[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, Yes, No, Yes, Yes, and Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the state of Florida could only restrict protesters to the extent necessary to allow the clinic to run and the staff to live in their homes without interference. Thus, the majority approved of the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic because it was essential to allow patients and staff to enter and leave the building freely, but disapproved of the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the building because it found no indication that protesting in these areas interfered with the function of the clinic. The Court also determined that the limitations placed on noise-making were necessary to insure the well-being of the patients, whereas those placed on images were not because they were easier to ignore. Finally, the Court concluded that both 300-foot radius rules were too broad, thus restricting the protestors more than was necessary. Therefore, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
California used a "worldwide combined reporting" method to determine tax liability for multinational corporations operating inside the state. Under this method, the multinational's income was taxed in proportion to the average percentage of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located inside the state. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal) was wholly owned by a multinational corporation, Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI). Barcal did not include financial data for BBI in its 1977 tax filings. The California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) determined that Barcal misrepresented the proportion of income subject to taxation, causing a tax deficiency of over one hundred thousand dollars. Barcal and BBI paid, but then sued for the amount paid, complaining that the cost to provide BBI's worldwide financial data was disproportionately large considering that Barcal operated largely independently of BBI and BBI operated largely outside of California. Barcal and BBI contended that this violated the Commerce Clause-derived anti-discrimination requirement, which prevents States from imposing disproportionately large tax compliance burdens upon corporations. The Tax Board allowed BBI to make a "reasonable approximation" of financial data to minimize costs, but BBI claimed that this action violated Due Process by admitting financial data that was possibly inaccurate.
The California Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and remanded the case to a California Court of Appeals, which also did not find the burden disproportionate. Barcal and BBI also contended that the "worldwide combined reporting" method risked double taxation by the state and the federal government. Additionally, The "worldwide combined reporting" method deviated from taxing methods employed by other states, thus transgressing the federal government's interest in providing uniform standards for taxing foreign commerce. (The case was consolidated with Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board Of California.)


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Justice Ruth Ginsburg wrote the opinion for a 7-2 Court. (1) The Court dismissed the alleged Due Process violation because a corporation could take action against the Tax Board if it felt the approximated amount was inaccurate. (2) Reasoning that the use of "reasonable approximations" minimized a multinational's compliance burden, the Court also dismissed the alleged Commerce Clause violation. The Court recognized that the "worldwide combined reporting" method carried a risk of double taxation by both the state and the federal government, but reasoned that this did not violate the Commerce Clause because every other method employed by the state to tax foreign commerce carried the same risk. Also, the Court found no "specific indications of congressional intent" to enforce uniformity in taxation of foreign commerce by preempting the California tax laws.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Margaret Gilleo placed a 24-by-36-inch sign calling for peace in the Persian Gulf on her front lawn. The original sign disappeared and a subsequent sign was knocked down. She reported these incidents to the police who advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue. She sued the city and the District Court ordered a preliminary injunction. Ladue repealed the law and replaced it with a new one which also banned window signs. Gilleo then placed another anti-war sign in her second-story window and amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Although acknowledging Ladue's police power to minimize visual clutter associated with signs, the Court ruled that the law "almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important." The Court held a "special respect" for an individual's right to convey messages from her home.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Robert Miller, a Mississippi resident who had moved north to find work, was injured while working as a seaman for American Dredging Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Miller returned home to Mississippi, and filed a suit against the company in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. The suit was filed under the Jones Act, a federal law that allows a seaman to sue his employer in either federal or state court when he suffers personal injury.
American Dredging moved to dismiss the case under the doctrine of "forum non conveniens," which allows a court to dismiss a case if it is filed in a place that is unnecessarily and significantly inconvenient to the defendant. The trial court agreed, holding that a Louisiana law making the doctrine of "forum non conveniens" inapplicable in Jones Act cases was superseded by federal maritime law (law that deals with oceanic commerce). An appeals court affirmed the decision, but the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned it, holding that the Louisiana law was not superseded by federal maritime law.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court decided that "forum non conveniens" claims were only procedural, not substantive, and that national uniformity was therefore not required by the Constitution. Writing for the seven-member majority, Justice Antonin Scalia stated "venue is a matter that goes to process rather than substantive rights -- determining which among various competent courts will decide the case. Uniformity of process (beyond the rudimentary elements of procedural fairness) is assuredly not what the law of admiralty seeks to achieve, since it is supposed to apply in all the courts of the world." Further, Scalia wrote that the amount of discretion left to the trial court by the forum non conveniens doctrine necessarily meant that, even if it was embraced by every state, it would still not result in uniformity.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Alabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B.(the putative father). A jury found for T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection bars the exclusion of potential jurors on the basis of their sex, just as it bars exclusion on the basis of race. "[G]ender-based classifications," wrote Justice Harry Blackmun for the majority, "require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." As a consequence, "[P]arties still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Endangered Species Act requires that no person "take" an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines take as "harass, harm, pursue," "wound," or "kill." The Secretary of the Interior further characterizes "harm" as including "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." Several persons within forestry industries sued the Secretary, asserting that Congress did not intend for the regulation to include changes in habitat. The District Court found for the Secretary of the Interior.
The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of words is determined by the words around it. Thus, "harm" could only include actions applying direct force to the animal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that habitat modification is a legitimate application of the word "harm." First, the Court found that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in assuming that the words in the definition of "take" only apply to actions involving direct contact with endangered animals. Then, based on the Act itself, the Court determined that the ordinary meaning of harm would in fact include changes in habitat that hurt the endangered animals. Also, the Court held that the intent of the Act to give broad protection to endangered species must include even actions that may have minimal or unforeseeable effects.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for an approval of proposed labels. The approval was rejected because it violated the Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s (FAAA) prohibition of disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or advertisements. Coors filed a claim arguing the regulation violated the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. The government argued the regulation was necessary to prevent “strength wars” among brewers, which in this case, refers to breweries competing on the basis of the potency of their alcohol.
The district court found in favor of Coors, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court subsequently upheld the ban of alcohol content in advertising, but not on labels. The government appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court by concluding that the label ban did not prevent strength wars.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that for the government to regulate commercial speech, the government must have a substantial interest that the regulation directly affects. In this case, the interest the government intended to protect by banning the display of alcohol content on beer labels was to limit the “strength wars” of competing beer companies, which could lead to greater alcoholism. However, the Court concluded that this interest was not substantial enough, since there was no reason to believe that banning the alcoholic content on beer labels would prevent such social harms. The regulation also does not directly advance the suppression of strength wars, especially since other provisions of the FAAA directly counteract its effects. Finally, the Court held the regulation was more extensive than necessary, since there were available and effective alternatives that would not violate the First Amendment.
Justice John Paul Stevens delivered a concurring opinion emphasizing the regulation is unconstitutionality of the regulation because it did not increase consumer awareness, but instead blinded the public to the truth of the alcohol content.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
James Ryder, an enlisted member of the Coast Guard, was convicted of drug offenses by a court-martial. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review affirmed. On rehearing, the court rejected Ryder's claim that its composition violated the Appointments Clause because two of the judges on the three-judge panel were civilians appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. The Court of Military Appeals agreed with Ryder that the appointments violated the Clause under its previous decision in United States v. Carpenter that appellate military judges are inferior officers who must be appointed by a President, a court of law, or a head of a department. The court nonetheless affirmed Ryder's conviction on the ground that the actions of the two civilian judges were valid de facto.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the judges' actions were not valid de facto. The Court reasoned that a defendant who made a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case was entitled to a decision on the merits of the question and whatever relief may be appropriate if a violation had occurred. The Court also noted that review by the properly constituted Court of Military Appeals did not necessarily give Ryder all the possibility for relief that review by a properly constituted Coast Guard Court of Military Review would have given him.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1987, several Spendthrift Farm shareholders, including Ed Plaut, brought suit against the corporation claiming stock sales in 1983 and 1984 had violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf v Gilbertson (1991) set a universal time limit of three years after an alleged violation for suits stemming from the relevant portion the Securities and Exchange Act. Based on this ruling, a district court judge dismissed the shareholders' case on August 13, 1991. On December 19, 1991, Congress enacted the FDIC Improvement Act, which required courts to reinstate cases dismissed under the Supreme Court's limitation in Lampf. The shareholders filed a motion to reinstate. A district court judge agreed the act required the case be reinstated, but denied the request on the ground that Congress had violated separation of powers in requiring the courts to reopen settled matters. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion on the same ground.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court concluded that Congress had usurped power assigned to the judiciary by Article III and thus had violated the separation of powers principle. Justice Scalia notes that Article III assigns to the courts the "judicial power of the United States" and the power to "say what the law is." According to the Court, this clearly includes "the power to render final judgments," and by enacting what Justice Scalia describes as "retroactive legislation, that is, legislation that prescribes what the law was at an earlier time," Congress intruded upon the power of the courts to issue "the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy." Thus, Congress had violated separation of powers.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA on the ground that there had been a change in conditions such that Rambo was no longer disabled. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA authorizes modification only where there has been a change in an employee's physical condition.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that a disability award may be modified under the LHWCA where there is a change in the employee's wage-earning capacity, even without any change in the employee's physical condition. The Court reasoned that, because an interpretation of the term "change in conditions" to include not only changes in physical condition but also changes in other conditions relevant to the initial entitlement to benefits, such as a change in wage-earning capacity is consistent with the purpose of the LHWCA. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that the term refers to the physical condition of the person receiving compensation and should not be departed from absent any indication from Congress.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Asgrow Seed Company (Asgrow) held two Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) certificates protecting different varieties of soybean seed. These PVPA certificates act like patents in order to promote research on new varieties of plants and to protect the owners of seed varieties from unauthorized sales. However, there is an exemption for farmers who sell seed to other farmers whose primary occupation is growing crops for sale. In 1990, Winterboer planted and harvested 265 acres of land with two Asgrow soybean varieties. He then sold enough to plant 10,000 acres to other farmers for use as seed. Asgrow claimed that the PVPA prohibits anyone from selling for seed more than would be needed to replant his own fields - an amount greatly exceeded by Winterboer's sales. Winterboer argued that the exemptions in the statute protect sales of unlimited amounts of seed as long as both seller and buyer grow crops primarily for "other than reproductive purposes." The District Court ruled in favor of Asgrow, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and denied Asgrow's petition for rehearing.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a farmer may sell for reproductive purposes only such seed as he has saved for the purpose of replanting his own fields. While the statute allows farmers to save seed to replant and then sell that saved seed to other farmers for planting, the statute prohibits growing protected seed as a "step in marketing" it as seed for planting. The Court held that because Winterboer's planting and harvesting were conducted solely to market (that is, to sell) Asgrow's protected seed varieties, he forfeited eligibility for the PVPA exemption and infringed on Asgrow's protective certificates.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After the October 1987 stock market crash, First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, demanded that Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI) immediately pay the entire MKI debt. When First Options' demands for payment went unsatisfied, it sought arbitration by a panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange based on workout agreements, which governed the working out of debts owned by Kaplan, his wife, and MKI. MKI, which had signed the only workout document containing an arbitration agreement, submitted to arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not signed that document, filed objections with the panel. The Kaplans argued that their disagreement with First Options not was arbitrable. After deciding that they had the power to rule on the dispute's merits, the arbitrators ruled in First Options' favor. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the award, finding that the dispute was not arbitrable. The appellate court concluded that courts should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute, and that it would apply ordinary standards of review when considering the District Court's denial of a motion to vacate the arbitration award.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts and that, rather than a special abuse of discretion standard, courts of appeals should apply ordinary standards when reviewing district court decisions upholding arbitration awards. "We conclude that, because the Kaplans did not clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Between 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was called a "geographic monstrosity" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, "the social, political, and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In some instances, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on race. Applying the rule laid down in Shaw v. Reno requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the "overriding, predominant force" in the redistricting process.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 prohibited the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual materials containing children engaged in sexually explicit acts. Richard Gottesman, owner and manager of X-Citement Video, sold forty-nine tapes to undercover officers. Gottesman shipped the videos, containing pornographic acts by industry legend Traci Lords before she turned eighteen, to Hawaii. Although he claimed he did not know the tapes contained underage pornographic acts, Gottesman was arrested for violating the sexual exploitation act.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court relied on an awkward grammatical construction as it held that the term "knowingly" applied to the entire passage of the law. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated that other interpretations failed to make sense since Congress obviously did not envision people accidentally mailing underage pornographic materials. All the law required was a showing that alleged violators intentionally distributed illegal pornography, regardless of whether they knew it depicted underage performances.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program, AAdvantage, challenged American's retroactive changes in program terms and conditions. Specially, the participants alleged that American's imposition of capacity controls and blackout dates to mileage credits they had previously accumulated violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted a breach of contract. American responded that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) preempted the claim. The ADA prohibits States from "enacting or enforcing any law...relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services." The Illinois Supreme Court ruled to allow the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, American petitioned for certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the ADA bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers, thus claims brought under a state's consumer fraud act are preempted; but that the ADA allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves, which permits breach of contract claims to proceed. "A remedy confined to a contract's terms simply holds parties to their agreements -- in this instance, to business judgments an airline made public about its rates and services," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justice Thomas Clarence. Justice Antonin Scalia took no part in the decision of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. In other words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. However, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, prohibits members of Congress, federal officers, and other government employees from accepting an honorarium for making an appearance, speech, or writing an article. The prohibition applies even when neither the subject of the speech or article nor the person or group paying for it has any connection with the employee's official duties. The National Treasury Employees Union filed suit challenging the honorarium ban as an unconstitutional abridgement of its freedom of speech. A District Court held the ban unconstitutional and enjoined the government from enforcing it against Executive Branch employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6 to 3 decision delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court declared that a flat ban violated free-speech rights. Concerns about impropriety do not apply if there is no link between a government employee's job and "the subject matter of the expression or the character of the payor."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1986 and 1987, the FBI investigated Michael Rudy Tham and Abe Chapman as part of a nationwide investigation into healthcare provider fraud. The judge on the case authorized a wiretap of Tham and Chapman’s phones. He kept these wiretaps secret. Chapman was distantly related to U.S. District Court Judge Robert P. Aguilar. When Chapman asked Aguilar for help in the case, Aguilar talked to the judge on the case and learned about the wiretap. Though the wiretap order had expired, Aguilar told Chapman about it. When FBI agents questioned Aguilar on the matter, he lied about his knowledge and participation in the case. Aguilar was tried and convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for disclosing a wiretap and endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that disclosing an expired wiretap does not violate the law, and Aguilar did not obstruct justice because the grand jury investigating the case did not order the FBI investigation.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, Yes. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court, affirming in part and reversing in part. The Supreme Court held that making false statements to an FBI agent who may or may not testify at trial is not sufficient to support a conviction for obstruction of justice. Aguilar’s conviction for disclosing a wiretap was proper, however, because the statute does not require that the wiretap is currently in force. The First Amendment did not require excluding expired wiretaps from the statute either.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that Aguilar’s conviction for obstructing justice should be overturned, but arguing that the wiretapping conviction should be overturned as well. There was no way Aguilar could interfere with a wiretap that no longer existed.
Justice Antonin Scalia also concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing to affirm the disclosure of wiretapping conviction, but arguing that the obstruction of justice should be affirmed as well.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by University guidelines.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furthermore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. A unanimous court held that the State Court's ruling to require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group expressing a message that the organizers do not wish to convey violates the First Amendment by making private speech subordinate to the public accommodation requirement. Such an action "violate[s] the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1992, Sharlene Wilson sold illicit narcotics to undercover agents of the Arkansas state police. Police officers then applied for and obtained warrants to search Ms. Wilson's home and to arrest her. When the police arrived, they found the main door to Ms. Wilson's house open. The officers opened the unlocked screen door and walked in, identified themselves as police officers, and said that they had a warrant. Ms. Wilson's attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming it was invalid on the grounds that the officers had failed to "knock and announce" before entering.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. A unanimous Court held that the common-law "knock-and announce" principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. "Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement, and the wealth of founding-era commentaries, constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases espousing or supporting the knock-and-announce principle,...the Amendment's Framers thought that whether officers announced their presence and authority before entering a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing a search's reasonableness." Countervailing law enforcement interests, such as officer safety, may, however, establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The city of Chicago hired the Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company (Great Lakes) to perform work that would prevent ships from bumping into piers. To that end, Great Lakes used a crane to drive piles into the riverbed, which potentially weakened the structure of the freight tunnel that ran below the river. On April 13, 1992, water from the Chicago River poured into a freight tunnel, which subsequently flooded into the basements of several buildings. After the flood, many victims sued Great Lakes in state court and argued that the flood was the result of the weakening of the tunnel. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock removed the case to federal district court and argued federal admiralty court had jurisdiction of marine cases. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice David Souter delivered the opinion of the 7-0 majority. The Court held the federal district court has admiralty jurisdiction to determine and limit the extent of the Great Lakes’ tort of liability. Admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate when a party can prove either that the tort occurred on navigable water or that the injury on land was caused by actions on navigable water. In this case, this condition is satisfied since the alleged tort was committed on navigable water, and it is not necessary to prove that the subsequent damage was close in time and space. Great Lakes proved the connection with maritime activity by showing how the damage caused by a vessel on navigable water to an underwater structure is potentially disruptive to maritime commerce.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1987, Steven Gwin, a homeowner in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime "Termite Protection Plan" from a local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Company. The termite prevention contract specified that any controversy would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After the Gwins sold their house and transferred their plan to the Dobsons, the Dobsons initiated suit against the Gwins, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix following a termite infestation. Allied- Bruce and Terminix asked for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act. In affirming, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. The court also found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply because the parties entering the contract contemplated transactions that were primarily local and not substantially interstate.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act applied to all disputes involving commerce, and thus the arbitration clause was valid and enforceable. The Court reasoned that the word "involving" in section 2 of the Act signaled an intent to exercise Congress' commerce clause power to the full and that section 2 is to be read requiring only that the "transaction" in fact "involve" interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas filed dissenting opinions.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic activity.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In January 1991, Phoenix police officer Bryan Sargent observed Isaac Evans driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Sargent directed Evans to pull over and asked to see his license. Evans informed Sargent that his license was suspended, and upon running the license, Sargent found that there was also an outstanding warrant for Evans’ arrest. During the arrest, Evans dropped a hand-rolled cigarette that smelled of marijuana, so officers searched his car and discovered a bag of marijuana. When Evans was charged with possession of marijuana, the police were informed that his arrest warrant had been quashed and only remained on the record due to a clerical error. Evans moved to exclude the marijuana evidence because it was discovered during the course of an illegal arrest. The trial court granted the motion.
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that the exclusionary rule was not intended to deter government employees who were not directly associated with the arrest. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and held there was no meaningful distinction between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and those committed by court employees.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review cases from state courts that deal primarily with federal law. The Court also held that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect against intrusions into a home or onto private property, or the conduct of police officers. The exclusionary rule therefore does not apply to the conduct of judicial officers.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion where she argued that the majority’s decision does not allow any evidence that is the result of a clerical error. Rather, the police must rely on accurate record-keeping systems in order to admit evidence found based on the information in those records. Justice David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the concurrence. In his concurrence, Justice Souter wrote that the majority’s opinion should be read as dealing solely with the issue of this type of clerical error, and not as dealing with the concept of how deterrence by exclusion extends to the government as a whole. Justice Breyer joined in the concurrence.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent and argued that the Fourth Amendment was meant as a constraint on governmental power as a whole, and not merely on its agents, namely the police. He also argued that the exclusionary rule does not place the government at a disadvantage in trial; the government is merely in the position it would be if it had not conducted the illegal search at all. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed because the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on the issue based on its constitutional analysis, rather than federal law, so the U.S. Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction. She also argued that the exclusionary rule should apply to judicial clerical errors because such errors become magnified and can hugely impact an innocent citizens life. Justice Stevens joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In Washington State, the City of Edmonds' zoning code provides that the occupants of single-family dwelling units must compose a family, defined as "persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons." Under the code, Oxford House, which operates a group home for 10-12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences, was issued a citation. Oxford House asserted that under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibits discrimination in housing against persons with handicaps, the city had failed to make reasonable accommodations permitting the maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. Edmonds sought a declaration that the FHA did not apply to the city's zoning code. The District Court held that the city's zoning code rule defining family was exempt from the FHA under as a reasonable restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. The Court of Appeals reversed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Edmonds' zoning code definition of the term "family" is not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA. Noting that it was designed to foster the family character of a neighborhood, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the provision was a family composition rule and was not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from FHA scrutiny because, while it capped the number of unrelated persons allowed to occupy a single-family dwelling at five, it did not cap the total number of people permitted to live in such a dwelling. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and "extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes." When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Matthew Wayne Tome was charged with sexually abusing his daughter, who was four years old at the time of the alleged crime. Tome and the child’s mother were divorced and Tome had primary physical custody of the child, but the mother was awarded custody in 1990. The prosecution argued that the sexual abuse occurred while the child was with Tome, but was not discovered until the child spent vacation time with her mother. Tome argued that the allegations were fabricated to keep the child from being returned to him. The prosecution produced six witnesses who testified to verify the out of court statements made by the child. The out of court statements were all made after the motive to fabricate would have arisen. The district court admitted the statements into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which state that prior statements of a witness are not hearsay is they are consistent with the witness’ testimony and are offered to rebut a charge of “recent fabrication or improper influence of motive.” Tome was convicted. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, holding that the proper test was to weigh the probative value against their prejudicial effect, not whether statements were made before or after the motive to fabricate arose.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that, consistent with common law, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) requires that prior consistent statements be made before the motive to fabricate arose in order to be admissible. While hearsay evidence is often relevant, relevance is not the only criterion for determining admissibility. The Court held that the 10th Circuit’s balancing approach involved too much judicial discretion, reduced predictability, and enhanced difficulties of trial preparation. The Court also noted that the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confirm their analysis. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing that the Advisory Committee Notes should have no authoritative effect and the case could be resolved without resorting to the Notes.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the basic issue in the case was relevance, not hearsay. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not codify the common law, and it permits the district court to allow prior consistent statements made at any time when they are probative. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The reasonableness of a search is judged by "balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." In the case of high school athletes who are under State supervision during school hours, they are subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy interests compromised by urine samples are negligible since the conditions of collection are similar to public restrooms, and the results are viewed only by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental concern over the safety of minors under their supervision overrides the minimal, if any, intrusion in student-athletes' privacy.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On August 18, 1975, Margaret Whitecotton received her vaccine against diptheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT vaccination) as a four-year old. That evening and the following morning, Margaret suffered seizures that were a symptom of encephalopathy. Her parents filed a claim on her behalf and alleged that the vaccine caused her encephalopathy, a condition that impairs brain function.
In order to prove their claim under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, claimants must meet the requirements of the Vaccine Injury Table, which lists the conditions associated with each vaccine and the timeframe of their expected occurrence. The Special Master, empowered to hear such claims, determined that Margaret’s symptoms indicated encephalopathy, but that she exhibited symptoms of the condition prior to the vaccination, and therefore her symptoms did not fit within the timetable. The Master denied compensation and the Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice David H. Souter delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that a claimant must show that the symptoms did not exist prior to the administration of the vaccine. The Act specifically states that the first symptom must occur within the timeframe set by the table in order for the claim to be valid. If the first symptom occurs before the vaccination, any further symptoms do not fulfill the requirement.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote that the Court’s ruling properly held the claims allowed by the Act to a high standard of proof, which adhered to the purpose of the Act. She also emphasized that the decision of the Court solely dealt with defining the burden of the claimant, and did not address any subsequent factual challenges on the part of the Whitecottons against the decision of the Special Master. Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined in the concurrence.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The display was private religious speech that "is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression." Because Capitol Square is designated as a traditional public forum, any group may express their views there, and the Board may regulate the content of the Klan's expression on the plaza only if a restriction is necessary and narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After a ship owned by the Cement Division of National Gypsum Co. sank in a winter storm while berthed in a slip owned by Milwaukee, National Gypsum brought an admiralty suit for damages, alleging that the city had negligently breached its duty as a wharfinger. The city denied fault and filed a counterclaim for damage to its dock, alleging that National Gypsum was negligent in leaving the ship virtually unmanned. The District Court found that both parties were negligent, apportioned liability primarily to National Gypsum, and entered a partial judgment for the stipulated amount of National Gypsum's damages, excluding prejudgment interest. The court held that the fact that National Gypsum's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence and the existence of a genuine dispute over the City's liability were special circumstances justifying a departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that mutual fault cannot provide a basis for denying prejudgment interest.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that neither a good-faith dispute over liability nor the existence of mutual fault justifies the denial of prejudgment interest in an admiralty collision case. In calculating the amount of the loss for which the relatively innocent party is responsible, the Court found that a denial of prejudgment interest on the basis of mutual fault would unfairly penalize a party twice for the same mistake. "The existence of a legitimate difference of opinion on the issue of liability is merely a characteristic of most ordinary lawsuits. It is not an extraordinary circumstance that can justify denying prejudgment interest," wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A collision between a car and a truck occurred in Ohio. More than three years later, Carol Hyde, a passenger in the car, sued the truck driver and his employer for negligence in the Court of Common Pleas. Ohio had a two-year statute of limitations for such actions, but because the truck driver and his employer were from out of state, a special provision tolled the running of the statute of limitations. 10 months after this suit began, the Supreme Court decided in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) that the tolling provision placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court of Common Pleas applied Bendix and dismissed Hyde's suit as untimely. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed on the ground that Bendix could not be retroactively applied to claims that commenced prior to that decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, Justice Stephan G. Breyer wrote for the majority, holding that the Bendix rule must be retroactively applied. Hyde conceded that the Supreme Court had already decided in Harper v Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) that when the court applies a new legal rule courts must treat the new rule as retroactive. The Court rejected Hyde's claim that applying the rule would unfairly deny her a remedy. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a special concurrence stating that Bendix did not announce a new rule and merely applied existing precedent. Following this reasoning, the discussion of retroactivity was unnecessary.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Police officers found Houston Jones, a diabetic, on the street while he was having an insulin seizure. The officers arrested Jones because he appeared drunk. Later, Jones found himself with several broken ribs. Jones brought a constitutional tort action against the officers, claiming that they used excessive force when they arrested him and that they beat him at the police station. As government officials, the officers were entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense. Three of the officers moved for summary judgment arguing that he could point to no evidence that these three had beaten him or had been present during beatings. Holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting Jones's theory of the case, the District Court denied the motion. The officers sought an immediate appeal, arguing that the denial was wrong because the evidence in the pretrial record was not sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a defendant, who is entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a District Court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court reasoned, in part, that the competing considerations underlying questions of finality, including the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review, the danger of denying justice by delay, the comparative expertise of trial and appellate courts, and the wise use of appellate resources, argue against allowing immediate appeals of orders of the kind in question and in favor of limiting interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of law.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Curtis Lee Kyles was charged with murdering 60-year-old Delores Dye in a Schwegmann’s parking lot. After an initial trial with a hung jury, Kyles was tried again, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision on direct appeal. Then Kyles sought state collateral review, where he was unsuccessful, but he uncovered evidence favorable to him that the prosecution failed to disclose before or during trial. Kyles filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, citing Brady v. Maryland, which held that the prosecution violates due process if they fail to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant. The district court denied relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Maybe, maybe. Justice David H. Souter, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that Kyles was entitled to a new trial because the net effect of the suppressed evidence raised a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result. The Fifth Circuit used the wrong standard and failed to consider the cumulative effect of all the evidence that the prosecution failed to disclose. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred, supporting the decision to grant certiorari and review the case on the merits. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the concurrence.
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, arguing that the case should be dismissed as improvidently granted. The suppressed evidence did not create a reasonable probability that the jury would reach a different result given the large amount of negative evidence the prosecution presented. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group, which was involved in litigation over the ownership and operation of Texas oil and gas properties, under several commercial liability insurance policies. After a verdict was entered against the Hill Group, the underwriters sought a federal declaratory judgment that their policies did not cover the Hill Group's liability. The Hill Group filed a state court suit and moved to dismiss or to stay the underwriter's action. The District Court entered a stay on the ground that the state suit encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the federal action. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that a district court has broad discretion to grant or decline to grant declaratory judgment, the appellate court did not require application of the exceptional circumstances test. The appellate court also reviewed the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion and found none.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and yes. In a 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the discretionary standard of Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, governs a district court's decision to stay a declaratory judgment action during the pendency of parallel state court proceedings and that a district courts' decisions about the propriety of hearing declaratory judgment actions should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Court also concluded that the District Court acted within its bounds in staying the declaratory relief action in this case, since parallel proceedings, presenting an opportunity for the ventilation of the same state law issues, were underway in state court. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. The "Term Limitation Amendment," in addition to limiting terms of elected officials within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any person who served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Constitution prohibits States from adopting Congressional qualifications in addition to those enumerated in the Constitution. A state congressional term limits amendment is unconstitutional if it has the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and "has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly." Furthermore, "...allowing individual States to craft their own congressional qualifications would erode the structure designed by the Framers to form a 'more perfect Union.'"


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Went For It, Inc., (a lawyer referral service) and John T. Blakely (a Florida attorney) were sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives who had been injured in an accident. According to Florida Bar rules, such direct and targeted mailings are prohibited for thirty days following an accident or disaster.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Lawyer advertising is commercial speech and as such, is accorded only a limited measure of First Amendment protection. Under this "intermediate scrutiny," restriction on commercial speech is permissible if the government (1) asserts a substantial interest in support of its regulation; (2) establishes that the restriction directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) demonstrates that the regulation is narrowly drawn.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Fred P. Gardner was treated in a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facility. Afterwards, he experienced weakness in his left leg, allegedly a result of the surgery. He claimed disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which requires the VA to pay disability compensation if an injury occurs as a result of or is worsened by treatment. The VA and the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the claim, stating that the statute, as interpreted by VA regulation 38 CFR 3.358 (c)(3), requires that the claimant prove that the injury arose due to negligence or error by the VA facility. The Court of Veterans Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that the fault-or-accident requirement in 38 CFR 3.358 was not warranted by Section 1151. The decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice David Souter, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision and ruled for Gardner. The Court held that Section 1151 contains no language requiring proof of fault, and it rejected the Government's claims that the requirement was implicit in the language of the statute. The Court acknowledged the 60-year longevity of the regulation and the post-1934 legislative silence on the issue, but neither concern could overcome the plain language of Section 1151.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) authorizes a civil enforcement action by aggrieved employees or their union against a covered employer who fails to give 60 days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff, but provides no limitations period for such an action. In 94-835, the United Steelworkers of America filed a WARN claim, charging Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. with laying off 85 employees without giving the required 60-day notice. In rejecting Crown Cork's contention that the statute of limitations had run, the District Court held that the source of the limitations period for WARN suits is state law and that the union's suit was timely under any of the arguably applicable Pennsylvania statutes. In 94-834, another District Court granted summary judgment for North Star Steel Company, holding the nonunion employees' suit barred under a limitations period borrowed from the National Labor Relations Act, which the court believed was more analogous to WARN than any state law. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and held that a WARN limitations period should be borrowed from state, not federal, law.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that State law is the proper source of the limitations period for civil actions brought to enforce WARN. Where a federal statute fails to provide any limitations period for a new cause of action, the Court noted that its longstanding practice has been to borrow the limitations period from the most closely analogous state statute. The Court reasoned that North Star did not fall within the exception where the relevant state limitations periods would frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies or be at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in the judgment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Lockheed Corporation hired Paul L. Spink when he was sixty-one. He was excluded from participation in Lockheed's retirement program. Later changes in federal law required Lockheed to add Spink to the retirement program. Lockheed added Spink, but refused accrued benefits for the years he had worked at Lockheed before federal law changed. Lockheed also offered an increased pension benefit to employees who would retire early in exchange for their waiver of any employment claims against the corporation. Spink refused to be added without earning the extra benefits for the previous years he had worked. Spink filed suit alleging he should receive full benefits. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Spink. It held the law applied retroactively which would cover Spink.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and no. In unanimous and 7-2 decisions, announced by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that businesses may condition early retirement benefits on the forfeiture of the right to sue in a job-related claim. The Court also ruled that the government could not retroactively apply retirement income benefit laws.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
James O'Connor, 56, was fired by Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. and replaced by a 40-year-old worker. O'Connor filed suit alleging that his discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The District Court granted Consolidated's summary judgment motion. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that O'Connor failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination because he failed to show that he was replaced by someone outside the age group protected by the ADEA since his replacement was 40 years old.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 limits its protection to those who are 40 or older, it prohibits discrimination against those protected employees on the basis of age, not class membership. "That one member of the protected class lost out to another member is irrelevant, so long as he lost out because of his age. The latter is more reliably indicated by the fact that his replacement was substantially younger," wrote Justice Scalia.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Mary Lu Redmond, a former police officer, received extensive counseling from a licensed clinical social worker after she shot and killed Ricky Allen. Carrie Jaffee, special administrator for Allen, filed suit in federal District Court alleging that Redmond had violated Allen's constitutional rights by using excessive force in the encounter. During the trial, Jaffee sought access to the notes from Redmond's counseling. Redmond's counsel resisted asserting the conversations were protected against involuntary disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The District Court judge rejected the argument, but the notes were not released. The judge instructed the jury that they could presume that the contents could have been unfavorable to Redmond. The jury awarded monetary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It found that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 prompted the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 protects the conversations between Redmond and her therapist from compelled disclosure. The Rule recognizes a "psychotherapist-patient privilege."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Ray Lewis, a mail handler for the United States Postal Service, was observed opening several pieces of mail and pocketing the contents. Subsequently, Lewis was charged with two counts of obstructing the mail, where each charge carries a maximum authorized prison sentence of six months. Lewis requested a jury trial. Denying his request, the Magistrate Judge ordered a bench trial, explaining that because she would not sentence him to more than six months' imprisonment, he was not entitled to a jury trial. The District Court affirmed. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right pertains only to those offenses for which the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty of over six months' imprisonment. The Court continued that, because each offense charged was petty in character, the fact that Lewis was facing more than six months' imprisonment in the aggregate did not entitle him to a jury trial. The court also reasoned that because the offense's characterization as petty or serious determined the right to a jury trial, a trial judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing could not deprive a defendant of that right.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is prosecuted for multiple petty offenses. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury trial does not extend to petty offenses, and its scope does not change where a defendant faces a potential aggregate prison term in excess of six months for the petty offenses charged. Because the Court ruled that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is charged with multiple petty offenses, it did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Residents of North Carolina challenged a plan to create two congressional districts on the ground that the proposed districts were racially gerrymandered. On initial review, a three-judge District Court panel dismissed the action only to have its decision reversed and remanded to it by the Supreme Court. However, the Court's standard for review left very little room for racial engineering of congressional voting districts. On remand, the District Court found the redistricting plans to be racially tailored and, therefore, unconstitutional. Again, the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court first confronted the threshold question of "standing." It held that some of the appellants lacked proper standing to challenge the redistricting plan. Only those voters who resided in a congressional district alleged to have been created by racial gerrymandering had proper standing to challenge the constitutionality of that district's creation. Those voters who did not reside in one of the two allegedly racially gerrymandered districts, and who failed to provide evidence that they were assigned to their district of residence on the basis of race, lacked proper standing to participate in the racial gerrymandering claim. After noting the challenged district's unusually non-compact serpentine shape, and the appellants' admission that the districts' were primarily designed to create black voting majorities, the Court applied "strict scrutiny" to the facts at hand. Finding no narrowly tailored plans aimed at serving a compelling state interest that would justify the creation of racially gerrymandered districts, the Court concluded that the redistricting plans violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
At his trial on a federal marijuana charge, Charles Carlisle filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after the jury returned a guilty verdict. The District Court granted the motion even though it was filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c), which provides that "[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty..., a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period." In reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the verdict and for sentencing, the Court of Appeals held that under Rule 29(c) a district court has no jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, or to enter such a judgment after submission of the case to the jury.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court had no authority to grant the petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day outside the Rule 29(c) time limit. Judges may not stretch the deadline by even one day; Justice Scalia wrote for the court that, "[t]here is simply no room...for the granting of an untimely post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, regardless of whether the motion is accompanied by a claim of actual innocence...."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Christopher Lee Armstrong and others were indicted on federal charges of "conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) and conspiring to distribute the same." The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had monitored Armstrong and others prior to their indictment and arrest. Armstrong filed a motion for discovery or dismissal, alleging that he was selected for prosecution because he was black. The District Court granted the discovery order. It ordered the government to provide statistics on similar cases from the last three years. The government indicated it would not comply. Subsequently, the District Court dismissed the case. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. It held that the proof requirements for a selective-prosecution claim do not require a defendant to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that in order to file selective-prosecution claims, defendants must show that the government failed to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races. "If the claim . . . were well founded," wrote Rehnquist, "it should not have been an insuperable task to prove that persons of a different race were not prosecuted."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Under the Constitution's Census Clause, Congress is vested with the responsibility of conducting an "actual enumeration" of the American public every ten years, primarily for the purpose of aportioning congressional representation among the states. Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce who, in the 1990 census, decided not to use a statistical correction, known as the post-enumeration survey (PES), to adjust an undercount in the initial population count. Acting on behalf of several citizens' groups, states, and cities, Wisconsin challenged the Secretary's decision not to use the PES; claiming that it resulted in an undercounting of certain identifiable minority groups.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court held that the decision not to use the PES-based statistical correction would not be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard of "one person - one vote" because there was no showing of intentional discrimination by the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary's decision was consistent with past census practices in which the promotion of distributive accuracy, rather than numerical accuracy, was the primary objective. This is because errors in numerical accuracy are less likely than errors in distributive accuracy to impact on the apportionment of representatives among the states. Moreover, the Court added that significant deference - regarding how best to conduct the census - must be accorded to the Secretary since he directly received such latitude from Congress which, in turn, received such latitude from the Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Holly Farms Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc., is a vertically integrated poultry producer. In 1989, the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391, filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board, seeking an election in a proposed unit that included live-haul employees working out of Holly Farms' Wilkesboro processing plant. The unit included workers described as "live-haul" crews, or teams of chicken catchers, forklift operators, and truckdrivers, who collect for slaughter chickens raised as broilers by independent contract growers, and transport the birds to the processing plant. Classifying the live-haul workers as employees protected by the National Labor Relations Act, rather than agricultural laborers excluded from the Act's coverage, the Board approved the bargaining unit. On petition for review, the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order, holding that the Board's classification rested on a reasonable interpretation of the Act and was consistent with the Board's prior decisions.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the NLRB's determination that the producer's live-haul workers were covered employees rather than exempt agricultural laborers, was a reasonable interpretation to which a reviewing court properly deferred. The Court was also split 5-4 in upholding the Board's classification for forklift operators who work in the chicken industry. In a 9-0 vote, the Court upheld the Board's classification for the live-haul crew's truck drivers.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) paid a tax on insurance premiums it paid to foreign insurers to insure exports from the U.S. to foreign countries. IBM sought a refund on the tax and filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims when its refund claim was denied by the IRS. IBM contended the tax violated the Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that "[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The court agreed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-2 decision, announced by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled the tax did violate the Export Clause and was therefore unconstitutional.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A federal District Court sentenced Meirl Gilbert Neal on two plea-bargained convictions involving possession of LSD with intent to distribute. The amount of LSD was determined, under both the federal statute directing minimum sentences and the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, by the whole weight of the blotter paper, or carrier medium, containing the drug. The combined weight of the blotter paper and LSD actually sold by Neal was 109.51 grams. Thus, the court ruled that Neal was subject to 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (1)(A)(v), which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on anyone convicted of trafficking in more than 10 grams of "a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of LSD. After the Commission revised the Guidelines' calculation method by instructing courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight, Neal filed a motion to modify his sentence, contending that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was only 4.58 grams, well short of 841(b)(1)(A)(v)'s 10-gram requirement, and that the Guidelines' presumptive-weight method controlled the mandatory minimum calculation. The District Court held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, was determinative of whether Neal crossed the 10-gram threshold and that the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence still applied to him notwithstanding the Guidelines. In affirming, an en banc Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Section 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual requires a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Fletcher Casey, Jr. and other inmates of various prisons operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), brought a class action against ADOC officials, alleging that the ADOC officials were furnishing them with inadequate legal research facilities and thereby depriving them of their right of access to the courts, in violation of Bounds v. Smith. Bounds held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." The District Court found the ADOC officials in violation of Bounds and issued an injunction mandating detailed, systemwide changes in ADOC's prison law libraries and in its legal assistance programs. The Court of Appeals affirmed both the finding of a Bounds violation and the injunction's major terms.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the success of Casey's systemic challenge was dependent on the ability to show widespread actual injury, and the District Court's failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual injury rendered its finding of a systemic Bounds violation invalid. Justice Scalia said the court's 1977 ruling in Bounds v. Smith "does not guarantee [inmates] the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After purchasing a new vehicle from an authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had been repainted. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed to the Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that while a state may impose punitive damages to further its interest in deterring unlawful conduct, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause prohibits states from imposing grossly excessive punishments on tort-feasors. In the present case, the punitive damage's excessive nature is indicated by the 500 to 1 ratio between the jury's punitive and actual damage awards, the relatively insignificant amount of damage, and the lack of statutory fines that remotely parallel the present award's magnitude. BMW's due process rights were also violated because it could not have possibly anticipated, nor did it receive fair notice, that it might face such a severe punishment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Umbehr was an independent trash-hauling contractor for Wabaunsee County, Kansas. He frequently criticized the County's Board of Commissioners (the Board). When the Board voted to terminate his contract, supposedly because the Board grew tired of his constant criticisms, Umbehr filed suit against two of the Board's members. Umbehr alleged that his termination resulted from his criticisms of the Board and, therefore, infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. On appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Board, the Tenth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted Umbehr's petition for certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech shielded Umbehr, as a government employee, from termination due to things he might have said about the Board. Umbehr successfully proved that his criticisms of the Board preceded his termination and were the primary motivating factor behind its retaliatory termination of his contract. The Court added that, in balancing an employee's interest in commenting on public concerns against an employer's interest in promoting efficient performance by its employees, it could not find any countervailing county interest justifying its infringement of Umbehr's freedom of speech.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
To prevent "local media monopolies," Section 533(b) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 barred local phone service providers (local exchange carriers or LECs) from directly providing video programming to their local phone service subscribers. The government claimed that because LEC- controlled phone lines could also transmit video signals, allowing LECs to provide video programming would hurt competing cable companies. First, LECs could deny competitors access to their data lines. Second, LECs could offer lower cable prices than competitors by raising the costs of telephone service and using the extra profits to subsidize the costs of cable service.
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia (Chesapeake) challenged the constitutionality of the statute, pointing out that "video programming" is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The government argued that the statute's regulation of the cable market had a "content-neutral" objective. The District Court ruled that the statute's restrictions were not "narrowly tailored" to serve the statute's objective. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adding that the statute did not leave open "ample alternative channels for communication" between LECs and local residents. The Supreme Court consolidated the case with National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Unanswered. After the Court heard oral arguments, the President signed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 into law. The Act repealed Section 533(b), allowing LECs to provide local cable service if they complied with a series of regulatory measures. The Court instructed the Fourth Circuit to reconsider the case and determine whether it had become moot.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Paul Casarotto, a Subway sandwich shop franchisee, sued franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and its agent, Nick Lombardi, in a Montana state court when a dispute arose between the parties with regard to a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of the shop. The court stayed the lawsuit pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out in ordinary type on page nine of the franchise agreement. In reversing, the Montana Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it did not meet the state-law requirement, 27-5-114(4), that "[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration" be "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract." DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued that the state-law requirement was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which declares written provisions for arbitration "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." The Montana Supreme Court focused on the question of whether the application of 27-5-114(4)'s notice requirement would undermine the FAA's goals and policies. In the Montana court's judgment, the notice requirement did not undermine these goals and policies, for it did not preclude arbitration agreements altogether.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 8-1 decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that Montana's first-page notice requirement, 27-5-114(4), which governs not "any contract," but specifically and solely contracts "subject to arbitration," conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and is therefore displaced by the federal measure. Justice Ginsburg wrote that Congress "precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status" when it passed the FAA.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Town & County Electric, Inc., a non-union company, sought to fill several positions for a construction job in Minnesota. Town & Country received applications from union staff, but refused to interview any of the applicants except one, who was eventually hired and fired soon thereafter. These individuals applied with the intention to organize Town & Country and were to remain on Union payroll during their time of employment. The union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town & Country had refused to interview and retain the workers because of their union affiliation, a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board held that the 11 individuals met the definition of employees under the Act and rejected Town & Country's claims that the individuals had been refused for other reasons.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the term "employee" does not include those individuals who remain on Union payroll during their time of employment with another company.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Supreme Court ruled for the Board and held that individuals can meet the definition of employee even if they are paid by a union to organize a non-union company while on company payroll. The Court found this result consistent with the language and purpose of the Act as well as the dictionary definition of "employee." The Court also reasoned that the language of the Act seemed to specifically take into account the possibility of workers who are paid union organizers.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Department of Transportation expelled Lane, a student, from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy because he was diagnosed with diabetes. Lane sued the Department of Transportation alleging that his termination violated section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, which barred "any program or activity under any executive agency" from discriminating on the basis of disability. The district court reinstated Lane, but refused to award damages because the federal government's sovereign immunity had not been waived by Congress. The appeals court affirmed the district court decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Although the related provisions of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and the 1991 Civil Rights Act might in combination be read as waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity, absent an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity, the court cannot permit damages to be awarded.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Ellis Felker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellate or certiorari review, and stay of execution after having his convictions for capital murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment affirmed on appeal. Felker's habeas petition challenged the constitutionality of Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "Act"). Title I of the Act requires that all motions for filing a second or successive habeas appeal from a district court be reviewed by an appellate panel whose decision shall not be appealable by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The unanimous Court held that the Act's creation of an appellate panel, charged with reviewing all second or successive habeas applications, is not unconstitutional. The Act simply transfers the duty of habeas review from the district courts to an appellate panel. While the Act prevents an appeal to the Court from an appellate panel's denial of leave to file a second habeas petition, it does not repeal the Court's authority to entertain original habeas petitions. Thus, the shift in habeas "gatekeeping" duties to an appellate panel is neither an unconstitutional "suspension" of the habeas writ which would violate the Exceptions Clause of Article III, nor a deprivation of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Alleging that Ursery manufactured marijuana on his property, the United States government initiated criminal proceedings against Ursery and began civil forfeiture proceedings against his property. On appeal from his conviction in District Court, the Court of Appeals reversed on double-jeopardy grounds. The government then initiated a second set of proceedings against Ursery's property, which was reversed on new double-jeopardy grounds. The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in an 8-to-1 decision, held that civil property forfeitures did not constitute a "punishment" for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. While the double jeopardy clause protects a defendant from being punished twice for the same offense, criminal and civil sanctions for the same offense are distinguishable. The civil property forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction not a punitive criminal "punishment." Applying a two-part test to determine if a forfeiture constitutes a "punishment" in terms of the double jeopardy clause, the Court held that it was both Congress's intention that property forfeitures be civil in nature and that they be remedial rather than punitive. The mere resemblance between Ursery's property forfeiture and criminal drug and money-laundering punishments, did not constitute the "clearest proof" that Congress did not intend to levy both civil and criminal sanctions on Ursery's conduct. Furthermore, property forfeiture's non-punitive remedial nature is also evident in its goal of encouraging owners to care for their property by guarding against its illegal usage.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Larry Grant Lonchar was sentenced to death for murder nine years ago. After the affirmance of Lonchar's conviction and sentence, his sister and brother filed "next friend" state habeas corpus petitions. Lonchar opposed both. Lonchar then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed. Shortly before Lonchar's scheduled execution, he filed another state habeas corpus petition. When the petition was denied, Lonchar filed an "eleventh hour" federal petition, his first, on the day of his scheduled execution. The District Court held that Lonchar's conduct in waiting almost nine years to file his federal petition did not constitute an independent basis for rejecting the petition and granted a stay to permit time for consideration of other grounds for dismissal raised by the State. The court had reasoned that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some generalized equitable authority to dismiss, governed the case. The Court of Appeals vacated the stay. Setting aside the Rules and traditional habeas doctrine, the court held that equitable doctrines independent of Rule 9 applied and it concluded that Lonchar did not merit equitable relief.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some general "equitable" power to create exceptions to the Rule, should have determined whether or not a petition's dismissal was appropriate. Justice Breyer wrote for the court that a long delay does not generally constitute an abuse of the system, adding, "[d]ismissal of a first habeas petition is a particularly serious matter for that dismissal denies the petitioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The IRS filed claims in Bankruptcy Court for taxes, interest, and penalties that accrued when Thomas R. Noland, the trustee of the in-debt First Truck Lines, Inc., sought relief under federal Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court held that the claims for taxes and interest were the first priority in the case. Consequently, the court subordinated the penalties, to be adjudicated following the taxes and interest, because the penalties were not financial losses for the IRS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that giving tax-penalty claims a lower priority than other claims contradicts Congress_ scheme of priorities regarding federal bankruptcy law.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Seminole Tribe brought suit against the State of Florida for violating the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under the IGRA, the Tribe may engage in gaming (i.e., casino gambling) activities subject to Florida's good faith regulations. Florida moved to dismiss the Tribe's action, alleging that the lawsuit violated Florida's sovereign immunity. On appeal from the District Court's denial of Florida's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from federal suit and that under Ex Parte Young, the Tribe may not enforce its right to good faith negotiations by naming Florida's governor as a party to the suit.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, The Court held that Congress did intend to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the IGRA but that the Indian Commerce Clause (and by implication the Commerce Clause) did not give Congress that power. Under the Eleventh Amendment, all states are regarded as sovereign entities. Such sovereignty inherently implies that states may not be sued by parties without their consent, even if they are given authority to regulate those parties' activities through receipt of federal funds. Finally, Ex Parte Young's ruling does not justify the Tribe's suit against Florida's governor in light of certain IGRA provisions which specifically prohibit such an action.