[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1995, a storm hit parts of western North Carolina causing extensive flooding and erosion. Graham and Cherokee Counties applied for assistance under the Emergency Watershed Protection Program ("EWPP"). Under the program, the counties would perform or hire to perform the necessary cleanup and repair work, paying for 25% of the costs, while the United States Department of Agriculture paid for the rest. During the cleanup, Karen Wilson, a secretary for the Graham Conservation District, raised concerns that she had about the legality of the awarded contracts. She filed suit in a North Carolina federal district court against Graham and Cherokee Counties, among others, under the False Claims Act. She alleged a conspiracy that tainted the execution of the EWPP contracts and rendered the claims for reimbursement false within the meaning of the False Claims Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the information underlying Ms. Wilson's claim was public disclosure and thus barred the court jurisdiction over the case. The court agreed and dismissed.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. It held that the audit reports that underlied Ms. Wilson's claim was not public disclosure for the purpose of the False Claim Act, and thus the district court was not barred from hearing her case.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that the reference to "administrative" reports, audits, and investigations within the FCA encompasses disclosures made in state and local sources as well as federal sources – like at issue in this case. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the FCA's plain language did not limit "administrative" to federal sources, nor did it preclude the inclusion of state sources. Moreover, the Court looked at the legislative history of the FCA and found it inconclusive.
Justice Antonin G. Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He emphasized that the legislative history of a statute is not relevant in analyzing what a statute means. Justice Sonia Sotamayor joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer also wrote separately, dissenting. She disagreed with the majority opinion in that it did not give sufficient weight to contextual and historical evidence of Congress' purpose in enacting the FCA. Under her analysis, she would hold that "administrative" refers only to federal sources.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A victim who obtained a civil protection order ("CPO") against John Robertson moved to hold him in criminal contempt for violating the order. A District of Columbia Superior Court convicted Mr. Robertson on three counts of criminal contempt for violating the CPO. Mr. Robertson moved to vacate the convictions, which was denied. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Robertson's conviction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Sonia Sotamayor, dissented. He recognized the complexity of the issue raised before the Court. However, he argued the answer to it is "no." He explained that "[t]he terrifying force of the criminal justice system may only be brought to bear against an individual by society as a whole, through a prosecution brought on behalf of the government" – not an individual.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In April 2005, Nadejda Reilly filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Pursuant to standard practice, she listed equipment related to her catering business as "exempt" from the bankruptcy proceedings and valued the equipment at over $10,000. Trustee William Schwab independently had Ms. Reilly's business equipment appraised at over $17,000. He then sought a motion for the Bankruptcy Court to sell Ms. Reilly's equipment and turn over the proceeds, less the value of her exemption. Ms. Reilly countered that the business equipment had become fully exempt when Mr. Schwab failed to timely object when she listed the equipment as exempt. The Bankruptcy Court agreed and denied Mr. Schwab's motion to sell off Ms. Reilly's equipment. A federal district court in Pennsylvania affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the court affirmed, holding that Mr. Schwab's failure to file a timely objection to Ms. Reilly's exemption barred him from moving to sell the property.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. No. The Supreme Court held that a creditor is not required to object to a debtor's exemptions in order to preserve his right to claim any value in the item exceeding the value listed as exempt. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the bankruptcy code only requires a timely objection to an asset's categorization as exempt and does not apply to objections about the asset's value.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. She argued that the failure to object to the debtor's valuation of an exempt asset should prevent the creditor's later challenge to the valuation because the asset's valuation is critical in determining whether the debtor will be allowed to keep the property.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Investors brought a securities fraud class action suit against Merck & Co. in a New Jersey federal district court. They alleged the company had misled investors about the drug Vioxx's safety and commercial viability. Merck moved to dismiss the claim arguing that the investors had been put on "inquiry notice" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitations had run. The federal district court agreed and dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It recognized that under the "inquiry notice" standard, plaintiffs are put on notice for the purpose of the statute of limitations in federal securities fraud litigation at the "possibility" of wrongdoing. Moreover, the court held that the investors had not been put on "inquiry notice" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitation had not run.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit, holding that the statute of limitations begins to run once the plaintiff actually discovered or a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered the facts constituting the violation – whichever comes first. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority, the Court noted that "inquiry notice" is only useful to the extent it describes the circumstances when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have begun to investigate.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He stated that much of the discussion in Part II of the majority opinion was unnecessary. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority holding to the extent it adopted a reasonably diligent person standard for when the statute of limitations begins to run.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Chicago Police Department seized property belonging to the plaintiffs, using the power granted it by the Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (DAFPA). The plaintiffs filed suit in an Illinois federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 arguing that when property is seized under the DAFPA, due process requires a prompt, postseizure, probable cause hearing. The district court dismissed, but the plaintiffs asked for a rehearing in light of Mathews v. Eldridge, which prohibited the seizure of real property without a prior hearing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted review.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the DAFPA did not provide adequate due process for an owner to contest the seizure of his property, reasoning the length of time between seizure and contest was too long (a maximum of 97 to 187 days). The court remanded the case and instructed the district court to devise a mechanism by which an owner can contest the validity of the retention of his property.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Unanswered. In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen J. Breyer, the court dismissed the case as moot. At oral argument, the parties confirmed that there was no longer any dispute about the ownership or possession of the property in question. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part but opposed vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Several suits were filed against Chicago and Oak Park in Illinois challenging their gun bans after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia handgun ban violated the Second Amendment. There, the Court reasoned that the law in question was enacted under the authority of the federal government and, thus, the Second Amendment was applicable. Here, plaintiffs argued that the Second Amendment should also apply to the states. The district court dismissed the suits. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense applicable to the states. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that rights that are "fundamental to the Nation's scheme of ordered liberty" or that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" are appropriately applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized in Heller that the right to self-defense was one such "fundamental" and "deeply rooted" right. The Court reasoned that because of its holding in Heller, the Second Amendment applied to the states. Here, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether Chicago's handgun ban violated an individual's right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.
Justice Alito, writing in the plurality, specified that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller. He rejected Justice Clarence Thomas's separate claim that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment more appropriately incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. Alito stated that the Court's decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases -- rejecting the use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause for the purpose of incorporation -- was long since decided and the appropriate avenue for incorporating rights was through the Due Process Clause.
Justice Antonin Scalia concurred. He agreed with the Court's opinion, but wrote separately to disagree with Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states, but disagreed that the Due Process Clause was the appropriate mechanism. Instead, Justice Thomas advocated that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the more appropriate avenue for rights incorporation. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He disagreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. He argued that owning a personal firearm was not a "liberty" interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, also dissented. He argued that there is nothing in the Second Amendment's "text, history, or underlying rationale" that characterizes it as a "fundamental right" warranting incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In August 2003, a detective from the Hagerstown, MD Police Department interviewed Michael Blain Shatzer Sr. regarding allegations that he had sexually abused his three-year old child. At the time, Mr. Shatzer was incarcerated on an unrelated offense involving sexual abuse of another child. After Mr. Shatzer invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, the interview was terminated. The investigation was subsequently closed, only to be reopened in January 2006 on the prompting of Mr. Shatzer's wife, when she recognized her child could make more specific allegations about Mr. Shatzer's alleged sexual abuse. Thereafter in March 2006, another detective from the Hagerstown Police Department, who was aware that Mr. Shatzer had been under investigation, but was not aware that Mr. Shatzer had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, interviewed him. At this interview, Mr. Shatzer was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, which he waived, and then confessed to specific instances of sexual abuse involving his child.
Prior to trial, Mr. Shatzer moved to suppress the confessions he made in the March 2006 interview arguing that his 2003 invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights was still applicable. Under Edwards v. Arizona rendered the confession inadmissible. The motion was denied and a Maryland trial court convicted him of sexual child abuse. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the protections of Edwards applies for an inmate who has been continually incarcerated and had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, until either counsel is made available or the inmate initiates further conversation with police. Therefore, under the circumstances, Mr. Shatzer's confession was inadmissible.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals of Maryland, holding that because Mr. Shatzer experienced a break in Miranda custody lasting more than two weeks between the first and second attempts at interrogation, Edwards does not mandate suppression of his 2006 statements. Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority reasoned that when a suspect has been released from custody and returned to normal life before the police later attempt interrogation, there is little reason to believe that the suspect's change of heart was coerced. The Court then stated that the appropriate period of time for a person to be re-acclimated to normal life was 14 days. Here, even though Mr. Shatzer was released back into the general prison population, he entered back into his normal life and was free of the pressures of investigative custody; thus, the Edwards presumption was no longer warranted.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Granite Rock Co. filed suit against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") in a California federal district court. Granite Rock argued that a Teamsters strike constituted a breach of a no-strike clause in their collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). The district court dismissed the case, finding that Granite Rock failed to state a claim, and denied Granite Rock's request to compel arbitration in order to determine if the CBA had been ratified.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while Granite Rock's claim against the Teamsters was outside the scope of the LMRA, the dispute should be arbitrated. The court reasoned that both parties consented to arbitration when Teamsters asserted the arbitration clause in its filings and when Granite Rock sued under the contract which included the arbitration clause.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. No. The Supreme Court held that the parties' dispute over the CBA's ratification date was a matter for the district court, not the arbitrator, to resolve. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court noted that the presumption that a dispute is arbitrable should only be applied where it reflects and derives its legitimacy from, a judicial conclusion that arbitration is what the parties intended because their express agreement to arbitrate was validly formed, is legally enforceable, and is best construed to encompass the dispute. The Court reasoned that the question of when the CBA was formed is for judicial determination because it constitutes a "judicial conclusion" needed to employ the framework for even determining arbitrability. The Court further held that the Ninth Circuit was correct in not recognizing a cause of action under the LMRA. The Court recognized that because Granite Rock had not yet exhausted other avenues of redress under such theories as state-law tort claims, unfair labor practice claims, and federal common-law breach-of-contract claims.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed that the LMRA does not recognize a new common-law cause of action. However, she argued that the arbitration provision in the CBA did cover the dispute in question. She reasoned the correct approach was for the Court to simply determine (1) whether the parties had an agreement to arbitrate and (2) whether the agreement covered the dispute. Here, she answered both inquiries in the affirmative.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A Michigan state court convicted Van Chester Thompkins of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and several firearms related charges. After exhausting his remedies in Michigan state court, Thompkins petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition.
On appeal, Thompkins argued that his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and that he was denied effective counsel at trial. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court's finding that Thompkins waived his Fifth Amendment right was unreasonable because Thompkins refused to sign an acknowledgement that he had been informed of his Miranda rights and rarely made eye contact with the officer throughout the three hour interview. The Sixth Circuit also held that the Michigan Supreme Court improperly determined that Thompkins was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction related to his separately tried co-defendant's testimony.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that the state court's decision to reject Mr. Thompkins' Miranda claim was correct. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that Mr. Thompkins failed to invoke his Miranda rights to remain silent and to counsel because he failed to do so "unambiguously." Moreover, the Court reasoned that Mr. Thompkins waived his Miranda right to remain silent when he "knowingly and voluntarily" made a statement to the police. The Court further held that, even if Mr. Thompkins' counsel was ineffective, he cannot show he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance – a prerequisite to establishing that his Sixth Amendment right was violated.
Justice Sonia Sotamayor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. She reprimanded the majority for retreating from the broad protections afforded by Miranda, stating that now a criminal suspect waives his rights simply by uttering a "few one-word responses."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Timothy Abbott, a British citizen, and Jacquelyn Abbott, an American citizen, litigated their divorce in the Chilean courts. Mrs. Abbott was awarded custody of their son, while Mr. Abbott was awarded visitation rights. At Mrs. Abbott's request, the Chilean court entered an order prohibiting the child's removal from Chile by either the father or mother without express mutual consent. One year later, Mrs. Abbott moved the child from Chile without Mr. Abbott's consent. Upon location of the child in Texas, Mr. Abbott requested an order in a Texas federal district court that the child be returned to Chile pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court denied the order holding that the child's removal did not constitute a breach of the father's "rights of custody" as defined by the Hague convention.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Chilean court's order and Chilean statute that required father's consent before the child could leave Chile did not give a non-custodial father "rights of custody" within the meaning of the Hague Convention. The court stated that Mr. Abbott merely possessed the rights of "access to the child."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that a parent has a right of custody under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction when the parent retains a ne exeat right (the right to restrain someone from leaving a country). Here, Mr. Abbott retained such a right. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court first recognized that the Convention applies because the child in question is under 16 and was a habitual resident of Chile. (Chile and the U.S. are signatories to the Convention.) The Court then reasoned that the Convention's text, the U.S. State Department's views, signatory states' court orders, and the Convention's purposes all suggest that Mr. Abbott retained a ne exeat right under Article 49 of the Convention. Because Mr. Abbott possessed direct and regular visitation rights with his child, his ne exeat followed. The Court noted that Mr. Abbott's ne exeat right gave him a right of custody to his child, so long as Ms. Abbott could not find an exception in the Convention precluding the exercise of Mr. Abbott's right to custody.
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. He argued that Mr. Abbott merely possessed a limited veto power over Ms. Abbott's ability take their son from Chile, not a custody right. He went on to explain that using the Convention's powerful return remedy under these circumstances is contrary to the Convention's "text and purpose."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Agron Kucana, a citizen of Albania, entered the United States in 1995 and did not leave when his visa expired. Mr. Kucana applied for asylum but failed to appear at his hearing, after which he was ordered removed from the United States. He filed a motion to reopen his case, which was denied. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. After failing to remove himself from the United States, Mr. Kucana once again moved to reopen his case, contending that conditions in Albania had deteriorated to the extent where his life would be in danger upon his return. His motion was denied.
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, he argued that the BIA "abused its discretion" in denying his claim when it failed to consider an affidavit testifying to the dangerous conditions existing in Albania. The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the matter. It found that the BIA's decision not to reopen Mr. Kucana's case was "discretionary." 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that "no court has jurisdiction to review" any decision that is under the discretion of the BIA. Therefore, the court reasoned that Mr. Kucana's claim was not reviewable by a federal court of appeals.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)'s proscription of judicial review applies only to determinations made discretionary by statute, not to determinations declared discretionary by the Attorney General himself through regulation. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotamayor, the Court reasoned that policy, the statute's language, and its history all indicate that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar judicial review for administrative decisions made discretionary by regulation. At the heart of the Court's concern was preserving the separation of powers and avoiding a scenario where an Executive Branch order could preclude Judicial Branch review over a matter.
Justice Samuel A. Alito filed a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment. He agreed that the Seventh Circuit had jurisdiction to review the denial of Mr. Kucana's petition to reopen his removal proceeding. However, Justice Alito argued for a narrower holding. He stated that while some regulations issued by the Attorney General may be unreviewable, the regulation at issue in this case did not have that effect.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Free Enterprise Fund, a non-profit organization, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It alleged that the creation of the Public Company Oversight Board (the Board) by the Act violated the Appointments Clause because it deprived the President from exercising adequate control over the Board. However, the Board itself was under the direct supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), all of whose commissioners are appointed by and can be removed by the President.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board did not violate either the Appointments Clause or the separation of powers principle. It reasoned that the Board's members were inferior officers under the supervision of the SEC and thus were not obligated to be appointed by the President. Also, the court noted that the President's ability to remove members of the SEC, who in turn could remove members of the Board, preserved the Constitution's separation of powers.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Yes. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the "for-cause" limitation on the removal of Board members is unconstitutional because it contravenes the Constitution's separation of powers. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for the majority, the Court reasoned because the Act protects Board members from removal except for good cause, but withdraws from the President any decision on whether good cause exists, the Act deprives the President the power to hold Board members accountable. Such an arrangement contradicts Article II's vesting of the executive power in the president. The Court further held that the unconstitutionality of the removal provision did not make unconstitutional the entire Board. The Court concluded that the Board may continue to function as before, but its members may be removed at will by the Commission. Lastly, the Court held that the Board's appointment is consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that Board members are inferior officers, and, thus, their appointment may permissibly be vested in the "Head of the Department." Here, the Commission constitutes the "Head of the Department."
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor, dissented. He agreed that the members of the Board are inferior officers. However, he disagreed that the Act unconstitutionally interferes with the President's executive power.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A Michigan state court convicted Diapolis Smith of second degree murder and felony possession of a firearm and sentenced him to life in prison. After exhausting his remedies in the Michigan state courts, Smith petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, Smith argued that he was denied an impartial jury from a fair cross-section of the community in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law in concluding that county jury selection "worked no systematic exclusion." The Court reasoned the state trial court's policy of excusing potential jurors for whom jury duty would constitute hardship based on child care concerns or transportation issues, when viewed together with another policy that assigned prospective jurors from the county's only large city, established a prima facie case of systematic under-representation of African- American jurors.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit erred in ruling that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision "involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it reasoned that Duren v. Missouri did not establish that Mr. Smith was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. While the Duren defendant established an absolute disparity, comparative disparity, and standard deviation of underrepresentation of women, that case did not specify the method courts must use to measure underrepresentation. Here, Mr. Smith did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the trial court's policies had any significant effect on the underrepresentation of African-American jurors in the area.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately, concurring. He challenged the Court to reconsider that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to a jury that represents "a fair cross section" of the community. Instead, he proposed that the right stems more from an "amalgamation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Bruce Weyhrauch was charged in the Alaska federal district court in part with a "scheme and artifice to defraud and deprive the State of Alaska of its intangible right to [his] honest services." Mr. Weyhrauch was a member of the Alaska House of Representatives and allegedly took actions favorable to an Alaska oil company, VECO Corp., in return for future employment. At trial, Mr. Weyhrauch moved to exclude evidence related to the honest services charge. The district court excluded the evidence because it would merely have shown that Alaska could have imposed a duty upon Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, and thus did not prove he had violated any duty imposed by state law.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 established a uniform standard for "honest services" that governs every public official and that the government did not need to prove an independent violation of state law to sustain an honest services fraud conviction. Therefore, the court reasoned that because the district court excluded the evidence needed to prove that state law imposed an affirmative duty on Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, the evidence was admissible.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Not answered. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in light of Skilling v. United States.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
African-American applicants for firefighter jobs in Chicago, IL sued the city under Title VII alleging the written test used for hiring had a disparate impact. After administering the test, the city graded the scores and placed applicants in three categories: "well qualified," "qualified," and "not qualified." Because the city had only 600 positions to fill among 1,782 "well qualified" applicants, "qualified" applicants were unlikely to get job offers. The class of plaintiffs in this suit allege that the test disparately categorized them as "qualified." An Illinois federal district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs' suit was untimely and dismissed. The court stated that the 300 day limit for filing such a claim began when the plaintiffs learned that they had been placed in the "qualified" category and that the city would be hiring those in the "well qualified" category. The court reasoned that because there was no fresh act of discrimination, the time for filing a Title VII claim began when the discriminatory decision was made and not when it was executed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may file his Title VII disparate impact claim within 300 days after the employer executes the allegedly unlawful practice so long so as he alleges each of the elements of a disparate impact claim. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that the principle inquiry in this case is not when the firefighters' claims accrued, but whether the claims stated a Title VII violation. The Court concluded that the firefighters successfully stated a Title VII violation within the claim-filing period when they alleged that the city caused a disparate impact on African-Americans each time it used its hiring list.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
An Indiana federal district court convicted Thomas Carr of violating the Sex Offender and Registration and Notification Act. The Act imposes penalties on anyone who is a convicted sex offender, and traveling in interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly fails to register as a sex offender, unless he proves that "uncontrollable circumstances" prevented him from doing so. On appeal, Carr argued that he did not violate the act because he traveled before the Act was passed. The Seventh Circuit held that the Act does not require that the defendant's travel postdate its enactment, and, consequently, affirmed the district court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Not answered The Supreme Court held that the Sex Offender and Registration and Notification Act does not apply to sex offenders whose interstate travel occurred before the statute's effective date. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the plain language and legislative history of the statute suggest that it does not apply to conduct that predates its enactment.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He disagreed that the majority referred to the legislative history of the statute to reach its conclusion. Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He argued that the majority's reasoning is faulty and that its conclusion leads to anomaly – where the statute treats differently similarly situated sex offenders.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Employees of the City of Ontario, California police department filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in a California federal district court against the police department, city, chief of police, and an internal affairs officer. They alleged Fourth Amendment violations in relation to the police department's review of text messages made by an employee on a city issued text-message pager. While the city did not have an official text-messaging privacy policy, it did have a general "Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy." The policy in part stated that "[t]he City of Ontario reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice," and that "[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources." Employees were told verbally that the text-messaging pagers were considered e-mail and subject to the general policy. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. The court held that city employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the text messages they sent on their city-issued pagers because there was no text message privacy policy in place. Moreover, the court noted that the police department's review of the text messages was unreasonable because it could have used "less intrusive methods" to determine whether employees' had properly used the text messaging service.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Not answered. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the City of Ontario did not violate its employees' Fourth Amendment rights because the city's search of Mr. Quon's text messages was reasonable. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that even assuming that Mr. Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages, the city's search of them was reasonable because it was motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose and was not excessive in scope. In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's "least intrusive" means approach to the issue.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred. He observed that the majority had not settled on one of the three approaches enunciated in O'Connor v. Ortega for determining the parameters of a "reasonable expectation of privacy." He reasoned that under any of the three approaches, Mr. Quon's expectations were not violated. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed that the Court tacitly reaffirmed the O'Connor framework for determining whether the Fourth Amendment applies to public employees, arguing that it was "standardless" and "unsupported."
Learn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On the second day of jury deliberations in Reginald Lett's murder trial in a Michigan state court, the trial judge declared a mistrial because a juror asked what would happen if the jury did not agree. Mr. Lett was subsequently retried and convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After exhausting his state court remedies, including an appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, Mr. Lett petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in a Michigan federal district court arguing that his retrial violated the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. The federal district court granted the petition.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court recognized that a "court may not force a defendant to undergo retrial on a matter that concluded without a conviction or acquittal unless there was a 'manifest necessity' for declaring a mistrial." While the court further recognized that a jury deadlock is a manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial, a trial judge's decision may only be upheld if it was based on an exercise of "sound discretion." Here, the court concluded that the Michigan Supreme Court erred in finding that the trial judge had exercised sound discretion.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in this case was not unreasonable; thus, the Sixth Circuit erred in granting Mr. Lett's habeas petition. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that while the trial judge in this case should have been more thorough before declaring a mistrial, the trial judge did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law.
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Sonia Sotamayor and in part by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. Stevens argued that the trial judge's reasons for declaring a mistrial were insufficient and unreasonably complied with clearly established federal law. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit's decision should have been affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A Texas federal district court convicted Jeffrey Skilling of conspiracy, securities fraud, making false representations to auditors, and insider trading. Mr. Skilling was the former C.E.O. of Enron Corp. On appeal, he argued that the government prosecuted him under an invalid legal theory and that the jury was biased.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated Mr. Skilling's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court first held that the government's theory under the "Honest Services" fraud statute was valid. It reasoned that it was immaterial whether Enron's board of directors knew or even tacitly approved of Mr. Skilling's fraudulent conduct when he withheld information that would lead a reasonable employer to change its conduct. Moreover, the court held that while Mr. Skilling proved that there was sufficient inflammatory and pervasive pretrial publicity to require a presumption that prejudice tainted the jury, the government met its burden to show that jury screening was adequate, and that the district court did not empanel any juror who was unconstitutionally prejudiced.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Not answered, Not answered. The Supreme Court held that pretrial publicity and community prejudice did not prevent Mr. Skilling from obtaining a fair trial. He did not establish that a presumption of juror prejudice arose or that actual bias infected the jury that tried him. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Court noted substantial differences between Mr. Skilling's case and in those where a presumption of juror prejudice arose. Most notably, the Court recognized that Mr. Skilling's trial took place in Houston, the fourth most populous city in the United States, as opposed to a local hamlet where it would more difficult to weed out biased jurors. The Court also recognized that the jury that convicted Mr. Skilling acquitted him of nine other counts. The Court further held that Section 1346, which proscribes fraudulent deprivations of "the intangible right of honest services," is properly confined to cover only bribery and kickback schemes. Here, Mr. Skilling's alleged misconduct entailed no bribe or kickback, and thus did not fall within Section 1346's coverage.
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Anthony M. Kennedy, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court's holding and reasoning as to Mr. Skilling's jury impartiality challenge. He also agreed that the Fifth Circuit's decision with respect to the "honest services fraud" claim warranted reversal, but on different grounds. He reasoned that Section 1346 is impermissibly vague and therefore violates the constitution. Justice Samuel A. Alito also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He clarified that his understanding of the "impartial jury" requirement dictated by the Sixth Amendment requires only that "no biased juror is actually seated at trial." Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed with the Court's resolution of the "honest services fraud" claim. However, she disagreed that Mr. Skilling received a fair trial considering the hostility that emerged in Houston after the collapse of Enron.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Curtis Johnson was convicted in a Florida federal district court for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the district court determined that his three earlier convictions constituted "violent felonies." Mr. Curtis appealed arguing that one of his prior convictions was for battery and the Florida Supreme Court had held the Florida battery law did not constitute a "violent felony."
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Mr. Johnson's prior battery conviction under Florida law constituted a "violent felony" under the ACCA. The court reasoned that the force requirement of the definition for a "violent felony" was satisfied by the "touching or striking" element under the state battery law.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. No. The Supreme Court held that while the meaning of "physical force" in the ACCA is a question of federal law, not state law, the Court was bound by the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements of a Florida statute. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia held that the Florida felony offense of battery by "actually and intentionally touching" another person does not have "as an element the use . . . of physical force against the person of another." The Court reasoned that within the context of the ACCA "physical force" means violent force, which rises beyond mere actual and intentional touching. Consequently, the Florida offense of battery does not constitute a "violent felony" under the ACCA.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented. Justice Alito stated that the classic definition of the crime of battery is the "intentional application of unlawful force against the person of another." He argued that under such a definition, battery falls squarely within the plain language of the ACCA.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction in a Washington federal district court to prevent the state of Washington from making referendum petitions available under the state's Public Records Act ("PRA"). In response to a petition titled "Preserve Marriage, Protect Children," plaintiffs attempted to prevent the release of the names and contact information of individuals who signed the petition. The plaintiffs argued that, as applied to referendum petitions, the PRA violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The district court granted the injunction.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the PRA does not violate the First Amendment when applied to require public disclosure of petitions calling for a referendum. The court reasoned that even assuming that signing a petition qualifies as expressive conduct, and that application of the PRA's public access provision has an incidental effect on a referendum signer's speech by deterring some would-be signers, the appropriate level of constitutional inquiry is intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the interests asserted by the state are sufficiently important to justify the law's incidental limitations of referendum petition signers' First Amendment freedoms.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the disclosure of referendum petitions does not as a general matter violate the First Amendment. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that an "exacting scrutiny standard" is the appropriate standard for determining First Amendment challenges in the electoral context. The standard requires a "substantial relation" between the disclosure requirement and a "sufficiently important" governmental interest. Here, the state met its burden in establishing that its disclosure requirement was constitutional.
Justice Samuel A. Alito concurred. He noted that the Court's opinion did not bar "as applied" exemptions from the PRA's disclosure requirements. To obtain an exemption, a speaker must show "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also concurred. She agreed that in this case, given the relative weight of the interests at stake and the traditionally public nature of the referendum process, the Court correctly rejected the constitutional challenge to the PRA. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He opined that this was "not a hard case" as it merely dealt with a neutral, nondiscriminatory policy of disclosing information already in the state's possession that might one day indirectly burden signatories. He did not view the burden imposed by the PRA as substantial. Justice Antonin Scalia also concurred in the judgment. He noted that a history indicates that the First Amendment does not prohibit public disclosure. He also doubted whether signing a petition fits within the definition of "freedom of speech" at all. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented. He argued that the PRA severely burdens the First Amendment right to free speech and "chills participation in the referendum process."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
American Needle Inc. filed suit in an Illinois federal district court against the National Football League ("NFL") and Reebok International Ltd. alleging that the teams' exclusive licensing agreement with Reebok violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. American Needle argued that because individual NFL teams separately own their team logos and trademarks, their collective agreement to authorize NFL Properties to award the exclusive headwear license to Reebok, was in fact a conspiracy to restrict other vendors' ability to obtain licenses for the teams' intellectual property. The district court disagreed and dismissed the case.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held that NFL teams were a single entity for purposes of antitrust laws, and thus could not have conspired to restrict trade. Therefore, the court stated that the teams were free to license their intellectual property on an exclusive basis.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the National Football League's licensing of intellectual property in this case constitutes concerted action that is not categorically beyond Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act's coverage. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for a unanimous Court, it noted that each NFL team is a substantial, independently owned, and independently managed business, whose objectives are not common. The Court reasoned that while the actions of NFL Properties ("NFLP") are not as easily classified as concerted activity, the NFLP's decisions about licensing are a concerted activity and, thus, are covered by Section 1.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Karen L. Jerman filed suit in an Ohio federal district against the law firm Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). The law firm had sought foreclosure on a property owned by Ms. Jerman and erroneously informed her that the FDCPA stated that the debt in question would be considered valid unless she disputed it in writing. Only later did the law firm discover that Ms. Jerman owed no debt and consequently withdrew its complaint. Before trial, the law firm argued that while it violated the FDCPA, its error was a bona fide error, and thus a complete defense to its actions. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FDCPA error defense applies to mistakes of law. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative history behind the FDCPA did not indicate Congress intended it to apply solely to clerical errors.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held that the bona fide error defense in the FDCPA does not apply to a violation resulting from a debt collector's mistaken interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Court reasoned in part that "ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally." Moreover, the Court did not find that Congress intended otherwise.
Justice Antonin G. Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority opinion in that it traced the actions of Congress outside of the FDCPA context to determine that Congress did not intend the bona fide error defense to apply to legal errors. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Samuel A. Alito, dissented. He disagreed with the majority opinion rejecting the straightforward and reasonable interpretation of the FDCPA that the bona fide error defense applies to legal errors.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Hertz in a California state court. Hertz moved to remove the case to a California federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argued that there was no diversity jurisdiction as Hertz's principal place of business was California and not New Jersey. The federal district court agreed and remanded the case to the state court.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court. It held that the district court correctly applied the "place of operations test" to determine Hertz's principal place of business. Therefore, there was no diversity jurisdiction and the district court had no authority over the case.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. No. The Supreme Court held that it retained jurisdiction over the case. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) simply requires a court of appeals to reach a decision within a specified time and does not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction when a court of appeals fails to reach a decision within the prescribed amount of time. Here, 28 U.S.C. § 1254 still gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction over any case it grants certiorari while that case is in the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court also held that the term "principal place of business" refers to the place where a corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities -- in other words its "nerve center." The Court stated that in practice, the nerve center is normally the corporation's headquarters -- provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination. The Court remanded the case to the district court in order to determine whether Hertz's headquarters in New Jersey was its nerve center.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of Law (CLS) filed suit against the university in a California federal district for violating its First Amendment rights. The Hastings College of Law failed to recognize the CLS as an official student organization because state law requires all registered student organizations to allow "any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions, regardless of their status or beliefs." In contrast, CLS requires its members to attest in writing that "I believe in: The Bible as the inspired word of God; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's son; The vicarious death of Jesus Christ for our sins; His bodily resurrection and His personal return; The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration; [and] Jesus Christ, God's son, is Lord of my life." The district court dismissed the case.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the school's conditions on recognizing student groups were viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Therefore, the school's conditions did not violate the CLS's First Amendment rights.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the college's all-comers policy is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student organization forum; and, therefore, did not transgress First Amendment limitations. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the same considerations that have led the Court to apply a less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited public forums, counseled the same result in this case. The Court further reasoned that, considering this constitutional inquiry occurs in the education context, Hasting's all-comers policy is reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote separately, concurring. He agreed with the Court's holding and answered an argument raised by CLS that Hasting's Nondiscrimination Policy would be "plainly unconstitutional" if addressed in this case. He disagreed with CLS noting that while the First Amendment may protect CLS' discriminatory practices off campus, it does not require a public university to validate or support such practices. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy also concurred. He noted that to be effective, a limited forum will exclude some speakers based on their affiliation, as occurred in this case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, dissented. He critiqued the majority for expounding the principle: "no freedom for expression that offends prevailing standards of political correctness in our country's institutions of higher learning." He argued that the majority arms public institutions with a "handy weapon" for suppressing the speech of unpopular groups.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Locomotive engineer Robert McBride filed suit after contending that he injured his hand while adding and removing railroad cars for his employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, a rail carrier is liable for worker injuries that result from negligence by the carrier. A trial judge instructed the jury that CSX caused or contributed to McBride's injury if its negligence "played a part, no matter how small, in bringing about the injury." The jury found for McBride and awarded him $184,250.
CSX argued that McBride should have been required to prove that the company's alleged negligence was a cause of the injury. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed, affirming the verdict.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The charge proper in FELA cases, we hold, simply tracks the language Congress employed, informing juries that a defendant railroad caused or contributed to a plaintiff employee's injury if the railroad's negligence played any part in bringing about the injury," Ginsburg wrote for the majority. Meanwhile, Chief Justice John Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and Samuel Alito. "The Court is wrong to dispense with that familiar element of an action seeking recovery for negligence, an element 'generally thought to be a necessary limitation on liability,'" Roberts wrote.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Two hours after Hannah Bruesewitz received her six-month diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccine in 1992, she started developing seizures and was hospitalized for weeks. Hannah has continued to suffer from residual seizure disorder that requires her to receive constant care, according to her parents. When their daughter was three-years-old, Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz filed a petition seeking compensation for her injuries. One month prior to the petition, new regulations eliminated Hannah's seizure disorder from the list of compensable injuries. The family's petition was denied. Three years later, in 1998, the drug company Wyeth withdrew the type of vaccine used in Hannah's inoculation from the market.
The Bruesewitzes filed a lawsuit against Wyeth in state court in Pennsylvania. They claimed the drug company failed to develop a safer vaccine and should be held accountable for preventable injuries caused by the vaccine's defective design. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act protected Wyeth from lawsuits over vaccine injury claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. The majority reasoned that Congress had set up a special vaccine court as a way to provide compensation to injured children without driving drug manufacturers from the vaccine market. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Carol Anne Bond was found guilty of trying to poison her husband's mistress, Myrlinda Haynes, with toxic chemicals at least 24 times over the course of several months. A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged Bond with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of a criminal statute implementing the treaty obligations of the United States under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The grand jury also charged Bond with two counts of mail theft. Bond's attorneys argue that the statute was intended to deal with rogue states and terrorists and that their client should have been prosecuted under state law instead. Bond, a laboratory technician, stole the chemical potassium dichromate from the company where she worked. Haynes was not injured. Bond's husband had a child with Haynes while married to Bond. Haynes had contacted police and postal authorities after finding the chemicals at her home. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Bond lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on the basis of the Tenth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Bond has standing to challenge the federal statute on grounds that the measure interferes with the powers reserved to States," Kennedy wrote. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer in which she argued: "I join the Court's opinion and write separately to make the following observation. Bond, like any other defendant, has a personal right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
John Thompson sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, the District Attorney, Harry Connick, in his official and individual capacities, and several assistant district attorneys in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C § 1983 in a Louisiana federal district court. Mr. Thompson served fourteen years on death row for a crime he did not commit because prosecutors failed to turn over blood work in a related case. The jury awarded Mr. Thompson $14 million against Mr. Connick in his official capacity. On appeal, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a tie vote and; thus by rule, affirmed the district court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. A divided Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's office could not be held liable for the illegal conduct of one of its prosecutors when there has been only one violation resulting from that deficient training. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the majority opinion for the court. In a dissent read from the bench, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, argued that the "what happened here, the Court's opinion obscures, was no momentary oversight, no single incident of a lone officer's misconduct." Instead, Ginsburg contended, evidence "established persistent, deliberately indifferent conduct for which the District Attorney's Office bears responsibility under §1983."
Justice Antonin Scalia joined the majority opinion but filed a separate concurrence, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, which responded to the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Jason Pepper pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine in an Iowa federal district court. In the latest of a long-running series of appeals and remands, a newly assigned Iowa federal district court sentenced Mr. Pepper to 77 months imprisonment and 12 months supervised release – a 20% downward departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory range. Thereafter, the district court granted the government's motion to reduce Mr. Pepper's sentence further to 65 months imprisonment because of the assistance Mr. Pepper provided after he was initially sentenced. Mr. Pepper appealed arguing in part that the district court should consider evidence of his post-sentence rehabilitation to reduce his sentence further.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Pepper's sentence, holding in part that evidence of a defendant's post-sentence rehabilitation was not relevant at resentencing. The court reasoned that Eighth Circuit precedent was clear that such evidence was not relevant.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and no. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded the case back to the lower court in a majority opinion written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The Court held that when the defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal, a district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant's rehabilitation after the initial sentences; and, that evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the sentencing guidelines.
Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurrence in which he agreed with the majority that the "law does not require a sentencing court to follow a Guideline policy statement that forbids taking account of post-sentencing rehabilitation." He went on, however, to suggest: "this conclusion does not leave a sentencing court free to disregard the Guidelines at will." Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito filed a partial concurrence and partial dissent, contending that "requiring judges to give significant weight to the Commission's policy decisions does not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment right that the mandatory Guidelines system was found to violate, i.e., the right to have a jury make certain factual findings that are relevant to sentencing." Justice Clarence Thomas dissented in full, writing that he would have affirmed the lower court's decision and upheld Pepper's sentence. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Alejandra Tapia was convicted of bringing illegal aliens into the United States and of jumping bail after being charged with immigration crimes. Following the jury trial, a judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced Tapia to 51 months in prison, noting that one factor in giving her a longer sentence was to make sure she remained confined long enough to take part in a drug rehab program.
Tapia appealed the sentence, arguing that the district court committed plain error by basing her sentence on speculation about whether and when she could enter and complete the Bureau of Prison's 500-hour drug abuse treatment program. But in April 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court holding in a unanimous decision by Justice Elena Kagan. "Section 3582(a) does not permit a sentencing court to impose or lengthen a prison term in order to foster a defendant's rehabilitation," Kagan wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Samuel Alito in which she wrote: "I agree with the Court's conclusion that 18 U. S. C. §3582(a) 'precludes federal courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant's rehabilitation. ' I write separately to note my skepticism that the District Judge violated this proscription in this case."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Daniel Kirk served with the U.S. Army in Vietnam from 1969 to 1971. Beginning in 1978, he worked at Millar Elevator Industries, which was later absorbed by Schindler Elevator in 2002. Although he had been promoted within the company on past occasions, in 2003, he was demoted from a managerial position to a non-managerial slot. He then resigned. Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor in 2004 claiming his demotion was in violation of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act. After his claim was denied by the department, he filed suit in the Southern District of New York in 2005 under the False Claims Act. Kirk claimed the company was shirking its obligation to take affirmative steps to employ and promote veterans, invite eligible veterans to identify themselves to employers and file annual reports detailing the hiring and placement of veterans.
Using documentation supplied by FOIA requests submitted by his wife and his own knowledge of company operations, he claimed the company failed to file reports from 1998 until late 2004 and filed false reports in 2004, 2005 and 2006, alleging that each claim for payment on the hundreds of government contracts submitted by Schindler was a violation of the False Claims Act.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint in March 2009 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In April 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the lower court order and remanded the case for further proceedings.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a decision by Justice Clarence Thomas. A written response to a FOIA request for records is a report within the meaning of the False Claims Act's disclosure bar, according to the majority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissent, which was joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Ginsburg wrote that she would "affirm the Second Circuit's judgment as faithful to the text, context, purpose, and history of the FCA's public disclosure bar." Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Randy Moore pled no-contest to felony murder in an Oregon trial court and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. After exhausting his post-conviction state court remedies, Mr. Moore petitioned for habeas corpus relief in an Oregon federal district court. Mr. Moore argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that his taped confession was obtained unconstitutionally. The district court denied the petition.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted the petition. The court held that Mr. Moore's counsel's failure to suppress Mr. Moore's confession was both constitutionally deficient and prejudicial under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington. The court was careful to note that even the state conceded the means by which the state elicited Mr. Moore's confession were unconstitutional because Mr. Moore's request for counsel had been ignored by the police.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The court reversed the appeals court decision, holding that defense counsel was not ineffective and that Moore was not in any event prejudiced by his counsel's actions. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the opinion for the court with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filing a concurring opinion. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Gladys Mensing took the drug metoclopramide for four years to help fight diabetic gastroparesis. She filed a lawsuit against the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors, contending that the drug gave her a severe neurological movement disorder, tardive dyskinesia, but none of the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors made any effort to include warnings on the label.
Metoclopramide manufacturers Pliva Inc. and Actavis Elizabeth LLC asked for the lawsuit to be thrown out, arguing that government regulations require thp to have the same label on metoclopramide as is on its brand-name equivalent, Reglan. Reglan did not have a warning about tardive dyskinesia while Mensing was taking metoclopramide.
A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota agreed, saying the lawsuit was pre-ppted by the federal regulations requiring the two labels to match. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit overturned that ruling, holding that more should have been done to warn consumers about possible risks.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Kennedy joined the opinion in part. "We defer to the FDA's interpretation of its CBE and generic labeling regulations," Justice Thomas wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan. "We have traditionally held defendants claiming impossibility to a demanding standard: Until today, the mere possibility of impossibility had not been enough to establish pre-emption," Sotomayor wrote.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Arizona taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of Arizona's tuition tax credit in an Arizona federal district court. They alleged the tax credit violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it funneled money to private religious schools. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the taxpayers had standing to bring their suit and had alleged a viable Establishment Clause claim.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court overturned the lower court in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. The majority held that the challengers to the tax credit in Arizona lack standing under Article III. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. "State sponsorship of religion sometimes harms individuals only (but this 'only' is no small matter) in their capacity as contributing members of our national community," Kagan wrote for the dissenters.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A California state court convicted Charles Martin of robbery and murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, Mr. Martin filed a round of habeas petitions in state court – all of which were denied. He then raised several new claims in petitions for federal habeas relief in a California federal district court. The court denied to examine the claims because they were not yet exhausted in state court. After Mr. Martin exhausted these last claims in state court, he returned to federal court for federal habeas corpus relief. The district court again denied the petition relying on California's statute of limitations for filing state habeas corpus petitions.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that California's statute of limitations could not operate as an independent and adequate state ground to bar federal habeas corpus review. The court reasoned that California's statute of limitations was not sufficiently defined, nor consistently applied such that it could bar Mr. Martin's petition.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The Court held that the California rule requiring state habeas petitions to be filed "as promptly as the circumstances allow" constitutes an independent state ground that is adequate to bar habeas relief in federal court.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The families of two North Carolina teenagers killed in a bus crash in France brought suit in North Carolina state court, alleging faulty tires. The tires were made in Turkey, and the plaintiffs sued Goodyear's Luxembourg affiliate and its branches in Turkey and France. A North Carolina appeals court held that the foreign defendants had sufficient contacts in the state to support general personal jurisdiction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "A connection so limited between the forum and the foreign corporation, we hold, is an inadequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction," Ginsburg wrote. "Such a connection does not establish the 'continuous and systematic' affiliation necessary to empower North Carolina courts to entertain claims unrelated to the foreign corporation's contacts with the State."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Craig and Wendy Humphries were accused of abuse by one of their children, arrested, and their children were taken away from them. They were charged with child abuse and felony torture, but the charges were dismissed once it became clear the allegations were not true. Despite the fact that the charges were dismissed, the Humphries were placed on California's Child Abuse Central Index ("CACI") – a database for known and suspected child abusers. The Humphries subsequently filed suit against Los Angeles County and various County officials in a California federal district court. The Humphries argued that California's maintenance of the CACI violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because identified individuals are not given fair opportunity to challenge the allegations against them. The district court dismissed their claims.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the erroneous listing of the Humphries on the CACI violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Humphries, as the prevailing party, then moved for attorneys' fees. The Ninth Circuit awarded the fees, reasoning that the limitations to liability established in Monell v. Department of Social Services do not apply to claims for declaratory relief.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit decision, holding that Los Angeles County does not have to pay attorneys' fees in the case. Justice Stephen Breyer, who wrote the 8-0 opinion for the court, reasoned that the court's ruling in Monell applies to claims against municipalities for prospective relief as well as to claims for damages. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the consideration and decision of the case because she worked on it while in the Solicitor General's office.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2003, the FBI arrested Abdullah al-Kidd as he was preparing to travel to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic and Islamic law. He was held for 16 days as a material witness in the terrorism trial of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Al-Kidd has since argued the government classified him as a material witness because it lacked enough evidence to hold him as a suspect. He filed a lawsuit against then-Attorney General John Ashcroft personally, claiming that he created and authorized a program that allegedly misused the material witness statute to detain suspected terrorists.
The lawsuit did not go to trial and in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Ashcroft's bid for absolute immunity, holding that it didn't apply because the government's motive for arresting Al-Kidd allegedly had nothing to do with the al-Hussayen prosecution.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Efficient and even-handed application of the law demands that we look to whether the arrest is objectively justified, rather than to the motive of the arresting officer," Scalia wrote.
Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined as to Part I. Kennedy expressed concern that the court's "holding is limited to the arguments presented by the parties and leaves unresolved whether the government's use of the Material Witness Statute in this case was lawful."
Ginsburg filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined. Ginsburg also addressed the Material Witness Statute and wrote that Al-Kidd's "ordeal is a grim reminder of the need to install safeguards against disrespect for human dignity, constraints that will control officialdom even in perilous times."
Meanwhile, Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. "Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the pretextual use of a material witness warrant for preventive detention of an individual whom the Government has no intention of using at trial is, in my view, a closer question than the majority's opinion suggests," Sotomayor declared.
Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Three members of the Williamson family were involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Delbert and Alexa wore lap/shoulder seatbelts and survived, while Thanh wore a lap-only seatbelt and died. Subsequently, they sued Mazda Motor of America for strict products liability, negligence, deceit, and wrongful death in a California state court. The court dismissed the claims, holding that federal law precluded a state court tort action "to the extent the theory of liability [was rooted in] the lap-only seat belt." On appeal, a California appellate court affirmed, holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") regulation allowing minivan rear seats to have either lap-only or lap/shoulder seat belts preempted state court wrongful death actions.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer. The court held that the state tort lawsuit in this case is not preempted by federal auto safety standards. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, while Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In these consolidated cases, the defendants engaged in drug trafficking while using a firearm. Both defendants received an additional five-year sentence for using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)A), even though they received longer mandatory minimum sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act. On appeal, they argued that the sentencing enhancement provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)A) should run concurrently with their already longer minimum sentences. The Third and Fifth Circuits rejected the defendants' arguments.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In its first opinion of the term, a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' opinions. "A defendant is subject to the highest mandatory minimum specified for his conduct in §924(c), unless another provision of law directed to conduct proscribed by §924(c) imposes an even greater mandatory minimum," Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in an 8-0 opinion. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the decision because of her involvement in the case as the solicitor general.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Various business and civil-rights organizations challenged the enforceability of The Legal Arizona Worker's Act ("LAWA") in an Arizona federal district court. They argued that federal law preempted LAWA, which requires Arizona employers to use the federal E-Verify employment verification system and revokes business licenses of those who hire unauthorized workers. The district court upheld the statute.
On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA was not preempted explicitly or impliedly by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"). The court reasoned that IRCA although IRCA expressly preempts all state and local laws imposing sanctions for hiring or recruiting unauthorized aliens, it excepts licensing laws – like LAWA – from preemptive reach. The court also reasoned that mandating the use of E-Verify is not impliedly preempted by IRCA because Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid states form requiring E-Verify participation.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court holding in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Arizona's licensing law falls well within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the States and therefore is not expressly preempted." All five members of the majority did not join the chief justice's opinion in full. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "Congress did not intend its 'licensing' language to create so broad an exemption, for doing so would permit States to eviscerate the federal Act's preemption provision," Breyer wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a separate dissent in which she contended that she "would also hold that federal law pre-empts the provision of the Arizona Act making mandatory the use of E-Verify, the federal electronic verification system." The Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
CompTel, a trade association that represents some of AT&T's competitors, filed a FOIA request with the Federal Communications Commision in 2005, seeking documents related to an FCC probe into whether AT&T had overcharged the agency for work on a technology education project. AT&T fought the request, contending the production of the documents violated Exemption 7(c) of FOIA, which exempts document disclosures in law enforcement records that would constitute an invasion of "personal privacy."
The FCC rejected AT&T's argument, but in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the phrase "personal privacy" applied to corporations because other sections of FOIA had defined "person" as a corporation.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.. The court held that corporations do not have a right of personal privacy that would protect them from the disclosure of public records that have been handed over to federal agencies. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") brought suit against the Alabama Department of Revenue in an Alabama federal district court seeking an injunction to prevent the imposition of the state's sales and use tax on diesel fuel. CSX argued that the tax discriminates against railroad companies in violate of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("RRRR"). The district court had granted a preliminary injunction, but of its own accord, dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the case.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately dismissed the action. The court reasoned that because it had already ruled in favor of the Alabama Department of Revenue on an identical challenge to the tax in Norfolk S. R. v. AL Dep't of Rev., the district court was correct in dismissing CSX's suit.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. The majority held that a railroad could invoke the RRRR statute to challenge sales and use taxes that apply to rail carriers but exempt their competitors in the transportation industry. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Following a jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Jason Louis Tinklenberg was convicted of possessing firearms after having been convicted of a felony and possessing materials used to manufacture methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.
Before trial, the district court had denied Tinklenberg's motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the STA. On appeal following Tinklenberg's conviction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the trial court had indeed violated the act and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer. The Speedy Trial Act "contains no requirement that the filing of a pretrial motion actually caused, or was expected to cause, delay of a trial," Breyer wrote for the unanimous court. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case. " I agree with the judgment of the Court in Part II that a pretrial motion need not actually postpone a trial, or create an expectation of postponement, in order for its pendency to be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act.... But I think that conclusion is entirely clear from the text of the Speedy Trial Act, and see no need to look beyond the text," Scalia argued.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In December 1993, a Rhode Island jury convicted Khalil Kholi on 10 counts of first-degree sexual assault. The charges stemmed from the alleged molestation of his two step-daughters. A judge on the state superior court sentenced Kholi to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, and the state supreme court affirmed the conviction in February 1996. Kholi did not file a federal writ of habeas corpus at that time. Instead, he filed a motion seeking sentence reduction as a form of post-conviction relief, which was denied. Kholi exhausted his procedural options regarding sentence reduction in 2007, at which time he began his appeal for federal writ of habeas corpus, which was well beyond the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's standard one-year limitation on filing. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's judgment that a petition for leniency is different from an appeal to correct legal errors and therefore does not result in a tolling of the statute of limitations under AEDPA. A circuit split exists on the issue. The First Circuit's decision was in line with a Tenth Circuit ruling on the same issue, but the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have previously ruled that a petition for leniency does not toll the statute of limitations under AEDPA.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito. "Because the parties agree that a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law is not part of the direct review process, we hold that respondent's motion tolled the AEDPA limitation period and that his federal habeas petition was therefore timely," Alito wrote for the court.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment but disagreeing with "Footnote 3 of the Court's opinion, which declines to decide whether a Rule 35 motion seeks direct review."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A group of Halliburton Co. shareholders, led by the Erica P. John Fund, filed a lawsuit that contends that from 1999 to 2001, the Houston-based company falsified earnings reports, played down estimated asbestos liability and overstated the benefits of a merger. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the investors' motion for class certification in the case, holding that they couldn't sue as a group because they hadn't established that they lost money as a result of the alleged fraud. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Securities fraud plaintiffs need not prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification," the Chief Justice wrote.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Virginia Office of Protection and Advocacy ("VOPA"), a state agency dedicated to advocating on behalf of persons with disabilities, sued several Virginia state officials in their official capacities in a Virginia federal district court. VOPA alleged that the officials violated two federal statutes when the officials refused VOPA access to state records which VOPA argued it was entitled. The officials moved to dismiss the case arguing that they were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the state officials were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The court reasoned that: (1) Congress did not abrogate state immunity under the statutes which VOPA sued under and (2) the mere receipt of federal funds by Virginia under the two statutes did not mean that the state had consented to suit. The court declined to extend the Eleventh Amendment exception established in Ex parte Young, where a private party may seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials, noting that VOPA was not a private party but rather a state agency.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. " Ex parte Young allows a federal court to hear a lawsuit for prospective relief against state officials brought by another agency of the same state," Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the 6-2 majority. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Roberts wrote that he disagreed with the majority's "substantial and novel expansion of what we have also called a 'narrow exception' to a State's sovereign immunity." Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2007, the Vermont legislature passed a law that banned the sale, transmission or use of prescriber-identifiable data (''PI data'') for marketing or promoting a prescription drug without the consent of the prescriber. The law also prohibited the sale, license or exchange for value of PI data for marketing or promoting a prescription drug.
Three companies -- IMS Health, Verispan and Source Healthcare Analytics, a unit of Dutch publisher Wolters Kluwer -- that collect and sell such data and by a trade group for pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit struck down the measure, holding that it violated the First Amendment because it restricts the speech rights of data miners without directly advancing legitimate state interests.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Vermont's statute, which imposes content-and speaker-based burdens on protected expression, is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny," Kennedy wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan. "The First Amendment does not require courts to apply a special 'heightened' standard of review when reviewing such an effort," Breyer wrote. "And, in any event, the statute meets the First Amendment standard this Court has previously applied when the government seeks to regulate commercial speech."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
William Freeman was charged with one count of crack possession, among other charges, and entered a plea agreement that included a sentence of 106 months. After his agreement was accepted by the trial judge and his sentence was entered, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to reduce the disparity in the treatment of crack and powder cocaine, and made the amendment retroactive. Freeman sought to reduce his sentence accordingly.
But in December 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky refused to do so. In November 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a plurality opinion. "The Justices who join this plurality opinion conclude that the categorical bar enacted by the Court of Appeals finds no support in §3582(c)(2), Rule11(c)(1)(C), or the relevant Guidelines policy statements," Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote. In the controlling opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted: "In my view, the term of imprisonment imposed by a district court pursuant to an agreement authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) ((C) agreement) is 'based on' the agreement itself, not on the judge's calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines." Meanwhile, Chief Justice John Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. "I agree with the concurrence that the sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is based on the agreement, not the Sentencing Guidelines," Roberts wrote. "I would, however, adhere to that logic regardless whether the agreement could be said to 'use' or 'employ' a Guidelines range in arriving at the particular sentence specified in the agreement."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
More than 20 years ago, General Dynamics Corp. and McDonnell Douglas Corp. signed a contract to build eight A- 12 Avenger stealth fighters for the U.S. Navy at a total estimated cost of more than $4 billion. Three years later, the Navy and then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney declared the company in default and canceled the contract. The government has argued that the companies weren't able to produce the aircraft as designed on schedule and is seeking repayment of $1.35 billion, plus more than $2.5 billion in accumulated interest, arguing that the companies failed to meet the terms of the contract. Meanwhile, General Dynamics Corp. and Boeing Co., which inherited the litigation through its purchase of McDonnell Douglas, contend that the delay was caused by the government's refusal to share essential stealth technology.
The government has argued that the companies couldn't press that argument because litigating the issue would require the disclosure of military secrets and jeopardize national security. Two lower courts agreed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Antonin Scalia. The court held that neither the government nor the defense contractors could pursue the long-running dispute because of the possibility that state secrets might be revealed. "Suit on the contract, or for performance rendered or funds paid under the contract, will not lie, and the parties will be left where they are," Scalia wrote. "Both parties—the government no less than petitioners—must have assumed the risk that state secrets would prevent the adjudication of claims of inadequate performance."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A California trial court convicted Joshua Richter of burglary and murder. He exhausted his state court remedies and filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. Mr. Richter argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the petition and was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
However, upon rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the state court's determination that Mr. Richter was not denied effective assistance of counsel was unreasonable. The court reasoned that under Strickland v. Washington the defendant must show that "counsel's performance was deficient." And, the defendant must show that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Here, the requirements of Strickland were met when Mr. Richter's counsel failed to conduct sufficient pre-trial investigation to determine what forensic evidence or experts would be useful to the defense's theory when it was foreseeable what evidence the state would introduce.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Reversing the lower court order, the court held that the defense lawyer was not deficient in failing to consult blood evidence when planning strategy for trial. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the opinion, which was joined by eight of the justices with Justice Elena Kagan taking no part in the consideration of the case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.