harris was convicted of possession of non-tax paid liquor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the investigators affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search. This made the search illegal and any evidence obtained during the search inadmissible at trial.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a 5-4 majority, delivered the opinion of the court. The Supreme Court held that the affidavit provided enough probable cause to issue a search warrant. In Part I, Chief Justice Burger expressed that the affidavit provided a factual basis for the search because of the investigator's personal knowledge of Harris. In Part II, Chief Justice Burger wrote that the investigator's knowledge of Harris’ reputation provided reliability for the constable’s information. In Part III expressed that the constable’s statements could be trusted because they were against his penal interest. Justices Hugo L. Black and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the entirety of the majority opinion and concurred, writing that they would overrule the cases the Sixth Circuit relied on. Justice Potter Stewart joined in Part I, and concurred in the judgment. Justice Byron R White joined in Part III, and concurred in the judgment.
Justice John M. Harlan dissented, writing that the investigator’s affidavit did not provide probable cause to issue a search warrant. Justices William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1965, six agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics forced their way into Webster Bivens’ home without a warrant and searched the premises. The agents handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and children and arrested him on narcotics charges. Later, the agents interrogated Bivens and subjected him to a visual strip search. Bivens sued the agents for $15,000 in damages each for humiliation and mental suffering. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, No answer. Justice William J. Brennan Jr., writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the Second Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that Bivens does have a cause of action for damages arising from the federal agents Fourth Amendment violations. Bivens must provide proof of his injuries in order to recover. The Court did not reach the privilege question because the Court of Appeals did not consider the question. Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the judgment, writing that federal courts have the power to award damages for constitutional violations.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that the doctrine of separation of powers is better served by leaving the question to Congress. He also argued that the doctrine of suppressing evidence obtained in illegal searches is insufficient to deter law enforcement. Justice Hugo L. Black also dissented, arguing that Congress could create the cause of action Bivens stated, but has not, so the majority’s decision is an unconstitutional extension of judicial power. Justice Harry A. Blackmun dissented, supporting the idea that the question in this case is better left to Congress.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
These cases involve juveniles brought to trial without a jury. The first involves Joseph McKeiver and Edward Terry, fifteen and sixteen year old boys charged with acts of robbery, theft, assault, and escape. At trial before the Juvenile Court of Philadelphia, each was denied a request for a jury trial. A Superior Court affirmed the order, and, after consolidation of their cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did likewise, saying there was no constitutional right to a jury trial for juveniles. In re Burrus concerns the consolidated cases of more than forty juveniles ranging in age from eleven to fifteen. Most of the juveniles faced misdemeanor charges stemming from protests of school consolidations that took place in November and December, 1968 during which, on six different occasions, they blocked traffic and refused to clear the roadway. Additionally, one sixteen-year-old juvenile faced charges of disorderly conduct for an incident that occurred at the local school. In each case, the judge denied a request for a jury trial. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of North Carolina both affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no constitutional requirement for a jury trial for juvenile defendants.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 plurality opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court concluded that the previous application of other criminal rights to juveniles, like rights to counsel and cross-examination, was done out of an emphasis on factfinding. "But one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding." Additionally, the Court noted that, because juvenile prosecution is not considered either civil or criminal, the whole of the Sixth Amendment does not necessarily apply. As such, there is no requirement for a jury trial in juvenile cases.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In the wake of a "particularly brutal" murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, the New Hampshire Attorney General took charge of police activities relating to the murder. When the police applied for a warrant to search suspect Edward Coolidge's automobile, the Attorney General, acting as a justice of the peace, authorized it. Additionally, local police had taken items from Coolidge's home during the course of an interview with the suspect's wife. Coolidge was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a decision in which a number of justices chose to concur in part and dissent in part, the Court held that the searches and seizures of Coolidge's property were unconstitutional. Justice Stewart's opinion held that the warrant authorizing the seizure of Coolidge's automobile was invalid because it was not issued by a "neutral and detatched magistrate." Stewart also rejected New Hampshire's arguments in favor of making an exception to the warrant requirement. Stewart held that neither the "incident to arrest" doctrine nor the "plain view" doctrine justified the search, and that an "automobile exception" was inapplicable.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1970, Congress passed Voting Right Act Amendments that lowered the voting age in state and federal elections from 21 to 18, forbade the use of literacy tests at the polls, and forbade states from disqualifying voters in presidential and vice presidential elections based on state residency requirements. The states of Oregon, Arizona, Idaho, and Texas sued, and argued that these Amendments infringe on rights the Constitution reserves for the states.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes in part and no in part. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress had the power to enact the amendments that changed the voting age for federal elections, abolish literary tests at the polling station, and abolish state residency requirements for presidential and vice presidential election. However, the Court held that lowering the voting age for state and local election was beyond Congressional purview.
The Court held that the Framers intended for Article I Section 4 of the Constitution and the Necessary and Proper Clause to grant the States the power to make the laws that govern elections and for Congress to have the power to alter the laws if necessary. The Court also held that the legislative history surrounding the enactment and enforcement of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments support the role that Congress plays in preventing racial discrimination in the electorate without denying the states their rights. Without evidence that the states use the 21-year-old voting requirement to discriminate based on race in state and local elections, Congress does not have the right to intervene. The Court held that the literacy test bans were constitutional under the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Justice William O. Douglas concurred in part and dissented in part. He disagreed with the majority’s ruling in regards to reducing the voting age in state and local elections. He argued that, because voting is a “fundamental right,” which Congress ensures under the Equal Protection Clause, Congress could legislate voting age at the state level as well as the federal.
Justice John M. Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress could prohibit literacy tests but disagreed on the issue of Congress’ ability to impose regulations on voting age and state residency requirements. He argued that the legislative history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment supported the preeminence of the right of the states to legislate voting. Since the Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress the right to legislate voting requirements, the right is reserved to the states. Without evidence that people between 18 and 21 and people who do not meet state residency requirements are being unconstitutionally discriminated against, Congress cannot intervene.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Byron R. White, and Justice Thurgood Marshall authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. They disagreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress cannot legislate voting age in state and local elections. They argued that, while the states have the right to determine qualifications for voting, Congress has the right to legislate the exercise of this power under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since 18-year-olds are treated as full adults under other aspects of the law, there is evidence that 18- to 21-year-olds are being denied voting rights to which they are entitled, and Congress has every right to intervene.
Justice Potter Stewart also wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He disagreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress could legislate voting laws in federal elections. He wrote that the Framers clearly intended the right to legislate voting to be reserved for the states and that the Constitution does not allow Congress to supersede that right without a compelling interest. He argued that the age qualification did not represent a compelling interest to allow Congress to enact legislation on the issue.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1959, Veron Atchley was convicted of murdering his wife by shooting her six times. The star witness at trial was Atchley’s insurance agent. The agent met with Atchley after his arrest to talk about the life insurance policy on his wife. During this conversation Atchley admitted to lying in wait for his wife with a gun, but said that the shooting was an accident. After notifying police, the insurance agent returned with a hidden recording device. Atchley made the same admission. Over Atchley’s objection the tape was admitted at trial. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction.
Atchley then sought habeus corpus relief in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that the tape was an unconstitutional involuntary confession. The district court agreed, ordering a new hearing on the issue of voluntariness. The district court held that the trial could not have reliably determined whether the confession was voluntary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Justice Potter Stewart, writing for eight members of the court, delivered the majority opinion. The Supreme Court held that an applicant for habeus corpus is not entitled to a new hearing on voluntariness unless he can show that his version of events, if true, would require the conclusion that the confession was involuntary. In this case, Atchley did not do that. He merely pointed to shortcomings in the trial court procedures. The trial court had given full consideration to the issue of voluntariness and applied the correct constitutional standard.
Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment and substantially all of the opinion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Plaintiffs, a group of parents of children in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District, sued the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (Board) in state court and argued that the state court should issue an injunction to prevent the Board from implementing a plan to assign children to public schools based on race. The plaintiffs claimed that this plan violated the children’s constitutional rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education as well as a North Carolina state statute that prohibited districts from assigning children to schools based on race. The state court issued the injunction, and the defendants moved the case to federal court by arguing that, because the issues in the case dealt with the U.S. Constitution, the federal court had jurisdiction. The district court heard arguments in this case with a similar one, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, and subsequently struck down the state court injunction by holding that the state statute was unconstitutional.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a per curiam opinion, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because, at oral arguments, both litigants argued that the state statute forbidding the assignment of children to schools based on race was constitutional. Because the parties agreed, there was no actual case or controversy and therefore the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The requirements to be eligible for admission to the Bar in New York included that the applicant must be a citizen of the United States, have lived in the state of New York for six months, and passed a written examination. In addition, the Bar required the creation of Committees on Character and Fitness to determine whether an applicant “possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.” The Committees required two affidavits in support of the applicant and a questionnaire filled out by the applicant. The petitioners were organizations and individuals representing a class of law students and recent law school graduates who sued two of the Committees by claiming that the vague and overbroad questions violated the applicants’ First Amendment rights. The questions related to the applicants’ political beliefs, membership in political association, and loyalty to the United States Constitution. A three-judge panel of the district court granted partial relief with respect to specific questions but sustained the validity of the New York system as a whole.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the character and fitness requirement has long been understood to refer to conduct which would be dishonorable in a legal setting and therefore is not overbroad. The Court also held that there was no burden of proof placed on the applicant, and there was no evidence of any intent to penalize political beliefs.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that a state had every right to refuse entrance to the bar to any applicant who professed a desire to overthrow the government or belonged to a group with those goals. While the First Amendment protects the applicants from being refused admission based on unpopular beliefs, it does not prevent them from being questioned about relevant issues.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that, when depriving an applicant of her right to practice law, a State must be held to a higher standard than when the state wishes to deprive someone of property. Because a state would never ask the same questions of a potential homeowner, the questions are not appropriate in a legal professional context either. Justice Black argued that, even if an applicant were to profess allegiance to a group that wishes to overthrow the government, those beliefs are protected by the First Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.
In his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the techniques the New York Committees use are intended to weed out political undesirables. He also argued that past practice illustrates that the understanding of the phrase is not narrow enough to prevent First Amendment violations.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Following a desegregation case that began in 1965, on February 5, 1970, the district court ordered the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system to implement a court-approved desegregation plan. Prior to this order, a suit had been filed in state court that sought an order enjoining the use of public funds for the transportation of students for desegregation purposes. In the midst of the extensive litigation, the North Carolina legislature enacted an anti-busing bill. Swann and other plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the statute, and a three-judge panel was convened to consider the issue. The three-judge panel declared the statute unconstitutional.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that, while state officials have a great deal of discretion in formulating school policy, that discretion does not override federal constitutional guarantees. The anti-busing statute flies in the face of the Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of Education and the requirement to provide desegregated education. The Court also held that the anti-busing statute would actively prevent government authorities from remedying the constitutional violations that stem from segregation.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
August Ledesma and several others were arrested and charged with violating both a Louisiana statute and a parish ordinance prohibiting display of obscene material for sale. The arresting officers seized the material in question. While the state court proceedings were underway, Perez, and the others arrested, sued in federal district court for a declaration that the statute and the ordinance were unconstitutional. A three-judge court convened and upheld the Louisiana statute, but found the arrests and seizure of materials invalid. The court prohibited use of the seized materials in the state criminal proceedings. The court noted that it had no jurisdiction to consider the ordinance, but expressed that it was probably invalid. A single federal judge later ruled the ordinance invalid. Local law enforcement officers directly appealed the district court decisions to the U.S. Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed in part and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s ruling on the validity of the arrests and seizure constituted improper federal interference with state criminal proceedings. The Court reversed that judgment. The Court also held that it had no jurisdiction to review the order declaring the ordinance invalid on direct appeal. Justice Potter Stewart concurred, citing several cases in support of his decision. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented in part, agreeing that the court had no jurisdiction to review the ordinance, but disagreeing on the district court’s arrest and seizure ruling. Justice William J. Brennan also dissented in part, agreeing with the majority on reversing the three-judge court, but disagreeing about the Supreme Court’s ability to review the decision on the ordinance. Justice Byron R. White and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in this dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The state of Arizona restricts the distribution of welfare benefits to individuals who are either United States citizens or aliens who have lived in the country for at least 15 years. In 1969, Carmen Richardson, a resident alien of Arizona who met all requirements for welfare eligibility except the residency requirement, filed a class action lawsuit against the Commissioner of the State's Department of Public Welfare questioning the constitutionality of that requirement. The three-judge court in the District of Arizona found in favor of Richardson, but the Commissioner appealed. In the same year, a similar class action suit was filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In this case, resident aliens of Pennsylvania challenged state law which dictated that if a Pennsylvania resident did not qualify for federal aid then he or she could only receive welfare benefits from the state if he or she were a citizen or had applied for citizenship. This three-judge court also found in favor of the resident aliens. However, one judge disagreed, and the defendants, namely the Executive Director of the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance and the Secretary of the Commonwealth's Department of Public Welfare, appealed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court asserted that to classify state residents solely based on alienage was inherently questionable, because aliens constitute a minority, separate from the rest of the population. The Court conceded that there had been instances in which state laws could treat citizens and non-citizens differently. However, it maintained that a state's aim to conserve welfare benefits for citizens would not legitimize the denial of welfare benefits to aliens. Their justification was that the aliens pay taxes and, consequently, contribute to the pool of money from which welfare benefits are drawn. As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the welfare benefit restrictions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use the words “allegedly” or “reportedly” in during one broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and other similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and “smut distributors”. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges.
Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district court held that the First Amendment standard, which allowed recovery of damages only for knowingly and recklessly false statements, did not apply because Rosenbloom was not a public official or figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award damages where Metromedia did not use reasonable care to discern the truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom general and punitive damages, although the district court reduced the punitive damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, No. In a 5-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the judgment of the court affirming the Third Circuit decision. The Supreme Court held that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied because the story was a matter of public concern. It did not matter that Rosenbloom was a private citizen. The Court also held that the evidence in the case did not support the damages award under the proper constitutional standard.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a special concurrence, stating that the First Amendment protected the news media from libel judgments even where the broadcaster knows their statements were false. Justice Byron R. White also wrote a special concurrence, asserting that the press have the privilege to comment on official actions of public servants, such as the police, in full detail.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, expressing that states should be free to impose a duty of reasonable care in defamation actions involving private citizens. He would remand the case for further consideration of whether Rosenbloom sustained actual harm and whether Metromedia acted with actual malice. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote a dissent, stating that the court should limit damages in libel actions by private citizens to actual losses. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Barbara James and her son Maurice lived in the Bronx, New York City. Shortly after Maurice's birth, Barbara James applied for assistance under New York State's Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). James began receiving assistance after a caseworker visited her apartment. Two years later, James was scheduled to be visited again by a caseworker. This visit was required under New York State law and would affect her benefits under AFDC. She refused to allow this visit. In a procedural hearing, she continued her refusal, and her AFDC assistance was terminated by New York State as a result. James then filed suit under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the caseworker visit was a search and would violate her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court ruled in her favor. New York appealed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court held that a caseworker visit was not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Harry A. Blackmun reasoned that "the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled," and as a result, "there is no entry of the home and there is no search." Even if the caseworker visit "does possess some of the characteristics of a search in the traditional sense," the visit still would not violate the Fourth Amendment, under the unreasonableness standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio. The Court concluded that the caseworker visit was not unreasonable, as the visit allowed the state to focus on the child and to ensure that its welfare funds were being used properly. Moreover, the visit was not confrontational and James' refusal did not lead to criminal prosecution. Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Louisiana State Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure allowed less-than-unanimous juries to convict defendants in criminal cases in which hard labor is considered as punishment. Nine of twelve jury members were needed to return a guilty verdict. Johnson was convicted of armed robbery by a jury split nine to three.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court held that less-than-unanimous convictions did not violate the reasonable doubt standard embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Justice White argued that a minority opposing conviction does not prevent the other jurors from reaching their decisions beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the presence of dissenting jurors does not indicate that the state failed to uphold this standard. Finally, allowing less-than-unanimous decisions in certain cases serves a rational state purpose, not offensive to the Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Apodaca and two other defendants were convicted of assault, burglary, and grand larceny before three separate juries, all of which returned verdicts which were less than unanimous. Two of the cases were 11-1 and the other was 10-2 in favor of conviction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a close decision the Court found that the accused's right to a jury trial does not require that juries return unanimous decisions in order to convict. After reviewing the history and function of juries in American society, the Court held that the most important function of the jury is to provide "commonsense judgment" in evaluating the respective arguments of accused and accuser. Requiring unanimity would not necessarily contribute to this function. A distinction was drawn, however, between capital and non-capital crimes.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1966 Martin Marietta Corp. (Martin) informed Ida Phillips that it was not accepting job applications from women with preschool-age children; however, at this time, Martin employed men with preschool-age children. Phillips sued and alleged she had been denied employment because of her sex in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment by holding that, because seventy-five to eighty percent of the applicants hired for the position for which Phillips applied were women, there was insufficient evidence that there was bias against women. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.