{"doc_id": "50606:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50606:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1970, Jane Roe (a fictional name used in court documents to protect the plaintiff’s identity) filed a lawsuit against Henry Wade, the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas, where she resided, challenging a Texas law making abortion illegal except by a doctor’s orders to save a woman’s life. In her lawsuit, Roe alleged that the state laws were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50606:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50606:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50606:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nInherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a fundamental “right to privacy” that protects a pregnant woman’s choice whether to have an abortion. However, this right is balanced against the government’s interests in protecting women's health and protecting “the potentiality of human life.” The Texas law challenged in this case violated this right.\nJustice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority of the Court.\nFirst, the Court considered whether the case was moot, concluding that it was not. When the subject of litigation is “capable of repetition yet evading review,” a case need not be dismissed as moot. Pregnancy is a “classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness.”\nThe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state action the right to privacy, and a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion falls within that right to privacy. A state law that broadly prohibits abortion without respect to the stage of pregnancy or other interests violates that right. Although the state has legitimate interests in protecting the health of pregnant women and the “potentiality of human life,” the relative weight of each of these interests varies over the course of pregnancy, and the law must account for this variability.\nIn the first trimester of pregnancy, the state may not regulate the abortion decision; only the pregnant woman and her attending physician can make that decision. In the second trimester, the state may impose regulations on abortion that are reasonably related to maternal health. In the third trimester, once the fetus reaches the point of “viability,” a state may regulate abortions or prohibit them entirely, so long as the laws contain exceptions for cases when abortion is necessary to save the life or health of the mother.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50606:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50613:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50613:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJoan Stanley had three children with Peter Stanley. The Stanleys never married, but lived together off and on for 18 years. When Joan died, the State of Illinois took the children. Under Illinois law, unwed fathers were presumed unfit parents regardless of their actual fitness and their children became wards of the state. Peter appealed the decision, arguing that the Illinois law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because unwed mothers were not deprived of their children without a showing that they were actually unfit parents. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Stanley’s Equal Protection claim, holding that his actual fitness as a parent was irrelevant because he and the children’s mother were unmarried.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50613:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50613:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50613:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 5-2 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that it could consider the constitutionality of the Illinois law even though Peter might have regained custody of his children through adoption or guardianship proceedings. The Illinois law violated the Due Process clause because an unwed father was stripped of his parental rights without a hearing. Justice William O. Douglas joined in this part of the opinion. A four justice plurality went on to write that the Illinois law also violated the Equal Protection Clause because it denied a fitness hearing to certain parents, while granting one to others.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that the majority exceeded its authority by raising the Due Process issue when the lower court had not. The Equal Protection question was the only one properly before the court, and it was not violated because the state was merely recognizing the legal relationships of fathers whether through marriage or adoption. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent. Justice Lewis F. Powell and Justice William H. Rehnquist did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50613:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50623:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50623:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Giglio was convicted of passing forged money orders. While his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was pending, Giglio’s counsel discovered new evidence. The evidence indicated that the prosecution failed to disclose that it promised a key witness immunity from prosecution in exchange for testimony against Giglio. The district court denied Giglio’s motion for a new trial, finding that the error did not affect the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50623:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50623:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50623:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that evidence of the agreement was relevant to the witness’ credibility. Because the new evidence affected the witness’ credibility and the prosecution’s case rested almost entirely on this witness’ testimony, the original trial violated due process and entitled Giglio to a new trial. Justice Lewis F. Powell and Justice William H. Rehnquist did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50623:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50632:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50632:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Idaho Probate Code specified that \"males must be preferred to females\" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50632:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50632:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50632:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that \"[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50632:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50643:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50643:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMiller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of \"adult\" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50643:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50643:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50643:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that \"[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.\" The Court rejected the \"utterly without redeeming social value\" test of the Memoirs decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50643:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50644:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50644:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nErnest E. Mandel was a Belgian professional journalist and editor-in-chief of La Guache, a Belgian Left Socialist weekly publication. He described himself as a revolutionary Marxist, advocating the economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world Communism. Previously, the United States twice allowed Mandel to temporarily visit the United States -- once as a working journalist in 1962 and once as a lecturer in 1968. Both times and without Mandel’s knowledge, the State Department found him ineligible, but the attorney general used his discretionary power under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to admit Mandel temporarily.\nThe Graduate Student Association at Stanford University invited Mandel to the United States for six days to participate in a conference. On September 8, 1969, Mandel applied to the American Counsel in Brussels for a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States. Other persons invited Mandel to additional events, and Mandel filed a second visa application in October detailing a more extensive itinerary. On October 23, the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel that the State Department -- headed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers -- refused his first application. The State Department later recommended to Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst that Mandel’s ineligibility be waived with respect to his October application. In a letter dated February 13, 1970, however, the Immigration and Naturalization Service stated that Mandel’s 1968 activities far exceeded the scope of that visa and concluded that the Attorney General should not waive Mandel’s ineligibility. Mandel’s address to the conference was delivered by telephone.\nMandel, along with various United States citizens who invited Mandel to speaking engagements, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge district court panel held in a 2-1 decision that citizens of the United States have a First Amendment right to have Mandel enter the country and to hear him speak. The court entered a declaratory judgment ruling that the portions of the statute delegating the waiver power to the attorney general were invalid as applied to Mandel; it also enjoined Rogers and Kleindienst from denying Mandel admission to the United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50644:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50644:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50644:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court held that the First Amendment did not obligate Kleindienst to grant a waiver to Mandel. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the First Amendment protected the scholars and students’ right to listen to and engage with Mandel in person --and that Mandel’s participation via telephone was not a good replacement-- but held that the implication of First Amendment rights was not dispositive here.\nJustice Blackmun noted Congress’ longstanding power to exclude aliens from the United States, and to set the terms and conditions of their entry. Through the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress legitimately delegated to the executive the authority to waive a finding of inadmissibility. He described the historical pattern of increasing federal control on the admissibility of aliens, particularly regarding individuals with Communist affiliation or views. Justice Blackmun held that the Court would not intervene so long as the executive used its waiver power on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason. This test did not balance the First Amendment interests of persons seeking to communicate with the applicant.\nJustice William Douglas dissented. He argued that Kleindienst had no clear interest in preventing Mandel from entering the country, given that Mandel posed no threat to national security. He described Kleindienst’s use of his delegated authority as an act of censorship, an unacceptable executive interpretation of congressional intent.\nJustices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan also dissented, in an opinion written by Justice Marshall. He pointed to the Court’s longstanding protection of the right to receive information and ideas, arguing that the government had no power to interrupt the process of free discussion. Justice Marshall questioned the precedential validity of the majority’s “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” test, as well as the truthfulness of the Kleindienst’s stated reasons for excluding Mandel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50644:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50655:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50655:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Illinois Crime Investigating Commission was created to investigate organized crime in Illinois. Albert Sarno and Chris Cardi were police officers. The Commission wanted the officers to testify pursuant to an investigation of a \"juice loan\" or \"loan shark\" racket.\nOn February 8, 1968, the presiding judge in the Circuit Court of Cook County entered an order requiring the petitioners to appear before the commission under a grant of immunity pursuant to an Illinois statute. On February 24, 1968, the officers appeared, but they refused to answer any questions pleading their right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.\nOn March 21, 1968, the Commission filed a motion in the Circuit court, and moved the court to enter an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and answer the questions. The officers filed a motion to dismiss or to strike the foregoing motion. The officers' motion was denied, and the court entered an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and to answer the questions. The officers refused to obey this subsequent order, still pleading the Fifth Amendment. The officers were found in contempt of court and sentenced to serve a period of six months in the County Jail. The decision of the trial court was appealed and subsequently affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. The officers appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50655:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50655:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50655:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court cited its own decision in Kastigar v. United States, and held that testimony may be compelled from an unwilling witness over a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by the grant of immunity. The Court further determined that any questions regarding the scope of protection under the Illinois immunity statute was best left to the courts of Illinois, meaning that the writ of certiorari was improperly granted. The Supreme Court dismissed the Writ.\nJustice William O. Douglas dissented for the reasons state in his dissenting opinion in Kastigar v. United States. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Kastigar v. United States. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50655:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50656:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50656:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJon Argersinger was an indigent charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor in the State of Florida. The charge carried with it a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a $1,000 fine. During the bench trial in which he was convicted and sentenced to serve ninety days in jail, Argersinger was not represented by an attorney.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50656:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50656:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50656:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) the Court found that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments required states to provide an attorney to indigent defendants in cases involving serious crimes. In this case, a unanimous Court extended that right to cover defendants charged with misdemeanors who faced the possibility of a jail sentence. Justice Douglas's plurality opinion described the intricacies involved in misdemeanor charges and the danger that unrepresented defendants may fall victim to \"assembly-line justice.\" Thus, in order to guarantee fairness in trials involving potential jail time, no matter how petty the charge, the Court found that the state was obligated to provide the accused with counsel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50656:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50657:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50657:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Baird gave away Emko Vaginal Foam to a woman following his Boston University lecture on birth control and over-population. Massachusetts charged Baird with a felony, to distribute contraceptives to unmarried men or women. Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them. Baird was not an authorized distributor of contraceptives.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50657:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50657:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50657:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Massachusetts law at issue violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by making it a crime for anyone other than a licensed physician or pharmacist to provide contraceptives, and by limiting access to such products to married people only. Justice William J. Brennan authored the 6-1 majority opinion of the Court.\nThe Court rejected Massachusetts’ claims that the statute was justified either on health grounds or as a deterrent to premarital sex. It found that the statute did not rationally serve either purpose. First, the law permitted distribution of contraceptives to prevent disease regardless of marital status, which undermined the health rationale. Moreover, the law treated distribution for unmarried individuals as a felony punishable by up to five years, while fornication was only a misdemeanor—a disparity that the Court said could not be reconciled with the state's asserted purpose of deterring premarital sex. Because unmarried individuals were entirely denied access to contraceptives while married individuals could obtain them via prescriptions, the law created an arbitrary and discriminatory classification unrelated to any legitimate goal.\nThe Court concluded that if married people have a constitutional right to access and use contraception under Griswold v. Connecticut, then unmarried people must have the same right. The law’s differential treatment of similarly situated individuals — based solely on marital status — made its enforcement inconsistent with equal protection principles. Treating contraceptives themselves as immoral or punishing their distribution to unmarried people could not support such unequal burdens on fundamental rights.\nJustice William O. Douglas authored a concurring opinion arguing the conviction violated the First Amendment’s protections for speech and educational advocacy.\nJustice Byron White, joined by Justice Harry Blackmun, concurred in the result, reasoning that the conviction could not stand because the state had failed to prove that the contraceptive Baird distributed posed any health risk.\nChief Justice Warren Burger dissented, arguing that the law legitimately regulated medical distribution of contraceptives, and Baird lacked standing to challenge it on behalf of unmarried persons.\nJustices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist took no part in the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50657:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50663:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50663:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Georgia state court convicted Johnny Wilson of violating a state statute. The statute provided that \"[a]ny person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence . . . opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.\" On appeal, Mr. Wilson argued that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the argument. Mr. Wilson successfully sought habeas corpus relief from a Georgia federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50663:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50663:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50663:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional. With Justice William J. Brennan writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Quoting Speiser v. Randall, the Court noted that \"the separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools than (Georgia) has supplied.\"\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented. He disagreed with not only the manner in which the majority reached its decision, but also its conclusion. Ultimately, he argued that the statute was narrowly tailored and did not suppress or deter \"important protected speech.\" Justice Harry A. Blackmun also dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger. He found it implausible that a state could not restrict speech that was as wildly offensive as in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50663:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50671:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50671:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFurman was burglarizing a private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50671:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50671:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50671:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court's one-page per curiam opinion held that the imposition of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. In over two hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the justices articulated their views on this controversial subject. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional in all instances. Other concurrences focused on the arbitrary nature with which death sentences have been imposed, often indicating a racial bias against black defendants. The Court's decision forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50671:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50683:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50683:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nK. Leroy Irvis, a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. 107, was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. The bylaws of the Lodge limited membership to white male Caucasians. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him, arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the club's discrimination \"state action.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50683:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50683:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50683:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Moose Lodge's refusal to serve food and beverages to Irvis because he was black did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that the state action doctrine did not necessarily apply to all private entities that received benefits or services from the government; otherwise, the Court reasoned, all private associations that received electricity, water, and fire protection would be subject to state regulation. The Court found that the Moose Lodge \"a private social club in a private building,\" and thus not subject to the Equal Protection Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50683:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50688:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50688:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called to testify before state grand juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50688:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50688:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50688:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a \"compelling\" and \"paramount\" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the case involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no Constitutional violation. The fact that reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50688:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50689:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50689:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Shard reported to the Chicago police that two men stole his wallet. The wallet contained traveler’s checks and his social security card, among other things. The next day, two police officers stopped Thomas Kirby and his friend, Ralph Bean. When asked for identification, Kirby produced Shard’s wallet. The officers arrested Kirby and Bean and brought them to the Maxwell Street Police Station. Once there, the officers learned about Shard’s robbery and sent a car to pick up Shard and bring him to the station. Without an attorney present, police asked Shard if Kirby and Bean were his robbers. Shard instantly gave a positive identification. Kirby and Bean were not indicted until almost 6 weeks later. At trial, Kirby unsuccessfully attempted to suppress Shard’s identification. The jury found Kirby guilty and the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50689:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50689:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50689:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a four justice plurality, delivered the judgment of the court. The plurality expressed that there is no constitutional right to counsel for an identification that takes place before the accused is indicted or formally charged. For this reason, the Exclusionary Rule does not apply, and the identification can be admitted at trial. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred, emphasizing that the right to counsel does not attach until an accused is formally charged. Justice Lewis F. Powell concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the Exclusionary Rule does not apply.\nJustice William J. Brennan dissented, arguing that prior Supreme Court Exclusionary Rule precedent just happened to cover post-indictment identifications, but the reasons for using the Rule are the same in pre-indictment cases. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the Exclusionary Rule applies in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50689:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50692:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50692:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50692:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50692:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50692:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade. In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court found that the values and programs of secondary school were \"in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion,\" and that an additional one or two years of high school would not produce the benefits of public education cited by Wisconsin to justify the law. Justice William O. Douglas filed a partial dissent but joined with the majority regarding Yoder. Justices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50692:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50695:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50695:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid Roth was hired under a one-year contract to teach political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. He was informed that he would not be rehired at the end of his contract. No reasons were given for this decision. Roth brought suit against the university claiming that (1) the real reason for his non-retention was his criticism of the university administration violating his right to free speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the university's failure to advise him of the reason for its decision violated his right to procedural due process. Roth won on the second claim. It was upheld on appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50695:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50695:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50695:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion by Justice Potter Stewart, the court held 5-3 that Roth had no protected interest in continued employment, as he had completed his contracted term, and therefore was no Fourteenth Amendment protection.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50695:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50707:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50707:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMississippi Chemical Corp. and Costal Chemical Corp. were “cooperate associations” within the meaning of the Agricultural Marketing Act. The associations qualified for membership in a “bank for Cooperatives”, which allowed them to borrow money. The Farm Credit Act of 1955 required that the associations buy Class “C” stocks valued at $100. The associations claimed a $99 interest deduction on their taxes for every stock purchased. When the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction, the associations paid the deficiency and then sued for a refund. The district court found for the associations and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50707:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50707:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50707:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court and remanding. Looking at the legislative scheme involved, the Supreme Court held that the stock was a capitol asset with long-term value, so it was not deductible. Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50707:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50709:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50709:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1969, the State of New York indicted Rudolph Santobello on two felony counts. After Santobello pled not guilty to both counts, the prosecutor offered him a plea deal. In order to receive a lighter sentence, Santobello could plead guilty to a lesser offense. The prosecutor further agreed not to recommend a sentence to the judge. Santobello accepted the deal and entered a plea of guilty to the lesser offense.\nAfter several months, Santobello still had not been sentenced. By the time the court considered his sentencing, both Santobello’s defense counsel and the original prosecutor had been replaced. The new prosecutor, unaware of the previous prosecutor’s plea offer, recommended the maximum one-year sentence for Santobello’s crime. Despite Santobello’s objections, the court issued the maximum sentence. Santobello appealed, but the appellate court affirmed his conviction.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50709:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50709:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50709:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a 4-3 majority, vacated the judgment and remanded. The opinion emphasized that the plea bargaining process is a crucial part of the criminal justice system. In the interests of justice, agreements between prosecutors and defendants must be upheld. Even though the trial judge claimed that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not influence his sentencing decision, the prosecutor had a duty to uphold the original agreement. The Court remanded the case so that the lower court could determine the appropriate relief for Santobello. Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that the Court must allow Santobello to withdraw his guilty plea entirely, instead of leaving the decision to the trial court. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Potter Stewart joined in his opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50709:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50715:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50715:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 4, 1967, John J. Morrissey entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with false uttering of a check. After serving part of his seven-year sentence, the Iowa Board of Parole granted Morrissey parole, and he was released from Iowa State Penitentiary on June 20, 1968. On January 24, 1969, however, Morrissey was arrested in Cedar Rapids for violating his parole. The Board of Parole entered an order revoking his parole and returning Morrissey to prison. Morrissey filed several habeas corpus actions in Iowa state courts between June 1969 and August 1969, but soon exhausted his state remedies. On September 12, 1969, Morrissey filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, which was denied; the court also denied his notice of appeal, considered as an application for certificate of probable cause. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted Morrissey’s application and appointed counsel to represent Morrissey on appeal.\nOn April 29, 1968, G. Donald Booher entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with forgery. On November 14, 1968, the Board of Parole granted his parole, releasing Booher from his ten-year sentence at Iowa State Penitentiary. On August 28, 1969, Booher allegedly violated his parole, and the Board of Parole revoked his parole on September 13. Booher filed several petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in state district court between November 1969 and March 1970; the district court dismissed all of Booher’s petitions. He then filed an application for certificate of probable cause in federal district court on June 16, 1970. The district court denied his application, but the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted it on appeal, appointing counsel and consolidating the claims of Morrissey and Booher.\nNeither Morrissey nor Booher was granted a hearing or other opportunity to question, challenge, or become aware of the facts which formed the basis of each man’s parole violation. Neither man was granted the opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf, or to confront or cross-examine those providing testimony against him. The Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the denials of the petitions of Morrissey and Booher in a 4-3 en banc ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50715:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50715:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50715:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court held that due process required Iowa to include a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for the parole revocations of Morrissey and Booker. Chief Justice Burger described the purpose of parole in the correctional process, focusing on the notion that a parolee was entitled to his liberty so long as he substantially abided by the conditions of his parole. He determined that Morrissey and Booker were entitled to some form of due process before Iowa could revoke their paroles. Chief Justice Burger wrote that Iowa had no interest in revoking parole without some informal procedural guarantees, while acknowledging Iowa’s interest in imposing extensive restrictions on parolees and in returning violators to prison without the burden of a new trial.\nChief Justice Burger wrote that due process required someone not directly involved in a parolee’s case to determine whether reasonable ground existed for revocation. He outlined the basic requirements for the official in charge of a parole revocation hearing, including notice to the parolee, disclosure of evidence, and a written determination by the officer based on the information presented at the hearing. Chief Justice Burger emphasized that parolees had a right to a final hearing prior to revocation held within two months after the parolee was taken into custody. This hearing must give a parolee an opportunity to show that he did not violate the conditions of his parole, and to show mitigating circumstances.\nChief Justice Burger declined to decide whether a parolee was entitled to the assistance of counsel if he was indigent. He remanded the case for the district court to make findings on the procedures actually followed by the Board of Parole.\nJustice William Brennan concurred, emphasizing that a parolee was clearly allowed to retain an attorney, leaving open the question of whether counsel must be provided if a parolee was indigent.\nJustice William Douglas dissented in part. He argued that where only a violation of a parole condition was involved, procedural due process required that the state should not arrest a parolee. He wrote that parolees were entitled to counsel, and emphasized that a parolee was entitled to his freedom until the revocation was final.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50715:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50719:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50719:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral indigent California state prisoners filed complaints attacking the constitutionality of the regulations which forbade California prisons from having more than twelve law books in a prison library. On January 10, 1967, the district court consolidated the multiple cases because they contained common questions of law and fact.\nThe California prisoners moved for the convening of a three-judge district court, but their motion was denied. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's order denying a three-judge panel. On May 28, 1970, a three-judge district court granted the plaintiffs relief from the regulation limiting the number of law books in prison libraries. The defendants appealed the district court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50719:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50719:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50719:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Court initially postponed the question of jurisdiction pending the hearing of the case on the merits. After hearing the case on its merits, the Court determined that it had jurisdiction and affirmed the lower court's opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50719:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50721:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50721:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1971, Senator Mike Gravel received a copy of the Pentagon Papers: a set of classified documents concerning U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. Gravel then introduced the study, in its entirety, into the record of a Senate Subcommittee meeting. Gravel also arranged for the private publication of the papers by the Beacon Press. A federal grand jury subpoenaed Leonard Rodberg, one of Gravel's aides, to testify about his role in the acquisition and publication of the papers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50721:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50721:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50721:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that because the work of aides was critical to the performance of legislative tasks and duties, they were nothing less than legislators' \"alter egos\" and thus immune from subpoenas by the Speech and Debate Clause. Aides were exempted from grand jury questioning so long as Senators invoked the privilege on their behalf. Moreover, the Court held that the protections of the Speech and Debate Clause did not extend beyond the legislative sphere, ruling that Senator Gravel's arrangements with the Beacon Press were not constitutionally protected.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50721:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50722:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50722:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring the early morning hours of October 30, 1966, an individual approached a police officer in a gas station parking lot in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and informed him that another individual in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. The officer approached the vehicle on foot and asked the occupant, Robert Williams, to open the door. When Williams rolled down the window instead, the officer reached into the car and removed a gun from Williams’ waistband, though the gun was not visible from outside the vehicle. The officer then arrested Williams for unlawful possession of a firearm and proceeded to search his vehicle, where he found heroin. Williams was convicted in a Connecticut state court of possession of a handgun and heroin.\nAfter the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the conviction, Williams filed a claim against the prison warden, Frederick Adams, in which he alleged that the state of Connecticut continued to detain him unlawfully as a prisoner. Williams argued that the handgun and drugs were discovered through an unlawful search and should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sided with Williams and ordered that his conviction be set aside.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50722:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50722:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50722:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the informant’s tip permitted the officer to approach Williams’ car and make a limited search of Williams’ waistband for the officer’s own protection. The Court further held that the discovery of the weapon gave the officer probable cause to arrest Williams’ for illegal possession of a firearm. Because the officer’s subsequent search of the vehicle was permissible, the narcotics he discovered were admissible at Williams’ trial.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest Williams’ for illegal possession of a firearm because Connecticut’s “free-and-easy” gun laws allow individuals to carry concealed weapons so long as they have a permit. Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. expressed concern that the unnamed informant gave no information that the officer could not have readily manufactured after seizing the weapon. Therefore, Justice Brennan argued that police officers should not be permitted to arrest and search individuals on the basis of an informant’s tip alone. Justice Marshall also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the prosecutors failed to meet their burden to prove that the informant’s information was reliable and sufficient to justify the arrest and search of Williams. Justice Douglas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50722:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50723:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50723:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDonald Tanner was a Vietnam War protestor who was distributing anti-war handbills inside Lloyd Center Mall in Portland, Oregon. The handbills were unrelated to the operations of Lloyd Center. Lloyd Center was privately owned by Lloyd Corporation, which prohibited the distribution of handbills inside the mall. While distributing handbills, Tanner and other protestors were informed by mall security that they should stop their distribution or be subject to arrest. The protestors ended their distribution, left the mall, and filed suit against Lloyd Corporation in United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging their First Amendment right to free speech had been violated. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50723:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50723:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50723:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Tanner was not entitled to distribute handbills within Lloyd Center. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell contrasted this case with Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, which allowed protestors to picket a shopping center when their picketing was \"directly related\" to the shopping center and no \"reasonable opportunities to convey their message...were available.\" Here, Tanner's were unrelated to the operations of the mall, and the protestors had an alternative on the sidewalks immediately outside the mall, which were owned by the City of Portland. Powell characterized equating public property with private property intended for public use – such as the mall – as \"reach[ing] too far.\" Therefore, Tanner and the protestors did not have a First Amendment right to distribute their handbills within the mall.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50723:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50724:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50724:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChicago adopted an ordinance prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school during school hours; the law made an exception for peaceful labor picketing. Mosley had been picketing near a public high school; he was protesting \"black discrimination.\" Mosley sought a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50724:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50724:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50724:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe exemption for labor picketing violated the equal protection clause. Government regulation of message content is presumed unconstitutional unless there are compelling justifications. And regulations that selectively exclude speakers from a public forum must undergo careful judicial examination to ensure the minimal degree of furthering an important government interest. Mosley fashions an important principle from the values of freedom and equality: equal freedom of expression.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50724:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50725:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50725:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGaines Ted Huson suffered a back injury while working on a fixed oil rig, owned by Chevron Oil Company, off the coast of Louisiana. More than two years after the injury, Huson sued Chevron for damages in United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Division. Huson alleged that it took several months for him to realize the severity of his injury. The District Court relied on Rodrigue v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969), holding that Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations applied instead of the admiralty laches doctrine so Huson's claim was barred. Rodrigue held that state law, not admiralty law, applied in these situations under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Huson argued that because he filed this case before the Rodrigue decision, applying its ruling would have an unfair retrospective effect. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Louisiana statute of limitations was inconsistent with the admiralty laches doctrine and, therefore, was not applicable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50725:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50725:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50725:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. In a 7-0 decision, Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a majority unanimous court, affirmed the Appeals Court's decision, but rejected their analysis. The Supreme Court held that Louisiana's statute of limitations was applicable under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act because the Lands Act specifically adopted relevant state laws as federal laws. There was no federal statute of limitations specified in the Lands Act so, state law was not inconsistent. Although applying Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations was proper as a general rule, the Court held that applying it in this case would unfairly deprive Huson of a remedy on the basis of an unforeseeable change in legal doctrine.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50725:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50742:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50742:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPerry Paul, an alleged bookmaker, and Jerome Zarowitz, a former executive of a Las Vegas casino, had their telephones tapped by federal agents. The agents recorded conversations between Paul and David Gelbard and between Zarowitz and Sidney Parnas. Gelbard and Parnas were called before a federal grand jury convened to investigate possible violations of federal gambling laws. When the government pressed Gelbard and Parnas to testify about these conversations, however, they refused to do so. Instead, they claimed that the wiretaps were illegal and argued that they should not be required to testify until given an opportunity to challenge the legality of the taps. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found Gelbard and Parnas in contempt of court and committed them to custody until they agreed to testify.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, stating that \"a witness in a grand jury proceeding has no right to resort to a court to secure authoritative advance determination concerning evidentiary matters that arise, or may arise, or to exclude evidence to be used in such a proceeding.\" Gelbard and Parnas then sought certiorari from the Court, pointing to a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacating contempt charges against a witness under similar circumstances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50742:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50742:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50742:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, they can. In a 5-4 majority opinion written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that the federal statute barring the use of evidence obtained through illegally intercepted communications also serves as a valid defense to civil contempt charges. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, expressing his belief that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against illegal searches and seizures provided enough protection in and of itself to suppress the illegally obtained communications even without the federal wiretapping statute. In a separate concurrence, Justice Byron White suggested that courts should look for a way other than suppression hearings, which are time consuming and can interrupt the flow of grand jury hearings, to resolve such conflicts. Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Harry Blackmun and Lewis Powell, dissented. Rehnquist argued that the clear language of the statute in question, combined with its legislative history, prohibited its use as a defense to civil contempt charges arising from grand jury proceedings. To apply it in that situation would represented a \"sharp break\" with the \"historical modus operandi of the grand jury.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50742:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50745:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50745:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCurtis C. Flood was a professional baseball player for the St. Louis Cardinals of the National League. Flood was a consistent, above-average hitter and a well-regarded outfielder, playing one full season without an error in 1966, an unusual achievement. Flood played twelve seasons for the Cardinals, participating in three World Series, and was the co-captain of the team between 1965 and 1969.\nDespite this, Flood was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in October 1969. The Cardinals did not consult him before the trade, and management only informed him about the trade after it was finalized. Flood complained to the Commissioner of Baseball, Bowie K. Kuhn, requesting that the league make him a free agent. Kuhn denied his request, relying on baseball’s “reserve clause,” which maintained a given team’s rights to a player even after that player’s contract expired. Flood then filed an antitrust suit against Kuhn, the presidents of the two major leagues, and the twenty-four major league clubs. He declined to play for the Phillies in 1970 despite a $100,000 salary offer.\nFlood alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws, civil rights laws, state statutes, the common law, and the imposition of a form of peonage and involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and several federal laws. The trial court granted the defense’s motion for summary judgment, relying on Federal Baseball Club v. National League and Toolson v. New York Yankees, which established a long-standing antitrust exemption for professional baseball clubs. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50745:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50745:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50745:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 5-3 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court affirmed that professional baseball and its reserve clause were immune from antitrust laws at the state and federal levels. Justice Blackmun described the background of Federal Baseball, emphasizing that antitrust violations against professional baseball were consistently rejected on that case’s authority. He also cited Toolson, where the Court specifically held that the business of holding public baseball games for profit between professional clubs was not within the scope of federal antitrust laws.\nJustice Blackmun also noted that Federal Baseball and Toolson were frequently and favorably cited in other cases to establish the uniqueness of baseball’s exemption. He also noted that it was within Congress’ power to remedy this inconsistency. Finally, Justice Blackmun agreed with the Second Circuit that the Commerce Clause precluded the application of state antitrust laws to professional baseball.\nChief Justice Warren Burger concurred, but agreed with Justice William Douglas that congressional inaction was not a solid basis to affirm the antitrust exemption for professional baseball.\nJustice William Douglas dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He argued that the ruling in Federal Baseball was a derelict, and that the reserve system was clearly an unreasonable restraint of trade. He also questioned the majority’s reliance on congressional inaction as evidence of Congress’ intent.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall also dissented, joined by Justice Brennan. Justice Marshall compared baseball’s reserve system to involuntary servitude. He also questioned the significance of congressional inaction. Justice Marshall argued that the Court should remand the case to determine whether Flood could state a claim despite the existence of a collective bargaining agreement between the teams and the players.\nJustice Lewis Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50745:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50749:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50749:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrancis Haines was placed in solitary confinement for 15 days because he hit another inmate over the head with a shovel during a confrontation. Haines was 66 years old and suffered from a foot disability. He claimed his foot disability worsened due to being kept in solitary confinement, where he had to sleep on the floor with only blankets for support. Haines sued the State of Illinois and argued that the conditions of his solitary confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The State of Illinois moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that Haines failed to state a cause of action. The district court granted the dismissal, and stated that courts can only intercede with the internal operations of state prisons under exceptional circumstances. The district court also found that Haines had failed to show that he had been deprived of his constitutional rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal and determined that state penitentiaries were entitled to their own discretion when punishing inmates.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50749:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50749:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50749:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nBefore a case is dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, the plaintiff should be allowed to offer evidence supporting his claims. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Haines had a right to present evidence of the alleged harm he suffered before his case was dismissed. Without such an opportunity, there could be no certainty that there was no set of facts to support the plaintiff’s claims that would entitle him to relief.\nJustices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50749:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50753:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50753:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKastigar cited his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in refusing to testify before a grand jury, even though prosecutors had granted him immunity from the use of his testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings. He was found in contempt of court for failing to testify.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50753:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50753:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50753:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that compelled testimony is legitimate given the grant of immunity. Justice Powell found that the protections of immunity that a congressional statute provided were \"coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination\" and \"sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50753:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50754:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50754:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1966, D.H. Overmyer Co. entered into a contract with Frick Co. for the manufacture and installation of a $223,000 automatic refrigeration system for a warehouse under construction in Toledo, Ohio. The agreement established a promissory note with monthly payment obligations. Overmyer began to fall behind on the monthly payments. Frick filed three mechanic's liens against the Toledo warehouse, and the two companies negotiated a new payment agreement in February 1967. Overmyer again fell behind on payments, and the two companies established a new note which contained a confession-of-judgment provision.\nIn June of 1968, Overmyer stopped making monthly payments under the new note and brought a claim against Frick in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for alleged breaches of the original contract. The District court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show any likelihood that it would prevail on the merits.\nFrick came before the Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, Ohio and asked the court to enter a judgment against Overmyer for the remaining balance of the note plus interest. Overmyer did not receive notice prior to the entry of the judgment because the confession-of-judgment provision waived the issuance and service of process and confessed judgment.\nAfter the entry of the adverse judgment, Overmyer filed several motions, including a motion to vacate the judgment due to a lack of notice. After a hearing was held, the court denied the motions. Overmyer appealed to the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, Ohio, asserting deprivation of due process in violation of the Ohio and Federal Constitutions. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the subsequent appeal, and Overmyer appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50754:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50754:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50754:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court and held that contractual clause waiving a party's rights to prejudgment notice and hearing is not unconstitutional per se. Since Overmyer agreed to the provision for consideration and with full awareness of the legal consequences, enforcement of the waiver was not a violation of Overmyer's constitutional rights.\nJustice William O. Douglas, with whom Justice Thurgood Marshall joined, wrote a concurring opinion. Douglas agreed that the heavy burden against the waiver of constitutional rights had been effectively overcome by the evidence presented. However, he emphasized the fact that a trial judge is duty-bound to vacate judgments obtained through clauses waiving due process rights whenever debtors present jury questions is a minimal obstacle, and complete answer to the contention that unbridled discretion governs the disposition of petitions to vacate.\nJustice Lewis Powell and Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50754:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50756:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50756:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn July 20, 1958, intruders beat an elderly couple to death in Christian County, Kentucky. Shortly afterward, police arrested Silas Manning and Willie Barker for the crime. Both were indicted on September 15 and assigned counsel on September 17. Barker’s trial was scheduled to begin on September 21, but the state believed it had a stronger case against Manning and that Manning’s testimony would be essential to convict Barker. The state obtained a series of continuances on Barker’s trial, as Manning was tried five times and finally convicted in 1962. Beginning in June 1959, Barker was out of prison on bail, and did not contest the continuances. Barker’s trial was set for March 19, 1963, and when the state requested further continuances, Barker unsuccessfully objected. At his trial beginning on October 9, 1963, Barker was convicted.\nThe Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Barker sought habeas corpus relief in district court, by arguing that the long trial delay violated his right to a speedy trial, which the district court denied. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50756:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50756:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50756:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the right to a speedy trial differs from other constitutionally guaranteed rights because it is often more in the interest of society and the justice system as a whole than it is in the interest of the accused. Additionally, there is no way to create a firm distinction between what is and is not a speedy trial, since the circumstances surrounding each trial are unique. The Court held that the consideration of whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial should be based on the length of the delay, the reason for it, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice towards the defendant. The Court held that, while the delay was long, Barker faced negligible prejudice and did not want a speedy trial, as evidenced by the many continuances that went uncontested.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White described the many reasons that a speedy trial is essential to prevent an unconstitutional infringement on the liberty of the defendant. He argued that the right could not be compromised by a state’s backlog of cases and limited resources. Given the facts of this case, however, he agreed that Barker acquiesced to the delays without state pressure. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50756:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50775:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50775:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Tennessee law required a one-year residence in the state and a three-month residence in the county as a precondition for voting. James Blumstein, a university professor who had recently moved to Tennessee, challenged the law by filing suit against Governor Winfield Dunn and other local officials in federal district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50775:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50775:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50775:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that the law was an unconstitutional infringement upon the right to vote and the right to travel. Applying a strict equal protection test, the Court found that the law did not necessarily promote a compelling state interest. Justice Marshall argued in the majority opinion that the durational residency requirements were neither the least restrictive means available to prevent electoral fraud nor an appropriate method of guaranteeing the existence of \"knowledgeable voters\" within the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50775:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50779:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50779:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1954, Allen Generes and his son-in-law William Kelly formed Kelly-Generes Construction Co., Inc. Generes and Kelly each owned 44% of the stock, with the remaining 12% owned by Generes’ son and another son-in-law. Generes was the president of the corporation and did not deal with the day-to-day running of the business. In addition to his position as president, he held another full-time position as the president of a savings and loan association. In 1958, Generes and Kelly signed an indemnity agreement for the corporation. In 1962, the corporation seriously underbid two contracts and went deeply into debt. Generes loaned the corporation money, but it went bankrupt, and he was unable to receive reimbursement.\nOn his 1962 tax return, Generes claimed the money the corporation lost as business bad debt and his direct loans to the corporation as nonbusiness bad debt. He filed a claim for a refund on the business bad debt. This claim was the subject of a jury trial in which the jury was asked to determine whether Generes’ signing of the indemnity agreement was “proximately related to his trade or business of being an employee “of the corporation. The government requested a jury instruction to clarify that “significant” motivation satisfies the requirement, but the court refused and instructed the jury that “dominant” motivation was sufficient. The jury found in favor of Generes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the significant motivation standard was acceptable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50779:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50779:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50779:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 4-3 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the significant motivation standard did not provide sufficient guidance to the trier of fact and that the dominant motivation standard should have been used. Under this standard, Generes’ actions were in his own interest and not those of the corporation, so he cannot claim the corporation’s loss as business bad debt.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that the congressional intent behind the statute distinguishing nonbusiness bad debt from business bad debt was to prevent family members from loaning money they knew they would not get back and getting tax refunds for it. He argued that the dominant motivation standard best protects Congress’ interests.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a partial concurrence and partial dissent in which he argued that the plurality should not have ruled on the merits of the case but should have remanded the case for a new trial under the new standard. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In his dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the wording of the statute does not require proof of a dominant motivation. He also argued that there was sufficient evidence that Generes’ actions were “proximately related” to his business interests.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Justice William H. Rehnquist did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50779:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50783:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50783:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest that was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1940s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80-acre ski resort. The size of the proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that would run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits for the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions of the defendants and therefore did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the appellate court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50783:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50783:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50783:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Sierra Club did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it failed to show that any of its members had suffered or would suffer injury as a result of the defendants’ actions. Justice Potter Stewart wrote the opinion for the 4-3 majority, in which the Court held that, in order to have standing to sue under the APA, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they had directly suffered an injury as a result of the actions that led to the suit. Although building roads and high voltage power lines through the wilderness upsets the beauty of the area and the enjoyment of some, such “general interest” in a potential problem is not sufficient to establish that a plaintiff has been injured in the manner that standing doctrine requires.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the standing doctrine should allow environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club to sue on behalf of inanimate objects such as land. There is precedent for inanimate objects to have legal personality for the purpose of lawsuits, and “[t]hose who have that intimate relation with the inanimate object about to be injured, polluted, or otherwise despoiled are its legitimate spokesmen.” In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that, when faced with new issues of potentially enormous and permanent consequences, such as environmental issues, the Court should not be quite so rigid about its legal requirements. Justice Blackmun proposed two alternatives for how to proceed in this case: either the Sierra Club’s request for preliminary injunction should be granted while it is given time to amend its complaint to comport with the requirements of the standing doctrine, or the Court should expand the traditional standing doctrine to allow this type of litigation. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which he agreed with Justice Blackmun regarding the Sierra Club’s standing and argued that the Court should have considered the case on its merits.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50783:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50784:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50784:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nInvestigating three people it suspected of conspiring to destroy government property and bombing a Central Intelligence Agency office, officials used electronic surveillance to record suspects' conversations. The wiretapping was conducted without a search warrant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50784:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50784:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50784:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held government officials were obligated to obtain a warrant before beginning electronic surveillance even if domestic security issues were involved. The \"inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept\" and the potential for abusing it to quell political dissent made the Fourth Amendment protections especially important when the government engaged in spying on its own citizens.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50784:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50786:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50786:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMaryland trial courts convicted Albert Murel and the other petitioners of various crimes and sentenced them to fixed terms of imprisonment. The petitioners were “defective delinquents,” so each was committed to the Patuxent Institution, a mental health facility, pursuant to the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law.\nThe petitioners sought a federal habeas corpus in district court. They challenged the conditions of their confinement and the procedures that led to their commitment. They also argued that Maryland's statutory standard for the commitment of \"delinquent defendants\" was unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's opinion. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50786:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50786:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50786:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nDismissed. In a per curiam opinion, the Court wrote that it had decided to hear the case in order to consider whether constitutional protections apply to the commitment process set forth in the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law. After briefing and oral argument, the Court concluded that the case did not present those issues in a manner that warranted the review of the Supreme Court. The Court also concluded that pending changes to the Maryland law made it an inopportune time for the Court to issue a comprehensive order concerning the Defective Delinquency Law.\n Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion. He argued that whenever a State moves to deprive an individual of liberty, the Constitution requires the state to meet a more rigorous burden of proof than Maryland employed to commit defective delinquents. Justice Douglas would have reversed the lower courts’ judgments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50786:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50790:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50790:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Sindermann had been a professor at Odessa Junior College for four years, working under one-year contracts. After his election as president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association, he had several public disagreements with the Odessa Junior College Board of Regents. In May 1969, after the expiration of his teaching contract, Sindermann was not offered a new contract and terminated by the college's Board of Regents. While the Board of Regents did issue a press release accusing him of insubordination, they did not provide official reasons for his termination or the option of a hearing for him to challenge his termination. Sindermann filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. He alleged that his termination was due to his disagreements with the Board of Regents, a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech, and that the lack of a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court ruled for the Board of Regents without a full trial. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that his termination would have been unconstitutional if it was based on his exercise of free speech or if he had a reasonable expectation of continued employment. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50790:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50790:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50790:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a 5-3 decision, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit and held that Sindermann was entitled to a full trial in federal District Court and a hearing before the Board of Regents. The Court acknowledged that Sindermann did not have a contractual or tenure-based right to continued employment by Odessa Junior College. However, this lack was \"immaterial to [Sindermann's] free speech claim.\" Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart relied on Shelton v. Tucker and Keyishian v. Board of Regents in emphasizing that nonrenewal of a one-year teaching contract \"may not be predicated on [a teacher's] exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.\" However, the Court stopped short of invalidating Sindermann's termination, as the Board of Regents' reasoning had not been established. While Sindermann had yet to \"show that he has been deprived of an interest that could invoke procedural due process,\" the Court stated that his claim did \"raise a genuine issue.\" While Odessa College did not have a formal tenure system, the Court recognized the possibility of a college having an \"unwritten 'common law'\" \"in practice\" that would grant \"the equivalent of tenure.\" Given the policies of Odessa College, Sindermann was entitled to a hearing before the Board of Regents as well.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50790:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50805:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50805:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA police officer stopped a car that had a burned out license plate light and headlight. There were six men in the car, including Robert Clyde Bustamonte. Only one passenger had a drivers license, and he claimed that his brother owned the car. The officer asked this man if he could search the car. The man said, “Sure, go ahead.” Inside the car, the officer found stolen checks. Those checks were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte’s trial for possessing checks with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Bustamonte, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that consent to search the car was given voluntarily, so evidence obtained during the search was admissible. The California Supreme Court denied review. Bustamonte filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that consent is not voluntary unless it is proven that the person who consented to the search knew he had the right to refuse consent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50805:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50805:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50805:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No answer. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that whether consent is voluntary can be determined from the totality of the circumstances. It is unnecessary to prove that the person who gave consent knew that he had the right to refuse. The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not require a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Because the Fourth Amendment claims had no merit, the Court did not reach the second question.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell also concurred, stating that the main question should be whether Bustamonte had a fair opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment claims. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, agreeing with the majority and noting it was unnecessary to reach the issue discussed by Justice Powell.\nJustice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the Ninth Circuit made the correct decision. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate dissent, stating that a person cannot waive their Fourth Amendment rights when he is unaware that his rights would be constitutionally protected if he did not waive those rights. Justice Thurgood Marshall arguing that the prosecution cannot rely on consent to a search if the person who gave consent did not know he could refuse consent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50805:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50808:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50808:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPetitioners proved that for nearly ten years since 1960 the Denver, Colorado school system implemented an unconstitutional policy of racial discrimination by operating a segregated school system. The defense argued, and the District Court held, that even though one part of the Denver system was guilty of segregation, it did not follow that the entire system was segregated as well.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50808:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50808:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50808:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court modified and remanded the lower court decision and held that when part of a school system is found to be segregated, a \"prima facie case of unlawful [systematic] segregative design\" becomes apparent. The school district involved assumes the burden of proving that it operated without \"segregative intent\" on a system-wide basis. This case is significant because it represents one of the first instances in which the Court identified segregation in northern schools.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50808:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50816:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50816:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought a dependent's allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives of members of the military automatically became dependents; husbands of female members of the military, however, were not accepted as dependents unless they were dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support. Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was turned down.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50816:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50816:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50816:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the statute in question clearly commanded \"dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated,\" violating the Due Process Clause and the equal protection requirements that clause implied. A majority could not agree on the standard of review, however. The plurality opinion written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., applying a strict standard of review to the sex-based classification as it would to racial classification, found that the government's interest in administrative convenience could not justify discriminatory practices. But a concurring opinion by Justice Lewis F. Powell and joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Harry A. Blackmun would not go so far as to hold sex discrimination to the same standard as race, choosing instead to argue that statutes drawing lines between the sexes alone necessarily involved the \"very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution,\" an approach employed in the Court's prior decision in Reed v. Reed. Justice Potter Stewart concurred separately that the statutes created invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented affirming the reasoning of the lower court opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50816:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50821:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50821:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1971, the Virginia legislature reapportioned itself. The plan for the House of Representatives provided for 100 representatives from 52 districts with each House member representing an average of 46,485 constituents(with a variance between largest and smallest being 16.4 percent, compared to the ideal 3.89 percent). Henry Howell challenged the plan as unconstitutional because its population deviations were too large to satisfy the principle of \"one person, one vote.\" This case was decided together with City of Virginia Beach v. Howell and Weinberg v. Prichard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50821:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50821:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50821:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that the plan was constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause as described in Reynolds v. Sims. The Virginia plan is not to be judged by the more stringent congressional standards in Section 2 of Article I. The Equal Protection Clause requires a state to make an \"honest and good faith effort\" to construct districts of as nearly equal population as practicable. Some deviations from the equal population principle are valid if based on legitimate considerations of a \"rational state policy.\" The Virginia plan advanced the policy of reapportionment without sacrificing substantial equality.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50821:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50834:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50834:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles J. Ash Jr. was indicted for robbing the American Trust & Security Company in Washington, D.C. Before his trial, almost three years after the robbery, an FBI agent and a prosecutor showed five color mug shot photographs to potential witnesses to make sure they would be able to make an in court identification of Ash. Ash’s counsel was not present for this process. Some of these witnesses then made in court identifications of Ash. Ash was convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Ash’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present for the photo identifications before trial. The court of appeals opinion expressed doubt that the in court identifications could have happened without the prior photo identifications.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50834:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50834:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50834:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a 7-3 majority, reversed the court of appeals and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to counsel for photographic displays held for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender. A photographic display is different from a line up, because the accused is not present and is not in danger of being misled or overpowered by the opposing attorney. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment, stating that pretrial photographic displays are not a critical stage of prosecution. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented, arguing that there is no meaningful difference between a pretrial lineup and a pretrial photo identification, so the right to counsel should extend in both circumstances. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50834:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50842:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50842:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United States in 1965 as a visitor. In 1967, she married a U.S. citizen and became a resident of Connecticut. She then attended Yale Law School and applied to take the Connecticut Bar in 1970. Despite the County Bar Association finding her qualified in every aspect, she was denied the chance to sit for the exam due to the fact that she was not a U.S. citizen, which Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut Practice Book of 1963 required. Griffiths requested judicial relief and argued that the rule was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court of Connecticut denied her request for judicial relief and the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50842:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50842:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50842:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA requirement that applicants to the state bar be United States citizens violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, while it is within a state’s rights to carefully select who may practice law, to deny an immigrant solely on their immigrant status is unconstitutional. A lawfully admitted resident alien is a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Because classifications based on nationality are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, the state must meet a high burden to justify such a classification. In this case, the state bar association did not meet that burden because there is no meaningful connection between citizenship and the qualifications for being a lawyer. The United States has always “welcomed and [drawn] strength from the immigration of aliens,” and their social and economic contributions to the country have been innumerable. Additionally, there is precedent to support the proposition that citizenship does not matter in reference to practicing law in the US.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the government should be justified in requiring certain jobs to be held by citizens, as the government has a vested interest in ensuring that specialized positions such as lawyers are held by citizens to, among other things, ensure their “moral character.” In his separate dissent, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that, as an “officer of the court,” states retain the right to exclude aliens from practicing the law. The Constitution grants states the right to determine who is appropriate for representing the state in court, even if that should mean excluding anyone who isn’t a U.S. citizen. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50842:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50844:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50844:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Tennessee state court convicted Archie Biggers in the rape of Margaret Beamer. The only major evidence against him was Ms. Beamer’s identification several weeks after the incident at a police station “show up”. The “show up” was similar to a line up, but contained the suspect alone. The police officer also had the suspect say phrases Ms. Beamer heard her attacker say on the night of the rape. Ms. Beamer said she had “no doubt” that Biggers was her attacker. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided court.\nBiggers then filed a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court granted, holding that the Supreme Court affirming by an equally divided court did not bar the writ. The court also held that the “show up” procedure was so suggestive that it violated due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50844:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50844:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50844:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. In a 5-3 decision Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote the majority opinion reversing in part and remanding. The entire court joined in the first part of the opinion, holding that affirming by an equally divided court did not constitute an “actual adjudication” of the issue. The habeas corpus proceeding could continue. Only five justices joined in the second part of the opinion, holding that the “show up” procedure was suggestive, but given the totality of the circumstances, there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification.\nJustice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that the decision on the “show up” procedure broke from the long established practice of affirming findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts. Justices William O. Douglas and Potter Stewart joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50844:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50847:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50847:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTo prevent gender discrimination, the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (the Commission) created an ordinance that forbids newspapers to advertise employment opportunities in gender-designated column. The National Organization for Women, Inc. filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that the Pittsburgh Press Co. (Pittsburg Press) violated the ordinance by allowing employers to place advertisements in the male or female columns when the jobs advertised do not have occupational qualifications or exceptions. The Commission had a hearing and concluded Pittsburg Press violated the ordinance. The Pittsburg Press appealed and contended the ordinance violates the First Amendment by restricting its editorial judgment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50847:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50847:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50847:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Pittsburg ordinance, which forbids newspapers to carry gender-designated advertising columns for job opportunities, does not violate their First Amendment rights. This clause in the ordinance does not deny the newspapers freedom of expression, nor does it hinder the newspapers’ financial profits. The First Amendment does not protect advertisements for purely commercial reasons.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority broadens the “commercial speech” doctrine to include the layout and organizations decisions of a newspaper, which violates the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment protects commercial advertisements and that newspapers should be able to print whatever they want because of the freedom of the press. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Potter Stewart argued that the First Amendment protects all freedoms of the press and that any expression should be unrestrained by government. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in this dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50847:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50877:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50877:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEngineers Gary Benson and Arthur Tabbot invented a faster and more efficient mathematical procedure for transforming the normal \"decimal\" type of numbers (base 10) into true \"binary\" numbers (base 2) which are simpler to process within computers. Their mathematical procedure was somewhat akin to long division, albeit with different steps. Their attorney argued before the patent examiner that the inventors were entitled to a broad patent covering any use of their new mathematical procedure, even use of it by a human using pencil and paper. The examiner rejected their invention. An appellate court overruled the examiner and ordered a patent to issue. The Commissioner of Patents then petitioned successfully to have the Supreme Court review this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the inventors' attorney backed down from his earlier position and argued that the inventors were entitled to a patent covering all uses of their new mathematical procedure in computers, but not necessarily to its use by humans using pencil and paper. (The members of the Supreme Court at that time knew very little about computers.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50877:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50877:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50877:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. The Supreme Court held that a patent cannot cover all possible uses of a mathematical procedure or equation within a computer. That would be tantamount to granting the inventor a patent on the mathematical procedure itself, and this was no more acceptable than granting Samuel Morse a patent covering all possible uses of magnetism to communicate, rather than a narrower patent covering only the specific way in which Morse actually used magnetism to communicate in his telegraph. The court then said that \"[i]f these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised which only committees of Congress can manage ....\" This decision was accepted as a final determination that computer programs were not patentable, and the Patent Office immediately ceased examining all computer program inventions. Very few patent applications directed to computer programs were filed until after the Supreme Court readdressed this issue in Diamond v. Diehr some nine years later. During these nine years, alternative ways of protecting computer programs were developed under the laws of copyright and trade secret which remain part of our law today.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50877:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50900:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50900:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt the conclusion of an undercover drug investigation, Richard Russell was arrested by Washington police and eventually convicted in a district court for drug manufacturing crimes. Russell challenged his conviction as the result of unconstitutional entrapment practices, since an undercover agent supplied him with an essential ingredient of his drug manufacturing operation. On appeal from an adverse Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court granted the government certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50900:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50900:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50900:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot always. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that law enforcement officers may participate in the procedural commission of certain crimes such as drug manufacturing, so long as they do not implant criminal designs in the minds of the accused. In Russell's case, the investigated drug operations were in place long before undercover agents infiltrated them. Moreover, the ingredients contributed by the agents could have been acquired independently by Russell and his co-conspirators. As such, none of the agents' participatory activities amounted to entrapment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50900:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50931:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50931:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter pleading guilty to armed robbery in Wisconsin, Gerald Scarpelli, was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, which was later reduced to probation. Scarpelli signed an agreement allowing him to reside in Illinois and was supervised by the Adult Probation Department of Illinois. Shortly after, Scarpelli was caught committing burglary with an accomplice. After being informed of his Constitutional rights, Scarpelli admitted to committing the felony, an admission he later claimed was made under extreme duress. The Wisconsin Department of Corrections revoked Scarpelli’s probation because of the violation and imprisoned him. He was not given a hearing. Two years later, Scarpelli filed a writ of habeas corpus and the district court held that revoking Scarpelli’s probation without a hearing and an attorney was a denial of his Constitutional right of due process. Gagnon, the warden of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, appealed and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment. Gagnon appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50931:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50931:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50931:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1majority. The Court held a previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing when his probation is revoked. While a probation hearing is not part of the criminal prosecution process, the results of the hearing could cause the defendant to suffer a substantial loss of liberty, and therefore the defendant has the right to due process. However, the Constitution does not require that the defendant be provided proper representation. Rather, the court appointment of an attorney should be applied on a case-by-case basis. The Court concluded there was no need to create a new rule of appointing an attorney, and the lower courts should use their discretion when deciding if a court-appointed attorney was necessary.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent in which he argued that court-appointed counsel was necessary to ensure the defendant was afforded due process", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50931:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50940:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50940:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter receiving reports of the type of sexual activity occurring on the premises of licensed liquor sellers, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control promulgated a series of regulations pertaining to the conduct on such licensed premises. The appellees, a group of holders of various liquor licenses, sought discretionary review of the new regulations. The district court held that the regulations unconstitutionally limited freedom of expression.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50940:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50940:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50940:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that states have the right to regulate expression that consists of “conduct or action” especially in the absence of a particular message. Since the California regulations did not prohibit all such behavior and performances but only those in certain locations that hold liquor licenses, the regulations did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that states have the authority to regulate where and under what conditions alcohol is sold. The exercise of that authority does not violate the constitutional rights of the proprietors and employees of alcohol-serving establishments.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that constitutional questions the case presents should not have been addressed until the regulations had been applied and the state courts had decided how strictly they should be construed. In his separate dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. argued that the regulations required the owner of a nightclub to curtail First Amendment expression to obtain a liquor license. States do not have the power to impose an unconstitutional condition on the granting of a license. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote a separate dissent where he argued that the regulations were too broad and lacked the precision necessary to avoid violating constitutional rights. The California regulations create even stricter standards than the Supreme Court’s ruling in regards to obscenity. He argued that the state’s authority to regulate the sale of alcohol does not allow it to override the protections of the First Amendment.\n\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50940:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50941:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50941:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York enacted Chapter 414 of its Education and Tax Laws, which created aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. These amendments included Section 1, which provided a grant for the maintenance and repair of schools that served many low-income students; Section 2, which provided tuition reimbursement for low-income parents; and Sections 3, 4, and 5, which provided tax relief for parents who did not qualify for tuition reimbursement. After the institution of these amendments, the Campaign for Public Education and Religious Liberty challenged the amendments in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that these amendments violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court held that Sections 1 and 2 violated the Establishment Clause, but not Sections 3, 4, and 5.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50941:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50941:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50941:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes to all sections. In a 6-3 decision, the Court affirmed the District Court on maintenance grant and tuition reimbursement and reversed the District Court on income tax relief. The Court cited earlier decisions that established that under the Establishment Clause, a law must \"first, reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, second, must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and third, must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.\" Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. acknowledged that New York's interest in creating a positive educational environment was a clearly secular purpose. Section 1, however, did not limit the use of the grants towards maintaining facilities used for secular purposes. This distinguished Section 1 from other aid programs approved by the Court in the past in Board of Education v. Allen and Tilton v. Richardson. Since \"all or practically all\" of the schools that qualified were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, the maintenance grants would \"subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian schools\" in violation of the Establishment Clause. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist concurred in this part of the judgment. The Court also struck down Section 2, as the tuition reimbursements did not \"guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions.\" While the Court recognized the possibility that reimbursement money would not end up in the hands of religious schools, the grants would attempt to \"enhance the opportunities of the poor to choose between public and nonpublic education,\" which would advance religion. Lastly, the Court reversed the District Court with regard to Sections 3, 4, and 5, ruling that effect of tax relief was similar to that of the tuition reimbursement and therefore unconstitutional. The Court in Walz v. Tax Commission upheld New York's property tax exemptions for religious organizations. However, the tax exemption was designed to prevent government oppression of religion through taxation, not for the promotion of religion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50941:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50944:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50944:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPatrick Dougall was a federally registered resident alien. He was employed by a nonprofit organization that was absorbed into the Manpower Career and Development Agency (MCDA) of New York City's Human Resources Administration. He was ineligible for employment by the city under Section 53 of the New York Civil Service Law because he was a noncitizen. He was terminated for this reason alone. Dougall and other noncitizens who were terminated under Section 53 challenged the statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which held the statute unconstitutional. New York appealed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50944:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50944:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50944:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court affirmed the District Court and held the statute unconstitutional. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the majority, recognized New York's \"interest in establishing its own form of government\" and having civil servants \"of undivided loyalty.\" However, Section 53's citizenship restriction was imprecise and \"swep[t] indiscriminately.\" Since it could prohibit noncitizens from jobs in a way that did not further the state interest, the distinction it made between citizens and aliens violated the Equal Protection Clause under Graham v. Richardson.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50944:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50946:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50946:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLeon Chambers was charged with murdering a policeman. Another man, Gable McDonald, confessed to the murder, in addition to confession to third parties, and was taken into custody. One month later, McDonald denied the confession and was released from custody. At trial, Chambers tried to prove McDonald admitted to the crime several times and confessed to third parties. The district court found the evidence of the confessions was inadmissible because of the voucher rule – a common-law rule that prohibits the defense from cross-examining a witness when the prosecution failed to do so – and the fact that the statements were hearsay. Chambers’ appealed and argued that the district court violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to admit the evidence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50946:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50946:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50946:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the district court denied Chambers a fair trial and violated his right to due process. The voucher rule prevented Chambers from discovering the circumstances of McDonald’s oral confession and challenging his repudiated written confession, which deprived Chambers of the right to contradict testimony offered against him. Under the Due Process Clause, defendants have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses on their own behalf. The Court also held that the hearsay statements were not untrustworthy evidence but were a crucial part of Chambers’ defense and could have led the jury to a different decision.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over this case because Chambers did not properly raise the issue of the violation of due process in the Mississippi courts before appealing to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50946:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50949:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50949:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Pennsylvania legislature passed Act 109, which reimbursed nonpublic religious schools for certain secular educational services. On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court held that Act 109 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The case was remanded, and on remand the district court entered an order which permitted the State to reimburse nonpublic religious schools for services provided before Act 109 was declared unconstitutional.\nLemon and others challenged the district court's opinion, asserting that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin payment of around $24 million set aside by the State to compensate nonpublic religious schools for educational services rendered during the 1970-1971 school year.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50949:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50949:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50949:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Announcing the Judgment of the Court, Justice Warren E. Burger affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Court held that permitting payment of allocated funds for 1970-1971 school year would not substantially undermine constitutional interest at stake. The Court also recognized that the denial of payment would have serious financial consequences on private schools which relied on the statute and the funds allocated for the 1970-1971 school year.\nJustice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment. Justice William O. Douglas, joined by Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Potter Steward, dissented. The dissent held that the First Amendment was violated whether the payment from public funds to religious schools involved the prior year, the current year, or the next year. Justice Thurgood Marshall took no part in consideration of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50949:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50954:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50954:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJacinta Moreno lived with Ermina Sanchez, who was not related, and Sanchez's three children. Sanchez provided care to Moreno, who contributed to household living expenses. Moreno satisfied the income requirements for the federal food stamp program, but was denied under Section 3 of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, amended in 1971, which prohibited households with unrelated members from receiving food stamp benefits. Sanchez's food stamp benefits were also to be terminated. Moreno and other households who were denied benefits under Section 3 challenged the statute in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court held that Section 3 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50954:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50954:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50954:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 decision, the Court upheld the District Court and maintained that amended Section 3 violated the Fifth Amendment in creating two types of households – one in which all members were related and one in which at least one member was unrelated. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the majority, acknowledged the interest of Congress in preventing abuse of the Food Stamp program. However, the statute did not fulfill Congress' stated purpose of preventing \"hippies\" and \"hippie communes\" from enrolling the food stamp program. Additionally, there existed other measures within the Food Stamp Act that were specifically aimed at preventing abuse of the program. Since the statute \"simply does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud,\" the distinction between households with related members and households with unrelated members did not further the state interest and therefore violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas authored a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50954:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50961:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50961:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nState officials in Georgia sought to enjoin the showing of allegedly obscene films at the Paris Adult Theatre. The Theatre clearly warned potential viewers of the sexual nature of the films and required that patrons be at least 21 years of age. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the films were \"hard core\" pornography unprotected by the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50961:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50961:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50961:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene films did not acquire constitutional protection simply because they were exhibited for consenting adults only. Conduct involving consenting adults, the Court argued, was not always beyond the scope of governmental regulation. The Court found that there were \"legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity,\" including the community's quality of life and public safety. The Court also noted that conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene materials was not necessary to justify the Georgia law.\nThe Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court with instructions to reconsider its decision in light of the obscenity standard spelled out in Miller v. California. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the works in question were obscene and directed the trial judge to issue an order permanently enjoining the theatre from exhibiting the films.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50961:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50979:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50979:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRosalind McClanahan was a member of the Navajo Indian nation who lived on the Navajo Reservation in Apache County, Arizona. Her employer withheld $16.20 in 1967 for Arizona state income taxes. McClanahan sought the return of her withheld income. She claimed that since she was a Navajo Indian residing on the reservation and since her income was derived completely on the reservation, she was exempt from state taxation. When her request was denied, she filed suit in Apache County Superior Court. The Superior Court dismissed her claim. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected her petition for review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50979:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50979:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50979:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals and held that Arizona did not have the right to tax McClanahan. In an opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court emphasized the long-standing status of Indian reservations as exempt from state authority. While the Navajo Treaty signed between the Navajo nation and the United States did not explicitly exempt the nation from state laws, Arizona entered the Union on the explicit condition that it would lose its authority over Indian tribes and reservations within the state, including taxation powers. Consistent with its decision in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, the Court ruled that Arizona \"had no jurisdiction to impose\" state income tax on McLanahan.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50979:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50984:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50984:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn addition to being funded through a state-funded program designed to establish a minimum educational threshold in every school, Texas public elementary and secondary schools rely on local property taxes for supplemental revenue. Rodriguez, acting on behalf of students whose families reside in poor districts, challenged this funding scheme by arguing that it underprivileged such students because their schools lacked the vast property tax base that other districts utilized. The reliance on assessable property, the school districts claimed, caused severe inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50984:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50984:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50984:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court refused to examine the system with strict scrutiny since there is no fundamental right to education in the Constitution and since the system did not systematically discriminate against all poor people in Texas. Given the similarities between Texas' system and those in other states, it was clear to the Court that the funding scheme was not \"so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory.\" Justice Powell argued that on the question of wealth and education, \"the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50984:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50985:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50985:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPercy Green, a black civil rights activist, was a mechanic working for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, a St. Louis-based aerospace and aircraft manufacturer, from 1956 until August 28, 1964, when he was laid off. Green protested his discharge by saying that the company’s hiring and firing practices were racially motivated. As part of his protest, he and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally parked their cars to block the main roads to the plant during the morning shift change. On July 2, 1965, there was a lock-in, in which workers were unable to leave, though the extent of Green’s involvement in this incident was unclear. On July 25, 1965, McDonnell Douglas Corporation advertised for qualified mechanics and Green reapplied, only to be turned down due to his involvement in the protests.\nGreen filed a petition with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and alleged that he was denied his position because of his race and civil rights activism. The Commission did not make any finding on the racial bias charge, but did conclude that Green was denied his job upon reapplication due to his involvement in civil rights protests. When the situation could not be resolved outside the courts, Green sued McDonnell Douglas Corporation. The district court dismissed the racial discrimination charge and held that the McDonnell Douglas Corporation refused to rehire Green because of his participation in illegal demonstrations rather than legitimate civil rights issues. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding that illegal protests were not protected activities but remanded the case to reconsider the racial discrimination charge.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50985:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50985:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50985:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the findings of the EEOC could not bar a suit that meets the jurisdictional requirements for suing in federal district court. The Court also held that Congress meant to prevent discriminatory hiring practices, not guarantee jobs, so that the complainant in an employment discrimination lawsuit carries the initial burden to present a prima facie case for racial discrimination. The burden then shifts to the company to prove that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring and/or firing practice. In this case, while Green presented a prima facie case, the Court held that McDonnell Douglas Corporation was not compelled to rehire him after his deliberately unlawful activities. On remand, Green must show that the corporation’s reasons regarding the unlawful activity were merely a pretext.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50985:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50993:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50993:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn October 1970, an Assistant United States Attorney filed an application for a wiretap with a federal judge. According to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Act), every application for the interception of wire or oral communications had to be authorized by the Attorney General or by an Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney General. The application in this case apparently contained all of the proper authorizations and signatures, was approved, and was used to arrest and charge Dominic Giordano with a drug crime. At Giordano’s pre-trial hearing, it came to light that the Assistant Attorney General had allowed an Executive Assistant in his office to authorize this and other applications. The district court granted Giordano’s motion to suppress the government’s evidence because it had misidentified the approving officer. The government appealed and argued that the court should not have suppressed the evidence because the Assistant Attorney General’s delegation to the Executive Assistant was not inconsistent with the Act and because the government’s conduct did not violate the Constitution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that the Executive Assistant’s approval violated the Act, which required the suppression of the evidence in question.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50993:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50993:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50993:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress intended only the Attorney General or a specifically designated Assistant Attorney General to have the power to authorize wiretap applications. Consequently, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act required the Court to suppress any evidence obtained from a wiretap that was issued in response to an application with insufficient authorization. Additionally, because the original wiretap application was invalid, the government could not rely on any contested evidence obtained from the properly authorized extension of the original wiretap.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he maintained that the Court should not have suppressed the evidence obtained from the extension of the original wiretap orders. Justice Powell argued that the probable cause for the properly authorized extensions was only partially obtained form the illegal wiretap; therefore, the Court did not need to suppress the evidence gathered from the extensions. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50993:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50995:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "50995:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming \"executive privilege,\" which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "50995:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "50995:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "50995:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to \"the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice.\" Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "50995:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51007:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51007:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA suit charging that the Detroit, Michigan public school system was racially segregated as a result of official policies was filed against Governor Milliken. After reviewing the case and concluding the system was segregated, a district court ordered the adoption of a desegregation plan that encompassed eighty-five outlying school districts. The lower court found that Detroit-only plans were inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the metropolitan plan. This case was decided together with Allen Park Public Schools v. Bradley and Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51007:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51007:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51007:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that \"[w]ith no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect,\" the district court's remedy was \"wholly impermissible\" and not justified by Brown v. Board of Education. The Court noted that desegregation, \"in the sense of dismantling a dual school system,\" did not require \"any particular racial balance in each 'school, grade or classroom.'\" The Court also emphasized the importance of local control over the operation of schools.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51007:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51017:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51017:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice arrested William Earl Matlock, a bank robbery suspect, in the front yard of the house where he lived. Police did not ask Matlock which room he occupied in the house or whether they could conduct a search. A woman, who gave them permission to search the house, including the bedroom where Matlock lived, let the officers inside. The woman’s parents leased the house and Matlock paid them rent for his room. In that room, police found $4,995 in cash.\nAt trial, Matlock moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. He argued that the unwarranted search of his room was illegal. At the suppression hearing, the woman who agreed to the search testified that she lived with Matlock in his room. This gave her sufficient authority to lawfully consent to the search. The district court held that those statements were inadmissible hearsay and granted the motion to suppress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51017:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51017:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51017:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that police can obtain consent for a search from a third party if that third party has common authority over the premises. The woman’s statements should not have been excluded at the suppression hearing because evidentiary burdens are lower for suppression hearings than the actual trial. On remand, the court must determine whether the woman had authority to consent to the search.\nJustice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the search was invalid because police officers failed to obtain a warrant when they had multiple opportunities to do so. The woman letting police officers into the house violated Matlock’s and her parents' privacy. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate dissent, writing that, on remand, the court should determine whether the woman knew she did not have to consent to the search of the house. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51017:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51026:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51026:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1972, the Communist Party of Indiana, a new political party, wished to place its candidates for President and Vice President of the United States on the ballot. The Indiana State Election Board rejected its application to do so until the officers of the party had filed an affidavit stating that the party did not advocate the overthrow of local, state, or national government by force or violence. The Communist Party of Indiana sued State Election Board and its members and sought an injunction that would require the Board to place the candidates on the ballot. The district court found the policy constitutional and required the Communist Party of Indiana to submit an affidavit to that effect. The Board found the Party’s affidavit unsatisfactory and again rejected it. The Party sought an injunction requiring the Board to accept the affidavit, and the district court denied the motion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51026:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51026:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51026:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that states may not interfere with the right to associate with the political party of one’s choice without proof that the political party was inciting immediate lawless action. Such action on the parts of the states prevented the effective casting of ballots, which violated basic civil and political rights, and was not in the best interests of the states.\nIn his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that the facts of the case showed that Indian did not require affidavits from the two main political parties. Because the policy represented a discriminatory preference without any justification, it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51026:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51029:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51029:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn inmate of a Nebraska state prison started a class action lawsuit, on behalf of himself and other inmates, alleging that prison disciplinary proceedings violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The suit also objected to the prison's inspection of privileged mail between inmates and their attorneys. The district court rejected the disciplinary proceeding claims, but held that the inspection of mail violated the prisoners' right of access to the courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the disciplinary proceeding claims, holding that prisons should use the procedures used in probation and parole hearings for disciplinary proceeding. The court also affirmed the district court as to the inspection of mail.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51029:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51029:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51029:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 vote Justice Byron R. White wrote for the majority reversing in part and affirming in part. The Supreme Court held that while prisoners are not entitled to full due process protections, disciplinary proceedings must include written notice to the defendant of the charges, a written statement of evidence, and the opportunity for an inmate to call witnesses and present evidence. The Court allowed for discretion by officials to deny a prisoner the right to present evidence or call witnesses if it would be \"unduly hazardous to institutional safety.\" The Court also held that prison official's opening of privileged letters in the presence of other inmates was not unconstitutional.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall dissented in part, stating that the inmate's right to present evidence and call witnesses is constitutionally protected and should not be abridged. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. joined. Justice Douglass wrote a dissent, saying that prisoners are entitled to all due process protections when they are faced with an substantial deprivation of liberty in the prison.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51029:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51031:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51031:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCarolyn Aiello experienced disability as a result of complications during her pregnancy. She was ineligible for benefits from California's Disability Fund under Section 2626 of California's Unemployment Insurance Code. Section 2626 denied benefits to women whose disabilities resulted from pregnancy. Aiello and other disabled women who were denied benefits under Section 2626 challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held the statute unconstitutional. The state appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51031:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51031:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51031:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 decision, the Court reversed the District Court and upheld the statute. In an opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court accepted California's interest in keeping the Disability Fund program solvent and maintaining the low contribution rate from program members. Insuring disability resulting from pregnancy complications would be \"extraordinarily expensive\" and make the program \"impossible to maintain.\" As in Dandridge v. Williams, California was not obligated by the Equal Protection Clause to \"choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.\" Therefore, California could constitutionally choose which disabilities to insure through the Disability Fund in order to maintain the solvency and contribution level of the program.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51031:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51033:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51033:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA federal grand jury questioned John P. Calandra in connection with loan sharking activities. The questions were based on evidence obtained during a search of Calandra’s business, Royal Machine and Tool Company. Calandra refused to answer any questions, arguing that the search of Royal Machine unlawfully violated the Fourth Amendment. The government attempted to grant Calandra immunity in district court, but he asked the court to suppress evidence obtained during the search. The district court granted the suppression order and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied. Under the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search and seizure cannot be used against the victim of that search in a criminal proceeding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51033:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51033:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51033:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Powell, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings. The purpose of a grand jury is to determine whether a crime was committed and whether to charge someone in connection with that crime. Using the exclusionary rule would interfere with that purpose. The exclusionary rule is also meant to deter police misconduct, not provide a new constitutional right.\nJustice William J. Brennan dissented, writing that application of the exclusionary rule should not depend on whether it deters police misconduct. The exclusionary rule gives meaning to the Fourth Amendments protection against unlawful search and seizure. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51033:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51035:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51035:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichardson, a taxpayer interested in activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, sued the government to provide records detailing the CIA's expenditures.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51035:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51035:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51035:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that Richardson did not have standing to sue. Using the two-pronged standing test of Flast v. Cohen (1968), Chief Justice Burger found that there was no \"logical nexus between the status asserted [by Richardson as a taxpayer] and the claim sought to be adjudicated.\" It was clear to Burger that Richardson was not \"a proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power\" on this issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51035:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51039:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51039:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Albany, Georgia theater manager was convicted under a Georgia obscenity law when he showed the critically acclaimed film \"Carnal Knowledge.\" The film explored social conceptions of sexuality and starred Jack Nicholson and Ann Margaret.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51039:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51039:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51039:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA unanimous Court held that the Georgia Supreme Court misapplied the obscenity test announced in Miller v. California (1973). Justice Rehnquist argued that Miller did not give juries \"unbridled discretion\" to determine what is patently offensive. Only material that displays \"hard core sexual conduct\" is prohibited. Since \"Carnal Knowledge\" did not contain scenes of that nature it merited constitutional protection.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51039:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51062:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51062:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCarol Jo LaFleur was a teacher at Patrick Henry Junior High School in Cleveland, Ohio. She was forced to discontinue her duties on March 12, 1971 because the Cleveland School Board required every teacher to take maternity leave without pay five months before the expected date of birth. The board also ruled that a teacher could not return from maternity leave until 1) the next school semester began, 2) the teacher obtained a certificate from her physician showing good medical health, and 3) the newborn child was three months old.\nAnn Elizabeth Nelson was a French teacher at Central Junior High School, also in Cleveland. She reported her pregnancy to the school's principal on January 29, 1971, and applied for maternity leave. Both LaFleur and Nelson wanted to continue teaching until the end of the school year, but were forced to leave in March 1971. LaFleur and Nelson filed separate suits in district court challenging the constitutionality of the school boards' maternity leave rules; the court tried their cases together, and held that the board's policies were constitutional. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed, concluding that the mandatory leave policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.\nSusan Cohen was a social studies teacher at Midlothian High School in Chesterfield County, Virginia. Cohen notified the Chesterfield School Board that she was pregnant on November 2, 1970. The board's rule required pregnant teachers to go on maternity leave at the end of their fifth month, but allowed re-employment the next school year upon submission of a medical certificate from the teacher's physician. Cohen's obstetrician believed that she was fit to continue working, but the school board denied Cohen's request for an extension. Cohen challenged the constitutionality of Chesterfield County's rule in district court, which held that the regulation violated the equal protection clause. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but on rehearing en banc, the court upheld the constitutionality of the regulation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51062:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51062:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51062:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes and no. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Potter Stewart held that the school boards' regulations requiring pregnant teachers to stop working after the fifth month of their pregnancies violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Justice Stewart emphasized that the Court extends strong protection to individuals' freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life. He pointed to both boards' requirements that pregnant teachers provide advance notice of their condition, arguing that this was in itself sufficient to preserve continuity in classroom instruction.\nJustice Stewart then turned to the school boards' claim that the rules were required because some pregnant teachers became physically incapable of teaching. He reasoned that these rules amounted to an irrebuttable presumption that every teacher in her fourth or fifth month of pregnancy was incapable of teaching. He also rejected the boards' argument that the rules were necessary for administrative convenience, concluding that administrative efficiency was not a sufficiently important interest to validate what was otherwise a violation of due process.\nJustice Stewart also held that the Cleveland School Board's eligibility restriction based on the age of the newborn child violated the due process clause because the board failed to show a reasonable justification for this regulation. In contrast, the Chesterfield School Board only required that teachers demonstrate good health, guaranteeing them re-employment by the beginning of the next school year. This was a reasonable and narrow method of protecting the school's interest in teacher fitness.\nJustice Louis Powell concurred in the result. He questioned the majority's conclusion that some of the maternity leave requirements amounted to an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness. Instead, Justice Powell argued that the board's classifications violated the female teachers' right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because they were not rationally related to the school's legitimate interest in fostering continuity of teaching.\nJustice William Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger, dissented. He argued that while the school boards' rules may have been arbitrary in particular cases, this was not enough to show that the rules themselves were unconstitutional. He noted that both parties conceded that the probability of physical impairment increased as a pregnancy advanced, and suggested that the line drawn by the boards was not irrational.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51062:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51071:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51071:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince 1941, Florida has granted a $500 property tax exemption for widows but no similar exemption for widowers. Widower Mel Kahn applied to the Dade County Tax Assessor’s Office for the property tax exemption, which was denied. He sued in circuit court and sought a declaratory judgment. The circuit court held that the statute was gender-based and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and held that the gender classification had a “fair and substantial relation” to the purpose of the legislation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51071:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51071:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51071:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that single women face significantly more hardship in the job market than single men, and the disparity is particularly true for surviving spouses. While widowers can generally continue in the job they held previously, many widows find themselves entering the job market for the first time or after an extended absence. Based on these differences, the Court held that the gender classification in the Florida statute has a “fair and substantial relation” to the legislation’s purpose of softening the financial impact of the loss of a spouse.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued classifications based on characteristics over which individuals have no control, such as gender, must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. In such cases, the government must prove not only that such classifications serve a compelling government interest, but also that the interest cannot be served by any other classification. In this case, he argued that the purpose of the legislation could be achieved without gender-based discrimination. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Byron R. White wrote that gender-based classifications require significant justification that Florida did not provide.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51071:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51075:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51075:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 8, 1970, Richard Guy Steffel and other individuals were distributing flyers protesting American involvement in the Vietnam War on the exterior sidewalk of the North DeKalb Shopping Center. Employees asked them to stop, but they did not, so the employees called the police. The police informed them that they would be arrested under a Georgia criminal statute if they did not stop, so they left. The next day Steffel and another individual returned to hand out flyers. The police were called again, and Steffel left to avoid arrest. The other individual, however, was arrested.\nSteffel sued and argued that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because his fear of being arrested kept him from distributing flyers. The district court dismissed the action and denied all relief after it found no evidence that the state acted in bad faith and therefore there was no active controversy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51075:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51075:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51075:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the case presented an actual controversy, as the Georgia statute could interfere with Steffel’s exercise of his constitutional rights even if he was not arrested. Because the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, which Steffel was protesting, was reduced, the issue of whether or not the case still presented an active controversy would be decided by the lower court on remand. The Court also held that awarding declaratory relief would not interfere with the state’s prosecution, and therefore is not precluded.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion and argued that plaintiffs in such constitutional cases must prove that the state’s actions represented a “genuine threat” to their constitutional liberties, which he predicts will be rare. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the concurrence.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that it would not be improper to issue declaratory or injunctive relief in state courts on issues that have already been decided by federal courts. He also argues that such measures should not be necessary because the decisions of federal courts carry more weight than precedents in state courts.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion and argued that issuing declaratory relief does not allow a plaintiff to avoid prosecution under state law. He also argued that this opinion does not provide support for the ability of federal courts to grant injunctive relief just because declarative relief was appropriate. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51075:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51081:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51081:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLawrence Mitchell purchased a refrigerator, range, stereo, and washing machine from W. T. Grant Company and fell behind on payments. W. T. Grant sued Mitchell in state court to recover the $574.17 balance. Pursuant to Louisiana law, W. T. Grant offered proof that it had a vendor's lien on the property and that Mitchell owed a balance and asked the court to issue a writ of sequestration to retain and hold the property pending the outcome of the suit. The trial court approved the writ without notifying Mitchell or allowing him an opportunity to defend his right to the property at a hearing. Mitchell moved to dissolve the writ of sequestration and argued that seizing his property without notice or an opportunity to defend his interest in the property violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The trial court, the appellate court, and the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Mitchell's argument and held that W. T. Grant's course of conduct ensured Mitchell's due process by proceeding according to Louisiana law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51081:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51081:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51081:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White wrote the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Louisiana's procedure for sequestering property provided both the buyer and the seller with a fair opportunity to secure and defend their respective interests in the challenged property. W. T. Grant Company provided a sworn statement documenting proof of the debt, the lien, and delinquency, all of which showed the judge that Mitchell's title to the property was encumbered. Additional safeguards in the Louisiana law required creditors to place a bond down at the time of sequestration to secure the buyer's interests should the proceedings show that sequestration was wrongful. The Court held that these safeguards, coupled with Louisiana's interest in preventing the buyer from transferring or concealing the property to the detriment of the creditor, justified sequestration without notice or a hearing.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that the majority opinion overturned the rule established in Fuentes v. Shevin. In that case, the Court held that procedural due process required \"an adversary hearing before an individual may be temporarily deprived of any possessory interest in . . . property.\" Justice Powell argued that the Fuentes rule was unnecessarily broad and that the narrower grounds the majority set forth represented a better balance of the interests of creditors and debtors.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court should adhere to the Fuentes rule. According to this rule, the Louisiana procedures violated due process by allowing the government to deprive a person of property with no advance notice or opportunity to be heard. Justice William O. Douglas, Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51081:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51084:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51084:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934. The Act included a provision in 25 U.S.C. Section 472 that gave hiring preference Native Americans for positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Congress then passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which prohibited racial discrimination in federal employment. In June 1972, the BIA extended Indian preference to both hiring and promotion decisions. C.R. Mancari was a non- Indian employee of the BIA. He and other non-Indian employees of the BIA filed a class action in United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They claimed that Section 472 was repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. They also claimed that Section 472 violated the Fifth Amendment and their right to property without due process. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51084:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51084:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51084:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. The Court reversed the District Court. The 1972 Act did not explicitly repeal Section 472. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, cited the long history of Indian employment preference as exceptions to prohibitions against employment discrimination. Congress had also passed two Indian preference statutes after the 1972 Act, showing that Congress did not intend implicitly to repeal Section 472. In addition, the Court held that Section 472 did not constitute discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Again, Justice Blackmun cited the history of \"special treatment\" granted to Indians. The preference for Indians in Section 472 was not \"a 'racial' preference\", but rather \"an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government.\" Section 472 went towards the \"fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation towards the Indians,\" and was therefore not in violation of the Fifth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51084:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51096:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51096:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1964, the federal government sued several corporations for rigging prices of concrete and steel pipes in violation of the Sherman Act. That case reached a final judgment in May 1968, when all parties agreed to terms that prevented the companies from engaging in future violations of anti-trust laws. Eleven days short of one year after this agreement, the State of Utah, on behalf of several agencies and local governments, filed a class action lawsuit against the same corporations. The lawsuit claimed that the corporations’ previous price fixing schemes had directly injured the State and other plaintiffs. Six months later, the corporations successfully argued that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the lawsuit could not be maintained as a class action because it was not impractical for the plaintiffs to each have individual representation. Eight days following this ruling, over 60 towns, municipalities, and water districts within the State of Utah immediately filed motions to intervene in the lawsuit. The court denied their motions because they had failed to argue them within the one-year time statute of limitations required under federal law. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, that court held that, by filing lawsuit as a class action, all of the claims were adequately before the trial court before the statute of limitations was reached. However, because the judge dismissed the class action after the statute of limitations ran, the parties were unable to re-file their claims against the corporations. That court held that the trial judge could not leave the plaintiff’s without recourse after the time to file the lawsuit had passed. Instead, the plaintiffs should have the eleven days that remained under the statute of limitations when the initial lawsuit was filed in order to intervene or otherwise file individual claims. The corporations appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51096:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51096:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51096:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the Ninth Circuit.The Supreme Court held that commencing a class action suspends all applicable statutes of limitations against members of that class who would have been parties had the suit been allowed to continue as a class action. Justice Stewart noted that the policies behind statutes of limitations are to ensure fairness to defendants by “preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Those policies, however, are satisfied when a plaintiff initiates a class action lawsuit because defendants know a named plaintiff and the number and generic identities of potential plaintiffs. Finally, the Court noted that eleven days remained under the statute of limitations when the class action was initially filed. Therefore, the motions to intervene that were filed within eight days of the judge’s dismissal were valid.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51096:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51107:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51107:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJoseph Anthony Davis was classified as I-A by a draft board and ordered to report for a physical examination. He failed to report several times. The draft board declared him a delinquent, and issued an order that he be inducted into the Armed Forces. Under 32 CFR Section 1631.7, a draftee could only be ordered to report for induction if he was deemed \"acceptable for service\" after a physical examination and if the board had mailed him a statement of his status with three weeks' notice. The statute provided an exception for draftees that were declared delinquent, accelerating the process. Davis was convicted in United States District Court for the Central District of California for his failures to report, and he appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While his case was pending, the Supreme Court decided Gutknecht v. United States. Gutknecht involved a similar situation, in which a draftee's induction was accelerated by his delinquent status. The Supreme Court declared Gutknecht's conviction invalid. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, which held that Davis' case was not impacted by Gutknecht. This ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Davis petitioned for certiorari. During this process, the Ninth Circuit ruled in United States v. Fox. Fox involved a situation similar to Davis'. Fox's conviction was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile, Davis' petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, and he began serving his prison sentence. Davis then challenged his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Davis asserted that in the process of his conviction, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Fox changed the law. The District Court ruled against him. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that it had already ruled against him on the same issue. Davis then appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51107:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51107:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51107:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that Davis could challenge his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart quoted the government's acknowledgment that the Ninth Circuit's opinion was \"not consonant with this Court's holding in Sanders v. United States.\" The Court rejected the government's suggestion that Section 2255 did not apply because Davis' challenge was not grounded in the Constitution. Since \"new law has been made...since the trial and appeal\" through the Ninth Circuit's later holding in Fox, Davis was entitled to a challenge under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. concurred in part and dissented in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51107:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51113:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51113:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHarold Omand Spence displayed an American flag with a peace symbol made out of removable tape on it outside of his home in Seattle, WA. When officers came to his house he offered to take the flag down, but was arrested, charged, and convicted under a Washington statute that forbade the display of an American flag to which figures symbols or other extraneous material is attached or superimposed. Spence was not charged under the state flag desecration statute. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. The state supreme court rejected Spence’s argument that the statute violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51113:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51113:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51113:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that that statute, as applied, violated the First Amendment right to free speech. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, writing that Spence’s display was symbolic speech entitled to constitutional protection. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the result.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that each state should decide how the American flag should be protected. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented, expressing that states have an interest in protecting the American flag as an important symbol of national unity. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51113:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51114:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51114:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPat Tornillo was Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association and a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in Dade County, Florida. The Miami Herald published two editorials criticizing Tornillo and his candidacy. He demanded that the Herald publish his responses to the editorials. When the Herald refused, Tornillo sued in Dade County Circuit Court under Florida Statute Section 104.38, which granted political candidates criticized by any newspaper the right to have their responses to the criticisms published. The Herald challenged the statute as a violation of the free press clause of the First Amendment. The Circuit Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed this decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51114:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51114:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51114:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Florida and held that Florida's \"right to reply\" statute violated the freedom of press found in the First Amendment. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court recognized the risks posed to the \"true marketplace of ideas\" by media consolidation and barriers to entry in the newspaper industry. However, even in that context, \"press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and...cannot be legislated.\" The statute was an \"intrusion into the function of editors,\" and imposed \"a penalty on the basis of the content.\" Chief Justice Burger relied on New York Times v. Sullivan in that the \"right to reply\" statute \"limits the variety of public debate,\" and was therefore unconstitutional. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. authored a concurring statement. Justice Byron R. White authored a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51114:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51121:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51121:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a \"Leninist\" and a \"Communist-fronter\" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury verdict and an award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51121:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51121:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51121:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court reversed the lower court decision, holding that Gertz's rights had been violated and ordering a new trial. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. First, the recklessness standard applies only to defamation of public figures or public officials. Second, even for private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media. And third, any standard of fault less then recklessness limits private persons to actual injury.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun write a concurring opinion signing on to the reasoning and outcome of the majority. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and William O. Douglas dissenting, arguing that the failure to apply the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to private persons involved in public matters would stifle \"free and robust debate.\" Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined the majority in reversing the Court of Appeals ruling but would have simply reinstated the jury verdict and damage award. They disagreed with the majority's refashioning of state libel laws involving private individuals and the news media.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51121:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51130:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51130:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Village of Belle Terre in New York had an ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings. The statute’s meaning of “family” was one or more related persons or not more than two unrelated people. The appellees owned a house and leased it to unrelated people, in violation of the Village’s ordinance. When the Village asked the respondents to remedy the violation, the homeowners sued the Village seeking a judgment that declared the ordinance unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with the right to travel and by expressing impermissible social preferences. The district court held the ordinance was constitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court determined that the ordinance was an attempt to ensure that residents conformed to social preferences of living style and had no relevance to public health, safety, or welfare.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51130:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51130:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51130:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAn ordinance restricting land use to “one-family” dwellings did not involve a procedural disparity, did not deprive any group of a fundamental right, and is rationally related to a permissible government objective. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Village of Belle Terre’s ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the ordinance was not arbitrary, did not unreasonably apply to some individuals and not others, and was reasonably related to a rational state objective. The Court also held that the ordinance did not violate the Due Process Clause because it did not deny anyone a fundamental right such as the rights to travel, association, and privacy.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that this case was moot because the unrelated tenants to whom the homeowners leased were no longer living in the house when this case was decided. There was no case or controversy as Article III of the Constitution requires. Justice Brennan explained that he would vacate and remand the judgment, and if the lower court determined that the case was moot, as he suggested, then the case should be dismissed. In his separate dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that the ordinance “unnecessarily burdens” the lessor appellees’ right to privacy and First Amendment right to freedom of association. The Village’s legitimate interests in controlling land use could be fulfilled by limiting the number of people dwelling in a single residence without specifying that they need to be related or unrelated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51130:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51132:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51132:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA police officer pulled over and arrested Robinson for operating an automobile without a valid permit. The officer then frisked Robinson and discovered a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen vials of heroin in his pocket.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51132:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51132:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51132:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court upheld the search. Distinguishing between searches done to discover concealed weapons and those conducted coextensive with an arrest, Justice Rehnquist argued since the officer did not conduct the search in an abusive or extreme manner, and because he acted consistent with the authority vested in a police officer when making an arrest, his actions were legitimate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51132:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51142:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51142:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Pugh and Nathanial Henderson were arrested in Florida and charged with felony and misdemeanor charges not punishable by death. Pugh was denied bail and Henderson was unable to post a $4,500 bond, so both remained in custody. Florida law only required indictments for capitol offenses, so Pugh and Henderson were charged only by information, without a preliminary hearing and without leave of the court. Florida courts previously held that filing an information foreclosed an accused’s right to a preliminary hearing, and that habeas corpus could not be used except in exceptional circumstances.\nPugh and Henderson filed a class action against Dade County officials, claiming a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing on the issue of probable cause. The district court certified the class and held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information the right to a preliminary hearing. The Florida Supreme Court adopted new rules in an attempt to fix the problem, but on remand, the district court held the rules still violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court also prescribed detailed procedures to protect that right. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, modifying minor portions of the district court’s prescribed procedures.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51142:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51142:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51142:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing for a unanimous court affirmed in part and reversed in part remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment entitles a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information to a timely preliminary hearing on probable cause. The prosecutor’s decision to file an information does not provide sufficient protection. Five members of the court agreed that the district court’s prescribed procedures were not required by the Fourth Amendment. The case was remanded for reconsideration of these procedures.\nJustice Potter Stewart concurred, writing that it was unnecessary to specify which procedural protections do not need to be provided to suspects awaiting trial. Justice William O. Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51142:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51143:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51143:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Martinez was a prisoner in the California State Prison in San Quentin, California. The California Department of Corrections had regulations which censored mail and which prohibited law students and legal paraprofessionals from conducing interviews with the inmates.\nMartinez and other prisoners in the California corrections system filed suit against officials in the California Department of Corrections in federal court, challenging the constitutionality of the aforementioned regulations. The district court decided in favor of the prisoners, and the officials from the department of corrections appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51143:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51143:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51143:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote for a unanimous Court and affirmed the lower court's opinion. The Court held that it was proper for the district court to refuse to abstain from deciding the constitutionality of the regulations. The Court further held that the censorship of direct personal correspondence created incidental restrictions on the right to free speech for both prisoners and their correspondents. Therefore, the speech could only be restricted if it furthered a substantial government interest and was narrowly tailored to further that interest. Under this rule, the policy censoring mail was unconstitutional.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall filed a concurring opinion, which Justice William J. Brennan joined. Justice Marshall emphasized his opinion that the prison authorities did not have a general right to open and read all incoming and outgoing prison mail.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote separately that prisoners were still entitled to all constitutional rights which were not curtailed by procedures that satisfied all the requirements of due process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51143:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51145:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51145:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHarry Lehman was running for the Ohio House of Representatives in the 56th District, which included the city of Shaker Heights. Lehman wanted to have his campaign advertisements placed on the side of Shaker Heights' streetcars. Metromedia, Inc. was designated by the city to manage that advertising space. Metromedia's contract with the city prohibited it from placing political advertisements on the streetcars. It was allowed, however, to place advertisements from businesses and public service groups. Lehman's request was denied, and he sued in the Ohio Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County alleging that Shaker Heights' policy violated his free speech rights. The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled for the city. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51145:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51145:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51145:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Ohio and found no violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for a plurality of four justices, Justice Harry A. Blackmun asserted that \"no First Amendment forum is here to be found,\" as the streetcars did not qualify as a \"public thoroughfare.\" Accordingly, the city \"need not accept every proffer of advertising.\" The city could reject certain types of advertising as long as the policies were not \"arbitrary, capricious, or invidious.\" Given the \"reasonable legislative objectives\" of minimizing \"chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience,\" Shaker Heights' policy was not unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51145:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51150:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51150:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1971, the San Francisco, California school system was integrated. As a result, the San Francisco school system absorbed over 2,856 students of Chinese ancestry who were not proficient in English. Of these students, the school system only provided about 1,000 with supplemental English language courses. Classes were taught exclusively in English.\nLau and other students of Chinese descent who did not speak English and received no supplemental English courses brought a class action suit against the officials in the San Francisco Unified School District. The students claimed that the failure to provide supplemental English classes constituted an unequal educational opportunity in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.\nThe district court denied relief, holding that the policies of the school system did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and a hearing en banc was denied. The students appealed the appellate court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51150:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51150:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51150:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote for a unanimous court. The Court determined that the school system's failure to provide supplemental English language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry who spoke no English constituted a violation of the California Education Code in the SFUSD Handbook and Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it deprived those students of an opportunity to participate in the public education program.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote an opinion concurring with the result, which was joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Harry Blackmun. He discussed the appropriateness of the statutory guidelines mandating affirmative remedial efforts for linguistically deprived children.\nJustice Harry Blackmun also wrote an opinion concurring with the result, which was joined by Justice Burger. The justice stressed that 1,800 children were being deprived of meaningful schooling in this matter. He limited the Court's holding by stating that, if only a few children spoke a language other than English, the Court's decision would not necessarily require supplemental language instruction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51150:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51151:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51151:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWayne Kennedy was a nonprobationary employee of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. He was dismissed from his position after allegedly making recklessly false and defamatory statements about other OEO employees. Though he had the right under federal regulations to reply to the charges, he chose instead to sue the agency for interfering with his freedom of expression and denying him due process. A three-judge District Court agreed with Kennedy on the due process claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51151:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51151:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51151:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a plurality opinion written by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the court held that the procedures established for the purpose of determining whether there is \"cause\" for Kennedy's dismissal satisfied the requirements of procedural due process. The court also held that standard of employment protection imposed by was not impermissibly vague or overbroad in its regulation of the speech of federal employees. The statute in question was not unconstitutional on its face.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51151:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51152:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51152:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the spring of 1970, Old Dominion Branch No. 496 of the National Association of Letter Carriers was recognized by postal authorities as the exclusive local collective-bargaining representative of the letter carriers of the Richmond, Virginia, area. Although already representing the majority of letter carriers, the Branch was involved in an ongoing campaign to convince the remaining letter carriers to join the organization. As part of this effort, the Branch’s monthly newsletter published a list of those who had not yet joined the union under the heading “List of Scabs.” After his name appeared twice in the list, Henry Austin complained to the Richmond Postmaster and the President of the Branch. Several weeks later, the list appeared again accompanied by a well-known piece of trade literature describing the despicable nature of a scab. Austin and the other appellees sued for defamation. The appellants moved to dismiss and argued that the publication was protected speech under the First Amendment and federal libel laws. The trial court judge instructed the jury that state libel laws were applicable to such speech if the jury found that the statements were made with actual malice. The jury found in favor of the appellees and awarded damages. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51152:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51152:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51152:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal law such as the National Labor Relations Act supports an environment for robust labor debate that allows for “intemperate, abusive, or insulting language” if it effectively makes a point. The Court also held that such language could not be interpreted as a false representation of fact and so maintained their First Amendment protection.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the First Amendment and its application to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit both the states and the federal government from limiting speech in federal labor disputes.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority unnecessarily extended the reach of federal labor law. He wrote that state libel laws represented the overriding state interest in allowing individuals redress for harms to their reputations. In this case, the individuals in question did not represent an economic threat to the union, so the speech should not be protected from state libel laws. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51152:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51161:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51161:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDeFunis was denied admission to the University of Washington Law School despite test scores that were higher than some of the minorities admitted. DeFunis then successfully asked a trial court to require the school to admit him. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, upholding the school's decision to deny DeFunis admission. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the case as DeFunis was entering his final year of school.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51161:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51161:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51161:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that because the University of Washington Law School had agreed to allow DeFunis to enroll and to earn a diploma, the case in question was moot. DeFunis would be able to complete his legal studies irrespective of any Supreme Court decision. The controversy between parties had thus \"clearly ceased to be 'definite and concrete' and no longer 'touch[ed] the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51161:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51163:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51163:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRespondents alleged that a section the New York welfare statute was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the Social Security Act. The New York statute required recipients to cooperate in a support action against a missing parent or they would not receive benefits. The Social Security Act contained no such requirement. A three-judge district court in the Northern District of New York agreed and ruled in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court heard the case on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51163:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51163:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51163:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. The court noted that since the district court's decision, the Social Security Act was amended to almost mirror that section of the New York welfare statute. The amendment would become effective just over three months after the Supreme Court's decision so the Court declined to deliver an extended opinion. Justices Lewis F. Powell and William Rehnquist dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51163:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51167:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51167:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMartin Cohn was the father of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television station broadcast the name of Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape victims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51167:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51167:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51167:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the Georgia statute violated the Constitution. Justice White recognized the primacy of issues of privacy and press freedom, but he also identified compelling reasons why the press should not be restricted in this case. First, the news media is an important resource for citizens which allows them to scrutinize government proceedings. The commissions and adjudication of crimes are issues relevant to the public interest. Second, in the development of the privacy right, the Court has held that the interests of privacy \"fade\" in cases where controversial \"information already appears on the public record.\" Restricting the media as the Georgia law did was a dangerous encroachment on press freedom, argued White, as it \"would invite timidity and self-censorship.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51167:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51170:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51170:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Virginia statute made it a misdemeanor for \"any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, [from encouraging] or [prompting] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage.\" Bigelow, director and managing editor of the Virginia Weekly, was convicted under this law when his newspaper ran an advertisement for an organization which referred women to clinics and hospitals for abortions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51170:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51170:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51170:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the Virginia law infringed upon Bigelow's First Amendment rights and violated the Constitution. Citing prior holdings such as New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), Justice Blackmun denied the Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling that commercial speech is not afforded First Amendment protection. Furthermore, the advertisement in question contained important information in the \"public interest\" which went beyond merely informing readers of a commercial service. Finally, the Court feared that the Virginia statute had the potential to \"impair\" national and interstate publications which might choose to carry similar advertisements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51170:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51171:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51171:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nColonial Pipeline Company is a Delaware corporation that operates a pipeline running from Texas to New York carrying petroleum. Colonial challenged a Louisiana corporation franchise tax, stating that all of their business in Louisiana was interstate. Colonial maintained no offices in Louisiana and delivered no petroleum intrastate, but they did have several employees in Louisiana. The Louisiana Court of Appeal held the tax unconstitutional as a state regulation on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, holding that the tax was not on interstate commerce, but on corporate business done in Louisiana.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51171:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51171:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51171:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court 7-1. The Supreme Court held that the tax was justified because Colonial had voluntarily qualified to do business in Louisiana, and gained benefits and protections from Louisiana. The Court also held that the tax was not discriminatory or unfairly apportioned. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurrence stating that the tax did not threaten state commerce by being discriminatory.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, asserting that Louisiana’s tax was solely on the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce, making it unconstitutional. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51171:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51172:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51172:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The purpose of the amendments was to regulate minimum wage and overtime pay for state and local government employees. The National League of Cities, as well as several states and cities, challenged the constitutionality of the amendments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51172:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51172:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51172:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nCongress may not regulate the labor market of state employees. The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting legislation which operates \"to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.\" While the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is \"plenary,\" that power has constitutional limits. In this case, the exercise of the commerce power ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment which protects the states' traditional activities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51172:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51173:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51173:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1970, Jack Roland Murphy was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit robbery while armed and/or assault, and was sentenced to life in prison. Murphy filed for change of venue because of media coverage of his previous crimes. Murphy was made famous by his involvement in the 1964 jewel heist of the “Star of India,” a rare precious sapphire that was housed at the New York Museum of Natural History. Murphy was given the nickname “Murph the Surf” in national media coverage. Murphy had also been arrested and indicted for the double murder of two women in Florida, which was nationally known as the “Whiskey Creek Murders.” Murphy contends that the national publicity surrounding these two convictions tainted the jury and that his right to fair trial was violated. The motion was denied, and Murphy was convicted. After his conviction, Murphy petitioned for habeas corpus and argued that the denial of his request to change venue resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial. The district court held that the jury was properly screened for prejudice and dismissed his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51173:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51173:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51173:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNational news coverage of the defendant’s previous crimes was not sufficient to establish a presumption of jury prejudice in violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that because the jury selection process was sufficiently thorough to exclude prejudice of the jurors, the petitioner’s right to a fair trial was not violated. The Court looked at other cases involving jury prejudice because of previous media attention and determined that they did not control the outcome in this case, as the jury members who were selected only had brief exposure to Murphy’s previous crimes and stated that they did not think the previous crimes influenced his guilt in this case. Although there was precedent that stated that certain circumstances could create a high potential for prejudice, the Court determined that precedent applied only in federal courts as an exercise of the Court’s supervisory powers over federal courts rather than as a constitutional rule that applied to state courts as well.\nIn his concurrence in the judgment, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that, while the trial judge should have shown more discretion in jury selection, the circumstances of the trial in this case did not rise to the level of violating the defendant’s rights to fair trial and due process.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that Murphy’s request for venue change should have been granted because some of the jurors did show prejudice regarding Murphy’s previous convictions, and therefore that he had been denied a fair trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51173:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51175:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51175:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnthony Pasquall Faretta was charged with grand theft. He filed a request to represent himself in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The judge initially accepted the request, but later called Faretta back in to question him about his knowledge of the hearsay rule and other court procedures. Based on Faretta’s answers, the judge determined that Faretta did not intelligently and knowingly waive his right to counsel and the judge appointed a public defender. The jury convicted Faretta. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court judge’s ruling that Faretta had no constitutional right to represent himself. The California Supreme Court denied review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51175:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51175:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51175:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, vacated the state court judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has the constitutional right to defend himself when he voluntarily and intelligently wants to do so. In this case, Faretta was deprived of that constitutional right. Farretta’s knowledge of the hearsay rule and court procedure was irrelevant to whether he voluntarily waived his right to counsel.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that the Constitution provides no basis for a right to self-representation. Justice Harry A. Blackmun and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent, arguing that the text of the Sixth Amendment does not support the right to self-representation, and such a right will lead to procedural confusion without providing any benefit to the accused. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51175:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51192:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51192:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA juvenile court found 17-year-old Gary Jones guilty of acts that would constitute robbery if he were tried as an adult. After the hearing, the court determined that Jones should be prosecuted as an adult. Jones filed for habeas corpus, arguing that the criminal trial put him in double jeopardy. The trial court, court of appeal, and Supreme Court of California denied the writ. The case went to trial and the court found Jones guilty of robbery in the first degree.\nJones again filed for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court. The court denied the petition, holding that hearings before juvenile court and criminal trials are so different that double jeopardy did not apply. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that the application of double jeopardy would not impede the juvenile courts. The court also held that allowing the criminal verdict to stand would destroy confidence in the judicial system.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51192:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51192:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51192:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Warren Burger delivered the opinion of the court vacating the lower court decision and remanding. The unanimous Supreme Court held that the criminal trial put Jones in jeopardy for a second time. The Court suggested that juvenile courts make determinations about whether to try a juvenile as an adult at a preliminary hearing before any adjudication is made. This would avoid any double jeopardy and allow juveniles to be tried as adults when appropriate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51192:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51196:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51196:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Maness, a lawyer, represented a client convicted of selling obscene magazines in violation of a city ordinance. The city attorney requested a subpoena to produce 52 such magazines in order to obtain an injunction to prevent their further sale. Maness advised his client not to produce the magazines and invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The judge ordered the production of the magazines, accepting the city clerk’s argument that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply in a civil proceeding. When Maness’ client still refused to produce the magazines, the judge held Maness and his client in contempt of court and sentenced them to 10 days in jail and a $200 fine.\nAnother state district judge reviewed and affirmed the contempt conviction, but changed the penalty to a $500 fine and no jail time. The Texas appeals courts and the Supreme Court of Texas refused to review the judgment. Maness filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of himself and his client in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, which granted the petition. The district court noted that civil and criminal charges in this case would arise under the same Texas statute, so the Fifth Amendment applied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held its judgment pending Supreme Court review of the contempt conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51196:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51196:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51196:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote the unanimous majority opinion, holding that Maness could not be held in contempt for giving advice in good faith. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the client should have produced the magazines and then appealed the decision to let them in as evidence. The Court noted that sometimes it is impossible to “unring the bell” and Maness took the proper course to protect his client. The Court also noted that the record showed no evidence of willfully disobedient conduct by Maness or his client.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a concurrence, stating that punishing an attorney for acting in good faith would violate due process as an arbitrary interference with a client’s right to the advice of counsel. Justice Bryon R. White also wrote a concurrence, noting that the trial court gave no assurance that the client would not be convicted based on the magazines. Justice White would have vacated the contempt judgment and given the client another opportunity to answer the questions with those assurances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51196:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51202:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51202:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJulian Vella, a seaman on the SS Robert MacNamara, suffered a severe head injury while doing a repair on the ship. This caused damage to Vella’s inner ear, making it difficult for him to balance. Doctors ruled the condition permanent and incurable. A jury awarded Vella maintenance and cure for his injury. The district court denied the ship owner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The ship owner argued that because the injury was permanent, maintenance and cure was not permissible. The appellate court reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51202:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51202:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51202:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the ship owner must pay maintenance and cure from the time of the injury through the time the injury was deemed permanent. The Court felt that not requiring payment would lead to unwanted situations where a worker had to pay back maintenance and cure once his injury was diagnosed as incurable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51202:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51203:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51203:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 11, 1973, border patrol agents stopped Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce’s car based on the fact that the occupant’s appeared to be of Mexican descent. Upon questioning the passengers, the agents determined that they were illegal immigrants. The agents arrested everyone, and Brignoni-Ponce was charged with two counts of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants. At trial, Brignoni-Ponce moved to suppress the statements of the passengers as the fruits of an illegal seizure. The trial court denied the motion, and Brignoni-Ponce was convicted.\nWhile Brignoni-Ponce’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, which held that the Fourth Amendment prevents roving patrols from searching vehicles without warrant or probably cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied to this case and held that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51203:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51203:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51203:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment required there to be reasonable suspicion for border patrol agents to stop a vehicle and question its occupants. This requirement allows the government to act in the public interest of ensuring legal immigration without infringing on the rights of legal immigrants and others. Because the border patrol agents in this case did not have a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing when they stopped Brignoni-Ponce’s vehicle, the motion to suppress any testimony gained from that illegal seizure should have been suppressed.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the majority’s decision only pertains to roving patrols and that there are many other cases in which stopping a vehicle would not be constitutionally suspect. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the Fourth Amendment required the police to show probable cause to stop a vehicle, and any lower standard unreasonably weakened the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment in which he argued that the idea of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment must take all the circumstances into account when weighing the public interest against the rights of the individual. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the majority’s opinion strains the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in an attempt to solve the immigration problem that could be better handled by legislative action. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51203:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51210:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51210:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are two consolidated cases involving the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) practice of allowing aliens from Canada and Mexico to immigrate daily or seasonally to the U.S. to work. The practice granted the aliens “special immigrant” status and authorized them to be “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” even though the workers did not intend to reside in the U.S. permanently. This “special” status, authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act, exempted the workers from normal documentation requirements. The United Farmworkers Organizing committee sued for injunctive relief from the practice. The district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that special status was permissible for daily workers, but not for seasonal workers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51210:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51210:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51210:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote for the majority affirming the lower court as to daily workers, but reversing as to seasonal workers. The Supreme Court held that even if workers did not intend to reside in the U.S., they were still entitled to the ability to do so. The Court noted that the practice was longstanding and had since Congress had impliedly approved it. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the plain meaning of the statute did not allow foreign commuters to be considered “permanent residents”. Justice White felt the statute was not ambiguous so the administrative practice was not authoritative.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51210:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51212:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51212:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are five consolidated cases involving 13 motor carriers who filed for certificates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in order to conduct business between the southwestern and southeastern United States. The ICC rejected all but three applications. Bowman Transportation, Inc., one of the approved applicants, asked for more authority than initially set out in their application. The ICC granted that authority, and the competing motor carriers sued in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas to annul the certificate. The district court found the ICC’s actions arbitrary and capricious. The court voided the certificates and permanently enjoined the ICC from issuing them. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51212:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51212:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51212:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the ICC based its decisions on consideration of relevant factors. While the ICC could have explained its reasoning more clearly, the Court did not feel the decisions were arbitrary and capricious. The Court also remanded the case to determine whether Bowman should receive the excess authority the ICC granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51212:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51219:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51219:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Mississippi Tax Commission (MTC) passed a regulation requiring out-of-state liquor distributors to collect a tax for liquor sold on Mississippi military installations. The tax resulted in a price mark-up for liquor sold on military installations. The MTC sent a letter to liquor distributors advising that if the tax was not collected directly from the military, the distributors could face criminal charges. The United States paid the tax and sought summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The United States argued that the mark-up was an unconstitutional tax on the federal government. The district court upheld the regulation, ruling that the Twenty-First Amendment allowed the tax. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded. On remand, the district court held that the tax was a permissible sales tax on the liquor distributors and not a tax on the federal government. Two of the military installments had concurrent jurisdiction with both the federal and Mississippi government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51219:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51219:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51219:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 decision Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion reversing the district court. The Supreme Court held that the legal responsibility for the tax fell on the military and so upon the U.S. federal government. This made the tax unconstitutional per McCulloch v. Maryland. The Court also held that the Twenty-First Amendment did not abolish federal immunity from taxes on the sale of liquor. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, stating that both the Twenty-First Amendment and the Buck Act authorized the regulation. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51219:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51225:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51225:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Harris County Commissioners Court voted to redistrict and consolidate several small districts. This left several justices of the peace and constables without positions before the end of their terms. The justices of the peace and constables sued to enjoin the redistricting, alleging equal protection and state constitutional violations. Under the Texas state constitution, a justice of the peace could only be removed from office before the end of an elected term if given notice and a jury trial. A three-judge federal district court held that the redistricting violated the Equal Protection Clause because it removed some officials but not others. The court did not decided the state constitutional issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51225:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51225:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51225:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo answer. In an 8-1 decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding to the district court. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have answered the state law questions and abstained from the federal question. Because of the unsettled nature of the state law question, the Court felt it was possible to modify or avoid the equal protection issue depending on how the court interpreted the state constitution. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, stating that the question of whether to decide the state law issues should have been left to the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51225:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51229:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51229:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSix maritime unions, including American Radio Association, picketed docks in Mobile, Alabama, asking the public not to patronize foreign vessels docked there. The unions were opposed to the low wages paid to foreign seamen. Mobile Steamship Association sued to enjoin the picketing because it prevented the loading and unloading of ships. The circuit court granted a temporary injunction and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The courts held that the picketing did not “affect commerce” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), so the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) did not have jurisdiction. The courts also held that enjoining the picketing did not violate the First Amendment because the picketing resulted in a work stoppage, not just the expression of ideas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51229:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51229:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51229:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion affirming the injunction. The Supreme Court held that the NLRB did not have jurisdiction because the affected ship was not “in” or “affecting” commerce as defined by the NLRA. This case was not distinguishable from Windward v. American Radio Assn., which involved owners of the foreign ships. The Court also held that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, agreeing with Justice Stewart and emphasizing the importance of the public interest in keeping marine traffic safe. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that this dispute was within the sole jurisdiction of the NLRB. Justices Douglas, William J. Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51229:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51234:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51234:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTom Ellis and Robert Love plead nolo contendere to charges of violating a city loitering ordinance. The court fined each man $10. Rather than seeking a trial in the county court and risking a harsher punishment, the men sued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and equitable relief in the form of removal of their arrest and conviction records. The district court denied relief and dismissed the claim, holding that declaratory relief was unavailable because there was no pending criminal prosecution or allegation of bad faith prosecution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed without an opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51234:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51234:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51234:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit relied on a rule that the Supreme Court later overturned. Since the district court ruling, the Supreme Court held that pending or bad faith prosecution was not necessary for declaratory relief. The Court remanded for the district court to reassess the case based on the new precedent.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, asserting that it was correct to remand the case to the district court. Justice Byron R. White wrote a partial concurrence, stating that he would affirm the dismissal of Ellis and Love’s request for equitable relief.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell wrote a dissent, stating that equitable relief was barred by the nolo contendere pleas and the deliberate choice to forgo state appellate remedies. Justice Potter Stewart joined in this part of the dissent. Justice Powell also expressed that he would affirm the dismissal of the constitutional challenge to the ordinance. Justice Stewart and Justice Warren Burger joined in this part of the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51234:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51239:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51239:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBilly J. Taylor was indicted on kidnapping charges by the grand jury of St. Tammany Parish. The day before his trial was supposed to start, he filed a motion to quash the petit jury that was selected for his trial because he argued that women were systematically excluded, which denied him a right to trial by a jury of his peers. Although 53% of eligible jurors in his district were female, only 10% of the jury wheel was female. This discrepancy was due to an article of the Louisiana Constitution that specifies that a woman could not be selected for jury service unless she had previously submitted a written declaration of her desire to serve. The trial court dismissed Taylor’s motion, and he was tried and found guilty. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that the article regulating women’s jury service did not violate federal law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51239:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51239:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51239:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that a jury made up of a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment. The article, while not actively disqualifying women from serving on the jury, systematically prevented many women from serving. Given the passage of the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 that guarantees a fair cross-section of the population for juries in federal courts, the Court held that Congress clearly considered a representative jury necessary for a fair trial.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in the result.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the Sixth Amendment only prevented the use of jury selection procedures that were likely to result in an unfair or biased jury. Since there was no evidence that the article in the Louisiana state constitution undermined jury fairness or that Taylor’s trial was biased, the Court should not overturn the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51239:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51240:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51240:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNine students at two high schools and one junior high school in Columbus, Ohio, were given 10-day suspensions from school. The school principals did not hold hearings for the affected students before ordering the suspensions, and Ohio law did not require them to do so. The principals' actions were challenged, and a federal court found that the students' rights had been violated. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51240:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51240:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51240:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that because Ohio had chosen to extend the right to an education to its citizens, it could not withdraw that right \"on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct ha[d] occurred.\" The Court held that Ohio was constrained to recognize students' entitlements to education as property interests protected by the Due Process Clause that could not be taken away without minimum procedures required by the Clause. The Court found that students facing suspension should at a minimum be given notice and afforded some kind of hearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51240:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51244:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51244:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn an effort to investigate the \"administration, operation, and enforcement\" of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security subpoenaed a bank for the financial records of the United States Servicemen's Fund. This nonprofit organization had actively published newsletters and sponsored coffeehouses in which discussions critical of the Vietnam War took place. The Fund challenged the subpoena arguing that its enforcement would violate the organization's First Amendment rights since the bank records contained information about the Fund's membership.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51244:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51244:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51244:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the Senate Subcommittee's actions were legitimate and did not violate the Fund's First Amendment rights. Chief Justice Burger argued that the power to investigate, even through a compulsory mechanism like a subpoena, is \"inherent in the power to make laws.\" Furthermore, the investigation was related to and aided in furthering a \"legitimate task of Congress,\" namely, the investigation of the Internal Security Act. Burger disregarded the Fund's claim that the investigation was being conducted to expose its beliefs, many of which were \"unorthodox or unpopular.\" He reasoned that the legitimacy of a congressional investigatory action is not derived from the motives of the members or by the information that the investigation uncovers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51244:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51247:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51247:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPlumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100 picketed Connell Construction Co., a local building contractor. The union wanted Connell to sign an agreement promising only to subcontract mechanical work to Union members. Connell sued to enjoin the picketing. Connell signed the agreement with the union under protest, and amended its complaint to allege antitrust violations. The district court held that the agreement was exempt from federal antitrust laws under a provision of the National Labor Relations Act. Also, federal labor laws pre-empted state antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51247:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51247:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51247:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe. Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote the 5-4 majority opinion affirming on state law pre-emption, but reversing on federal antitrust exemption. The Supreme Court held that the agreement was not exempt because it imposed a direct restraint on competition. The Court remanded because the question of whether the agreement violated the Sherman Act was not fully briefed or argued.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that Congress did not intend to impose antitrust sanctions for this type of activity. Justice William O. Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan, and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice William O. Douglas also wrote a dissent, asserting that only federal labor law applied because Connell based its argument on the fact that they were coerced into signing the agreement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51247:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51257:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51257:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe University Drive-In Theater in Jacksonville, Florida had a screen that was visible from nearby public streets. The theater showed an R-rated film containing female nudity, which violated a Jacksonville city ordinance that prohibited the showing of films containing nudity if the film was visible from a public area. Richard Erznoznik, the theater's manager, was charged with a Class C offense under the ordinance. He challenged the ordinance in Duval County Circuit Court, which upheld the statute. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51257:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51257:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51257:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court struck down the Jacksonville ordinance. While individuals did have a right to not be exposed to offensive films, the ordinance singled out \"some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others,\" Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for the majority. Since the \"offended viewer readily can avert his eyes\" from the films shown, Jacksonville's distinction between films with nudity and films without nudity was unconstitutional. Under Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, \"government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.\" The ordinance was \"broader than permissible\" in trying to protect children from exposure to nudity and \"invalid\" as an attempt to prevent traffic accidents. Justice William O. Douglas authored a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51257:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51258:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51258:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCatherine Jackson had received electricity from Metropolitan Edison at her home. Her service was terminated in September 1970 due to a lack of payment. Jackson opened another account under the name of another resident, James Dodson. Metropolitan Edison investigated her residence on October 6, 1971 and service was again terminated without notice on October 11. Jackson sued in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. She sought damages for the termination and an injunction to continue her service. The court dismissed her suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51258:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51258:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51258:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the court affirmed the Third Circuit and held that Metropolitan Edison's termination of Jackson's service did not qualify as state action. Rehnquist reiterated that private actions are \"immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment.\" The Court acknowledged that Metropolitan Edison was heavily regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, but this regulation did not make Metropolitan Edison part of the state. Additionally, the Court cited Nebbia v. New York in declining to rule on whether all actions by businesses that provided essential public services qualified as state action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51258:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51259:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51259:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPeggy Strickland and Virginia Crain were sophomores at Mena Public High School in Mena, Arkansas. They heard about a school meeting where both parents and students would be present and decided to spike the punch with alcohol. Ten days later, Mrs. Curtis Powell, a teacher at the high school, learned of the prank and confronted the girls. The girls confessed based on the understanding that she would handle their punishment. The next day, the teacher informed the girls that the principal, P. T. Waller, heard about the incident and she would not be able to help them unless they confessed to the principal. The girls did so, and Mr. Waller suspended them for two weeks pending a decision by the school board. The school board voted to suspend the girls for the rest of the semester. The girls, their parents, and their counsel were present at a subsequent meeting to ask the board to reconsider the suspensions. The board denied the request.\nStrickland and Crain sued the members of the school board, administrators, and the school district of Mena, Arkansas for damages resulting from their suspension, which they claimed violated their right to due process. The jury could not reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. The district court directed a verdict for the school board because there was no evidence of malice toward the girls. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51259:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51259:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51259:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the common law doctrine of immunity for public school officials provided immunity from liability if the school board acted in good faith. To impose a penalty of liability for such a decision would make the board vulnerable to intimidation. The Court also held that, to prove the board acted in bad faith, the evidence must show that the school board members knew or should have known that their actions would violate the constitutional rights of the students. Given the information available to the school board at the time of the decision, the Court found that the school board acted in good faith. The Court also held the United States Court of Appeals went beyond its purview by reinterpreting the school board statute.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell wrote on opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed that the case should be remanded but argued that the majority’s opinion placed too high a burden on school board officials by equating ignorance of the law with malicious intent. He cited recent split decisions on the part of the Court as evidence that even knowledge of the law did not necessarily lead to an understanding of a clear course of action. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51259:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51266:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51266:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nStephen Wiesenfeld and Paula Polatschek were married in 1970. Polatschek had worked as a teacher for the five years prior to their marriage and continued teaching after they were married. Her salary was the principle source of the couple’s income, and social security contributions were regularly deducted from her salary. In 1972, Polatschek died in childbirth, which left Wiesenfeld with the care of their newborn son. Wiesenfeld applied for social security benefits for himself and his son, and was told that his son could receive them but that he could not. Social Security Act provides benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father that are available to both the children and the widow. The benefits for a deceased wife and mother, however, are only available to the children.\nIn 1973, Wiesenfeld sued on behalf of himself and similarly situated widowers. He claimed that the relevant section of the Social Security Act unfairly discriminated on the basis of sex and sought summary judgment. A three-judge panel of the district court granted Wiesenfeld’s motion for summary judgment", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51266:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51266:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51266:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the social security benefits for the surviving spouse and children is to enable the surviving spouse to properly care for the children, regardless of the gender of the parent. Gender-based discrimination regarding these benefits is therefore both illogical and counter-productive.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the gender-based classification of the social security benefits does not serve any legitimate government interest. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the concurring opinion. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that the majority’s opinion overreached the bounds of the question by ruling on whether the statute violated the Fifth Amendment. He argued that the statute does not serve a valid legislative purpose and could be overturned on that basis alone.\nJustice William O. Douglas did not participate in either the discussion or the decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51266:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51269:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51269:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) set fixed commission rates for stock transactions less than $500,000. Richard A. Gordon, on behalf of a class of independent investors, sued the New York Stock Exchange and member firms claiming fixed commission rates and exorbitant membership fees violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the New York Stock Exchange, holding that the authority of the SEC provided immunity from antitrust claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51269:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51269:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51269:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the unanimous opinion. The Supreme Court held that the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 impliedly repealed any applicable antitrust laws. The Act authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission as the sole regulator for the New York Stock Exchange. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence, stating that the SEC has actively exercised its authority so commission rates are monitored in the way Congress intended. Justice Potter Stewart also wrote a concurrence, emphasizing that rules fixing commission rates are only immune from antitrust laws if the rules are necessary to make the Securities and Exchange Act work.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51269:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51270:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51270:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe respondents represent a class of current and past employees of the Albemarle Paper Co. paper mill in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, who claimed to have suffered from racially discriminatory hiring and promoting practices. In 1966, after filing a race discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the respondents sued Albemarle Paper Co. and the plant’s labor union, Halifax Local 425, and sought permanent injunctive relief against any plant “policy, practice, custom, or usage” that violates Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. In 1970, the plaintiffs moved to add a class demand for backpay.\nAt trial, the court found that the plant’s seniority system was racially segregated and ordered the plant to implement a new system. The court did not award backpay because the company did not act in bad faith and respondents added the demand four years after the action was initiated. The court also did not enjoin Albemarle’s use of pre-employment tests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the district court should have awarded backpay and enjoined the use of the pre-employment tests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51270:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51270:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51270:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that backpay should be awarded based on a court’s discretion. The decision in this case should be considered in light of the goals of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Because the prospect of a backpay award could ensure the use of equal employment practices, it serves the purposes of the Act and should be awarded in this case. Finding that the employer did not act in bad faith is not a sufficient reason to deny backpay. The Court also held that district courts have the authority to award backpay based on the legislative history surrounding the Act, regardless of when the demand was added to the action. The Court held that nothing in the Act precluded the use of employment tests, but only if they can be proven to be reasonable measures of job performance. Based on the Guidelines issued by the EEOC, the Albemarle tests do not reasonably measure job performance. Because Albemarle has been revising their testing procedures throughout the appellate process, the Court left determining the appropriate relief to the lower court on remand.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that there was no legal bar to awarding backpay under Title VII of the Act, and only extremely unusual circumstances would prevent the awarding of backpay when liability has been established. He also argued that, although the backpay demand can be added to the action at any point, the district court can consider whether adding it later prejudiced Albemarle’s case in any way. In his concurring opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that, in most cases, the awarding of backpay is at the discretion of the trial judge and should be governed by equity considerations. He also wrote that a lack of “bad faith” was not enough evidence to refuse to award backpay, though there are situations where the refusal would be appropriate.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in judgment. He argued that an employer’s good faith was a relevant issue in a court’s discretionary decisions. He also argued that the Guidelines were theories regarding employment testing and its accuracy, and they should not be considered too rigidly.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that, under the majority opinion’s standard, awarding backpay was unnecessary in this case, as Albemarle was already changing their policies. He also argued that the use of the EEOC Guidelines to determine whether the employment tests were constitutional was unreasonable because the Guidelines carry no legislative weight.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51270:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51278:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51278:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 21, 1971, Ralph Feola, along with Enriquito Alsondo, Henry Rosa, and Michael Farr, planned to sell a kilo of powdered sugar in place of heroin to customers who, unbeknownst to them, were undercover cops. If the sale did not go well, the four planned to attack the buyers and take the money. Agent Hall and Agent Lightcap posed as customers and the deal was in progress when they found themselves under attack. They countered the attack, and Feola, Alsondo, Rosa, and Farr were arrested for conspiracy to assault and assaulting federal agents in the commission of their duties.\nAt trial in the district court, the jury instructions specified that knowledge of the agents’ true identities was not a necessary element to prove the conspiracy charge. When the respondents appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction on the assault charges, but reversed the conviction on the conspiracy charges.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51278:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51278:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51278:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, given the legislative history of the statute, Congress clearly intended it to afford “maximum protection” to federal officers. This purpose was best satisfied with a looser understanding of intent. The Court held that this ruling was not unfair to the defendant because it did not make a previously legal action illegal. Intent to assault is criminal, regardless of the intended victim. The Court also held that the burden for proving conspiracy was not any higher than the burden for proving the element of the crime itself.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent where he argued that the precedent established by state laws makes the knowledge of an officer’s identity an essential element of the crime of assaulting one. Without such knowledge, the crime should be treated as an assault on a private citizen. He also argued that the statute’s specification regarding an assault on a federal agent during the “performance of his official duties” requires that the perpetrator be aware of the federal agent’s official status. Justice William O. Douglas joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51278:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51279:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51279:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn May 6, 1968, Roger Corpus was shot and killed in his apartment. The police obtained the name of Richard Brown, who was identified as an acquaintance of the victim, though not a suspect. On May 13, 1968, detectives arrested Brown and searched his apartment without probable cause and without a warrant. The detectives read Brown his Miranda rights and proceeded to question him. During the questioning, Brown confessed to assisting in Corpus’ murder. Later, Brown was questioned again after being read his Miranda rights a second time. He substantially repeated his account of the murder.\nPrior to his trial, Brown moved to suppress the two statements based on the fact that his arrest was illegal and the statements were taken in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found Brown guilty. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment but did not accept the State’s argument that the arrest was legal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51279:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51279:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51279:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that Miranda warnings are not sufficient to remove the taint of an illegal arrest from statements made in custody. The Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment were meant to work together, so that even if a statement is found to be voluntary as required by the Fifth Amendment, it could still be the result of an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment and therefore inadmissible. Because Brown’s arrest was illegal and the statements clearly stemmed from that arrest, the Court held that the statements were inadmissible.\nJustice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment and wrote that the Miranda warnings do not circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part. He argued that the admissibility of Brown’s statements should be considered in the context of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. He also argued that the case should be remanded because the trial court made no determination regarding probable cause for the original arrest. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51279:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51286:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51286:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSchick, a master sergeant in the Army, was convicted of murder in a military court and sentenced to death in 1954. President Eisenhower intervened and commuted his sentence in 1960, reducing it to life imprisonment without parole.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51286:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51286:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51286:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court dismissed Schick's claim that Eisenhower's action was invalid because it imposed a condition not authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Tracing the development and Court's interpretation of the President's powers to commute sentences, Chief Justice Burger argued that since the pardoning power is an enumerated one, any limit on it must be found in the Constitution. Thus, its use does not depend on statutes such as those found in the military code.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51286:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51292:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51292:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn December 1967, the Silver Bridge at Point Pleasant, West Virginia, collapsed and killed 43 people, including Melvin Cantrell. Joseph Eszterhas, a reporter for the local newspaper the Plain Dealer, was assigned to cover the story. He decided to focus on the Melvin Cantrell’s funeral and the impact of his death on his family. Five months later, he returned to do a follow-up piece and spoke to the Cantrell children when their mother, Margaret Cantrell, was not present. The article appeared on August 4, 1968 and contained a number of admitted inaccuracies concerning the family and the status of their home.\nMargaret Cantrell and her children sued under the “false light” theory of invasion of privacy. After the jury heard plaintiff’s case, the judge removed the demand for punitive damages because Cantrell had failed to present evidence that the falsehoods stemmed from actual malice. The defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the judge denied. The jury found the defendants guilty and awarded compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the district judge should have granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51292:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51292:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51292:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the district judge adequately instructed the jury that liability could only be imposed if the jury determined that the false statements were made knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the truth. Because no one objected to the instructions, the Court held that it did not have to consider whether this was an acceptable standard for “false light” cases. The Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in overturning the case. The Court of Appeals based its analysis on the concept of “actual malice” as defined in New York Times v. Sullivan, while the district judge based his analysis on the common law standard of malice. The Court held that the district judge should not have directed a verdict for Forest City Publishing Co. because there was sufficient evidence in the case to prove Forest City Publishing Co. was aware of the falsehoods.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent and argued that the imposition of legal analysis differentiating common law malice from actual malice infringes on the freedom of the press by making that freedom contingent upon a jury’s opinion. He argued that such a stance could result in a more timid press that would not report stories accurately for fear of facing a libel suit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51292:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51296:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51296:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order under their emergency powers limiting the time railroad cars could stay at a holding location. The order was issued without notice or a hearing. If a railroad shipper held a car for longer than that time, they would lose the privilege to reconsign the contents of the car and were subject to a tariff from the point of origin to the holding point and from the holding point to the ultimate destination. A three-judge district court held the ICC did not have the power to issue the order because it was not suspending any rule or regulation. This case was heard on direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51296:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51296:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51296:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote the unanimous opinion reversing the district court. The Supreme Court held that the ICC did have the power to issue the order in an emergency and the order was in line with the ICC’s purpose. The order and tariff were not an unreasonable means of expediting movement of rail cars.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51296:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51299:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51299:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nQuality Manufacturing Company fired an employee after she refused to meet with the company president without a union representative. The shop chairlady and assistant chairlady were also fired for trying to represent the employee at the meeting and for filing a grievance. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that these discharges constituted unfair labor practices because the employee reasonably believed that disciplinary action would occur at the meeting. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the ruling was an impermissible departure from prior NLRB precedent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51299:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51299:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51299:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan wrote for the 6-3 majority, reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that, while it was a departure from prior precedent, the NLRB ruling was permissible. Denying her a union representative interfered with her individual rights as a union employee.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissent, stating that the NLRB had not explained its decision to depart from precedent so he would remand to the NLRB for further explanation. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a dissent, asserting that representation in meetings was a matter Congress left to decide during the bargaining process. Justice Potter Stewart joined Justice Powell’s dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51299:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51300:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51300:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe State of Iowa denied Linda Alcala and several other pregnant women welfare benefits for their unborn children. The Department of Social Services stated that although those children would be eligible for benefits once born, while unborn they do not fit the Social Security Act’s definition of “dependent children” as required by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The pregnant women sued, arguing that the denial of benefits conflicted with federal Social Security standards and violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that unborn children were “dependent children”, but did not reach the 14th Amendment arguments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51300:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51300:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51300:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Undecided. In a 7-1 decision, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the legislative history surrounding the Social Security Act did not provide a basis for including unborn children in the definition of “dependent children”. While some states had adopted welfare plans that included unborn children, it was not required in order to comply with federal law. The Court also remanded the case for consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment issues.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that the legislative history is inconclusive. Also, the long-standing administrative practice of providing unborn children with AFDC benefits when a state legislates for it prove that unborn children are included in the definition of “dependent children”. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51300:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51303:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51303:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 3, 1957, Kenneth Donaldson was committed on the petition of his father, following a brief hearing before a county judge. Twelve days later, he was admitted to Florida State Hospital and soon thereafter diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. The committing judge told Donaldson that he was being sent to the hospital for “a few weeks”. Instead, he was confined for almost fifteen years.\nWhen Donaldson was admitted in 1957, J.B. O’Connor was Assistant Clinical Director of the hospital; O’Connor was also Donaldson’s attending physician until he transferred wards on April 18, 1967. John Gumanis was a staff physician for Donaldson’s ward. Donaldson was denied grounds privileges by Gumanis and confined to a locked building with sixty closely-quartered beds. As a Christian Scientist, Donaldson refused to take any medication or to submit to electroshock treatments. According to Donaldson, he received cognitive therapy from O’Connor no more than six times. In essence, the hospital provided Donaldson with subsistence-level custodial care, and a minimal amount of psychiatric treatment. Donaldson challenged his continued commitment several times, but each challenge was denied with little explanation.\nIn February 1971, Donaldson charged O’Connor and other members of the hospital’s staff under § 1983 with intentionally and maliciously depriving him of his constitutional right to liberty. Evidence at trial showed that the staff had the power to release a mentally ill, committed patient if he was not dangerous to himself or others, but that the staff did not exercise this power. The jury trial found in favor of Donaldson, assessing both compensatory and punitive damages against O’Connor and Gumanis. O’Connor appealed his case separately, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court rejected O’Connor’s argument that the trial court improperly barred the jury from finding that O’Connor acted in good faith. The jury instruction was valid because it explicitly stated that the defendants’ reasonable belief that Donaldson’s confinement was proper would preclude damages. Any reliance on state law would fall under this consideration of O'Connor's good faith intentions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51303:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51303:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51303:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. While the trial court properly instructed the jury on the relevance of O’Connor’s good faith intentions, Justice Stewart held that the Fifth Circuit must determine if the trial court properly instructed the jury on O’Connor’s reliance on state law. Justice Stewart acknowledged that the state cannot constitutionally confine a non-dangerous, mentally ill person capable of living outside of a mental health facility. He noted, however, that neither the trial court nor the Fifth Circuit acted with knowledge of the Court’s most recent decision on the scope of state officials’ qualified immunity, Wood v. Strickland. Under that decision, the relevant question for the jury was whether O’Connor knew his actions would deprive Donaldson of his constitutional rights, or whether he maliciously deprived him of his constitutional rights. The Court remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit to be reconsidered with this test in mind.\nChief Justice Warren Burger concurred. He argued that the Fifth Circuit should consider Donaldson’s consistent refusal of medical treatment to be taken into account in considering the respondent’s good faith defense. Chief Justice Burger also would have ordered the Fifth Circuit to consider the hospital staff’s potential reliance on Donaldson’s repeated unsuccessful attempts to seek release through the Florida court system.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51303:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51308:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51308:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGurley Oil Co. owned five gas stations in Mississippi and purchased gas tax-free out of state. Gurley added both federal and state excise taxes on to the retail price of the gasoline. Mississippi imposed an additional 5% tax on the “gross proceeds” of all gas sales. Mississippi did not permit Gurley to deduct the state and federal excise taxes from the “gross proceeds” before calculating the 5% tax. Gurley paid the tax under protest, but sued for a refund. They alleged that not allowing a pretax deduction of the excise taxes was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Gurley argued that the company was just a collector of taxes paid by the consumer, so those taxes were not actually part of his gross receipts. The chancery court dismissed the suit and the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51308:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51308:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51308:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William J. Brennan wrote the unanimous opinion. The Supreme Court held that the 5% tax is on Gurley, not the consumer. Retailers traditionally pass the economic burden of taxes on to consumers, but that does not mean the legal responsibility for the tax has shifted. Because the tax fell on Gurley, he was not unconstitutionally deprived of his property. The court also held that the 5% tax did not violate equal protection because there was no claim of discriminatory enforcement. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51308:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51310:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51310:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1960, the government of the Republic of Cuba confiscated the businesses of several Cuban cigar manufacturers. The Republic named “interventors” to take over and run the businesses. The interventors continued to ship cigars to foreign purchasers, including in the U.S., and some purchasers mistakenly paid money owed to the original owners for cigars shipped before the takeover. The interventors refused to return the money. The original owners fled to New York and sued the purchasers for trademark infringement and compensation for money paid to the interventors for past shipments. The district court held that the 1960 intervention was an “act of state” so U.S. courts had no power in the matter. Under the act of state doctrine, the courts of a sovereign cannot question the acts of another sovereign within its own borders. The court did, however, have power over the amounts mistakenly paid for pre-intervention shipments. The purchasers were entitled to set off their mistaken payments against amounts due for post intervention shipments. One purchaser, who was entitled to more than it owed, received an affirmative judgment.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the 1960 act was an “act of state”, but also held that the interventor's refusal to pay back the mistaken payments was also an act of state. The purchasers could still set off the amount they were entitled to against the amount they owed, but the court reversed the ruling for the one purchaser who received an affirmative judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51310:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51310:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51310:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower judgment. The Supreme Court held that the record contained no evidence to support an act of state. There was no statute, decree or order by the Cuban Government refusing to pay, only a statement by the interventor’s counsel during trial. The interventors did not possess governmental power just because the Cuban government appointed them. The affirmative judgment for the one purchaser was restored.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell wrote a concurrence, expressing that even in cases involving purely political matters, the courts must decide for themselves whether abstention is necessary, and it was not necessary in this case. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, agreeing that the act of state doctrine did not bar the judgment in favor of the purchasers.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that the interventor’s refusal to pay over the mistaken funds was an act of state regardless of the lack of an express decree by the Cuban government. Justice William J. Brennan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51310:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51318:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51318:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIt was long the rule in admiralty cases arising from collision or stranding that, when both parties were negligent, the sum of the damages to both should be split evenly between them. The Supreme Court endorsed this \"rule of divided damages\" in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickenson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).\nOn a clear night, in 8-10 foot seas and 45 knots of wind off Rockaway Point, the Mary A. Whalen, a coastal tanker carrying fuel oil to New York from New Jersey, went astray. Unable to locate the breakwater light, her master attempted a U-turn, stranding her upon a sand bar. The light had failed. Its maintenance was the U.S. Coast Guard's responsibility. The tanker's owner sued in federal district court, which found negligence on the parts of both the vessel (75%) and the Coast Guard (25 %). Even though only the ship owner suffered damages, the district court applied the rule of divided damages, assessing both parties equal shares. They cross-appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed per curiam.\nAbstract prepared by Professor J.P. Jones", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51318:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51318:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51318:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that in such cases liability should be allocated with reference to the comparative degrees of fault on the part of each party. \"We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property damage in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for such damages is to be allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of their fault.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51318:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51325:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51325:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEarl Foster began working for Dravo Corp. in 1965. In 1967, he worked the first nine weeks of the year before being called for military service. He served for 18 months before returning to Dravo to work the last 13 weeks of 1968. Under his collective bargaining agreement, employees earn full vacation benefits if they work at least 25 weeks per year. Under the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), veterans returning to civilian jobs are entitled to their job at the same level of seniority, status and pay as when they left. Foster did not receive vacation benefits for 1967 and 1968, so he sued in district court, arguing that he would have received those benefits had he worked for Dravo while he was in the military.\nThe district court ruled in favor of Dravo, holding that the vacation benefits did not accrue automatically with continued employment and so were not tied to seniority. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case to determine whether Foster should receive partial vacation benefits for the time he worked in 1967-68.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51325:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51325:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51325:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Maybe. In a unanimous decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Supreme Court held that Foster was not entitled to full vacation benefits because the benefit did not accrue automatically as a result of continued employment. The Court also held that the MSSA does not guarantee partial vacation benefits for time worked, but Foster’s collective bargaining agreement may. The court of appeals properly remanded the case to district court to determine whether Foster is entitled to partial vacation benefits under his collective bargaining agreement. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51325:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51327:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51327:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSoutheastern Promotions was a theatrical production company that requested to use the Tivoli Theater in Chattanooga, Tennessee to present the musical \"Hair.\" \"Hair\" was a controversial musical that contained obscenities and nudity. The Tivoli was privately owned, but was leased to the city of Chattanooga. The city rejected Southeastern's request based on the controversial content in the production. Southeastern challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that Chattanooga's denial of its request violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court ruled for Chattanooga and found that the musical contained obscene content that was not constitutionally protected. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51327:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51327:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51327:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that Chattanooga's denial of the Southeastern's request was a \"prior restraint,\" an attempt to censor speech and prevent it from reaching the public. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated that though prior restraints were not necessarily unconstitutional, \"the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable.\" Chattanooga's \"procedural safeguards were lacking\" in dealing with those risks and placed the burden on Southeastern to ensure that the musical could be produced. This was inconsistent with Freedman v. Maryland, and therefore unconstitutional. Justice William O. Douglas dissented in part and concurred in the result in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51327:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51332:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51332:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUsing marked money, police officers made an undercover heroin buy from a third party who, upon taking money from the officers, entered \"Mom Santana's\" house and emerged with heroin. Officers then arrested the third party and returned to Santana's house where they identified themselves as police officers, entered the house after Santana fled into it from the porch, and, after ordering her to empty her pockets, discovered some of the marked money. The search was done without a warrant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51332:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51332:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51332:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court upheld the search. Relying on the the Court's decision in United States v. Watson (1976), Justice Rehnquist argued that by standing on her porch when the officers arrived, Santana was \"not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy.\" Since the police had probable cause to arrest and search her at that point, their behavior was consistent with the Court's Watson precedent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51332:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51333:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51333:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Nebraska state trial judge, presiding over a widely publicized murder trial, entered an order restraining members of the press from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police. The judge felt that this measure was necessary to guarantee a fair trial to the accused.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51333:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51333:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51333:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court agreed with the trial judge that the murder case would generate \"intense and pervasive pretrial publicity.\" However, the unanimous court held that the practical problems associated with implementing a prior restraint on the press in this case would not have served the accused's rights. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that\"a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51333:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51336:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51336:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA flyer identifying \"active shoplifters\" was distributed to merchants in the Louisville, Kentucky area. The flyer included a photograph of Edward C. Davis III, who had been arrestedon a shoplifting charge. When the charge was dismissed, Davis brought an action against Edgar Paul, the Louisville chief of police. Davis alleged that the distribution of the flyer had stigmatized him and deprived him of his constitutional rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51336:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51336:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51336:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that Davis had not been deprived of any constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. The Court also emphasized that constitutional privacy interests did not cover Davis's claims. The Court argued that the constitutional right to privacy was limited to matters relating to \"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.\" The publication of records of official acts, such as arrests, did not fall under the rubric of privacy rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51336:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51349:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51349:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA 1971 statute enacted in Maryland authorized the payment of state funds to any private higher education institute that met a set of minimum criteria and refrained from awarding “only seminarian or theological degrees.” The grants were noncategorical, but they could not be used for sectarian purposes, as per a 1972 provision. At the end of every fiscal year, the institution that received the aid must report all financial transactions and identify the nonsectarian expenditures within those transactions.\nFour Maryland taxpayers sued to challenge the constitutionality of the statute and argued that the statute benefited certain church-affiliated institutions that are constitutionally ineligible for this form of aid under the First Amendment. The district court applied the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman ― which asks whether the state aid has a secular purpose, a primary effect other than the advancement of religion, and doesn’t excessively entangle the state in church affairs ― and determined that the statute was constitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51349:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51349:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51349:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA 1971 statute that allocated Maryland taxpayer money to private religiously-affiliated schools for “nonsectarian” purposes did not violate the First Amendment. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the 5-4 majority opinion. The Court held that the law passed the “Lemon Test” from the Court’s decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman. The majority concluded that funds given to private, religiously-affiliated schools would not become wrapped up in religious uses simply because they were presented to a religious school. As such, there was no violation of the First Amendment.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the three-part test the Court established in Lemon v. Kurtzman was unnecessary to determine whether a statute violates the First Amendment. As long as there was a secular legislative purpose and the primary effect of the statute was not to advance or inhibit religion, there was no need to examine whether the statute would lead to an excessive entanglement of the state with religion. In this case, everyone agreed that the purpose of the legislation was secular and that the primary effect was not to promote religion, so the statute was constitutional. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence in the judgment.\nIn his dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that, because the funds were not “ear-marked” at payment, they were essentially general subsidies of public funds to religious institutions, which was precisely the type of entanglement between religion and the state that the First Amendment was enacted the prevent. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that government funds provided to religious institutions could incentivize such institutions to alter their missions and therefore act as a deterrent to the goals of the religious institution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51349:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51350:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51350:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing his conviction for first-degree murder, and subsequent imposition of a death sentence, Roberts challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana's death penalty scheme. This scheme mandated the death penalty's imposition, regardless of any mercy recommendation, whenever the jury found that the defendant demonstrated a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while in the commission of at least one of five different narrowly defined types of homicide. The sentencing scheme also required juries, in all first-degree murder cases, to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second degree murder even if no evidence existed to support such verdicts.\nThis case is one of the five \"Death Penalty Cases\" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Proffitt v. Florida , and Woodson v. North Carolina .", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51350:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51350:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51350:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. By mandating the death penalty's imposition for certain crimes, Louisiana's sentencing scheme fails to afford juries the constitutionally required opportunity to consider any mitigating factors presented either by the circumstances of the crime or the individual offender's character. The Supreme Court also held that by requiring jurors to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second-degree murder, even if no evidence exits to support such verdicts, Louisiana's sentencing scheme encourages them to disregard their oaths by recommending a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel that the death penalty is inappropriate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51350:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51351:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51351:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Michelin Tire Corporation (MTC) operated a warehouse in Gwinnett County, Georgia, in which products imported from France and Nova Scotia were stored for later distribution. The County levied a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on the goods (a percent of the property's value). MTC claimed that the contents of the warehouse were constitutionally free from state taxation because they were in their original containers. The county declared that the products were subject to the tax because they had been sorted and arranged for sale.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51351:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51351:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51351:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court affirmed the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court, finding the tax to be valid. The Court stated that the Framers of the Constitution had adopted the Import-Export Clause to give the federal government a source of revenue and the superior position to regulate such foreign trade. This was to overcome the problems under the Articles of Confederation where states lacked uniformity in import regulation, burdening inter-state trade. The property tax was consistent with the Import-Export Clause because it did not (1) interfere with the Federal Government's regulation of foreign commerce (2) deprive the Federal Government of its exclusive right to revenues from imposts and duties on imports (3) interfere with the free flow of goods between the states. It taxed the use of the property and was not based on the origin of the goods.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51351:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51355:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51355:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 17, 1972, a postal inspector received information from an informant that the respondent, Henry Ogle Watson, was in possession of stolen credit cards. The informant had provided the inspector with reliable information in the past, and, later that day, provided the inspector with a stolen card. The inspector asked the informant to arrange another meeting with Watson to deliver more stolen cards. At the meeting on August 23, when the informant gave the signal, officers revealed themselves and arrested Watson. The officers read Watson his Miranda warning and searched him but did not find the cards on his person. They asked to search his car, and Watson gave them permission. In the car, officers found two stolen cards. Watson was then charged with four counts of possessing stolen mail. Prior to the trial, Watson moved to suppress the cards by claiming his arrest was illegal because there was no warrant, and that the search of his car was involuntary because he was not informed that he could withhold consent. The motion was denied and Watson was convicted.\n The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the arrest was unconstitutional because the postal inspector had sufficient time to obtain a warrant but failed to do so. The Court of Appeals also held that the subsequent search was coerced and hence unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51355:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51355:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51355:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that postal inspectors have the power to execute an arrest without a warrant when there is probable cause. Congress has granted this power to several federal agencies, not just the postal service. Because Watson’s arrest was constitutional, the search of his car was not the product of an illegal arrest. The Court held that there was no evidence that Watson was coerced into agreeing to the car search.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote that there was established historical precedent for warrantless arrests. He also argued that interpreting the Fourth Amendment as always requiring a warrant prior to arrest would severely and negatively impact effective law enforcement. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the arrest occurred with probable cause, in broad daylight, in a public place and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment. He also held that the majority’s decision in this case does not set any precedent regarding under what circumstances an officer may make a warrantless arrest in a private place.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent and argued that the majority’s opinion grants police broad powers to make warrantless arrests and breaks with precedents already set regarding the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. He argued that the majority’s opinion goes beyond the bounds of the case in question and misinterprets common law history. He wrote that the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect people, not places, and that the interests of the people would be best served with a warrant requirement. The warrant requirement would not unduly burden the police because there is no reason to assume that it would cause any delay in an arrest, unless exigent circumstances are present, in which case the arrest may be made without a warrant. He also argued that the government did not meet its burden to show that Watson’s consent was not coerced. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.\nJustice John Paul Stevens took no part in the discussion or decision in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51355:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51363:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51363:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMitch Miller was charged of carrying alcohol distilling equipment and whiskey on which liquor tax had not been paid. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) issued subpoenas to two of Miller's banks, The Citizens & Southern National Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank of Byron requesting records of Miller's accounts. The banks complied with the subpoenas, and the evidence was used during Miller's trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Miller was convicted and appealed his conviction alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in his favor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51363:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51363:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51363:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that Miller had no right to privacy in his bank records. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell asserted that the \"documents subpoenaed are not [Miller's] 'private papers',\" but instead, part of the bank's business records. Consistent with Hoffa v. United States, Miller's rights were not violated when a third party - his bank - transmitted information that he had entrusted them with to the government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51363:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51365:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51365:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMary Alice Firestone filed for divorce from her husband, an heir to the Firestone Tires fortune. He counterclaimed alleging “extreme cruelty and adultery”. The court granted the divorce with an ambiguous decree that did not specify the grounds. Time Magazine printed an article reporting that Firestone’s extreme cruelty and adultery caused the divorce. Firestone requested a retraction, but Time refused. Firestone sued Time, Inc. for libel in Florida state court. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Firestone for $100,000. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51365:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51365:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51365:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-2 vote, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion vacating the lower judgment and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the actual malice standard for media reports on public figures did not apply. Firestone was not a public figure as defined by prior precedent. The Court also held the Florida judgment invalid because the court awarded damages without determining fault. Justice Lewis Powell wrote a concurrence, stating that the ultimate question is whether Time exercised reasonably prudent care in light of the ambiguous divorce decree. Justice Potter Steward joined in the concurrence", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51365:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51368:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51368:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGeorge Eldridge, who had originally been deemed disabled due to chronic anxiety and back strain, was informed by letter that his disability status was ending and that his benefits would be terminated. Social Security Administration procedures provided for ample notification and an evidentiary hearing before a final determination was made, but Eldridge's benefits were cut off until that hearing could take place. Eldridge challenged the termination of his benefits without such a hearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51368:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51368:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51368:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 6-to-2 decision, the Court held that the initial termination of Eldridge's benefits without a hearing did not violate due process. The Court noted that due process was \"flexible\" and called for \"such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.\" The Court found that there were numerous safeguards to prevents errors in making decisions to terminate disability benefits and argued that \"[a]t some point the benefit or an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society, in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51368:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51373:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51373:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51373:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51373:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51373:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn this complicated case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the \"integrity of our system of representative democracy\" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51373:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51377:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51377:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nActing on behalf of prescription drug consumers, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council challenged a Virginia statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for licensed pharmacists to advertise their prescription drug prices. On appeal from an adverse ruling by a three-judge District Court panel, the Supreme Court granted the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51377:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51377:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51377:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-1 opinion, the Court held that the First Amendment protects willing speakers and willing listeners equally. The Court noted that in cases of commercial speech, such as price advertising, freedom of speech protections apply just as they would to noncommercial speech. Even speech that is sold for profit, or involves financial solicitations, is protected. The Court concluded that although the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy has a legitimate interest in preserving professionalism among its members, it may not do so at the expense of public knowledge about lawful competitive pricing terms.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51377:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51383:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51383:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMassachusetts enacted a law specifying consent requirements for unmarried minors seeking abortions. William Baird, on behalf of an abortion counseling organization, Parents Aid Society, filed a class action under the Fourteenth Amendment challenging the statute against state Attorney General Frances Bellotti and all district attorneys within the state. Baird argued that the statute created a parental veto. Parental vetoes were ruled unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. The federal District Court struck down the law. Bellotti appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, contending that the District Court should have abstained until a decision on the statute by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51383:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51383:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51383:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court held that the District Court should have abstained and vacated the judgment. There was ambiguity in whether the Massachusetts statute created a \"parental veto,\" which under Planned Parenthood v. Danforth affected the constitutionality of the statute. Since the Supreme Judicial Court's ruling would have resolved the ambiguity, the District Court should have abstained.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51383:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51384:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51384:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1968, Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc. (Brada Miller) agreed to lease a tractor and trailer operated by its employee-driver, H. L. Hardrick, to fellow licensed motor carrier Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. (Transamerican) for a shipment from Detroit, Michigan, to Kansas City, Missouri. The agreement stated that Transamerican assumed control and responsibility for the operation of the equipment during the lease and that Brada Miller agreed to indemnify Transamerican from any and all claims related to any negligence on the part of Brada Miller or its employees. On the way to Kansas City, the truck collided with another car in Illinois. The injured driver sued both Brada Miller and Transamerican in federal district court and alleged that the accident was caused by Hardrick’s negligence.\nTransamerican settled with the driver for $80,000 and then sued Brada Miller seeking indemnification for the settlement amount and costs of litigation. The district court held that the indemnity clause was unenforceable because it was contrary to public policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Brada Miller. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed and held that the indemnification clause was an attempt to circumvent regulations promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that required carriers to exert actual control and responsibility over leased equipment and borrowed drivers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51384:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51384:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51384:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the indemnification provision did not contravene ICC regulations designed to prevent motor carriers from sharing operating authority in order to evade safety requirements and limit each carrier’s liability to the public. The Court noted that the indemnity clause likely increases public safety as it holds the lessor accountable for its own negligence.\nJustice William O. Douglas concurred in the judgment, but declined to write separately.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51384:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51395:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51395:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the applications of two blacks were rejected by the District of Columbia Police Department, the two men filed suit against Mayor Walter E. Washington. The men alleged that the Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, discriminated against racial minorities. They claimed that the test was unrelated to job performance and excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51395:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51395:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51395:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the procedures and written personnel test did not constitute racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the Clause was designed to prevent official discrimination on the basis of race; laws or other official acts that had racially disproportionate impacts did not automatically become constitutional violations. The Court reasoned that the D.C. Police Department's procedures did not have discriminatory intent and were racially neutral measures of employment qualification.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51395:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51397:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51397:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing his Florida conviction for first-degree murder and the imposition of the death penalty, Proffitt challenged the constitutionality of both his death sentence, alleging it was a \"cruel and unusual\" punishment, and Florida's capital-sentencing procedure, alleging is was arbitrary and capricious insofar as it permitted judges rather than juries to act as sole sentencing authorities.\nThis case is one of the five \"Death Penalty Cases\" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Roberts v. Louisiana , and Woodson v. North Carolina .", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51397:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51397:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51397:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. The Court held that the death penalty was not a \"cruel and unusual\" punishment per se, and that Florida's capital-sentencing procedure was not unconstitutionally arbitrary and/or capricious. Although empowering trial judges with sole sentencing authority, the statutory procedure tightly prescribed their relevant decision-making process. The procedure requires sentencing judges to focus on both the crime's circumstances and the defendant's character by weighing eight statutory aggravating factors against seven statutory mitigating factors. Furthermore, sentencing judges are required to submit a written explanation of their death-sentence finding for the purpose of automatic review by Florida's Supreme Court. Such strict requirements sufficiently safeguard against the presence of any constitutional deficiencies arising from an arbitrary and/or capricious imposition of the death penalty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51397:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51412:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51412:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael McCrary and Colin Gonzales were black children who were denied admission to Bobbe's School. Gonzales was also denied admission to Fairfax- Brewster School. McCrary and Gonzales's parents filed a class action against the schools, suspecting the denials were due to their children's race. A federal district court ruled for McCrary and Gonzales, finding that the school's admission policies were racially discriminatory. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51412:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51412:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51412:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held that Section 1981 prohibited the racially discriminatory policies of the schools. While the schools were private, Jones v. Alfred Meyer Co. held that Section 1981 applied to \"purely private acts of racial discrimination.\" Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart described the school's admission policies as \"classical violation[s] of Section 1981.\" While the Court acknowledged the right to free association of parents to send their children to schools that \"promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable,\" it was not entitled the constitutional protection. Additionally, the Court cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters and the right of the State \"reasonably to regulate all schools.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51412:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51416:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51416:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAmerican Mini Theaters opened two theaters that showed adult movies in the city of Detroit. Two city ordinances enacted in 1972 prohibited the opening of adult theaters within 1,000 feet of other buildings with \"regulated uses\" or within 500 feet of any residential district. American Mini sued city officials challenging the ordinances on two grounds: that the ordinances imposed an undue burden on First Amendment rights and that ordinances violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. A federal district court ruled in favor of the city, a decision that was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appeals court concluded that the ordinances posed a prior restraint based on content and that the ordinances ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51416:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51416:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51416:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 5-4 opinion, the court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that Detroit's ordinances were reasonable, and although erotic material could not be completely suppressed, Detroit had adequate reasons to restrict the distribution of such material. Justice John Paul Stevens doubted that Voltaire's observation – \"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it\" – applied to pornographic films. This prompted a stinging rebuke from Justice Potter Stewart who maintained that the free expression is neither defined nor circumscribed by popular opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51416:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51419:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51419:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJules Hutton was a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informant that made the acquaintance of Charles Hampton. According to the government, Hampton told Hutton that he could acquire heroin and was willing to sell it. Hutton replied that he would find a buyer and orchestrate a sale. Hampton and Hutton arranged two appointments with DEA agents posing as buyers. At the second appointment, Hampton was arrested. According to Hampton, he was unaware that he was selling heroin. He claimed that Hutton provided him with the drugs and that Hutton had told him they were counterfeit. Since the government, through Hutton, had provided him with the drugs, he had been entrapped and was therefore not guilty. Hampton was convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, alleging entrapment and a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51419:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51419:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51419:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-3 decision, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. Writing for the majority, Justice William H. Rehnquist relied on the Court's earlier opinion in United States v. Russell in that the \"defense of entrapment was not available where...a Government agent supplied a necessary ingredient in the manufacture of an illicit drug.\" While Hampton's case involved distribution and not manufacture, Hampton was still \"predisposed to commit the crime.\" As opposed to the Government inducing Hampton to commit the crime, \"the police, the Government informant, and [Hampton] acted in concert.\" Therefore, no violation of due process occurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51419:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51426:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51426:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe respondent, Donald Opperman, left his car unattended in a prohibited parking space in violation of local ordinances in Vermillion, South Dakota. He received two parking tickets from local police officers, and as a result, his vehicle was subsequently inspected and impounded. At the impound lot, a police officer observed personal items in the dashboard of the car and unlocked the door to inventory the items using standard procedures. In the unlocked glove compartment, the officer found marijuana in a plastic bag. Opperman was arrested later that day and charged with possession of marijuana. He was convicted but the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed on appeal and concluded the search was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51426:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51426:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51426:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Mr. Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger delivered opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that police can inventory a vehicle that has been lawfully impounded, even without a warrant. Inventory procedures for impounded vehicles are taken in order to protect the owner’s property and to protect police from claims of stolen items as well as potential danger. Therefore, the search of an impounded vehicle is considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\nJustice Louis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion agreeing that the Constitution allows inventory searches, as long as the search is not done in order to find evidence that could lead to criminal charges.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall, with whom Justice William J. Brennan Jr. and Justice Potter Stewart join, wrote a dissent arguing that the search of an automobile without a warrant clearly violates the Fourth Amendment. A routine inventory is no excuse to violate the privacy of the automobile’s owner.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51426:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51429:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51429:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMartinez-Fuerte and others were charged with transporting illegal Mexican aliens. They were stopped at a routine fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants on a major highway not far from the Mexican border.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51429:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51429:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51429:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, these routine stops with brief questioning do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing for the 7-to-2 majority, said: \"The defendants note correctly that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.... But the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.\"\nPrepared by Michael Brandow.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51429:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51445:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51445:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLloyd Powell was convicted of murder by a California court. Powell sought relief in federal district court by filing a writ of federal habeas corpus. Powell claimed that the search that uncovered the murder weapon was unlawful and that the evidence should have been inadmissible at trial. This case was decided together with Wolf v. Rice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51445:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51445:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51445:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that where states had provided opportunities for full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, the Constitution did not require the granting of federal habeas corpus relief. The Court also held that any additional benefits from considering search and seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review would be small in relation to the costs. The Court found that the Fourth Amendment values protected by the exclusionary rule would not be significantly enhanced in such situations and that deterrence of police misconduct was unlikely to increase.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51445:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51448:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51448:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe state of North Carolina enacted legislation that made the death penalty mandatory for all convicted first-degree murderers. Consequently, when James Woodson was found guilty of such an offense, he was automatically sentenced to death. Woodson challenged the law, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.\nThis case is one of the five \"Death Penalty Cases\" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Proffitt v. Florida , and Roberts v. Louisiana .", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51448:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51448:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51448:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the North Carolina law was unconstitutional. The Court found three problems with the law: First, the law \"depart[ed] markedly from contemporary standards\" concerning death sentences. The historical record indicated that the public had rejected mandatory death sentences. Second, the law provided no standards to guide juries in their exercise of \"the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live and which shall die.\" Third, the statute failed to allow consideration of the character and record of individual defendants before inflicting the death penalty. The Court noted that \"the fundamental respect for humanity\" underlying the Eighth Amendment required such considerations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51448:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51449:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51449:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter his conviction by a Texas trial court for murder and the imposition of the death penalty, Jurek challenged the constitutionality of both his death sentence, alleging it was a \"cruel and unusual\" punishment, and the state's capital-sentencing procedure, alleging it would result in arbitrary and \"freakish\" imposition of the death penalty.\nThis case is one of the five \"Death Penalty Cases\" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Proffitt v. Florida , Roberts v. Louisiana , and Woodson v. North Carolina .", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51449:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51449:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51449:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the death penalty was not per se a \"cruel and unusual\" punishment. Furthermore, the capital sentencing procedure in Texas was not unconstitutional on the theory that it would result in arbitrary and freakish impositions of the death penalty. While death penalty sentencing systems which permit juries to consider only aggravating, and no mitigating, circumstances are unconstitutional, Texas' sentencing system is not like this. Under its sentencing scheme, Texas juries may consider whatever evidence of mitigating circumstances there may be - thus allowing them to ponder not only why the death penalty should be imposed, but also why it should not. These options sufficiently focus the juries' attention on the defendant's unique circumstances and character, thus meeting constitutional requirements of particularity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51449:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51461:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51461:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1961, Morris Hasson, a Los Angeles grocery store manager, was shot and killed during a robbery attempt. Paul Imbler was convicted of the murder after three eyewitnesses identified him as the gunman. After the trial, the prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Richard Pachtman, wrote to the Governor of California and described newly discovered evidence that undermined the testimony of one of the eyewitnesses. In light of the letter, Imbler challenged his incarceration in state court, where his petition was denied, and later in federal court. The federal district court found that Pachtman had knowingly used false testimony during the trial and suppressed evidence favorable to Imbler, so the district court ordered Imbler released from prison. Imbler then filed an action against Pachtman in federal court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows a party to recover damages from any person who acts “under color of state law” to deprive another of a constitutional right. The district court held that Pachtman was immune for civil liability for acts done in his capacity as prosecutor and dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51461:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51461:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51461:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that prosecutors have the same absolute immunity under Section 1983 that they had under common law in malicious prosecution suits. In both situations, there are similar public policy concerns related to the need for prosecutorial independence. The Court declined to consider whether a prosecutor was entitled to similar level of immunity for actions taken in the role of an administrator or investigator.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for the knowing or reckless presentation of false testimony, but that absolute immunity should not shield claims against a prosecutor for the unconstitutional suppression of evidence. Justice White argued that the denial of immunity would encourage prosecutors to turn over more information than necessary, which would be beneficial to the judicial process overall. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51461:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51471:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51471:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTeachers at the Hortonville Joint School District went on strike when negotiations over employment contracts broke down. Wisconsin law prohibited strikes by public employees. The School District invited the teachers to return to work several times, and a few teachers accepted the offer. After about two weeks of striking, the school board set disciplinary hearings for the teachers who continued to strike. An attorney for the teachers indicated that the teachers wished to be treated as a group and argued that the school board was not sufficiently impartial to be able to exercise discipline over the teachers. The attorney argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required an independent, unbiased decision maker. The school board still voted to terminate the teachers, but invited them to reapply for their jobs. One teacher did so and returned to work. The remaining teachers were replaced.\nThe fired teachers sued the school district in Wisconsin state court alleging that their termination violated their due process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, holding that due process was not violated because the teachers admitted to being on strike in violation of state law after receiving adequate notice and a hearing. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Due Process Clause required the teachers' conduct and the school board’s decision to be evaluated by an impartial decision maker.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51471:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51471:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51471:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause did not guarantee the teachers an independent review of the decision to terminate them. The fact that the school district had negotiated with the teachers earlier and had knowledge of the events surrounding the strike did not make them incapable of giving the teachers due process.\nJustice Potter Stewart dissented, arguing that the case should be remanded for a determination of whether the school board must consider the reasonableness of the strike considering its own actions, or whether it is free to exercise its discretion when deciding to terminated teachers. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51471:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51472:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51472:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Murgia, although he was in excellent physical and mental health, was forced to retire at age fifty according to state law. Murgia had been a uniformed officer in the state police force. Murgia successfully challenged the mandatory retirement law in district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51472:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51472:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51472:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the right of governmental employment was not per se fundamental, and that uniformed state police officers over 50 did not constitute a suspect class under the Clause. Applying a rational relationship test, the Court reasoned that the statute was sufficiently justified as a means of protecting the public \"by assuring physical preparedness of [the] uniformed police.\" The Court noted that while the law may not have been the best means to accomplish this purpose, it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment merely because of its imperfections.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51472:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51473:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51473:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 8, 1971, Richard Mosley was arrested in Detroit in connection with robberies that had occurred at two local restaurants. Mosley was taken to police headquarters, where he was informed of his Miranda rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present. After Mosley signed the police department’s constitutional rights notification certificate, Detective James Cowie began to question Mosley, but he immediately stopped when Mosley said that he did not wish to speak about the robberies. A few hours later, Detective Hill brought Mosley out from his cell to question him about the recent murder of a man named Leroy Williams, and Mosley was again informed of his Miranda rights. At first Mosley denied any involvement, but after being informed that another man had named him as the shooter, he made statements implicating himself in the murder. During the second interrogation, he never asked for a lawyer or refused to answer questions. Mosley was subsequently charged with first-degree murder. Mosley moved to suppress his incriminating statement and argued that Detective Hill’s interrogation and eventual use of his incriminating comment violated his Miranda rights. The trial court denied his motion, and he was found guilty and given the mandatory sentence of life in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and held that the trial court’s failure to suppress Mosley’s statement was a per se violation of Mosley’s Miranda rights. The Michigan Supreme Court denied further review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51473:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51473:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51473:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe re-initiation of interrogation after a suspect has invoked his right to silence is not a per se violation of Miranda rights, as long as the suspect’s invocation of his rights is honored. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the decision for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the Miranda rule, which requires an immediate cessation of questioning if the individual in custody wishes not to speak, does not clearly establish the circumstances under which questioning may be resumed. The Miranda rule could bar the police from questioning the individual again in regards to any subject, or it could require a complete break from any current questioning but allow for re-initiation of another round of questioning at a later time. The Court held that Miranda only required that the suspect’s right to refuse to answer questions be honored. In this case, the Court held that Mosley’s invocation of his right to silence had been honored because the interrogation ceased as soon as he stated he did not wish to continue, he was read his rights again before interrogation was re-initiated, and a significant amount of time passed between the two interrogations.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that, to keep from unnecessarily hindering the fact-finding process, only confessions made as “the result of involuntary waivers” of judgment should be excluded in regards to a trial.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority’s ruling degraded the protection of self-incrimination rights that the Miranda decision represented because it allowed for police officials to sidestep the Miranda protections. Justice Brennan also noted that individual states have the power to establish greater protections of the Miranda rights than those set by the majority opinion. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51473:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51491:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51491:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGeneral Electric Co. offered its employees a disability plan for non-occupational sicknesses and accidents, but the plan did not cover disabilities from pregnancy. The respondents, a class of female employees of General Electric Company, sued their employer for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the plan violated the Act, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51491:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51491:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51491:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that employers have the right to exclude any condition from a disability plan with a reasonable basis. The Court referred to a previous decision, Geduldig v. Aniello, which dealt with a similar case under the Equal Protection Clause. In that case, the Court held that the pregnancy exclusion divided the employees into two groups, one that was solely female and the other that contained both sexes, so the distinction is not primarily sex-based. The Court applied the same analysis to this case. Because the disability plan was not worth more to men than it was to women, it did not discriminate based on sex.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that this particular case had no impact on the general evidence necessary to prove a discrimination case under Title VII.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part where he argued that he agreed with the majority’s opinion on the merits of this case but did not agree in any inference that this case would affect overall Title VII decisions.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the majority examined the policy in isolation, when it should have considered the policy in light of General Electric Co.’s history of downgrading the role of women in the workforce. Under that framework, the policy was clearly not gender-neutral. He also argued that the political background for this issue indicated that pregnancy exclusions in disability pay drastically affected women’s abilities to remain in the workforce. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.\nIn his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the Geduldig case should not be the basis for this decision, because the Equal Protection Clause did not contain the word “discrimination.” He found that the language of Title VII required a different analysis than the one the majority used.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51491:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51495:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51495:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeven prisoners in the custody of the California Department of Corrections sued the United States District Court for the Northern District Court of California and alleged the manner in which the California Adult Authority determined the length and conditions of punishment for convicted criminal offenders violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants argued that two sets of documents, the Adult Authority files and the Prisoners’ files, which contained personal information, were irrelevant, confidential, and privileged information that should not be admissible into evidence. The district court ordered the production of the documents; however, the court limited the number of people associated with the prisoners who could examine those documents and only allowed access to the counsel and no more than two investigators designated by the counsel. The defendants filed a writ of mandamus requesting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacate the decision to compel discovery, but the appellate court denied the petition because the prisoners had no absolute privilege that would allow them to avoid production of the documents at issue. However, the petitioners were allowed to have their request for in camera review, or private review, considered.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51495:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51495:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51495:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that since less extreme alternatives for modification of the challenged discovery orders were available, the writ of mandamus was inappropriate. A writ of mandamus should only be issued in extraordinary circumstances when there are no other adequate means to secure relief. In this case, adequate alternatives existed, such as the prison officials’ opportunity to assert a separate privilege more specifically and have their request for in camera review considered.\nJustice John Paul Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51495:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51496:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51496:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAbout a year after the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, the State of Missouri passed a law regulating abortions in the state. Planned Parenthood of Missouri and two doctors who supervised abortions at Planned Parenthood sued to prevent enforcement of certain parts of the law. The challenged parts of the law: (1) define “viability” as the “stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support systems”; (2) require a women submitting to an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy to sign a consent form certifying that she was not coerced; (3) require written consent from the woman’s spouse during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless the abortion will save the mother’s life; (4)require parental consent if the woman is younger than 18; (5) require physicians to exercise professional care in preserving a fetus life or risk being charged with manslaughter; (6) declare an infant who survives an abortion attempt as a ward of the state, depriving mother and father of parental rights; (7) prohibit saline amniocenteses after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; and (8) require reporting and record keeping for facilities and physicians that perform abortions.\nThe district court upheld all of the provisions except 4, holding that it was overbroad because it did not exclude the stage of pregnancy before the fetus is viable. The Supreme Court head this case on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51496:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51496:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51496:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes in part. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the majority opinion, reversing in part and remanding. The Court followed the three-trimester framework laid out in Roe v. Wade. The Supreme Court held that provisions 1, 2 and 8 were constitutional. Provisions 3 and 4 were unconstitutional because the state cannot delegate the authority to prevent an abortion to anyone but the physician and the woman during the first trimester of pregnancy. Provision 5 was unconstitutional because it required physicians to preserve the life of the fetus at any stage of pregnancy. Provision 7 was unconstitutional because it failed to regulate in reference to the mother’s health, and instead was designed to prohibit most abortions after 12 weeks. The Court refused to consider provision 6.\nJustice Potter Stewart concurred, expressing that the mother’s consent provision was constitutional because not prevents a state from ensuring that the abortion decision is made knowingly and voluntarily. The parental consent provision was unconstitutional places a potential prohibition on abortion for women under 18. The spousal consent provision was also unconstitutional because the woman’s right to make the decision outweighed a father’s right to associate with his offspring. Justice Lewis F. Powell joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Byron R. White concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the physician care provision was constitutional because the state can require a physician to preserve the life of a fetus once it is viable. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in Justice White’s opinion.\nJustice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that prohibiting saline amniocenteses was unconstitutional because it essentially prohibited abortions after the first trimester. The parental consent provision was constitutional because the state has an interest in protecting the welfare of its young citizens.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51496:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51498:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51498:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a \"cruel and unusual\" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.\nThis case is one of the five \"Death Penalty Cases\" along with Jurek v. Texas , Roberts v. Louisiana , Proffitt v. Florida , and Woodson v. North Carolina .", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51498:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51498:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51498:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51498:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51512:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51512:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA New Hampshire law required all noncommercial vehicles to bear license plates containing the state motto \"Live Free or Die.\" George Maynard, a Jehovah's Witness, found the motto to be contrary to his religious and political beliefs and cut the words \"or Die\" off his plate. Maynard was convicted of violating the state law and was subsequently fined and given a jail sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51512:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51512:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51512:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that New Hampshire could not constitutionally require citizens to display the state motto upon their vehicle license plates. The Court found that the statute in question effectively required individuals to \"use their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message.\" The Court held that the State's interests in requiring the motto did not outweigh free speech principles under the First Amendment, including \"the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster. . .an idea they find morally objectionable.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51512:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51514:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51514:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn _Milliken v. Bradley (1973) _, the Court ruled that an inter-district desegregation plan in the city of Detroit was impermissible and remanded the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court ordered remedial education programs be instituted within the Detroit school district, and that the State of Michigan would bear half the costs of the remedial programs. The state of Michigan challenged the District Court order, which was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51514:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51514:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51514:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court affirmed the District Court order, emphasizing \"equitable principles\" in the construction of desegregation plans set forth in Brown v. Board of Education (1955) _. The Court relied on _United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education in that \"matters other than pupil assignment must on occasion be addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of prior segregation\" and numerous lower court decisions providing for remedial programs. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger asserted that the District Court order \"does no more than\" what was accepted in Ex Parte Young. The burden to eliminate the effects of segregation rested on state officials, consistent with Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Board of Education. Therefore, the District Court's order did not violate the Eleventh Amendment. Justice Thurgood Marshall authored a concurring opinion. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. concurred in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51514:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51521:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51521:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard M. Nixon resigned as President of the United States on August 9, 1974, leaving in government custody approximately 42 million pages of documents, 880 reels of tape recordings of conversations, and other materials. Soon after, Nixon executed a depository agreement with the Administrator of General Services Administration providing for the storage of these materials near Nixon’s California home; this agreement also specified that certain of the materials would be destroyed at Nixon’s discretion.\nShortly after this agreement was publicized, the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act became law. The act directed the Administrator to take custody of Nixon’s presidential materials, assign government archivists to screen materials for items that were personal or private in nature, preserve materials with historical value, and make materials available for use in judicial proceedings. The act also directed the Administrator to promulgate regulations allowing eventual public access to the materials.\nThe day after President Ford signed the act into law, Nixon challenged its constitutionality in district court, claiming that it violated 1) the principle of separation of powers, 2) Nixon’s presidential privilege, 3) Nixon’s privacy interests, 4) Nixon’s First Amendment associational rights, and 5) the bill of attainder clause. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the act. The district court dismissed Nixon’s compliant, holding that his constitutional challenges were without merit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51521:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51521:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51521:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\n\"\nNo, no, no, no, and no. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that the act did not violate any of Nixon’s relevant constitutional rights. Justice Brennan first determined that the district court correctly limited the scope of its review to the constitutional consequences of the archival screenings because the Administrator had not yet promulgated any regulations.\nJustice Brennan rejected Nixon’s claim that the act violated the constitutional separation of powers, focusing on whether the act prevented the executive branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. He noted that the act placed custody of the materials in officials also of the executive branch, and that the materials could only be released if that action was not barred by some applicable executive privilege.\nJustice Brennan rejected Nixon’s claim that presidential privilege barred archival scrutiny of the materials. He noted that presidential immunity was generally qualified, and that the screening constituted a very limited intrusion by executive branch personnel into executive matters. Moreover, the intrusion was justified by a clear public interest in preserving materials for legitimate historical and governmental purposes.\nJustice Brennan held that the act did not violate Nixon’s right to privacy. He weighed the potential intrusion into Nixon’s privacy against the public interest in subjecting the materials to archival screening. He noted that only a small fraction of the materials in question related to personal matters, and that the act provided procedures for the expressed purpose of minimizing intrusions into Nixon’s private and personal matters.\nJustice Brennan held that the act did not violate Nixon’s right to associational privacy under the First Amendment. He acknowledged that Nixon as President was the head of the national Republican Party and that the First Amendment closely protects involvement in partisan polities. Here, however, archival screening was apparently the least restrictive means of meeting the compelling government interests promoted by the act.\nFinally, Justice Brennan rejected Nixon’s argument that the act was a bill of attainder that legislatively determined guilt and inflicted punishment on Nixon without provision of the protections of a judicial trial. He concluded that the act did not impose any punishment traditionally judged to be prohibited by the bill of attainder clause, that the act was justified by Nixon’s plan to eventually destroy some of the materials, and that the legislative history did not indicate an intent to punish Nixon.\nJustice Byron White concurred in part and in the judgment. With respect to the bill of attainder issue, Justice White argued that it was sufficient to demonstrate that the act did not impose any punishment on Nixon. He questioned the majority’s assumption that the government’s interest in historical preservation could be important enough in itself to entitle it to Nixon’s private communications.\nJustice John Paul Stevens concurred. He outlined the history of bill of attainders, pointing out that they were generally directed at formerly powerful political actors. Here, however, the facts provided a legitimate justification for the specificity of the act.\nJustice Harry Blackmun concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He described his posture as essentially similar to that of Justice Louis Powell, but did not share his view that the President Carter’s agreement with the position of the Administrator was dispositive of the separation-of-powers issue.\nJustice Louis Powell concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Powell emphasized the uniqueness of the situation leading to the act’s signing, and the importance of safeguarding the materials. Regarding the separation of powers issue, Justice Powell considered it dispositive that President Carter represented through his Solicitor General that the act serves the executive.\nChief Justice Warren Burger dissented. He argued that the act was an unconstitutional congressional violation of separation of powers. He highlighted the historical importance of presidential freedom from control or coercion by Congress, and characterized the act as an attempt by Congress to exercise the executive power to control executive materials, some of which were confidential.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51521:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "51521:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51521:Conclusion:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nandtheimportanceofsafeguardingthematerials.Regardingtheseparationofpowersissue,JusticePowellconsidereditdispositivethatPresidentCarterrepresentedthroughhisSolicitorGeneralthattheactservestheexecutive.ChiefJusticeWarrenBurgerdissented.Hearguedthattheactwasanunconstitutionalcongressionalviolationofseparationofpowers.HehighlightedthehistoricalimportanceofpresidentialfreedomfromcontrolorcoercionbyCongress,andcharacterizedtheactasanattemptbyCongresstoexercisetheexecutivepowertocontrolexecutivematerials,someofwhichwereconfidential.\nJustice William Rehnquist dissented, characterizing the question as whether congress has the right to seize the official papers of an outgoing president as he is leaving the inaugural stand. He emphasized the importance of candid and open discourse in the executive branch and the potential effect of the act on the free flow of information to and from the President. He rejected the majority’s balancing of the violation of separation of powers against the public interests allegedly furthered by the act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51521:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "51524:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51524:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEast Cleveland's housing ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. Part of the ordinance was a strict definition of \"family\" which excluded Mrs. Inez Moore who lived with her son and two grandsons.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51524:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51524:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51524:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe four justices in the plurality held that the ordinance violated Moore's rights as it constituted \"intrusive regulation of the family\" without accruing some tangible state interest. Justice Stevens joined in the judgment and argued that the ordinance was invalid because, by regulating who could live with Moore, it constituted a taking of property without just compensation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51524:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51528:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51528:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn February 18, 1974, three enrolled Couer d’Alene Indians—William Davison, Gabriel Francis Antelope, and Leonard Davison—broke into the home of 81-year-old Emma Johnson, robbed her, and killed her. Because the crimes were committed on an Indian reservation, the three were subject to federal prosecution under the Major Crimes Act. They were indicted by a grand jury and tried for burglary, robbery, and murder. Leonard Davison and Antelope were found guilty on all three charges, and William Davison was found guilty of second-degree murder.\nThe defendants appealed and argued that their convictions under federal law were the result of unlawful racial discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions and held that the defendants were placed at a “racially based disadvantage.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51528:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51528:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51528:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the law and the courts have treated American Indian tribes as unique entities, and this treatment has been upheld against claims of racial discrimination. The Court also held that Congress has the authority to legislate over reservation territory, and as long as the Congressional legislation is fair, it does not violate Equal Protection to try individuals under the federal laws rather than the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51528:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51534:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51534:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe North Carolina Department of Correction (“DoC”) had custody of approximately 10,000 prisoners housed in 80 prison units in 67 different counties. The only unit having a writ room and some semblance of a legal library was the Central Prison in Raleigh. Robert Smith, Donald W. Morgan, and John Harrington were all inmates in the DoC’s custody. In consolidated cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the state of North Carolina failed to provide its prisoners with proper legal facilities. They argued that this violated their right of access to the courts guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.\nThe district court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, ordering the responsible state officials to submit a proposed plan to provide library facilities for the use of indigent prisoners seeking to file pro se habeas or civil rights actions, or to provide some acceptable substitute. The court suggested that the state could fulfill its obligations by making legal counsel or assistance available, but did not mandate this approach. In response, the state proposed to construct seven new law libraries within the prison system, to expand the facilities at Central Prison, and to provide all inmates with access to these libraries upon request.\nThe plaintiffs protested that the plan was inadequate, but the court rejected their objections. It held that North Carolina was not constitutionally required to provide legal assistance as well as libraries. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but held that the plan failed to provide female prisoners with the same access as male prisoners.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51534:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51534:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51534:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the constitution required the North Carolina Department of Correction to provide prisoners with legal assistance as part of prisoners’ right of access to the courts. Justice Marshall emphasized that prisoners have a well-established right of adequate, effective and meaningful access to the courts. He wrote that this access generally required states to shoulder affirmative obligations to provide meaningful access, including paying for trial counsel for indigent clients.\nJustice Marshall acknowledged that habeas corpus and civil rights complaints only needed to set forth facts giving rise to the complaint, but rejected North Carolina’s argument that law libraries or legal assistance were not essential to frame those complaints. A typical client would expect any lawyer preparing either complaint to research the law to determine whether an actionable claim existed. Justice Marshall rejected the state’s argument that inmates were ill-equipped to use the tools of the trade of the legal profession.\nJustice Marshall also rejected North Carolina’s interpretation of Ross v. Moffitt, where the Court held that prisoners’ right to appointed counsel in appeals to criminal cases was limited. Here, the Court was concerned with prisoners seeking new trials, release from confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights. Justice Marshall noted that adequate law libraries were only one constitutionally acceptable method of assuring meaningful access to the courts. Finally, he rejected the state’s argument that the district court exceeded its powers by ordering North Carolina to devise a remedy for the violation.\nJustice Louis Powell concurred, emphasizing that the majority’s holding did not pass on the kinds of claims that state or federal courts were constitutionally required to hear.\nChief Justice Warren Burger dissented. He could not determine the source of the constitutional right of access to the courts, or of the requirement that the states foot the bill for assuring that access for prisoners. Chief Justice Burger noted that the right of prisoners to collaterally attack convictions was derived from federal statutes and not from the constitution itself.\nJustice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger. He characterized the majority’s opinion as a reiteration of the reasoning in Younger v. Gilmore, where the Court also failed to identify a constitutional source for prisoners’ right of access to the courts. He emphasized that lawful imprisonment properly resulted in a retraction of prisoners' rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51534:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51546:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51546:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDianne Rawlinson applied to be a prison guard with the Alabama Department of Corrections. The Department had a minimum height and weight requirement of 120 pounds and 5 feet 2 inches. Rawlinson did not meet the minimum weight requirement, so the Department refused to hire her. Rawlinson sued on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated women under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination. While this suit was pending, the Alabama Board of Corrections adopted a rule banning women from working in “contact positions” that require close physical proximity to inmates. Rawlinson amended her complaint to challenge the new rule as well. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of Rawlinson. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51546:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51546:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51546:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion affirming in part and reversing in part. The Supreme Court held that the height and weight requirements violated Title VII because Rawlinson showed that the requirement excluded 41% of females in the nation, and the Department was unable to show that the requirement was job-related. The “contact position” ban was a bona fide occupational qualification, however, so Title VII did not prohibit it. The Court held that having women in these positions would create substantial security and safety problems. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, agreeing that the “contact position” ban relates to a bona fide occupational qualification, but stating that the district court should have analyzed the height and weight requirement in more depth. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a partial dissent, agreeing that the height and weight requirements violated Title VII, but expressing that the ban on women in “contact positions” is also prohibited. Justice William J. Brennan joined in the concurrence. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that showing that the general height and weight statistics do not establish a valid case. Rawlinson also hadn’t proved she was denied employment under the “contact position” rule because she didn’t meet the height and weight requirement in the first place.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51546:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51551:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51551:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA St. Louis policy prohibited non-therapeutic abortions in the city's two publicly run hospitals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51551:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51551:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51551:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that St. Louis could enact a \"policy choice\" to refuse to provide publicly financed hospitals for nontherapeutic abortions even though it provided facilities for childbirth. Relying on its reasoning in Maher v. Roe (1977), the Court distinguished between a state interfering with a protected activity and simply encouraging an alternative activity. Since the state did not deny women the right to have an abortion, the law was consistent with the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51551:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51555:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51555:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA New Jersey statute prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste into the state, except for garbage for swine feed. The City of Philadelphia challenged the statute, alleging it was unconstitutional under the Commerce clause of Article I and pre-empted by the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the statute. Congress then passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51555:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51555:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51555:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nPerhaps and not addressed. In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that the pre-emption question \"should be resolved before the constitutional issue.\" Since that question \"depends primarily on statutory and not constitutional interpretation\" of the 1976 Act, the case was remanded to the New Jersey Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51555:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51556:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51556:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1974, Erlich Anthony Coker, serving a number of sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault, escaped from prison. He broke into a Georgia couple's home, raped the woman and stole the family's car. The woman was released shortly thereafter, without further injuries. The Georgia courts sentenced Coker to death on the rape charge.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51556:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51556:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51556:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the death penalty was a \"grossly disproportionate\" punishment for the crime of rape. The Court noted that nearly all states at that time declined to impose such a harsh penalty, with Georgia being the only state that authorized death for the rape of an adult woman. Because rape did not involve the taking of another human life, the Court found the death penalty excessive \"in its severity and revocability.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51556:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51564:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51564:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn regulating the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of Arizona restricted advertising by attorneys. Bates was a partner in a law firm which sought to provide low-cost legal services to people of moderate income who did not qualify for public legal aid. Bates and his firm would only accept routine legal matters (many of which did not involve litigation) and depended on a large number of patrons given the low financial return from each client. In assessing their concept of legal services, Bates's firm decided that it would be necessary to advertise its availability and low fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51564:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51564:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51564:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that the rule violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Blackmun argued that commercial speech does merit First Amendment protection given the important functions it serves in society, such as providing consumers with information about services and products, and helping to allocate resources in the American system of free-enterprise. The Court held that allowing attorneys to advertise would not harm the legal profession or the administration of justice, and, in fact, would supply consumers with valuable information about the availability and cost of legal services.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51564:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51565:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51565:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the wake of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion opponents turned to state and local legislators in an effort to curb the practice of abortion. This case involved a Pennsylvania law which restricted Medicaid-funded abortions only to indigent women in situations in which a doctor determined the procedure was medically necessary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51565:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51565:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51565:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that states could exclude nontherapeutic abortions from coverage under their Medicaid programs. Justice Powell argued that in its provisions, Title XIX of the Social Security Act made no specific reference to abortion nor did it require states to fund every medical procedure which could possibly fall under its umbrella. Powell made clear however that the federal statute did give states the option to fund therapeutic abortions if they chose to do so.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51565:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51569:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51569:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted a regulation that required all apples shipped into the state in closed containers to display the USDA grade or nothing at all. Washington State growers (whose standards are higher than the USDA) challenged the regulation as an unreasonable burden to interstate commerce. North Carolina stated it was a valid exercise of its police powers to create \"uniformity\" to protect its citizenry from \"fraud and deception.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51569:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51569:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51569:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court voted unanimously that the North Carolina regulation was an unconstitutional exercise of the state's power over interstate commerce. Although the regulation was facially neutral, it had a discriminatory impact on the Washington growers while shielding the local growers from the same burden. The regulation removed the competitive advantage gained by the Washington apples from stricter inspection standards. The regulation produced a leveling effect that works to the local advantage by \"downgrading\" apples from other states unjustly. Therefore, the regulation places an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51569:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51584:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51584:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe U.S. Attorney General sued Hazelwood School District, alleging a “pattern or practice” of discrimination against African Americans in hiring teachers. This violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The government provided statistical evidence of the number of African American teachers hired. The district court entered summary judgment for Hazelwood, finding that the government’s evidence did not establish a pattern or practice of discrimination. The court compared the number of African American teachers hired to the number of African American students in the school district. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the proper statistical comparison is between the number of African American teachers on staff and the number of qualified African American individuals in the relevant labor market. The relevant labor market included St. Louis and the county where Hazelwood was located.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51584:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51584:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51584:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for an 8-1 majority, vacated the Eighth Circuit judgment. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals used the correct statistical comparison, but erred in determining the relevant labor market. The court of appeals also failed to consider that Hazelwood may have been able to rebut some of the statistics with evidence of its hiring practices post Title VII. The Court remanded the case for further consideration of the relevant labor market. Justice William J. Brennan concurred, stating that the case was properly remanded so the parties could address the statistical data with more care. Justice Byron R. White also concurred, writing that the government should have produced evidence of the racial makeup of Hazelwood’s applicant pool to compare with the racial makeup of those hired.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that the government proved discrimination through statistical data, historical evidence, and evidence relating to specific acts. The school district failed to rebut that proof.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51584:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51587:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51587:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1962, GTE Sylvania Incorporated (Sylvania) enacted a plan that limited the number of franchises in any given geographical area to which they would sell televisions. Three years later, Sylvania franchised a San Francisco area company, Young Brothers, which was located only one mile from one of their existing franchises, Continental T.V., Inc. (Continental). Continental protested that the Young Brothers franchise violated Sylvania’s new location restrictions. When Sylvania ignored their protests, Continental tried to acquire more Sylvania televisions to sell in a new retail location in Sacramento. Sylvania already had retailers near Continental’s new Sacramento location and declined to supply them with more televisions, so Continental withheld payments they owed Sylvania under an existing franchise agreement.\nContinental sued in district court and alleged that Sylvania’s franchise agreements, which placed location-based restrictions on the sale of their products, violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Sherman Act). A jury found that Sylvania’s location restrictions violated the per se rule established in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co. that prohibited manufacturers from “restrict[ing] and confin[ing] areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.” Sylvania appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which declined to apply the per se rule. Instead, the appellate court distinguished this case from Schwinn, applied a reasonableness rule, and held that Sylvania’s restrictions “had less potential for competitive harm than” other invalidated restrictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51587:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51587:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51587:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the per se rule established in Schwinn applied to this case. However, the Court found that the Schwinn rule was outdated and overbroad; therefore, the Court overturned the rule in favor of a reasonableness standard. That standard considered whether the franchise agreement was an unreasonable restriction of competition and whether it had any redeeming virtue. The Court ruled that the appellate court properly applied this reasonableness rule and upheld Sylvania’s restrictions.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment but arguing that the Court should not have gone as far as to overturn the per se rule.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented and argued that the Court should not have overturned the per se rule and should have rejected Sylvania’s restrictions.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51587:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51597:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51597:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Williams escaped from a mental hospital and lived at the Des Moines YMCA. Soon thereafter, a 10-year-old girl disappeared from the YMCA while at her brother’s wrestling match. A boy in the parking lot saw Williams carrying a large bundle to his car with two “skinny and white” legs in it. The next day, police found Williams’ abandoned car about 160 miles east of Des Moines. Williams soon turned himself in to police in Davenport, Iowa. Williams said he would tell police the whole story once he saw his lawyer in Des Moines. Williams spoke with a local attorney and reiterated his intention to confess when he saw his attorney in Des Moines. Davenport police promised not to question Williams during the drive to Des Moines. During the drive, however, the detective, knowing that Williams was deeply religious, told Williams that the girl’s family wanted to give her a “Christian burial” and suggested that they stop to locate the body. As a result of the officer's pointed statements, Williams made incriminating statements and ultimately led police to the girl’s body. He was indicted for first-degree murder.\nAt trial, Williams moved to suppress all evidence relating to the car ride conversation, arguing that the questioning violated Williams’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The judge denied the motion, and a jury found Williams guilty. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Williams petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The court granted the writ, finding that speaking to Williams during the drive violated his right to counsel, and the evidence in question was wrongly admitted at trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51597:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51597:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51597:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion, affirming the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held police denied Williams his Sixth Amendment rights because the adversary proceeding had already began. The detective’s statements eliciting incriminating statements amounted to an interrogation, entitling Williams to counsel. The Court also held that Williams had not waived his right to counsel.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall concurred, writing that the detective who gave the \"Christian burial\" speech knowingly set out to violate Williams’ constitutional rights. The nature of the crime was not an excuse for the detective’s behavior. Justice Lewis F. Powell also concurred, stating that the record clearly showed that Williams had not waived his rights. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, expressing that the state had promised not to question Williams before he reached Des Moines, and the state could not dishonor that promise made to Williams’ lawyer.\n:\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, writing that Williams validly waived his right to counsel, and even if he had not, the disclosures he made were voluntary and uncoerced. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the record showed Williams knowingly and intentionally waived his rights. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a separate dissent, stating that there was no interrogation, and he would remand the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the Williams made the incriminating statements voluntarily. Justices Byron R. White and William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51597:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51599:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51599:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHugo Zacchini performed a \"human cannonball\" act, in which he was shot from a cannon into a net 200 feet away. A free-lance reporter for Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. recorded the performance in its entirety without consent and it aired on the nightly news. Subsequently, Zacchini sued Scripps-Howard, alleging the unlawful appropriation of his professional property. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in favor of Scripps-Howard. While recognizing that Zacchini had a cause of action for the infringement of his state-law right to publicity, the court found that Scripps-Howard was constitutionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for some nonprivileged purpose.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51599:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51599:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51599:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Byron R. White, the Court held that Scripps-Howard's constitutionally privileged free speech did not extend to broadcasting Zacchini's entire performance without his permission. Noting that Zacchini's interest in the case was similar to a patent or copyright, in which he was seeking to obtain the benefit of his work, the Court emphasized that the broadcast of an entire act was categorically different from reporting on an event in so far as it posed a substantial threat to the economic value of the performance. \"Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent,\" wrote Justice White. Justice Louis F. Powell, Jr., joined by Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall, dissented, arguing that the recording was genuinely treated as news and as such Scripps-Howard was constitutionally privileged. Justice John Paul Stevens also dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51599:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51602:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51602:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the wake of Roe v. Wade, the Connecticut Welfare Department issued regulations limiting state Medicaid benefits for first-trimester abortions to those that were \"medically necessary.\" An indigent woman (\"Susan Roe\") challenged the regulations and sued Edward Maher, the Commissioner of Social Services in Connecticut.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51602:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51602:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51602:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Connecticut law placed no obstacles in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion, and that it did not \"impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.\" The Court noted that there was a distinction between direct state interference with a protected activity and \"state encouragement of alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.\" Holding that financial need alone did not identify a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court found that the law was \"rationally related\" to a legitimate state interest and survived scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51602:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51606:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51606:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 6, 1975, federal prosecutors indicted Eugene Lovasco for the possession of stolen firearms and for dealing in firearms without a license. The indictment alleged that Lovasco committed the offenses between July 25 and August 31, 1973—more than 18 months before the prosecutors filed the indictment. Lovasco moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the delay was unnecessary and prejudicial to his defense, as two of his witnesses had died in the interim. The district court found that the government had collected all of the necessary information to indict Lovasco within a month of the alleged commission of crimes and granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51606:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51606:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51606:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies only after a person has been accused of a crime and that the pre-indictment delay did not deprive Lovasco of due process, though the lapse of time somewhat prejudiced his defense. The Court held that the deaths of the witnesses did not outweigh the government’s interest in fully investigating crimes before bringing charges against the accused.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court should have accepted the lower court’s finding that the delay was unnecessary and unreasonable rather than accept as fact the government’s unsworn statements that the delay was due to good-faith investigative efforts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51606:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51609:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51609:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1972, the state legislature enacted the New York State Controlled Substances Act. The Act required doctors to fill out forms for potentially harmful prescription drugs. The prescribing doctor kept one copy, while another copy was sent to the dispensing pharmacy and a third copy was sent to the state department of health. The forms included personal information such as the patient's name, address, and age.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51609:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51609:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51609:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the requirements of the Act did not on its face violate a \"constitutionally protected 'zone of privacy.'\" The Court found that the statutory scheme evidenced \"a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy\" and that the \"remote possibility\" of potential abuses of data accumulation and disclosure were not sufficient to establish an invasion of any rights or liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51609:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51612:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51612:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nComplete Auto Transit was a Michigan corporation doing business in Mississippi. Complete shipped cars into the state where they were distributed for sale. Mississippi imposed a tax on transportation companies for the \"privilege of doing business\" in the state. The tax was applied equally to businesses involved in intra-and interstate commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51612:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51612:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51612:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA unanimous Court found the tax valid. Businesses involved in interstate commerce should assume a just share of the state tax burden. The Court's decision established four criteria to be met for a state tax to be valid and not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. The tax must be (1) on an activity connected to the state, (2) fairly apportioned to be based on intrastate commerce, (3) nondiscriminatory, and (4) related to state services provided. These criteria are only valid if Congress has not imposed conflicting regulations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51612:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51623:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51623:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Act), which gave the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power to enact regulations to limit the amount of pollution that manufacturing plants could discharge. In exercising that power, the Administrator of the EPA created groups made up of similar plants and prescribed a specific pollution limitation to each of the different groups. These regulations granted existing plants some leeway for complying with the prescribed pollution limit. Petitioners, eight inorganic chemical manufacturing plants, sued the EPA in district court and alleged that it had overstepped its statutory authority by promulgating regulations organized by categories, instead of issuing specific pollution limits for each plant. Petitioners also argued that the EPA regulations for plants that had not yet been built violated the provisions of the Act because they did not allow for any variance from the prescribed limit. The district court found that the Act gave appellate courts jurisdiction to review pollution regulations and removed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court rejected petitioners’ arguments regarding the categorical limits but held that the EPA must provide new plants the same variance allowances with which the existing plants were provided.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51623:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51623:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51623:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes, yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the language of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act unambiguously allowed the EPA to enact regulations creating categorical limits on pollution, while allowing existing plants to vary slightly from the prescribed limit. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the EPA must create a limit for each individual plant via a permit system because such a system would impose a heavy burden on the EPA to be intimately familiar with the circumstances of more than 42,000 manufacturing plants. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellate court had jurisdiction to review the pollution restrictions as a whole and was not limited to reviewing only the individual variance allowed for each plant. Although the restrictions for existing plants allowed for variance from the prescribed pollution limit, the Court held that the language of the Act showed a clear congressional intention to charge the EPA with setting absolute prohibitions on pollution. Therefore, the EPA could set exacting pollution standards for newly constructed plants that did not allow for any variance.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. took no part in the consideration of these cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51623:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51627:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51627:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 1, 1970, Assistant Principal Solomon Barnes applied corporal punishment to Roosevelt Andrews and fifteen other boys in a restroom at Charles R. Drew Junior High School. A teacher had accused Andrews of tardiness, but Andrews claimed he still had two minutes to get to class when he was seized. When Andrews resisted paddling, Barnes struck him on the arm, back, and across the neck.\nOn October 6, 1970, Principal Willie J. Wright removed James Ingraham and several other disruptive students to his office, where he paddled eight to ten of them. When Ingraham refused to assume a paddling position, Wright called on Barnes and Assistant Principal Lemmie Deliford to hold Ingraham in a prone position while Wright administered twenty blows. Ingraham’s mother later took him to a hospital for treatment, where he was prescribed cold compresses, laxatives and pain-killing pills for a hematoma.\nIngraham and Andrews filed a complaint against Wright, Deliford, Barnes and Edwart L. Whigham, the superintendant of the Dade County School System; the complaint alleged the deprivation of constitutional rights and damages from the administration of corporal punishment. They also filed a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all students in the Dade County schools. At the close of Ingraham and Andrews’ case, the defendants successfully moved to dismiss the third count because the plaintiffs showed no right to relief. The court also ruled that the evidence for the first two counts was insufficient to go to a jury. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed. The Fifth Circuit held that the punishment of Ingraham and Andrews was so severe that it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments and that the school’s corporal punishment policy failed to satisfy due process. Upon rehearing, the en banc court rejected this conclusion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It held that due process did not require that students receive notice or an opportunity to be heard and that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not forbid corporal punishment in schools.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51627:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51627:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51627:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Lewis Powell, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not prevent corporal punishment in public schools. While acknowledging the general abandonment of corporal punishment as a means of punishing criminals, Justice Powell looked to the common law history of similar punishment in schools and discerned no trend towards its elimination. Rather, common law suggested that teachers could legally impose reasonable, non-excessive force on their students. He also noted that the Court previously limited the application of the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” language to criminal punishment. Justice Powell reasoned that Ingraham and Andrews had less need for similar Eighth Amendment protection because they attended an open institution subject to more public scrutiny.\nJustice Powell also held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of procedural due process was satisfied by Florida law. Florida recognized students’ common law right to be free from excessive corporal punishment in school, mandating that teachers and administrators exercise prudence and restraint in administering physical punishment. Unreasonable or excessive punishment could result in criminal or civil liability for the responsible teacher or administrator.\nJustice Byron White dissented, joined by Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens. Justice White rejected the majority’s holding and reasoned that if some types of extreme corporal punishment violate the Eighth Amendment when used against criminals, similar punishment cannot be imposed on students for obviously lesser infractions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51627:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51629:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51629:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLeon Goldfarb was a widower who applied for survivor's benefits under the Social Security Act. Even though his wife Hannah had paid Social Security taxes for 25 years, his application was denied. To be eligible for benefits under 42 U.S.C. Section 402, he must have been receiving half his support from his wife at her time of death. Section 402 did not impose this requirement on widows whose husbands had recently passed away. Goldfarb challenged this statute under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The District Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51629:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51629:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51629:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the District Court in holding the statute unconstitutional. Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. described this situation as \"indistinguishable\" from the one in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, where a similar statute was invalidated. In this case, a female worker's family was less protected than the family of a male worker. The court rejected the \"archaic and overbroad\" generalizations that a wife is more likely to be dependent on her husband than a husband on his wife. These \"old notions\" of gender roles were not sufficient to justify the different treatment of widows and widowers, and which was therefore in violation of the Due Process Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51629:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51648:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51648:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSection 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, while allowing legitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from either their mothers or fathers, allowed illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers. Consequently, Deta Trimble, the illegitimate daughter of Sherman Gordon, was unable to inherit her father's estate when he died intestate. After losing her challenge to Section 12 in the Illinois Supreme Court, Trimble appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51648:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51648:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51648:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Section 12 was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Applying the \"rational relationship\" test under the Clause, the Court emphasized that such a standard was not a \"toothless\" one. The Court then rejected the argument \"that a State may attempt to influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships.\" The Court also noted that it was likely that Trimble would have inherited a substantial part of Gordon's estate had he written a will before his death.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51648:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51656:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51656:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC) contracted with the Village of Arlington Heights (\"Arlington\") to build racially integrated low-and moderate-income housing. When MHDC applied for the necessary zoning permits, authorizing a switch from a single-to a multiple-family classification, Arlington's planning commission denied the request. Acting on behalf of itself and several minority members, MHDC challenged Arlington's denial as racially discriminatory. On appeal from an adverse district court decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted Arlington certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51656:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51656:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51656:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nPerhaps. After finding that MHDC had proper federal standing, since it acted on behalf of black plaintiffs who stood to suffer direct and measurable injuries from Arlington's denial, the Court held that it failed to establish Arlington's racially discriminatory intent or purpose. While indicating that Arlington's zoning denial may result in a racially disproportionate impact, the evidence did not show that this was Arlington's deliberate intention. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further consideration.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51656:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51673:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51673:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress provided in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act that reapportionment plans of several states were to be submitted to the U.S. attorney general or the District Court of the District of Columbia for approval. Several districts in New York were restructured to create districts with a minimum nonwhite majority of 65 percent. A Hasidic Jewish community was split in two by the reapportionment. The community claimed that the plan violated their constitutional rights because the districts had been assigned solely on a racial basis.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51673:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51673:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51673:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that the reapportionment plan was valid under the Constitution. Neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment prohibit per se use of racial factors in districting and apportionment. Also, a reapportionment plan does not violate the same Amendments by using numerical quotas to establish a certain number of black majority districts. Although New York deliberately increased nonwhite majorities in several districts, there was no \"fencing out\" of the white population in the county from electoral participation. The reapportionment did not underrepresent the whites relative to their share of the population. The Court found that New York could use apportionment plans to attempt to prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted at the expense of the white populations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51673:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51675:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51675:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1971, Wesley Ward was charged with selling two sadomasochistic publications at his store in violation of the Illinois obscenity statute. The statute defined material as obscene if its predominant appeal was “a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion” and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters. Ward waived his right to a jury trial, and was found guilty based on the two publications and the testimony of the police officer who purchased them at the store. Ward was sentenced to one day in jail and a $200 fine. While Ward’s appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. California, which confirmed that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment, but acknowledging that official regulation should only cover “works which depict or describe sexual conduct” and such conduct must be specifically defined in the applicable law. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Ward’s conviction. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the publications were obscene and the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51675:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51675:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51675:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the Illinois statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ward because an earlier Illinois Supreme Court decision made it clear that the statute reached sadomasochistic materials. Sadomasochistic materials could be prohibited under a state obscenity statute, even though they were not in the examples of sexually explicit representations made in the Miller decision, because those examples were not intended to be an exhaustive list. The Illinois statute was not overbroad because previous Illinois Supreme Court decisions provided guidelines in line with Miller.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr dissented, arguing that the Illinois statute was overbroad and unconstitutional on its face. Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens also dissented, writing that the majority opinion abandoned the specificity prong of the Miller test. Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51675:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51676:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51676:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the spring of 1972, Ernest Dobbert’s son was found wandering outside a Holiday Inn in Jacksonville, Florida, with apparent signs of a beating. He told a circuit court judge that his injuries were the result of beatings from his father, that his brother and one of his sisters had been killed by his father, and that his other sister was kept locked in a closet at home. The judge issued a warrant for Dobbert’s arrest, and Dobbert fled Jacksonville. In October 1973, Dobbert was arrested in Texas and extradited to Florida for trial. The Florida death penalty law in place when the children were killed, which gave the jury ultimate authority in deciding to impose the penalty, was found unconstitutional before Dobbert’s trial. It was replaced by a new law where the jury gave an advisory recommendation, but the judge made the ultimate decision.\nBefore his trial, Dobbert applied to the Supreme Court of Florida for a constitutional stay of trial, arguing that applying the new death penalty law violated the ex post facto and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. His application was denied. Dobbert also moved for a change of venue from Duval County based on the publicity his trial was receiving. The trial judge took the motion under advisement and later denied it. Dobbert was convicted of the first-degree murder of his daughter, second-degree murder of his son, and the torture and abuse of his two other children. At his sentencing hearing, the jury recommended life imprisonment, but the trial judge, acting under the authority granted to him by the Florida statute governing the death penalty, overruled the jury and sentenced Dobbert to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51676:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51676:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51676:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, despite the fact that the Florida laws governing the death penalty changed during the time period the crimes in question were committed, the changes were procedural and better for the sentencing system. The Court also held that Florida’s previous death penalty statutes, although found unconstitutional before Dobbert’s trial, served as a warning to Dobbert’s that Florida could impose the death penalty. Additionally, Dobbert failed to provide evidence that his trial was affected by the trial judge’s dismissal of his motion for a change in venue.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a concurring opinion and argued that the changes in the Florida death penalty statutes altered the system in favor of defendants, and therefore Dobbert’s constitutional rights were not violated.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment that violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment in all circumstances. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. In a separate dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that, since the previous Florida death penalty statutes were found to be constitutionally invalid, they cannot be considered a fair warning. He also argued that Dobbert would not have faced the death penalty if tried slightly earlier, and it showed “capricious action” on the part of the government to subject him to the death penalty. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51676:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51677:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51677:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51677:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51677:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51677:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe repeal violated the Constitution. Justice Blackmun argued that the states could have implemented a less drastic solution to encourage people to use commuter train services in lieu of driving their cars. (State leaders thought the increase in bridge fares that would occur with the agreement's repeal would cause this to occur.) Furthermore, since the need to facilitate mass transportation in the New York metropolitan area had been a concern long before 1962, the states could not justify their action as a response to unforeseen circumstances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51677:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51682:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51682:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJ. W. Gamble was a prisoner in the Huntington Unit of the Texas prison system, also known as the “Walls Unit.” On November 9, 1973, a 600-pound bale of cotton fell on Gamble while he was working in a textile mill during a work assignment in Huntsville, Texas. He continued to work for several hours, but later became stiff and requested a pass to the unit hospital. The hospital gave Gamble a checkup for a hernia and sent him back to his cell, but later his pain became so intense that he was forced to return to the hospital. A nurse gave Gamble two pain pills, and a hospital doctor later examined him but gave him no further treatment. On November 10th, a different doctor examined Gamble, prescribed him painkillers and placed Gamble on a cell-pass cell-feed routine that mostly confined him to his cell.\nThat same doctor later took Gamble off the cell-pass cell-feed routine, concluding that he was able to engage in light work. The prison administrative office soon placed Gamble in “administrative segregation” -- essentially solitary confinement -- for refusing to work. Gamble remained in solitary confinement through January of the next year, although he complained that his back pain was as intense as on the first day he was injured. On December 6, a different doctor examined Gamble and diagnosed him with high blood pressure; the previous doctor never detected this condition. Gamble refused to work several more times over the next few months, and was repeatedly disciplined for doing so. When Gamble began experiencing pain in his chest on a regular basis, he was hospitalized and treated, but the prison denied him later requests for treatment. In all, medical personnel treated Gamble seventeen times.\nOn February 11, 1974, Gamble signed a pro se complaint alleging that the prison subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth. The district court dismissed Gamble’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed, noting that the prison failed to diagnose Gamble’s back injury by giving him an X-ray, that the prison provided no real treatment for Gamble’s back injury, and that Gamble was essentially placed in solitary confinement due to substandard medical care.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51682:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51682:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51682:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the prison’s treatment of Gamble did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Justice Marshall acknowledged that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required the Texas government to provide medical care for prisoners; he also determined, however, that a negligent or inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care did not constitute medical mistreatment under the Constitution.\nJustice Marshall then considered whether Gamble’s complaint stated a claim, construing the pleadings of his inartfully written pro se complaint liberally. He focused on the fact that medical personnel treated Gamble on seventeen occasions in a three-month period. Justice Marshall argued that the form of medical treatment was a classic example of a matter for medical judgment; as a consequence, the doctor’s decision not to order an X-ray or provide additional medication did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Thus, the Fifth Circuit erred in reversing the district court’s dismissal of Gamble’s claim.\nJustice Harry Blackmun concurred in the Court’s judgment.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that Court should have asked whether it could say with assurance and beyond any doubt that no set of facts could be proved that would entitle Gamble to relief. He questioned the Court’s decision to grant certiorari, noting that any constitutional questions presented by Gamble’s case were already resolved by other circuit courts. Finally, Justice Stevens argued that the majority improperly considered the defendants’ subjective motivations in determining whether or not their actions were crude or unusual.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51682:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51689:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51689:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn undercover police officer bought drugs from a narcotics vendor. The officer saw the vendor up close for several minutes. The officer described the vendor to another officer who obtained a photograph of Nowell A. Brathwaite and gave it to the first officer. The officer identified the Brathwaite as the narcotics vendor. At trial, the photograph was admitted as evidence and the officer again identified Brathwaite as the vendor. A jury convicted Brathwaite of possession and sale of heroin. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed. Brathwaite then filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus in district court. The district court dismissed the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the officer’s identification was unreliable and the method of identification from a single photograph was unnecessarily suggestive.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51689:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51689:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51689:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that a suggestive identification procedure does not automatically require excluding the evidence if the identification is reliable, considering the totality of the circumstances. With the circumstances in this case, the identification was reliable. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred, writing that rules to protect against convictions based on unreliable identifications are better developed by the legislative process.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing for a per se exclusionary rule for unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51689:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51690:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51690:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of \"nonintoxicating\" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and Carolyn Whitener, a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51690:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51690:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51690:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case.\nIn striking down the Oklahoma law, the Court established a new standard for review in gender discrimination cases. More demanding than the lowest standard for review -- rational basis -- but less demanding than the highest standard -- strict scrutiny, the majority articulated an in-between standard -- intermediate scrutiny.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51690:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51703:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51703:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFred Doyle was a certified teacher and employee of the Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education from 1966 until 1971. In 1969, he was elected president of the Teachers’ Association during a period of tension between the board and the Teacher’s Association. Doyle was also involved with a series of incidents beginning in 1970 where he allegedly behaved inappropriately toward students and other staff members; in one incident, Doyle made obscene gestures to two students. Finally, in February 1971, Doyle conveyed the substance of an internal memorandum regarding a proposed staff dress code to a disc jockey at WSAI, a Cincinnati radio station. The disc jockey promptly announced the dress code as a news item.\nOne month later, the superintendent of the school district recommended that the board not renew Doyle’s contract, along with the contracts of nine other teachers. The board adopted the superintendent’s recommendations. In response to Doyle’s request for an explanation, the board stated that Doyle displayed a “lack of tact in handling professional matters,” and cited both the call to the disc jockey and the obscene gestures Doyle made toward students. Doyle brought a § 1331 federal question action against the board for reinstatement with damages, claiming that the board’s refusal to rehire him violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.\nWhile the district court found that all of the incidents occurred, it held that Doyle was still entitled to reinstatement with backpay. The court concluded that Doyle’s call to the radio station was protected by the First Amendment and that the call played a substantial part in the board’s decision not to rehire Doyle, a violation of Doyle’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit affirmed in a short per curiam opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51703:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51703:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51703:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist held that the school district was not entitled to sovereign immunity, which generally extended to the states themselves and to state officials in their official capacities. He reasoned that the board was more akin to a municipal corporation, given its independent power to issue bonds and levy taxes.\nWhile acknowledging that Doyle’s claims were not defeated by the fact that he lacked tenure and that his call to the station was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the board’s consideration of the call in itself violated Doyle’s rights. He questioned the “substantial part” rule used by the district court, expressing concern that it might prevent employers from properly and thoroughly assessing employees’ performance when employers are aware of protected conduct. Instead, Justice Rehnquist held that the district court should have also determined whether the board showed by a preponderance of evidence that it would have reached the same decision if it had not considered Doyle’s phone call to the radio station.\nFinally, although the school district argued that it was not a “person” for purposes of a § 1983 claim, Justice Rehnquist declined to answer whether Doyle’s § 1331 federal question claim was limited by the terms of § 1983. He noted that Doyle demonstrated a proper federal question and claimed more than $10,000 in damages, given the potential value of his reinstatement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51703:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51713:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51713:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1971 Ora Spitler McFarlin presented a petition for sterilization of her mildly mentally disabled daughter, Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman, to Judge Harold D. Stump. Judge Stump concluded sterilization was in Sparkman’s best interests due to her mental capabilities and approved the petition. The operation was performed, although Sparkman was unaware of the true nature of the surgery. Two years later, after Sparkman married, she discovered that the sterilization explained her inability to become pregnant. Sparkman sued Judge Stump for violating her right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that although the approval of the petition by Judge Stump was erroneous, he had jurisdiction to consider the petition and was entitled to judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment and concluded that Judge Stump did not have jurisdiction to approve the petition and that he did not have judicial immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51713:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51713:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51713:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the law vested the district court judge with the power to entertain and act upon the petition for sterilization, and he is therefore immune from damages liability even if his approval of the petition was in error. The Court held that a judge could only be deprived of immunity when he acted in clear absence of jurisdiction. In this case, the court had general jurisdiction over the petition for sterilization, therefore, Judge Stump’s approval was a judicial act, and he was immunized from liability.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, in which he argued that the scope of judicial immunity was a limited liability for judicial acts. Because approval of a petition for sterilization is not a function normally performed by a judge, it is not a judicial act. In a separate dissent, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. argued that a judicial officer acted in a manner that precluded all resort to appellate or other judicial remedies and that the judge should not be entitled to immunity.\nJustice William J. Brennan Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51713:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51715:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51715:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Bank of Boston, along with two other national banks and three corporations, wished to spend money to publicize their opposition to a ballot initiative that would permit Massachusetts to implement a graduated income tax. The Attorney General of Massachusetts informed the organizations that he intended to enforce a state statute that prohibited such organizations from making contributions to influence the outcome of a vote that does not materially affect their assets and holdings. The organizations sued and argued that the statute violated their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the constitutionality of the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51715:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51715:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51715:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the right to attempt to influence the outcomes of elections is one of the primary rights the First Amendment was meant to protect. If this form of speech came from a person rather than a corporation, there would be no question about whether it was protected speech. The Court also held that its previous decisions regarding the First Amendment rights of corporations emphasized the role that such speech played in creating public discussion.\nIn his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that the Massachusetts risked stifling the speech of organizations who use the corporate form to ensure mass communication with the public. He also argued that the statute could easily interfere with the First Amendment protection of the freedom of speech, since many newspapers and other news sources are part of large media conglomerations.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the majority’s opinion vastly underestimates the importance of state regulation of competing First Amendment interests, especially given the disproportionate economic power of corporations. Since corporations are funded by the money of investors, Justice White argued that it was the state’s duty to ensure that shareholder money was being used for its primary purpose: to make money, not pursue unrelated political objectives. The statute ensured that shareholders’ money is not funding political initiatives they would not individually support. He pointed out that the statute did not prevent the individuals who make up the corporations from communicating their views to the public on an individual basis.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that corporations are, and had always been, considered artificial persons under the law, and therefore not granted the rights of natural persons. Since the right of political expression is not necessary for a corporation to function economically and could be detrimental to the overall political sphere, he argued that the statute was justified.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51715:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51717:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51717:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEdna Smith Primus was a practicing attorney who worked for a private law firm and was also affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a non-profit organization. She received no compensation for her work with ACLU. In her capacity as a lawyer at the private firm, Primus discovered women were being sterilized. Primus spoke to a group of the sterilized women to advise them of their legal rights and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit. One of these women, Mary Etta Williams, decided she wanted to sue her doctor over her sterilization. Primus then informed Williams through a letter of the ACLU’s offer of free legal representation. Shortly after, Williams visited the doctor who sterilized her, signed a release of liability, and notified Primus she no longer intended to sue.\nA few months later, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Board) filed a complaint that charged Primus with solicitation in violation of the Canons of Ethics, a code of professional conduct for lawyers. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in accordance with the Board’s panel recommendation, found Primus in violation of regulations regarding solicitation. Primus appealed and argued that the disciplinary action violated the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51717:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51717:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51717:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that South Carolina’s application of disciplinary action for the attorney’s solicitation activity violated the First Amendment’s protection of political expression and association as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, Primus’ actions were an expression of the political beliefs and civil liberty objectives of the ACLU, rather than actions personal financial gain. Therefore, reaching out to the sterilization victim was not a misrepresentation or invasion of privacy.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the states should decide which lawyers shall be admitted to or released from the Bar, and that the disciplinary action in this case does not violate the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51717:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51718:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51718:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 28, 1974, Officer Barry Headricks of the Tucson Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad allegedly arranged to purchase a quantity of heroin from Rufus Mincey. Later, Officer Headricks knocked on the door of Mincey's apartment, accompanied by nine other plainclothes officers. Mincey’s acquaintance, John Hodgman, opened the door. Officer Headricks slipped inside and quickly went to the bedroom. As the other officers entered the apartment -- despite Hodgman’s attempts to stop them -- the sound of gunfire came from the bedroom. Officer Headricks emerged from the bedroom and collapsed on the floor; he died a few hours later.\nThe other officers found Mincey lying on the floor of his bedroom, wounded and semiconscious, then quickly searched the apartment for other injured persons. Mincey suffered damage to his sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of his right leg; a doctor described him as depressed almost to the point of being comatose. A detective interrogated him for several hours at the hospital, ignoring Mincey’s repeated requests for counsel. In addition, soon after the shooting, two homicide detectives arrived at the apartment and took charge of the investigation. Their search lasted for four days, during which officers searched, photographed and diagrammed the entire apartment. They did not, however, obtain a warrant.\nThe state charged Mincey with murder, assault, and three counts of narcotics offenses. Much of the prosecution’s evidence was the product of the extensive search of Mincey’s apartment. Mincey contended at trial that this evidence was unconstitutionally taken without a warrant and that his statements were inadmissible because they were not made voluntarily. In a preliminary hearing, the court found that Mincey made the statements voluntarily. Mincey’s motion to suppress evidence taken from his apartment was also denied, and he was convicted on all charges. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was constitutional because it was a search of a murder scene, and that Mincey’s statements were admissible for impeachment purposes, reversing the murder and assault charges on other grounds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51718:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51718:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51718:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that the extensive, warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was unreasonable and unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Stewart wrote that warrantless searches were per se unreasonable with a few specific exceptions, and rejected Arizona’s argument that the search of a homicide scene was one of these exceptions.\nJustice Stewart rejected Arizona’s contention that Mincey forfeited his right to privacy in his home by shooting Officer Headricks. He pointed out that this argument assumed Mincey’s guilt, also writing that the fact of Mincey’s arrest did not remove his right to privacy in his home. Justice Stewart also rejected Arizona’s argument that the search of the homicide scene was justified by emergency circumstances or by vital public interest in prompt investigation of the scene. He wrote that there were no exigent circumstances allowing the search, and held that the seriousness of the alleged crime did not create those circumstances.\nJustice Stewart also held that Mincey’s statements were inadmissible because they were not made voluntarily. He looked to the circumstances, focusing on Mincey’s physical state during Detective Hust’s interrogation. Mincey was in the intensive care unit, barely conscious, heavily encumbered by medical equipment, and completely at Detective Hust’s mercy. Justice Stewart also focused on Mincey’s repeated statements that he did not want to speak without a lawyer.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall concurred, joined by Justice William Brennan. Justice Marshall emphasized the practical difficulties created by denying petitioners a federal habeas remedy for Fourth Amendment violations arising out of state criminal convictions.\nJustice William Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that the warrantless search was unconstitutional, but argued that the majority failed to defer to the trial court’s determination that Mincey’s statements were voluntary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51718:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51727:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51727:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor, fathered a child. A court ordered him to pay child support. Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. His application was denied by County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a state statute on the ground that Redhail owed more than $3,700 in child support.. Redhail filed a class action in federal district court against Zablocki and all Wisconsin county clerks. The court ruled in Redhail's favor. Zablocki appealed to the United States Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51727:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51727:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51727:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court held that Wisconsin's statute violated the Equal Protection Clause and reaffirmed that marriage was a fundamental right. In the majority opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court emphasized marriage as part of the right to privacy found in the Fourteenth Amendment as identified in Griswold v. Connecticut. While the state has an interest in ensuring that child support obligations were fulfilled, this statute only regulated those who wished to be married and did not justify the restriction on the right to marriage as found in Loving v. Virginia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51727:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51729:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51729:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1972, the Alaska Legislature passed the Local Hire Under State Leases Act which required \"all oil and gas leases [and other activities related to this industry] to which the state is a party\" include provisions for the preferential hiring of Alaska residents over non-residents. To administer the law, residents were issued residency cards which they were to present to potential employers when seeking jobs. Hicklin and others did not qualify for employment under the Alaska residency standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51729:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51729:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51729:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe unanimous Court held that the Alaska Local Hire Act violated the Constitution. Citing past decisions of the Court, Justice Brennan argued that the Alaska law did not meet the strict standard of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, namely, that discrimination against non-citizens of a state is only allowed when those non-citizens \"constitute a peculiar source of evil at which the statute is aimed.\" Since no evidence indicated that non-residents were the major cause of state unemployment or any other evil, there was no justification for the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51729:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51731:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51731:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPaul Lewis Hayes was charged with forgery, an offense which carried a two-to-ten-year prison sentence. During plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered to pursue a five year sentence if Hayes would plead guilty. However, the prosecutor also stated that he would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Crime Act if the defendant did not register this plea. (Hayes had two prior felony convictions on his record.) If found guilty under this law, Hayes would be imprisoned for life. Hayes did not plead guilty and the prosecutor followed through on his promise.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51731:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51731:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51731:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the defendant's due process rights were not violated in this case. Justice Stewart spent some time describing the important role that plea bargaining plays in the nation's legal system, a role that has been accepted by the Supreme Court in cases such as Blackledge v. Allison (1977) and Brady v. United States (1970). This acceptance, in turn, implies that the prosecutor has a legitimate interest in persuading a defendant to relinquish his or her right to plead not guilty. Threatening a stiffer sentence is permissible and part of \"any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas,\" Stewart declared.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51731:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51732:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51732:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York, sued their employers for depriving them of their constitutional rights. The employers required pregnant women to take unpaid leaves of absence before there was any medical reason to do so. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the forced leaves of absence in the future, as well as back pay for those that had already occurred.\nThe district court found that such policies were unconstitutional but held that the city had immunity from paying the back wages. The district court also held that the motion for an injunction was moot because the organizations removed the policy in the intervening time. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51732:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51732:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51732:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and specifically the Sherman Amendment, indicated that municipalities could be liable for the infringement of constitutional rights. Additionally, by 1871 there was a clear legislative and precedent-based history for municipal corporations — such as a school board — to be considered a “person” for the purpose of lawsuits and liability. The Court held that this liability only existed when the constitutional infringement was the direct result of an official policy.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that the Court’s decision to overrule Monroe v. Pape was an unusual but crucial one. The Court was able to rely on the precedents that established the liability of school boards for suits dealing with civil rights issues such as segregation. Given these precedents, the decision in this case allowed the Court to correct an error and create a more consistent stance on municipal liability.\nJustice John Paul Stevens concurred in the sections of the Court’s opinion that explain the decision and not in those that serve purely as background.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that there were too many precedents that supported the immunity of municipalities to summarily dismiss with this decision. Since this decision represents such a huge departure from the previous understanding of municipal immunity under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Court should require evidence “beyond doubt” that the previous decision was incorrect. The majority based its decision primarily on the debate surrounding a rejected amendment to the Act, which he argued is not strong enough evidence to overrule Monroe v. Pape. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51732:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51735:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51735:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring school hours on January 23, 1974, the principal of the Chicago Vocational High School saw Jarius Piphus, then a freshman, standing on school property sharing an irregularly shaped cigarette with another student. The principal saw a pack of the cigarettes change hands and believed he smelled marijuana. When the principal approached, the students immediately discarded the cigarette. The students were suspended for the customary 20 days for violation of the school drug policy, despite their protests that they had not been smoking marijuana. A few days later, Piphus, his mother and sister, school officials, and representatives from a legal aid clinic met to discuss the suspension, not to determine whether or not Piphus had violated the school drug policy. Piphus and his mother sued the school official in federal district court for violating Piphus’ Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $3000 in damages.\nOn September 11, 1973, Silas Brisco, a sixth grader at Clara Barton Elementary School in Chicago, received a 20-day suspension for wearing an earring to school in violation of school policy. The previous year, the school principal had enacted a policy banning earrings, as he believed they were associated with gang affiliation. When asked to remove the earring, Brisco refused and stated it was a symbol of black pride. Brisco and his mother sued the school officials in federal district court for violating Brisco’s right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and $5000 in damages.\nThe two cases were consolidated for trial and the district court held that their suspensions violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that the schools were not entitled to immunity, but the court did not award damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to reconsider questions of relief and damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51735:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51735:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51735:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is to compensate people for injuries caused by the deprivation of civil rights, which means that compensation cannot occur without proof of injury. However, the definition of injury must be adapted to fit the civil rights in question. The Court held that due process could cause distress even when conducted properly, so there must be evidence of an actual injury to justify compensation. The Court also held that proof of actual injury was not required to award nominal damages not to exceed one dollar.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the result.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51735:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51736:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51736:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Landmark Communications newspaper, The Virginian Pilot, published an article regarding the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's investigation into a state judge. The article, which was accurate, violated a Virginia law that prohibited the release of information from Commission hearings. Landmark was indicted by a grand jury, had its motion to dismiss denied by the trial court, convicted without a jury trial and fined. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Landmark's conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51736:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51736:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51736:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court ruled 7-0 reversing the Supreme Court of Virginia. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger authored the majority opinion. Speaking for six members of the Court, Burger recognized the need for confidentiality in the Commission's proceedings. However, the disclosure of information from the Commission hearing by the Pilot served a public interest consistent with New York Times v. Sullivan. Therefore, the state interest did not \"justify encroaching on First Amendment guarantees\" in the form of the criminal punishment. Justice Potter Stewart wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51736:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51746:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51746:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring a Writers Guild of America strike, certain supervisor union-member employees continued to work as representatives for collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustments for their employers, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. These union members undertook no writing functions, as the writing contract was the basis for the strike. The union charged those members for violating several strike rules for crossing the picket line, issued threats to get them to stop working and imposed hefty penalties. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the National Labor Relations Act (Act) protected the actions of the union members and that the union violated the Act by disciplining members. The Board ordered the union to cease and desist its actions against said members. The Administrative Law Judge held that unions cannot discipline a representative responsible for collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment during a strike. Respondents applied to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review, and the Board applied to enforce its order. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s ruling that only supervisory tasks were undertaken and denied enforcement of the Board’s order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51746:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51746:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51746:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, if the sanctions imposed may adversely affect the supervisor’s performance of his collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment tasks and coerce or restrain the employer. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Act may intrude upon the union’s right to resort to sanctions to effectuate a strike, but it provides for a level playing field for both negotiators during a strike..The Court also held that no writing-related work was undertaken, so the union had violated the Act by disciplining the union members in question.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he argued that barring a union from imposing sanctions against members weakens a collective strike and upsets the balance between labor and management in management’s favor. Therefore, the majority’s opinion is inconsistent with the structure of the Act. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51746:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51754:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51754:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 21, 1970, Tyler’s Auction, a furniture store in Oakland County, Michigan, caught fire shortly before midnight. The building was leased to Loren Tyler, who ran the business with Robert Tompkins. When Fire Chief See arrived on the scene, he was informed that two plastic containers of flammable liquid were found in the building. After determining that arson possibly caused the fire, See called Police Detective Webb. Webb arrived and took pictures, but the smoke and steam forced him to postpone his investigation. Around 4 a.m., the fire was extinguished and the personnel left the premises. The containers were turned over to Webb. Webb did not have a warrant for any of the entries into the building or the removal of the containers.\nThe next morning, See returned to the scene with Assistant Chief Somerville, whose job was to determine the “origin of all fires that occur in the Township.” They conducted a cursory examination and left. An hour later, Somerville returned with Webb, and the two discovered evidence of arson. The men did not have warrants for these entrances or seizures of evidence. Over the course of multiple visits beginning on February 16, Sergeant Hoffman of the Michigan State Police Arson Section conducted an investigation and secured further evidence of arson that played an important role in the trial.\nAt trial, the respondents objected to the introduction of this evidence, but the judge admitted it, and they were convicted. The Court of Appeals of the State of Michigan held that the constitutional protections against illegal searches and seizures did not pertain to arson investigations of burned premises and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the illegal searches and seizures had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51754:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51754:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51754:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that any search for administrative purposes, such as to find evidence of a crime, requires a warrant. There are circumstances that require law enforcement agents to act without a warrant, such as when firemen enter a burning building. Once in the building for that purpose, the firemen may seize evidence of arson that is in plain view without obtaining a warrant. The Court also held that determining the cause of the fire is part of a fireman’s job, so firemen may remain in a building without a warrant after a fire has been extinguished for “a reasonable amount of time” to investigate. The Court held that the initial entry and the investigation on the following morning were constitutional, but the subsequent entries and seizures of evidence were not.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the Court’s finding that the entries of February 16 and beyond were illegal searches, but disagreed with the Court on the meaning of the Warrant Clause. He argued that a warrant is necessary when there is probable cause and the search must be unannounced to be effective. If there is no reason for such a confrontation, the Warrant Clause requires that the property owner be given fair warning of the search.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the Court applied the “reasonable amount of time” criterion too broadly in this case. He argued that there was no reason to consider the reentry of the premises the following morning a continuation of the original warrantless entry. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that reasonable searches of commercial premises do not require a warrant. The record showed that Tyler did not object to the searches as they were occurring, and therefore obviously considered them reasonable. Since Tyler no longer used the building after the fire, providing him fair notice would not have served a purpose either.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51754:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51756:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51756:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing a failed attempt by the Department of Agriculture to revoke or suspend his commodity futures commission company's registration, Arthur Economou sought damages against Earl Butz and several other federal administrative officials for wrongful initiation of administrative proceedings. On appeal from an adverse district court finding of absolute immunity for state officials, the New York Court of Appeals reversed as it found that federal administrators were only entitled to qualified immunity. Butz appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51756:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51756:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51756:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 4-to-5 opinion, the Court began by noting that absent exceptional circumstances federal executive officials are only entitled to qualified immunity, since such officials must abide by constitutional and statutory scope-of-power limitations. Federal officials who perform adjudicatory, or other similar prosecutorial functions, cannot, however, be held liable for mere \"good faith\" judgment errors. The Court reasoned that the risk of making unconstitutional determinations is outweighed by the need to preserve independent judgement, through grants of absolute immunity to judges and other similarly situated decision makers. The Court concluded that the similarity between the type of decision-making required of federal prosecutors and other administrative agents is sufficiently strong to warrant an extension of absolute immunity to the latter for decisions made in the course of their official conduct.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51756:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51759:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51759:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMaryland observed oil producer-operated stations receiving favorable rates from producers and refiners. In response, Maryland passed a statute prohibiting oil producers or refiners from operating gasoline stations within the state and requiring producers and refiners extend temporary price cuts to the stations they supplied. Exxon challenged the statute in Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, which ruled the statute invalid. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51759:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51759:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51759:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 7-1 decision, the Court affirmed the Maryland Court of Appeals. Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens cited Ferguson v. Skrupa establishing that the purpose of the judiciary is not to \"weigh the wisdom of legislation,\" and therefore did not concern due process. Additionally, since all gasoline sold in Maryland came from out-of-state refineries, Maryland's statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The court acknowledged that while the price-cut provision conflicted with the purposes of the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts, the hypothetical situations of price discrimination presented were \"speculative\" and insufficient to invalidate the act. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not take part in consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51759:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51763:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51763:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEdmund Foley applied for a position as a New York state trooper. Although Foley was a legally admitted resident alien, state officials refused to permit him to take the examination. New York authorities relied on a statute providing that \"no person shall be appointed to the. . .state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United States.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51763:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51763:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51763:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the states had an \"historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions\" and that the New York statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Noting that states need only to show some rational relationship between a valid state interest and a classification involving aliens, the Court held that the police function was \"one of the basic functions of government\" and thereby the province of actual United States citizens.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51763:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51767:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51767:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBallew was found in violation of a misdemeanor for exhibiting an obscene motion picture film. In the Criminal Court of Fulton County, a jury of five persons was selected and sworn to hear the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51767:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51767:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51767:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court found that a trial by jury of less than six members violated the accused's right to a trial by jury as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Blackmun reasoned that small juries foster poor group deliberation. Group memory of the details of testimony, the ease with which group compromises can be made, and the desire of the group to be self-critical and reflective are all hindered as the size of the jury decreases. Blackmun also relied on statistical studies to claim that the risk of jury error increased with smaller juries.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51767:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51775:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51775:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1967, Congress appropriated funds to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to build the Tellico Dam. In 1973 Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which protected certain species classified as “endangered”. The Secretary of the Interior declared the Snail Darter endangered. The area of the Tellico Dam was its “critical habitat”. Although the multi-million dollar project was almost completed, the project predated the ESA, and Congress continued to appropriate funds to the project after the ESA passed, Hiram Hill sued to enjoin the completion of the Dam in order to protect the Snail Darter. He argued that completing and opening the dam would violate the ESA by causing the extinction of the snail darter. The district court refused to grant the injunction and dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to issue a permanent injunction against any activities that would modify or destroy the Snail Darter’s critical habitat.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51775:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51775:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51775:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the majority opinion affirming the injunction. The Supreme Court held that Congress’ continued appropriation of funds did not imply that the Dam project was exempt from the ESA. The operation of the Tellico Dam would wipe out the Snail Darter's habitat, so an injunction was the proper remedy. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissent, stating that the ESA does not apply to any project that is completed or substantially completed when the threat to the endangered species arose. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent, arguing that the ESA did not prohibit the district court from refusing to grant an injunction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51775:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51778:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51778:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1970, Congress imposed an annual registration tax on all civil aircraft that fly in the navigable airspace of the United States. The state of Massachusetts owned and utilized a helicopter for the purpose of patrolling highways and fulfilling other police duties. When Massachusetts refused to pay the tax, the federal government collected it from the state's accounts, plus interest and penalties. Massachusetts then sought a refund of the money collected.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51778:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51778:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51778:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that so long as charges did not discriminate against state functions, were based on fair approximations of uses of the system of navigable airspace, and were structured to produce revenues that did not exceed the total cost of the benefits to be supplied to national airsystem, there could be no basis for claims that the National Government was \"using its taxing powers to control, unduly interfere with, or destroy\" Massachusetts' ability to perform \"essential services.\" The Court emphasized its reluctance to enlarge the scope of state immunity from federal taxation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51778:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51784:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51784:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral faculty members of the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School expressed dissatisfaction with the clinical performance of Charlotte Horowitz, a medical student. The Council of Evaluation (Council), a faculty-student body that recommends various actions including probation and dismissal, recommended Horowitz only advanceto her last year on a probationary status. In the middle of the following academic year, the Council concluded that Horowitz should not be considered for graduation at the end of the year and would be dropped as a student unless the Council saw a radical improvement. Horowitz failed to show improvement, her surgery rotations rated “low satisfactory,” and the Council recommended dismissal from the university. A committee composed solely of faculty members and the Dean, the final decision-makers, approved the decision. Horowitz sued and claimed that the procedure leading to her dismissal violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court concluded that Horowitz had been afforded all the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision by holding that Horowitz had not been afforded procedural due process prior.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51784:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51784:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51784:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The court held that the procedures leading to the Horowitz’s dismissal for academic deficiencies did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Horowitz was fully informed of the faculty dissatisfaction with her clinical progress and the threat of postponing her graduation and continued enrollment. The Court held that a hearing before the school’s decision-making body is not required for dismissals for academic deficiencies.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he added that Horowitz was dismissed for academic deficiencies rather than for disciplinary reasons, and that in these circumstances she was accorded due process.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the various meetings about Horowitz’s academic performance met the standards of procedural due process. However, the procedure of dismissal for academic reasons, rather than disciplinary reasons was arbitrary. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, with whom Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined, wrote that Horowitz received the procedural process due under the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the Court should not decide what the further appropriate procedures are required in graduate school dismissals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51784:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51786:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51786:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Ohio law required that individuals found guilty of aggravated murder be given the death penalty. The death penalty was mandatory unless: 1) the victim had induced the offense, 2) the offense was committed under duress or coercion, or 3) the offense was a product of mental deficiencies. Sandra Lockett, who had encouraged and driven the getaway car for a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pawnshop owner, was found guilty under the statute and sentenced to death.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51786:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51786:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51786:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required, in all but the rarest capital cases, that sentencers not be precluded from considering a range of mitigating factors before imposing the death penalty. These factors included any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense proffered as a reason for a sentence less than death. The Court held that the Ohio statute did not permit the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51786:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51789:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51789:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe New York City Landmarks Preservation Law of 1965 empowered the city to designate certain structures and neighborhoods as \"landmarks\" or \"landmark sites.\" Penn Central, which owned the Grand Central Terminal (opened in 1913), was not allowed to construct a multistory office building above it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51789:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51789:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51789:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the restrictions imposed did not prevent Penn Central from ever constructing above the terminal in the future. New York's objection was to the nature of the proposed construction and not to construction in general implemented to \"enhance\" the Terminal. Preventing the construction of a 50-plus story addition above the station was a reasonable restriction substantially related to the general welfare of the city.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51789:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51790:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51790:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBeth Israel Hospital, a nonprofit hospital, had a rule that prohibited employees from soliciting and distributing literature except in sanctioned areas such as certain employee locker rooms and restrooms. An employee distributing a pro-union newsletter in the employee cafeteria was informed that she had violated the rule and was warned of possible dismissal if she continued. The union filed a claim against the hospital under the National Labor Relations Act, which in 1974 was extended to employees of nonprofit healthcare institutions. After a hearing before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Administrative Law Judge, who resolves disputes between government agencies and persons affected by the decision of the agencies, held that the hospital cannot interfere with the employees' rights and must rescind its written rule prohibiting distribution of union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffee shop. The hospital appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the part of the lower court's ruling that called for rescinding the rule that excluded union activity in eating facilities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51790:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51790:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51790:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that, since 1974, the Act provided employees of nonprofit healthcare institutions with the right to self-organize and bargain collectively, including the right to communicate about the topic at the jobsite. However, an employer may curb that right by showing that special circumstances necessitate the prohibition of communication in order to maintain production or discipline. In this case, the Court held that the communication and organizing in the cafeteria and the coffee shop did not interfere with patient care sufficiently to justify enforcement of the hospital's rule.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the Board's broad order may not fully appreciate the delicate nature of a hospital's communal space and the patients' need to recover in a stress-free environment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Lewis F. Powell joined in the concurrence. In his separate concurrence, Justice Powell criticized the Board's use of the precedent case, Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, in reaching its decision. He asserted that Republic's holding that solicitation during work hours were presumptively invalid was inapplicable in the context of this case given the distinct nature of a hospital as a recovery place and also that the employees lacked meeting space within the hospital. Chief Justice Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51790:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51793:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51793:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLitigation challenging the conditions in the Arkansas prison system began in 1969. In evaluating the diet and sleeping arrangements of the inmates, the physical condition of cells, and the behavior of prison guards (some of whom were inmates who had been issued guns), a District Court called the conditions which inmates were forced to face \"a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world.\" This case involved a challenge to the practice of \"punitive isolation\" in Arkansas prisons which was often done for indiscriminate periods of time in crowded windowless cells.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51793:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51793:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51793:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that punitive isolation for longer than thirty days in Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. Justice Stevens conceded that isolation in and of itself was not necessarily unconstitutional and may in fact serve an important, legitimate interest in administering a prison. However, when taken as a whole, continued Stevens, the conditions in Arkansas's prisons, combined with the severe risks to an inmate's health and safety which accompanied confinement in isolation, did constitute cruel and unusual punishment. \"A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of 'gruel' might be tolerated for a few days and be intolerably cruel for weeks or months,\" Stevens concluded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51793:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51797:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51797:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn its licensing system for elk-hunters, the state of Montana required nonresidents to pay a substantially higher fee than residents for a hunting permit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51797:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51797:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51797:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court affirmed the right of Montana to charge higher fees for out-of-state elk hunters. Justice Blackmun found that the Privileges and Immunities Clause only applied to activities which bear \"on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity.\" Since elk hunting is a recreational activity and not fundamental to the survival of nonresidents of Montana, Blackmun argued that it did not fall within the scope of the protections guaranteed by the Constitution. \"Equality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union,\" he concluded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51797:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51798:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51798:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA catalytic converter is a device that removes pollutants during the refining of oil. In order to function effectively, it must operate within certain temperature and pressure ranges (“alarm limits”) that fluctuate during the conversion process. Dale R. Flook applied for a patent on a method of adjusting alarm limits in response to changes that occur during the catalytic conversion process.. Because the only novel feature of the method was a mathematical formula, the patent examiner determined that the method did not amount to a discovery eligible for patent protection and rejected the application. The Board of Appeals for the Patent and Trademark Office sustained the rejection. On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed and held that the limited application of the method did not “wholly pre-empt” the formula from the public domain, and therefore it was eligible for patent protection.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51798:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51798:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51798:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, absent some other novel or inventive concept in the individual’s application for a patent, activity that results from the solution of a formula or algorithm cannot transform the formula from an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he argued that the method for updating alarm limits did not lose its eligibility for patent protection merely because one step in the method was not patentable. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined the dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51798:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51800:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51800:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince its first state Constitution in 1796, Tennessee has had a statute that prohibited ministers from serving as legislators. In 1977, Paul A. McDaniel, a Baptist minister, filed as a candidate for the state constitutional convention. Another candidate, Selma Cash Paty, sued for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified. The Chancery Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. McDaniel’s name remained on the ballot and he was elected. After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Chancery Court and held that the statute did not restrict any expression of religious belief. The court held that the state interest in maintaining the separation of church and state was sufficient to justify the restrictions of the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51800:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51800:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51800:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that the statute made the ability to exercise civil rights conditional on the surrender of religious rights and therefore violated the First Amendment protection of the free exercise of religion as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court hesitated to strike down a statute that had such a long and vital national history, Tennessee could not prove that clergy participation was dangerous to the modern political processes.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment. He argued that the Tennessee statute essentially established a test of religious conviction in order to be eligible for office that disqualified anyone with a strong enough belief to join the clergy. Government imposition of the burden to choose between one’s religious beliefs and the desire to seek office is an unconstitutional restriction on the free exercise of religion. He argued that the Establishment Clause does not give the government the power to discriminate against religious persons seeking or holding office. Justice Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.\n Justice Potter Stewart separately concurred in the judgment, and wrote that this case was covered by the ruling in Torcaso v. Watkins, where the Court held that states may not condition public office on any type of religious belief.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. He argued that, rather than violating the First Amendment protection of the free exercise of religion, the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the statute is specific to ministers, it implies that ministers are less able to keep outside interests from interfering with their governmental service than anyone else. Tennessee was not able to prove the necessity of this restriction.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51800:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51803:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51803:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChannel Islands National Monument is a nationally designated area off the coast of California, including Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands. In 1949, President Harry S Truman issued a proclamation that extended the boundary of the National Monument within one nautical mile of the islands.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51803:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51803:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51803:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart determined that under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 after the 1947 United States v. California decision, Congress specified that the lands in dispute were under California's control.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51803:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51804:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51804:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1971, officers of the Palo Alto, California, Police Department obtained a warrant to search the main office of The Stanford Daily, the student newspaper at the university. It was believed that The Stanford Daily had pictures of a violent clash between a group of protesters and the police; the pictures were needed to identify the assailants. The officers searched The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets, but no materials were removed from the office. This case was decided together with Bergna v. Stanford Daily, involving the district attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the obtaining of the search warrant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51804:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51804:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51804:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the \"third party\" search of the newsroom did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that such searches, accompanied by warrants, were legitimate when it had been \"satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the premises.\" The Court also found that the Framers of the Constitution \"did not forbid warrants where the press was involved.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51804:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51811:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51811:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEstelle Jacobs was accused of threatening to harm a man who owed a substantial gambling debt to her employer, a collections agency. Unbeknownst to her, the phone call in which she made the threat was recorded. The Federal Bureau of Investigations contacted Jacobs and informed of her Miranda rights during questioning about the incident. About nine months later, Jacobs was called before a grand jury via a subpoena regarding the threatening statements she had previously made. She did not have an attorney present, but she was read her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. During her trial, Jacobs denied having made the phone call, the tape of the recorded phone call was played, and she was subsequently indicted. The district court dismissed the indictment and held that a witness in a trial who is a potential defendant should be informed of that potential upon taking the witness stand and is entitled to full Miranda warnings under those circumstances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51811:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51811:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51811:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. In a per curiam decision, the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51811:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51820:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51820:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue, \"Filthy Words.\" Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. The station warned listeners that the monologue included \"sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some.\" The FCC received a complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51820:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51820:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51820:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in determining whether to invoke sanctions. \"[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51820:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51823:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51823:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKQED Inc., owner of a number of licensed television and radio broadcasting stations, requested permission to inspect and take pictures of the Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita. KQED sought to investigate a recent suicide that had occurred at the facility. Houchins, the Sheriff of Alameda County, denied access to the media.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51823:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51823:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51823:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the First Amendment granted no special right of access to the press to government-controlled sources of information. The Court reasoned that the importance of acceptable prison conditions and the media's role of providing information afforded \"no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the public or the media to enter these institutions. . .and take moving and still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51823:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51831:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51831:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 13, 1973, Shirley Brooks and her family were evicted from their apartment in Mount Vernon, New York. The city marshal arranged for Flagg Bros., Inc. to store the Brooks' furniture in their warehouse, and informed Ms. Brooks of the cost. Although she objected, she allowed the workers to remove her furniture to the warehouse. On August 25, 1973, after a series of disputes about the charges, Ms. Brooks received a letter from Flagg Bros., Inc. informing her that her furniture would be sold if she did not settle her account within 10 days.\nMs. Brooks initiated a class action in district court and alleged that such a sale as allowed by a New York statute would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The American Warehousemen’s Association, the International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses, and the Attorney General of New York intervened as defendants to defend the statute in question. The district court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51831:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51831:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51831:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the decision of the storage facility to sell the goods could not be considered a state action, and therefore did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. To show that they had a claim worthy of relief, the respondents must have given evidence that they were denied a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and that Flagg Bros., Inc. was operating as the State of New York. The Court held that there was no deprivation of a Constitutional right, as the Constitution only protects against state seizure of property, not that of private actors. The Court also held that the statute that allows the sale to happen does not imply any state action, so Flagg Bros., Inc. was not acting on behalf of the state.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent and argued that the statute allowed for unconstitutional discrimination against the poor, who were unable to pay the required fee in order to prevent the sale of their belongings. He also argued that the Court’s determination ignored the realities of the state’s role in eviction and subsequent legal procedures.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the company’s right to conduct the sale derived from the state, and not the original property owners, so the sale must be held to the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued that state authorization of a “nonconsensual resolution of conflict between debtor and creditor” is the type of action that the Due Process Clause was meant to prevent. Justice Byron R. White and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not take part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51831:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51833:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51833:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1974, Minnesota adopted legislation which required private employers to pay a fee if they terminated employee pension plans or if they moved their offices from the state, leaving insufficient funds to cover pensions for ten-year employees. This law affected Allied Structural Steel as the company began closing offices in Minnesota. Even though the employees affected by the closing were not entitled to pensions under the terms of their employment with the company, according to the Minnesota law, they were. The company was ordered to pay approximately $185,000 to comply with the statute's provisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51833:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51833:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51833:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that the Minnesota law did violate the Constitution as it \"substantially altered\" the provisions of pension agreements which Allied Steel had with its employees. Citing the importance that the Framers placed on private contracts in the conduct of business, Justice Stewart found that the act's effect was \"severe\" as it nullified terms of t he company's obligations to its employees and imposed an \"unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts.\" Furthermore, the law was narrowly targeted at employers who had decided to establish employee pension plans, and it did not seek to deal with broad economic and social problems.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51833:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51844:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51844:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA New Jersey law prohibited the importation of most \"solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51844:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51844:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51844:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the law violated the principle of nondiscrimination as it treated out-of-state waste differently than waste produced within the state. Since New Jersey could not demonstrate a legitimate reason for distinguishing between foreign and domestically produced waste, it was clear to the Court that the state had \"overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for protectionist reasons.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51844:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51849:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51849:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1972, twenty one states were members of the Multistate Tax Compact, a body formed by states to assist them in formulating and administering tax law relating to multistate businesses. The Compact had not received congressional approval.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51849:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51849:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51849:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found no constitutional violation. The Compact did not enhance state political power at the expense of the United States; it not confer to states powers which they did not already possess; it did not involve any delegation of state power to the Commission. Furthermore, argued Justice Powell, each state was free to withdraw from the group at any time.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51849:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51852:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51852:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 1, 1975, three men entered a restaurant in Little Rock, Arkansas, and proceeded to rob and terrorize the five employees. The two female employees were raped. The ensuing police investigation resulted in the arrest of the Winston Holloway, Ray Lee Welch, and Gary Don Campbell. On July 29, 1975, the three defendants were each charged with one count of robbery and two counts of rape. On August 5, the trial court appointed Harold Hall to serve as counsel for all three defendants, and the date was set for their consolidated trial. Prior to the trial, Hall moved for the court to appoint separate counsel for each defendant because he felt, based on information from the defendants, that there would be a conflict of interest in representing their cases together. The trial court declined to appoint separate counsel. Hall renewed the motion before the jury was empaneled, and the court again denied it. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51852:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51852:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51852:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that a single lawyer representing multiple defendants does not automatically deprive the defendants of their rights, but it does if there is a conflict of interest. Because Hall showed that a conflict of interest was present, the trial court should have taken steps to appoint separate counsel or ensured that the risk of conflict was not great enough to require such action. The trial court did neither, so the defendants were deprived of their Sixth Amendment rights. The Court also held that, in such situations, the reversal of the conviction is automatic.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. argued that the trial court’s failure to investigate the defense counsel’s claim that the interests of his clients conflict does not rise to level of a constitutional violation requiring reversal of the verdict. He argued that the majority’s opinion is based on the assumption that the jury will be prejudiced rather than on any evidence of a conflict. Justice Harry A. Blackmun and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51852:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51853:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51853:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAllan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for \"qualified\" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51853:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51853:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51853:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51853:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51873:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51873:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA class of female employees of the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power sued the department because they were forced to make larger contributions to the employee pension plan than their male colleagues. The department determined that, because women live longer than men, the women cost the company more in retirement benefits than the men and so must pay more into the plan. Since the employee contribution was taken directly out of the employee’s paycheck, the female employees brought home less than the men.\nThe women sued the company for violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sought an injunction against future payments as well as restitution for the past contributions. While this action was pending in district court, the California legislature passed a law prohibiting companies from forcing women to contribute to the retirement fund more than men. The department changed its payment plan effective January 1, 1975. The district court, however, found that the original plan violated the Civil Rights Act and ordered a refund for the excess payment. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51873:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51873:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51873:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the company’s policy was based on aggregate numbers that are not necessarily true for individuals, which violates the Civil Rights Act prohibition of individual discrimination based purely on gender. Although the department argued that that the policy was based on longevity rather than gender, the Court held that many different factors influence longevity and the payment differential was solely gender-based. The Court held that the department was not liable for back pay because the potential that such a holding would influence other companies to change their policies did not offset the potential negative impact on the economy.\n In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the decision of the majority departed from the precedents set by Geduldig v. Aiello and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert without sufficient reasoning. He concurred in the part of the majority’s decision that held the department not liable for back pay.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that Congress did not intend the Civil Rights Act to impede a business’ ability to create policies based on statistically sound longevity data. Since any individual woman is statistically likely to live longer than any individual man, the policy did not discriminate against individuals solely on the basis of sex but rather based on the likelihood of longevity. He concurred in the majority’s decision that held the department not liable for back pay. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined the dissent.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part. He concurred in the majority’s decision that held that the department’s policy violated the Civil Rights Act, but he argued that the department should be held liable for back pay. The district court held the department liable, and the majority’s decision did not find any flaws in the district court’s reasoning.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51873:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51874:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51874:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCanadian Javelin, Ltd. (CJL) allegedly distributed false and misleading press releases regarding its business activities. In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercised its authority ostensibly under § 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, suspending the trading of securities of the company for 10 days. The SEC exercised this authority repeatedly, resulting in suspension of the trading of the stock of CJL for over a year.\nSamuel H. Sloan owned 13 shares of CJL and was engaged in \"substantial\" purchases and short sales of the stock when it was suspended. He filed a lawsuit against the SEC alleging, among other claims, that it exceeded its authority under § 12(k) to issue consecutive suspension orders. Notably, Sloan represented himself in the courts below, as well as before the US Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51874:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51874:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51874:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe issue presented is not moot because the source of the injury \"is capable of repetition, yet evading review.\" On the merits, § 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not grant the Commission authority to issue a series of summary orders that would suspend trading in a stock beyond the initial 10-day period, absent additional circumstances warranting such action. Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion that was unanimous as to the judgment.\nAs to the question of mootness, the Court's precedent provides that a case is not moot when \"(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.\" Because of the historic practices of CJL, of which Sloan still owns stock, it remains likely that the SEC will again suspend trading of its shares, creating a \"reasonable expectation of recurring injury\" to Sloan.\nAs to the merits, the Court first looked to the language of § 12(k), which provides that the SEC may \"summarily to suspend trading in any security . . . for a period not exceeding ten days.\" The Court found that the SEC's interpretation of this provision as permitting redetermination every 10 days under a single set of circumstances was \"not the most logical or logical one.\" Moreover, the power to suspend, effectively indefinitely, the trading of a company's stock is \"an awesome power, with a potentially devastating impact on the issuer, its shareholders, and other investors.\" Such power may only arise from a \"clear mandate from Congress,\" which § 12(k) does not provide. The Court concluded that \"Congress did not intend the Commission to have the power to extend the length of suspensions under § 12(k) at all, much less to repeatedly extend such suspensions without any hearing.\"\nJustice William Brennan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thurgood Marshall joined. Justice Harry Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51874:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51875:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51875:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn February 1974, 18-years-olds Carol McClintock and Wanda Lou Holbert were seriously injured when an uninsured motorist hit the vehicle McClintock was driving in their hometown of Montville, Ohio. When Albert Ohralik, a local attorney, learned of the accident, he visited McClintock in the hospital and offered to represent her in exchange for a portion of the proceeds collected from her insurer. Ohralik also approached Holbert at her home and obtained her oral assent to representation, which he secretly tape-recorded. Both women eventually discharged Ohralik and filed grievances with the local bar association, which in turn filed a formal complaint against Ohralik with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio (Board). The Board found that Ohralik violated provisions of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility that banned a lawyer’s in-person solicitation of employment to a non-lawyer and publicly reprimanded him. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Ohralik’s claim that his conduct was protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and increased the sanction against Ohralik to indefinite suspension.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51875:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51875:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51875:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that a state may constitutionally discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person and for financial gain under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the state has a right to prevent. The Court further held that the state need not show actual harm or injury to the solicited clients to sustain a disciplinary action. Unlike other forms of advertising concerning the terms and availability of legal services, in-person solicitation often exerts pressure upon and requires an immediate response from the recipient, without providing time for comparison or reflection. Because the Court held that a state has a particularly strong interest in preventing aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, and overreach, a state may adopt an outright ban in order to maintain standards in the legal profession.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt as to whether the state’s interest in prohibiting even honest, unpressured commercial solicitation justified the restriction on the free flow of information. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed that Ohio acted within the limits prescribed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but argued that the Court should grant even greater leeway in the ability of state bar associations to regulate the conduct of their members.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51875:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51878:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51878:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSusan Norwick and Tarja Dachinger were both foreign nationals who had resided in the United States for many years and were married to United States citizens. Both were eligible for citizenship, but had refused to apply. Both had applied for certification as public school teachers in New York State. New York law prohibited the certification of non-citizen teachers who had not sought citizenship. Both applications were denied certification solely on that ground. Norwick filed suit in federal district court, which Dachinger later joined. The three-judge district court ruled in their favor, arguing that the statute as \"overbroad.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51878:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51878:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51878:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion, the Court reversed the District Court and held that states could be justified in barring aliens from certain positions in government. Justice Lewis F. Powell's majority opinion asserted the state's interest in charging teachers with \"an obligation to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes, regardless of the subject taught.\" The statute furthered this interest, in that it affected only non-citizens who did not want to seek citizenship. This interest satisfied the \"rational relationship\" required by _Foley v. Connelie", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51878:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51882:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51882:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn December 9, 1977, El Paso Police Officers Venegas and Sotelo were cruising in a patrol car. At 12:45 p.m., they observed Zackary C. Brown and another man leaving an alley in opposite directions. The alley was in an area known for a high incidence of drug traffic. The officers believed the situation was suspicious and stopped Brown for questioning. They asked Brown to identify himself, and he refused and asserted that they had no cause to stop him. When the officers frisked him, they did not find any drugs or other suspicious material on Brown. He was arrested for violation of a Texas statute that made it illegal for a person to refuse to identify himself when a police officer lawfully requests it. Brown was taken to the county jail, where he did identify himself, and was charged with the violation.\nBrown was convicted in municipal court and fined. He then exercised his right to a trial in the county court and moved for dismissal on the grounds that the Texas statue was unconstitutional under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The motion was denied and he was convicted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51882:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51882:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51882:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment covers all police seizures, even those as brief as preventing a person from walking away. The Fourth Amendment requires that such seizures be based on specific and objective facts that create a compelling public interest in the seizure that outweighs the individual’s expectation of privacy. In this case, the Court held that the police officers lacked any reasonable suspicion based on objective fact to allow them to detain Brown and question him. Since the seizure was not lawful, the Texas statute requiring Brown to identify himself did not apply.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51882:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51884:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51884:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnthony Herbert was a retired Army officer who served in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he accused superior officers of covering up atrocities that American troops had committed. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) produced and broadcast a documentary of the petitioner's story. Herbert sued for libel arguing that the program falsely and maliciously portrayed his character, causing him financial loss. In order to prove libel under the \"actual malice\" standard, Herbert's attorneys deposed Lando as well as the producer and the editor of the documentary, attempting to deduce the editorial decisions that were made during the production of the program.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51884:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51884:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51884:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the privilege not to answer editorial inquiries is not absolute. Justice White argued that shielding editorial decision-making from inquiry would \"substantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice,\" a burden which was already substantial in the Court's view. White was confident that investigations into this process for falsehood or libelous reporting would not lead to self-censorship of stories that are documented and true; \"only reckless error will be discouraged,\" which would not threaten the constitutionally protected freedom of the press.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51884:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51886:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51886:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nScott was convicted in a bench trial of shoplifting and fined $50. The statute applicable to his case set the maximum penalty at a $500 fine and/or one year in jail.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51886:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51886:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51886:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA plurality held that Illinois had not violated the Constitution. Writing for four of the justices, Rehnquist clarified the Court's holding in Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) and argued that states could only sentence a convicted criminal to imprisonment if that person had been represented by counsel. Since Scott was not sentenced to imprisonment, even though the applicable statute allowed for it, the state was not obligated to provide counsel. Rehnquist called that line of reasoning \"the central premise of Argersinger.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51886:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51888:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51888:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA New York State police investigator bought two films from Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.’s Adult Store. After viewing the videos, he took them to the Town Justice, who determined that the films violated state obscenity laws. The Justice issued a warrant authorizing a search of the store and seizure of other copies of the two films. Because the investigator said that more obscene materials would be found and asked the Justice to accompany him to the search, the Justice included in the warrant, “the following items which the Court independently has determined to be possessed in violation” and left it open ended so any items found at the store could be added later. During the search, the store’s clerk was arrested. The Justice viewed several videos, books, and other materials and determined that they were obscene. The police seized all of these materials, took and inventory of the items and then filled out the open ended warrant. Before trial, the store owner moved to suppress the seized evidence as violating the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge denied the motion and the store owner plead guilty. The Supreme Court of the State of New York affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York denied leave to appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51888:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51888:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51888:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes as to the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of a unanimous court, reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not permit a search with an open-ended warrant that left the determination of what was obscene fully in the discretion of the officials conducting the search. The Court also held that the search was not justified under the theory that the store owner had no legitimate expectation of privacy because the items were displayed at a store open to the general public. Merely inviting the public to enter does not give consent to wholesale searches and seizures that do not conform to the Fourth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51888:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51889:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51889:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA West Virginia statute made it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without approval of juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51889:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51889:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51889:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that governmental attempts to restrict the publication of truthful information \"seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.\" As long as the information is lawfully obtained, as it was in this case involving a shooting at a junior high school, the state cannot restrict a newspaper from publishing a juvenile offender's name unless the restriction serves a substantial state interest. No such interest was present in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51889:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51897:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51897:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBurch was found guilty by a nonunanimous six-member jury of showing obscene films. The court imposed a suspended prison sentence of two consecutive seven-month terms and fined him $1,000.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51897:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51897:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51897:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that convictions by the nonunanimous six-member jury violated the Constitution. Tracing the development of the Court's considerations of this issue, Justice Rehnquist indicated that Burch's case sat at the \"intersection of our decisions concerning jury size and unanimity.\" Rehnquist relied on the Court's holding in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) and the practices in several of the states to find against convictions by nonunanimous juries of six members. Only two of the states that used six-member juries in trials for petty offenses allowed verdicts to be less than unanimous. This \"near uniform judgment of the Nation\" of the inappropriateness of this jury arrangement, argued Rehnquist, provided the Court with a \"useful guide\" in determining constitutionally allowable jury practices.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51897:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51902:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51902:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter he collided with a motorcycle in Acton, Massachusetts, Donald Montrym was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). A state court later dismissed the DUI charges, but the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles suspended Montrym’s driver’s license for ninety days because Montrym had refused to take a breathalyzer test at the time of his arrest. Montrym filed a class-action lawsuit in federal district court alleging that the statute that required drivers to submit to breathalyzer tests violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not provide for a pre-suspension hearing. The district court found in favor of Montrym and ordered the Registrar to return the plaintiffs’ licenses. The Registrar appealed directly to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51902:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51902:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51902:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the lower court erred in finding that the Massachusetts statute deprived Montrym of his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process. In the Court’s view, Massachusetts’ interest in highway safety and administrative efficiency outweighed Montrym’s interest in his driver’s license. Furthermore, the possibility for a prompt, post-suspension hearing before the Registrar minimized the risk of erroneous deprivation.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he characterized the statute as inducing drivers to submit to a breath analysis test, which in turn provided the police with credible evidence of drunk driving. He argued that the interest in preventing drunk driving did not trump an individual’s right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension of his driver’s license. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51902:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51912:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51912:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLocal police in Little Rock, Arkansas received a tip that an individual would be arriving at the airport with a suitcase containing a significant quantity of marijuana. Upon arriving, the suspect retrieved his suitcase and left in a taxi. The police officers pursued and stopped the taxi, and ordered the driver to open the trunk which revealed the suitcase in question. The police opened the suitcase without obtaining permission from its owner and found nearly ten pounds of marijuana.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51912:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51912:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51912:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile. In this case, Justice Powell applied the principle which the Court had identified in United States v. Chadwick (1977), namely, that a locked footlocker which had been loaded into a vehicle could not be opened without a warrant. Since the Little Rock police officers had exclusive control of the luggage at the time of their search, there was no danger that its contents could have been tampered with or removed before a valid warrant could have been obtained. Powell concluded that since \"luggage is a common repository of one's personal effects\" it is \"associated with the expectation of privacy.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51912:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51913:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51913:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York City police suspected Theodore Payton of murdering a gas station manager. The police forcibly entered Payton's home thinking he was there (he was not) and found evidence connecting Payton to the crime, which was introduced at Payton's trial. The police lacked an arrest warrant when they entered his home. However, they acted under a New York law allowing police to enter a private residence to make a felony arrest without a warrant. At trial, Payton unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. State courts upheld. In the companion case, victims identified Obie Riddick in June 1973 for robberies in 1971. Police learned of his whereabouts in 1974. Without a warrant, they knocked on his door, entered his residence and arrested him. A search for weapons revealed illegal drugs. He was indicted on narcotics charges but sought the suppression of the evidence based on a warrantless entry. The trial judge concluded that the entry was authorized by the New York law and that the search was therefore permissible. Riddick was convicted. The appeals court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51913:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51913:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51913:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the 6 to 3 majority, held that the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, \"prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest.\" Warrantless arrests and searches went to the core of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy in a citizen's dwelling. This protection was too important to be violated on the basis of a police officer's on-the-spot decision regarding probable cause. In the absence of special circumstances, a search of a residence is permissible only after a finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate issuing a search warrant. Justice Byron R. White, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist, dissented. White maintained that common law and practice prior to and at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted did not limit a police officer's inherent power to arrest or search.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51913:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51916:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51916:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case supplements Elkins v. Moreno, in which Juan Carlos Moreno and other nonimmigrant aliens residing in Maryland sued the University of Maryland for failing to grant them in-state status for the purpose of tuition. They alleged violations of various federal laws and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found in favor of Moreno and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In Elkins v. Moreno, the Supreme Court held that, since the University of Maryland policy is based on showing proof of domicile in the state, the University has no reason to deny in-state tuition if the proper proof can be shown.\nOn June 23, 1978, two months after the decision in Elkins, the University of Maryland adopted a resolution affirming their denial of the in-state tuition rate. The Attorney General of Maryland then requested that the Supreme Court put the case back on the docket for further argument given the new resolution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51916:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51916:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51916:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the University of Maryland’s resolution effectively changed the constitutional basis for consideration. In the previous case, the issue was linked to whether the nonimmigrant aliens could be domiciled in the state. In view of the new resolution, the domicile issue is no longer paramount. The Court held that there were new issues that must be considered by a district court before the case makes its way to the Supreme Court docket.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51916:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51925:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51925:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCurtis Parham's child and the child's mother were killed in a car accident. Parham was never married to the child's mother, but he signed the child's birth certificate and provided financial support. Parham never legitimated his child as available under Georgia law. After the child's death, Parham attempted to bring a wrongful death action on behalf of his illegitimate child. A Georgia statute barred fathers from bringing wrongful death actions on behalf of illegitimate children. The trial court held that the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, finding that the classification involved was reasonably related to legitimate state interests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51925:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51925:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51925:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision the Court held that the law does not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process clause. Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the majority deciding that the statute did not invidiously discriminate because legitimacy is not an immutable characteristic. The law is also rationally related to the state interest in avoiding the difficulties in proving paternity of illegitimate children in wrongful death actions. Justice Lewis F. Powell concurred in the judgment but felt the proper level of scrutiny was that a law must be substantially related to an important governmental interest.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a dissent stating that the statute discriminates on the basis of sex by requiring unmarried fathers to take additional measures not required of unwed mothers in order to prove the legitimacy of his parenthood. Justice William J. Brennan, Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51925:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51927:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51927:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam and Lillian Orr were divorced in February 1974. William Orr was ordered to pay monthly alimony of $1,240. Lillian Orr sued William Orr for lack of payments in July 1976. Alabama's alimony statutes only required husbands to pay alimony, but not wives. William Orr challenged these statutes as unconstitutional. The Lee County Circuit Court ruled against him. The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama affirmed this ruling. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted a writ of certiorari that was later dismissed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51927:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51927:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51927:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court established its jurisdiction over the question and ruled that Alabama's statutes were unconstitutional. In writing for the majority, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. maintained that under the Equal Protection Clause, \"classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives.\" The Court rejected several objectives proposed by the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, holding that gender was not an \"accurate proxy\" for financial need. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul Stevens each wrote concurring opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51927:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51930:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51930:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn early 1975, Senator William Proxmire implemented what he called the \"Golden Fleece Award of the Month.\" The award was given out to governmental agencies which sponsored programs and research that Proxmire found to be a waste of tax dollars. One Golden Fleece went to federal agencies sponsoring the research of Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist. Proxmire detailed the \"nonsense\" of Hutchinson's research on the floor of the Senate, in conferences with his staff, and in a newsletter sent to over 100,000 of his constituents. Hutchinson sued for libel, arguing that Proxmire's statements defamed his character and caused him to endure financial loss.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51930:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51930:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51930:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that Proxmire's statements in his newsletters and press releases were not protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. However, in upholding this ruling, the Court also found that Proxmire's statements were not made with \"actual malice\" and thus, were not libelous. Chief Justice Burger, relying on the Court's finding in Doe v. McMillan (1973), concluded that while speeches in Congress and discussions with staff were protected by Section 6, statements in newsletters and press releases were not because they were not \"essential to the deliberations of the Senate\" nor were they part of the legislature's \"deliberative process.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51930:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51944:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51944:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA class action lawsuit challenged the legality of conditions facing pretrial detainees in a New York City correctional facility. Petitioners claimed that double-bunking, restrictions on reading materials that inmates were allowed to receive, and required cavity searches and shakedowns amounted to punishment before conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51944:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51944:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51944:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court found that that the conditions of confinement did not infringe upon a pretrial detainee's rights. Justice Rehnquist's opinion argued that the issue of prison management is ripe with \"judgment calls\" which rest outside the jurisdiction of the judiciary. As long as administrative practices are implemented in the genuine interest of \"safeguarding institutional security\" then they do not warrant judicial scrutiny and are consistent with the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51944:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51948:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51948:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Texas Department of Human Resources took custody of the children of John and Mary Sims after a teacher suspected child abuse. The Sims moved to modify the Harris County court order granting custody to the state. When they were not able to obtain and immediate hearing, the Sims filed a writ of habeas corpus. The court transferred the matter to Montgomery County. Rather than proceeding with the case in Montgomery County, the Sims sued in Federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of Texas’ child custody laws.\nThe district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing Texas from prosecuting any state suit under the child custody laws. The court held that abstention under Younger v Harris was improper because of the multifaceted nature of the litigation. The federal court addressed the constitutional issues in their decision. Under Younger v Harris, a federal court must abstain from ruling in a case where there are pending related claims in state court. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51948:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51948:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51948:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion reversing the district court. The Supreme Court held that the federal court did not have jurisdiction while the state law claims were pending. There was no indication that the state court would be unable to reach the constitutional issues themselves. Also allowing the state case to constitute did not cause any irreparable injury to the Sims, so there was no reason for ignoring Younger.\nJustice Stevens wrote a dissent, stating that the Sims clearly did not have the opportunity to pursue their constitutional claims in state court, so there the district court acted properly. Justice William J. Brennan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51948:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51953:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51953:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Massachusetts law gave hiring preference to honorably discharged veterans applying for state civil service positions. Feeney, a woman who scored high on certain competitive civil service examinations, was ranked below male veterans who had lower scores.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51953:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51953:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51953:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the law was enacted to serve \"legitimate and worthy purposes\" and not to discriminate on the basis of sex. Even though few women benefitted from the scheme, Justice Stewart argued that \"veteran status is not uniquely male.\" Furthermore, the law placed many men who were not veterans at a disadvantage as well. The distinction in the law was clearly between veterans and nonveterans, not between men and women.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51953:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51954:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51954:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice arrested Michael C., a 16 year old, on suspicion of murder. Michael was already on probation and had a long history of criminal offenses. Before questioning, policed informed Michael of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436(1966). Michael asked for his parole officer, but police said he was not available. Police offered Michael an attorney, which he refused. During questioning, Michael made incriminating statements that linked himself to the murder.\nAt trial, Michael moved to suppress statements and sketches he drew during police questioning. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Michael’s request for his probation officer automatically invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination just as if Michael had asked for an attorney.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51954:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51954:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51954:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion reversing the state court. The Supreme Court held that a juvenile’s request for a probation officer does not invoke the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. A court must look at the totality of the circumstances in each case to determine whether a juvenile waived that right. In this case, Michael knowingly waived his right to remain silent, so all evidence obtained during the police questioning is admissible in court.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that Miranda requires police questioning to stop whenever a juvenile requests an adult who represents his interests. The case-by-case approach does not provide police with adequate guidance for future procedure. Justices William J. Brennan and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a dissent, expressing that police subjected Michael to a coercive interrogation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51954:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51958:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51958:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are two consolidated cases. For 77-1546, in 1972, U. S. Attorney William Stafford, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Florida Stuart Carrouth, and Department of Justice Attorney Guy Goodwin conducted a grand jury investigation into a conspiracy to cause a riot in Florida. Respondents were among the group subpoenaed to appear and testify. During the course of the proceedings, Goodwin stated under oath that there were no government agents in the witness lineup called by respondents’ counsel. Respondents later sued Stafford, Carrouth, Goodwin, and FBI Agent Claude Meadow in their individual and official capacities for falsely testifying and conspiring to deprive the respondents of statutory rights. Respondents sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia, where Goodwin resided. The petitioners requested a transfer to the Northern District of Florida or a dismissal based on improper venue. The district court denied the motion to transfer but granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the venue was proper because Goodwin was a resident of the District of Columbia.\nFor 78-393, from 1953 until 1973, CIA agents regularly opened and photocopied mail going through the International Airport in New York to and from the Soviet Union. In 1975, respondents sued on their behalf and on the behalf of others whose mail had been opened by the CIA. Respondents sued in the district court of Rhode Island and alleged that the interference with their mail constituted a violation of their constitutional rights. Petitioners moved to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient service of process. The district court denied these motions but certified the case for an immediate appeal. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the denial of the motions as they relate to petitioners employed by the CIA at the time of filing, but reversed as to the officials who had left their government positions at the time of filing. The Court of Appeals held that the venue was proper because one of the petitioners resided in Rhode Island.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51958:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51958:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51958:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 5-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the language of the statute clearly indicated that Congress meant to restrict the applicability of the statute to employees currently employed by the government at the time of filing. Additionally, the legislative history of the statute shows Congress’ desire to restrict civil actions against governmental officials to those acting in their official capacity. Congress only allowed governmental officials to be sued nominally in their individual capacity in order to circumvent some vestiges of sovereign immunity. The Court held that, regardless of the venue, the case must be essentially against the United States government, rather than against officers in their individual capacities.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent and argued that the Act unambiguously allowed civil suits to be brought against government employees in their individual capacities to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity. He argued that the legislative history supported a broader reading of what the Act allows in civil suits against government officers. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.\nJustice Byron R. White did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51958:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51975:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51975:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Delaware patrolman stopped William Prouse's car to make a routine check of his driver's license and vehicle registration. The officer had not observed any traffic violation or suspicious conduct on the part of Prouse. After stopping the car, the officer uncovered marijuana. The marijuana was later used to indict Prouse.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51975:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51975:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51975:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the privacy interests of travelers outweighed the state interests in discretionary spot checks of automobiles. The Court found that random checks made only marginal contributions to roadway safety and compliance with registration requirements; less intrusive means could have been used to serve the same ends. Officers must be held to a \"probable cause\" standard for searches, otherwise individuals would be subject to \"unfettered governmental intrusion\" each time they entered an automobile.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51975:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51977:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51977:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavis, a former employee of Louisiana Congressman Otto Passman, charged Passman with violating her Fifth Amendment right to due process. Prior to the time of her firing Passman wrote a note explaining that, even though he knew Davis as an \"able, energetic, and a hard, hard worker\", he preferred a man to work in her position. The Court of Appeals ruled that Davis had no civil remedies under the Fifth Amendment due process requirement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51977:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51977:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51977:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents (1971) and Butz v. Economou (1978), the Court reversed the lower court's conclusions. Both cases affirmed a citizen's right to bring suit against federal officers for constitutional violations. In this case, Passman violated Davis's rights through sexual discrimination. The Court added that Passman's actions and words did not constitute protected speech and that a damage remedy provided a ready mechanism for remedial action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51977:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51980:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51980:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 5, 1976, Patricia McDonough was robbed in Baltimore, Maryland. She was able to give the police a description of the robber and the 1975 Monte Carlo she thought the robber was driving. Within a few days, she began receiving threatening phone calls that culminated in the caller telling her to stand on her porch, from where she observed the same Monte Carlo drive past. On March 16, the police observed the car in McDonough's neighborhood. By running a search on the license plate number, the police learned the car was registered to Michael Lee Smith. The police contacted the telephone company and requested that a pen register, a device that only records numbers dialed, record the numbers dialed from the telephone at Smith's home. On March 17, the pen register recorded a call from Smith's phone to McDonough's home, so the police obtained a warrant to search Smith's house. During the search, police discovered a phone book with the corner turned down on the page on which McDonough's name was found. Smith was arrested and placed in a line-up where McDonough identified him as the man who robbed her.\nIn pretrial, Smith filed a motion to suppress the information derived from the installation of the pen register because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, Smith waived a jury, and the case was submitted to the court with an agreed-upon statement of facts. The court convicted Smith and sentenced him to six years in prison. Smith appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Maryland Court of Appeals intervened by issuing a writ of certiorari. That court affirmed the conviction and held that there was no expectation of privacy to cover the numbers dialed into a telephone system, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the warrant requirement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51980:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51980:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51980:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that Fourth Amendment protections are only relevant if the individual believes that the government has infringed on the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonable expectation of privacy does not apply to the numbers recorded by a pen register because those numbers are used in the regular conduct of the phone company's business, a fact of which individuals are aware. Because the Fourth Amendment does not apply to information that is voluntarily given to third parties, the telephone numbers that are regularly and voluntarily provided to telephone companies by their customers do not gain Fourth Amendment protections.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he argued that a person who uses a telephone has a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the content of call. Because the telephone numbers dialed also contain information relating to the content of the call, that information is also protected by the Fourth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the majority opinion's analysis depends on an individual's choice to voluntarily turn over information, but that choice is not valid if no practical alternative exists. He wrote that no citizen should be forced to accept government monitoring of the phone numbers he dials simply by registering a phone with a telephone company. Such government intrusion on telephone records could impede the exercise of free speech or political affiliation. Therefore phone records should be subject to the Fourth Amendment's protections. Justice Brennan also joined in the dissent.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51980:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51994:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51994:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation implemented an affirmative action-based training program to increase the number of the company's black skilled craft workers. Half of the eligible positions in the training program were reserved for blacks. Weber, who was white, was passed over for the program. Weber claimed that he was the victim of reverse discrimination. These cases (United Steelworkers v. Weber and Kaiser Aluminum v. Weber) were also decided together with United States v. Weber.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51994:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51994:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51994:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the training scheme was legitimate because the 1964 Act \"did not intend to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps\" to implement the goals of Title VII. Since the program sought to eliminate archaic patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy while not prohibiting white employees from advancing in the company, it was consistent with the intent of the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51994:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51997:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "51997:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn FBI officer read Willie Thomas Butler his rights under Miranda v Arizona after arresting him on a federal warrant. At Butler’s interrogation, the officer gave Butler an “Advice of Rights” form and asked him to sign it to indicate that he understood his rights. Butler refused to sign the waiver portion of the form, but indicated that he would like to talk to the officer. Butler did not ask for an attorney. Butler proceeded to make incriminating statements, which were introduced as evidence at trial. Butler moved to suppress the evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. The court held that Butler had effectively waived his right to an attorney when he spoke with the FBI officer after indicating that he understood his rights. The jury found Butler guilty of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial, holding that statements made under interrogation are not admissible without an express waiver of rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "51997:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "51997:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "51997:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-3 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that Miranda did not require adopting an inflexible per se rule. Also, 10 of 11 U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that express waiver is not necessary. It is up to the lower court to determine whether Butler impliedly waived his rights.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurrence, stating that he assumed the court did not rely on the “intentional relinquishment of a known right” formula from earlier Supreme Court precedent.\nJustice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that an express waiver is required under Miranda. Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. Justice Lewis F. Powell did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "51997:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52008:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52008:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVineville Presbyterian Church was organized in 1904 and first incorporated in 1939. Its property was purchased using funds contributed entirely by local church members. The year it was organized, Vineville was established as a member of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (“PCUS”). Under the PCUS’s hierarchical structure, the actions of the government of a local church were subject to the review and control of the higher church courts: the Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly. The powers and duties of each court were set forth in the constitution of the PCUS, the Book of Church Order.\nOn May 27, 1973, 164 members of Vineville’s congregation voted to separate from the PCUS and join the Presbyterian Church in America; ninety-four members opposed the resolution. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate and resolve the dispute. This commission eventually ruled that the minority faction at Vineville was the true congregation of Vineville, withdrawing all authority from the majority faction, which took no part in the commission’s inquiry.\nThe minority faction brought a class action in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive orders establishing their right to exclusive possession and use of Vineville’s property. The trial court, relying on Georgia’s “neutral principles of law” approach to church property disputes, found for the majority faction. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the ruling, holding that the trial court correctly applied Georgia law and rejecting the minority faction’s claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52008:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52008:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52008:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require Georgia state courts to defer to the Augusta-Macon Presbytery commission’s ruling in the Vineville church property dispute. Justice Blackman examined the history of Georgia’s approach to church property litigation. Georgia eventually arrived at a “neutral principles of law” method for resolving church property disputes. As applied to the PCUS, this required examining the deeds to the properties in question, state statutes dealing with implied trusts, and the Book of Church Order. The trial court would then determine whether there was a basis for a trust in favor of the general church.\nHere, the trial court did not discover any language in the Book of Church Order implying a trust in favor of the general church. While acknowledging that the First Amendment severely limits the role civil courts play in resolving property disputes, Justice Blackmun held that Georgia’s approach was constitutional. The neutral principles of law approach required courts to use objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law, leaving courts free from entanglement in religious doctrinal questions.\nWhile Georgia’s approach was constitutional on its face, Justice Blackmun could not determine from the facts whether Georgia courts applied the method constitutionally. While the respondent argued that Georgia applied a presumptive rule of majority representation -- as opposed to a rule of deference to church governments -- neither the Supreme Court of Georgia nor the trial court explicitly stated that it was using this rule. Consequently, Justice Blackmun remanded the case so that the Supreme Court of Georgia could definitively determine whether this rule was the law of Georgia.\nJustice Louis Powell dissented, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Potter Stewart and Byron White. He characterized the dispute not as one over the ownership of property but rather over which faction in Vineville’s congregation has the right to control the use of that property. Justice Powell argued that disputes over church property almost invariably arise out of disagreements regarding doctrine and practice. Consequently, state courts should defer to decisions made within the structure of church governments in any case involving an intrachurch dispute, even when the dispute is over church property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52008:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52014:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52014:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Nebraska Board of Parole (Parole Board) procedure to determine whether an inmate was eligible for release is based on a yearly review of each inmate’s record and an informal interview in which the inmate could present letters and statements in support of his release on parole. The Parole Board would then determine whether the inmate was a good candidate for release and, if so, schedule a final hearing. Inmates scheduled for a final hearing were informed in advance of the month in which the hearing would take place, but did not receive notice of the specific date until the morning of the hearing. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex filed a class action in federal district court alleging that the discretionary parole procedures used by the Parole Board violated their rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the procedures did not satisfy due process and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals instructed the Parole Board to modify its procedures to provide each inmate eligible for parole with a full formal hearing and, in the event of an adverse decision, a statement of evidence relied on by the Board.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52014:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52014:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52014:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, although there is no constitutional right to an inmate’s release from prison prior to the expiration of a valid sentence, the specific wording of the Nebraska statute created a constitutionally protected expectation of parole. The Court further held that the Parole Board’s procedures were adequate and reversed the prescribed modifications from the Court of Appeals.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. reasoned that a state’s establishment of a parole problem, regardless of the specific wording of the statute, triggered a right to procedural due process. Justice Powell agreed that the Court of Appeal’s recommendations were unnecessary, but he argued that the Parole Board should provide inmates with at least 72 hours notice of their hearing date.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that all prisoners potentially eligible for parole have a right to due process. In his view, the Parole Board should provide the inmates with reasonable notice of their hearing dates and a written statement of the reasons underlying adverse decisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52014:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52017:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52017:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWiley L. Bolden and other residents of Mobile, Alabama brought a class action on behalf of all black citizens in Mobile. They argued that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of black citizens. A district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Bolden.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52017:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52017:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52017:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment did not entail \"the right to have Negro candidates elected,\" and that only purposefully discriminatory denials of the freedom to vote on the basis of race demanded constitutional remedies. The Court also found that multimember legislative districts were not unconstitutional per se; such legislative apportionments only violated the Fourteenth Amendment if they were \"conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial. . .discrimination.\" In short, the Court held that facially neutral actions were unconstitutional only if motivated by discriminatory purposes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52017:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52019:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52019:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA jury convicted Billy Duren of first degree murder and first degree robbery. Duren alleged that the selection of this jury violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross section of the community. Specifically, Jackson County allowed an automatic exemption from jury service for women upon request. While women made up 54% of the population in the Jackson County, only 26.7% of people summoned from the jury wheel were women. Defendant had an all-male jury selected from a panel of 48 men and 5 women. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, questioning the validity of Duren’s statistics. The court also held that even if women were disproportionally excluded from jury service, the amount of women who participated in the process was well above constitutional standards.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52019:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52019:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52019:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White, writing for an 8-1 majority, reversed the state court and remanded. The Supreme Court held that Duren’s statistical evidence sufficiently proved that Jackson County’s jury selection process violated his constitutional rights. Duren showed an underrepresented “distinctive” group resulting from Jackson County’s practice of exempting women. Also, there was no significant state interest to justify exempting women from jury service. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the majority incorrectly used an combination of the Due Process clause and Equal Protection clause to make their decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52019:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52021:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52021:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSection 632 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 required that members of the Foreign Service retirement system retire at 60. No mandatory retirement age was specified for employees covered by the Civil Service retirement system. Holbrook Bradley, a member of the Foreign Service retirement system, challenged the statute in United States District Court for the District of Columbia and prevailed. The government appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52021:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52021:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52021:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Byron R. White, the Court emphasized the distinction between the Civil Service and Foreign Service, and the \"special attention\" paid to the Foreign Service by Congress. The Court interpreted the purpose of Section 632 to be the encouragement of the \"highest performance in the ranks of the Foreign Service by assuring that opportunities for promotion would be available,\" a legitimate interest that justified the distinction. The Court also recognized the possibility that service in the Foreign Service would be more rigorous than service in the Civil Service. Given that possibility, Congress had a \"reasonable basis\" for enacting the statute, satisfying the rationality standard set forth in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52021:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52025:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52025:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCarl Beazer and Jose Reyes were employees of the New York Transit Authority (NYTA). Both were heroin addicts undergoing methadone treatment. NYTA maintained a policy against hiring anyone using narcotics. Methadone was considered a narcotic, and both Beazer and Reyes were terminated after NYTA learned of their methadone use. Beazer and Reyes filed a class action against the Transit Authority, alleging that NYTA's policy discriminated against blacks and Hispanics. They cited a statistic showing that 81 percent of suspected violations of NYTA's policy were black or Hispanic. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Beazer, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52025:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52025:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52025:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that the Transit Authority's policy was not unconstitutional or illegal under the Civil Rights Act. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens described Beazer's statistical argument as \"weak\", as the 81 percent statistic did not relate to methadone users specifically. The Court recognized the public safety interest in keeping narcotics users from working for NYTA. The narcotics rule was an allowable policy choice made by NYTA, and any specific exemption for methadone users from the narcotics rule would have been \"costly\" and \"imprecise.\" Justice Lewis Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52025:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52028:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52028:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a Rochester, New York pizza parlor was killed in an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, the police received a lead implicating Irving Dunaway, but the lead did not provide enough information to arrest him. Nevertheless, the police brought him in for questioning. He was not told he was under arrest, but he would be physically restrained if he attempted to leave. After being informed of his Miranda rights, Dunaway waived his right to counsel and made statements and a drawing that incriminated himself.\nAt trial, Dunaway filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his confession and drawing. The motion was denied and he was convicted. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Brown v. Illinois.\nThe Monroe County Court determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted under Brown. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department reversed and held that suspects can be detained and questioned without violating Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed Dunaway’s application for leave to appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52028:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52028:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52028:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the police violated Dunaway’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by picking him up and taking him to the police station to be questioned without probable cause. Because picking someone up for questioning involves an intrusion on par with that of an arrest, it is held to the standard of “probable cause” rather than the lower standard of “reasonable suspicion.” The Court also held that the confession stemmed directly from the illegal questioning, and without an intervening event, the confession should have been considered tainted evidence and not allowed into evidence at trial.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the key principle of the Fourth Amendment was the balancing of competing interests. He wrote that, while there must be general rules for police conduct, cases should be considered based on their individual facts. In this case, the questioning was too close to an arrest to fit any other criteria.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that an illegal arrest is only relevant to determining the voluntariness of a confession if it can be shown that the conduct of the illegal arrest was what motivated the confession.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent, arguing that not all interactions between citizens and police officers are seizures of persons. Because Dunaway willingly accompanied officers to the police station, his time at the police station could not be deemed a seizure. He also argued that, because the police acted in good faith and gave Dunaway the Miranda warnings, his statements and drawings should be considered voluntary and admissible. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52028:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52031:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52031:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrances Davis sought admission to the nursing program at Southeastern Community College, which received federal funds. Davis also suffered from a hearing disability, and was unable to understand speech without lip-reading. Davis' application was denied. She asked for reconsideration, and her application was again denied. Davis filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which ruled against her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned that decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52031:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52031:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52031:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for a unanimous court that an \"otherwise qualified handicapped individual\" specified by the Act meant one who meets all the program's requirements \"in spite of his handicap\" as opposed to \"in every respect except as to limitations imposed by their handicap.\" Even with an improved hearing aid, Davis still required lip-reading to understand speech, and therefore was not \"otherwise qualified.\" Since Davis could not be admitted to Southeastern's program without substantial changes to admission requirements, Davis' rejection did not constitute unlawful discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52031:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52035:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52035:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrank Addington was charged with “assault by threat” of his mother. His mother then filed a petition for his permanent confinement in a mental health facility. At trial, evidence was presented that Addington suffered from serious delusions, and two physicians testified that he was a psychotic schizophrenic. The jury was instructed to decide Addington’s mental state and whether he was a possible threat to himself and others by weighing the “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” The jury determined the evidence was sufficient, and Addington was sentenced to Austin State Hospital for an indefinite amount of time. He appealed on the grounds that the jury should have been instructed to evaluate the evidence using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The state appellate court remanded his case stating that his rights had been violated when the jury was improperly instructed on the burden of proof. The Supreme Court of Texas overturned the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s finding by holding that the standard of proof used in the initial jury instructions was adequate for a civil proceeding and did not violate Addington’s due process rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52035:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52035:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52035:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe standard of proof in a civil confinement case requires a burden of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence, but not as high as the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal cases. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the use of the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence standard in a jury instruction in a civil commitment case was proper. Because of the importance of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in criminal proceedings, the Court was weary of requiring the same standard for civil proceedings. Furthermore, this case involved psychiatric evaluation, which was not considered reliable evidence. A “beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement in cases involving mental diagnosis may be too high a burden for the state to reach. Therefore, the middle ground of requiring a “clear and convincing” standard of proof was appropriate.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. took no part in the consideration or or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52035:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52039:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52039:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1957 and 1958, Ilya Wolston’s aunt and uncle, Myra and Jack Soble, were the subject of an investigation to find Soviet intelligence agents in the United States. On one occasion, Wolston failed to respond to a subpoena and pleaded guilty to a contempt charge. The incident was publicized in newspapers, but Wolston succeeded in returning to life as a private citizen. In 1974, Reader’s Digest Association published a book by John Barron about the KGB and Soviet agents in the United States. The book and its index identified Wolston as a Soviet agent.\nWolston sued the author and publishers for libel in district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Association and held that Wolston was a “public figure” and had to prove the Association acted with actual malice to prevail in a libel suit. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52039:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52039:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52039:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that Wolston met neither of the requirements to be considered a public figure. Wolston was not a figure of “persuasive power and influence,” nor did he thrust himself to the forefront of popular controversy. The Court held that an individual does not become a public figure merely by attracting public attention, and such individuals should not lose the protection afforded to private individuals.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the majority’s decision defined “public figure” too narrowly, but the intervening years between Wolston’s publicity and the libelous statement sufficed to consider him a private citizen. Blackmun argued that the timing of the potentially libelous statement relative to the event that brought about public scrutiny of an individual is relevant in libel cases. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent and argued that, because the issue of Soviet espionage remained a relevant issue in 1974, the intervening years did not diminish Wolston’s status as a public figure. He also wrote that the district court erred in granting summary judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52039:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52043:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52043:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Massachusetts law required minors to gain parental consent before having an abortion. However, if either or both of the parents refused, a judge of the superior court could allow a minor to have the procedure \"for good cause shown.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52043:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52043:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52043:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found the statute unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it allowed judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is mature and competent enough to make the decision independently. Second, it required parental notification in all cases (parents were required to be notified if their daughter initiated proceedings in superior court) without allowing the minor to seek an independent judicial assessment of her competence to decide the abortion issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52043:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52047:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52047:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo suspects charged with murder, robbery, and grand larceny requested that the public be excluded from a pre-trial hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence. They argued that an \"unabated buildup\" of adverse publicity had jeopardized their ability to receive a fair trial. The request was granted by the judge, and no objections were made at the time. The judge then denied press access to the pre-trial hearing and refused to immediately release the transcript of the proceedings. The case was argued and decided with Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. American Petroleum Institute et al.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52047:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52047:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52047:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that members of the public had no right to attend criminal trials under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court noted that judges had \"an affirmative constitutional duty\" to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity, and that closure of pretrial proceedings was an effective method to do so. The Court found that the Sixth Amendment, while granting defendants the right to a public trial, did not imply a public right of access to trials. The Court added that since the suppression of the transcript was only temporary, no violation of the First Amendment had occurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52047:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52060:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52060:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHerman Raddatz was indicted for unlawfully receiving a firearm. Before trial, he moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to police and FBI officers. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing as authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act (FMA). The Magistrate made findings of fact and recommended dismissal of the motion to suppress. The district court accepted the recommendation and denied Raddatz’s motion to suppress. A jury found Raddatz guilty and sentenced him to six months in prison and four and half years of probation. On appeal, Raddatz argued that the FMA violates Article III of the Constitution, and the district court denied him due process by not personally hearing disputed testimony. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the referral provisions of the FMA do not violate Constitution because the district court makes the final determination. The court reversed, however, because Raddatz was denied due process when the district court failed to hear the disputed testimony where credibility is crucial to the outcome.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52060:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52060:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52060:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Warren Burger, in a 5-4 decision, wrote the majority opinion reversing the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the FMA did not did not require the district court to independently review disputed testimony. Also, the FMA did not violate the Constitution. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, writing that the statute in question does not threaten judicial power or independence in judicial decision making.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell wrote a partial dissent, stating that a district court must rehear evidence when credibility is at issue. Justice Potter Stewart dissented, writing that the FMA clearly requires a district court to rehear evidence when a party objects to a magistrate’s recommendation. Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a separate dissent, expressing that use of the the FMA was impermissible in this case under the Fifth Amendment and Article III.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52060:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52078:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52078:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program, via Title XIX of the Social Security Act, to provide federal financial assistance to states that chose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the \"Hyde Amendment\" that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Cora McRae, a pregnant Medicaid recipient, challenged the Amendment and took action against Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52078:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52078:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52078:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that states participating in the Medicaid program were not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions under Title XIX. The Court found that a woman's freedom of choice did not carry with it \"a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.\" The Court ruled that because the Equal Protection Clause was not a source of substantive rights and because poverty did not qualify as a \"suspect classification,\" the Hyde Amendment did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the Court held that the coincidence of the funding restrictions of the statute with tenets of the Roman Catholic Church did not constitute an establishment of religion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52078:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52079:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52079:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPetitioner Vincent Chiarella worked in the composing room of Pandick Press (Pandick), a financial printer. An acquiring corporation hired Pandick to produce announcements of corporate takeover bids. Although the identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed, Chiarella was able to deduce the names of the target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover bids were made public. Chiarella realized slightly more than $30,000 in profits from his trading activities. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) then investigated Chiarella's trading activities. Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return the profits he made to the sellers of the shares. A few months later, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use \"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security\" of \"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.\" Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to \"employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.\" Chiarella was convicted at trial and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52079:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52079:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52079:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. A duty to disclose information arises if there is a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to the transaction. Chiarella had no such duty. He was not a corporate insider in the acquiring corporation and he did not receive confidential information from the target company. He also had no fiduciary relationship with the shareholders of the target company: he was not their agent; they placed no trust or confidence in him; indeed, they had no prior dealings with him. A duty to disclose under Section 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52079:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52092:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52092:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52092:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52092:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52092:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials was \"implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment.\" The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not only the right to speak but also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas. The Court also noted that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such as courthouses. The Court emphasized that \"certain unarticulated rights\" were implicit in enumerated guarantees and were often \"indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52092:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52096:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52096:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 13, 1972, Randal Rush and Jeffrey Savchuk were involved in a single-car crash outside of Elkhart, Indiana. The passenger, Savchuk, was injured in the crash. In June 1973, Savchuk moved to Minnesota with his parents. He sued Rush in Minnesota district court and attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the fact that State Farm, the agency that insured Rush’s car, operates in Minnesota. Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss, but the trial court denied the petition and allowed Savchuk to proceed. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Rush appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Minnesota Supreme Court again found in favor of Savchuk.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52096:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52096:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52096:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that there must be a certain amount of minimum contacts between the defendant and the state in which the suit occurs. The fact that Rush’s insurance company does business in Minnesota is not a sufficient link between him and the state, especially since he owns no property there and has no other connection. Rush had no reason to suspect that having an insurance contract with State Farm would subject him to the possibility of a lawsuit in all states where State Farm does business.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the insurance company could be sued in Minnesota under Rush’s policy. As long as it is understood that the Minnesota court has jurisdiction over the policy and State Farm, rather than the defendant, Justice Stevens argued that the suit could be continued.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52096:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52098:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52098:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter genetically engineering a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil, Ananda Chakrabarty sought to patent his creation under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101, providing patents for people who invent or discover \"any\" new and useful \"manufacture\" or \"composition of matter.\" On appeal from an application rejection by a patent examiner the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed, stating that living things are not patentable under Section 101. When this decision was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52098:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52098:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52098:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court explained that while natural laws, physical phenomena, abstract ideas, or newly discovered minerals are not patentable, a live artificially-engineered microorganism is. The creation of a bacterium that is not found anywhere in nature, constitutes a patentable \"manufacture\" or \"composition of matter\" under Section 101. Moreover, the bacterium's man-made ability to break down crude oil makes it very useful.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52098:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52112:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52112:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, the United States granted the Sioux Indian Nation the Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills of South Dakota. Congress reneged in 1877, passing an act that reclaimed the Black Hills. The Sioux Nation requested compensation in 1920. The United States Court of Claims ruled against the Sioux Nation in 1942. Congress then established the Indian Claims Commission in 1946. The Commission ruled that the Sioux Nation was not barred by the Court of Claims decision and ruled that Congress used its powers of eminent domain in 1877 and the Sioux were therefore entitled to compensation. The Court of Claims maintained that the Sioux were barred by their first case. Congress amended the Indian Claims Commission Act in 1978, removing the judicial bar. The Court of Claims then held that the Sioux were entitled to $17.1 million.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52112:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52112:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52112:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court held that Congress did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers and affirmed the Court of Claims decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Harry A. Blackmun noted a similar situation in Nock v. United States, where a congressional exemption from a judicial bar was ruled not to be in violation of separation of powers and upheld by the Court. Additionally, since Congress \"had not made a good-faith effort to give the Sioux the full value of the Black Hills,\" Congress' 1877 action qualified as use of its eminent domain power under Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States. Therefore, the Sioux were entitled to compensation under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52112:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52119:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52119:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York residents purchased a car from a Volkswagen retailer in New York. On a drive to Arizona, the residents got in a car accident while driving through Oklahoma. A defective gas tank in the car allegedly caused the accident. The residents sued the retailer and its New York based wholesale distributor in Oklahoma state court. The retailer and distributor asserted that Oklahoma could not properly have jurisdiction. The trial court rejected this claim. The retailer and distributor then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial court from exercising in personam jurisdiction. The court denied the writ because jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma’s long-arm statute, which allowed jurisdiction over defendants who caused tortious injury within the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52119:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52119:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52119:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court judgment. The Supreme Court held that a state court could only exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when that defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state. In this case, the only contact with Oklahoma was the accident. The Volkswagen retailer and distributor had taken advantage of none of the benefits of Oklahoma law, had not solicited business in Oklahoma, and did not regularly sell cars that reached Oklahoma directly or indirectly.\nJustice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent expressing the view that the retailer and distributor had purposely entered their goods into the stream of commerce and had gained benefits from other states through the nature of their product. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that a local car retailer makes itself a part of a national network of retailers and can reasonably expect that its product may cause injury in other states. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissent stating that cars were intended for local and long-distance travel, so it was not unreasonable for Oklahoma to exercise jurisdiction when the accident happened there.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52119:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52125:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52125:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Village of Schaumburg Illinois adopted an ordinance that prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting contributions in public areas without a permit. Permits were only granted to organizations that could demonstrate that 75 percent of their receipts were applied towards \"charitable purposes.\" Citizens for Better Environment, a nonprofit tax-exempt organization, was denied a permit because it did not satisfy the 75-percent requirement. CBE sued in federal district court, which ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52125:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52125:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52125:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court held that charitable solicitation is not purely commercial speech and is closely related to forms of protected speech such as advocacy. Justice Byron R. White, who authored the majority opinion, argued that \"it is clear\" that charitable solicitations are protected. While Schaumburg had an interest in preventing fraud, the ordinance did not fully serve that interest, which could be accomplished through alternate means. The ordinance in question also barred legitimate organizations from soliciting contributions. Schaumburg's interest did not justify the ordinance's \"interference with protected speech,\",which was therefore unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52125:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52127:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52127:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter a picture identification by the victim of a robbery, Thomas J. Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to the station in a police car, three officers began discussing the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52127:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52127:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52127:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Miranda safeguards came into play \"whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent,\" noting that the term \"interrogation\" under Miranda included \"any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject.\" The Court then found that the officers' conversation did not qualify as words or actions that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit such a response from Innis.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52127:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52135:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52135:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn September 25, 1975, 12 packages containing 871 boxes of films depicting homosexual activities were shipped from St. Petersburg, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia. Though addressed to Leggs, Inc., the boxes were mistakenly delivered to the address of L’Eggs Products, Inc. Employees of L’Eggs Products opened the boxes and found the boxes of films, which contained suggestive drawings on one side and descriptions on the other. One of the employees opened one of the boxes of films and unsuccessfully attempted to view portions of the film. The FBI became involved on October 1, 1975 and, without making any effort to obtain a warrant, projected and viewed the films.\nOn April 6, 1977, William Walter, Arthur Randall Sanders, Jr., and Gulf Coast News Agency, Inc. were indicted on obscenity charges relating to the interstate transportation of the boxes of films. Petitioners filed a motion to suppress use of the films as evidence. The motion was denied, and the petitioners were convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52135:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52135:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52135:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that projection and viewing of the films constituted a search, and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the lack of a warrant. The fact that the FBI was lawfully in possession of the boxes did not grant them the authority to view the films without a warrant. The Court also held that the fact that the boxes had been opened by a third party, which placed information about the content of the films in plain view, did not alter the owner’s legitimate expectation of privacy.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the judgment.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment. He argued that even if the films had been viewed by a third party before the FBI viewed them, the government could not consider the films to be in plain view and warrants unnecessary. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissent and argued that the Fourth Amendment only prevented unlawful searches and seizures by the government. Because the FBI received the films after the boxes had been opened to the point that the suggestive material was visible, the FBI’s viewing of the films did not violate Fourth Amendment rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52135:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52139:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52139:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are three consolidated cases.\nJasper F. Williams and Eugene F. Diamond, doctors who perform medically necessary abortions, a welfare rights organization, and Jane Doe, a woman in poverty who needed an abortion for medical reasons but not to save her life, brought a class action suit against the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid in federal district court. The appellants challenged an Illinois statute that prohibited state medical assistance from paying for abortions that were not necessary to save the life of the mother. The appellants alleged that the Medicaid Act required the state to cover the cost of all medically necessary abortions. They also alleged that the denial of funding for certain abortions is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.\nInitially, the district court refused to consider the case until the state courts had reached a decision on the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision and remanded the case to the district court to for consideration on the merits. The district court held that the Medicaid Act required a state to provide funding for all medically necessary abortions. The district court also held that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funds for certain abortions, does not exempt the state from fulfilling the Medicaid requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that the Hyde Amendment allows a state to limit funding to the type of abortions the Amendment specifies. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to consider the constitutional issues. The district court held that both the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment were unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52139:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52139:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52139:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, since none of the parties to the case challenged the Amendment. The opinion referenced Harris v. McCrae, another opinion filed the same day, which upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. The Court also held that a state is not obligated to pay for abortions through Medicaid when there will be no federal reimbursement because of the restrictions of the Hyde Amendment.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented and argued that a state’s interest in protecting the life of a fetus could not come at the cost of denying poor women medically necessary abortions. He also argued that, in upholding the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, the Court allowed a state to yield undue influence over a woman’s decision whether or not to go through with a pregnancy; this influence disproportionally affects poor women. Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall dissented and argued that the Hyde Amendment essentially denies women in poverty the ability to have a legal abortion that protects their health but not their lives. Because the burden falls exclusively on poor women who cannot afford an abortion, he disagreed with the Court’s finding that the Hyde Amendment did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nIn his a dissenting opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun expressed that the Court refused to recognize the realities of poverty. He argued that such actions by the government wrongfully punish those living in poverty.\n Justice John Paul Stevens also wrote a dissenting opinion. He argued that, since the government provides Medicaid on the basis of expressed financial and medical need, it could not deny assistance when both of those needs have been shown. If a woman has a constitutional right to choose to protect her own health rather than the potential life of the fetus, the government cannot deny her assistance to which she would otherwise be entitled.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52139:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52140:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52140:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard Thomas was convicted of attempted murder and committed to a mental institution for a suggested one to twenty years. The parole officials released him after five months. Five months after his release on parole, he murdered Mary Ellen Martinez, a fifteen-year-old girl. Her family, sued the parole official for negligence, but the district court dismissed the case because a California statute states that a parole officer cannot be liable for injury resulting from the decision to revoke parole or release a parolee. The California Supreme Court also dismissed the case and the Martinez family appealed by arguing the statute of immunization of parole officials violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52140:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52140:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52140:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that a state statute immunizing parole officials from injuries resulting from parole decisions does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute does not condone the killing of a human being, but rather it protects parole officials who are required to make a difficult decision. There is always a risk involved in releasing a prisoner, and the parole officer must use his discretion in making the decision. The state has a parole program to promote rehabilitation and it is the duty of the state legislature, not the courts, to decide if that program is rational. Therefore, the suit against the parole officials by the family of a parolee’s murder victim is not actionable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52140:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52147:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52147:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe County of Los Angeles imposed an ad valorem tax on manufactured items stored in warehouses. Sears, Roebuck and Co. paid this tax under protest and claimed an exemption from that tax for items manufactured outside the United States and imported into the United States. These items were intended for sale both in and out of the State of California. Sears sued for a refund of the tax in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The court granted Sears’ motion for summary judgment and awarded the refund. The Court of Appeal of California reversed, holding that giving exemptions to foreign goods intended for interstate commerce provided a competitive advantage over domestic goods. This made the county tax an unconstitutional regulation on interstate commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52147:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52147:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52147:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a two-sentence unsigned opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. Justice Potter Stewart did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52147:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52149:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52149:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52149:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52149:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52149:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court overruled the Court of Appeals of New York and held that the New York's ban violated the right to commercial speech. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell cited the protections for \"commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation\" set forth in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The Court recognized New York's interest in promoting energy conservation and accepted that the PSC's regulation would directly further that interest. However, since the regulation restricted all promotional advertising regardless of its effect on electricity use, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment under First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens each wrote opinions concurring in part and in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52149:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52151:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52151:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRincon Island is artificial island off the coast of Ventura County, California and is connected to the mainland via a causeway. Additionally, there are 15 piers on the coastline. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted to California all land and resources within three miles of the coastline. California and the United States disputed over whether the island and piers were included in this coastline. A special master was appointed to resolve this dispute. The Special Master found that the island and piers did not affect the shoreline, and were therefore not extensions of the coastline. California filed an exception to the Master's finding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52151:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52151:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52151:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous 8-0 decision, the Court held that the special master's determination was correct. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger acknowledged the ambiguity in the Submerged Lands Act. However, since the piers and island in dispute did not provide protection, they did not qualify as \"harbor works\" that would have extended the coastline.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52151:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52162:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52162:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe state of South Dakota operated a cement plant. A substantial percentage of the plant's production was sold to buyers outside the state. One such customer was Reeves, Inc., a concrete distributor in Wyoming that obtained over 90 percent of its cement from the state-run plant. In 1978, for economic reasons, the South Dakota plant began supplying in-state customers before honoring other commitments. Reeves, Inc. challenged South Dakota's \"hoarding\" of resources.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52162:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52162:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52162:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. and found that \"'[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.'\" The Court found that South Dakota was acting as a \"market participant\" rather than a \"market regulator,\" and was capable of withdrawing from the interstate market if an in-state shortage arose. The Court rejected arguments that cement was a \"natural resource\" to which South Dakota had sought to limit outside access.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52162:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52164:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52164:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52164:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52164:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52164:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the minority set-aside program was a legitimate exercise of congressional power. The Court found that Congress could pursue the objectives of the minority business enterprise program under the Spending Power. The plurality opinion noted that Congress could have regulated the practices of contractors on federally funded projects under the Commerce Clause as well. The Court further held that in the remedial context, Congress did not have to act \"in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52164:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52169:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52169:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile working for his father’s broker-dealer firm, Peter E. Aaron was in charge of supervising sales of securities made by other employees and maintaining files on the companies that issued the securities sold by the firm. In the fall of 1974, two of Aaron’s employees began telling prospective investors that they should buy shares of the Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corporation (Lawn-A-Mat) because the company planned to manufacture a new type of small car within the next six weeks. An attorney for Lawn-A-Mat contacted Aaron twice and informed him that the company had no plans to manufacture a car, but Aaron did not ensure that the employees would stop making those statements in promoting the Lawn-A-Mat stock. In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint against Aaron in district court and alleged that he had violated, and aided and abetted violations of, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), and Rule 10b-5, which is a rule promulgated by the SEC to implement Section 10(b). The district court found that Aaron had violated the securities laws in question through his “intentional failure” to stop the fraudulent practices of the employees working under him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment but declined to reach the question of whether Aaron’s conduct amounted to an intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Instead the Court of Appeals held that proof of negligence is sufficient to establish a violation of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52169:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52169:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52169:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that plain language and the legislative history of the statutes required the SEC to establish defendant’s intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud” for violations of Section 10(b) and the part of Section 17(a) that specifically refers to the use of a device, scheme, or artifice with intent to defraud. Employing the same textual and legislative history analysis, the Court further held that the parts Section 17(a) that deal with false statements, omissions of fact, and transactions or practices that operate as fraud do not contain an intent requirement.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a concurring opinion in which he urged those critical of the public policy implications to voice their complaints to Congress. He also argued that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the ruling on the ground that Aaron “intentionally failed” to terminate the fraudulent statements about Lawn-A-Mat stock.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the SEC should not be required to prove the defendants intent to establish a violation of Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, or Section 17(a). Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52169:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52183:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52183:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 7, 1975, police arrested Herschel Roberts in Lake County, Ohio. Roberts was charged with forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possessing stolen credit cards belonging to Amy Isaacs. At the preliminary hearing on January 10, Roberts’ lawyer called the Isaacs’ daughter, Anita, as a witness to testify that she knew Roberts and allowed him to use her apartment while she was away. The attorney attempted to elicit testimony from Anita that she gave Roberts the checks and credit cards without telling him that she did not have permission to do so. Ms. Isaacs would not admit to these actions, and Roberts’ attorney did not ask the court to declare her a hostile witness or place her on cross-examination. When Ms. Isaacs failed to respond to five subpoenas to appear at Roberts’ subsequent criminal trial, the state entered the transcript of her earlier testimony into evidence, as allowed by an Ohio Statute.\nAfter being convicted by the trial court, Roberts appealed on the grounds that the admission of the prior testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52183:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52183:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52183:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to restrict the admission of unreliable hearsay into evidence. Generally, face-to-face confrontation is preferred as it allows the accused to probe the memory of the witness and allows the jury to take the demeanor of the witness into account when assessing the reliability of the testimony. The Court held that the opportunity for face-to-face interaction with, and cross-examination of, the witness at the previous hearing satisfied the requirements of the Confrontation Clause for the later trial. Although Ms. Isaacs was not officially cross-examined, the questions she answered had the proper form and intent to satisfy the purpose of cross-examination and establish the reliability of the testimony. The Court also held that a witness may be declared officially unavailable if a good-faith effort was made to locate her, as was the case with Ms. Isaacs.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the state did not meet its burden to show a diligent effort to locate Ms. Isaacs. The state sent subpoenas to the home of Ms. Isaacs’ parents, although there was evidence that she no longer resided there, and made no further effort to locate her new residence. Without evidence of a diligent effort to locate the witness, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause could not be circumvented. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52183:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52185:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52185:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGilberto Alvez was a seaman on vacation from his regular trade. He was moonlighting for Joseph Vinal Ship Maintenance, Inc. as a harbor worker on the SS Export Builder, a vessel owned by American Export Lines, Inc (“AELI”). On October 13, 1972, while the SS Export Builder was in New York waters, the handle of a defective tension jack struck Alvez in the eye. He completely lost his right eye in the accident. He also suffered from depression as a result of the accident and his injuries.\nAlvez sued AELI in New York, claiming damages resulting from AELI’s negligence and the unseaworthiness of their ship. Alvez then moved to add his wife, Juanita Alvez, as a party plaintiff, claiming that his injuries deprived her of the benefits of their marriage.\nThe Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (“Jones Act”) created several classes of sea workers, allowing a wider breadth of causes of action for those injured within the United States’ territorial waters. It did not, however, specifically provide a cause of action for loss of consortium for spouses. Similarly, the Death on the High Seas Act of 1920 (“DOHSA”) did not create a specific right to a cause of action for loss of consortium. The district court denied the claim for loss of consortium. The appellate court reversed, noting that while such motions were not available in some maritime law cases, the Supreme Court in Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet allowed a decedent’s dependents to recover for loss of society in a wrongful death maritime law claim. Thus, there is no clear precedent prohibiting claims of loss of consortium from nonfatal injuries.\nNew York’s Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. It rejected AELI’s use of Igneri v. Cie. De Transports Oceaniques, a U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit decision holding that the spouse of an injured longshoreman had no cause of action for loss of consortium. It noted that most states now allowed a spouse to state a cause of action for loss of consortium. It also reasoned that the heavy burden now placed on Juanita Alvez as a marriage partner justified allowing her to sue for damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52185:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52185:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52185:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision with two concurrences, Justice William Brennan held that maritime law authorizes Juanita Alvez to maintain an action for damages against AELI resulting from the loss of her husband’s society. He rejected AELI’s argument that the Jones Act and DOHSA represented Congress’ intention to preclude actions for loss of consortium or society. He noted that DOHSA centered on relief for fatal injuries on the high seas, not nonfatal injuries within terrestrial waters, and that the Jones Act does not exhaustively regulate the claims of longshoremen or seamen. Justice Brennan agreed with the lower courts that the Court’s recent maritime law decisions eroded the justification for denying claims used in Igneri. He also pointed to the contemporary state of the law, where a clear majority of states permitted a wife to recover damages for loss of consortium from personal injuries to her husband.\nJustice Lewis Powell concurred, writing that there was no rational basis for drawing a distinction between fatal and nonfatal injuries in loss of consortium cases.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justices Potter Stewart and William Rehnquist, dissented. He questioned the majority’s assumption that the federal question at hand would necessarily survive AELI’s appeals in state court. He warned against the practice of granting review to non-final lower court orders, and recommended denying certiorari to such cases in the future.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52185:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52187:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52187:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHigh school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against \"publicly expressive\" activities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52187:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52187:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52187:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Since the California Constitution protected \"speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the shopping centers are privately owned,\" PruneYard could not prevent the students from soliciting on its property. The Court argued that it was within California's power to guarantee this expansive free speech right since it did not unreasonably intrude on the rights of private property owners.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52187:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52188:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52188:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Code of Virginia authorizes the Supreme Court of Virginia to regulate and discipline attorneys. Under this authority, the Virginia court promulgated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (Bar Code), and the content makes it clear that the Virginia court holds all legislative and regulatory power over the legal profession in the state. The court also adjudicates alleged violations of the Bar Code.\nIn 1974, Consumers Union of the United States sought to prepare a legal directory designed to assist consumers in making informed decisions about legal representation. Consumers Union attempted to canvass all of the attorneys of Arlington County, Virginia, for the information for their directory. Many attorneys refused to provide the requested information for fear of violating the Bar Code’s prohibition against attorney advertising and providing the type of information the Consumers Union sought to publish.\nOn February 27, 1975, Consumers Union and the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council sued the Virginia Supreme Court, the Virginia State Bar, the American Bar Association, and other individuals. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to gather, publish, and receive factual information concerning attorneys practicing in Arlington County. The plaintiffs sought a declaration and an injunction against the enforcement of the relevant section of the Bar Code.\nThe district court held that the section of the Bar Code unconstitutionally restricted access to information concerning the attorneys’ initial consultation fees, but did not enjoin the enforcement of the code as it relates to advertising. Consumers Union appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the prohibition of attorney advertising violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that the section of the Bar Code was unconstitutional in its entirety and enjoined its enforcement. Consumers Union moved for the awarding of attorneys fees, which the Virginia Court objected to on the grounds that it had judicial immunity. The district court awarded attorneys fees against the Supreme Court of Virginia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52188:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52188:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52188:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no. Justice Byron R. White delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Supreme Court of Virginia was immune to suits in its legislative capacity, just as any other legislative body would be. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has the power to enforce the Code, and this suit was brought against it in its enforcement capacity. The Court held that suits for declaratory and injunctive relief can be brought against the Supreme Court of Virginia in its enforcement capacity. The Court also held that the Supreme Court of Virginia cannot be liable for attorney’s fees because it has legislative immunity. The legislative history surrounding the issue of legislative immunity shows that Congress intended agencies that have legislative immunity to also be immune from attorney’s fees.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or consideration of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52188:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52190:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52190:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 1, 1976, an Illinois Circuit Court judge authorized a warrant to search the premises of the Aurora Tap Tavern and the person of the bartender Greg for heroin and other drug paraphernalia, based on information the Illinois Bureau of Investigation obtained from an informant. When officers arrived to conduct the search, they also conducted a cursory pat down for weapons on all of the patrons in the bar, pursuant to an Illinois state statute that allows officers to search persons on the premises during the execution of a valid search warrant. During the pat down, an officer found and retrieved a cigarette pouch from the pocket of one of the patrons, Ventura Ybarra, that contained tin foil packets of a substance later confirmed to be heroin.\nYbarra was subsequently indicted for possession of a controlled substance. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence of the contraband that had been seized from his person during the search at the bar. The trial court denied the motion. Ybarra was found guilty. On appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the statute as it applied to the facts of this case because it was obvious that there was a connection between Ybarra and the premises being searched. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Ybarra’s petition for appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52190:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52190:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52190:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no probable cause to suspect any of the patrons of committing a crime simply because they are on the premises during a search. Without any particular indication that a person is connected to the premises for the reasons the search is being conducted, a police search of the person violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that even an initial pat-down search is unconstitutional without a reasonable belief that the person is armed and dangerous.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion creates an unnecessarily broad reading of the exclusionary rule and ignores the practical needs of law enforcement. He also argued that it was perfectly reasonable for the police to search persons found on the premises of a bar known as a place for the procurement of drugs and that the law must account for the safety of officers in performing their duty. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment calls for specificity regarding the location to be searched and the person or things to be seized, not the persons from whom items will be taken. He argued that it was not practical to prohibit law enforcement from flexibility in the performance of their duty. The courts may consider the reasonableness of an individual search based on the scope of the intrusion and the justification to determine whether it violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52190:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52196:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52196:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter being convicted of three felonies over a period of fifteen years, William James Rummel was given a life prison sentence as mandated by a Texas recidivist statute. Rummel's offenses involved approximately $230, and all of the offenses were nonviolent. Lower courts rejected Rummel's challenge to the sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52196:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52196:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52196:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the life sentence imposed by Texas law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that Texas had a significant interest in dealing \"in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society.\" The Court also noted that Texas had \"a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good time' credits to its prisoners,\" indicating that there was a possibility that Rummel would not be imprisoned for the rest of his life.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52196:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52210:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52210:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn September 1977, Robert Franklin Godfrey and his wife had a heated argument. After Godfrey consumed a number of beers, threatened his wife with a knife, and tore her clothes, she threatened to leave him and then left to stay with relatives. Within a few days, she had secured a warrant against Godfrey for aggravated assault and filed for divorce. On September 20, they argued again, and Godfrey’s wife told him that reconciliation was impossible. Godfrey went to his mother-in-law’s trailer with his shotgun. He shot his wife through the window, struck his daughter with the butt of the gun, and shot his mother-in-law. Godfrey then called the police, explained what had happened, and asked them to come and pick him up.\nGodfrey was indicted on two counts of murder, and one count of aggravated assault. He pled not guilty, and argued the defense of temporary insanity. Godfrey was found guilty, and at the sentencing phase of the trial, the same jury sentenced him to the death penalty on both counts of murder. Georgia law states that a person my be convicted of murder and sentenced to the death penalty if it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense committed was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of the mind, or an aggressive battery to the victim.” The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52210:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52210:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52210:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia law was unconstitutionally vague and failed to properly distinguish between those cases that would be eligible for the death penalty and those that wouldn’t. Even accepting the law, the Court found no evidence that Godfrey’s crimes contained the elements described in the law.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a concurring opinion where he argued not only that the law was unconstitutional, but also that a death penalty sentencing requires much more restrictive sentencing guidelines. He also argued that the death penalty itself was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., joined in the concurrence.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the plurality’s decision leads to death penalty sentences being imposed on a case-by-case basis, which is more arbitrary than the current Georgia law. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Byron R. White argued that the Georgia law provided strict enough requirements to ensure that the imposition of the death penalty was not disproportionate to the crime. He also argued that the Supreme Court should not interfere with the decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court when they are “responsibly and consistently interpreting state law.” Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52210:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52211:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52211:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nActing under authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Secretary of Labor, after having demonstrated a link between exposure to benzene and leukemia, set a standard reducing the airborne concentrations of benzene to which workers could be exposed. The standard reduced the allowable amount from 10 parts per million (ppm) to one ppm. This case was decided together with Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52211:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52211:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52211:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Secretary had acted without knowledge that the new standard was necessary to \"provide safe and healthful employment\" as mandated by the Act. Nothing in OSHA's administrative record indicated that exposure to benzene at 10 ppm would cause leukemia and that exposure to one ppm would not. Since the Secretary had not made a threshold finding that exposure to 10 ppm posed significant health risks, he was powerless to promulgate the new standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52211:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52217:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52217:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOtis Trammel, Jr. was indicted on federal drug charges. Before his trial, he advised the court that the Government would call his wife as a witness against him. The indictment named Mrs. Trammel as an unindicted co-conspirator and the Government granted her immunity in exchange for her testimony. Otis moved to assert a privilege against adverse spousal testimony to prevent her from testifying against him. The district court denied the motion, and allowed Mrs. Trammel to testify to any act she observed during the marriage and any communication made in the presence of a third party. Only confidential communications between Mr. and Mrs. Trammel remained privileged and inadmissible. Otis was tried and convicted. On appeal, Otis argued that the district court’s ruling violated Hawkins v. United States where the U.S. Supreme Court held that one spouse may not testify against the other unless both consent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, holding that the Hawkins did not prevent voluntary testimony of a spouse who appears as an unindicted co-conspirator under grant of immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52217:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52217:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52217:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for eight members of the court, affirmed the 10th Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the rule from Hawkins was modified so that the privilege against adverse spousal testimony vested in the witness spouse alone. A witness may not be compelled to testify or foreclosed from testifying. Information disclosed privately between a husband and wife is still privileged under a separate rule protecting confidential marital communications. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment, writing that the foundations for the privilege against adverse spousal testimony disappeared long before Hawkins was ever decided.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52217:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52233:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52233:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA New York State police officer stopped a car speeding on the New York State Thruway. Roger Belton was a passenger in that car. When the officer spoke with the driver he smelled marijuana and saw an envelope he believed contained marijuana. The officer also found that none of the car’s occupants owned the car or were related to the owner of the car. After asking the four occupants of the car to get out, the officer searched the car and found a leather jacket belonging to Belton with cocaine zipped inside one of the pockets.\nAt trial for criminal possession of a controlled substance, Belton argued that the officer seized the cocaine in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court denied his motion to suppress that evidence. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that the search was constitutional, reasoning that after the officer validly arrested Belton, he could reasonably search the immediate area for more contraband. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed, holding that because Belton had no way of gaining access to the cocaine at the time the officer searched the car, the officer needed a warrant for the search he conducted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52233:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52233:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52233:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 vote, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court rejected the previously used case-by-case analysis for whether a search is reasonable in favor of a bright line rule. The Court held that a police officer can always lawfully search a car and any compartments in that car after arresting its occupants. The search in this case was incident to a lawful arrest and did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, stating that he joined in the opinion because the majority was unwilling to overturn Mapp v. Ohio, which held that evidence obtained in unlawful searches and seizures cannot be used in criminal prosecutions. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, expressing that the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement clearly gave the police officer authority to conduct the search in this case.\nJustice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that the bright line rule adopted by the majority was a departure from prior precedent. He argued that a clear rule will not provide officers in the field with any greater guidance about what searches are permissible. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in this dissent. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, expressing that the new rule permits officers to search luggage, briefcases, or other containers in a car without a warrant or any suspicion that they contain relevant evidence. Justice Marshall also joined in this dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52233:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52243:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52243:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 1976, Ohio charged petitioners, officers of Hustler Magazine, with disseminating obscene materials for their role in publishing an issue of Hustler that contained a political cartoon that Ohio deemed obscene. The trial court dismissed the charge and held that Ohio violated the petitioners’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause by engaging in discriminatory prosecution. Ohio appealed to the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Eighth District, which reversed the trial court’s decision and reinstated the charges. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio and argued that Ohio’s decision to prosecute Hustler, instead of other magazines that routinely published similar content, was discriminatory. The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that petitioners did not establish the elements for a prima facie case for unconstitutional discriminatory prosecution. To do so, petitioners had to show that they were singled out for prosecution while there were other magazines similarly situated that were not prosecuted, and that the government’s decision to prosecute them was made in bad faith, based upon race, religion, or the desire to prevent their exercise of First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court of Ohio determined the petitioners had not met this burden and remanded the case to the lower courts so that the petitioners could present further evidence to meet this burden.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52243:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52243:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52243:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court issued a per curium opinion for the 5-4 majority in which it dismissed the previously granted writ of certiorari for a lack of jurisdiction. The Court noted that it normally reviews decisions that have received final judgment and that the ruling of the Supreme Court of Ohio was not a final judgment since it returned the case to the lower court and allowed the petitioners to provide further evidence relating to their discriminatory prosecution claim. Although the Court can disregard the final judgment requirement in cases where the refusal to review a lower court’s decision “might seriously erode federal policy;” in this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s ruling did not threaten to erode federal policy to the extent that review was necessary.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that a criminal trial of the petitioners under the obscenity statute would undermine their First Amendment rights. Justice Stewart argued that this violation of rights was sufficient to dispose of the final judgment requirement. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the interest in protecting magazine publishers from being prosecuted because their magazines’ content offends state officials is a significant First Amendment interest, sufficient to allow the Court to review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52243:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52253:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52253:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Democratic Party of the United States (National Party) required that delegates sent to its National Convention were chosen exclusively by voters affiliated with the party, but the state of Wisconsin allowed non-Democrats to participate in state primaries. In the primary, voters expressed their choice among Presidential candidates for the Democratic Party's nomination. Although the Wisconsin Democratic Party (State Party) selected delegates at a caucus occurring after the primary, Wisconsin law required these delegates to allot their votes at the National Convention in accord with the amount of support each candidate received in the primary. The National Party prohibited the State Party delegates from participating in the 1980 National Convention because of non-Democrat influence in the state primary. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the National Party must admit the delegates since Wisconsin had a \"compelling interest\" to maintain the \"open\" feature of its primary system.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52253:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52253:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52253:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart the Court reversed the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Referring to its decision in Cousins v. Wigoda, the Court held that the \"First Amendment freedom to gather in association for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by any State.\" Granting states the power to place delegates in a National Convention over party objections to how they were selected would impair the right of political parties to associate with whom they wish, especially when non-party members could influence the interests of the delegates. Justice Lewis Powell argued in his dissent that Wisconsin's \"compelling interest\" to involve non-affiliated voters in the primary justified this burden on the freedom of association, although the majority held that this could be accomplished without intruding upon internal party rules.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52253:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52257:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52257:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo Miami Beach police officers were charged with burglarizing a local restaurant. Their trial gained much media attention. Local television stations televised a small portion of the trial, thanks to a recent Florida Supreme Court decision which permitted (with certain restrictions) electronic media to record judicial proceedings. Officers Chandler and Granger objected to the coverage and were found guilty as charged.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52257:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52257:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52257:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found no constitutional violation in this case. Chief Justice Burger first denied Chandler's and Granger's claim that the Court's holding in Estes v. Texas (1964) regarded television cameras in the courtroom as offensive to due process. State experimentation with \"evolving technology\" in the courtroom, as long as it does not infringe on \"fundamental guarantees\" of the accused, is consistent with the Constitution. Furthermore, Florida's policy was implemented with strict guidelines intended to protect the right of a defendant to a fair trial. For example, the state required its courts to protect certain witnesses from the \"glare of publicity\" and to hear and consider arguments from a defendant who feels that electronic coverage may bias the jury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52257:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52268:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52268:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act), which authorized the Secretary of Labor to enact mandatory nationwide standards to govern workplace safety. On December 26, 1978, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published a proposal to change the federal standard regarding cotton dust exposure. There was a 90-day comment period followed by a series of hearings over the course of two weeks. After the hearings, the Secretary of Labor, Raymond J. Donovan, determined that exposure to cotton dust represented a significant health risk that warranted the adoption of the new standard. The new standard required a mix of engineering controls, such as the installation of pieces of equipment, along with work practice controls, and required these changes within four years. The petitioners, representing the interests of the cotton industry, challenged the validity of the standard in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. They argued that the Act required OSHA to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the standard. The Court of Appeals held that OSHA had done everything required by the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52268:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52268:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52268:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that that the language of the Act requires OSHA to engage in feasibility analysis but not a cost-benefit analysis. The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress understood that new standards would create significant costs for employers but found the costs necessary to create safe working environments. The Court also held that OSHA reasonably evaluated the cost and feasibility of implementing the standards, and that the decision to implement was supported by substantial evidence.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that OSHA did not have substantial evidence to justify its determination of the cost and therefore did not effectively show that the standard was economically feasible. In his separate dissent, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that the Act unconstitutionally delegated policy-making authority from the legislative branch of government to an unelected official in the executive branch. He argued that the legislative history of the Act shows that Congress could not decide exactly how much authority OSHA should have in enacting standards, so the feasibility requirement represented a Congressional compromise rather than a decision. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52268:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52270:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52270:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 14, 1978, a confidential informant contacted the Detroit police with information that wanted-drug dealer Ricky Lyons was at a residence in Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta police responded to the residence and, without a warrant, searched the home of petitioner Gary Steagald. Although the police did not find Lyons, they did find what appeared to be cocaine. At this point, the police obtained a warrant and completed their search, in which they found 43 pounds of cocaine.\nSteagald was arrested and brought to trial. He moved to suppress the evidence that police found prior to the warrants, and the district court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52270:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52270:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52270:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment prevents all warrantless searches of homes unless there are clearly exigent circumstances. Although the officers in this case did have a warrant to arrest Lyons, their warrant did not extend to the search of Steagald’s home, and there was no judicial oversight to determine if there were grounds for such an extension.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in the judgment.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist dissented and argued that, if the police possess a valid search warrant and believe the subject is in a third party’s residence, they can reasonably execute a search to carry out the arrest warrant. The arrest warrant can serve as a search warrant because it functions to limit the scope of the search. He also argued that the state has a compelling interest in a search because of the inherent mobility of the subject. Justice Byron R. White joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52270:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52272:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52272:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Texas Department of Community Affairs (TDCA) hired Joyce Burdine as an accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers Division (PSC). Burdine possessed several years’ experience, was promoted and was often assigned additional duties. Burdine applied for the supervisor’s position of Project Director, however, she never received a response and the position remained vacant for six months. When the PSC learned it would lose funding unless it appointed a permanent Project Director and completely reorganized the PSC staff, a male employee from another division was hired as Project Director. Three employees, including Burdine, were let go, leaving a male as the only professional employee in the division. The TDCA rehired Burdine and assigned her to another division where she received the same salary as the Project Director at PSC. Burdine sued the TDCA and alleged that the failure to promote her and the decision to terminate her were gender discrimination that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part because the TDCA bore the burden of proof and did not prove it was more likely than not that the male employee hired or promoted was better qualified than Burdine.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52272:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52272:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52272:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Lewis P. Powell, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held that the defendant bears the burden of proof to clearly explain the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions in a gender discrimination case and can do so by introducing the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection. In this case, the TDCA was not required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Burdine and also was not required to prove by objective evidence that the person hired was more qualified than Burdine. The Court held that employers should have discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based on unlawful criteria; therefore, the TDCA was not required to hire a minority or female applicant when that person’s objective qualifications were equal to those of a white male applicant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52272:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52276:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52276:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEddie C. Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness and an employee of Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Co., asked his company to lay him off when it transferred all of its operations to weapons manufacturing. He stated that his religious faith prohibited him from producing arms. His employer refused, so he quit instead. He applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act, which the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division denied. The board agreed that he quit because of his religious convictions, but claimed that this was not a \"good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work\" that would qualify him for benefits. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that it burdened Thomas' First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana reinstated the board's initial decision, calling Thomas' decision to quit a \"personal philosophical choice\" that only indirectly burdened his free exercise right.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52276:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52276:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52276:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Burger, the Court held that the Review Board's denial of unemployment benefits to Thomas violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana wrongfully used Thomas' struggle to \"articulate\" his religious beliefs as grounds to call his decision merely \"philosophical.\" The Court's decisions in _ Everson v. Board of Education_ and Sherbert v. Verner had established that \"[a] person may not be compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public program.\" In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the free exercise clause did not require a \"State to provide direct financial assistance to persons solely on the basis of their religious beliefs.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52276:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52281:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52281:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHazel Morrison was indicted for distributing heroin and obtained private counsel for her defense. Without her counsel's knowledge two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conversed with her regarding a related investigation. During this conversation the agents advised that she have a public defender represent her instead of her private counsel. They also told her that the severity of her punishment would depend on how well she cooperated with them. Morrison notified her counselor immediately and did not speak to the agents about the investigation. She unsuccessfully petitioned the District Court to dismiss her indictment on the ground that the agents had violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Morrison then entered a guilty plea to one count of the indictment. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that Morrison's Sixth Amendment rights had been violated and ruled to drop all charges against her.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52281:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52281:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52281:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron White authored the opinion for the Court unanimously reversing the Third Circuit's decision. For sake of argument, the Court granted that Morrison's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated, but held that this did not merit the dismissal of all charges since the conduct of the agents did not prejudice the outcome of the trial. The Court maintained that Sixth Amendment violations should not be remedied beyond the scope of the harm they inflicted upon the defendant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52281:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52288:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52288:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn September 26, 1974, William L. Lassiter was born out of wedlock. On May 23, 1975, the state determined that William L. Lassiter was a neglected child in need of protection, and placed him in the custody of the Durham County Department of Social Services. The state then placed William in foster care.\nAbby Gail Lassiter, William’s mother, was convicted of second-degree murder in July of 1976, and began serving her twenty-five to forty year sentence at the North Carolina Correctional Center for Women. In 1978, the Department petitioned the court to terminate Abby’s parental rights. It alleged that Abby had not contacted William since December 1975, and that she willfully left William in foster care. On August 31, 1978, the state brought Abby from prison to the hearing, which opened with a discussion of whether Abby should have more time to find legal assistance. The court concluded that she had ample opportunity to obtain counsel; Abby did not claim to be indigent, and the court did not appoint counsel for her.\nA social worker from the Department testified about Abby’s lack of contact with William, Abby’s mother’s unfitness to care for William, and William’s condition. Abby cross-examined the social worker, but many of her questions were disallowed because they were arguments. She also testified on her own behalf and later cross-examined her mother, who denied saying she could not care for William, contradicting the Department’s allegation. The court held that Abby willfully failed to maintain concern or responsibility for William’s welfare, and terminated Abby’s status as William’s parent. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that North Carolina was not constitutionally mandated to provide Abby counsel during the hearing. The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied her application for discretionary review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52288:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52288:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52288:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that North Carolina was not constitutionally required to appoint counsel for Lassiter. Justice Stewart emphasized that due process required fundamental fairness. He wrote, however, that the Court generally only recognized an indigent’s right to appointed counsel where the litigant could lose his physical liberty if he lost the litigation.\nJustice Stewart looked to the Court’s due process standard in Mathews v. Eldridge, determining that 1) Lassiter’s interest was important, 2) the state shared with Lassiter a common interest in a correct decision, but also a pecuniary interest and an interest in informal procedures, and 3) the complexity of some proceedings could be great enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a parent’s rights insupportably high. He refused to hold, however, that indigent parents were entitled to counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights. He acknowledged that thirty-three states and the District of Columbia required counsel in termination hearings, but characterized this as wise public policy and not a constitutional requirement.\nChief Justice Warren Burger concurred, implying that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted because the termination proceeding was not punitive.\nJustice Harry Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. He argued that the unique importance of a parent’s interest in the care and custody of his or her child could not be constitutionally extinguished through formal judicial proceedings without the benefit of counsel. Justice Blackmun disagreed that physical confinement was the only loss of liberty serious enough to trigger a right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause. He also emphasized the risk of error in termination proceedings when a parent lacked counsel.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented separately to take Justice Blackman's reasoning one step further. Justice Stevens opined that the issue raised is one of fundamental fairness, not balancing of pecuniary costs against societal benefits. No benefit to society can justify the state depriving an individual's liberty without due process of law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52288:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52293:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52293:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMinnesota enacted a statute prohibiting the sale of milk and milk products in non-refillable, non-returnable plastic containers. Clover Leaf Creamery sued to overturn the law. A Minnesota District Court found that the statute did not fulfill the legislature's purpose. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52293:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52293:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52293:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. Writing for the majority in a 7-1 decision, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. maintained that Minnesota's statute was not unconstitutional, acknowledging that the legislature had an interest in promoting resource conservation and resolving solid waste disposal issues. The difference between non-reusable plastic containers and paper or reusable plastic containers was \"rationally related\" to the legislature's purpose, and therefore not unconstitutional under the rational basis test set forth in New Orleans v. Dukes. The statute banned sale of all milk in the specified containers and did not distinguish by seller, and therefore did not violate the commerce clause. Justice Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52293:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52294:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52294:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress enacted legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s to adjust the compensation of federal employees, including judges, which provided automatic annual pay raises. However, from 1976 to 1979 Congress intervened and blocked cost-of-living increases which were scheduled to occur.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52294:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52294:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52294:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn two of the years in question, Congress effectively revoked automatic pay increases after the statutes guaranteeing those increases had already taken effect. This amounted to a reduction in salaries for judges and violated the Compensation Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52294:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52299:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52299:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in early 1980, President Jimmy Carter reactivated the draft registration process. Congress agreed with Carter's decision, but did not enact his recommendation that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) be amended to include the registration of females. A number of men challenged the constitutionality of the MSSA, and the challenge was sustained by a district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52299:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52299:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52299:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Congress's decision to exempt women from registration \"was not the 'accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females'\" and did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court found that men and women, because of combat restrictions on women, were not \"similarly situated\" for the purposes of draft registration. The Court also upheld Congress's judgment that the administrative and military problems that would be created by drafting women for noncombat roles were sufficient to justify the Military Selective Service Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52299:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52308:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52308:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Fourth Amendment prohibits the unreasonable seizure of a person by the government, and the Fourteenth Amendment applies that prohibition to the states. On October 10, 1974, George Summers was leaving his house in Detroit, Michigan, as local police officers arrived with a warrant to search the property for narcotics. The officers requested that Summers help them gain entry to the house, and they detained him while they searched the premises. After finding two packages of heroin in the basement, the officers arrested Summers and searched his person. In his coat pocket, they found an envelope containing heroin, and it was this discovery of heroin⎯not the heroin found in the basement⎯that formed the basis of charges against Summers. At trial, Summers argued that the search of his person was illegal because the officers had no authority to detain him during their search of the house. The trial judge agreed and granted Summers’ motion to suppress the heroin evidence. On appeal, the State argued that Summers’ detention was reasonable, given his close proximity to the house when the officers arrived to perform the search. The State also contended that the concealable nature of the narcotics described in the warrant implicitly authorized the search of people found on the property. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan, which affirmed the ruling of the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52308:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52308:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52308:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that a warrant to search for contraband grants police officers the limited authority to detain occupants of a house during the search of the premises. This authority is an exception to the probable cause standard to determine the reasonableness of Fourth Amendment seizures. The law enforcement interests in preventing the flight of occupants of the property named in the search warrant, reducing the risk of harm to officers, and otherwise facilitating the search convinced the Court that the detention of people on the property in question was reasonable. Similarly, the Court held that the exception to the probable cause standard applied to Summers’ detention because it was less intrusive than an arrest and unlikely to be abused by police officers. Finally, the connection between an occupant and the home named in the search warrant gave the officers an easily identifiable and certain basis on which to detain Summers.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which he criticized the Court for expanding the scope of the exception to the probable cause standard for Fourth Amendment seizures. Justice Stewart argued that the State failed to offer a justification for the detention that was unrelated to its interest in investigating crimes and apprehending suspects. He further expressed concern that the Court’s holding could be exploited by police officers eager to detain occupants and make them available for arrest in case the search of the property revealed evidence of criminal activity. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52308:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52320:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52320:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael M., a 17 and 1/2 year-old male, was found guilty of violating California's \"statutory rape\" law. The law defined unlawful sexual intercourse as \"an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years.\" The statute thus made men alone criminally liable for such conduct. Michael M. challenged the constitutionality of the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52320:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52320:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52320:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a plurality decision, the Court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that \"young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse.\" The Court found that the state had a strong interest in preventing \"illegitimate pregnancy.\" The Court noted that \"[i]t is hardly unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females to exclude them from punishment. Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter males.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52320:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52323:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52323:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1974, Philip Agee, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, announced a campaign \"to fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating.\" Over the next several years, Agee successfully exposed a number of CIA agents and sources working in other countries. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig revoked Agee's passport, Agee filed suit claiming that Haig did not have congressional authorization to do so. Agee also claimed that the action violated his right to travel, his First Amendment right to criticize the government, and his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52323:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52323:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52323:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Passport Act of 1926 and other congressional statutes implicitly granted the Secretary of State the power to revoke passports. The Court noted Congress's historical recognition of \"Executive authority to withhold passports on the basis of substantial reasons of national security and foreign policy.\" The Court further held that because the regulations were limited to cases in which there was a likelihood of \"serious damage\" to foreign policy, Agee's claims concerning the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the right to travel were \"without merit.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52323:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52325:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52325:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEngineers James Diehr and Theodore Lutton invented an improved press that cured rubber by controlled heating. The press contained a temperature probe which measured the temperature rise of the rubber from within the press. By repeatedly calculating the rubber cure time from this temperature measurement and comparing this computed cure time to the actual elapsed time, the computer was able to determine precisely when to open the press and eject the cured rubber, which then emerged perfectly cured. The patent examiner, viewing all computer programs as unpatentable because of the earlier Supreme Court decision Gottschalk v. Benson (1972), rejected their patent application because, he argued, the inventors had simply combined an unpatentable program with a conventional rubber curing press. An appellate court reversed the Examiner and ordered a patent to issue. The Commissioner of Patents then petitioned successfully to have the Supreme Court review this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the inventors' attorney argued that the steps of continuously measuring temperature and repeatedly recalculating the rubber cure time and comparing it to the elapsed time were new steps that were worthy of patent protection.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52325:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52325:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52325:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the court held that a machine which transforms materials physically under the control of a programmed computer is patentable. In addition, and without overruling the earlier Gottschalk v. Benson decision holding that a mathematical procedure cannot be patented, the majority in Diehr said the Benson decision did not render all computer programs unpatentable, contrary to what Justice John Paul Stevens argued in his strong dissenting opinion in Diehr. The Diehr court left undecided the question of whether computer programs standing by themselves could ever be patentable. Immediately following the Diehr ruling, software patent applications began flowing into the Patent Office in a steady stream that remains undiminished today. (Thirteen years later, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in In re Alappat, ruled that virtually all computer programs are patentable.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52325:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52332:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52332:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1974 Congress passed the Railroad Retirement Act, which restructured the retirement system previously established in 1937. Under the old system, employees who were eligible for both railroad benefits and social security benefits received both, along with an additional “windfall” benefit. Since this system threatened to bankrupt the railroad retirement program, the goal of the new Act was to eliminate some of these benefits. The new Act divided employees into different classes based on their employment history as of January 1, 1975. Employees who had worked for the railroad fewer than 10 years would not receive any windfall benefit. Employees who were already retired and receiving the full benefits would continue to do so. Employees who qualified for the full benefits but had not yet retired would receive the full benefits only if they had a current connection to the railroad industry or had served for 25 years or more. Employees who did not meet these requirements received a lesser windfall benefit.\nThe appellee Gerhard H. Fritz was part of a plaintiff class of former railroad employees who were eligible for the windfall benefits under the old system, but who did not have a current connection to the railroad and had worked fewer than 25 years. Alleging that the Act created an irrational distinction between employees that violated the Due Process Clause, they filed a class action suit in district court. The district court held that such a distinction was not “rationally related” to the goal of ensuring the solvency of the retirement system.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52332:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52332:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52332:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that laws may create classifications that are not elegant or “artfully drawn” but that are not unconstitutional. The Constitution would allow Congress to deny windfall benefits to all employees, therefore it was not unconstitutional to deny them to some. The Court also held that the distinctions were not arbitrary, as Congress was attempting to “protect the relative equities of employees and to provide benefits to career railroad employees.”\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the statute deserved more consideration to determine whether the adverse impact was a deliberate aim or an acceptable cost of the legislation. Since the Act had two conflicting aims — to protect the solvency of the retirement program and to ensure that employees received the benefits they earned — he argued that the statute in question legitimately pursues those goals. Congress had to make cuts in order to ensure the solvency, and length of service was a fair method of drawing distinctions.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that a “principal purpose” of the Act was to ensure that the employees received the benefits that they earned. Since this statute directly conflicts with the stated goal, the classification cannot be rationally based on the legislation. He also disagreed with the Court’s analysis that did not consider the effect of the statute in relation to its purpose. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52332:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52344:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52344:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe city of San Diego banned most outdoor advertising display signs in order to improve the city's appearance and prevent dangerous distractions to motorists. Only \"onsite\" billboards with a message relating to the property they stood on would be permitted. Upon petition by a coalition of businesses owning advertising signs, a trial court ruled that the ban was an unconstitutional exercise of the city's police powers and hindered First Amendment rights of the businesses. The California Court of Appeals affirmed that the city had exceeded its police powers, but the California Supreme Court reversed this judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52344:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52344:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52344:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron White wrote the opinion for a 6-3 court. The ban's exception allowing \"onsite\" advertising discriminated against noncommercial speech. It allowed businesses in commercial properties to interrupt city motorists so long as it was with their own messages yet barred noncommercial advertisers from causing the same level of interruption. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented and viewed the \"onsite\" exception to the ban as \"essentially negligible\" rather than unconstitutional favoritism. However the Court held that affording \"a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech\" reversed the long-standing Court precedent to show greater deference to noncommercial speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52344:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52347:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52347:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring the early morning hours of January 5, 1975, California Highway Patrol officers pulled over a the driver of a station wagon, Jeffrey Richard Robbins, for driving too slowly at speeds far below the minimum speed limit and drifting across the center lane. Upon smelling marijuana smoke as they approached the car, officers searched the passenger compartment, where they found marijuana. The officers then opened a recessed luggage compartment in the trunk and unwrapped two tightly sealed packages that each contained a pound of marijuana. Robbins was charged with several drug offenses. At trial, he argued that the evidence of the drugs was the product of an illegal search and filed a motion to suppress the evidence. The judge denied the motion, and a jury convicted Robbins. Robbins appealed, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case for the appellate court to consider in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arkansas v. Sanders, which established that officers could not search closed luggage found during a lawful automobile search. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Robbins conviction a second time on that grounds that Robbins did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because the package’s contents could be inferred given the shape, size, and wrapping of the exterior.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52347:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52347:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52347:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 plurality. The plurality opinion held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment did not extend to closed and opaque containers found during the search. According to the plurality of the Court, the record in the case did not support the appellate court’s finding that Robbins did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in the judgment of the Court. In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote that the careful manner in which the packages containing the marijuana were wrapped and sealed demonstrated Robbins’s intention to keep their contents private. However, he argued that the plurality opinion imposed too heavy a burden on police officers by requiring them to obtain a warrant to search every closed container found during a lawful, warrantless search of an automobile.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissent in which he argued that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement should authorize police officers to seize and search any personal containers found within the vehicle. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a separate dissent in which he agreed with Justice Blackmun’s proposed rule. He also expressed opposition to the practice of excluding evidence obtained through impermissible means, especially with the Court’s extension of exclusionary rule to state law enforcement agencies in Mapp v. Ohio.\nHe argued that the harshness of the rule created an unfair advantage for the suspects because it required police officers to not only understand the nuanced case law surrounding the Fourth Amendment, but also to make the correct decision instantly. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the scope a lawful, warrantless search should include any container that a magistrate could authorize by warrant. As the police officers searched the car for evidence of contraband, the fact that the packages were tightly wrapped and sealed was of little consequence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52347:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52349:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52349:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Minnesota law allowed the Minnesota Agricultural Society to devise rules to regulate the annual state fair in St. Paul. Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 required organizations wishing to sell or distribute goods and written material to do so from an assigned location on the fairgrounds. In other words, walking vendors and solicitors were not allowed. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness challenged the rule, arguing that it restricted the ability of its followers to freely exercise their religious beliefs at the state fair.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52349:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52349:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52349:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUsing the \"valid time, manner, and place\" criteria which the Court employs to assess government restrictions of First Amendment activities, the Court held that Rule 6.05 did not violate the Constitution. Since the rule was applied equally to all groups wanting to solicit at the fairgrounds, not making restrictions based on the content of a group's message, and because the state had an important interest in \"protecting the safety and convenience\" of the fair's patrons, Justice White argued that the rule's restrictions were legitimate. Allowing all religious, nonreligious, and commercial groups to move about the grounds distributing literature and soliciting funds would result in \"widespread disorder\" which would be potentially dangerous to the fair's visitors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52349:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52352:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52352:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn reaction to the seizure of the U.S. embassy and American nationals in Iran, President Jimmy Carter invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and froze Iranian assets in the United States. When the hostages were released in 1981, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan affirmed the agreements made the Carter administration that terminated all legal proceedings against the Iranian government and created an independent Claims Tribunal. Dames & Moore attempted to recover over $3 million owed to it by the Iranian government and claimed the executive orders were beyond the scope of presidential power.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52352:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52352:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52352:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act constituted a specific congressional authorization for the President to order the transfer of Iranian assets. The Court further held that although the IEEPA itself did not authorize the presidential suspension of legal claims, previous acts of Congress had \"implicitly approved\" of executive control of claim settlement. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its ruling, limiting the decision to the facts of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52352:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52356:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52356:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Iowa law restricted the length of vehicles traveling on its highways. Iowa justified the law as a reasonable use of its police power to assure safety on the state's roads.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52356:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52356:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52356:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the law violated the Commerce Clause for two reasons. First, Iowa could not prove that the vehicles it targeted posed potential danger to highway travelers. The safety interest was \"illusory.\" Second, the law was \"out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States\" which did not have similar regulations. This placed significant burdens on the flow of interstate commerce", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52356:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52370:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52370:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 11, 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee (CMPC) requested time for a thirty-minute program from each of the three major television networks on behalf of President Jimmy Carter. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) refused to make the requested time available, emphasizing in part the potential disruption of regular programming. CBS offered to sell the CMPC two five-minute segments instead. The American Broadcasting Companies (ABC) and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) each replied that it had not yet begun to sell political time for the 1980 presidential campaign. On October 29, 1979, the CMPC filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), charging that the networks violated their obligations under the Federal Communications Act.\nThe Federal Communications Act of 1934, as modified by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, authorized the FCC to revoke broadcasting station licenses for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access or failure to permit the purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for federal elective office. On November 26, 1979, the FCC ruled in a four-to-three vote that the networks violated the act, rejecting the networks’ arguments that Congress did not intend the act to create a new right of access to the broadcast media and that the FCC improperly substituted its judgment for the networks’ in evaluating the CMPC’s request for time.\nFollowing the seizure of American embassy personnel in Iran in November 1979, the CMPC decided to postpone the broadcast of its thirty-minute program; it successfully purchased five minutes of time from CBS, and later purchased thirty minutes of time for the full program from ABC and NBC. Throughout these negotiations, however, all parties maintained their rights relating to the appeal to the FCC’s decision. The United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, affirmed the FCC’s decision. It held that the act created a new, affirmative right of access to broadcast media for candidates for federal office and that the FCC had the authority to evaluate whether a campaign has begun for purposes of the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52370:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52370:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52370:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes, and no. In a 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court held that the Federal Communications Act created a new, individual right to broadcast access for candidates for federal office. He looked to the language of the Federal Communications Act’s requirement that a broadcaster provide candidates with reasonable access to the airwaves. Justice Burger noted that this section focused on an individual candidate seeking airtime for his/her candidacy, and that a different section of the act already imposed a general, public interest duty on broadcasters to provide time for political programming. Justice Burger looked to the legislative history of the act and the FCC’s past interpretations of the public interest right of access; both indicated that the right of access for federal candidates was a new, separate right.\nTurning to the FCC’s decision on the CMPC’s right of access to the airwaves, Chief Justice Burger held that the act authorized the FCC to determine whether a campaign has begun and to assess the specific needs of a candidate. He argued that the FCC did not arbitrarily set the starting date for a campaign; instead, it looked to objective evidence, taking into account the interests of candidates and the networks. Looking to the circumstances of the 1980 presidential election, Chief Justice Burger determined that the FCC did not abuse its discretion in holding that the networks failed to specifically grant the CMPC reasonable access to the airwaves. He noted that when the CMPC made its original request, ten candidates were formally seeking the Republican nomination and that various states had already started the delegate selection process, among other factors.\nFinally, Chief Justice Burger held that the First Amendment did not give CBS, Inc. the right to refuse to sell the CMPC thirty minutes of airtime. He argued that Congress intended for the act to protect the First Amendment rights of candidates and voters by securing a forum for candidates’ political speech. Justice Burger emphasized that while the act did not grant the CMPC a general constitutional right of access to broadcast media, the act created a limited right of reasonable access to broadcast media for candidates for federal office.\nJustice Byron White dissented, joined by Justices William Rehnquist and John Paul Stevens. Justice White looked to the history of federal regulation of broadcast media, inferring a clearly-defined legislative desire to preserve values of private journalism. He then turned to the legislative history of the act and determined that Congress merely codified the networks’ pre-existing duty to provide access to political broadcasts, attaching the threat of license revocation to give weight to that duty. He argued that the FCC arbitrarily determined that the start of a campaign was the beginning of the networks’ obligations under the act, and that the language of the act itself did not support FCC’s individualized-need approach. Further, this approach essentially destroyed the networks’ editorial discretion.\nJustice John Paul Stevens also filed a separate dissent. He argued that the FCC could not adequately evaluate the performance of the networks’ public interest duty by focusing on the needs or requests of particular candidates.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52370:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52372:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52372:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Watkins was charged with attempting armed robbery of a liquor store in Louisville, Kentucky. He was arrested based on the identification of two witnesses. One of those witnesses identified Watkins as the gunman two days later in a lineup, and later that same day, the police took Watkins to the other witness’s hospital bed where he identified Watkins as the shooter. At the trial, both witnesses identified Watkins as the shooter. Watkins, along with two other witnesses, testified he was at a pool hall at the time of the shooting. Watkins was convicted, and on appeal he argued that the trial court had a constitutional obligation to conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the identification evidence was admissible, but the Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected the argument. Watkins then sought a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ and held that a failure to hold a pretrial hearing does not require the reversal of a conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52372:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52372:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52372:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state criminal court to conduct a hearing out of the jury’s presence whenever a defendant contends that a witness’ identification was improper. The reliability of the identification evidence determines its admissibility, which can be evaluated under the trial judge’s jury instructions and the Due Process Clause is satisfied when the defendant is given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness to test the reliability of the identification. The Court held that while it is advisable for there to be a judicial determination of admissibility of identification evidence, it is not required.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52372:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52384:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52384:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n(This summary was prepared by Tom Feledy.)\nA British company, flying an airplane manufactured by Piper, a Pennsylvania company, equipped with propellers made by Hartzell, an Ohio company, conducted a charter flight in Scotland for five Scottish citizens. When the plane crashed, killing all on board, the next of kin, also Scottish, had a Los Angeles-based lawyer sue Piper and Hartzell for wrongful death. The suit was filed in a California state court, then removed to Federal District Court in California, and finally transferred to Federal District Court in Pennsylvania. There it was dismissed for forum non conveniens under the determination that the case should be tried in Scotland: the crash had occurred, the crash investigation had been conducted there by British authorities, and the pilot's estate, the plane's owners, and the charter company were all located there. However, respondents successfully appealed, claiming that substantive law in Scotland would be unfavorable to their case. Scotland, unlike Pennsylvania, had no strict liability law, which, along with negligence, respondents were relying upon in order to prevail.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52384:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52384:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52384:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 4-3 majority opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the District Court properly weighed private and public interests using the Gulf Oil v. Gilbert test to determine that the trial should be held in Scotland. The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry. Justices Lewis Powell and Sandra Day O'Connor did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52384:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52388:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52388:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJoe Hogan, a registered nurse and qualified applicant, was denied admission to the Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing's baccalaureate program on the basis of sex. Created by a state statute in 1884, MUW was the oldest state-supported all-female college in the United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52388:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52388:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52388:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the state did not provide an \"exceedingly persuasive justification\" for the gender-based distinction. The state's primary argument, that the policy constituted educational affirmative action for women, was \"unpersuasive\" to the Court since women traditionally have not lacked opportunities to enter nursing. If anything, argued Justice O'Connor, the statute \"tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively women's job.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52388:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52393:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52393:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1978, a Washington police officer stopped a student at the Washington State University after observing the student was carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. The officer asked for identification. The student, accompanied by the officer, then went into his dormitory to retrieve proof of age. After the student had entered his room, the officer noticed that the student's roommate, Chrisman, had marijuana seeds and a pipe on his desk. Chrisman was subsequently charged with the possession of marijuana and LSD.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52393:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52393:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52393:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the \"plain view\" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permitted law enforcement officers to seize clearly incriminating evidence discovered \"in a place where the officer has a right to be.\" The Court held that the officer had a right to remain at the initial suspect's elbow at all times, and did not waive his right to custodial control because he hesitated briefly in the doorway of the dormitory room before entering. In short, the officer had obtained lawful access to an individual's area of privacy and was free to seize incriminating evidence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52393:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52399:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52399:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe island of Vieques lay six miles off the southeastern coast of Puerto Rico. Vieques’ population of 8,000 mostly lived in two coastal towns and in a rural area outside of those two towns. Of a total area of approximately 33,000 acres, the United States Navy owned 25,231.72 acres, slightly more than 76% of the island.\nThe Navy’s installations on the eastern part of Vieques were part of a large military complex known as the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility, headquartered at Roosevelt Roads Naval Station. This consisted of four firing ranges; the outer range was a large area of ocean thirty-five miles to the north and twenty miles to the south of Vieques. Two separate inland areas were used for artillery training, strafing, air-to-ground bombing, and simulating close air support; no targets existed in the area between the eastern border of these areas and Punta Este, the easternmost point of Vieques. During air-to-ground training, however, pilots sometimes accidentally discharged ordnance into the navigable waters around Viques.\nCarlos Romero-Barceleo was the governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Along with Radamees Tirado Guevara, the mayor of Vieques, and Puerto Rico’s Environmental Quality Board, Romero-Barceleo sought to enjoin the United States Navy from using any part of its lands in Vieques, or in its surrounding waters, to carry out naval training operations. Plaintiffs alleged harm to all residents of Vieques and violations of numerous environmental laws, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). Under the FWPCA, the addition of any pollutant from any point source into the navigable waters of the United States required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit from the Environmental Protection Agency.\nThe district court acknowledged that the release of ordnance into navigable waters was a discharge of pollutants, but it refused to enjoin Navy operations, instead ordering the Navy to apply for an NPDES permit. The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It ordered the Navy to cease operations until it obtained an NPDES permit. It held that the Navy has an absolute statutory obligation to stop any discharges of pollutants until it obtains a permit despite the importance of its operations to the public good.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52399:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52399:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52399:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron White, writing for the Court in an 8-1 decision, held that the district court was not obligated to enjoin the Navy from operating on and around Vieques island. He emphasized the traditional flexibility of equitable remedies and courts’ responsibility to balance plaintiffs’ need for an injunction with the public utility of the enjoined action. He acknowledged that Congress may control the exercise of courts’ discretion by statute, but distinguished the case from TVA v. Hill, where the Court held that the completion of a dam would violate explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act. Here, an injunction is not the only means of ensuring compliance, as the FWPCA provides remedies in the form of fines and criminal penalties.\nJustice White also looked to the legislative history of the FWPCA, determining that Congress did not intend to take away courts’ discretion in issuing injunctions. He also noted that the district court did not find that the Navy’s operations negatively impacted Vieques’ water quality; hence, requiring the Navy to obtain a permit while continuing its operations would meet the FWPCA’s goal of controlling water pollution.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell concurred. He agreed that Congress did not intend to take away courts' discretion in ordering injunctions, but would have remanded the case to the First Circuit with instructions to affirm the district court’s decision.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented. He also agreed that the FWPCA does not specifically command courts to issue an injunction for every unpermitted discharge of a pollutant, but he rejected the Court’s characterization of the First Circuit’s opinion. He argued instead that the First Circuit rightly gave weight to the FWPCA’s permitting structure given the Navy’s ongoing violation of the act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52399:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52403:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52403:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe MITE Corp, organized under Delaware laws with its principal office in Connecticut, initiated a tender offer for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., an Illinois corporation. The Illinois Business Take-Over Act requires a tender offeror to notify the Secretary of State and the target company of its intent to make a tender offer and the terms of the offer 20 days before the offer becomes effective. During that time, the target company, but not the offeror, is free to disseminate information about the offer to the target company's shareholders. In addition, the Secretary of State could call a hearing, and the offer could not proceed until the hearing was completed. Finally, the Secretary of State could deny registration of a takeover offer he or she found inequitable. MITE Corp. sought and won a declaratory judgment holding that the Illinois Act was pre-empted by the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f), and that it violated the Commerce Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52403:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52403:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52403:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, with regard to the Commerce Clause. The Illinois Act imposes burdens on interstate commerce that are excessive in light of the local interests the Act purports to further. Among the ways a corporation can be covered by the Act is if 10% of the class of equity securities subject to the offer is owned by shareholders located in Illinois. Thus Illinois would have the power to determine whether a tender offer may proceed even if made for a corporation incorporated and having a principal place of business outside of Illinois, with up to 90% of the shareholders residing outside of Illinois. Illinois's asserted interest in protecting resident security holders is insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois would impose on interstate commerce. In addition, Illinois's asserted interest in regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated under its laws not only fails to justify the Act's coverage of foreign corporations, but transfers of stock to a third party do not implicate the internal affairs of a corporation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52403:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52414:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52414:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGiles Lugar leased a truckstop from Edmondson Oil Co. and fell behind on his rent payments. Edmondson issued a suit against him in a Virginia state court for failing to repay his debt. Before the court reached a decision, it issued a \"writ of attachment\" against Lugar. This disabled him from selling any property he owned while the case was open, since Edmondson wanted the property as collateral in case he could not repay his debt. A state trial judge cancelled the \"writ of attachment\" one month later after finding no statutory justification for its issuance. Lugar claimed that Edmondson worked with the government to deprive him of his property without the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He said this caused him financial loss and sought to recover damages from Edmondson in a District Court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. This code provides rewards to those who have had their rights violated because of \"state action.\" The District Court rejected Lugar's claim because it deemed that no \"state action\" had occurred. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected using solely \"state action\" to validate Section 1983 suits. It claimed that certain instances where private parties acted \"under the color of state law\" also validated Section 1983 suits. However the Fourth Circuit found that none of these actions occurred in Lugar's case and rejected his suit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52414:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52414:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52414:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 5-4 court. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents \"state actions\" from intruding unlawfully upon the rights of citizens. Section 1983 offers relief to those who have their rights unlawfully abridged by actions occurring \"under the color of state law.\" The Court decided that a state was liable for damages caused by unconstitutional conduct when two conditions were met. First, \"the deprivation [of a constitutional right] must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State.\" Second, \"the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.\" This includes both state officials and those whom are significantly aided by them. The Court previously found that the states guaranteed the due process of law when placing holds on disputed pieces of property, and therefore they are responsible for violations of this process. Accordingly, when Edmondson used state mechanisms to unconstitutionally deprive Lugar of his property, the state was responsible for compensating him for damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52414:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52419:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52419:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Island Trees Union Free School District's Board of Education (the \"Board\"), acting contrary to the recommendations of a committee of parents and school staff, ordered that certain books be removed from its district's junior high and high school libraries. In support of its actions, the Board said such books were: \"anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy.\" Acting through his friend Francis Pico, and on behalf of several other students, Steven Pico brought suit in federal district court challenging the Board's decision to remove the books. The Board won; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Board petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52419:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52419:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52419:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Although school boards have a vested interest in promoting respect for social, moral, and political community values, their discretionary power is secondary to the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that as centers for voluntary inquiry and the dissemination of information and ideas, school libraries enjoy a special affinity with the rights of free speech and press. Therefore, the Board could not restrict the availability of books in its libraries simply because its members disagreed with their idea content.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52419:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52423:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52423:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1968, Fitzgerald, then a civilian analyst with the United States Air Force, testified before a congressional committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the production of the C-5A transport plane. Roughly one year later he was fired, an action for which President Nixon took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his dismissal was unjust.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52423:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52423:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52423:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the President \"is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts.\" This sweeping immunity, argued Justice Powell, was a function of the \"President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by our history.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52423:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52428:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52428:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1978, a Seattle school district adopted a mandatory busing plan to integrate its schools. No court or administrative body found the district to be engaged in unlawful segregation. A statewide initiative adopted in 1978 mandated a neighborhood school policy. The policy provided for some exceptions including voluntary busing options and mandatory busing if so ordered by state or federal courts. The initiative blocked the implementation of Seattle's mandatory busing plan. School officials challenged the Washington government in federal court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52428:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52428:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52428:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The initiative reordered the educational decisionmaking process by moving the power over busing for purposes of integration to state control. The state explicitly employed \"the racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process.\" This kind of state action places an unconstitutional burden on racial minorities within the governmental process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52428:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52440:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52440:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 4, 1977, sixteen-year-old Monty Lee Eddings and several of his friends ran away from home. Before leaving, Eddings took three of his father’s firearms, including a .410 gauge shotgun with a shortened barrel. Before reaching the Turner Turnpike near Tulsa, the group stopped at a Howard Johnson restaurant. As they were leaving, Eddings lost control of the car, briefly sending it over a curb and into a ditch before regaining control. A witness observed this and informed an officer of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, Patrolman Larry Crabtree, who followed their car and pulled it over. When Crabtree was within about six feet of the car, Eddings stuck the shotgun out of the window and fired it, killing Crabtree, then immediately drove the car away.\nAt trial, the defense presented evidence of circumstances mitigating Eddings’ guilt, including the details of his extensive juvenile record in Missouri. Eddings’ parents divorced when he was five, after which he was shuffled between his mother’s house and his father’s house and also spent some time in a group home. Witnesses testified that Eddings was emotionally disturbed and at a level several years below his age in terms of mental and emotional development. A state psychologist testified that Eddings had a sociopathic or antisocial personality disorder.\nThe state provided evidence of aggravating circumstances. Oklahoma alleged 1) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, 2) that the crime was committed to avoid a lawful arrest, and 3) that there was a probability that the defendant would commit more criminal acts of violence constituting a threat to society. The trial judge found that the state proved all three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge also found that Eddings’ age was a mitigating factor of great weight, but would not consider evidence of Eddings’ “violent background.” The judge then found that the aggravating circumstances proven by the state outweighed the fact of Eddings’ age and sentenced him to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed the sentence, also holding that Eddings' death penalty sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52440:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52440:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52440:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Louis Powell, the Court held that the trial court erred when it failed to consider mitigating evidence of Eddings’ unhappy childhood and emotional disturbance. Justice Powell looked to the Court’s decision in Lockett v. Ohio, where it held that a sentencer must consider any relevant aspect of a defendant’s character or record as mitigating factors toward imposing a sentence less than death.\nJustice Powell then determined that the trial judge refused to consider the mitigating evidence of Eddings’ family history as a matter of law, rather than finding that evidence wanting as a matter of fact. He also determined that the court of appeals limited the evidence of mitigating circumstances to the fact of Eddings’ youth. He emphasized that the undisputed evidence of Eddings’ violent background demonstrated that he was not a normal sixteen-year-old. Justice Powell held that the Oklahoma state courts must consider such evidence when imposing the death penalty, reversing the sentence and remanding the case for further proceedings.\nJustice William Brennan concurred, repeating his view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred, agreeing that the trial court incorrectly determined that it could not consider evidence of Eddings’ violent background as a matter of law. She emphasized that the majority’s holding did not change the Court’s opinions establishing the constitutionality of the death penalty; nor did it determine whether the Constitution permits the imposition of the death penalty on a sixteen-year-old.\nChief Justice Warren Burger dissented, joined by Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun, and William Rehnquist. He pointed out that the Court granted certiorari to answer whether it was constitutional to impose the death penalty on a sixteen-year-old offender, and that Eddings raised the evidentiary question for the first time in his brief to the Court. He argued that both the trial judge and the court of appeals actually weighed the evidence of Eddings’ violent background and found it lacking.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52440:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52461:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52461:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEight black citizens of Burke County, Georgia, challenged the at-large system of elections within the county. Although a substantial number of blacks lived within the county, no minority candidate had ever been elected to the Burke County Board of Commissioners, the chief governing body. To be elected, candidates had to receive a majority of the votes cast in the primary or general election.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52461:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52461:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52461:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the at-large system of elections in Burke County violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that the at-large system was operated as a purposeful device to further racial discrimination. The Court held that there was extensive historical evidence that the county had impeded the political participation of black citizens and that the at-large system minimized even further the ability of blacks to participate in the political process. The Court also upheld the system of single-member districts established by a district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52461:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52462:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52462:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Secretary of Defense closed the Valley Forge General Hospital in an effort to reduce the number of military installations in the country. In accordance with a congressional statute regulating the dispersal of surplus government property, part of the hospital's land was given, free-of-charge, to the Valley Forge Christian College.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52462:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52462:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52462:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that Americans United for Separation of Church and State did not have standing to sue. Justice Rehnquist argued that the group did not pass the first prong of the Court's test for taxpayer standing. Since the source of the group's complaint was not a congressional statute but the decision of a government agency to dispose of a parcel of property, and because the transaction did not involve the taxing and spending power, the group had no standing to sue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52462:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52466:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52466:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nImmediately after Treasure Salvors, Inc. (\"Treasure\") located a 17th-century Spanish wreck of its coast, Florida claimed ownership of the remains. Treasure contracted with the Florida Division of Archives (\"Archives\") to salvage the wreck in exchange for 75% of the recovered artifacts' appraised value. Meanwhile, in the unrelated proceedings of United States v. Florida, the United States won a judgment granting it ownership of the lands, minerals, and other natural resources in the area of the Spanish wreck's discovery. Upon learning of this ruling, Treasure sought a declaration of title to the wreck. Following a second favorable appellate decision, Treasure sought and received a warrant to seize all artifacts from the Archives. Florida challenged the warrant and its issuing district court's jurisdiction, but lost on both counts. On appeal from an unfavorable appellate ruling, the Supreme Court granted Florida certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52466:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52466:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52466:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a plurality opinion, the Court first held that while a state enjoys limited immunity from federal process under the Eleventh Amendment, its officers do not. In the present case, the seizure warrant was filed against Florida's officers in the Archives. The Archive officers, although acting in official state capacity and defended by state attorneys, are not immune as the state itself may be from having to pay a judgment against them. Moreover, the Court found that although a profit sharing contract existed between Treasure and Archives, it did not justify Archive's refusal to surrender ownership over the artifacts pursuant to a federal warrant. Finally, the Court ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Florida's interest in the artifacts because these materials were held in a different district court's jurisdiction. As such, the decision was reversed in part and remanded as to its jurisdictional violations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52466:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52468:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52468:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCornerstone was an officially recognized student organization on the campus of the University of Missouri - Kansas City. The avowed purpose of Cornerstone was to promote a knowledge and awareness of Jesus Christ on the campus. From 1973 to 1977, Cornerstone obtained permission to use university facilities for its weekly meetings and events.\nIn January 1977, the group sought permission from the university to use two rooms of its Haag Hall Annex for two and a half hours every week. University officials asked for a description of the activities that would be conducted at the proposed meetings. Cornerstone told the university that worship in the form of prayer and biblical teaching would be an important part of the general atmosphere of the meetings. University officials rejected Cornerstone’s application for regular use of the rooms, concluding the meetings would violate several sections of the Collected Rules and Regulations of the University of Missouri. These regulations prohibited the use of university buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious teaching.\nOn December 11, 1979, the trial court granted summary judgment to Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at the university, and the university’s Board of Curators, rejecting a motion for summary judgment filed by Cornerstone’s members. It concluded that the university’s ban on religious services in its buildings was required by the First Amendment’s establishment clause. It also held that the university did not violate the students’ free exercise rights, and that any violation was outweighed by Missouri’s compelling interest in the separation of church and state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that the university’s regulation had the primary effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Instead, the Eighth Circuit suggested that a neutral policy toward religious groups would satisfy the university’s First Amendment obligations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52468:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52468:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52468:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., the Court held that the university’s policy violated Cornerstone members’ First Amendment rights. He reasoned that when the university opened its facilities to student meetings, it created a public forum for those student groups; given no other justification, the university excluded Cornerstone based on the content of its members’ speech. While acknowledging the university’s obligation to comply with its constitutional obligations, Justice Powell agreed with the Eighth Circuit that a neutral policy toward religion would achieve this end.\nJustice Powell argued that any religious benefits from an open forum would be incidental because the forum was available to a broad class of both religious and nonreligious speakers and because the university was not showing approval of a particular religious sect or practice. Justice Powell rejected the university’s argument that the Missouri Constitution compelled it to exclude Cornerstone, noting that Cornerstone’s First Amendment interests outweighed this state interest through the supremacy clause.\nJustice John Paul Stevens concurred. He rejected the majority’s description of the university’s student meetings policy as the creation of a public forum, but agreed that the university failed to justify its refusal to allow Cornerstone to worship on campus.\nJustice Byron White dissented. He rejected the argument that the university created a public forum, but also suggested that the university’s fear of appearing to subsidize religion was too extreme. He balanced the state’s interest in enforcing its regulation with the burden on Cornerstone’s members’ ability to freely exercise their beliefs, concluding that the burden on Cornerstone was minimal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52468:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52474:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52474:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFurnace Woods School refused to provide deaf student Amy Rowley with a sign language interpreter. Amy was an excellent lip reading and had minimal residual hearing. School administrators, along with a sign language expert, determined Amy was able to succeed in school without an interpreter. Amy’s parents sued the school on her behalf for violation of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. The Act requires all schools that accept federal funds to provide a “free appropriate public education” to all handicapped students. The Act also allows schools discretion in deciding what steps to take to accommodate handicapped students.\nThe district court ruled in the Rowleys' favor, holding that while Amy was doing better in school than the average hearing student, she was not achieving to her full potential because she was unable to understand as much as she would with a sign language interpreter. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52474:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52474:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52474:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-3 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the lower court decisions. The Supreme Court held that the Act does not require a school to provide a sign language interpreter to a deaf student when she is otherwise receiving personalized instruction and an adequate education. School administrations are allowed to determine what is required to meet a handicapped students individual needs.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a special concurrence, expressing that no interpreter was required because Amy was given the opportunity to learn and participate in the classroom in a way that was substantially equal to her non-handicapped classmates. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the Act requires a school to provide a handicapped student with and education equal to non-handicapped children.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52474:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52490:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52490:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1981, a representative of Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party (\"Party\") died in office. Searching for a replacement, the Governor of Puerto Rico held a \"by-election\" open to candidates of all parties. The Party challenged the Governor, alleging that under Puerto Rico statutes only candidates and electors affiliated with the Party could participate in the by-election. On appeal from a Superior Court judgment favoring the Party, Puerto Rico's Supreme Court modified the judgment holding that a by-election was only required if the party of the legislator vacating the seat fails to name a replacement within 60 days. Before Puerto Rico's Supreme Court could deliver its decision, the Party held an election open only to its members and, then, pursuant to the Supreme Court's mandate, swore in a new representative. Rodriguez appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52490:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52490:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52490:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court, in a unanimous opinion, began by noting that the Constitution does not compel a fixed method of selecting state or local representatives. As such, the Puerto Rican Commonwealth legislature could vest exclusive interim appointment power in parties affiliated with the previous incumbent. This scheme is particularly reasonable in light of Puerto Rico's interest in maintaining continuity of party representation until the next general election and insuring its legislature's delicate balance of minority representation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52490:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52491:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52491:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNicholas Romeo was a 33-year-old man with the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child. Following the death of his father, Romeo’s mother was unable to adequately care for Romeo and had him involuntarily committed to Pennhurst State School and Hospital (“Pennhurst”) on a permanent basis. During his time in the state facility, Romeo suffered injuries on numerous occasions and was physically restrained at times. Romeo’s mother became concerned, and after objecting to Romeo’s treatment several times, sued the facility on behalf of Romeo. Romeo’s mother claimed that his treatment violated the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Romeo’s mother claimed Romeo had the right to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraints, and access to habilitation (training or treatment with the goal of eventual release).\nAt trial, the court instructed the jury that they could only find that Pennhurst violated Romeo’s constitutional rights if the officials had been “deliberately indifferent” to Romeo’s medical and psychological needs, and the jury found in favor of Pennhurst. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Court of Appeals held the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was inapplicable, because it applies to individuals convicted of crimes, not the involuntarily committed. However, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Romeo had liberty interests in freedom from restraint, safe conditions, and minimally adequate habilitation, which could only be violated if three distinct standards were met. An infringement of the right to safe conditions can only be justified by “substantial necessity,” the right to freedom from bodily restraints can only be infringed for “compelling necessity,” and the access to habilitation must be “acceptable in the light of present medical or other scientific knowledge.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52491:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52491:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52491:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes, unanswered. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the involuntarily committed do have liberty interests in safe confinement and freedom from bodily restraint under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, a historical right to adequate habilitation was less clear, made especially so by the facts of the case in question. Because no amount of habilitation would allow Romeo to live independently, the Court was unsure what would qualify as adequate habilitation. The Court held that Romeo’s liberty interests required Pennhurst to provide adequate habilitation, but only as it related to Romeo’s right to safe confinement and freedom from undue restraint. The Court declined to answer whether the Fourteenth Amendment includes a stand-alone right to adequate habilitation, or how to determine the level of habilitation required to protect other liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court emphasized the need to balance the legitimate interests of both parties involved to determine whether liberty interests were being adequately protected. In the involuntary commitment arena, deference to qualified professionals is necessary because of their specialized knowledge and the specific circumstances and risks inherent in a mental hospital. Therefore, such professionals and institutions can only be held liable for infringements on liberty interests when the decision by a professional is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurrence emphasizing that the majority opinion had correctly not ruled on whether a state can accept an individual for care and then refuse treatment or whether the right to habilitation required Pennhurst to offer adequate training to preserve Romeo’s original basic self-care skills. He argued that the record was not adequately developed to address these two issues. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the concurrence. In his separate concurrence, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment did not contained a separate right to habilitation. Any right to habilitation only arises from other liberty interests, not as a liberty interest in and of itself.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52491:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52494:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52494:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1974, Ohio enacted a statute that stated, while the burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rested on the prosecution, the burden of proof for an affirmative defense rested on the defendant. From 1974 until 1976, Ohio state courts operated as though this statute did not affect Ohio's traditional rule that a defendant had to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. However, in 1976 the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the statute placed only the burden of production of such evidence — as opposed to the burden of persuasion — on the defendant, and jury instructions were altered accordingly.\nThe respondents, Lincoln Isaac, Kenneth Bell, and Howard Hughes, each had separate trials that occurred after the 1974 statute was put in place, but before the 1976 decision. At the time of their trials, none of the respondents objected to the jury instructions regarding how the jury should consider evidence of self-defense. The Ohio Criminal Code required defendants to raise any objections to jury instructions at the time the instructions are given. The respondents filed petitions in federal district courts for writs of habeas corpus and used the 1976 decision to challenge the jury instructions trial. The courts denied the writs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, and rejected the argument regarding the jury instructions because it had not been made at the time of the trial. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52494:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52494:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52494:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for a 7-2 majority, ruled in favor of Engle and stated that the respondents cannot challenge the constitutionality of the Ohio jury instructions in federal habeas corpus proceedings. The Court held that the respondents forfeited their right to object to the jury instructions when they did not comply with the Ohio Criminal Code that specified they must make any objections at the time of the trial. The Court also found that the jury instructions themselves were not unconstitutional, as they depend on how a state defines the elements of a particular crime. The jury instructions were consistent with the Ohio state laws regarding to what extent the prosecution must disprove certain affirmative defenses. Thus, the respondents did not have constitutional grounds for the writ.\nIn an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice John Paul Stevens agreed with the judgment of the Court that the petition for the writs should be dismissed. However, he argued that such an error in jury instructions would not have resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. found that the Court’s dismissal of Isaac’s petition on procedural grounds is illogical, given that Isaac’s claim did not exist when he could have raised the appropriate objection at trial. He also found that the double-pronged standard of cause and prejudice that the Court uses to determine if there are grounds for a habeas claim is too high for any defendant to reasonably meet. He was joined in the dissent by Justice Thurgood Marshall.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52494:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52496:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52496:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Massachusetts law required trial courts to exclude members of the press and public from certain cases involving sexual offenses and testimony of victims less than eighteen years old. In a trial involving a male who was accused of raping three minors, the court, acting in reference to the Massachusetts statute, conducted a closed trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52496:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52496:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52496:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the Massachusetts law violated the First Amendment. Recalling the Court's holding in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1980), Justice Brennan reviewed important historical and judicial reasons why access to criminal trials is \"properly afforded\" First Amendment protection. When the court denies access, argued Brennan, the only justification is to serve a compelling state interest. The Court found no such interest here. First, protecting the psychological well-being of a minor, arguably a compelling interest, conceded Brennan, \"does not justify a mandatory closure rule\" as circumstances can vary greatly in this type of case. Second, there was no convincing empirical or logical evidence to prove that victims would be more likely to come forward if the press and public were excluded from trials of this nature.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52496:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52501:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52501:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52501:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52501:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52501:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In the Court's first examination of a statute specifically targeted against child pornography, it found that the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors was a compelling \"government objective of surpassing importance.\" The law was carefully drawn to protect children from the mental, physical, and sexual abuse associated with pornography while not violating the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52501:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52507:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52507:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAmerican Tobacco Company operated two plants in Richmond, VA. Until 1963, both plants were segregated, and the better job opportunities were reserved for white employees. Between 1963 and 1968, the plants were officially desegregated, but the promotion policies were left mostly to the discretion of the supervisors. The best jobs continued to go to the white employees. In November 1968, the company proposed nine new lines of employment progression that linked bottom jobs with the top job a worker could eventually receive. Four of the lines linked majority-white bottom jobs with majority-white top jobs; two of the lines linked majority-black bottom jobs with majority-black top jobs. The top jobs for the majority-white progression lines were the best jobs in the factories.\nOn January 3, 1969, John Patterson and two other employees filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In 1973, alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act, the employees sued the company in district court . The district court held that the lines of progression violated the Act and prohibited the company from using them. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District affirmed and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the remedy. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.\nOn remand, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaints by arguing that the seniority system was exempt from the Civil Rights Act. The district court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision because that the lines of progression are not a seniority system. The Court of Appeals also held that the immunity for seniority systems only extends to those in place before the effective date of the Civil Rights Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52507:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52507:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52507:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the absence of any sort of grandfather clause or explicit distinction between pre- and post-Act systems meant that the section applied to all seniority systems, regardless of when they were put in place. There was no clear legislative history to support the distinction between pre-existing systems and those that were implemented later. The Court also held that such a reading would drastically shift national labor policy away from the balance that Congress intended the section to strike.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. argued that the decision of the Court ignored the crucial distinction between the adoption of a seniority system and its application. The section’s clear use of the language of application on the part of the employer — without any mention of adoption or the union — indicated a more narrow meaning. He also argued that the legislative history showed that Congress meant the Act to have a stronger effect on systems put in place after the effective date of the Act. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.\n Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent where he expressed that the Court misread the section as referring to seniority systems both before and after the effective date of the Act. He argued that the purpose of the section was limited to determining which of the pre-Act systems should be considered legal and which should not; the section has no bearing on any post-Act systems.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52507:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52511:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52511:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1966, at a local meeting of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) attended by several hundred people in Claiborne County, Mississippi, the group launched a boycott of white merchants. The purpose of the boycott was to promote equality and racial justice. The boycott consisted of nonviolent picketing, but some acts and threats of violence also occurred. In 1969, white merchants sued the NAACP for damages as a result of the injuries to their businesses that the boycott caused. These damages included loss of earnings over a seven-year period. The Chancery Court imposed damages liability and the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the imposition of tort liability as well as concluding the entire boycott was unlawful since the NAACP agreed to use force, violence, and “threats” to carryout the boycott.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52511:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52511:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52511:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the nonviolent elements of the protesters’ activities are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. In this case, the members of the NAACP exercised their First Amendment right of speech, assembly, and petition in a nonviolent way to bring about social change. The NAACP is not liable in damages for the consequences of their nonviolent activity and the damages cannot be recovered because the violence or threats of violence were not a proximate cause of the business losses.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52511:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52514:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52514:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1961, Minnesota passed the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act, which established a system of registering charitable organizations that solicit money. All organizations subject to the Act must file extensive annual reports with the Minnesota Department of Commerce. The Department may deny or withdraw the registration of any organization that engages in fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest practices. From 1961 until 1978, all religious organizations were exempt from the Act. In 1978, the state legislature amended the Act to include religious organizations that received more than fifty percent of their funding from solicitations of nonmembers.\nShortly after the amendment, the Department notified the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church) that it must register under the Act. Pamela Valente and other members of the Church responded by suing and alleging that the Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The United States Magistrate granted a preliminary injunction and held that the Act failed the second part of the Lemon Test, that the primary effect of a law must neither advance nor inhibit religion. Accepting the recommendation of the Magistrate, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the fifty percent rule violated the Establishment Clause, but held that proof of status as a religious organization was required to be exempt from the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52514:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52514:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52514:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the fifty percent rule clearly distinguished between denominations and created denominational preferences within the law, and it did not serve a compelling government interest. The Court also held that the Act failed the three-part test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman by fostering the government entanglement in religion.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that, although it is unclear whether or not the Unification Church would be considered a religious organization under the Act before the amendment, the judicial record has assumed it to be, so the majority’s decision to treat it as such is consistent with the orderly administration of justice.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a dissent and argued that the majority erred by examining the case under a different framework than the previous courts, and should have remanded the case. He also argued that the majority should not have rejected the argument that the state has a valid secular purpose in preventing fraudulent charities from preying on the public. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.\nIn a separate dissent, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that it is the Unification Church’s status as a charitable organization that makes it eligible for the registration requirement, not its status as a religious organization under the fifty percent rule, which establishes exemptions. Since it is unclear whether the Unification Church is a religious organization under the Act, he argued it was improper for the majority’s opinion to rule on the constitutionality issue. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Byron R. White, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52514:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52530:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52530:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 created a system of bankruptcy courts as an adjunct to the federal system of district courts. This case was decided together with United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52530:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52530:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52530:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. A plurality held that Congress had essentially conferred Article III powers to an adjunct system of courts and, consequently, \"impermissibly removed most, if not all, of the essential attributes of the judicial power\" from the district courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52530:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52531:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52531:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA new collective bargaining agreement increased health benefits for widows of coal miners who were receiving pensions when they died. The agreement did not increase benefits for widows of coal miners who were still working at the time they died, although they were eligible for pensions. These health benefits were paid out of a trust fund financed by the operators. Gracie Robinson and Juanita Hager brought this class action on behalf of all similarly situated widows. They alleged that requiring the worker to be receiving a pension at the time of death to qualify for increased health benefits bore no relation to the purpose of the trust. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that the collective bargaining agreement failed to meet the reasonable standard set out in the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The LMRA requires pension trusts to be maintained “for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees...and their families”.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52531:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52531:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52531:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the LMRA does not have a reasonableness requirement. The relevant section of the LMRA is merely meant to protect employees from having their benefit funds used for other union purposes. The collective bargaining agreement did not violate any command of Congress, so the Court had no authority to modify its terms.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52531:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52532:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52532:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEdwin Lee, a member of the Old Order Amish, employed several other Amish workers on his farm and in his carpentry shop. He did not pay quarterly social security taxes, and in 1978, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed $27,000 in unpaid taxes. Lee paid the portion due for the first quarter of 1973 and sued for a refund. Lee argued that the tax violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. In the Amish religion, it is a sin not to provide for the community’s elderly and needy citizens. Lee argued that paying the federal government for Social Security violates that provision of his religion by giving the responsibility of caring for the elderly and needy to the government. The district court held that the Social Security tax was unconstitutional as applied. The court also noted that §1402(g) provides an exception to the social security tax for certain self employed individuals. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52532:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52532:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52532:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the §1402(g) exemption only applied to self-employed individuals, not employers and employees like those involved in this case. The Court held that the tax was not unconstitutional as applied. By becoming an employer, Lee entered into commercial activity and accepted certain limits on the exercise of his beliefs.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, stating that the tax objector has the burden of showing that there is a unique reason for allowing an exemption from a valid law when the objectors religious obligation and civic obligation are irreconcilable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52532:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52535:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52535:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nActing on a tip that Ross was selling drugs from his car in the District of Columbia, police officers pulled Ross over, opened his trunk, and discovered a bag of heroin. After returning to the station, another search uncovered $3200 in cash. Officers acted without a warrant in each search.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52535:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52535:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52535:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that since the search was done with probable cause and extended into the realm (Ross's car) of which a magistrate issuing a warrant would have approved, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens defended the search of the vehicle's trunk, arguing that if probable cause justifies a vehicle search, then every part of the vehicle is open to inspection.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52535:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52537:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52537:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn one section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress authorized either House of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General. Chadha had stayed in the U.S. past his visa deadline. Though Chadha conceded that he was deportable, an immigration judge suspended his deportation. The House of Representatives voted without debate or recorded vote to deport Chadha. This case was decided together with United States House of Representatives v. Chadha and United States Senate v. Chadha.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52537:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52537:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52537:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate the Constitution. Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues of bicameralism and separation of powers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that even though the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency, it violated the \"explicit constitutional standards\" regarding lawmaking and congressional authority.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52537:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52540:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52540:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEarl Enmund and two codefendants were found guilty of the felony murder and robbery of Thomas and Eunice Kersey, an elderly couple. Enmund was the getaway driver, who waited in the car during the robbery, did not participate in the killing and had no idea anyone would be killed. Enmund argued that the evidence did not show any intent to kill, so the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment. Despite this, the jury sentenced him to death along with his codefendants. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52540:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52540:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52540:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that imposing the death penalty on someone who aided and abetted but did not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill, violated the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. It is unlikely that the death penalty could deter someone who did not intend to kill or attempt to kill, and putting someone to death for two killings they did not commit is disproportionate retribution. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred, writing that the death penalty is cruel and unusual in all circumstances.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented, arguing that the majority’s decision is not supported by prior precedent. The Florida Supreme Court rejected critical factual findings, so the case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Lewis F. Powell, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52540:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52541:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52541:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn May 1970, Jeffrey MacDonald, an army captain living at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was charged with the murders of his wife and two children. However, after an investigation by the Army Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”), the murder charges were dropped, and MacDonald was given an honorable discharge. Following MacDonald’s discharge, the U.S. Justice Department asked the Army CID to continue its investigation into the murders, and in 1972 the CID created a report on the murders that recommended further investigation into MacDonald. After evaluating the report, the Justice Department presented the case to a grand jury in the fall of 1974, which returned an indictment for MacDonald in January of 1975 that charged him again with all three murders.\nMacDonald moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that the delay between the original murder charge in 1970 and the grand jury indictment in 1974 violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court denied MacDonald’s motion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit reversed the district court by finding that the time-gap between the 1972 CID report to the Justice Department and the 1974 convening of a grand jury infringed on MacDonald’s Sixth Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed and remanded. The Court held that MacDonald could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of the 6th amendment right to speedy trial until after the trial has been completed. MacDonald was tried and convicted of all three murders. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit again held the indictment violated MacDonald’s Sixth Amendment rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52541:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52541:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52541:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is intended to protect citizens from the extended disruptions that may accompany being charged with a crime, such as social stigma, anxiety, and the financial burden of defending oneself in court. In the current case, these interests were not being infringed during the period between the original dismissal and the re-filing of the murder charges because MacDonald was not under arrest, in custody, or subject to any criminal prosecution. Though the situation may have led to stress or other adverse consequence, once the original charges had been dismissed, MacDonald was in the same position as he would have been if charges had never been filed. The Court held that MacDonald could not claim his Sixth Amendment right was being infringed after the dismissal of the original charges.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that MacDonald’s right to a speedy trial was not suspended during the period between the original dismissal and re-filing. However, the importance of allowing the Government to be cautious before prosecuting MacDonald for such a serious crime meant that the delay did not violate MacDonald’s right to a speedy trial.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall dissented and argued that the majority opinion failed to take certain facts into account when determining the original charges and the re-filed charges were distinct events between which MacDonald’s right to a speedy trial was not implicated. Not only did the investigation not end when the original charges were dismissed, but MacDonald was also aware the investigation was ongoing. Multiple times between 1972 and 1974, MacDonald requested the Government complete its investigation and even offered to sit for further interviews. Furthermore, the Government never offered any legitimate reason for the delay in re-filing the charges. Neither the language of the Sixth Amendment nor Supreme Court precedent supported the majority’s narrow view of when a criminal prosecution is taking place. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52541:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52549:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52549:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1972, the United States Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibited federally funded education programs from discriminating on the basis of gender and allowed the government to withhold federal funds to non-complying educational institutions. Government agencies tasked with supplying federal funding to educational institutions were authorized to create regulations to enforce Title IX. In 1975, one of these agencies, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW”) passed regulations that extended the prohibition on gender discrimination to school personnel.\nEmployees of two Connecticut school districts, North Haven and Trumbull, accused the districts of practicing gender discrimination. HEW opened investigations into both districts and eventually warned both that they were in jeopardy of losing their federal funds. Both districts filed separate suits against HEW, claiming that the regulation went beyond the authority of Title IX, which does not explicitly cover gender-based employee discrimination. In both cases, the district court found for the school districts by holding that Title IX was intended to apply to students, not employees. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district courts and held that Congress had intended Title IX to apply to both students and employees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52549:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52549:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52549:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, while Title IX does not expressly include employees, Congress’s choice of words, i.e. “no person” as opposed to “student” or “beneficiary”, implies an intention to broadly cover individuals involved in educational institutions rather than only students. The legislative history of Title IX supports the inference that Congress intended Title IX to prohibit gender discrimination of employees. Additionally, Congress was given the opportunity to view HEW’s regulations and pass a resolution of disapproval if the regulations were inconsistent with Title IX. While such a resolution concerning the employee discrimination regulation was introduced, it was not passed. Therefore, Congress appeared to intend Title IX to apply to employee discrimination, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s regulations were valid.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the language of Title IX, on its face, did not apply to employee discrimination. Legislative history can only override the language of a law if the legislative history is clear and unambiguous that Congress intended Title IX to apply to employee discrimination. In this case, the majority opinion relied primarily on the statements of one congressman when analyzing the legislative history, which is not sufficient to support the majority’s conclusion. Therefore Justice Powell held that Title IX did not apply to employee discrimination. Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent,", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52549:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52552:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52552:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA revision to the Texas education laws in 1975 allowed the state to withhold from local school districts state funds for educating children of illegal aliens. This case was decided together with Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed Alien Child.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52552:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52552:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52552:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court reasoned that illegal aliens and their children, though not citizens of the United States or Texas, are people \"in any ordinary sense of the term\" and, therefore, are afforded Fourteenth Amendment protections. Since the state law severely disadvantaged the children of illegal aliens, by denying them the right to an education, and because Texas could not prove that the regulation was needed to serve a \"compelling state interest,\" the Court struck down the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52552:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52559:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52559:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 13, 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst in the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the U. S. Congress regarding $2 billion in unexpected costs associated with the C5-A transport plane along with its technical difficulties. In January 1970, he was fired, and he believed his dismissal was in retaliation for his testimony. Fitzgerald sued presidential aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield for civil damages and claimed they were involved in a conspiracy that resulted in his wrongful dismissal. Both Harlow and Butterfield claimed to have no knowledge of any conspiracy and asserted that their actions surrounding this issue were undertaken in good faith. Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment, which the court denied. The district court also found them ineligible for immunity. They appealed the denial of immunity to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without issuing an opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52559:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52559:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52559:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity but not absolute immunity. Absolute immunity is only available for specific functions that require a total shield from liability. The Court held that qualified immunity was necessary for the government officials to carry out their jobs and that the courts could adequately determine whether an action falls within the scope of qualified immunity based on whether the official knew or should have known that his/her actions would violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that the “knew or should have known” standard the majority established would often require discovery to determine what a defendant actually knew. He argued that the issues surrounding discovery of such evidence could be handled by a trial judge pending any motion for summary judgment made on the basis of qualified immunity. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Byron R. White, Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, but emphasized that Nixon v. Fitzgerald, a similar case where they dissented, was wrongly decided.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissent where he argued that, based on the Court’s previous decisions that granted absolute immunity to legislative aides, presidential aides should also receive absolute immunity. He argued that the degree of immunity for a government official should depend on that official’s function rather than that official’s place in the hierarchy. Since the President relies on his aides to perform the duties of his office, the aides should be considered “alter egos” for legal purposes and entitled to the same absolute immunity. Without that assurance of immunity for aides, the President’s functionality would greatly diminish.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52559:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52571:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52571:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo non-profit groups merged to form the group Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR). One of the original groups obtained 501(c)3 status from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which allowed donors to make tax-deductible donations to it. Because the other group participated in political lobbying, it did not qualify for 501(C)(3) status and could not offer tax-deductible donations. Since the newly formed TWR also participated in \"substantial lobbying,\" the IRS denied it tax-deduction privileges. TWR alleged in District Court that the IRS's \"substantial lobbying\" restriction for 501(C)(3) status violated its First Amendment rights by imposing an \"unconstitutional burden\" on its ability to receive tax-deductible donations. TWR also argued that the restriction violated its Fifth Amendment equal protection rights since veterans' organizations that lobbied extensively could receive tax-deductible donations. The District Court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the \"substantial lobbying\" restriction did impair TWR's Fifth Amendment equal protection rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52571:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52571:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52571:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. Justice William H. Rehnquist authored the opinion for a unanimous court. Allowing a non-profit to solicit tax-deductible donations is a form of paying for its operations. Pointing to its decision in Cammarano v. United States, the Court maintained that \"Congress is not required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying.\" The federal government does not have to sponsor every activity that the First Amendment protects, and its choice to sponsor one type of activity does not force it to sponsor every related type of activity. The federal government can choose to support veterans' lobbying organizations without also having to fund the lobbying of other groups. Non-profit groups interested in offering tax-deductions to donors can separate with the parts of the organization engaged in lobbying.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52571:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52581:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52581:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPhillip Bosco died with a great deal of tax debt, so the government sued his widow, Lucille Mitzi Bosco Rodgers, to force her to sell the house in which she currently resided to pay off his debt. Rodgers, however, was not in debt and under Texas law, had a separate right to the homestead. The district court held Rodgers had a state-created right not to have her homestead subjected to a force sale. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52581:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52581:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52581:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held section 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 does grant the government power to order the sale of a home itself, even if the delinquent taxpayer is not the only one with interest in the property. However, that power is limited by equitable discretion, which means that the district court should consider a number of different variables including the possible competing prejudices and expectation of the parties involved. The Court also held that, if the home is sold, then the nondelinquent spouse is entitled to a portion of the proceeds because taking away the interest of an innocent third party would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun delivered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the government has the power to sell property not belonging to an indebted taxpayer, but that it should be determined how far the power can extend. The government does not have the power to sell jointly owned property if the nondelinquent co-owner has a right to ban the sale and continue the possession. In this case, Rodgers had a state-protected right to remain in her home, so the government did not have the power to sell her house.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52581:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52583:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52583:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHelm was convicted of writing a check from a fictitious account, a crime carrying with it a five-year jail sentence. However, since this was his seventh felony conviction in South Dakota since 1964, he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under a state recidivist statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52583:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52583:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52583:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Since all of Helm's prior offenses, including his current check-writing conviction, had been \"relatively minor\" and were not crimes against people, Justice Powell held that Helm had \"received the penultimate sentence (South Dakota did not have the death penalty) for relatively minor criminal conduct.\" Powell concluded that Helm was treated more harshly than the state's most violent criminals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52583:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52584:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52584:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1976, police officers of the City of Los Angeles stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic code violation. Although Lyons offered no resistance, the officers, without provocation, seized Lyons and applied a chokehold. The hold rendered Lyons unconscious and damaged his larynx. Along with damages against the officers, Lyons sought an injunction against the City barring the use of such control holds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52584:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52584:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52584:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that federal courts were without jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief. The fact that Lyons had been choked once did nothing to establish \"a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped. . .by an officer who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness.\" The Court held that in order to establish an actual controversy, Lyons would have to show either 1) that all Los Angeles police officers always choked citizens with whom they had encounters, or 2) that the City ordered or authorized officers to act in such a manner. Lyons was thus limited to suing the police and the city for individual damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52584:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52597:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52597:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Texas law permitted public school districts to deny tuition-free admission to minors living apart from their parents if their primary purpose of living in the district was to attend school free of charge. Roberto Morales left his family in Mexico to live with his sister, Oralia Martinez, in Texas. When the school district denied Morales' application for free admission, Martinez challenged the law in court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52597:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52597:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52597:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the Constitution permitted states to restrict eligibility for tuition-free education to bona-fide residents. The Court found that the Texas requirement was \"far more generous\" than traditional residency requirements, since it extended benefits to many children even if they did not intend to remain in a school district indefinitely. No violation of the Equal Protection Clause was found.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52597:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52603:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52603:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA California law dictated that before additional nuclear power plants could be built, the state energy commission had to determine that there would be adequate storage capacity for spent fuel rods. Two utility companies challenged the law, arguing that its provisions had been preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52603:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52603:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52603:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that the California law did not impinge upon congressional authority. The Court found that because the rationale for enacting the law was an economic one, it did not interfere with federal regulations governing nuclear safety. The Court held that Congress had left \"sufficient authority in the states to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons\" and that the courts should not rework the division of regulatory authority created by Congress.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52603:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52623:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52623:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince 1945, Alabama had imposed a severance tax on oil and gas operations. Exxon Corporation (Exxon), along with other gas and oil producers in Alabama, had contractual agreements regarding the tax with the owners of the land on which operations occurred and with oil and gas purchasers. The owners were paid a royalty on all gas and oil produced, but were contractually assessed a portion of the severance tax, and the purchasers were required to reimburse the producers for any severance tax paid by them. In 1979, the Alabama Legislature passed a statute altering the severance tax. The statute increased the severance tax, exempted royalty landowners from the increase, and prohibited gas and oil operators from passing the tax increase on to oil and gas purchasers.\nExxon and other oil and gas producers sued Ralph Eagerton, the Commissioner of Revenue in Alabama and argued that the National Gas Policy Act, which allowed natural gas producers to take steps to recoup state severance tax, preempted the prohibitions on passing along the costs to purchasers. Furthermore, the oil and gas producers argued that the exemption and the prohibition violated the oil and gas producers’ Constitutional rights under the Contract Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Circuit Court of Montgomery County ruled the new severance tax provisions unconstitutionally violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment and the Contract Clause. The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which reversed the lower court’s decision, holding any constraints imposed by the new tax were generally applicable and therefore valid.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52623:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52623:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52623:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no, no, no. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the unanimous court. The Court held that federal law entirely preempts state law either when Congress explicitly declares it or when federal regulation is so pervasive that it is reasonable to infer that there is no space for a state to supplant federal regulation. Specific state laws are preempted to the extent that they stand in conflict or as an obstacle to federal law. The Court held that the National Gas Policy Act preempted the pass-through prohibition as they applied to interstate transactions. The pass-through prohibition could however be applied to intrastate transactions because Congress did not intend the National Gas Policy Act to preempt state regulation of state gas and oil markets. The Court also held that the exemption for royalty landowners did not violate the Contract Clause of the Constitution, because the exemption does not prohibit land owners and oil and gas producers from contractually shifting the tax burden Additionally, the Court held that a statute does not violate the Contract Clause simply because it has an effect on contractual obligations undertaken prior to passage of a statute. Because the pass-through prohibition only created incidental effects on pre-existing contractual obligations, it was not unconstitutional. The Court also held that, the statute only had to pass rational basis review because it did not affect a fundamental interest or create a suspect categorization. Because the royalty landowner exemption and the pass-through prohibition were both rationally related to Alabama’s legitimate interest in protecting consumers from excessive prices, neither provision violated the oil and gas producers’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52623:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52631:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52631:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nErnest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska legislature, challenged the legislature's chaplaincy practice in federal court. This practice involves the offering of a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session by a chaplain chosen by the state and paid out of public funds. The district court supported Chambers on the use of public funds. The appeals court supported Chambers on the prayer practice. Both parties appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52631:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52631:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52631:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court upheld the chaplaincy practice. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger abandoned the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which had been the touchstone for cases involving the Establishment Clause. In its place, Burger rested the Court's opinion on historical custom. Prayers by tax-supported legislative chaplains could be traced to the First Continental Congress and to the First Congress that framed the Bill of Rights. As a consequence, the chaplaincy practice had become \"part of the fabric of our society.\" In such circumstances, an invocation for Divine guidance is not an establishment of religion. \"It is,\" wrote Burger, \"simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52631:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52635:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52635:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLawson was a law-abiding black man of unusual deportment (he wore his hair in long dreadlocks). Lawson was frequently subjected to police questioning and harassment when he walked in white neighborhoods. Lawson challenged the California law \"that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52635:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52635:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52635:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe law was unconstitutionally vague because it gave excessive discretion to the police (in the absence of probable cause for an arrest) whether to stop and interrogate a suspect or leave him alone. The majority hinted that the California statute compromised the constitutional right to freedom of movement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52635:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52636:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52636:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1966, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which gave the Secretary of Transportation the power to issue motor vehicle safety standards. The Secretary also has the ability to delegate that power to another agency, in this case the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA). The Act also authorizes judicial review to determine whether the NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously.\nIn 1967, the Department of Transportation first issued Standard 208, which at that point only required all automobiles to have seat belts. By 1975, Standard 208 had been revised multiple times to require passive restraints, such as airbags and seat belts that would operate automatically and not require action on the part of the occupants. Because of the unpopularity of the standard, in 1974 Congress amended the Act to allow alternative safety measures. In 1976, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman suspended the passive restraint requirement entirely. The succeeding Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams, issued Modified Standard 208, which required passive restraints in large cars of model year 1982 or later and in all cars of model year 1984 or later. In 1981, Secretary of Transportation Andrew Lewis began reconsidering Modified Standard 208. The NHTSA rescinded the passive restraint requirement of Modified Standard 208 because it determined that the restraints would not have the expected safety benefits, so the requirement would not be reasonable or practicable.\nState Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and the National Association of Independent Insurers filed for review of the NHTSA’s decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NHTSA’s decision to rescind the standard was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals held that there was not enough evidence to support the NHTSA’s position and that the NHTSA failed to properly consider alternative possibilities under which the standard could be effective.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52636:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52636:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52636:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that the rescission of a standard should be reviewed based on whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious. Because the removal of a standard often entails the same level of policy changes as the promulgation of a law, it should be reviewed under the same tests. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals, while correctly finding that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious, relied too strongly on an inferred congressional mandate for passive restraints. The Court held that, by rescinding Modified Standard 208 without considering alternatives and consequences, the NHTSA did not provide evidence for its decision and therefore acted arbitrarily and capriciously.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that the NHTSA did not provide adequate analysis for rescinding the requirements regarding airbags and continuous spool seat belts, but it did explain its decision in regards to detachable belts. He also argued that it is reasonable for an agency to reassess its priorities over time, as happened in this case. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52636:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52638:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52638:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTristan Armstrong, a former employee of the 3M Company, which manufactures chemicals in St. Paul, came under suspicion for stealing chemicals that could be used to manufacture illegal drugs. The company notified a narcotics agent, and further investigation determined that Armstrong had been purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in St. Louis. With the consent of Hawkins Chemical Company, narcotics agents installed a radio transmitter in the container of chloroform that Armstrong would receive. By tracking the radio transmitter, officers were able to track Armstrong delivering the chloroform to Darryl Petschen. Petschen drove it to a cabin owned by Leroy Carlton Knotts in Shell Lake, Wisconsin. Relying on this information, the officers obtained a search warrant for the cabin and found a fully operable drug-manufacturing lab.\nKnotts was convicted in district court after the court denied his motion to suppress the evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction and held that the monitoring of the radio transmitter violated Knotts’ Fourth Amendment rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52638:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52638:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52638:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the use of the radio transmitter to track the movements of a suspect in a car falls under the privacy expectations for a vehicle, which are less than those of a house. Since the radio transmitter in this case was used primarily to ascertain where the chloroform traveled and where it stopped, the surveillance did not violate Knotts’ right to privacy in his home. Additionally, the use of the radio transmitter did not serve any function that the police could not have performed visually; the transmitter merely made the process easier.\n Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment and wrote that, while he agreed with the majority’s decision concerning the use of the radio transmitter, he found its original installation to be on shakier constitutional ground. He argued that the installation of the radio transmitter represented a significantly larger intrusion upon a person’s privacy. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun also concurred in judgment and argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily referred to the “open fields” doctrine that was a major issues in two cases the Court had yet to hear. He wrote that he did not wish either side in those two cases to gain legitimacy from this one. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the concurrence in judgment.\n Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment and wrote that the majority opinion’s implication that the this case involved the “open field” doctrine was false. He also argued that the use of technology to augment officers’ abilities was not always automatically constitutionally sound. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the opinion concurring in judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52638:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52652:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52652:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVerlindin B.V., a Dutch Corporation, sued Central Bank of Nigeria in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for breaching a letter of credit. Verlindin alleged that the court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The FSIA grants jurisdiction for actions against foreign parties who are not entitled to immunity. Central Bank moved to dismiss the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, holding that Central bank had sovereign immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but held that the entire FSIA exceeded the scope of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52652:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52652:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52652:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous court, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the FSIA does not violate Article III. The FSIA was a valid exercise of Congress’ power to regulate foreign commerce. On remand, the court of appeals should consider whether Central Bank is entitled to sovereign immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52652:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52659:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52659:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJonathan Lehr, the biological father of Jessica M., filed a petition to vacate an order of adoption. He argued that Jessica was adopted by her mother’s husband in violation of the Constitution because Lehr was never notified of the proceedings. Under New York law, Lehr was not in any of the classes of people entitled to notification of adoption proceedings. Lehr never supported the child financially, had a significant relationship with the child, or entered his name into the state’s father registry. The Ulster County Family Court denied Lehr’s petition and the Appellate Division and New York Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52659:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52659:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52659:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the New York courts. The Supreme Court held that due process and equal protection were not violated because Lehr never had a significant personal or financial relationship with Jessica M. Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the state cannot deny notice of adoption proceedings to a biological father when the state knows his whereabouts and interest in the child. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52659:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52670:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52670:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrom 1972 through 1978, Falls City Industries, Inc. sold beer to Vanco Beverage, Inc., the sole wholesale distributor for Falls City in Indiana at a higher price than Falls City charged its only wholesale distributor in Kentucky. Under Indiana law, brewers were required to sell to all Indiana wholesalers at a single price, Indiana wholesalers were prohibited from selling to out-of-state retailers, and Indiana retailers were not permitted to purchase beer from out-of-state wholesalers. Vanco filed suit, alleging that Falls City's price discrimination violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. The Federal Court found that Vanco had established a prima facie case of price discrimination. The court rejected Falls City's \"meeting-competition\" defense under section 2(b) of the Clayton Act, which provides that a defendant may rebut a prima facie showing of illegal price discrimination by establishing that its lower price to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52670:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52670:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52670:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court held that section 2(b) is not so inflexible. The Court held that the meeting-competition defense required a seller at least to show the existence of facts that would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the seller's lower price would meet the equally low price of a competitor and required the seller to demonstrate that its lower price was a good faith response to a competitor's low price. \"Falls City contends that it has established its meeting-competition defense as a matter of law. In the absence of further findings, we do not agree,\" wrote Justice Blackmun.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52670:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52672:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52672:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1978 the Akron City Council enacted an ordinance which established seventeen provisions to regulate the performance of abortions. Among other things, the ordinance required: all abortions performed after the first trimester to be done in hospitals, parental consent before the procedure could be performed on an unmarried minor, doctors to counsel prospective patients, a twenty-four hour waiting period, and that fetal remains be disposed of in a \"humane and sanitary manner.\" Some of the ordinance's provisions were invalidated by a federal district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52672:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52672:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52672:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court affirmed its commitment to protecting a woman's reproductive rights by invalidating the provisions of Akron's ordinance. Generally, Justice Powell's opinion reiterates the Court's findings in Roe and reasons that certain provisions of the ordinance violated the Constitution because they were clearly intended to direct women away from choosing the abortion option. They were not implemented out of medical necessities. The fetal disposal clause was struck down because its language was too vague to determine conduct subject to criminal prosecution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52672:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52673:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52673:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found by Michigan police in the passenger compartment and trunk of his car. The police searched the passenger compartment because they suspected Long's vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. After a state appellate court affirmed the conviction, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52673:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52673:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52673:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court, after admitting that it had not developed \"a satisfying and consistent approach\" regarding lower court references to independent state grounds, held that it had jurisdiction in the case. The Court held that when state court decisions appeared to rest primarily on federal law, it would infer that state courts believed that federal law required them to do so. State courts could expressly state that independent grounds were being used in cases as opposed to constitutional grounds. The Court reasoned that this approach would avoid the rendering of advisory opinions and would decrease the intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify decisions to the liking of the Justices. In the case at hand, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the search and affirmed Long's conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52673:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52677:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52677:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDr. Chris Simopoulos, a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist, performed an abortion for a 17-year-old girl at his clinic in Falls Church, Virginia. The girl was in her second trimester and did not inform her parents about the procedure, despite Dr. Simopoulos’ suggestion. Dr. Simploulous was indicted under a Virginia law prohibiting second trimester abortions outside of a licensed hospital. The Circuit Court of Fairfax County convicted him without a jury and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52677:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52677:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52677:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No, No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, writing for an 8-1 majority, affirmed the Virginia court. The Supreme Court held that requiring doctors to perform second trimester abortions in licensed hospitals was a reasonable means of furthering the state’s interest in protecting the mother’s health and safety. The prosecution was not required to prove a lack of medical necessity, and Dr. Simopoulos’ actions clearly caused the death of the unborn fetus. This case is different from past cases where hospitalization requirements were unconstitutional, because the Virginia statute allows abortions in outpatient facilities as long as they are properly licensed.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, expressing that the validity of the Virginia statute did not depend on which trimester was regulated. The statute was not an undue burden on the decision to undergo an abortion, so it was valid. Justice Byron R. White and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, writing that the Court should vacate the lower decision and remand the case for further consideration of unclear state law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52677:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52682:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52682:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSony Corporation of America manufactured and sold the \"Betamax\" home video tape recorder (VTR). Universal City Studios owned the copyrights to television programs broadcast on public airwaves. Universal sued Sony for copyright infringement, alleging that because consumers used Sony's Betamax to record Universal's copyrighted works, Sony was liable for the copyright infringement allegedly committed by those consumers in violation of the Copyright Act. Universal sought monetary damages, an equitable accounting of profits, and an injunction against the manufacturing and marketing of the VTR's. The District Court denied all relief, holding that the noncommercial home use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. Moreover, the court concluded that Sony could not be held liable as contributory infringers even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing use. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Sony liable for contributory infringement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52682:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52682:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52682:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that \"[t]he sale of the VTR's to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of [Universal's] copyrights.\" The Court concluded that there was a significant likelihood that a substantial number of copyright holders who license their works for free public broadcasts would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private viewers and that Universal failed to show that time-shifting would cause non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that \"[t]he sale of copying equipment...does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, or, indeed, is merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses.\" For the dissenting minority, Justice Blackmun expressed the views that taping a copyrighted television program is infringement and that the recorder manufacturers were guilty of inducing and materially contributing to the infringement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52682:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52686:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52686:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBob Jones University was dedicated to \"fundamentalist Christian beliefs\" which included prohibitions against interracial dating and marriage. Such behavior would lead to expulsion. In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) changed its formal policy to adopt a district court decision that prohibited the IRS from giving tax-exempt status to private schools engaging in racial discrimination. The IRS believed that the University's policies amounted to racism and revoked its tax-exempt status. The University claimed that the IRS had abridged its religious liberty. This case was decided together with Goldsboro Christian Schools Inc. v. United States, in which Goldsboro maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting for the most part only Caucasian students. The IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an exempt organization and hence was required to pay federal social security and unemployment taxes. After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit claiming that the denial of its tax-exempt status violated the U.S. Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52686:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52686:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52686:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that the IRS was correct in its decision to revoke the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University and the Goldsboro Christian School. These institutions did not meet the requirement by providing \"beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life\" to be supported by taxpayers with a special tax status. The schools could not meet this requirement due to their discriminatory policies. The Court declared that racial discrimination in education violated a \"fundamental national public policy.\" The government may justify a limitation on religious liberties by showing it is necessary to accomplish an \"overriding governmental interest.\" Prohibiting racial discrimination was such a governmental interest. Hence, the Court found that \"not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52686:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52690:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52690:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrom 1967 to 1971, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company, a publisher of a morning and evening newspaper in Minneapolis, was exempt from a state sales and use tax provided periodic publications. In 1971, the Minnesota legislature imposed a \"use tax\" on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in publishing. In 1974, the legislature exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed a year. After the enactment of this exemption, the Star Tribune found itself paying roughly two-thirds of the total revenue raised by the tax.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52690:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52690:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52690:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that while the First Amendment did not prohibit all regulation of the press, Minnesota had \"created a special tax that applie[d] only to certain publications protected by the First Amendment.\" Noting that there was \"substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have troubled the Framers of the First Amendment,\" the Court held that when states single out the press \"the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute.\" The Court concluded that \"recognizing a power in the State not only to single out the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the scheme.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52690:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52695:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52695:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n(Tom Feledy prepared this summary.)\nA traveler at an airport alerted the suspicions of drug agents, who, based upon his behavior and discrepancies in his luggage tags, believed he was carrying narcotics. They relayed this information to fellow agents at his destination airport. There, the agents met him and seized his bags without his consent. Ninety minutes after the seizure, his bags were subjected to a \"sniff\" test by a drug-detection dog. The dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance in one of the bags. The agents then obtained a warrant for that suitcase, which turned out to contain cocaine, and the man was convicted of the drug offense. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on the ground that the ninety minutes exceeded the investigative stop permitted by _Terry v. Ohio\n, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure privilege.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52695:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52695:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52695:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. Seizures pursuant to investigative detentions are lawful only if they are limited in scope, as described in Terry, and evidence resulting from such unlawful seizures must be suppressed. The \"sniff\" of a properly trained narcotics detection dog does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52695:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52697:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52697:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Minnesota law allowed taxpayers to deduct from their state income tax expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children's elementary or secondary school education. Parents who sent their children to parochial school also qualified for the deductions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52697:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52697:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52697:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the law did not have \"the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the non-public schools,\" nor did it \"excessively entangle\" the state in religion. Most importantly, argued Justice Rehnquist, the deductions were available to all parents; in effect, Minnesota did not \"confer any imprimatur of state approval\" on religious schools. Thus, the law passed the Court's three-pronged test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) used to evaluate claims regarding the Establishment Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52697:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52698:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52698:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 14, 1978, a Texas jury in Bell County found Thomas A. Barefoot guilty of the murder of a police officer. A separate sentencing hearing was held before the same jury to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. The prosecution called two psychiatrists to the stand who testified that Barefoot was likely to commit further acts of violence and would remain a danger to society. The jury sentenced Barefoot to death. Barefoot appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and argued that the use of the psychiatrists to testify as to future conduct was unconstitutional because psychiatric testimony cannot accurately predict future dangerousness and is likely to produce erroneous convictions. He also argued that this specific testimony was unconstitutional, as neither psychiatrist had personally examined Barefoot. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence.\nBarefoot’s execution was scheduled for September 7, 1980. A stay of execution was granted by the Supreme Court pending the filing and disposition of a petition of certiorari. The petition was denied, and Barefoot’s execution was rescheduled for October 1981. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Barefoot’s application for habeas corpus, and he filed a petition for habeas corpus in district court. The district court granted a stay of execution pending action on the petition, and later denied the petition and vacated the stay of execution. The district court also issued a certificate of probable cause that would allow Barefoot to continue the appeals process. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals again denied Barefoot’s petition for habeas corpus and motion for a stay of execution. Barefoot appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth District for a stay of execution, pending the consideration of his appeal of the denial of his petition for habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals denied the motion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52698:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52698:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52698:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that, in denying the stay of execution, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit necessarily examined the decision of the district court on the merits of the case. Although the Court of Appeals may not formally affirm the judgment of the lower court, the denial of the stay of execution serves the same purpose. The Court also held that the psychiatrists’ testimony did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights because the testimony falls under precedents that allow for predictions of future behavior to be considered relevant evidence in sentencing hearings. The reliability of such evidence should be weighed according to the rules of evidence by the fact-finder. The Court also held that the testimony of expert witnesses need not rely on personal examination and can be in the form of responses to hypothetical questions.\n Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Court of Appeals made procedural errors, but that the Supreme Court reviewed the case on the merits, and he concurred with the majority’s opinion as to the merits of the case.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent in which he argued that a defendant must be afforded a hearing on the merits of his case when he petitions for a writ of habeas corpus unless the case can be dismissed as frivolous. Because a hearing on the merits can often be time-consuming, the Court of Appeals should have granted a stay of execution to allow enough time to properly consider the case. He also argued that death penalty jurisprudence placed an added emphasis on the importance of careful consideration, and the majority opinion’s suggestion of a summary approach goes against those precedents. He also cited his opinion that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that, while the possibly specious testimony of psychiatrists would be acceptable in a regular case, in a capital case a higher standard of reliability must be expected. Because unreliable scientific evidence is likely to prejudice the jury, it must be held to a stricter standard of accuracy than psychiatric testimony can be proven to meet. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52698:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52699:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52699:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDemocrats in control of the New Jersey Legislature designed a plan for congressional redistricting in the state which the outgoing Democratic governor signed into law. Even though the district populations differed by less than one percent from each other, they were clearly drawn to maximize Democratic power in the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52699:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52699:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52699:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nEven though the population differences in the districts were slight, the Court held that they were unconstitutional because they \"were not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve population equality.\" Justice Brennan upheld past Court decisions (Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 1973, and Wesberry v. Sanders, 1964) and argued that relying on a strict numerical standard of populations to assess district equality would be misguided.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52699:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52705:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52705:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1973, Raymond Dirks was an officer of a New York-based firm that specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. On March 6, he received insider information that Equity Funding of America, a corporation engaged primarily in selling life insurance and mutual funds, had vastly overstated assets as a result of fraudulent company policies. Dirks did not do any business with Equity Funding, but he decided to investigate and, during the investigation, discussed his information with investors who did hold Equity Funding stock. Some of these people sold their stock based on Dirks’ information. Dirks also urged the Wall Street Journal to publish an article on the fraud allegations, but it would not for fear of the story being libelous. The drop in Equity Funding’s share price caused the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation. On April 2, the Wall Street Journal ran a story that was based largely on Dirks’ information, and the SEC then began investigating Dirks’ role in the affair.\nIn their investigation of Dirks’ actions, the SEC found that he had aided and abetted the violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by informing other members of the investment community of the fraud allegations. However, because he assisted in exposing the fraud, Dirks was only censured. Dirks appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed the SEC’s decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52705:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52705:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52705:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the duty to disclose information arises from a financial relationship with one of the parties, not just the possession of information. The Court also held that an insider is only liable for inside trading when he makes a profit on the information before disclosing. Because Dirks did not have a financial relationship with Equity Funding, nor did he make a profit from the information, he neither had a duty to disclose nor did he violate the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that Dirks served as a proxy to provide insider information to people who did have a financial interest in Equity Funding and were able to act on his information. By fulfilling this role, he is liable. He also argued that that the majority’s opinion essentially rewards Dirks for participating in the affair, which is counterproductive for the purposes of enforcing the federal securities acts. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52705:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52707:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52707:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSheila Meyers worked as an Assistant District Attorney for just over five years when her boss transferred her to a different section of the criminal court. Meyers strongly opposed this transfer, and made her feelings known to several supervisors, including District Attorney Harry Connick. Before the official transfer took place, Meyers prepared a questionnaire asking for her co-workers views on the transfer policy, office morale, and the level of confidence in supervisors. When Connick learned of the questionnaire, he immediately terminated Meyers. He said he fired her because she refused to accept her transfer. He also said that distributing the questionnaire was insubordination. Meyers sued, alleging that her termination violated her First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled in favor of Meyers and ordered her reinstatement, payment of back pay, damages, and attorney fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52707:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52707:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52707:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that speech of public employees is generally only protected when they speak on matters of public concern. Meyers’ speech only dealt with personal and internal office issues. The district court also erred in placing too high of a burden on Connick to show that Meyers’ speech substantially interfered with the operation of the office. It is sufficient to show that the employer reasonably believed Meyers’ speech would interfere with office operations.\nJustice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, expressing his view that speech concerning the way government is run is protected under the First Amendment. Meyers’ questionnaire addressed that subject and interfered with the operation of the office, so her termination violated the First Amendment. Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52707:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52709:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52709:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Perry Education Association (PEA) won an election against the Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA) to serve as the sole union representing teachers in Perry Township, Indiana. As part of the collective-bargaining agreement reached between PEA and the Board of Education of Perry Township, PEA obtained exclusive rights to use the internal school mail system and PLEA was denied access. PLEA contended that denying their members use of the mail system violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A Federal District Court ruled against PLEA but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52709:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52709:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52709:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron White delivered the opinion of a 5-4 court. The school board chose to grant exclusive access to the official teachers union in order to facilitate a collective-bargaining agreement. It did not act to suppress the speech of rival teachers unions. The school board entrusted PEA with obligations as the sole representative of teachers that would require the use of the mail system. PLEA did not have these obligations and could communicate effectively though many other channels. Since the mail system was not a \"public forum,\" PLEA had no unassailable right to access it. In his dissent, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. contended that the mail system constituted government property and PLEA lost access privileges because its viewpoints differed from those of the official union.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52709:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52712:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52712:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA jury in the Bleckly County Superior Court convicted Alpha Stephens of murder and sentenced him to the death penalty based on two of three possible statutory aggravating circumstances. While Stephens’ appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled one of the aggravating circumstances that justify the death penalty invalid. After exhausting all post conviction remedies, Stephens filed a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.\nOn certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court certified the Supreme Court of Georgia to answer the question of what state law premises support affirming Stephens death sentence, even though one of the aggravating circumstances was now invalid. The Georgia court responded, holding that the jury used other aggravating circumstances along with the invalid one to sentence Stephens, so his sentence should stand.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52712:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52712:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52712:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision, Justice John Paul Stephens wrote the majority opinion reversing the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that where there are other valid aggravating circumstances to substantiate the death sentence, habeas relief is not available. The jury did not rely solely on the invalid factor in making its decision. Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurrence, stating that the sentence could stand on a line of cases where convictions are upheld if any of the counts are sustainable. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence emphasizing the application of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capitol sentencing cases.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent condemning capital punishment as cruel and unusual. He also felt the aggravating circumstance used in making the sentencing decision was constitutionally defective. Justice William J. Brennan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52712:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52717:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52717:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn apportioning its state legislative seats, the State of Wyoming made provisions to allocate to each county at least one state representative. With the state's total population and its sixty-four House seats, the ideal apportionment would have been 7,337 persons per representative. Given the guarantee of county representation, Niobrara County, with a population of less than half the ideal (2,924), was allocated a House seat.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52717:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52717:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52717:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court upheld the Wyoming apportionment scheme and found no Fourteenth Amendment violations. Justice Powell argued that using counties as legislative districts and assuring at least one representative per county supported \"substantial and legitimate state concerns.\" Since the population variations in the Wyoming plan were the result of the consistent application of a nondiscriminatory and legitimate state policy, the plan was consistent with the Constitution. Any dilution of voting strength which the constituents of the other sixty-three representatives may have experienced as a result of Niobrara's relatively small population was minimal and irrelevant given the advantages of the Wyoming scheme.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52717:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52724:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52724:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received an anonymous tip that Lance and Susan Gates were selling drugs out of their home. After observing the Gates's drug smuggling operation in action, police obtained a warrant and upon searching the suspects' car and home uncovered large quantities of marijuana, other contraband, and weapons.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52724:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52724:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52724:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the test for probable cause which the Court had announced in Spinelli v. United States (1969). Justice Rehnquist argued that an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are important in determining probable cause, but that those issues are intertwined and should not be rigidly applied. He argued that the \"totality-of-the-circumstances\" approach to probable cause was the correct one to glean from Spinelli, and that the law enforcement officials who obtained a warrant abided by it in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52724:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52741:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52741:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Kansas Power & Light Company (KPL) entered long-term contracts in 1977 governing its purchase of natural gas from the Energy Reserves Group (ERG), a Kansas-based oil company. The contracts contained \"price escalator\" clauses which provided for gas prices to rise to the levels set by governmental authorities. In 1978, the federal government established a new system for regulating natural gas prices under the Natural Gas Policy Act. The Act set maximum lawful prices that could be charged for different types of natural gas and applied these price levels to intrastate gas markets. The Act allowed states to set maximum price levels below federal levels, which Kansas did under the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act (Kansas Act). When ERG tried to raise its prices to the higher federal levels using the \"price escalator\" clause, KPL insisted that it was only legally obligated to buy gas at the lower prices set by the Kansas Act. ERG claimed that KPL violated the contract by refusing to pay federal prices. In response, KPL argued that the Kansas Act clearly prohibited the use of federal price levels to trigger \"price escalator\" clauses. After a state trial court ruled in favor of KPL, ERG claimed that the Kansas Act violated the Contract Clause by preventing federal price changes from affecting state contracts. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the Kansas Act did not violate the Contract Clause since it was a legitimate effort by the state of Kansas to protect its economy from rapid price changes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52741:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52741:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52741:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court determined that ERG did not have its contractual rights \"substantially impaired\" and found that the state of Kansas had \"significant and legitimate public purpose[s]\" for passing the Kansas Act. The contract between ERG and KPL facilitated changes in prices according to governmental price controls, and the new state price controls adhered to federal guidelines. In passing the Kansas Act, the state \"exercised its police powers to protect consumers from the escalation of natural gas prices.\" The Natural Gas Policy Act set maximum price levels for natural gas but explicitly permitted states to lower these levels. Therefore \"price escalator\" clauses included in intrastate contracts would adhere to lawfully enacted state price levels.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52741:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52745:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52745:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBush, an aerospace engineer at the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (Center), a facility operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), made a series of public comments critical of the Center. Lucas, the Center s director, demoted Bush on the ground that the comments were false and misleading. The Federal Employee Appeals Authority upheld the demotion, but the Civil Service Commission s (CSC) Appeals Review Board later found that the demotion had violated his First Amendment rights. NASA accepted the Board_s recommendation that Bush be restored to his former position retroactively, with back pay. While his administrated appeal was pending, Bush brought suit against Lucas in Alabama state court, seeking to recover damages for violation of his First Amendment rights. Lucas removed the action to federal district court, which granted summary judgment for Lucas. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Bush had no cause of action for damages under the First Amendment in view of the available remedies under the CSC regulations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52745:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52745:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52745:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo; not under the CSC regulations. The federal judiciary, pursuant to its common law authority, has the power to recognize new causes of action in absence of, or to supplement, statutory remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated its relief is to be exclusive. In determining whether judicial relief should be granted, federal courts are (1) to pay particular attention to special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, and (2) to ascertain whether the purpose and comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme precludes judicial remedies where statutory relief is available. The administrative scheme in this case reflected Congress_ attempt to balance the competing interests of protecting the First Amendment rights of federal employees and maintaining a disciplined and effective workforce. Congress, not the judiciary, is in the best position to regulate the employee relations. Grant of supplementary judicial relief would disrupt this balance and is therefore inappropriate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52745:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52747:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52747:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter extensive hearings in the mid-1960s, the Hawaii legislature discovered that while Federal and State governments owned nearly 49 percent of the land in Hawaii, another 47 percent was owned by only 72 private landowners. To combat this concentration of ownership, the legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967. The Act adopted a method of redistribution in which title in real property could be taken from lessors and transferred to lessees. Frank E. Midkiff, a landholder, challenged the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52747:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52747:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52747:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Public Use Clause did not preclude Hawaii from taking title in real property, with just compensation, for the purpose of reducing the concentration of ownership. Noting that Hawaii's statute was rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court argued that \"debates over the wisdom of takings\" were best carried out by legislatures, not by federal courts. The Court also held that the fact that the property taken by eminent domain was transferred to private beneficiaries did not condemn the law to having a solely private purpose.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52747:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52748:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52748:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAccording to its bylaws, membership in the United States Jaycees was limited to males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Females and older males were limited to associate membership in which they were prevented from voting or holding local or national office. Two chapters of the Jaycees in Minnesota, contrary to the bylaws, admitted women as full members. When the national organization revoked the chapters' licenses, they filed a discrimination claim under a Minnesota anti-discrimination law. The national organization brought a lawsuit against Kathryn Roberts of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, who was responsible for the enforcement of the anti-discrimination law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52748:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52748:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52748:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Jaycees chapters lacked \"the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women.\" The Court reasoned that making women full members would not impose any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association. The Court thus held that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against women justified enforcement of the state anti-discrimination law. The Court found that the Minnesota law was not aimed at the suppression of speech and did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52748:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52749:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52749:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Immigration and Nationality Act grants the Attorney General the power to suspend the deportation of any otherwise deportable alien if the person has been consistently physically present in the United States for at least seven years, is of good moral character, and whose deportation would represent great hardship to the person and/or family members.\nPadrungsi Phinpathya, a citizen of Thailand, first entered the United States in 1969 as a nonimmigrant student. She and her husband, a Thai citizen who entered the country in 1968, were granted permission to stay until July 1971. When their visas expired, they chose to stay without the permission of the proper authorities. In January 1977, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) commenced deportation processes on the couple. They applied for a suspension, which an immigration judge granted to Phinpathya’s husband but denied for her because she did not meet the continuous residency requirement. Phinpathya’s own testimony showed that she left the country in 1974 and improperly obtained a visa from the US consular office in Thailand for her return three months later.\nThe Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s ruling and held that Phinpathya’s illegal status when she left and returned to the US made the absence “meaningfully interruptive” of her residency and made her ineligible for the suspension of deportation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, despite her absence, Phinpathya’s intent was always to return to the US.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52749:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52749:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52749:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 9-0 court. The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of any language or legislative history indicating flexibility in the requirements, the section should be interpreted based on its plain meaning. Other immigration legislation has shown that when Congress intends there to be exceptions, the wording of the relevant statute reflects that intention. The Court also held that Congress intended the requirements to present a high threshold to suspension, and therefore the “continuous presence” requirement should not be interpreted loosely.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment where he argued that Phinpathya’s unexplained three-month absence from the country was enough to disqualify her from a suspension of deportation without requiring the Supreme Court to address the issue of the meaning of the “continuous presence” requirement. He argued further that Congress did not intend the requirement to be taken literally in situations that would be unreasonable, but rather it was intended to prevent abuses. Legislative and judicial history supported a more flexible reading of the requirement. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52749:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52762:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52762:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTilden N. Engle was an employee of a plant owned and operated by the Chrysler Corporation. Chrysler dismissed him on December 4th, 1972. Engle suffered from alcoholism, and he drank heavily following his dismissal. On December 7th, he consumed four anti-anxiety Librium pills and large quantities of whiskey. That day, he returned to the plant and told his nephew Chrysler employee Renus Engle, that he was going to kill someone. Renus Engle testified that the Tilden had a nervous pitch to his voice and tears in his eyes. According to Renus Engle, the respondent had been drinking but was not drunk.\nEngle went to the office of Donald Ambrose, a clerk, and asked for Regis Lantzy, whom Engle believed was responsible for his termination. Ambrose said that Lantzy was not present, and later testified that Engle looked strange, as if something was troubling him. A short time later, Engle found Lantzy in the plant. Engle shot Lantzy with a pistol in front of several workers. Lantzy tried to flee, and Engle shot him several more times. He stood over the body briefly, then returned to Ambrose's office and surrendered to a security guard. The guard smelled alcohol on Engle's breath, but officers who arrived later on the scene did not detect the odor of alcohol. On December 8th, Engle gave a statement to the police. He admitted to purposefully shooting and killing Lantzy, albeit under the influence of alcohol.\nOn trial for murder in July, 1973, Engle's sole defense was temporary insanity due to the effects of alcohol, Librium, and a dissociative reaction, a temporary mental disorder often accompanied by memory loss. He stated that he remembered nothing between drinking the morning of December 7th and the moment he awoke in jail. He did not remember making a statement to the police.\nThe trial judge instructed the jury that malice --a necessary element for conviction-- is \"implied from any deliberate and cruel act against another person.\" Regarding Engle's use of a pistol, the trial judge instructed the jury that \"a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts.\" He also instructed the jury to consider the number and location of Lantzy's wounds when considering the issue of malice. Engle was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. He appealed, arguing the jury instructions constituted reversible error.\nA unanimous U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed. It rejected Koehler's argument that Engle's failure to make a timely objection prevented him from raising the issue of jury instruction on appeal, noting that Michigan courts do not enforce a contemporaneous objection rule. The court held that the jury could have inferred from the instructions that the burden of proving lack of malice and intent lay with Engle. He also argued that the jury could have presumed from the use of a deadly weapon and the number and location of Lantzy's wounds that these facts alone constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Engle's malice and intent. He held that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, pointing to conflicting evidence about Engle's state of mind at the time of the shooting.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52762:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52762:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52762:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a per curiam opinion delivered by an equally divided Court, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's judgment without further comment.\nJustice Marshall took no part in the decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52762:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52769:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52769:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1979, Esmail Yermian was hired by Gulton Industries, a company that contracts for the Department of Defense. Because Yermian would have access to classified materials in the course of his job, he had to fill out a security questionnaire. On the form, Yermian failed to note that he had been convicted of mail fraud in 1978. He also claimed to have worked at two companies where he had never been employed. He signed a certificate stating that his answers were “true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge.” Government investigators later discovered that Yermian’s statements were false. When the investigators confronted him with the statements, he admitted to knowingly providing false information.\nAt his trial, Yermian requested a jury instruction requiring the government to prove that he had knowledge not only of the falseness of his statements, but also that he had knowledge that a federal agency had jurisdiction. The district court rejected the instruction, and Yermian was convicted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the district court had erred by not allowing the requested instruction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52769:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52769:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52769:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the language of the statute applied the requirement of knowledge to the act of making false statements, rather than the jurisdiction. The Court also held that there was no legislative history to support the reading that Congress intended intent to deceive the federal government to be an element of the crime.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that there was a great deal of ambiguity in the statute regarding to which element the knowledge requirement applied. He argued that, without any clues in the statute, the majority’s opinion cannot simply decide what the phrase “knowingly and willfully” is meant to modify. He also argued that there was no evidence to suggest that Congress intended to expand the definition of the crime to any false statement that could fall under the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52769:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52770:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52770:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1981, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) entered into negotiations with ABC and CBS regarding televising the NCAA football games. Each of those companies had the rights to air 14 live games per season as well as to negotiate individually with the competing schools, and they were required to pay a “minimum aggregate compensation” to the participating schools. The goal of the plan was to televise games in such a way as to not drastically decrease live attendance at the games. The NCAA did not permit any of the schools to negotiate outside of this plan.\nThe University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia are both members of the College Football Association (CFA), a group within the NCAA that was formed to represent and promote the interests of the major football schools. These schools, along with the other schools in the CFA, negotiated a separate contract with NBC that would allow for more televised games and greater revenues for the schools in question. The NCAA then announced that it would take disciplinary action against any school that complied with the CFA plan as opposed to the NCAA one. The respondent schools took the issue to the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which found that the NCAA contract violated the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals for Oklahoma affirmed the judgment of the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52770:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52770:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52770:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the NCAA plan creates a structure in which the market cannot be responsive to viewer demands in terms of price and output. Since the viewers of college football games can be defined as a distinct market, a plan that places the NCAA in complete control of the broadcasts that reach this market creates the type of monopoly that the Sherman Act was meant to prevent. By limiting the number of live broadcasts, the Court found that the NCAA was attempting to artificially increase the value of live tickets, in the same way that a monopolist seeks to manipulate the market by limiting output.\nIn his dissent, Justice Byron R. White argued that the Court erred by treating the NCAA as a purely commercial and profit-oriented organization. Because the NCAA is uniquely linked to both amateur athletics and higher education, it has been allowed a great deal of leeway in regulation that would be condemned in a purely business environment. He further argued that the NCAA plan “reflects the NCAA’s fundamental policy of preserving amateurism and integrating athletics and education.” Justice William H. Rehnquist joined Justice White in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52770:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52778:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52778:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1972 Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a position with King & Spalding (Firm), a law firm in Atlanta, Georgia. During recruitment, Hishon had been told that after five or six years there was a possibility of promotion to partner; associates with “satisfactory evaluations” would be promoted to partner on a “fair and equal basis.” Hishon claimed to have relied on this information when making her decision to accept employment with the Firm. After six years of employment, Hishon was considered for admission to the partnership and was ultimately rejected. One year later Hishon was again considered for admission and again rejected. She was told to begin seeking new employment and was let go in December 1979.\nIn November 1979, Hishon sued the Firm and filed her claim with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. Hishon claimed that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex and that this discrimination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Commission issued a notice of right to sue, and Hishon sued in federal district court. The district court dismissed her claim, and Hishon appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed that ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52778:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52778:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52778:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against any employee on the basis of their sex. In this case, the Court held that the promise of equal consideration for partnership that went along with Hishon’s employment was contractual in nature and subject to the regulations of Title VII. By preventing Hishon from obtaining partnership because of her sex, the Firm discriminated against her and breached the “terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” and therefore the Firm acted in direct violation of Title VII.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote a concurring opinion noting that the Court’s opinion should be careful to not go to far in interfering with a firm’s ability to make partner decisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52778:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52781:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52781:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPart of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983 denied federal financial aid to males between the ages of 18 and 26 who had failed to register for selective service. Applicants for financial aid were required to inform their universities that they had (or had not) registered for the draft.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52781:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52781:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52781:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court upheld the law. Since no student is compelled to seek financial aid, requiring an applicant to state whether or not he had registered for the draft would not be equivalent to forcing an individual to incriminate himself.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52781:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52783:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52783:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a \"traditional\" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52783:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52783:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52783:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the guiding principles of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTA was subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. The Court found that rules based on the subjective determination of \"integral\" or \"traditional\" governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. The Court argued that the structure of the federal system itself, rather than any \"discrete limitations\" on federal authority, protected state sovereignty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52783:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52785:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52785:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Clean Air Act (the Act) required states that had not yet achieved national air quality standards to establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution, such as manufacturing plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) passed a regulation under the Act that allows states to treat all pollution-emitting devices in the same industrial grouping as though they were a single “bubble”. Using this bubble provision, plants may install or modify one piece of equipment without needing a permit if the alteration does not increase the total emissions of the plant. Several environmental groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, challenged the bubble provision as contrary to the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the EPA regulation as inappropriate for a program enacted to improve air quality.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52785:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52785:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52785:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous court, reversed. The Supreme Court held that the bubble regulation was a reasonable interpretation of the term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act. Congress did not have a specific intention for the interpretation of that term, and the EPA’s regulation was a reasonable policy choice. The regulation also provided reasonable accommodations for the many competing interests affected by the Act. Justices Thurgood Marshall, William H. Rehnquist, and Sandra Day O’Connor did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52785:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52796:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52796:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEarly in the morning of October 18, 1980, a fire was reported at the Clifford residence in Detroit, Michigan. The Cliffords were out of town, so the Detroit Fire Department arrived, extinguished the fire, and left by around 7 a.m. An hour later, the fire investigator received a notice to inspect the house for evidence of arson. When he and his partner arrived on the scene at 1 p.m., they found a work crew from the Cliffords’ insurance company that the Cliffords had contacted to secure the house. When the work crew had cleared the basement, the fire investigators began to inspect it without obtaining either consent or a warrant. They determined that the fire had started in the basement, where they found several fuel cans and a crock pot attached to a timer, all of which was seized as evidence.\nRaymond and Emma Jean Clifford were arrested and charged with arson. At the preliminary examination held to determine probable cause, they moved to suppress the evidence as the products of an illegal search made without warrant or consent. The motion was denied. Prior to the trial, there was an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence, and it was admitted because there were exigent circumstances surrounding the search. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and held that there were no exigent circumstances that justified the search.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52796:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52796:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52796:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the judgment of the court in an opinion for a four-justice plurality. The Supreme Court held that that a reasonable expectation of privacy remains within a burned building. While the fire department does not need a warrant to fight the fire, any further official presence on the property must have a warrant. Whether the search is to identify the cause of the fire or to look for evidence of criminal activity will determine the type of warrant the fire department needs to obtain and the requirements for doing so. In the case of the fire at the Clifford home, both searches occurred but without the appropriate warrants. The Court also held that there were no exigent circumstances that prevented the investigators from obtaining the warrants.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in judgment where he argued that once the emergency that has granted the fire fighters authority to enter the premises has ended, the Fourth Amendment requires that notice be given to the property owners before entry. He also argued that if there is probable cause to suspect a crime has occurred, a warrant is required to conduct a search.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the fire fighters initially at the scene suspected arson because an investigator was called, which means the investigation and the fighting of the fire were happening simultaneously. The inspection by the fire investigator was a continuation of one that began when the fire fighters were legally on the premises. He also argued that the public interest in investigating the cause of a fire outweighs the property owner’s right to privacy. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52796:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52803:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52803:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1980, Oklahoma's Attorney General determined that the re-broadcasting of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials by Oklahoma cable television stations violated the State's ban against advertising alcoholic beverages. Richard Crisp, the Director of Oklahoma's Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, warned the offending cable operators that their continued transmission of banned beverage commercials would result in criminal prosecution. In response, and on behalf of other cable operators, Capital Cities Cable challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising ban. On appeal from the Tenth Circuit's reversal of a district court decision favoring Capital Cities Cable, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52803:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52803:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52803:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held unanimously that Oklahoma's ban on local cable transmissions of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials violated both the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses. While Oklahoma can regulate local cable aspects, such as franchise formation and construction, it cannot tamper with the flow of information from other states. Such tampering violates the Federal Communication Commission's guidelines prohibiting the censorship or alteration of interstate broadcast signals. As such, in the interest of maintaining diverse program offerings and encouraging competition among cable providers, the FCC's guidelines supercede Oklahoma's local regulatory authority. Moreover, despite its broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the importation and use of intoxicating liquor, the Court held that the federal government retains final authority under the commerce clause to regulate all aspects of interstate liquor commerce. Therefore, Oklahoma's continued ban on interstate alcoholic advertising violated the Commerce Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52803:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52807:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52807:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid Washington pleaded guilty to murder in a Florida state court. At sentencing, his attorney did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric evaluation. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Washington to death finding no mitigating circumstances to rule otherwise. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Washington sought habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district court. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right was violated because he had ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a right to counsel rendering \"reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances.\" It then remanded the case to the district court to apply this standard and determine whether Mr. Washington's counsel was sufficiently prejudicial to justify the reversal of his sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52807:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52807:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52807:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court held that: (1) counsel's performance must be deficient; and (2) the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. With Justice Sandra Day O'Connor writing for the majority, the Court counseled that in making a showing of deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an \"objective standard of reasonableness.\" The Court also noted that to show prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a \"reasonable probability\" that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. Here, the Court reasoned that Mr. Washington's counsel was not unreasonable. Moreover, the Court stated that even if counsel was unreasonable, counsel's conduct did not cause sufficient prejudice to Mr. Washington to warrant setting aside his death sentence.\nJustice William J. Brennan wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He viewed the death sentence as per se cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, he would not have upheld Mr. Washington's sentence. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote separately, dissenting. He disagreed with the majority's holding in that in its attempt to make a uniform standard, it created one so malleable as to be virtually useless.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52807:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52814:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52814:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRespondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, both Mexican citizens, were ordered deported by an immigration judge in separate proceedings. The orders were issued based upon each respondent's admission to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials that he had entered the country unlawfully. Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez challenged the orders on grounds that their respective arrests by INS officials were illegal and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Sandoval-Sanchez further moved to have his admission suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest. (Lopez-Mendoza did not move to strike his admission from the record.) In each case, the presiding judge found the legality of the arrests irrelevant to the determination of the respondents' deportation status. On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the orders noting that deportation proceedings are civil actions and \"[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation hearing.\" The BIA also found application of the exclusionary rule in a deportation proceeding inappropriate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed finding the respondents' arrests were illegal and the resulting admissions fruit of unlawful arrests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52814:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52814:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52814:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In both criminal and civil proceedings, the \"body\" or identity of a defendant is never suppressible as fruit of an illegal arrest. This alone was sufficient basis to uphold Lopez-Mendoza's deportation order. Moreover, deportation proceedings are civil actions and the protections afforded defendants in the criminal context do not apply. Specifically, Sandoval- Sanchez's appeal to the exclusionary rule in his motion to suppress his admission fails because the purpose the exclusionary rule is designed to serve deterring official misconduct is not served in the context of a deportation proceeding. First, the INS is only required to show identity and alienage to meet its burden in a deportation hearing. Since the defendant's body is not suppressible, the INS must only prove alienage, generally not a difficult task even absent a confession. Further, INS has its own comprehensive oversight program in place to monitor Fourth Amendment compliance internally. The exclusionary rule would do little to enhance these efforts. Finally, deportations hearings, unlike criminal trials, are designed to prevent the continued violation of the law. The social cost of releasing a defendant whose mere presence in the country puts him in continued violation of the law is too high to bear in light of the minimal benefits derived from application of the exclusionary rule in this context.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52814:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52818:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52818:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Federal Aviation Act of 1958 directs the Secretary of Transportation to \"promote the safety of civil aircraft\" by establishing minimum standards of airworthiness. Pursuant to this directive, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), acting as the Secretary's designee, instituted a certification process for the design and manufacture of all private aircraft. Under FAA rules, manufacturers are required to develop the plans and specifications and perform the inspections and tests necessary to establish that an aircraft design comports with the regulations. FAA engineers then conduct \"spot-check\" inspections of the manufacturer's work. This case arose out of two separate accidents in which commercial aircraft, certified by the FAA or its predecessor, caught fire mid-air, resulting in the deaths of most of the people on board one plane and all of the people on board the other. Each accident was found to have been caused by a faulty part a trash receptacle in one case; a gas burning cabin heater in the other which did not comply with FAA regulations. In both cases, plaintiffs sued the U.S. under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on the ground that the FAA or its predecessor negligently issued certificates for the respective aircraft. The district court in the first case granted summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that recovery against the U.S. was barred by 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a), which provides a discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the discretionary function exception did not apply, and that the U.S., just as a private party, could be held liable for negligent inspection under the California \"Good Samaritan\" rule. In the other case, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs under the California \"Good Samaritan\" rule, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52818:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52818:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52818:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Government liability under the FTCA is limited by the discretionary function exception of 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a), which provides that the federal government may not be held liable for \"[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function . . . whether or not the discretion involved be abused.\" The FAA's decision to institute the \"spot-check\" program to monitor compliance with its minimum safety standards was clearly discretionary and protected by Section 2680(a). It was a calculated decision which took into account the objectives of the certification process in light of practical considerations such as funding and staffing. Judicial intervention in such a decision would be precisely what the discretionary function exception was designed to prevent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52818:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52819:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52819:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDun and Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, mistakenly reported to some of its subscribers that the construction contractor Greenmoss Builders had voluntarily filed for bankruptcy. The president of Greenmoss quickly learned about the erroneous report, requested Bradstreet to correct its error, and asked for the list of subscribers who received the report. Bradstreet refused to release the names on the list, but issued a correction to its five subscribers who received the original report. The correction stated that actually a former employee of Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy and that Greenmoss Builders \"continued in business as usual.\" Greenmoss was dissatisfied with the correction and again asked for the list. When Bradstreet refused a second time, Greenmoss filed suit against it for defamation in a Vermont state court. The court discovered that a 17-year-old high student interning for Bradstreet had caused the error and the jury awarded $350,000 to Greenmoss in compensatory and punitive damages. Bradstreet claimed that contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Gertz v. Robert Welch, the trial judge told the jury that it could award punitive damages even if Bradford did not make mistakes intentionally or out of recklessness. The court granted Bradstreet's motion for retrial, but the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that Gertz only applied to cases involving defamation by the media.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52819:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52819:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52819:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Lewis Powell authored the opinion for a 5-4 court. Although the trial court correctly perceived that the trial judge's instructions did not satisfy the requirements of Gertz, the Court held that Gertz did not apply since the present case did not involve public speech. Instead the Court looked to apply the logic of Gertz to situations concerning private speech. The Court reasoned that laws regulating defamation suits aimed to \"balance the State's interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting this type [Bradstreet's] of expression.\" Because the First Amendment offers less protection to private speech than to public speech, and especially less to speech \"being solely motived by a desire for profit,\" damages caused by it can result in heavier penalties and broader conditions for convictions. Therefore states can allow the recovery of punitive damages in defamation cases involving private speech even when the perpetrator does not demonstrate \"actual malice.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52819:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52836:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52836:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter receiving the description of Quarles, an alleged assailant, a police officer entered a supermarket, spotted him, and ordered him to stop. Quarles stopped and was frisked by the officer. Upon detecting an empty shoulder holster, the officer asked Quarles where his gun was. Quarles responded. The officer then formally arrested Quarles and read him his Miranda rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52836:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52836:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52836:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that there is a \"public safety\" exception to the requirement that officers issue Miranda warnings to suspects. Since the police officer's request for the location of the gun was prompted by an immediate interest in assuring that it did not injure an innocent bystander or fall into the hands of a potential accomplice to Quarles, his failure to read the Miranda warning did not violate the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52836:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52838:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52838:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress responded to the Court's decision in Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), which invalidated a gender-based dependency requirement in the allocation of Social Security payments, and to the necessity of preventing bankruptcy in the Social Security fund. It enacted amendments in 1977 to the Social Security Act. The 1977 amendments included a \"pension offset\" provision which reduced spousal benefits by the amount of certain federal and state pension funds that a Social Security applicant received. However, Congress exempted from this provision spouses who were eligible to receive pension benefits prior to December 1982 and who would have qualified for unreduced spousal benefits prior to the Court's Califano decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52838:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52838:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52838:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe unanimous Court upheld the law. Justice Brennan granted that the 1977 amendments temporarily revived gender-based eligibility requirements, but maintained that they served a legitimate government interest, namely, they protected individuals who had planned for their retirements relying on the law as it stood before the Court's Califano decision. The resurrected eligibility criteria were narrowly drawn, applying to those individuals who were eligible for spousal benefits prior to 1977 who retired by 1982. Since many individuals who are planning for retirement rely on the law in making investment and spending decisions, changing the law (as Califano did) without giving some leeway to people who had already planned for the future would place an unreasonable burden on many who were close to retirement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52838:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52841:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52841:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSure-Tan Inc. and Surak Leather Company were two small leather processing firms in Chicago who were considered a single employer for the purposes of this case. Of the 11 laborers both companies employed, several were illegal immigrants. In July 1976, eight workers from both companies authorized the Chicago Leather Workers Union to act as their collective bargaining representative. On December 10, 1976, the Union prevailed in a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election. The companies filed complaints with the NLRB and alleged that many of the voting members were illegal immigrants. When the NLRB certified the union anyway, the president of Surak Leather Company sent a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to request a check on the immigration status of the employees in question. INS agents discovered five employees were living and working illegally in the United States and deported them.\nThe NLRB’s Acting Regional Director filed complaints alleging that the companies engaged in unfair labor practices, and the charges were heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s recommendation to order the petitioners to cease and desist the unfair labor practices and substituted backpay for the recommendation of reinstatement.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the first part of the Board’s order. However, the Court of Appeals held that, because backpay could only be given for periods of time when the employees were legally eligible but unable to work, the companies should be required to pay a minimum amount of six months worth of backpay.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52841:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52841:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52841:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that that the NLRB can act to protect the labor rights of illegal immigrants because it serves the broader purpose of labor to have all workers represented, regardless of immigration status. Precedent establishes that the Board can protect the rights of any employee. The petitioners’ actions illegally discouraged union activity and caused the deportation of their employees. The Court also held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit impermissibly expanded its authority by modifying the order of the NLRB in regards to backpay.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that the majority erred in remanding the case to the Court of Appeals, as the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed in its entirety. Since the NLRB acquiesced to the remedy provided by the Court of Appeals, no purpose was served by reconsideration. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part where he argued that illegal aliens are not considered employees under the National Labor Rights Act. Since illegal aliens are actively violating United States criminal laws, the Act does not afford them protection. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52841:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52842:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52842:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Hawaii Liquor Tax, enacted in 1939, imposed a twenty percent excise tax on wholesale liquor sales. Certain locally produced alcohol products, such as okolehao brandy and fruit wine, were exempt from the tax. Bacchus Imports, a liquor wholesaler, challenged the law's validity and sought a refund of $45 million from the state of Hawaii.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52842:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52842:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52842:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that the Hawaii Liquor Tax violated the Constitution. Justice White reaffirmed what he called a \"cardinal rule of Commerce Clause jurisprudence\" in arguing that states are prohibited from imposing taxes which discriminate in the traffic of interstate commerce. Since the law was originally enacted to support local industries in Hawaii, and the alcoholic products which the law exempted competed with different beverages produced outside the state, Justice White concluded that there were clear constitutional violations in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52842:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52843:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52843:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBose Corporation, a loudspeaker manufacturer, brought a product disparagement action against Consumer Union for publishing a negative review of Bose products. Among other comments, Consumer Union's article mistakenly said that Bose loudspeakers caused sounds of individual musical instruments to wander \"about the room\" when they in fact merely wandered \"along the wall[s].\" Ruling in favor of Bose, the District Court found that the article's statements were factually wrong and made with \"actual malice.\" On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed as it found the lower court's ruling to be clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court granted Bose certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52843:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52843:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52843:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that while the record revealed that the article's author mistakenly described the sound path of Bose speakers, he did not do so with actual malice. A review of the author's testimony showed that he heard the Bose speaker sounds as tending to wander \"along the wall\" between speakers, rather than \"about the room.\" Despite this disparity, the Court held that the description of Bose speaker sounds as wondering \"about the room,\" though a misconception, was not written with actual malice since its author was not aware of his mischaracterization in time to remedy the error. Therefore, his speech was entitled to First Amendment protection.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52843:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52844:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52844:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who's body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52844:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52844:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52844:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court relied on the \"inevitable discovery doctrine,\" as it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the child's body as evidence since it was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered the body even absent Williams's statements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52844:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52848:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52848:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nT.L.O. was a high school student. School officials searched her purse suspecting she had cigarettes. The officials discovered cigarettes, a small amount of marijuana, and a list containing the names of students who owed T.L.O. money. T.L.O. was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, T.L.O. moved to suppress evidence discovered in the search, but the Court denied her motion. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County found her guilty and sentenced her to probation for one year. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by school officials in public schools.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52848:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52848:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52848:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAfter the original oral argument in March of 1984, the Supreme Court restored the case to the calendar for reargument. In addition to the previously argued question, the Court requested that the parties brief and argue the additional question of whether the assistant principal violated the Fourth Amendment in opening T.L.O's purse.\nThe Court heard reargument on October 02, 1984. The Court held that while the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to public school officials, they may conduct reasonable warrantless searches of students under their authority notwithstanding the probable cause standard that would normally apply to searches under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable under the circumstances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52848:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52849:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52849:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBoston police sought to obtain a warrant to search the home of Osborne Sheppard, a suspected murderer. Detective Peter O'Malley prepared an affidavit listing the pieces of evidence he hoped to find at Sheppard's home. Since the local court was closed for the weekend and O'Malley could not find a new warrant form, he filled out a previously used form instead. He took this form and the affidavit to the residence of the presiding judge and told him the form required revision and approval. The judge returned the form with his approval, but he did not list the pieces of evidence from the affidavit on the warrant. Police found items from the affidavit in Sheppard's home and charged him with first-degree murder. During Sheppard's trial, the judge stated that the warrant did not conform to Fourth Amendment standards because it did not describe the items to be seized. Because the police acted in good faith upon what they believed was a valid warrant, the judge admitted the items as evidence and Sheppard was convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Sheppard successfully argued that the trial judge should have suppressed the evidence since no \"good-faith exception\" existed for admitting evidence obtained on a faulty warrant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52849:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52849:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52849:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron White delivered the opinion for a 7-2 court. The Court maintained that trial courts can use evidence seized by officers who have an \"objectively reasonable basis\" for mistakenly believing they have obtained valid warrants. Upon a factual inquiry, the Court found that \"the officers in this case took every step that could reasonably be expected of them\" to secure a valid warrant. Lawmakers did not enact rules for excluding evidence to invalidate evidence because of clerical errors by judges but to deter police from conducting unlawful searches.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52849:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52850:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52850:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 31, 1980, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper C.J. Williams observed Richard McCarty’s vehicle weaving back and forth on Interstate Highway 270. He followed the car, pulled McCarty over, and asked him to exit the vehicle. Williams noticed that McCarty had trouble standing, and thus determined that he would charge McCarty with a traffic offense and that McCarty was no longer free to leave the scene. McCarty failed a balancing test.\nWilliams then asked McCarty whether he had been using intoxicants, and McCarty responded that he had consumed two beers and smoked several joints of marijuana a short time before. Williams placed McCarty under arrest. At the county jail, however, a breathalyzer test did not detect any alcohol in McCarty’s system. Williams resumed questioning McCarty, asking him if he was under the influence of alcohol and whether the marijuana had been treated with any chemicals. Williams responded, “I guess, barely,” to the first question, but denied that the marijuana he smoked had been treated. At no point did Williams or any other officer tell McCarty that he had a right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, or to have an attorney appointed for him if he could not afford one.\nMcCarty was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a first-degree misdemeanor under Ohio law punishable by fine or imprisonment for up to six months. McCarty moved to exclude the incriminating statements he made to Trooper Williams both on the scene of the arrest and in jail, on the grounds that he had not been informed of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The trial court denied the motion; McCarty pled ‘no contest’ and was found guilty. On appeal, the Franklin County Court of Appeals held that the Miranda rule does not apply to misdemeanors, relying on a prior decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed McCarty’s appeal for failing to present a substantial constitutional question. The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed McCarty’s writ of habeas corpus, but the United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that Miranda warnings must be given to all individuals accused of misdemeanor traffic offenses prior to custodial interrogation, but did not clearly apply this rule to McCarty’s statements made at the scene of his arrest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52850:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52850:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52850:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that arrestees in custody and under suspicion for a misdemeanor traffic offense must be informed of their constitutional rights or subsequent statements are inadmissible. Justice Marshall rejected Berkemer’s argument that the Court should carve out an exception to the Miranda rule for lesser offenses. He noted that the police are often unaware when they arrest a person whether that person has committed a felony or a misdemeanor, and that seemingly minor offenses sometimes escalate into more serious investigations. He reasoned that carving out an exception to the Miranda rule for misdemeanor traffic offenses would undermine Miranda’s simplicity and effectiveness given the rule’s widespread, customary use by police.\nJustice Marshall then distinguished between the statements McCarty made at the scene of the arrest and at the jail. He held that McCarty was in custody as of the moment he was formally placed under arrest for driving under the influence, and that statements made after this point were inadmissible. He also held, however, that McCarty was not put in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule before this point. Justice Marshall reasoned that a routine traffic stop was more akin to a non-custodial ‘Terry stop’, and generally ended with a motorist’s release. He noted that McCarty was not told he could not leave prior to his arrest, and was only asked a few questions and told to perform a balancing test. Consequently, Justice Marshall held that the Ohio State Highway Patrol was not obligated to give Miranda warnings to persons detained pursuant to routine traffic stops.\nJustice John Paul Stevens concurred. He argued that the majority should have limited its decision to the question presented in Berkemer’s petition for certiorari: Whether law enforcement officers must give ‘Miranda warnings’ to individuals arrested for misdemeanor traffic offenses. He argued that the Court failed to follow the course of judicial restraint by answering a question not passed upon by the lower courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52850:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52854:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52854:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe exclusionary rule requires that evidence illegally seized must be excluded from criminal trials. Leon was the target of police surveillance based on an anonymous informant's tip. The police applied to a judge for a search warrant of Leon's home based on the evidence from their surveillance. A judge issued the warrant and the police recovered large quantities of illegal drugs. Leon was indicted for violating federal drug laws. A judge concluded that the affidavit for the search warrant was insufficient; it did not establish the probable cause necessary to issue the warrant. Thus, the evidence obtained under the warrant could not be introduced at Leon's trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52854:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52854:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52854:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, there is such an exception. The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant could be introduced at trial. The exclusionary rule, argued the majority, is not a right but a remedy justified by its ability to deter illegal police conduct. In Leon, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits. The exclusionary rule is costly to society: Guilty defendants go unpunished and people lose respect for the law. The benefits of the exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot deter police in a case like Leon, where they act in good faith on a warrant issued by a judge.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52854:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52855:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52855:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFred and Mary Engle filed a joint federal income tax return in 1975. During that year, Fred Engle acquired two oil and gas leases covering a total of 240 acres in Wyoming. The Engles claimed a percentage depletion deduction on advance royalties from the oil and gas leases, but the Commissioner of Internal Revenue rejected their claim because the deduction was not based on average daily production from the property’s oil and gas leases, as required by the Commissioner’s interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 613A of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination, with one dissent. The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, reversed, holding that § 613A authorized depletion allowances on advance royalties so long as there was eventual production from the property.\nAlso in 1975, the families of Philip D. Farmar and A. A. Sugg, joint owners of 46,515 acres of land in Irion County, Texas, leased their oil and gas interests to various lessees. Under these leases, the Farmars and Suggs received royalties and annual cash bonuses from the lessees. The bonuses were payable even when the property produced no oil or gas. The Farmars and Suggs claimed percentage depletion deductions on both the royalties and bonuses, but the Commissioner disallowed the deductions on the royalties because they were not based on average daily production from the property. In a consolidated suit, the Court of Claims held that Congress only allowed for depletion deductions from actual production during the taxable year.\n In the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Congress eliminated percentage depletion deductions for major oil producers. § 613A(d), however, authorized any qualified independent gas or oil producer or royalty owner to compute the allowance for percentage depletion in accordance with gross income from the property. The act stipulated that the allowance was tied to the taxpayer’s average daily production so as not to exceed the taxpayer’s depletable quantity. The Farmars and Suggs and the Commissioner filed petitions for writs of certiorari; the Supreme Court of the United States granted their petitions and consolidated their cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52855:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52855:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52855:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Court held that the act allowed independent lessors to claim percentage depletion deductions on advance royalties from oil and gas leases. Justice O’Connor first described the history of percentage depletion deductions from oil and gas income, noting that prior to 1975, the Commissioner allowed such deductions on any advance royalty or bonus whether there was current production of the underlying minerals or not. These deductions only had to be attributed to actual production during the life of the lease.\nWhile acknowledging that the Commissioner’s interpretation was plausible given the language of the act, Justice O’Connor argued that Congress eliminated the percentage deductions for large producers to subsidize the combined efforts of small producers and royalty owners in the exploration and production of the nation’s oil and gas resources. Under the Commissioner’s interpretation of § 613A, however, lessors and lessees would devote fewer resources to development of the nation’s energy resources. Justice O’Connor also looked to the legislative history of the act, noting that a complete repeal of the percentage deduction was never suggested during committee consideration of the act.\nFinally, Justice O’Connor held that the Commissioner’s interpretation of the act was unreasonable. She wrote that holders of interests in oil and gas deposits had been consistently entitled to percentage deductions for the past fifty years. She noted that the Commissioner’s interpretation denied percentage deductions to all parties when congress clearly intended to grant them to at least some parties.\nJustice Harry Blackmun dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan, Justice Byron White and Justice Thurgood Marshall. He emphasized that the Commissioner’s interpretation was consistent with the language of the statute, and that the act specifically tied the calculation of percentage deductions to average daily production during a given taxable year. Justice Blackmun disagreed that congressional silence on the availability of percentage deductions was dispositive.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52855:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52858:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52858:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDefendants James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant, to be used to extract cocaine from clothes imported into the United States. Carl Muehlenweg, the informant and owner of the ether, gave consent to the police to install a tracking device into one of the cans containing the ether before delivery to the defendants.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52858:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52858:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52858:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court found that although the cans of ether may have contained an unknown and unwanted object, no meaningful interference with the defendants' interest in their possessions occurred, as the tracking device was installed before the defendants obtained the ether. This case was an expansion of the holding announced in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). (Abstract by Blaine Schmidt.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52858:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52860:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52860:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1982, the National Park Service issued a renewable permit to the Community for Creative Non-Violence to conduct a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall in Washington, D.C. The C.C.N.V. demonstration was intended to represent the plight of the homeless, and the demonstrators wished to sleep in tent cities set up in the park. Citing anti-camping regulations, the Park Service denied the request.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52860:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52860:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52860:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the regulations did not violate the First Amendment. The Court noted that expression is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and that the manner of the protest was at odds with the government's interest in maintaining the condition of the parks. The Court argued that the Park Service did not attempt to ban all sleeping in public parks (only in certain areas), and that the protesters had alternative means of communicating their message.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52860:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52861:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52861:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHenri and Mary Tatro’s three-and-a-half year old daughter Amber had spina bifida. As a result, Amber suffered from a neurogenic bladder, which required the use of a catheter every three or four hours each day to avoid kidney injury. The preferred method of catheterization was called clean intermittent catheterization (CIC). Amber was unable to perform this method herself because of her age, but a layperson could easily learn to perform the procedure.\nIn 1979, Irving Independent School District agreed to provide special education for Amber as required by the federal Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). This law required Texas to provide handicapped children with a free public education including ‘related services’. It only required ‘medical services’ for purposes of diagnosis or evaluation. Amber’s individualized education program provided that she would attend early childhood development classes and receive physical and occupational therapy. Her program, however, made no provision for school personnel to administer CIC. The Tatros unsuccessfully pursued administrative remedies to secure CIC services during school hours.\nIn October 1979, the Tatros filed an action against the district, the Texas State Board of Education, and others. They sought an injunction requiring the district to provide Amber with CIC. They also sought damages and attorneys’ fees through the Rehabilitation Act (RA), which forbade programs receiving federal aid from excluding handicapped people from participation and allowed prevailing parties to recover attorneys’ fees. The district court denied the Tatros' request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that CIC was not a ‘related service’ under the EHA because it did not arise from an effort to educate. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that CIC was indeed a ‘related service’ under the EHA, and remanded the case to the district court. The district court then ruled that CIC was not a ‘medical service’ under the EHA because a doctor was not needed to administer the procedure. It found that CIC was a ‘related service’ and ordered the defendants to modify Amber’s individualized education program accordingly. It also held that the Tatros had proved a violation of the RA. The Fifth Circuit affirmed both holdings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52861:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52861:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52861:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court held that the provision of CIC was a ‘related service’ and not a ‘medical service’ under the Education of the Handicapped Act. He looked to the text of the EHA, which defined ‘related service’ as that which is required for a handicapped child to benefit from special education. Chief Justice Burger noted that Amber would not be able to attend school and benefit from special education without CIC. He cited the Court’s previous holdings on the act, where it determined that congress intended to give handicapped children meaningful access to public education.\nChief Justice Burger held that CIC was not a ‘medical service’ under the EHA. He deferred to the regulations of the Department of Education, which defined ‘medical services’ as those provided by a licensed physician. As CIC could be performed by a layperson and was required for Amber to attend school, it fell within both Congress’ and the Department of Education’s definitions of ‘related services’.\nChief Justice Burger also held that the Tatros were not entitled to relief under the Rehabilitation Act because relief was available under the EHA. Hence, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the Tatros were entitled to attorneys’ fees.\nJustice William Brennan concurred in part, but dissented from the majority’s holding on the awarding of attorneys’ fees under the Rehabilitation Act. He referred to his dissent in Smith v. Robinson, where he similarly objected to that majority’s interpretation of a conflict between the EHA and the RA as an implicit repeal of parties’ right to seek attorneys’ fees.\nJustice Stevens concurred in part but also dissented to the majority’s holding on the awarding of attorneys’ fees. He noted that the district's petition for certiorari did not challenge the award of attorneys’ fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52861:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52862:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52862:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1974, Marshall Murphy was questioned by Minneapolis police about the rape and murder of a teenage girl, but he was never charged. In 1980, Murphy pleaded guilty to false imprisonment in an unrelated criminal sexual conduct case and was sentenced to a 16-month suspended prison sentence and three years probation. During probation, Murphy was required to participate in a treatment program for sex offenders at Alpha House and to see a probation officer. While at Alpha House, Murphy admitted to the 1974 rape and murder. An Alpha House counselor contacted Murphy’s probation officer about the admission and the officer called Murphy in for a meeting. During the meeting Murphy became angry and said he “felt like calling a lawyer” but still admitted to the rape and murder. The probation officer relayed the information from the meeting to the police, and Murphy was arrested and charged with first-degree murder.\nAt trial, Murphy tried to suppress testimony about the confession, arguing that it was obtained in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court found that Murphy was not in custody at the time of the confession, and the confession was not compelled or involuntary. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the confession violated the Fifth Amendment because Murphy’s parole officer knew that Murphy’s answers were likely to be incriminating.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52862:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52862:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52862:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that admissions made to a probation officer about a crime unrelated to the probation are admissible in subsequent prosecution. A state may require a probationer to meet with his officer and discuss matters that may affect his probationary status, but this does not create an exception to the rule that one must assert the privilege against self-incrimination. Murphy could have asserted that privilege when his officer asked the questions that led to the incriminating answers, but he failed to do so.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing that the state should have to prove that Murphy knew his rights and knowingly waived them. The facts of this case did not warrant application of the principle that one waive their privilege against self-incrimination unless they asserted it in a timely fashion. Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52862:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52866:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52866:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGrove City College, a private, coeducational liberal arts school, sought to preserve its institutional autonomy by consistently refusing state and federal financial assistance. The College did, however, enroll a large number of students who received Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG's) through a Department of Education-run program. The DOE concluded that this assistance to students qualified the College as a recipient of federal assistance and made it subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. When the College refused to comply with the requirements, the DOE attempted to terminate assistance to the student financial aid program. The College challenged the DOE's actions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52866:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52866:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52866:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that there was no \"substantive difference\" between institutional assistance and aid received by a school through its students; Title IX coverage, the Court found, was triggered by the BEOG's. The Court noted that the assistance did not trigger institutionwide coverage under the Amendments, however. Only the College's financial aid program was subject to the federal requirements. The Court concluded that prohibiting discrimination as a condition for federal assistance did not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of the College and that the school was free to end its participation in the grant program.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52866:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52867:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52867:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 allocated federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations to support operations and educational programming. The act did not allow stations receiving money under the act to \"engage in editorializing.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52867:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52867:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52867:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Even though the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the broadcast medium, \"since broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative activity,\" Congress must use the First Amendment to \"inform and give shape\" to its regulation. Justice Brennan argued that no legitimate government interest was served by the law which broadly banned all editorializing, a form of speech which \"lies at the heart of First Amendment protection.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52867:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52869:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52869:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnthony and Linda Sidoti, both Caucasians, were divorced and Linda was awarded custody of their daughter. One year later, Anthony sought custody of the child after Linda began cohabitating with Clarence Palmore, an African-American. The Florida courts awarded Mr. Sidoti custody of the child, arguing that the child would be more vulnerable to social stigmatization in a racially mixed household. No evidence was introduced that indicated Ms. Sidoti was unfit to continue the custody of the child.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52869:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52869:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52869:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that while ethnic prejudices did exist in society, those private biases were not permissible considerations for the removal of an infant child from the custody of its mother. \"Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.\" The Court thus held that the decision of the lower courts was an unconstitutional denial of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52869:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52870:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52870:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1980 and 1981, in separate incidents, each of four respondents were suspected of drunk driving on California highways and pulled over by police. Each agreed to an Intoxilyzer test (commonly known as a “breathalyzer test”) that registered a blood-alcohol level (BAL) substantially higher than .10, the legal BAL limit in California. Each was charged with drunk driving. Before trial, each defendant motioned to exclude the breathalyzer test results from evidence by arguing that the police had failed to preserve breath samples from the time of the stop. All of their motions to exclude were denied. Two of the defendants were tried and convicted by the municipal court of Sonoma County; the remaining two had not yet gone to trial. All defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeals of the First District, Division Four, which granted the convicted respondents a new trial and ordered that the test results be excluded from all the trials.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52870:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52870:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52870:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that due process rights do not extend to the point of compelling law enforcement to preserve evidence on behalf of criminal defendants. The state’s duty to preserve evidence is limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense. Such evidence must possess an apparent exculpatory value before it is destroyed, and it must be of such a nature that the defendant could not obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means. States are also prohibited of not taking breath samples did not violate the Due Process Clause because the breathalyzer tests were reliable and the exculpatory value of breath samples was very low. Additionally, defendants could have used alternate means to disprove the test results.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52870:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52871:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52871:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRussell Palmer, a prisoner in a Virginia prison, brought suit against Ted Hudson, an officer at the institution. Hudson had conducted a \"shakedown\" search of Palmer's locker and cell for contraband. Hudson and another officer also charged Palmer with destroying state property after they discovered a ripped pillowcase near Palmer's cell bunk. Palmer was then ordered to reimburse the State.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52871:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52871:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52871:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches did not apply \"within the confines of the prison cell.\" Noting that privacy was fundamentally incompatible with the maintenance of prison security and surveillance, the Court found that \"the paramount interest in institutional security\" outweighed all privacy concerns. The Court further held that \"random and unauthorized\" deprivations of property did not violate the Due Process Clause, so long as postdeprivation remedies were available.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52871:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52872:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52872:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nActing under court authorization, Georgia police placed wiretaps on a number of phones and conducted searches pursuant to an investigation of illegal gambling. A number of people were indicted as a result of the investigation. The defendants moved to suppress the wiretaps and the evidence seized during the searches. Because the wiretap evidence related to alleged offenders not then on trial, Georgia moved to close to the public any hearing on the motion to suppress. A trial court upheld Georgia's move to close the hearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52872:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52872:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52872:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial applied to suppression hearings. The Court found that the \"aims and interests\" of public trials were \"no less pressing in a hearing to suppress wrongfully seized evidence.\" The Court noted that the presumption of openness for trials could be overcome only by overriding interests based on findings that closure was absolutely necessary to preserve higher values and was narrowly tailored to serve those interests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52872:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52873:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52873:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn May 1, 1981, pursuant to company procedure, employees at the FedEx office at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport opened a package that had been damaged by a forklift. The package was an ordinary-looking cardboard box wrapped in brown paper. Inside, they found a tube that contained four plastic bags inside one another, and the innermost bag contained a white substance. They notified the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and replaced the contents of the box. When the DEA agents arrived, they removed a small amount of the white powder to conduct a field test that determined the powder was cocaine. The DEA agents obtained a warrant for the address on the package and searched the location, where they arrested Bradley Thomas Jacobsen and Donna Marie Jacobsen for possession of an illegal substance with intent to distribute.\nAfter they were indicted, the respondents filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the warrant was the product of an illegal search. The motion was denied, and the defendants were tried and convicted in district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision and held that the warrant was the product of the test of the powder, for which a warrant was required.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52873:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52873:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52873:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the decision of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the initial inspection by the DEA agent did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it remained within the scope of the previous search conducted by private agents. Once the agents gained enough information about the package to believe it contained contraband, the warrantless seizure of the package and its contents was not unreasonable. The Court also held that the test did not compromise any legitimate privacy interest. Either the test would be positive, which meant that the respondents had no legal right to posses the substance, or the test would be negative, which meant the agents knew nothing more about the powder than they knew after the visual examination.\n Justice Byron R. White concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He argued that the Court unnecessarily dwelled on the fact that the DEA agent’s initial inspection of the contraband was allowed by the Fourth Amendment. Since the Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence was in plain view when the agents arrived, there was no reason for the Court to consider the issue. He also disagreed with the Court’s analysis and argued that the government cannot duplicate a private search without a warrant.\n Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that the condition in which the DEA agents found the contents of the box was not clear enough to make a ruling. If the contents of the box were in plain view, the agents did not need a warrant, but if the contents were not, the agents required a warrant to replicate the private search. He also argued that the Court erred by not taking into account the context in which agents find an item as evidence of an expectation of privacy that the search violates. In this case, the packaging clearly indicated that the substance was illegal. Therefore the respondents had no expectation of privacy, and the search was legal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52873:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52878:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52878:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 17, 1972, Carl Edwin Wiggins robbed a Piggly Wiggly store in San Antonio. He was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life in prison, but his conviction was set aside due to a faulty indictment. At the first trial, Wiggins waived his right to counsel. On April 16, 1973, about two months before his second trial was set to begin, Wiggins filed a request for counsel and rescinded his earlier waiver. His feelings toward his standby counsel remained volatile throughout the trial. Wiggins was convicted in his second trial. He moved for a new trial and argued that his standby counsel interfered with his defense, but the court denied the motion. After he exhausted direct appellate and state habeas relief, Wiggins petitioned for federal habeas relief in district court. The district court denied his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52878:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52878:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52878:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to self-representation completely free from the presence of standby counsel. Rather, the Sixth Amendment protects the defendant’s right to “control the organization and content of his own defense.” The Court held that Wiggins was afforded all appropriate rights and that the presence of standby counsel did not interfere with the exercise of these rights.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the result.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Sixth Amendment protected a defendant’s right to present his case entirely without the mediation of a court-appointed attorney. Although Wiggins’ standby counsel was appointed in a purely advisory capacity, the attorneys regularly intervened and could have undermined Wiggins’ defense strategy. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52878:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52880:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52880:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading \"Seasons Greetings,\" and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52880:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52880:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52880:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the Holiday and had \"legitimate secular purposes.\" The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was \"far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52880:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52887:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52887:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1977, fourteen-year-old Gregory Martin was arrested for first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. While detained, Martin lied to the police about his address. He was held overnight. At his initial appearance in court, the prosecution cited the gun, the lie about his address, and his evident lack of supervision as reasons why he should remain in detention until his fact-finding hearing. The court granted the detention under the New York Family Court Act (FCA). Fellow appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan were also detained prior to their fact-finding hearings. Both were fourteen at the time, and had other delinquency petitions pending when they appeared before the court. While held in pretrial detention, Martin began a habeas corpus class action, which Rosario, Morgan, and 31 others joined, against the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice. Martin argued that the pretrial detention amounted to punishment before a determination of guilt.\nThe U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the pretrial detention was a violation of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and determined that the FCA was unconstitutional because it allowed detention of juveniles to serve as a punishment before the trial occurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52887:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52887:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52887:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing for a 6-3 majority, held that pretrial detention of juveniles does not violate the right of Due Process. The pretrial detention serves the legitimate purpose of protecting both the state and the juvenile from further crimes. Since the state has more responsibilities in the case of a juvenile than in the case of an adult, the pretrial detention not only protects society from potential crime, but it also protects the juvenile from the potential physical and psychological harm that can happen in the commission of a crime. The Court also found that the FCA put in place enough procedural safeguards that the juveniles are not denied Due Process. They are afforded notice, a hearing, and a statement of facts before any detention takes place, as well as an additional hearing to determine probable cause if the fact-finding hearing is not scheduled within three days.\n Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented and wrote that the standard of “serious risk” was too vague and easily satisfied given the limited information in the possession of the judge or the juvenile’s lawyer at the time of the initial hearing. Additionally, the conditions of juvenile detention centers are often such that the psychological harms of subjecting a juvenile who has not been found guilty to that environment far outweigh the abstract benefits to society. Given the near-impossibility of predicting whether or not a juvenile will commit a crime in the near future, Justice Marshall found that drastic measures such as pretrial detention could not be justified and represented a violation of Due Process. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52887:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52899:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52899:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nShirley Jones was a professional actress and California resident whose television career was also based in California. Marty Ingels, her husband, was also a professional entertainer. On October 9, 1979, the National Enquirer published an article about Jones. John South wrote the first draft of the article, and his byline appeared on it. Shortly before publication, South called Ingels to read him the article and elicit his comments on it. Ian Calder, the president and editor of the Enquirer, declined to print a retraction.\nNational Enquirer, Inc. was a corporation that published a national newspaper with a total circulation of over five million, 600,000 copies of which were sold in California. John South was a reporter for the Enquirer. He was a resident of Florida, but frequently travelled to California on business. Ian Calder was a Florida resident and he exerted close control over the functions of the Enquirer; he had traveled to California only twice and had no other relevant contacts with that state.\nJones filed an action in California state court against Calder and South, alleging that the article was untrue, libelous, and that it damaged their reputations and good names. The superior court ruled that although the injury occurred in California, it lacked personal jurisdiction over the claim because of the potential chilling effect from requiring editors and reporters to appear in remote jurisdictions. The California Court of Appeals reversed because the defendants intended to cause tortious injury to Jones and Ingels in California. A timely petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of California was denied, but the Supreme Court of the United States treated it as a petition for a writ of certiorari, granting review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52899:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52899:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52899:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that Calder's and South’s contacts with California were sufficiently strong to give California state courts jurisdiction over Jones’ libel claim. Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant has certain minimum contacts with a state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\nLooking to the facts of Jones’ claim, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident, and that Jones’ television career was based in California. In addition, the alleged injury to Jones’ career was suffered in California. Thus, jurisdiction was proper because of the effects of Calder and South’s Florida activities in California. Unlike a welder who helps create a boiler in one state that is sold in another state and that subsequently malfunctions, Calder and South allegedly intentionally directed their actions at California.\nJustice Rehnquist noted that courts must evaluate each defendants’ contacts with a given state to determine if they’re sufficient, even if defendants work for the same organization. He rejected Calder and South’s argument that extending jurisdiction over writers and editors in remote states would have a chilling effect on speech; First Amendment concerns about that effect are already taken into account in the constitutional limits on the substantive law of libel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52899:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52902:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52902:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring a four-month period in 1975, Harrison P. Cronic, along with Carolyn Cummings and Wylie C. Merritt, participated in a mail fraud that involved transferring more than $9,400,000 in checks between a bank in Tampa, FL, and one in Norman, OK. The three were indicted on mail fraud charges. Shortly before trial, Cronic’s counsel withdrew and the court appointed a lawyer for him. The court appointed a lawyer who specialized in real estate law and only had 25 days to prepare for the trial, compared to the government’s almost five years. Cummings and Merritt agreed to testify for the government. The jury found Cronic guilty and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison.\nThe Court of Appeals concluded that Cronic’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated and reversed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52902:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52902:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52902:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by inferring that the less-than-ideal circumstances leading up to the trial negatively influenced the lawyer’s performance. The Sixth Amendment protects the right for an accused to receive effective assistance of counsel in order to protect the adversary process. Therefore, the test to determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment occurred must rely on evidence that the adversary process itself suffered. In this case, there was no evidence of specific instances of failure of counsel during trial. Also, the circumstances prior to the trial were not such that effective assistance would have been impossible.\n Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52902:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52904:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52904:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are two consolidated cases involving the discovery of open marijuana fields as the result of unwarranted searches of privately owned land.\nIn the first case, Kentucky State police searched Ray E. Oliver's farm, acting on reports that marijuana was grown there. A gate marked with a \"No Trespassing\" sign surrounded the field. Police found marijuana in the field about a mile from Oliver's home. Before trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky suppressed evidence found in the search on the ground that Oliver had a reasonable expectation that his field would remain private. This expectation triggered the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed under the open field doctrine. The open field doctrine states that a citizen's protection from unwarranted search does not extend to open fields.\nIn the second case, police searched the woods behind Richard Thornton's property after an anonymous tip. Police found two marijuana patches on Thornton's land. The Maine Superior Court granted Thornton's motion to suppress evidence found in the search for the same reasons as the Oliver case. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Main affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52904:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52904:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52904:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 vote, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for the majority, stating that the open field doctrine applies to both cases. Individuals cannot legitimately expect privacy for activities conducted out in the open except in the area immediately surrounding their house. Also, the act of police officers entering a privately owned field is not automatically a search for Fourth Amendment purposes even if it is a common law trespass. Oliver's case was affirmed, and Thornton's was reversed and remanded.\nJustice Byron White wrote a special concurrence, saying that there was no need for the majority to deal with the expectation of privacy issue because a field is clearly not a \"house\" or an \"effect\" under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, contending that the law should protect private land that is marked as such against unreasonable searches and seizures. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice John P. Stevens joined Justice Marshall's dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52904:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52907:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52907:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn January 1980, Richmond Allen was arrested for allegedly using abusive and insulting language, which is a Class 3 misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of $500. Gladys Pulliam, the state magistrate for Culpeper County, Virginia set bail at $250 and, when Allen was unable to make bail, Pulliam committed him to the Culpeper County Jail for 14 days. Allen was tried, found guilty, fined, and released. The trial judge reopened his case and reversed the judgment. Allen sued Pulliam in district court and sought declaratory and injunctive relief for incarcerating him while waiting for trial on non-jailable offenses.\nJesse Nicholson was arrested four times in a two-month period for public intoxication, a Class 4 misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty is a $100 fine. Like Allen, Nicholson was incarcerated for failure to make bail, and he intervened in Allen’s suit as a party plaintiff.\nThis district court held that Pulliam’s practice of incarcerating persons for not making bail on non-jailable offenses violated their rights to due process and equal protection. The district court enjoined the practice and found Allen and Nicholson entitled to costs, including attorneys’ fees. Pulliam appealed the finding regarding costs and argued that, as a judicial officer, she was granted judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the judicial immunity argument and affirmed the district court’s decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52907:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52907:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52907:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the precedent set by British common law relied on the issuance of writs, rather than the imposition of judicial immunity, to protect judicial independence. The United States never had a doctrine of judicial immunity from prospective relief, and there was no evidence that the lack of that protection created a chilling effect on judicial independence. The Court held that there was no reason to assume such immunity was necessary. There was no legislative history to indicate that Congress intended to insulate judges from injunctive relief. The Civil Rights Acts and their interpretations illustrate that Congress intended all state actors to be subject to such remedies to ensure the protection of Fourteenth Amendment rights.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that judicial immunity from all types of relief and damages in civil suits is essential to protect judicial independence. He wrote that the majority’s opinion misinterprets British common law, which does rely on judicial immunity to protect judges from suit arising from a judge acting in her official capacity. He argued that the potential for the awarding of attorneys’ fees greatly increases the risk of harassing litigation because attorneys will recommend such action to clients. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice William H. Rehnquist, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52907:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52913:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52913:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRespondents were inmates being held in Los Angeles County Central Jail (Central Jail) prior to their trials. Central Jail did not allow inmates to have contact visits with spouses, children, or other guests. Central Jail also prohibited inmates from watching the irregularly-scheduled shakedown searches of their own cells. Respondents sued in district court and argued that these practices violated their civil rights under Section 1983 of the United States Code. The district court agreed with respondents' claim that an inmate's right to embrace his family is \"a matter of great importance\" and outweighs the minimal risks the contact visits posed. The district court held that low-risk detainees should be allowed contact visits if they are incarcerated for more than a month. The district court also held that inmates should be allowed to watch searches of their cells from a distance because the shakedowns often resulted in prison officials removing or destroying the inmates' personal property. The jail officials appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52913:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52913:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52913:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that Central Jail's policies worked to further the government's reasonable and legitimate interest in ensuring the safety of jail officials and visitors. The Court cited the extensive precedent that gave discretion to prison officials in enacting policies and procedures that they deem necessary to preserve internal order and security.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed with the approval of Central Jail's policies but disagreed with the majority's willingness to grant judicial deference to jail officials rather than to perform a careful analysis of the inmates' constitutional claims.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall authored a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the jail officials could not show that allowing low-risk inmates to see their family would \"frustrate the achievement of any substantial state interest.\" Furthermore, Justice Marshall cautioned against the Court's quick deference to the \"expertise\" of prison administrators and their blanket acceptance of \"established state procedure[s],\" at the cost of the depriving inmates of their private property. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice John Paul Stevens joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52913:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52919:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52919:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTitle II of the Social Security Act (Act) establishes a four-step review process of disputed disability benefit claims. First, a state agency determines if a claimant has a disability and when the condition began or ended. Second, state agencies' disability determinations can be reviewed upon the claimant's request. Third, if upon review the claimant suffers an adverse finding he or she may demand an evidentiary hearing by an administrative law judge. Fourth, if a claimant is dissatisfied with the administrative law judge's decision, they may appeal to the Appeals Council of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Claiming delays in excess of 90 days, during steps two and three, Leon Day sued on behalf of several similarly aggrieved Vermont claimants alleging a violation of the \"reasonable time\" hearing limitation. On appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling upholding a district court's imposition of disability hearing deadlines, the Supreme Court granted HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52919:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52919:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52919:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that Congress already considered and expressly rejected the imposition of mandatory disability dispute-resolution deadlines. Such deadlines, according to congressional reports, would subordinate quality of service to timeliness. The Court cautioned that pervasively regulated areas, such as the Social Security Act in general and its dispute resolution mechanisms in particular, should be left free of judicial intervention that is far less attuned to the needs of the constituencies served by such legislation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52919:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52923:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52923:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKathy Keeton (Keeton) sued Hustler Magazine, Inc. (Hustler) and several other defendants for libel in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Keeton alleged that the district court had jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship since she was a resident of New York and Hustler was an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in California. Hustler sold 10 to 15 thousand copies of its magazine in New Hampshire each month but Keeton's only connection to New Hampshire was the circulation there of copies of a magazine that she assisted in producing. She chose to sue in New Hampshire because it was the only state in which the statute of limitation for libel six years, the longest in the United States had not run. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the application of New Hampshire's long-arm statute in order to acquire personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that Keeton's contacts with New Hampshire were too attenuated for an assertion of personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The Court of Appeals also found the application of the \"single publication rule,\" which would require the court to award Keeton damages caused in all states should she prevail, unfair since most of Keeton's alleged injuries occurred outside of New Hampshire.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52923:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52923:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52923:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Hustler's regular circulation of magazines in New Hampshire is sufficient to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine. In analyzing whether there are sufficient minimum contacts to permit personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, a court should focus on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Hustler has continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market and therefore it must reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there. Keeton did not need to have minimum contacts with the forum state in order for that state to have asserted personal jurisdiction over Hustler. New Hampshire had a sufficient interest in adjudicating the dispute. Moreover, even though most of the harm done to Keeton occurred outside New Hampshire, the same would be true in most libel cases brought anywhere other than plaintiff's state of domicile.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52923:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52924:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52924:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1980, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and a private firm planned to inspect a plant owned by Stauffer Chemical Co. (Stauffer) in Tennessee. Before granting entry, Stauffer requested that the employees of the private firm sign an agreement promising not to disclose any trade secrets they might learn during the inspection. The employees refused, and Stauffer denied them entry. The EPA and private firm returned with a warrant to enter the premises, but Stauffer again denied them entry.\nThe EPA began a civil contempt proceeding against Stauffer to gain entry. The district court ruled in favor of the EPA and Stauffer appealed. On appeal, Stauffer argued that the employees of the private firm did not qualify as “authorized representatives” under the Clean Air Act, and therefore Stauffer was not required to grant them entry. Stauffer had used this argument before in a similar case from Wyoming, which involved the same parties. Stauffer argued that this previous case precluded the government from re-litigating this issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with Stauffer and reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52924:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52924:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52924:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion in which the Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied in this case. This doctrine prevents re-litigation of issues that were “conclusively determined in a prior action involving the same parties.” While, the government conceded that the facts and question in this case were the same as those already ruled upon in the Wyoming case, it argued that this case could proceed because it involved unrelated subject matter. Additionally, the government argued that it had a duty to re-litigate issues of public importance. The Court found these arguments unpersuasive and concluded that this case involved the same parties, issues of law, and virtually identical fact scenarios.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion in which he warned of taking the doctrine of collateral estoppel too far.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52924:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52926:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52926:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn an effort to curb racially discriminatory practices in private schools, the Internal Revenue Code denies tax-exempt status to schools which promote such practices. The Code also prohibits individuals from making tax-deductible donations to private schools which racially discriminate. Inez Wright and others filed a nationwide class action suit arguing that the IRS had not fulfilled its obligations in enforcing these provisions of the Code, and thus, that government was subsidizing and encouraging the expansion of segregated education in private schools. This case was decided together with Reagan v. Wright.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52926:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52926:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52926:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that the circumstances involved in this case did not warrant federal-court adjudication. Justice O'Connor's opinion argued that the Court could not act since the injuries that the suit identified were not \"judicially cognizable\" and because they were not \"fairly traceable to the assertedly unlawful conduct of the IRS.\" Citing past precedents, O'Connor found that, by itself, an assertion that the government is not acting in the bounds of the law is not enough to bring a suit to a federal court. To allow so would open the door to a myriad of legal challenges in which the courts would become buried by the minutiae of governing, acting as \"continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52926:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52929:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52929:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52929:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52929:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52929:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court determined the constitutionality of Alabama's prayer and meditation statute by applying the secular purpose test, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion. The Court held that Alabama's passage of the prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the state's duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion, but was an affirmative endorsement of religion. As such, the statute clearly lacked any secular purpose as it sought to establish religion in public schools, thereby violating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52929:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52936:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52936:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1980, Cleburne Living Center, Inc. submitted a permit application to operate a home for the mentally retarded. The city council of Cleburne voted to deny the special use permit, acting pursuant to a municipal zoning ordinance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52936:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52936:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52936:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous judgment, the Court held that the denial of the special use permit to Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. was premised on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, and hence unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court declined to grant the mentally retarded the status of a \"quasi-suspect class,\" it nevertheless found that the \"rational relation\" test for legislative action provided sufficient protection against invidious discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52936:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52948:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52948:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn indictment issued by a grand jury charged James Miller with fraud. The indictment alleged he conspired with a burglar and overstated the value of the stolen items so his insurer would pay him more in damages recovery. The prosecution presented evidence proving that Miller had overstated the value of the items but did not try to establish that he had conspired with the burglar. The jury found his overstatement of value sufficient to convict him of fraud. Miller argued that by convicting him despite the fact that the prosecutors only addressed part of the indictment, the jury violated his Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on a grand jury indictment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52948:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52948:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52948:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the decision for an 8-0 court. The Court maintained that an indictment is valid so long as it \"clearly set[s] out the offense for which [the accused] was ultimately convicted.\" In this case, the defense clearly understood that Miller could be convicted for fraud solely because he overstated the value of the stolen items. Failing to convict him on other grounds did not annul his proven criminal conduct. The allegation of conspiring with a burglar constituted another \"means of committing the same crime\" and could be \"treated as a useless averment that may be ignored\" once the prosecution dropped it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52948:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52954:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52954:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency officers observed Charles Carney approach a youth who followed him into a motor home parked in a lot in downtown San Diego. Having previously received a tip that Carney was using the motor home to sell marijuana in exchange for sexual favors, the officers kept the motor home under surveillance while the two were inside. When the youth exited, the officers contacted him, and he confirmed that Carney gave him marijuana in exchange for receiving Carney’s sexual advances. The officers knocked on the door of the mobile home, identified themselves, and entered without a warrant or consent. They found marijuana, plastic bags, and a scale on the table. The officers arrested Carney for possession of marijuana with intent to sell.\nCarney moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search of the motor home, and the trial court denied the motion. Carney pleaded no contest, was convicted, and placed on probation. He appealed, and the California Court of Appeals upheld the conviction on the grounds that the motor home fell under the vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of California reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52954:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52954:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52954:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied a lesser degree of protection to motor vehicles based on the ability to easily and quickly move them before a warrant can be obtained. Also, the regulation surrounding automobiles affords them a lesser expectation of privacy and therefore less protection under the Fourth Amendment. Since Carney’s motor home was not in an area traditionally used for residence and was licensed to operate as a vehicle on public streets, the Court held that it should receive the level of constitutional protection of a motor vehicle rather than a residence. The Court also held that the officers had probable cause and that the search itself was reasonable.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent where he argued that the Court should have relied on the ruling of the California Supreme Court to establish precedent for that state. He also argued that the majority’s decision overemphasized the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. Since the motor home was neither in motion nor was there any indication that Carney would quickly move it, there were no circumstances to prevent the officers from obtaining a warrant. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52954:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52958:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52958:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGary Garcia alleged that in 1979 he was unlawfully arrested, beaten, and tear-gassed by the petitioner, Richard Wilson, who was a New Mexico State Police officer. Garcia also alleged that Martin Vigil, the Chief of the State Police, knew Wilson had attacked citizens on several occasions but had failed to take action. Garcia sued for a violation of Section 1983 of the United State Code, a civil rights statute that creates a civil cause of action for the deprivation of rights. The petitioners argued that this Section 1983 claim should be subject to the two-year statute of limitations that applied to a similar cause of action found in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (Act). If that statute of limitations were applied, this case could not proceed because the complaint was not filed until two years and nine months after the alleged beating. The district court held that the two-year statute of limitations recommended by petitioners did not apply because it was not sufficiently related to the nature of the right being enforced by Garcia's claim. Instead, the district court held that a different cause of action in the Act was more closely related to this Section 1983 claim and applied that cause of action's four-year statute of limitations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling but held that actions brought under Section 1983 are essentially an injury to personal rights; therefore, the three-year statute of limitations that applies to all personal injury actions in New Mexico should apply to Section 1983 claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52958:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52958:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52958:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes, yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that, in situations where a federal action does not have a statute of limitations, the practice has been to adopt a local limitation as long as that limitation is not inconsistent with a federal law or policy. Looking at the language of Section 1983, the Court determined that Congress intended to create a federal cause of action; therefore, it is up to the federal courts to determine the proper statute of limitation. The Court also determined that the importance of consistency and the diversity of Section 1983 causes of action required a uniform limitation for all causes of action to prevent uncertainty and quarrels over which limitation to apply. Finally, the Court agreed with the appellate court that the three-year personal injury limitation was the best available because of the nature of the remedy afforded by Section 1983.\nJustice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that there need not be a uniform application of limitations to all Section 1983 claims. Rather, each claim should be evaluated individually and assigned a limitation that is most analogous to the specific claim that is brought before the court.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52958:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52979:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52979:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral prison inmates convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) alleging that the drugs to be used for their executions were not approved for use in human executions and therefore violated the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). When the FDA denied enforcement, the inmates brought suit claiming violations of the FDCA and requesting that the FDA be required to take enforcement actions. The district court granted summary judgment to the FDA holding that decisions declining to initiate enforcement proceedings were not judicially reviewable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that the decision not to begin an enforcement action was judicially reviewable under 5 U.S.C. Section 701(a)(2) and an abuse of discretion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52979:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52979:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52979:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, they are presumptively unreviewable. Refusals of administrative agencies to exercise enforcement authority involve a complicated balancing of factors, including agency allocation of scarce resources, which are not suitable for judicial review. Thus, they are presumptively \"committed to agency discretion by law\" under Section 701(a)(2). This presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers. In the instant case, the presumption of unreviewability was not overcome by the enforcement provisions of the FDCA. The FDCA's prohibition on \"misbranding\" of drugs and introduction of \"new drugs,\" absent agency approval, does not supply relevant guidelines. Neither does the FDA's \"policy statement\" indicating that the agency considered itself \"obligated\" to take certain investigative actions nor the FDCA's provision that the Secretary need not report for prosecution minor violations of the Act supply relevant guidelines.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52979:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52982:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52982:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn October 1977, Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted on fifteen charges of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. The government’s two principal witnesses were James F. O’Connor and Donald E. Mitchell, private security guards. Between April and June 1977, they assisted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) in conducting an undercover investigation of Bagley. In response to a discovery request for information about any deals, promises or inducements made to O’Connor or Mitchell, the government produced only affidavits from each man stating that each spoke without any threats or rewards, or promises of reward. Bagley waived his right to a jury trial. At trial, O’Connor and Mitchell testified about the firearms and narcotics charges. On December 23, 1977, the court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, but not the firearms charges.\nIn mid-1980, Bagley filed requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act and to the Privacy Act of 1974. He received copies of ATF form contracts, each entitled, “Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor.” These contracts indicated that O’Connor and Mitchell provided information to the ATF and promised a future payment of $300 to each informer. Bagley moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that the government’s failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.\nThe motion came before the same district judge who presided at Bagley’s trial. At an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate found that neither informant expected payment for his testimony. In contrast, the district judge found that O’Connor and Mitchell probably expected to receive compensation for their assistance, and that the government suppressed evidence favorable to Bagley. He also concluded, however, that the disclosure would not have had an effect on the court’s verdict. He emphasized that Bagley’s counsel did not seek to discredit O’Connor or Mitchell on cross-examination. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed, reasoning that the government’s failure to disclose required automatic reversal because it impaired Bagley’s Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses through effective cross-examination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52982:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52982:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52982:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-3 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court held that the government’s failure to disclose the contacts in discovery did not violate the Due Process Clause. Justice Blackmun wrote that the state was required by due process to disclose evidence that was both favorable to the accused and material to either guilt or punishment, and that impeachment evidence fell within this requirement. He rejected, however, the Ninth Circuit’s argument that the government’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence required automatic reversal. The Court was concerned with undisclosed impeachment evidence that directly restricted the scope of cross-examination; here, Bagley’s counsel was free to cross-examine the informants on any relevant subject.\nRelying on United States v. Agurs, Justice Blackmun held that undisclosed evidence was material if there was a reasonable possibility that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed. He acknowledged that the government’s failure likely lead the defense counsel to believe that the informants could not be impeached on the basis of bias or inducements offered by the government. Nonetheless, the district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome would have been the same if the government had disclosed the evidence in question. Justice Blackmun reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration.\nJustice Byron White concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist. He would have simply held that the proper standard was one of reasonable probability and that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the standard necessities reversal.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He argued that a failure to disclose cannot be considered harmless when the government withholds evidence that might impeach the prosecution’s only witnesses. He wrote that the majority’s standard encouraged prosecutors to withhold potentially dispositive evidence.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented. He noted that the analysis in Agurs was restricted to the context where the defense made either a general request for evidence or no request at all, not a specific request for impeachment evidence. He rejected the majority’s results-based test for materiality.\nJustice Louis Powell took no part in the decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52982:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52984:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52984:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMr. Wayte was required by a 1980 Presidential Proclamation to register with the Selective Service system. Instead, he wrote letters to various government officials stating that he had not registered and did not intend to do so. Wayte's letters were added to a file kept by the Selective Service of men who had informed the government that they were not complying with the proclamation.\nThe Selective Service later adopted a policy of passive enforcement, in which it would prosecute only men who had either reported to the government that they were not registering or whom other people had reported to the government for not registering. After a long series of requests by the government that Wayte register (all of which he failed to respond to), the government eventually indicted Wayte in federal district court for violating the Military Selective Service Act.\nThe district court, however, dismissed the indictment, holding that the government's passive enforcement policy was unconstitutional because it amounted to selective prosecution of only those men who took an outspoken stance against the Selective Service. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wayte had failed to show that the government focused its attention on him because of his protest activities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52984:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52984:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52984:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held, 7-to-2, that the government's passive enforcement policy was constitutional. In the majority opinion, Justice Lewis Powell found that the government's policy was not unconstitutional selective enforcement (in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection clause) because men who had not taken an outspoken stance against the Selective Service, but who were merely reported by others for failing to register, were treated the same as those men who had notified the government of their own refusal to register. Justice Powell wrote, \"In the present case, petitioner has not shown that the Government prosecuted him because of his protest activities. Absent such a showing, his claim of selective prosecution fails.\"\nTo decide the First Amendment challenge, Justice Powell cited four requirements for incidental government regulation of speech laid out in United States v. O'Brien: the regulation must be within the government's constitutional power, must further an important or substantial government interest, must have an interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech, and must restrict only as much speech as is necessary to meet the government interest. Powell found that the passive enforcement policy satisfied all these requirements, and therefore did not violate the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52984:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52986:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "52986:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDonald E. Thornton worked as a supervisor in the Caldor department store chain. A devout Presbyterian, Thornton asked to be excused from working Sundays at the company's store in Torrington, Connecticut. The store required its managers to work one of every four Sundays, although rank-and-file employees were exempt under their union contract from Sunday work. In 1979, the company refused to allow Thornton to take off Sundays but offered him a transfer to another store, an hour away in Massachusetts, that was closed on Sundays. When he turned that down, the company said it would demote him from his manager's job and cut his hourly pay from $6.46 to $3.50. Thornton had worked Sundays for nearly eight months before he became aware the store was violating Connecticut law giving employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath. He filed a grievance against Caldor with the state board of mediation. The board ruled in his favor. The state supreme court reversed. Thornton's estate (Thornton died in 1982) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "52986:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "52986:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "52986:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court held 8-to-1 that the Connecticut Sabbath observance statute was void, saying its \"unyielding weighing in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests\" results in an unconstitutional mingling of church and state. In his opinion, Burger wrote that the Connecticut law \"provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath.\" Burger said the state law \"thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "52986:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53024:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53024:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 1981, David Smith sued Robert McDonald in state court. Smith alleged that, while he was being considered for the position of U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of North Carolina, McDonald sent two letters to President Ronald Reagan that contained libelous falsehoods about him. Smith claimed that McDonald knew the accusations in the letters were false and that he mailed the letters with malicious intent to undermine the prospect of Smith’s appointment as U.S. Attorney. Smith’s complaint alleged that the letters had their intended effect—he was not appointed to the position, and he suffered damage to his career and reputation—so he sought compensatory damages.\nMcDonald removed the case to the district court on the basis of diverse citizenship and moved for judgment on the pleadings by arguing that the Petition Clause granted him absolute immunity. The district court held that the Petition Clause granted general immunity but not absolute immunity from liability for libel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53024:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53024:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53024:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that, while the Petition Clause was an important foundation for the ideas of self-government, there is no evidence that the Framers intended it to allow the unchecked expression of false information. Previous cases have also shown that the right to petition is not without limits; baseless litigation is not protected under the Petition Clause. The Court also held that damages may not be recovered without proof that the defendant acted with actual malice.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that the Framers intended the Petition Clause to be a part of the overlapping First Amendment protections of free expression. Since the other parts of the First Amendment do not grant absolute immunity, he argued that there was no reason to assume that the Petition Clause should. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. took not part in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53024:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53027:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53027:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPart of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 authorized local institutions to receive funds to assist educationally deprived children from low-income families. Since 1966, New York City had used portions of its Title I funding to pay salaries of employees who teach in parochial schools.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53027:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53027:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53027:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Even though the Court acknowledged that the efforts of the City of New York were well-intentioned, it found that the funding practices violated the Constitution. As part of New York's program, teachers were directed to avoid involvement in religious materials and activities in their classrooms. This, as well as the actions of school administrators and field supervisors who monitored classroom activities for religious content, posed constitutional problems for the majority. Involving agents of the city in extensive monitoring increased the potential for \"divisiveness along religious lines\" and violated the intent of the Establishment Clause which is to prevent the intrusion of church and state on each other's respective domain.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53027:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53028:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53028:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1977, former President Gerald Ford contracted with Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. to publish his memoirs. Harper & Row negotiated a prepublication agreement with Time Magazine for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Ford's account of his pardon of former President Richard Nixon. Before Time released its article, an unauthorized source provided The Nation Magazine with the unpublished Ford manuscript. Subsequently, The Nation, using approximately 300 words from the manuscript, scooped Time. Harper & Row sued The Nation, alleging violations of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976. The District Court held that The Nation's use of the copyrighted material constituted infringement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Nation's use of the copyrighted material was sanctioned as a fair use.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53028:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53028:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53028:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that The Nation's use of verbatim excerpts from the unpublished manuscript was not a fair use. The Court reasoned that the unpublished nature of a work is a key, though not necessarily determinative, factor tending to negate a defense of fair use. \"Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use,\" wrote Justice O'Connor. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the four statutory factors relevant to determining whether the use was fair were not satisfied. In his dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., argued that the Court was advancing the protection of the copyright owner's economic interest \"through an exceedingly narrow definition of the scope of fair use.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53028:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53029:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53029:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are two consolidated cases involving claims and counterclaims between the same parties. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., a Puerto Rico corporation, entered into distribution and sales agreements with Mitsubishi Motors, a Japanese corporation that manufactures automobiles in Japan. The sales agreement provided for arbitration by the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association of all disputes arising out of certain articles of the agreement. A dispute did arise from slowing automobile sales. When the dispute could not be resolved, Mitsubishi sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking an order to compel arbitration. Soler filed counterclaims, including Sherman Act antitrust violations. The district court ordered arbitration of all claims, holding that the international nature of the dispute required enforcement of the arbitration clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed as to the antitrust claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53029:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53029:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53029:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. The Supreme Court held that claims arising under the Sherman Act and encompassed in a valid arbitration clause in an international commercial transaction are arbitrable under the federal Arbitration Act.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that a fair construction of the arbitration clause does not encompass antitrust claims. An arbitration clause should be construed to cover a remedy it does not expressly identify, and congress did not intend the federal Arbitration Act of apply to antitrust claims. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in all but part II of the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53029:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53030:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53030:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Gay Task Force filed a facial constitutional challenge to an Oklahoma Statute that allowed schools to fire teachers who engage in “public homosexual activity” or “public homosexual conduct”. Public homosexual activity encompassed physical sexual acts while public homosexual conduct included advocating for or encouraging public or private homosexual activity. The district court ruled in favor of the Board of Education, holding that the statute did not inhibit First Amendment freedoms, and the right of privacy did not include the activities prohibited by the statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed in part, holding that the part of the statute that prohibited public homosexual conduct was unconstitutionally broad and attempted to regulate speech. The court upheld that part of the statute prohibiting public homosexual activity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53030:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53030:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53030:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo answer. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower judgment by an equally divided court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53030:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53034:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53034:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCustoms officials stopped Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez at the Los Angeles Airport, where she arrived after a flight from Bogota, Columbia. Montoya de Hernandez’s passport revealed eight recent trips from Bogota to Miami or Los Angeles. After further questioning, officials detained Montoya de Hernandez under suspicion that she was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. After 16 hours of detention where Montoya de Hernandez did not speak or use the bathroom, officials obtained a court order for an x-ray and other tests. At the hospital, a doctor removed a balloon filled with cocaine from her rectum. Over the next four days, Montoya de Hernandez passed 88 balloons filled with cocaine, totaling 528 grams. At trial, the district court admitted the cocaine into evidence and convicted Montoya de Hernandez on federal drug charges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Montoya de Hernandez’s detention violated the Fourth Amendment because customs officials did not have a “clear indication” that she was smuggling drugs.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53034:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53034:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53034:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that detention of a traveler at an international border is justified if customs agents reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling illegal drugs in their body. The facts in this case supported that reasonable suspicion. Given the manner in which the drugs were concealed, Montoya de Hernandez’s detention was not unreasonably long. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment, writing that the detention was justified because Montoya de Hernandez refused to consent to the x-ray.\nJustice William J. Brenan dissented, arguing that government officials should not have a lower standard for detaining someone at an international border than in the interior of the United States. Indefinite detentions are only reasonable with approval of a magistrate, and that approval can only be given if there is probable cause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53034:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53038:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53038:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHamilton Bank of Johnson City owned of a tract of land in Williamson County Tennessee and intended to develop it into a residential subdivision. When Hamilton Bank attempted to get a layout of the subdivision approved, the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission denied it because the layout violated certain zoning regulations. Hamilton Bank sued the Commission alleging that the zoning laws constituted a \"taking\" under the Fifth Amendment. At trial, the jury awarded Hamilton Bank $350,000 as compensation for the taking. The court issued an injunction against the Commission and awarded judgment notwithstanding the verdict denying money damages because the \"taking\" was only temporary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the zoning laws denied Hamilton Bank all \"economically viable\" use of the land and that damages were required to compensate for the temporary taking.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53038:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53038:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53038:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo decision. In a 7-1 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote for the majority, reversing and remanding to the lower court. The Supreme Court held that even if there was a temporary taking, a decision on money damages was premature because Hamilton Bank had not obtained a final administrative decision on the subdivision layout. The claim was premature under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the same reason. Justice Byron R. White dissented from the holding that the issues in the case were not ripe for decision.\nThe Court in 2019 overturned this case in Knick v. Township of Scott, holding there that a government violates the Takings Clause when it takes property without compensation, and a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at that time.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53038:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53039:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53039:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCertain bank holding companies located principally in either Connecticut or Massachusetts applied to the Federal Reserve Board (Board) to obtain approval for acquisitions of banks or bank holding companies (banks) in the other state. If a bank from one state seeks to acquire a bank, or substantially all of a bank's assets, from another state, the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 12 U.S.C. Section 1842(d), allows the Board to approve the acquisition only if it \"is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such [acquired] bank is located.\" Massachusetts and Connecticut have substantially similar laws allowing out-of-state banks to buy in-state banks only if the out-of-state banks (1) have their principal place of business in another New England State, and (2) the other New England State accords equivalent reciprocal privileges. Certain banks from outside of New England opposed the acquisitions, but the Board found that the Douglas Amendment did not prevent their authorization, and approved them.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53039:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53039:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53039:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes to part 1; no to part 2. Though the Douglas Amendment's language does not specifically indicate that a state may partially lift the ban on out-of-state banks acquiring in-state banks, the Amendment's legislative history indicates that Congress intended to allow each state such flexibility. Moreover, the Massachusetts and Connecticut laws favoring out-of-state banks from New England are consistent with the broader purpose underlying the BHCA: to retain local control over banking. As for the constitutionality of these state laws, there is no violation of the dormant Commerce Clause because Congress exercised its commerce power by enacting the BHCA and the Douglas Amendment. There is no violation of the Compact Clause because Massachusetts and Connecticut did not form a compact, and even if they did, they do not pose a threat to federal supremacy. Finally, there is no violation of the Equal Protection Clause because our country has traditionally favored widely dispersed control of banking, and so the concerns Massachusetts and Connecticut had with preserving the local nature of banking meet the traditional rational basis for judging equal protection claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53039:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53040:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53040:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the provisions of the Education of the Handicapped Act, state and local education agencies must provide handicapped children and their parents or guardians with access to the appropriate safeguards to ensure free and appropriate public education. Such safeguards include the right of the parents and guardians to participate in the development of an individual education program (IEP) and a procedure for the review of a proposed IEP if there is disagreement.\nIn the spring of 1979, Michael Panico, who was considered to be “handicapped” under the meaning of the Act, was attending Memorial School, a public school in Burlington. His continued poor performance and the school’s inability to handle his needs led to a discussion between the school district and Michael’s parents about what changes needed to be made to his IEP. In June of 1979, the town presented the Panicos with an IEP that called for Michael to be placed at Pine Glen School. In the meantime, the Panicos had met with specialists at the Massachusetts General Hospital who recommended that Michael’s needs could best be served at the Carroll School in Lincoln, Massachusetts. The Panicos enrolled Michael at the Carroll School at their own expense.\nThe Massachusetts Department of Education’s Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) held several hearings on the issue and determined that the town’s proposed placement was inappropriate and that the Carroll School was most adequately equipped to meet Michael’s needs. The BSEA ordered the town to pay for Michael’s tuition and transportation, as well as reimburse the Panicos for money already spent. The town sought judicial review in district court under federal and state statutes. The district court granted summary judgment against the town on the state law claim and set a date for trial on the federal claim. Because the town had refused to comply with the BSEA order, the Panicos and the state moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the judgment in regards to the state law claim and held that none of the parties were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief because none could show irreparable injury. On remand, the district court found in favor of the town that the proposed IEP was appropriate and that the town should not be required to compensate the Panicos. The case was transferred to a different district judge to rule on the issue of whether or not the town should be required to pay the Panicos for costs incurred while the case was pending. The district court held that the Panicos’ decision to place Michael in the Carroll School without the town’s consent absolved the town of financial responsibility while the case was pending and ordered the Panicos to reimburse the town. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred in conducting an entirely new trial, gave insufficient weight to the BSEA findings, and did not properly evaluate the IEP in question.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53040:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53040:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53040:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the unanimous court. The Supreme Court held that the Education of the Handicapped Act grants the courts broad discretion in overseeing the administrative proceedings of IEP disputes that includes the ability to order reimbursement. Because the courts must ensure appropriate placement for the children in question, there may be situations in which all of the public school options are deemed inappropriate for the needs of a particular child. The Court also held that a reading of the Act that forces parents to waive their right to reimbursement if they place their child in an alternative school from the one recommended in the IEP would defeat the purpose of the Act. Parents who unilaterally change their child’s placement do so at their own financial risk, but they may be reimbursed if the placement is deemed to be the most appropriate available option.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53040:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53046:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53046:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1975, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) was accused by both the Democratic Party of the United States and the Federal Election Commission of violating the Federal Election Campaign Act. The Act stipulated that independent political action committees could not spend more than $1,000 to support the election of a presidential candidate. This case was decided together with Democratic Party v. NCPAC.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53046:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53046:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53046:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the expenditures prohibited by the Federal Election Campaign Act were \"at the core of the First Amendment\" and could not be restricted by the government. The Court rejected the notion that the PACs' form of organization diminished their entitlement to First Amendment protection. The Court drew a distinction between contributions to candidates-- which were open to corruption--and contributions to independent organizations in support of candidates.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53046:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53048:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53048:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the Commission) filed a complaint against the Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers (CDCB), alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. CDCB was going through bankruptcy at the time and a trustee was appointed At a deposition related to the Commission's lawsuit, Gary Weintraub, CDCB's former counsel, refused to answer certain questions, citing attorney-client privilege. The Commission obtained a waiver of attorney-client privilege from the CDCB's bankruptcy trustee. The district court directed Weintraub to answer the questions, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the power to waive attorney-client privilege for communications that occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53048:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53048:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53048:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy trustee does have the power to waive attorney client privilege for communications that occurred before filing the bankruptcy petition. This power is held by the management of a corporation, and a bankruptcy trustee is merely a new form of management. If the power to waive attorney-client privilege remained with the corporation's directors, it would frustrate the goal of the trustee, to uncover fraud and misappropriated corporate assets. Justice Lewis F. Powell did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53048:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53050:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53050:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames Loudermill stated on his application for employment with the Cleveland Board of Education that he had never been convicted for a felony. After hiring him as a security guard, the board discovered that he had been convicted for grand larceny and without further consideration fired him for providing false information on his application. Since Loudermill qualified as a \"classified civil servant\" under Ohio law, he obtained a property right to his employment. This meant he could only be dismissed for cause and could obtain an administrative review of the causes for his termination. The Cleveland Civil Service Commission granted him an administrative review after his termination and found it valid. Loudermill filed suit in District Court alleging that the review system was unconstitutional because it only allowed him to respond to the charges against him after his termination. He argued that the board removed his property without giving him a chance to defend himself in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court agreed that the Ohio statute gave Loudermill a property right to his job, but ruled that the board did not violate his due process rights because it followed the procedures specified by the same statute for removing the property right. In a similar case, Richard Donnelly alleged that post-dismissal hearings violated his due process rights. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard both cases together and ruled that the board violated both defendants' due process rights by removing their property rights to employment before providing an opportunity for them to respond to charges against them.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53050:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53050:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53050:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron White authored the opinion for an 8-1 court. The Ohio statute clearly grants civil servants property rights to their employment. In order to lawfully remove this property, the Due Process Clause requires a procedure that carefully weighs the interests of the government in removing the property against the interests of the private party in retaining the property. This procedure must incorporate the \"essential requirements of due process,\" which \"are notice and an opportunity to respond.\" There was no strong reason to delay the opportunity to respond until after termination. The Court found that \"affording the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable delays.\" Accordingly, the significant interests of the employees to retain their jobs outweighed the interests of the state to remove employees quickly.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53050:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53051:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53051:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are two consolidated cases against different defendants involving the same incident. During a chase, police officer Elton Hymon shot 15-year-old Edward Eugene Garner with a hollow tip bullet to prevent Garner from escaping over a fence. Garner was suspected of burglarizing a nearby house. Hymon admitted that before he shot he saw no evidence that Garner was armed and \"figured\" he was unarmed. The bullet hit Garner in the back of the head. Garner was taken to the hospital where he died a short time later.\nGarner's father sued seeking damages for violations of Garner's constitutional rights. The district court entered judgment for the defendants because Tennessee law authorized Hymon's actions. The court also felt that Garner had assumed the risk of being shot by recklessly attempting to escape. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that killing a fleeing suspect is a \"seizure\" under the Fourth Amendment and such a seizure would only be reasonable if the suspect posed a threat to the safety of police officers or the community at large.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53051:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53051:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53051:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote for the majority affirming the court of appeals decision. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of deadly force unless it is necessary to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of violence to the officer or the community. The Tennessee statute was unconstitutional as far as it allowed deadly force to prevent the escape of an unarmed fleeing felon.\nJustice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a dissent stating that the majority went too far in invalidating long-standing common law and police practices contrary to the holding. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53051:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53053:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53053:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murder for killing a couple in Oklahoma. At trial, his behavior was so abnormal that the court ordered a prolonged mental examination to determine his competency to stand trial. After six months of examination, a state psychiatrist declared Ake unfit for trial and in need of a “maximum security facility.” Six weeks after this declaration, the same psychiatrist found that, when Ake was on his anti-psychotic medication, he was stable and competent to stand trial; the state resumed proceedings.\nAke intended to assert the insanity defense, so a psychiatrist had to determine Ake’s mental state at the time of the killings. Because Ake could not afford to hire a psychiatrist, his attorney requested that the state provide him one. The court refused and rejected Ake’s argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the government to provide indigent defendants with a psychiatrist to allow them to raise a meaningful insanity defense. Without a psychiatrist, Ake was unable to provide any evidence as to his mental state at the time of the offense. Absent this evidence, jurors were instructed that Ake was to be presumed sane at the time of the offense. The jury subsequently rejected Ake’s insanity defense and convicted him on all counts. At the sentencing hearing, Ake—still unable to afford a psychiatrist—could not provide expert testimony to mitigate his offense and was sentenced to death. Ake appealed to the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, which affirmed and held that the government was not responsible for providing psychiatric help to indigent defendants charged with capital crimes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53053:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53053:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53053:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that, when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense will be at issue during the trial, the Constitution requires the government to provide psychiatric assistance if the defendant cannot afford it. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires state-provided assistance in cases where there is a private interest that will be affected by the state’s actions, value that will be derived from the additional safeguards, and when providing the assistance will only be a minimal burden to the state. All three of these factors were present in this case. Furthermore, both justice and the Fourteenth Amendment require a defendant to be able to participate meaningfully in the judicial proceedings, which is impossible if the government were to deny this type of assistance to Ake and similar defendants.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a concurring opinion in which he noted that the Court’s decision applies only to capital cases.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he, like Justice Burger, argued that this decision should apply only to capital cases. Furthermore, he argued that this rule should provide for an independent psychiatric evaluation, not a comprehensive defense consultant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53053:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53057:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53057:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 10, 1980, an Oklahoma City police officer shot and killed Albert Tuttle outside a bar. Rose Marie Tuttle, Albert’s widow, sued the police officer and the city in district court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows an individual to recover damages against a party who “acting under color of state law” deprives another of his constitutional rights. The district court instructed the jury that the city could be held liable only if the incident had been caused by a municipal “policy,” but a single, unusually excessive use of force could support a finding that the city was grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent in the training or supervision of its police force and was therefore liable under Section 1983. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the police officer but against the city and awarded Tuttle’s estate $1.5 million in damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53057:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53057:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53057:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the four-justice plurality. The plurality held that the district court’s instructions to the jury improperly allowed a plaintiff to impose liability on the city without proof of a single action taken by a municipal policy maker. The plurality further concluded that proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability on a city for a policy that is not in and of itself unconstitutional.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that Section 1983 does not permit a city to be held liable on a theory of strict responsibility for its non-policy-making employees. Instead, municipalities are liable for constitutional deprivations caused by an official policy or custom. Because the jury could have found the city liable solely because the police officer’s actions were so excessive and out of the ordinary, Justice Brennan concurred with the judgment reached by the Court. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent in which he argued that cities should be held liable under Section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their agents that are performed in the court of their official duties.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53057:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53065:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53065:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1981, John Abel was indicted for robbing a bank in California. During Abel’s trial, the prosecution called one of his accomplices, Kurt Ehle, to testify that Abel had participated in the robbery. To counter Ehle’s testimony, Abel called a mutual friend, Robert Mills, to the stand. Mills, Abel, and Ehle knew each other from the time they spent in prison together and their involvement in a prison gang, the Aryan Brotherhood. Mills testified that, in prison, Ehle had talked about his plans to rob the bank and blame it on Abel. To discredit Mills, the prosecution re-called Ehle to the stand to expose the three men’s involvement in the Brotherhood and the gang’s strict code of protection, which required members to lie, cheat, steal, and kill to protect a fellow member. Ehle testified that this code of conduct explained why Mills testified in defense of Abel. Abel’s counsel argued that this testimony was irrelevant, but the district court allowed it into evidence because the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect it may have on Abel. Abel lost and appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed because admitting evidence that Mills belonged to a perjurious organization, to suggest he was committing perjury this time, unfairly prejudiced him by association absent any evidence of his individual willingness to lie.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53065:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53065:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53065:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion, in which the Court held that the evidence of bias introduced for purposes of impeachment is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Relevant evidence is that which has the tendency to make the existence of any fact more or less probable. The Court determined that a showing of bias on the part of a witness would have a tendency to make the facts to which they testify less probable and is therefore relevant. Furthermore, the district court ensured the admission of only the highly probative evidence about the men’s involvement in the Brotherhood and sustained objections relating to the punishment of unfaithful members and other topics that might have been prejudicial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53065:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53076:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53076:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael James Elstad was suspected of committing a burglary and was picked up by police officers in his home. Before officers had given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, Elstad made an incriminating statement. Once at the Sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was advised of his rights. Elstad then voluntarily executed a written confession.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53076:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53076:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53076:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that while Miranda required that unwarned admissions must be suppressed, subsequent statements, if made knowingly and voluntarily, need not be. The Court held that \". . .the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion.\" The Court also noted that police officers were ill-equipped to determine when \"custody\" legally begins. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, argued that the holding \"in no way retreat[ed] from the bright-line rule of Miranda.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53076:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53090:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53090:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKathryn Piper was a resident of Lower Waterford, Vermont, which is about 400 yards away from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, she applied to take the 1980 New Hampshire Bar Examination and submitted her statement of intent to become a New Hampshire resident. Piper passed the New Hampshire Bar and was informed she would have to establish a home address in New Hampshire before being sworn in. In May 1980, Piper requested a dispensation from the residency requirement due to special circumstances and the fact that she met all of the other requirements. When her request was denied, she formally petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court to become a member of the bar. The New Hampshire Supreme Court denied her petition on December 31, 1980.\nOn March 22, 1982, Piper sued the New Hampshire Supreme Court in district court and argued that the residency requirement violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted Piper’s motion for summary judgment and found that the requirement violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53090:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53090:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53090:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was intended to create one economic union out of a collection of states, and so it was relevant to employment and business regulations. Specifically the legal profession plays a crucial rule in the national economy, and therefore the ability to practice should be considered a “fundamental right” that is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Court also held that, because a lawyer is not an officer of the State, there is no substantial reason for New Hampshire to exclude non-residents from the bar.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion and argued that, other than the location of Piper’s home, there was nothing to distinguish her from any other New Hampshire lawyer. He found that the residency requirement should not apply in her case, but he did not think the majority’s opinion needed to reach any finding regarding the Constitutional validity of the residency requirement in general.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the practice of law differed from other professions in that it does not always readily translate across state lines, as laws and their enforcement often differ in different localities. He also argued that the state had substantial reasons to exclude out-of-state lawyers from the bar.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53090:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53091:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53091:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the 1976-1977 school year, the school district of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted two programs, Shared Time and Community Education, that provided secular classes to private school students at public expense. The Shared Time program offered classes during the school day that were intended to “supplement the core curriculum” of the private schools. The Shared Time teachers were full-time public school teachers, and many had previously worked in private schools. The Community Education program was offered for children and adults at many different sites, but the classes at issue took place after the school day in private elementary schools. The Community Education teachers were part-time public school employees, and many also held jobs at private schools. The classrooms for both programs were leased from the private schools. The vast majority of the participating private schools were religious, and there was no evidence that a public school student ever attended a Shared Time or Community Education class held in a private school.\n Six taxpayers filed suit against the school district and state officials and alleged that they violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by using public funds to pay for private (and religious) education. The district court applied the Lemon test and determined that, although the aim was secular, the effect of the programs conferred benefits to religious institutions and entangled the affairs of church and state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53091:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53091:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53091:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the statute failed the Lemon test because it had the effect of advancing religious agendas and it unnecessarily entangled the government and religion. The statute advanced religion in three ways: the teachers may inadvertently or intentionally instruct from a religious perspective; the programs themselves may serve as a symbolic link between the government and religion in the eyes of impressionable children; and the programs essentially serve as a government subsidy for religious instruction. The Court recognized that the intent of the programs was to provide secular education, but there was too great a risk of the religious environment influencing the children’s instruction.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the Court’s decision on the Community Education program, but dissented regarding the Shared Time program. He argued that there was no way to completely eliminate contact between the government and religion, and to attempt to do so in this case would come at the cost of children’s education.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part. She argued that there was no evidence to indicate a link between the Shared Time program and religion other than the fact that the classes were taught in private schools. In the case of the Community Education program, she agreed with the majority.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a dissent where he argued that the Court has long engaged in an unnecessarily narrow reading of the Establishment Clause. He held that this decision and others like it were “contrary to the long-range interests of the country.”\n Justice William H. Rehnquist also dissented and argued that the Establishment Clause was never meant to establish a “wall” between the government and religion but merely to prevent the establishment of a national religion, which these programs do not come close to doing. He also argued that there was no basis for the assumption that teaching secular topics in a religious school would effectively link the government and religion in the minds of schoolchildren.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53091:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53094:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53094:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAround 1 a.m. on July 18, 1982, Ralph Watkinson was locking up his shop when he saw a figure with a gun approaching him. Watkinson drew his own weapon, and the two fired at each other. Watkinson was hit in the legs, and the other shooter was wounded on his left side and managed to run away. About 20 minutes later, the police found Rudolph Lee, Jr., bleeding from his left side, eight blocks away from Watkinson’s shop. The police took Lee to the same hospital Watkinson was in, and Watkinson identified Lee as his shooter. Lee was charged with attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony.\nThe Commonwealth of Virginia filed a motion in state court to compel Lee to submit to surgery to recover the bullet still lodged in his side. The court granted the motion based on testimony that the surgery would be relatively noninvasive and accomplished without use of general anesthetic. The Virginia Supreme Court denied the appeal. Lee sued in district court on the ground that the surgery constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. The court issued a preliminary injunction. After presenting evidence that the surgery would be much more serious than the court originally thought, Lee asked for a rehearing in the state court, which was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Lee brought the case back to the district court, which ruled against the surgery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53094:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53094:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53094:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that below-the-skin surgery represented such an infringement on the expectation of privacy that it must be justified by a compelling need for the evidence that might be produced. Since the state could not demonstrate a compelling need for the bullet in order to make the case against Lee, the Court held that the intrusion on Lee’s privacy vastly outweighed any state interest. Therefore, the surgery would be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun and Justice William H. Rehnquist concurred in the judgment.\nIn his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that he did not read this decision as preventing the police from detaining a suspect whose body they believed to contain evidence that would be naturally revealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53094:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53099:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53099:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe city of Renton, Washington, enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating with in 1,000 feet of \"any residential zone, single-or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.\" Playtime Theatres, Inc., challenged the ordinance and sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53099:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53099:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53099:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the zoning ordinance did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the ordinance was a form of time, place, and manner regulation, not a ban on adult theaters altogether. The Court reasoned that the law was not aimed at the content of the films shown at adult motion picture theaters, \"but rather the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community.\" The Court found that the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest in preserving the quality of life and allowed for \"reasonable alternative avenues of communication.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53099:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53102:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53102:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt a school assembly of approximately 600 high school students, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what some observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which \"substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.\" Fraser was suspended from school for two days.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53102:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53102:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53102:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court found that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. Chief Justice Burger distinguished between political speech which the Court previously had protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and the supposed sexual content of Fraser's message at the assembly. Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech since such discourse was inconsistent with the \"fundamental values of public school education.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53102:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53103:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53103:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDow Chemical Company denied the Environmental Protection Agency a follow-up on-site inspection of its facilities in Midland, Michigan. In response, EPA conducted an unannounced aerial inspection. When Dow became aware EPA had taken aerial photographs of its facilities, it filed suit in District Court alleging that EPA conducted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court ruled that the aerial inspection violated Dow's \"expectation of privacy\" from searches. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling on the ground that Dow only expected pivacy with respect to its indoor property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53103:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53103:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53103:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Warren Burger delivered the opinion for a 5-4 court. The Court maintained that the EPA's statutory jurisdiction \"carries with it all the modes of inquiry and investigation traditionally employed or useful to execute the authority granted.\" Fourth Amendment protection involves the invasion of areas where intimate activities occur, whereas \"the open areas of an industrial complex are more comparable to an 'open field' in which an individual may not legitimately demand privacy.\" The fact that EPA could take aerial photographs of the facilities from public airspace with the standard photographic equipment employed by mapmakers confirmed that the area was not subject to strict protection from observation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53103:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53118:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53118:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nScott Ewing was enrolled in a medical program, and in the spring of 1981, he took and failed the NBME Part 1 (Exam), which is an exam his program required. After reviewing the status of several students in the program, the Promotion and Review Board (Board) voted unanimously to drop Ewing from the program. The Board took into account his recent failure as well as the totality of his academic record when making their decision. Ewing appealed the Board’s decision four times and argued that, because every student before him who had failed the Exam had been allowed to retake it, he should be afforded the same opportunity. All of his appeals were unsuccessful.\nIn August of the following year, Ewing sued in federal district court and alleged a breach of contract as well as a violation of his right to due process. The district court sided with the University and Ewing appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Ewing’s right to enrollment qualified as a property right that deserved protection from arbitrary state interference under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53118:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53118:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53118:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grants citizens a substantive right to own property free from arbitrary state interference. The Court held that, even if Ewing had a property interest in his admission, the careful consideration that went into his dismissal made this interference with his property anything but arbitrary. The Court determined that Ewing’s dismissal was reasonable based on all the available evidence.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. filed a concurring opinion in which he argued that the classification of Ewing’s continued admission was not a constitutional property right deserving the protection of substantive due process, but rather a state issue requiring, at most, procedural due process protection.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53118:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53119:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53119:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter being dismissed from her job at a Meritor Savings Bank, Mechelle Vinson sued Sidney Taylor, the Vice President of the bank. Vinson charged that she had constantly been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor over her four years at the bank. She argued such harassment created a \"hostile working environment\" and was covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vinson sought injunctive relief along with compensatory and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53119:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53119:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53119:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the language of Title VII was \"not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination,\" finding that Congress intended \"'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment. . .\" The Court noted that guidelines issued by the EEOC specified that sexual harassment leading to noneconomic injury was a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The Court recognized that plaintiffs could establish violations of the Act \"by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.\" The Court declined to rule on the degree to which businesses could be liable for the conduct of specific employees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53119:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53120:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53120:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBatson, a black man, was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four black persons on the venire, resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Batson was convicted on both of the charges against him.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53120:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53120:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53120:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that the prosecutor's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Relying heavily on precedents set in Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. Alabama (1965), Justice Powell held that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors not only deprives the accused of important rights during a trial, but also is devastating to the community at large because it \"undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.\" Without identifying a \"neutral\" reason why the four blacks should have been excluded from the jury, the prosecutor's actions were in violation of the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53120:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53124:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53124:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1982, the state of Pennsylvania enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortion. The law required the following: \"informed consent\" of the woman, the dissemination of information concerning the risks of abortion, reporting procedures, the use of certain medical techniques after viability, and the presence of a second physician for post-viability abortions. The initial suit was brought against Richard Thornburgh, the Governor of Pennsylvania.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53124:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53124:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53124:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania requirements \"wholly subordinate[d] constitutional privacy interests and concerns with maternal health\" and were attempts to deter women from making their own choices concerning abortion. The Court held that 1) the \"informed consent\" and printed materials provisions unduly intruded upon the privacy of patients and physicians; 2) the reporting and viability determination provisions were designed to identify and deter women from having abortions through the threat of harassment; and 3) the post-viability care and second physician provisions unconstitutionally interfered with the health of the mother by increasing delays and medical risks.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53124:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53131:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53131:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Santa Clara Police received an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his back yard. Unable to observe the yard from the ground due to a high fence which encircled it, the police secured a private plane and flew over Ciraolo's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The fly-over confirmed the presence of marijuana. The police then obtained a search warrant, seized 73 plants on the next day, and arrested Ciraolo who then pleaded guilty to the cultivation of marijuana. The California Court of Appeals, however, found that the aerial observation was illegal and reversed Ciraolo's conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53131:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53131:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53131:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe divided Court found that the observation did not violate the Constitution. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protections regarding the home had never been absolute: for example, police officers are not obligated to shield their eyes when passing homes on public streets or sidewalks. Since the observations of the Santa Clara officers was \"nonintrusive\" and \"took place within public navigable airspace,\" their actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. \"Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed,\" concluded Burger. The dissenters, led by Justice Powell, argued that this decision was a significant departure from the Court's holding in Katz v. United States (1967) which established a two-part test to evaluate privacy claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53131:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53134:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53134:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring the capital trial of Ardia McCree, a judge removed prospective jurors who stated that under no circumstances would they be able to impose the death penalty. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the judge's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. A.L. Lockhart, the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53134:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53134:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53134:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that excluding people who are unwilling under any circumstances to impose the death penalty during sentencing did not violate a defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Justice Rehnquist argued that the state has a legitimate interest to impanel jurors who \"can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial.\" As long as a jury is selected from a fair cross-section of the community, is impartial, and can properly apply the law to a case's circumstances, then a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is protected.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53134:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53145:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53145:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1975, a federal district court found the Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Union guilty of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court established a 29 percent minority membership goal and ordered the union to implement procedures to meet the goal. In 1982 and 1983, the union was found guilty of civil contempt for disobeying the court orders. The court then established a 29.23 percent nonwhite membership goal to be met by August 1987.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53145:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53145:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53145:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that Title VII did not prohibit courts from ordering, in appropriate circumstances, affirmative race-conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination. Specifically, the Court held that such relief was appropriate where employers or labor unions had engaged in \"persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination.\" The Court noted that injunctions simply reiterating Title VII's prohibition against discrimination were useless in cases of chronically discriminatory employers or unions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53145:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53147:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53147:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn April of 1973, pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (Penn DER) submitted a plan for meeting federal air quality standards. This plan included a provision requiring the implementation of a program for the inspection and maintenance of automobile emissions systems (I/M program) by May 1, 1975. By mid-1976, Pennsylvania had not implemented any I/M program.\nIn response, the Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (DVCCCA) brought suit against Pennsylvania and the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA filed a separate action against Pennsylvania and DVCCCA dropped its charges against the EPA. On August 29, 1978, Pennsylvania, Penn DER and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (Penn DOT) agreed to a final consent decree, terminating the DVCCCA and EPA actions.\nOn January 2, 1982 and after more than five years of intermittent litigation -- during which Pennsylvania consistently resisted or ignored the consent decree -- the district court declared Pennsylvania, the Secretaries of the Penn DOT and Penn DER to be in civil contempt. On May 3, 1983, the Pennsylvania legislature authorized the Secretary of Penn DOT to implement an I/M program following several years of consistently denying Pennsylvania the requisite funding.\nThe CAA provided that in issuing a final order in any action brought under the CAA, the court may award the costs of litigation to any party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate. The DVCCCA and the EPA consequently sought attorneys’ fees and costs for all activity performed after the court issued the consent decree on August 29, 1978. The district court awarded attorneys’ fees that included time spent by plaintiffs’ attorneys monitoring Pennsylvania’s performance under the consent decree, an award for “superior quality” while opposing the state’s motion to stay the consent decree, and work performed for hearings held before the EPA. It also awarded a multiplier for the arguably small likelihood of plaintiffs’ success in three phases of the litigation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the attorneys’ fees awarded by the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53147:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53147:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53147:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a decision written by Justice Byron White, the Court held that the district court appropriately awarded the DVCCCA and the EPA attorneys’ fees and costs for non-litigation work. Justice White noted the unusual nature of the plaintiffs’ dispute with Pennsylvania, given that the DVCCCA and the EPA were essentially tasked with protecting the full scope of the consent decree both in and out of court. He looked to the legislative history of the CAA, wherein Congress used the phrases “action” and “proceeding” interchangeably; this suggested to Justice White that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase “action” to litigation.\nJustice White agreed, however, with Pennsylvania’s contention that the Third Circuit erred in awarding plaintiffs attorneys’ fees for “superior work”. He outlined the history of the Court’s “lodestar” approach to attorneys’ fees, reasoning that any reasonable “lodestar” approach would already account for attorneys’ superior work. Justice White cautioned that the district court’s award risked double counting attorneys’ work. He declined to consider whether the district court erred in multiplying attorneys’ to compensate for plaintiffs’ low chance of success.\nJustice Harry Blackmun concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall. Justice Blackmun agreed that the district court appropriately awarded the DVCCCA and EPA attorneys’ fees for work performed out of court to protect the consent decree. He took issue with the majority’s decision to defer ruling on the district court’s multipliers for plaintiffs’ low chance of success. Justice Blackmun also rejected the Court’s limited interpretation of the “lodestar” approach to attorneys’ fees, arguing that the district court reasonably adjusted fees based on the quality of work performed. Justice William Brennan joined Blackmun’s dissent on this point alone.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53147:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53148:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53148:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA nurse in California was charged with killing 12 patients by administering massive doses of heart medication. During a preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of California, Riverside County, the nurse moved to exclude the public. California law requires preliminary hearings to be open to the public unless a closed hearing is necessary to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial. The judge granted the motion because of the the national publicity surrounding the case. After the hearing, Press-Enterprise Co. requested a transcript of the proceedings. The court denied the request because the transcript might prejudice the nurse’s right to a fair and impartial trial. Press-Enterprise filed a preemptory writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, but the court denied the writ. The California Supreme Court also denied the writ, holding that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right of access to preliminary hearings. The court also held that once the accused establishes a “reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice”, the burden shifts to Press-Enterprise to show there is no reasonable probability of prejudice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53148:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53148:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53148:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the California court. The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment right of public access applies to preliminary hearings. Closed preliminary hearings are only permissible when specific findings on the record show that closure is essential. The California court should have asked whether there was a substantial probability that the accused’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced, and whether any reasonable alternatives to closure could protect that right.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that the right to fair trial in this case was more significant than Press-Enterprise’s interest in getting the transcript. The framers did not intend for preliminary hearings to remain open. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53148:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53149:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53149:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nClifford Carrier was arrested on charges of rape and abduction in 1977. Before his trial, Carrier's attorney filed a motion asking the court to give him access to the victim's statements about her assailants, their vehicle, and the location of the rape. The court rejected the motion. Carrier was subsequently convicted, and his attorney filed an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. The appeal did not mention the trial judge's decision about the victim's statements. That appeal was rejected.\nA year later, Carrier filed a new appeal in state court claiming that he had been denied his 14th Amendment right to Due Process by the trial judge's refusal to grant him access to the victim's statements. The court dismissed his case, however, citing Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:21, which states that claims left out of an initial appeal cannot be raised in later appeals. Because Carrier's attorney had not mentioned the victim's statements in the first appeal, Carrier could not raise them in the second.\nCarrier then filed a similar appeal in federal district court, again citing the 14th Amendment Due Process claims. The state argued that the appeal was procedural barred because it dealt with issues not raised during the initial appeal. Carrier countered that the omission of the claim had been his attorney's mistake (rather than a tactical decision), and that it should therefore not be held against him. The federal district court rejected the argument, dismissing the case. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, finding that the omission had been the attorney's mistake and therefore represented a failure of the attorney to provide effective counsel in that particular part of the case (though the representation as a whole was not unconstitutionally poor). The panel stated that because the omission resulted from ineffective counsel, it should not be held against Carrier.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53149:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53149:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53149:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Supreme Court ruled that merely proving that an omission resulted from an attorney's mistake rather than from a tactical decision does not exempt a defendant from state court procedural rules. Justice O'Connor wrote, \"We see little reason why counsel's failure to detect a colorable constitutional claim should be treated differently from a deliberate but equally prejudicial failure by counsel to raise such a claim. The fact that the latter error can be characterized as a misjudgment, while the former is more easily described as an oversight, is much too tenuous a distinction to justify a regime of evidentiary hearings into counsel's state of mind in failing to raise a claim on appeal.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53149:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53152:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53152:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Bernard Jackson was charged with second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. During his arraignment, Jackson requested that the court appoint him counsel. The next day, Jackson was interrogated again before he was able to communicate with his attorney. Jackson confessed during that interrogation.\nIn December 1978, Rudy Bladel killed three railroad employees in Michigan. Bladel was arrested shortly thereafter, the police questioned him twice but released him. Two months later, he was arrested again and agreed to talk to the police without an attorney present. During his arraignment the following day, Bladel requested counsel, and the court assigned a firm to his case. The next day, the police questioned Bladel again before the firm was able to contact him and before he was aware he had been assigned counsel. During this questioning, Bladel confessed.\nIn both cases, the trial courts held that the confessions, which were obtained after arraignment and before the defendants were able to meet with counsel, were properly received into evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Jackson’s conviction, and he appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court consolidated Jackson and Bladel’s cases and ruled that both confessions should not have been admitted into evidence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53152:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53152:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53152:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of representation prevent the police from initiating an interrogation after a defendant has requested counsel. Therefore, unless the accused initiates the conversation, police are not allowed to ignore a request for counsel and begin an interrogation. The Court also held that the arraignment marks the beginning of the judicial process and the moment when the accused has a Sixth Amendment right to rely on counsel to act as “a ‘medium’ between him and the State.” From this point on, the suspect becomes the accused, and the assistance of counsel becomes essential. The Court rejected the state’s argument that the defendant’s request for counsel only applied to formal legal proceedings and noted that such a request is a “significant event” requiring additional attention and safeguards. If a defendant asks for counsel at an arraignment, any waiver of that right to counsel during police-initiated interrogations that may follow would be invalidated.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger authored a concurring opinion that warned of the dangers of using “hard cases” with difficult fact scenarios, such as these, to set “bright-line rules” for all cases.\nJustice William H. Rehnquist dissented and argued that the bright-line rule the majority opinion established should only apply to Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and not Sixth Amendment rights. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53152:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53154:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53154:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGoldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, an Orthodox Jew, and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty and in Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation mandated that indoors, headgear could not be worn \"except by armed security police in the performance of their duties.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53154:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53154:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53154:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist argued that, generally, First Amendment challenges to military regulations are examined with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society, given the need for the military to \"foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.\" Since allowing overt religious apparel \"would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations,\" the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate. In 1987, Congress passed legislation which reversed this decision and allowed members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel in a \"neat and conservative\" manner.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53154:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53159:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53159:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe American College of Physicians, a non-profit, tax-exempt organization, published a monthly medical journal. Within the journal were paid advertisements for products useful in the field of medicine specifically covered by the journal. Section 511(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on \"unrelated business taxable income\" of tax-exempt organizations. The IRS asserted that the advertising income from the medical journal fell under this category. The American College of Physicians countered that the advertisements were \"substantially related\" to its tax-exempt purpose of maintaining high standards in medicine, and that they were therefore tax-exempt. When the IRS refused to give the organization a tax refund, it filed suit in United States Claims Court.\nThe Claims Court held that the advertisements were not substantially related to the organization's tax-exempt purpose and that the income was therefore taxable. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that the advertisements helped to educate the journal's readers and was therefore substantially related.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53159:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53159:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53159:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Supreme Court held that the advertisements in this particular case were not \"substantially related\" to the medical journal's educational purposes. The Court found that the conduct of the journal, rather than the content of the advertisements, was the relevant factor. Quoting the Claims Court, Justice Marshall wrote, \"The evidence is clear that plaintiff did not use the advertising to provide its readers a comprehensive or systematic presentation of any aspect of the goods or services publicized. Those companies willing to pay for advertising space got it; others did not.\" The Court rejected both the government's contention that all advertising revenue should be taxed and the journal's contention that any informative advertising revenue should be exempt, relying instead on a case-by-case examination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53159:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53160:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53160:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1979, the Southwestern Power Administration, a federal regulatory body acting on behalf of the Secretary of Energy, increased the cost of electricity generated by federally owned dams under its control. The price hike was initially implemented on an interim basis, and three years later, after furher review, the new rates were made permanent. A group of cities that purchased power from the dams filed suit to recover the extra fees it had paid before the interim rates were made final, claiming that Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 prohibited the imposition of interim fees. The Act stated that new rates would \"become effective upon confirmation and approval by the Secretary (of Energy).\" The cities asserted that the rates, while in their interim phase, had not yet received \"confirmation and approval\" from the Secretary and could therefore not be legally implemented.\nThe Court of Claims sided with the cities, holding that the new rates could only be charged once they received final approval from the Secretary. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53160:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53160:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53160:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Secretary of Energy could impose rate hikes on an interim basis without violating the Act. The Court found that the language of the Act and its legislative history did not conclusively show whether Congress intended the Secretary to impose rate hikes on an interim basis. The Secretary's decision, therefore, only needed to be a reasonable attempt to balance the competing interests in the act: preventing unnecessarily high charges to customers while still allowing the dams to be self-sufficient (and therefore not a burden on government resources). Justice Marshall wrote \"Interim ratesetting appears well suited to accommodating that dual goal... [and therefore] the procedures established by the Secretary to exercise his powers under the Flood Control Act both are within his delegated authority and constitute a reasonable accommodation of the policies underlying that Act.\" The Court further found that the rate increases were consistent with the cities' electricity contracts, which were based largely on the language of the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53160:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53163:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53163:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1962, an all-white grand jury indicted Booker T. Hillery—a black man—for the murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Hillery was tried and convicted, he appealed his conviction and claimed that black potential jurors were systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, which violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hillery pursued remedy in state courts until the California Supreme Court finally denied him relief in 1978. Shortly after, Hillery filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court requested and received statistical evidence regarding the probability of having an all-white grand jury in Kings County, California, where Hillery was indicted and subsequently ruled in favor of Hillery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53163:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53163:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53163:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, and no. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that Hillery was allowed to pursue his claim in federal court because the district court was within its power to request additional evidence that did not fundamentally alter the legal claim that the state courts already considered. The Court also held that Hillery's eventual conviction in a fair trial did not render any discrimination at the indictment phase \"harmless error.\" The Court referenced the extensive precedent that rejected similar arguments and noted that discrimination in the indictment process can have an array of negative effects such as a false finding of probable cause, charging a greater or capital offense, or charging numerous counts.\nJustice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which she argued that petitioners who have claimed discrimination during the indictment process and have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that claim in state court should not be able to file federal habeas corpus as an alternate avenue. However, in this case, Justice O'Connor agreed that Hillery was denied a fair state court review.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the injustice in this case was slight because a grand jury that accurately reflected the population of Kings County when Hillery was indicted would have had only one black member. Additionally, Justice Powell argued that relief in the form of an automatic reversal of Hillery's conviction, which required the state to hold a new trial 23 years after the crime had been committed, imposed too great of a burden on the state to justify setting Hillery free. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53163:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53169:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53169:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn August of 1981, Larry Gene Heath hired two men to kidnap and murder his pregnant wife. Heath met the men in Georgia, just across the state line from the Heath residence in Alabama, led them back to the house, and left. Rebecca Heath’s body was later found on the side of a road in Georgia. Both Georgia and Alabama authorities pursued investigations in which there was a degree of cooperation.\nOn September 4, 1981, Georgia authorities arrested Heath, and he waived his Miranda rights and confessed. He was indicted by a grand jury in Troop County, Georgia, and pled guilty in February 10, 1982. On May 5, 1982, Heath was indicted by a grand jury in Russell County, Alabama. Prior to the trial, Heath argued that his conviction and sentencing in Georgia barred any prosecution in Alabama and that Alabama lacked jurisdiction. The trial court rejected both claims, and Heath was convicted. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the Alabama Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53169:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53169:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53169:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of dual sovereignty grants each state the right to try a criminal under the laws of that state, regardless of whether he had already been tried under the laws of another state. The states can each be considered a separate sovereign because they do not derive their powers from the same source, namely the federal government. The Court also held that it would be an unconstitutional deprivation of a state’s powers to prevent that state from enforcing its laws because another state had proceeded to trial earlier.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that different interests or purposes in prosecution do not justify an exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. In Justice Marshall’s separate dissent, he argued that the dual sovereignty doctrine was meant to permit federal and state prosecutions for the same offense due to the overlapping spheres of governmental power, not to permit prosecution from multiple states. He also wrote that the Court should have heard arguments about other aspects of the case that violated the petitioner’s rights rather than limiting the issues at hand to the one of dual sovereignty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53169:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53176:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53176:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53176:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53176:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53176:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The divided Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy, and that states could outlaw those practices. Justice Byron White argued that the Court has acted to protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are \"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty\" (Palko v. Connecticut, 1937) or when they are \"deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition\" (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). The Court held that the right to commit sodomy did not meet either of these standards. White feared that guaranteeing a right to sodomy would be the product of \"judge-made constitutional law\" and send the Court down the road of illegitimacy.\nThe Court subsequently overruled this decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53176:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53180:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53180:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the morning of July 26, 1984, Lamont McLaughlin and a companion, both wearing stocking masks, entered a bank in Baltimore. McLaughlin displayed a handgun and ordered everyone in the bank to put his hands up and not to move. While McLaughlin remained in the lobby area holding the gun, his companion placed about $3,400 in a brown paper bag. A police officer apprehended the two as they left the bank. The police then found that McLaughlin's gun was not loaded. Ultimately, McLaughlin pleaded guilty to charges of bank robbery and bank larceny and was found guilty of assault during a bank robbery \"by the use of a dangerous weapon.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53180:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53180:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53180:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that an unloaded handgun is a \"dangerous weapon\" within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute, 18 USC section 2113(d). The Court articulated three reasons supporting the conclusion that such a gun is a dangerous weapon: First, a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous. Second, the display of a gun instills fear in the average citizen. Finally, a gun can cause harm when used as a bludgeon.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53180:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53207:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53207:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHughes Properties owned a casino called Harold’s Club in Reno, Nevada. This casino operated slot machines that featured “progressive” jackpots. This jackpot increased as gamblers played and only paid out when the machine hit a certain combination. State gaming regulations prohibited lowering the jackpot until someone won. At the end of each fiscal year, Hughes took the year’s total progressive jackpots and subtracted the amount of last year’s jackpots to claim that amount as a business expense deduction. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction, reasoning that until a patron won the jackpot, the liability was contingent.\nThe IRS determined a tax deficiency amount, which Hughes paid before suing for a refund. The United States Claims Court granted summary judgment to Hughes on the ground that the jackpot amount was contingent until someone won it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the casino’s liability was not contingent because state regulations barred a decrease in the amount.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53207:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53207:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53207:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the jackpot amount was fixed by the state regulation, so it could be deducted as a normal business expense. The Court felt that not knowing identity of the winner or the time it would be paid was irrelevant. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent, stating that the jackpot amount was contingent, because the casino could avoid paying out altogether by declaring bankruptcy or forfeiting its gaming license. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53207:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53208:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53208:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 1978, Willie Lloyd Turner entered a jewelry store and killed the proprietor. Turner was disarmed, arrested, and charged with capital murder. During the jury selection process, Turner's counsel requested that the trial judge ask potential jurors if they would be biased by the fact that Turner was black while the victim was white. The judge declined to ask the question regarding racial prejudice and instead asked the prospective jurors if they thought that they would be able to be impartial and fair. Turner was convicted and sentenced to death.\nAfter exhausting his appellate options at the state level, Turner filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. Because the facts of the case \"did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might [have] infect[ed the defendant's] trial,\" the district court held that the trial judge's refusal to question potential jurors about racial prejudice was not unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53208:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53208:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53208:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that \"special circumstance[s]\" could create a significant likelihood that a trial judge's failure to question potential jurors about racial prejudice leads to a biased jury. In this case, where an interracial murder was charged as a capital offense, the Court held that the facts amounted to one of those special circumstances. The Court reasoned that jurors in capital cases have broader discretion that makes it easier to act, even if subtly, with racial prejudice. This discretion, coupled with the finality of a death sentence, entitles defendants in interracial capital cases to inform prospective jurors of the victim's race and question them about any potential racial bias.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the majority should have overturned Turner's death sentence rather than vacating it. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the defendant should retain the right to inform prospective jurors of the race of the victim and inquire about potential racial biases in any case that involved a violent interracial crime. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the opinion.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he warned that the majority's new rule would drastically increase the number of death row prisoners filing habeas petitions without providing them any new protections. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53208:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53212:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53212:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1975, eight Chicano individuals were attending a party that was broken up by the Riverside police using tear gas and physical force without a warrant. Subsequently, the eight individuals filed suit in Federal District Court against the city and various police officers under several federal Civil Rights Acts, alleging violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The jury found in the individuals' favor and awarded $33,350 in compensatory and punitive damages. The individuals also sought attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 in the amount of $245,456.25, based on 1,946.75 hours expended by their two attorneys at $125 per hour and 84.5 hours expended by law clerks at $25 per hour. Finding both the hours and rates reasonable, the District Court awarded the requested amount, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court found that the fee award was not excessive merely because it exceeded the amount of damages awarded by the jury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53212:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53212:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53212:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held, 5-4, that there was no requirement under Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 that attorneys' fees be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff might recover. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens, reasoned that such plaintiffs seek to vindicate important constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms, and a proportionality requirement would seriously undermine Congress's purpose under the Act to insure the availability of counsel in civil rights cases. Concurring, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., reasoned that neither the prior decisions of the Supreme Court nor the legislative history of the Act supported such a requirement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53212:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53214:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53214:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTransamerica Delaval Inc. designed and manufactured propulsion systems for four supertankers. The propulsion systems eventually failed due to design and manufacturing flaws. Only the propulsion systems themselves were damaged - no other part of the ship was damaged, and no one was injured.\nEast River Steamship and the other companies that had purchased the supertankers sued Transamerica under the negligence and products-liability doctrines of tort law, a branch of law that deals with injuries not covered by contractual agreements. They sought compensation for the cost of repairing the ships as well as for the income they lost while the ships were out of service. The district court, however, granted summary judgment to Transamerica. It held that the injuries were not covered by tort law because only the propulsion systems themselves had been injured, and that the case therefore dealt with the product's warranty rather than tort law. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case en banc and affirmed the district court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53214:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53214:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53214:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. A unanimous Supreme Court ruled that when a defective product injures only itself and causes only economic harm, tort law claims do not apply. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the Court, stated \"a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.\" The suit, therefore, could only be brought under warranty claims, which could no longer be filed because of a time limit in the contract.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53214:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53217:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53217:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLiberty Lobby, Inc. (Liberty), a nonprofit \"citizen's lobby\" corporation, filed a libel action against a magazine published by Jack Anderson et al. Liberty claimed that one of Anderson's articles contained false and derogatory statements about its operations. In its defense, Anderson claimed that as a public entity Liberty must show with \"convincing clarity\" that Anderson acted with actual malice - something they could not do since the article's author stated in an affidavit that he thoroughly researched and cross-checked all his information. Liberty claimed that Anderson did act with actual malice since its author depended on patently unreliable sources. Following a district court's summary judgment ruling favoring Anderson, an appellate court reversed as it held that the lower court erroneously applied actual malice standards of proof at the summary judgement phase. Anderson appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53217:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53217:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53217:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court held that the purpose of summary judgments is to determine if the evidence is so one-sided that a party should prevail as a matter of law. Summary judgments will not lie if there is a sufficient likelihood that a reasonable jury would return a verdict favorable to the nonmoving party. In libel cases involving public entities, trial courts faced with summary judgment motions must decide whether a reasonable jury could conclude with convincing clarity that actual malice existed. The mere assertion by a plaintiff that a defendant's summary judgment motion is deficient because a reasonable jury might disbelieve the defendant's denial of actual malice is insufficient to warrant a grant of summary judgment without any offer of evidentiary proof to that effect. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded for reconsideration of its summary judgment ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53217:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53218:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53218:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson Board of Education (Board) and a teachers' union, teachers with the most seniority would not be laid off. It was also agreed not to lay off a percentage of minority personnel that exceeded the percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of a layoff. When the schools laid off some nonminority teachers, while retaining other minority teachers with less seniority, Wendy Wygant, a displaced nonminority teacher, challenged the layoff in district court. Holding that the Board could grant racial preferences without grounding them on prior discrimination findings and that the preferences did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since they remedied discrimination by providing \"role models\" for minority students, the District Court upheld the layoff provision's constitutionality. When the appeals court affirmed, the Supreme Court granted Wygant certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53218:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53218:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53218:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court argued that Wygant's layoff stemmed from race and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court noted that the government, when embarking on affirmative action, had two duties: first, to justify racial classification with a compelling state interest and second, to demonstrate that its chosen means were narrowly tailored to its purpose. Regarding the first, the Court rejected the lower court's argument that racial preferences were justified because the percentage of minority students exceeded the percentage of minority teachers. At best, this argument implied a separate but equal system, which the Court rejected in Brown v. Board of Education. Instead, racial preferences had to be based on prior discrimination. Second, the Court rejected the school's discrimination remedy: layoff preferences incorrectly addressed injurious prior discriminatory hiring practices since \"denial of a future employment opportunity [was] not as intrusive as loss of an existing job.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53218:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53219:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53219:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn order to protect its fisheries from parasites and non-native species, the state of Maine prohibited the importation of live baitfish. Robert J. Taylor, the owner of a bait business, violated the law and was prosecuted by Maine authorities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53219:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53219:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53219:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the limitation imposed by the Commerce Clause on state regulatory power was not absolute and that the States \"retain[ed] authority under their general police powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern.'\" The Court found that Maine's ban on the importation oflive baitfish served a legitimate local purpose that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives. The Court argued that the ban was not a simple case of \"arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53219:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53223:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53223:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe petitioners represented a group of corporations that used a group of motor carriers regulated by the Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. (NFTB), an organization that engaged in collective ratemaking activities for shipping goods over the border between the United States and Canada. The petitioners sued the carriers and alleged that, between 1966 and 1981, the group had engaged in price fixing that violated the terms of the NFTB agreement and could not be approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The petitioners argued that during those years they paid higher rates than they would have in a freely competitive market and sought treble damages on that difference, along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the case based on precedent set by a previous Supreme Court decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the treble damages and remanded for further hearings to determine whether the petitioners were entitled to injunctive relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53223:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53223:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53223:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that the precedent established by the previous decision is relevant to this case because in both cases the rates were approved by the ICC, which meant that the rates were lawful under the Interstate Commerce Act, and the carriers were protected from suits for damages. The Court also held that the recently enacted Reed-Bullwinkle Act did not alter any anti-trust laws applicable to carriers. The legislative history surrounding the Act makes it clear that Congress did not intend to drastically alter existing anti-trust legislation and its judicial interpretation.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court of Appeals opinion provided sufficient analysis as to why the previous precedent should be overruled and that he was persuaded by the analysis.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53223:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53228:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53228:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOrion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion) was a customer of Philadelphia Gear Corporation (PG). To provide a guarantee of payment to PG, Orion obtained a letter of credit for the benefit of PG from Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Bank). If Orion failed to pay an invoice to PG for at least 15 days, PG could draw upon that line of credit, up to $145,200. This type of credit line, meant to guarantee payment to a seller, is referred to as a standby letter of credit. To back up that line of credit, Orion executed an unsecured promissory note in favor of the Bank. This note is referred to as a backup letter of credit. Nothing was due on the backup letter of credit unless PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit. Thus the backup letter was a contingent promissory note. The Bank did not credit any account of Orion's in exchange for the note, and did not treat its own assets as increased by its acceptance of the note. In 1982, the Bank was declared insolvent and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed its receiver. PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit for goods delivered before the Bank's insolvency, but the FDIC returned them unpaid. PG sued the FDIC, claiming that the standby letter of credit was an insured deposit under the definition of \"deposit\" set forth at 12 U.S.C. Section 1813(l)(1), and that PG was therefore entitled to $100,000 in deposit insurance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53228:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53228:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53228:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In light of the longstanding interpretation of the FDIC, such a letter does not create a deposit. This interpretation is consistent with Congress' intent in creating the FDIC, namely ensuring that a deposit of \"hard earnings\" entrusted to a bank would not lead to a tangible loss in the event of a bank failure. In this case, the standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note did not entrust any noncontingent assets to the Bank. Therefore, such a letter of credit does not give rise to an insured deposit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53228:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53229:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53229:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLarry Witters attended the Inland Empire School of the Bible, seeking to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Inland Empire was a non-denominational Christian school supported by donations and tuition payments. Witters suffered from a progressive eye condition, which rendered him legally blind under Washington law.\nWitters applied to Washington’s Commission for the Blind to participate in its vocational rehabilitation program, funded by approximately eighty percent federal funds and twenty percent state funds. The commission, however, had previously adopted a policy statement forbidding the use of public funds to assist an individual in pursuing a career or degree in theology or related areas, based on Washington’s constitution. The commission denied Witters’ application because his vocational objective was to become a pastor, viewing this as falling within the areas related to theology. A state hearings examiner upheld the commission’s ruling, also citing Washington’s constitution. A Washington district court upheld the decision for the reasons given by the hearings examiner.\nOn appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the decision, but declined to base its ruling on the Washington Constitution. Instead, it reserved judgment on the state constitutional issue and determined that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause required the commission to deny Witters’ application. Using the three-part test established by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, it held that approving his application would have the primary effect of advancing religion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53229:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53229:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53229:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that extending aid to Witters through Washington’s vocational rehabilitation program would be consistent with the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Justice Marshall also looked to the Lemon test, agreeing with the Supreme Court of Washington that the statute had a facially secular purpose, to promote the well-being of the visually handicapped.\nJustice Marshall held, however, that extending aid to Witters would not have the primary effect of advancing religion. He noted that the program did not provide greater or broader benefits for recipients who apply their aid to religious education, and that nothing in the record indicated that a significant portion of aid extended through the program would flow to religious education. He also argued that although the aid would ultimately flow to Inland Empire, this was not because of the state's actions but rather Witters’.\nJustice Louis Powell, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist, concurred. He argued that the statute could not have the primary effect of advancing religion because the funds were available to applicants regardless of whether their school was secular or religious; hence, any aid to religion would result from the private choices of individual beneficiaries.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor also concurred. She emphasized that any potential aid to religion would be the result of Witters’ choice, and that no reasonable observer would likely draw an inference that Washington was endorsing a religious belief or practice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53229:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53231:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53231:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBrian Burbine was arrested for burglary in Cranston, Rhode Island. Police then received information connecting Burbine to a murder that happened in town a few months earlier. Burbine was read his Miranda rights and held for questioning. At first, Burbine refused to waive his rights, but later he signed three forms acknowledging that he understood his right to an attorney and waived that right. After questioning, he also signed three written statements admitting to the murder. That same night Burbine’s sister called the local Public Defender’s Office to get a lawyer for her brother. The sister did not know about the potential murder charge. When the Public Defender called the Cranston Police Station, police told her that Burbine was unavailable and would not be questioned until the next day. Police never told Burbine that an attorney attempted to contact him.\nAt trial, the judged denied a motion to suppress the statements made at the police station, holding that Burbine knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied Burbine’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that the police officer’s deliberate or reckless failure to inform Burbine that his counsel attempted to contact him invalidated his waiver of rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53231:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53231:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53231:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that failure to inform Burbine about the attorney’s phone call did not affect the validity of his waiver of rights. The waiver was not coerced, and Burbine was aware of his rights at all times. The right to counsel does not attach until an accused is formally charged, so that right was not violated in this case. Also, the misleading conduct by the police was not so offensive that it deprived Burbine of his due process rights.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that Burbine’s waiver of rights was invalidated by the police’s deceptive acts. Those acts also constituted an interference with the administration of justice that the due process clause was meant to prohibit. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53231:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53233:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53233:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nStephen J. Roy and Karen Miller, along with their daughter Little Bird of Snow, were residents of Pennsylvania receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps programs. Roy and Miller refused to comply with the federal requirement that participants in these programs provide the social security numbers of all family members receiving benefits. They argued that obtaining a social security number for Little Bird would violate their Native American religious beliefs. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare terminated AFDC benefits paid for Little Bird and the parents sued, arguing that the free association clause of the First Amendment provided an exemption to the social security number requirement. At trial, Roy disclosed the Little Bird already had a social security number, and the court suggested the case was moot. Roy then argued that widespread use of the social security number would “rob the spirit” of Little Bird, violating their religious beliefs. The court restrained the government from denying benefits for Little Bird until she was 16 years old, but denied Roy’s request for damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53233:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53233:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53233:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for seven members of the court, vacated the lower judgment and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the social security requirement did not violate the First Amendment and the injunction against the government was vacated. The requirement was entirely neutral in religious terms, and was a reasonable means of preventing welfare fraud. The First Amendment does not require the government to aid individuals in carrying out their religious beliefs. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in part, expressing that the entire lower judgment should be vacated because the record was unclear as to whether a justiciable controversy remained. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and concurred in the result, expressing that the Roy’s claim for benefits was either moot or not ripe for decision.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the government failed to show that allowing an exception to the social security requirement for those with legitimate religious objections would harm the state’s interest in preventing welfare fraud. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in Justice O’Connor’s opinion. Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that prior precedent clearly showed that requiring a social security number to receive benefits in spite of legitimate religious objections clearly violated the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53233:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53240:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53240:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Puerto Rican law restricted advertising by the island's casino gambling establishments. Even though gambling was a legal activity in Puerto Rico, the law only allowed advertising that was targeted at tourists.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53240:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53240:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53240:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the Act passed the constitutional test for restrictions on commercial speech. Justice Rehnquist argued that Puerto Rico's desire to protect the \"health, safety, and welfare of its citizens\" by attempting to isolate them from casino advertising served a \"substantial government interest.\" The law was clearly drawn and directly related to the government's goal of minimizing the ill effects, such as prostitution and crime, that gambling cultivates in local communities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53240:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53241:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53241:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1974, a Florida court sentenced Alvin Bernard Ford to death for first-degree murder. At the time of the murder, trial, and sentencing phase, there was no indication that Ford was suffering from any mental deficiencies. While awaiting execution, Ford's mental condition worsened. His competency was assessed in accordance with Florida procedures. Following this assessment, Florida's Governor signed Ford's death warrant. A state court declined to hear arguments raised about Ford's competency. Without the benefit of a hearing, Ford's habeas corpus petition was then denied by the a federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53241:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53241:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53241:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a 7-2 decision reversing and remanding the lower court's judgment, Justice Thurgood Marshall writing for the five-justice majority noted that English common law found executing the insane \"savage and inhumane.\" In addition, no State permitted such executions. Opponents of such executions maintained that it \"offends humanity\" and that such executions had neither a deterrent nor a retributive effect. On the second question, Marshall observed that no state court had heard arguments that Ford was insane. In addition, Florida's competency procedures were inadequate.\nJustice Lewis F. Powell, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed that executing an insane inmate violated the Eighth Amendment. For Powell, \"the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.\" Powell argued that Florida's procedure for determining the competency of the inmate violated due process.\nJustice Sandra Day O'Connor joined by Justice Byron R. White, dissented in part. They agreed that Florida's procedures did not protect Ford's due process rights but that \"the Eighth Amendment does not create a substantive right not to be executed while insane.\" Justice William H. Rehnquist further, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, also maintained that no substantive right was created. In addition, Rehnquist argued that the State's procedures drew sustenance from the common law and were not out of step with contemporary practice.\nThis abstract was prepared by Adam J. Ruggles, Gloria R. Thornburg, and Peter Watkins.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53241:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53242:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53242:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police force was conducting an authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll. On December 20, the police intercepted two phone calls from an unknown source that made reference to marijuana use that had occurred at a party the previous night at the Briggs’ residence. Edward Malley was the police officer in charge of the Driscoll investigation, and on the basis of these two calls, he drew up felony charges for the Briggs. The charges were presented to a state district court judge in February 1981, and the judge signed warrants for the Briggs’ arrest. The Briggs were arrested in their home on March 19, 1981, and taken to a police station where they were booked and held for several hours before being released. When presented to a grand jury, the charges were dropped.\nThe Briggs sued Malley in district court and alleged that his application for the warrants for their arrest violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the evidence was presented to the jury, Malley moved for a direct verdict, which the district court granted. The district court held that it was judge’s signing of the arrest warrants that was improper and that an officer who believes that he is acting on correct information is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that an officer is not entitled to immunity unless the officer had an “objectively reasonable” basis to believe that the alleged facts are sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest warrant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53242:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53242:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53242:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that immunity can be judged on a standard of objective reasonableness. If a reasonable officer could not believe that a warrant has sufficient probable cause, the officer cannot be immune from prosecution. The Supreme Court also held that the officer applying for the warrant bears the burden of liability rather than the magistrate who signs it because, under the constraints of a docket, the magistrate may tend to defer to the officer’s judgment.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that, based on the record for this case, a reasonable officer could have assumed that there was probable cause for an arrest warrant. He argued that the majority’s opinion did not grant enough weight to the fact that a judge signed off on the arrest warrant. Because a judge also agreed that there was enough evidence for an arrest, there is substantial evidence that the police officer acted reasonably and should have been granted immunity from damages. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53242:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53253:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53253:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of Democrats challenged Indiana's 1981 state apportionment scheme on the ground of political gerrymandering. The Democrats argued that the apportionment unconstitutionally diluted their votes in important districts, violating their rights. A three-judge District Court sustained the Democrats' challenge.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53253:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53253:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53253:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that while the apportionment law may have had a discriminatory effect on the Democrats, that effect was not \"sufficiently adverse\" to violate the Equal Protection Clause. The mere lack of proportional representation did not unconstitutionally diminish the Democrats' electoral power. The Court also ruled that political gerrymandering claims were properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, noting that judicially manageable standards could be discerned and applied in such cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53253:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53254:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53254:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe North Carolina General Assembly passed a redistricting plan for the state's Senate and House of Representatives. Black citizens of North Carolina alleged that the plan created seven new districts where blacks would not be able to elect representatives of their choosing. They filed suit in a District Court claiming that this violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Before the District Court could hear the case, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in order to clarify that voting violations needed only to have a \"discriminatory effect\" and required no \"discriminatory purpose.\" Considering the \"totality of circumstances\" of the redistricting plan, the District Court ruled that six of the new districts violated the newly amended Voting Rights Act by diluting the power of the black vote. The North Carolina Attorney General appealed the decision directly to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53254:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53254:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53254:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court found that five of the six contested districts discriminated against blacks by diluting the power of their collective vote. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The District Court properly performed its function \"to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.\" The District Court correctly analyzed data from three election cycles in North Carolina to determine that the black voters strongly supported black candidates, whereas whites usually voted against black candidates. The redistricting plan apportioned \"politically cohesive groups of black voters\" into districts where blocs of white voters would consistently defeat the black candidates. In violation of the Voting Rights Act, this damaged the ability of black citizens \"to participate equally in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53254:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53256:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53256:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nInvestigator David Groblewski from the Erie County District Attorney's Office viewed videos rented from P.J. Video and determined their content violated New York obscenity statutes. He drafted an affidavit describing the content on the videos and filed a warrant authorizing their seizure. A village justice in Depew NY issued the warrant and the police seized ten movies suspected to contain obscene content. A local court determined five of the movies violated obscenity standards. P.J. Video argued that the justice issued the warrant without probable cause since he did not personally view the movies. The court agreed and suppressed the videos as evidence. The County Court of Erie County affirmed the decision, and the New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. It asserted that warrants authorizing the seizure of items that were both non-dangerous and mediums of speech needed to satisfy a higher level of proof of \"probable-cause\" than other types of warrants because of First Amendment concerns.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53256:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53256:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53256:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court determined that the police department did not discriminate based on content. It seized the videos in order to preserve evidence rather than to suppress speech. In nondiscriminatory cases, the Court held that the same test for preventing Fourth Amendment wrongful search violations also secured against First Amendment free speech violations. Particularly, \"the First Amendment should be evaluated under the same probable-cause standard used to review warrant applications.\" The officers met this standard by describing content in the videos that clearly violated the obscenity statutes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53256:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53257:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53257:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn a series of articles, the Philadelphia Inquirer accused Hepps of links to organized crime and of capitalizing on that connection to influence the state legislature. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court favored Hepps and held that the newspaper was obligated to prove its accusations true.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53257:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53257:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53257:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Relying on its reasoning in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. (1974), the Court reversed the state court's decision. The Gertz standard for evaluating potentially libelous speech required that \"the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53257:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53258:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53258:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDayton Christian Schools, Inc. (Dayton) is a private, non-profit corporation formed by two churches for the purposes of providing private education at the primary and secondary levels. The corporate charter includes a section that requires employees to subscribe to a particular set of religious beliefs, including a resolution of disputes through the “Biblical chain of command,” which means that all disputes must be handled internally, without redress in civil court. p>\nLinda Hoskinson was a teacher at Dayton during the 1978-1979 school year. She agreed to the requirement of the corporate charter, including the Biblical chain of command. In January 1979, Hoskinson informed her principal that she was pregnant and was told that her employment contract would not be renewed because of the organization’s belief that mothers should stay home with their young children. Rather than appealing the decision internally, Hoskinson contacted a lawyer and threatened to sue based on state and federal sex discrimination laws if her employment contract was not renewed. Hoskinson was suspended and then fired for going outside of the internal dispute resolution system.\nHoskinson filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which filed an order that required Dayton to reinstate Hoskinson with backpay. When Dayton did not respond, the Commission filed suit. Dayton responded by arguing that that the First Amendment prevented the Commission from having jurisdiction over the exercise of religious beliefs. While the administrative proceedings were pending, Dayton sued the commission in district court and sought an injunction against the state proceedings because they violated the First Amendment. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss and argued that federal abstention doctrines meant that the district court should let the administrative proceedings run their course. The district court refused the issue the injunction without addressing the abstention argument. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that allowing the Commission jurisdiction over Dayton would violate the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53258:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53258:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53258:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal courts should abstain from adjudicating civil state proceedings in which important state interests are involved. As long as the plaintiff has a full and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional claim, there is no reason for the district court to become involved. Because the Ohio court has the authority to consider whether the Commission’s actions violated the First Amendment, the issue can be fully addressed in state court.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the district court’s decision on the merits of the case was correct. The Commission merely investigated a complaint based on Dayton’s conduct and filed suit; there was no evidence that the Commission intended to impose a sanction. Without the threat of a sanction, there is no potential constitutional violation. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53258:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53259:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53259:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSection 706(g)of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits a court from ordering the promotion of an individual who was denied advancement for any reason other than racial discrimination. In 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland, an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a lawsuit alleging that the City’s system for hiring and promoting firefighters discriminated against racial minorities, which violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Shortly after the City entered into settlement negotiations with the Vanguards, Local Number 93 of the International Association of Firefighters (a union representing a majority of Cleveland firefighters) moved to intervene as a party-plaintiff according to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that allows a nonparty to join an ongoing lawsuit in order to protect its rights from being affected by the litigation. The union argued that it had an interest in the suit because of its concern that promotions based upon a “racial quota system” (rather than competence exams or seniority rights) would detract from the quality of the Cleveland firefighting force. The Court approved the motion and ordered the Vanguards and the City to engage the union in settlement negotiations.\nDuring the negotiations, the union membership overwhelmingly rejected a consent decree between the parties that increased the total number of supervisory positions within the Fire Department without specifying to whom those positions would be given. The Vanguards and the City moved for the approval of an amended consent decree that adopted the agreed-upon promotional system but was not subject to the union members’ approval. The district court approved the consent decree over the union’s objections. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Local Number 93 petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari based on its argument that the consent decree was an impermissible remedy under Section 706(g) of Title VII. According to the union, the court was precluded from approving the new promotional system because it may benefit individuals who were not actual victims of racial discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53259:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53259:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53259:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that Section 706(g) does not apply to relief awarded in a consent decree. Although a consent decree has several characteristics of a judicial order, the Court found that it was not an “order” for purposes of Section 706(g) because of its voluntary, contractual nature. Additionally, the legislative history surrounding the enactment of Title VII suggests that Congress intended to encourage private, voluntary remedies for past discrimination. Because the consent decree did not “bind Local 93 to do or not to do anything,” it did not preclude the union from raising claims it may have under other laws, such as the unlawful employment provisions of Title VII.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor emphasized the narrow nature of the majority’s opinion. Even though the union had not raised the claims before the Court in its petition for certiorari, the non-minority employees retained the ability to challenge the consent decree under Section 703 of Title VII or the 14th Amendment.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a dissent in which he argued that the consent decree fell under the purview of Section 706(g) and therefore was not a permissible remedy for past discrimination because it benefited minorities who may not have been the actual victims of the City’s racially discriminatory promotional system for firefighters. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that a consent decree is a judicial order and subject to the limitations of Section 706(g). He wrote that the district court’s failure to make a finding about past discrimination toward each minority firefighter who would receive preferential treatment under the new promotional system rendered the consent decree an impermissible judicial order. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53259:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53263:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53263:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1974, Zenith Radio Corporation, an American manufacturer of consumer electronic products, and National Union Electronic Company (collectively referred to as Zenith) sued 21 Japanese-owned or -controlled manufacturers of consumer electronics and claimed that these companies conspired to drive the American companies out of the market. According to Zenith, the Japanese companies conspired to set artificially high prices for their products in Japan to offset the artificially low prices of their products in America, which was harmful to the American companies. Zenith claimed this conspiracy was a violation of several anti-trust laws intended to prevent price-fixing. The Japanese companies filed a motion for summary judgment. After finding the bulk of Zenith’s evidence inadmissible, the district court held that the admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact and granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that most of Zenith’s evidence was admissible. On the merits of the case, and in light of the greater amount of admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals held that a reasonable factfinder could find evidence of a conspiracy and that the district court improperly granted the summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53263:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53263:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53263:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that evidence of alleged conspiracies is not sufficient to prove allegations of violating antitrust legislation unless there is evidence that the conspiracies in question injured American companies. To effectively oppose the motion for summary judgment, the evidence must show that the respondents suffered harm as a result of the petitioners’ illegal activity and that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court also held that all inferences drawn in a motion for summary judgment must be construed in the light most favorable to the side opposing the motion, but in antitrust cases those inferences are constrained by economic factors. In this case, the alleged conspiracy would be economically irrational and therefore cannot be inferred to exist.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily confuses the standard by which a motion for summary judgment should be adjudicated. In an antitrust summary judgment hearing, it is not the job of the judge to determine whether an inference of a conspiracy is more probable than not. In doing so, the Court invades the role of the finder of fact. He also argued that the Third Circuit was correct in holding that the evidence demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53263:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53267:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53267:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDue to rising government budget deficits during the first term of the Reagan Administration, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985. The act was designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by restricting spending during fiscal years 1986 through 1991. Under the law, if maximum allowable deficit amounts were exceeded, automatic cuts, as requested by the Comptroller General, would go into effect. This case was decided together with O'Neill v. Synar and United States Senate v. Synar.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53267:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53267:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53267:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that the duties which the Congress delegated to the Comptroller General did violate the doctrine of separation of powers and were unconstitutional. A two step process led Chief Justice Burger to arrive at this conclusion. First, in exploring the statute defining the provisions of the Comptroller General's office relating to the Congress's power of removal, it was clear to Burger that this officer was subservient to the legislative branch. Second, in examining the functions that this officer would carry out under the Deficit Control Act, Burger concluded that the Comptroller General was being asked to execute the laws and, thus, was intruding on the prerogatives of the executive branch.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53267:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53269:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53269:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMcCleskey, a black man, was convicted of murdering a police officer in Georgia and sentenced to death. In a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that a statistical study proved that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some extent on the race of the victim and the accused. The study found that black defendants who kill white victims are the most likely to receive death sentences in the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53269:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53269:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53269:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that since McCleskey could not prove that purposeful discrimination which had a discriminatory effect on him existed in this particular trial, there was no constitutional violation. Justice Powell refused to apply the statistical study in this case given the unique circumstances and nature of decisions that face all juries in capital cases. He argued that the data McCleskey produced is best presented to legislative bodies and not to the courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53269:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53273:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53273:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 11, 1983, FBI Agent Russell Anderson, along with other state and federal officers, conducted a warrantless search of the Creighton family home based on the belief that Vadaain Dixon, a man suspected of robbing a bank earlier that day, was hiding in the house. The Creightons sued Anderson in Minnesota state court and filed a claim for monetary damages under the Fourth Amendment. The suit was removed to federal district court, where Anderson moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on his alleged qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for certain violations of an individual’s constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for Anderson after finding that the search was lawful because Anderson had probable cause.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the case could not be decided on summary judgment because there were unresolved factual disputes regarding the legality of the search. The Court of Appeals also held that that Anderson did not have qualified immunity because the right he allegedly violated was the well-established Fourth Amendment right to protection from warrantless searches of a home.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53273:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53273:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53273:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that an officer of the law has qualified immunity from civil liability if the actions that officer took “could reasonably have been thought consistent” with the allegedly violated rights. Because Anderson could reasonably believe that his actions were legal, he is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court also held that the determination of whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity should be determined based on the reasonable belief of the legality of the search, rather than the actual legality of the search.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily expands the idea of qualified immunity beyond high political officials to police officers, whom it is in the public’s best interests to hold accountable for their actions. He also argued that the lower court was correct in holding that summary judgment cannot be granted without resolving the factual disputes regarding the constitutionality of the search. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53273:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53275:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53275:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the late 1970s, Renz Correctional Institution converted to a “complex prison”. Generally, female prisoners at Renz were medium and maximum security level offenders, while most male inmates were minimum security offenders. Leonard Safley was a male inmate at Renz, and P.J. Watson was a female inmate. They met at Renz, where they became romantically involved; Watson was then transferred to Ozark Correctional Center because of this relationship. Prison authorities rebuffed all of Safley’s attempts to directly contact Watson.\nA Missouri Division of Corrections regulation permitted correspondence between inmates who were immediate family members, but correspondence between inmates who were not family members was only allowed if 1) it related to legal matters or 2) at the discretion of the classification/treatment team of both inmates. Another regulation only permitted inmates to marry with the permission of the prison superintendent, and specified that permission should only be given when there was a compelling reason to do so.\nThe district court certified plaintiffs as a class including inmates at Renz who desired to correspond with inmates at other prison facilities. This class also included persons who wished to marry inmates at Missouri correctional facilities and whose right to marry had been allegedly violated by the DoC. Plaintiffs filed an action against Renz's Superintendent William Turner and others for injunctive relief and damages. The district court applied strict scrutiny to both DoC restrictions. It held that the restriction on correspondence was overly broad and capriciously applied, and that the marriage restriction violated inmates’ constitutional right to marry. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, affirmed, further holding that neither restriction was the narrowest means of addressing the DoC’s security concerns.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53275:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53275:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53275:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Byron White, Justice Louis Powell and Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court upheld the Missouri Department of Correction’s restriction on correspondence between inmates. Justice O’Connor looked to the Court’s test for determining the reasonableness of restrictions on prison inmates’ expressive freedom. She argued that this particular content-neutral restriction on correspondence between inmates was logically connected to the DoC’s legitimate security concerns, noting the danger of coordinated gang activity in Missouri prisons. Justice O’Connor further reasoned that the restrictions did not deprive inmates of all means of expression, only limiting correspondence with a particular class of people. She argued that the Eighth Circuit failed to consider the impact easing the restriction might have on the liberty and safety of prison guards and other inmates. Finally, Justice O’Connor argued that there were no obvious, easy alternatives to the DoC’s restrictions.\nTurning to the DoC’s marriage restriction, Justice O’Connor held that it was an unconstitutional violation of inmates’ fundamental right to marry. While acknowledging that prisoners’ right to marry is subject to restriction, she argued that many important aspects of marriage should not be altered by a person’s incarceration, including the potential emotional and religious impact of marriage to another. Hence, Missouri prisoners retained a constitutionally-protected right to marry. Justice O’Connor further held that the DoC’s marriage restriction was not reasonably related to its stated interest in preventing violence in prisons and in the rehabilitation of female prisoners.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun, concurred in part and dissented in part. While agreeing with the majority’s holding that the marriage restriction was unconstitutional, he rejected the majority’s application of a reasonableness standard to the facts on record. Justice Stevens argued that the majority improperly accepted the DoC’s mostly speculative arguments with respect to the DoC’s security concerns about inmate correspondence, while rejecting the DoC’s similarly speculative concerns about marriage between inmates.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53275:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53276:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53276:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn February 1979, John Leroy Spring and a companion shot and killed Donald Walker during a hunting trip in Colorado. Shortly after, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) received information from an informant that Spring was involved in the transportation of stolen firearms across state lines. The informant also told the agents the Spring had been talking about killing Walker. The agents set up an undercover operation and arrested Spring on March 30. Spring was advised of his Miranda rights at the scene of the arrest and again at the police station. He then signed a document stating that he understood and waived his rights and was willing to make a statement. After asking Spring about the firearms transactions, the agents asked Spring if he had ever shot anyone, and if he had shot Walker in Colorado. Spring admitted to shooting someone but denied shooting Walker, and the interview ended. On May 26, Colorado police officers visited Spring in jail intending to question him about the Walker murder. They read Spring his Miranda rights, and he signed a document stating that he waived them. During the course of the interview, Spring confessed to the murder.\nSpring was charged with first-degree murder in Colorado state court. He moved to suppress both the March 30 and May 26 statements by arguing that he invalidly waived his Miranda rights. The trial court held that the police’s failure to inform Spring of the topics that would be covered in questioning did not affect the the waiver, but the content of the March 30 interview was not relevant. The trial court suppressed the March 30 statement and admitted the May 26 statement into evidence. Spring was convicted. On appeal, Spring renewed his argument about the waiver of his Miranda rights for the March 30 statement and argued that the May 26 statement was the “illegal fruit” of the March 30 statement. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and held that the March 30 statement was inadmissible because the ATF agents had a duty to inform Spring that he was a suspect in the Walker murder before questioning him about it. The Court of Appeals also held that the state failed to meet its burden to prove that the May 26 statement was not the product of the earlier illegal statement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53276:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53276:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53276:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence that Spring was in any way coerced into signing the waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights or that he was prevented from understanding his rights and the consequences of waiving them. The Constitution does not require that the suspect understand every possible nuance of the consequences of waiving his rights, but rather that he understand that whatever he says may be used against him. The Court also held that police silence regarding the topics of an interrogation is not an attempt to trick the suspect and does not affect the validity of the waiver. Because the interrogation on March 30 was not illegal, the May 26 statements cannot be considered “fruit of the poisonous tree.”\nIn his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the state failed to meet the heavy burden to prove that Spring’s waiver was valid and that the scope of the questioning was highly relevant to Spring’s decision. He also argued that the agents’ silence on the extent of their questions was an interrogation technique designed to draw Spring into confessing more than he would have otherwise. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53276:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53286:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53286:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn response to a series of NAACP-initiated lawsuits in the 1970s, the Alabama Department of Public Safety was required to implement a promotion scheme in which half of the department's promotions to certain ranks would go to black officers if enough qualified blacks were available.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53286:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53286:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53286:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a plurality opinion, the Court upheld the promotion plan. The scheme did not impose an \"absolute bar\" to white advancement, was narrowly drawn to include only specific ranks in the department, and, according to the four justices who voted to affirm it, was \"required in light of the Department's long and shameful record of delay and resistance\" in complying with past judicial decisions. It is important to remember that courts had first found the Department's practices unconstitutional in 1972.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53286:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53287:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53287:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Board of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance which prohibited all \"First Amendment activities\" in the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Alan Snyder, a minister with Jews for Jesus, was instructed by an airport officer to refrain from distributing free religious literature on a walkway in the central terminal of LAX.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53287:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53287:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53287:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Using the \"First Amendment overbreadth doctrine,\" which allows an individual to challenge a statute on its face which is potentially threatening to others, the Court found that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Justice O'Connor argued that the rule was vague, overly broad, and would have effectively prohibited activities such as reading, talking, or wearing expressive shirts or political buttons in the LAX terminal. Allowing such an ordinance, which touched \"the universe of expressive activity\" in its totality, would have caused LAX to become a \"First Amendment Free Zone,\" according to O'Connor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53287:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53290:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53290:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, Francis Connelly approached a police officer and, without any prompting, confessed to murder. The police officer immediately informed Connelly that he had the right to remain silent, but Connelly indicated that he still wished to discuss the murder. It was later discovered that Connelly was suffering from chronic schizophrenia at the time of the confession. A Colorado trial court suppressed the statements on the ground that they were made involuntarily.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53290:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53290:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53290:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that because the taking of Connelly's statements as evidence did not involve any element of governmental coercion, no violation of the Due Process Clause occurred. The Court argued that suppressing statements in cases where suspects were not coerced would have no deterrent effect on future violations of the Constitution by the police. The Court noted that \"Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53290:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53291:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53291:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnthony Tanner and William Conover were indicted on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of mail fraud. After the jury ruled, Tanner and Conover filed a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit stating that several jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief, holding that juror testimony was inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict under Rule 606(b). There was insufficient evidence other than that testimony of juror misconduct. Tanner and Conover filed another motion, this time alleging juror use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the trial. The district court declined to hold another evidentiary hearing. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a second evidentiary hearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53291:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53291:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53291:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the majority opinion affirming in part and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the district court was right to refuse to admit juror testimony in the evidentiary hearing. There was insufficient non-juror testimony to substantiate the claims of juror misconduct. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration of the conspiracy claims.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a partial dissent, stating that juror testimony was admissible under Rule 606(b), and allowing the district court to ignore sworn affidavits from jurors violated the Sixth Amendment right to a competent jury. Justices William J. Brennan, Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53291:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53294:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53294:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1973, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. California and established a three-prong test for determining whether material is obscene. The test asks whether the material in question appeals to a prurient interest, describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and whether the work as a whole lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”\nOn July 21, 1983, police detectives in Rockford, Illinois, purchased magazines from Richard Pope and Charles Morrison, both of whom were attendants in an adult bookstore. Pope and Morrison were subsquently charged under Illinois’ obscenity statute for the sale of those magazines. They each moved to dismiss the charges and argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it did not require that the value of the work in question be judged on an objective basis but instead allowed for judgment based on contemporary community standards. The trial courts denied the motions and instructed the juries to determine whether the material would be viewed as obscene by adults in Illinois. Pope and Morrison appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. The Illinois Supreme Court denied review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53294:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53294:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53294:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, while the first two prongs of the Miller test may be determined based on contemporary community standards, the third prong must be determined based on whether a reasonable person would find value in the material. In this manner, the work in question is protected from needing to obtain majority approval to be deemed of value. Because the statute under which Pope and Morrison were convicted had already been repealed, the Court held that the case should be remanded for consideration of whether the error in this case was harmless.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that the Miller test was meant to be adjudicated based on what a reasonable person would find valuable, but he also argued that art could not be judged objectively.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a partial concurrence and partial dissent in which he argued that the “harmless error” analysis proposed in the majority opinion was inappropriate in this case, but the majority opinion correctly protected a work from being judged solely by the value, or lack thereof, that a majority of community members might ascribe to it.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent in which he argued that the error in this case was harmful to Pope and Morrison because the jury evaluated their guilt based on unconstitutional instructions. Justice Stevens also wrote that the majority opinion’s attempt to clarify the definition of obscenity subjected the First Amendment’s protection of free speech to the whims of jurors who might believe that a majority view on the value of a work is more reasonable than a minority view. The difficulty in attempting to define obscenity reflects what Justice Stevens found to be the constitutional impossibility of criminalizing the creation or sale of obscene literature to consenting adults. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., and Justice Blackmun joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that the concept of obscenity cannot be sufficiently defined to provide fair notice to the creators and purveyors of sexually oriented materials without also seriously undermining the First Amendment protection of free speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53294:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53298:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53298:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 26, 1973, Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts as a non-stock, non-membership corporation. Beginning in January 1973, MCFL distributed a newsletter to its contributors focused on MCFL’s political concerns. Prior to the September 19, 1978, primary elections, MCFL distributed a flyer to contributors, due-payers and to approximately 50,000 people MCFL considered sympathetic to its goals. This flyer encouraged readers to vote ‘pro-life’, listed candidates for state and federal office in every voting district in the state, and identified each candidate as either supporting or opposing MCFL’s views.\nThe Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibited corporations from spending general corporate treasury funds on any federal election; MCFL spent a total of $9,812.76 from its general treasury on the flyers in question. When conciliation proved unsuccessful, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) filed a complaint against MCFL seeking a civil penalty and other relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found for MCFL, holding that the flyers did not fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and that the flyers fell under the act’s press exemption for news stories, commentaries, or editorials. The court also held that the act would violate the First Amendment if applied.\nAfter examining the legislative history of the FECA, the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It held that the flyers fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and did not fall under its press exemption. It did, however, affirm the lower court’s ruling that FECA would be unconstitutional if applied, holding that the government offered no substantial government interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53298:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53298:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53298:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In an opinion written by Justice William J. Brennan, the Court held unanimously that Massachusetts Citizens for Life’s flyers violated FECA’s prohibition on expenditures. He pointed to the general definitions section of FECA, where ‘expenditures’ included the provision of anything of value made for the purpose of influencing a federal election. Justice Brennan also looked to the legislative history and determined that Congress did not intend to abandon its restrictions on expenditures to support candidates. Justice Brennan rejected MCFL’s argument that it did not expressly advocate for a candidate, noting that the flyers exhorted readers to vote for specific ‘pro-life’ candidates.\nIn a 5-4 majority, Justice Brennan also held that FECA was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL’s flyers. While acknowledging that FECA’s requirements were not an absolute restriction on MCFL’s First Amendment rights, he argued that they were a substantial restriction. He noted that MCFL was forced to comply with several burdensome requirements only because it was a corporation; these requirements potentially created a disincentive for engaging in political speech. Justice Brennan held that the state’s compelling interest in restricting corporate spending on elections did not extend to MCFL because 1) MCFL was formed for an exclusively political purpose, 2) it had no shareholders, and 3) it was not formed by a business corporation or labor union. He noted that even if FECA’s disclosure requirements no longer applied, MCFL was still required to identify anyone contributing over $200.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred with both of the majority’s holdings. She emphasized that the significant burden on MCFL arose from FECA’s additional organizational restrictions, and not from its higher disclosure requirements.\nChief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, dissented on the constitutionality of FECA. While acknowledging that the threat from corporate political activity varied depending on the characteristics of a particular corporation, he argued that these were distinctions in degree and not differences in kind. He described the majority’s three-part test as legislative in character.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53298:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53302:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53302:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE) is a union that represents railroad workers across the country, specifically the employees of Maine Central Railroad, a subsidiary of Guilford Transportation Industries (Guilford). After Guilford acquired Maine Central in 1981, Maine Central had to lay off 300 of the 400 employees that BMWE represented. The collective bargaining agreement between the two expired in 1984, before the parties were able to reach a satisfactory new agreement. For the following year, the parties attempted to reach a settlement using the procedures set out by the Railroad Labor Act (RLA), but they exhausted those options. On March 3, 1986, BMWE began a strike against Maine Central that expanded to encompass the other Guilford subsidiaries. Upon receiving information that other railroad companies were assisting Guilford, BMWE began picketing other railroads’ lines. On April 9, Burlington Northern Railroad Company sought and received a temporary restraining order from the district court to stop the picketing. Six other railroad companies filed petitions in the same court and received temporary restraining orders on April 11. On April 23, the district court consolidated the cases entered a preliminary injunction against BMWE.\nThe Court of Appeals reversed based on the understanding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents the use of injunctions to halt labor dispute protests. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not have the jurisdiction to enter the injunction and ordered it to dismiss the petitioners’ claims.\nWhile these judicial procedures were pending, on May 16, 1986, the President issued Executive Order No. 12557, which convened an emergency board to investigate the dispute and report back to the President after 30 days. During that period the parties had to maintain the status quo that existed before the dispute. Congress also convened an advisory board that recommended that Congress enact legislation that would bind the parties to the recommendation of the President’s emergency board. Congress did so, and the President signed it into law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53302:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53302:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53302:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly to prevent courts from distinguishing between primary and secondary actors for the purposes of labor immunity in labor disputes. Additionally, since Congress did not provide any clear way to distinguish between primary and secondary actors in such cases, the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to make decisions based on a distinction that lacks a legislative basis. The Court also held that Congress meant the term “labor dispute” to be broad, so the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not only refer to employers who are substantially aligned with the primary employer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53302:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53303:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53303:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe state of Illinois required all who sell or scrap motor vehicles or parts to obtain licenses. That law also required anyone with a license to allow police to inspect their records at any time without a warrant. Albert Krull, George Lucas, and Salvatore Mucerino operated a wrecking yard. During a routine records inspection, police found four stolen cars on the lot. The men were arrested and charged with several criminal violations of Illinois motor vehicle laws. The next day, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the law that allowed police officers to inspect records without a warrant.\nKrull moved to suppress evidence found during the search because the law that police officers relied on was now unconstitutional. As a general rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search is excluded at trial. Illinois argued that because the police officer acted in good faith, the evidence was admissible. The trial court granted Krull’s motion. The state appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded. On remand, the trial court maintained its original position and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53303:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53303:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53303:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply because the officer acted in good faith. The officer’s reliance on the unconstitutional law was objectively reasonable when he conducted the search. Excluding the evidence in this case would not support the policy behind the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct. The Court followed United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897 (1984) where police conducted a search with a warrant that they later found out was defective.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a dissent, stating that United States v. Leon qs distinguishable from this case. She also asserted that the rule the majority adopted was inconsistent and difficult to apply. Justices William J. Brennan and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, joining in Justice O’Connor’s dissent, but expressing that her discussion of prior precedent was unnecessary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53303:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53307:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53307:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe 1984 Bail Reform Act allowed the federal courts to detain an arrestee prior to trial if the government could prove that the individual was potentially dangerous to other people in the community. Prosecutors alleged that Salerno and another person in this case were prominent figures in the La Cosa Nostra crime family.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53307:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53307:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53307:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the Act was constitutional because when the government's interest in protecting the community outweighs individual liberty, pre-trial detention can be \"a potential solution to a pressing societal problem.\" The Act only applied to a specific list of serious offenses, placed heavy burdens on the government to prove that the arrestee posed significant threats to others, and did not prevent the accused from enjoying a speedy trial. The Court also dismissed Salerno's argument that the Act violated the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53307:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53308:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53308:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUntil 1984, the statutes governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) allowed a family to exclude one member if that person had an income or is receiving benefits that would reduce the amount of government aid. In 1984, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which removed the option of excluding a family member. The new law required that the filing unit include all income from all members of the family. This might reduce the family’s total income by reducing the benefits the family is eligible to receive.\nIn 1970, Beaty Mae Gilliard, who had been receiving benefits from North Carolina through the AFDC since 1962, gave birth to her seventh child. Because Gilliard was receiving child support from the child’s father, the state deducted the child support from the benefits she was eligible for as the parent of an eight-person family. Gilliard sued, and the district court agreed with her reading of the statute that she was allowed to exclude the child who was receiving child support from her filing unit because the seven-person family benefits were greater than what she would receive from the eight-person family benefits minus the child support. The district court awarded class relief to anyone in Gilliard’s position. When North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with the 1984 Act, Gilliard and other members of the class filed a motion to reopen the case and obtain relief. The district court concluded that the new statutory scheme adopted by the 1984 Act violated the Due Process and Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53308:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53308:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53308:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the 1984 Act supported the federal government’s dual interests of reducing the deficit and distributing aid to needy families in the fairest way possible. Because some families receive income from sources other than the government, the Court held that it was reasonable for the government to be able to provide more aid to those families that have no other means of support. Based on the rational basis for this decision, the 1984 Act did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court also held that the 1984 Act did not violate the Takings Clause because the amount of money the child receives does not change, regardless of the amount of money the family as a whole receives from the government. The government is not taking anything away from the child without compensation, the type of government action the Takings Clause was meant to prevent.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that the government’s actions unduly harm the parent-child relationship. Because an increasing number of children live in a single-parent household headed by the mother, forcing the children to forego the financial support of the father in order to live with the mother and receive her government benefits can cut children off from a relationship with their fathers. He argued that the 1984 Act places an undue burden on the child and the familial relationship, which requires a higher level of scrutiny than merely proving the decision was a rational one. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice Harry A. Blackmun also wrote a dissent stating that he agreed with Justice Brennan’s arguments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53308:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53312:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53312:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen the Duarte chapter of Rotary International violated club policy by admitting three women into its active membership its charter was revoked and it was expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in reversing a lower court decision, found that Rotary International's action violated a California civil rights act prohibiting sexual discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53312:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53312:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53312:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary's membership, the Court found that the relationship among the club's members was not of the intimate or private variety which warrants First Amendment protection. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued that because many of Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are conducted in the presence of strangers, and because women members would not prevent the club from carrying out its purposes, there was no violation of associational rights. Furthermore, even if there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that minimal infringement would be justified since it \"serves the State's compelling interest\" in ending sexual discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53312:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53323:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53323:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Prior to this act, tribal land was allotted to individual tribal members in trust. Individual owners would hold the land in trust and could convey the land to their heirs. If a tribal member who held land in trust died without a will, the land would be divided among all of the heirs of that tribal member. This eventually lead to heirs inheriting very small fractional interests in land. The Indian Land Consolidation Act contained a provision which would transfer certain minimal fractional interests in land away from the individual heirs and back to the tribal governments.\nMary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, and Eileen Bissonette were enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and were heirs or devisees of Tribe members who died in 1983. Each had inherited a fractional interest in land which they would lose to the tribal government under the Indian Land Consolidation Act.\nIrving, Seed, and Bissonette filed suit in the district court claiming that the provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act resulted in taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court held that the statute was constitutional and that the complainants had no vested interest in the property of the decedents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court. It held that the complainants had standing and that the statute did violate the Fifth Amendment. The Secretary of the Interior appealed the appellate court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53323:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53323:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53323:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court affirming the appellate court's decision. The Court held that the section of the Indian Land Consolidation Act which transferred ownership of fractional land interests to the respective tribe constituted an unconstitutional seizure of property without just compensation. The Court also held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the provision.\nJustice William J. Brennan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun joined. Justice Brennan emphasized that the ruling would not limit the Court's opinion in Andrus v. Allard, and that the property rights and expectations specific to this case made this case unusual.\nJustice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Lewis F. Powell joined. He stated that the Court's decision effectively limited Andrus v. Allard to its facts.\nJustice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Byron White joined. He stated that Congress had failed to afford the affected Native Americans due process by failing to provide any opportunity to order their affairs in light of the new law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53323:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53328:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53328:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter its Maryland synagogue was painted with anti-Semitic slogans and symbols, the Shaare Tefila Congregation brought a suit charging the white defendants with racially discriminatory interference with property rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1982. The Maryland District Court dismissed the claims, maintaining that white-on-white violence was not racially discriminatory.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53328:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53328:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53328:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court unanimously ruled that Jews can state a claim of racial discrimination since they were among the peoples considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of U.S.C. Section 1982. The statute \"was intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.\" The Jewish people most certainly suffered such discrimination and so were not barred from their claim simply because both they, like the defendants, were Caucasian.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53328:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53333:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53333:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53333:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53333:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53333:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Scalia held, in a 5-4 opinion, that the Coastal Commission could only place conditions on the Nollans’ development permit to rebuild their home where those conditions substantially furthered government interests that would justify denial of the permit entirely. Because the Nollans’ request to rebuild their home did not further the government’s interest in overcoming a perceived psychological barrier to using the beach, the condition was a regulatory taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53333:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53334:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53334:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPaula Hobbie worked for Lawton and Company, a Florida jewelry shop. She joined the Seventh-day Adventist Church and informed her employer that she could not work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday since it was her new church's Sabbath day. Lawton soon dismissed her for refusing to work Friday evening and Saturday shifts. Hobbie filed for unemployment compensation with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. Lawton objected to paying benefits, claiming that she did qualify since she had been dismissed \"for misconduct connected with her work.\" The Bureau of Unemployment Compensation agreed and denied her benefits. Hobbie claimed that this violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. She unsuccessfully appealed the decision in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53334:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53334:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53334:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for an 8-1 court. Referring to its similar decisions in Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., the Court maintained that a state cannot deny unemployment benefits to an employee dismissed for having religious conflicts with the employer. This violates the Free Exercise Clause by pressuring religious adherents to modify their religious views in order to retain work or benefits. The state cannot do this without a compelling interest. The Court did not find it relevant that Hobbie converted after she began working, and did not consider the fact that she still qualified for partial benefits a satisfactory remedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53334:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53344:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53344:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn September 23, 1978, Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda motorcycle while riding down Highway 80 in Solano County, California. His motorcycle collided with a trailer and killed his passenger and wife, Ruth Ann Moreno. A year later, Zurcher filed a liability suit alleging that the sudden loss of air and subsequent explosion of his rear tire caused the accident. His complaint named Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, as a defendant. Cheng Shin sued its co-defendant, Asahi Metal Industry Company, the Japanese manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly. Zurcher's claim was eventually settled, which left the suit against Asahi still outstanding.\nAsahi filed a motion with the superior court to quash the summons by arguing that the court had no jurisdiction over the company. The Court denied the motion because Asahi does business internationally and therefore should be subject to international laws. The Court of Appeal of the State of California ordered the Superior Court to grant the motion because it was not reasonably foreseeable for Asahi products to end up in California. The Supreme Court of the State of California reversed and held that Asahi placed its components in a \"stream of commerce\" with the awareness that some of those components ended up in California.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53344:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53344:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53344:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that the state must show that the defendant company purposefully established \"minimum contacts\" by directing products toward a particular state. Although Asahi placed its products in a stream of commerce that eventually led to California, there was no evidence that the company marketed or in any way anticipated sales in California. The Court also held that the jurisdiction of the California court would be unreasonable for Asahi, given the distance and the fact that this dispute is purely between Asahi and Cheng Shin. The state of California had only a slight interest in this case that did not outweigh the burden on Asahi.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the decision of the Court that the California jurisdiction would place an unfair and unreasonable burden on Asahi, but he disagreed with the holding that Asahi did not purposefully interact with the California market. He argued that the \"\"stream of commerce\"\" is both predictable and profitable for companies, and the benefits of sales balance the potential burden of litigation. Justices Byron R. White, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence in part and in the judgment.\n In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the examination of whether or not Asahi had established \"\"minimum contacts\"\" was unnecessary. The test of minimum contacts only becomes relevant once a reasonable burden has been established. He also argued that the Court misapplied the test by not recognizing that such a high volume of Asahi parts reaching California can only be the result of purposeful business. Justices Byron R. White and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the partial concurrence and concurrence in judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53344:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53345:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53345:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nArdith McPherson was a clerical employee in the Harris County, Texas constable's office. After hearing on the office radio that there had been an attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, McPherson, who thought she was alone with one other office worker, stated \"if they go for him again, I hope they get him.\" Another co-worker overheard the comment and reported it to the Constable, Walter H. Rankin. Rankin subsequently fired McPherson.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53345:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53345:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53345:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Rankin's interest in discharging McPherson was outweighed by her rights under the First Amendment. The Court held that McPherson's statement, when considered in context, \"plainly dealt with a matter of public concern.\" The Court found that there was no evidence that McPherson's speech interfered with \"the efficient functioning of the office\" and that her private comment had not discredited the office. The Court also noted that McPherson did not serve a \"confidential, policymaking, or public contact\" role, diminishing the impact of her speech on the agency's proper functioning.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53345:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53347:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53347:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAl-Khazraji, a professor and U.S. citizen born in Iraq, filed suit against his former employer and its tenure committee for denying him tenure on the basis of his Arabian race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The District Court held that while Al-Kharzraji had properly alleged racial discrimination, the record was insufficient to determine whether he had been subjected to prejudice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53347:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53347:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53347:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that persons of Arabian ancestry were protected from racial discrimination under Section 1981. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Byron R. White maintained that section 1981 encompassed discrimination even among Caucasians. Justice White noted that history did not support the claim that Arabs and other present-day \"Caucasians\" were considered to be a single race for the purposes of section 1981. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in a separate concurrence, added that \"Pernicious distinctions among individuals based solely on their ancestry are antithetical to the doctrine of equality upon which this nation is founded.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53347:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53353:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53353:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCurrently unavailable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53353:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53353:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53353:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nCurrently unavailable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53353:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53354:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53354:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. To investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. During the search, which was done without a warrant, an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. The officer moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53354:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53354:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53354:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), Justice Scalia upheld the \"plain view\" doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. However, critical to this doctrine, argued Scalia, is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no \"special operational necessities\" be done with probable cause. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a \"reasonable suspicion\" and not a \"probable cause\" to believe that the equipment was stolen, the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53354:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53356:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53356:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nClarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were charged with the assault of Cynthia Knighton and the murder of her four-year-old son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott. Despite Marsh’s objections, she and Williams were tried jointly. The prosecution entered Williams’ confession into evidence, although the confession was redacted to prevent any mention of anyone other than Williams and Martin being involved in the crime. In his closing argument, the prosecution admonished the jury not to use Williams’ confession against Marsh but linked her testimony to events in the confession. The judge also instructed the jury not to use the confession against Marsh. Marsh was convicted, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied the appeal.\nMarsh filed a writ of habeas corpus and argued that the introduction of the confession violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. The district court denied the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53356:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53356:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53356:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that not only did the jury receive instructions not to consider the confession in assessing Marsh’s guilt, but also the confession was redacted so that there was no incriminating evidence regarding Marsh’s actions. Without the implication that the evidence in the confession was incriminating, Marsh’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated. The Court also held that joint trials, while not necessarily in either defendant’s best interests from the perspective of the Confrontation Clause, are a necessary part of the justice system.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent and argued that the Confrontation Clause regulates the introduction of any evidence from which the jury could infer the defendant’s guilt. Given the presentation of the confession in this case, the jury could only infer that Williams’ confession also enumerated Marsh’s guilt. He also argued that the legal system’s interest in joint trials from an efficiency standpoint should not outweigh the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53356:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53357:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53357:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn February 1958, Master Sergeant James Stanley volunteered to participate in a military program ostensibly testing the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical warfare. He spent a month at the Army’s Chemical Warfare Laboratories and during that time was secretly administered doses of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). As a result of his exposure to LSD, Stanley began experiencing hallucinations, memory loss, impaired performance of his job, and he engaged in domestic violence without remembering it later. He was discharged from the Army in 1969. In 1975, Stanley received a letter from the military asking for his cooperation in a study to determine the long-term effects of LSD and referring to his previous “voluntary” involvement in the 1958 tests. This letter was the first notification that Stanley received regarding the true purpose of the 1958 tests. He sued the government under the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) and argued that there had been negligence in the administration, supervision, and subsequent monitoring of the drug testing program.\nThe district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and held that the government was not liable for negligence that occurred while Stanley was on active duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed but also held that the district court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On remand, Stanley amended his complaint to include claims that unknown officers violated his constitutional rights and argued that the constitutional claim did not fall under the service exception to the FTCA. The district court again dismissed the claim under the FTCA and rejected the government’s argument that the same exception barred Stanley’s constitutional claims. The government moved for partial final judgment because Stanley had not named individual defendants. Stanley filed a second amended complaint that named individual defendants, but before the court ruled on it, the Supreme Court decided Chappell v. Wallace, which held that enlisted military personnel may not file constitutional claims. The district court held that the Chappell decision did not bar Stanley’s constitutional claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that recent precedent did not require Stanley’s FTCA claim to be barred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53357:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53357:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53357:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not have the jurisdiction to consider Stanley’s FTCA claims because they were not a part of the order that was originally appealed. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals took an unnecessarily narrow view of the Chappell decision by limiting it to an even greater extent than the FTCA waiver of governmental liability. Because the government is protected from suits arising from activities that occurred during the course of service under the FTCA, there is no reason to assume that the precedent set by the Chappell decision would provide less protection.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that members of the armed forces deserve the same constitutional protections from the government as those enjoyed by ordinary citizens. Previous federal immunity jurisprudence was based on the specific circumstances surrounding events and that the individuals named in the suit should be required to demonstrate absolute immunity. He also argued that the Chappell decision only barred constitutional claims when military discipline would suffer. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In her separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued that both the Chappell decision and the FTCA exception prohibit civilian courts from considering suits that arise as the result of military service. However, because Stanley’s FTCA claims arise as the result of his involuntary conclusion in a military test, his claims should be allowed to proceed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53357:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53360:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53360:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAhmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen were inmates in New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison. The prison classified inmates depending on the security risk each posed. Due to their classification, Shabazz and Mateen were assigned to a prison job outside of the main prison building and were not allowed to return to the main prison building during the workday. Because of these restrictions neither men, both of whom were practicing Muslims, were able to attend Juamu’ah, a weekly religious service held on Fridays.\nThe two men sued the prison and argued that the work policies infringed on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The federal district court found in favor of the prison and held that the prison policies plausibly advanced the goals of security, order, and rehabilitation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling and held that the prison was required to show that there was no other reasonable method by which the inmate’s religious rights could be accommodated without creating actual security problems.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53360:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53360:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53360:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, while prisoners do not forfeit their constitutional rights after being convicted of a crime, being incarcerated does place necessary limitations on those rights. Because of the particular interests and dangers involved in prisons and the prison administration’s everyday experience with the operation of a prison, courts should largely defer to prison administrators on questions of policy or regulation. Therefore, even when an inmate alleges that a prison policy infringes on his or her constitutional rights, the policy is valid as long as it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective, as the policy in this case was. The Court also held that a prison is not required to adopt any alternative policy that may have “undesirable results,” as determined by the prison.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that a prison must demonstrate that the restrictions imposed on inmates were necessary to further an important governmental interest. He also argued that there should be a varying level of scrutiny depending on the nature of the right being asserted, rather than the general standard of deference in the majority opinion. Because the prison policy in the case in question acts as a complete ban that prevents some Muslim prisoners from attending Juamu’ah, an obligatory and important religious ceremony, the prison should be required to show the policy was necessary and no less extreme measures could serve the same purpose. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent,", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53360:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53361:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53361:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBy passing the the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Act), the Pennsylvania Legislature empowered the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to regulate underground coal mining that damaged structures on the surface. When implementing the Act, DER prevented coal miners from removing more than 50% of coal from mines located beneath buildings. Historically, coal miners acquired rights to \"mining estates\" separate from the property owned on the above \"surface estates.\" The Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, a group of miners, complained that the Act created a \"support estate\" that effectively took away its property without compensation. Keystone relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon to allege that this state action violated the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected both allegations and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53361:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53361:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53361:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of a 5-4 court. Like in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court's decision depended upon the \"particular facts\" of the mining regulation in question. Unlike in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court found a valid public purpose behind the present Act and determined the Act would not make it impossible for the miners to profitably conduct business. Therefore the decision in Pennsylvania Coal did not apply. To refute alleged Takings Clause violations, the Court established that \"the support estate has value only insofar as it is used to exploit another estate.\" Then the Court conducted a factual review of the effects of the new regulation. It concluded that \"[b]ecause petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all the coal in their mineral estates, the burden the Act places on the support estate does not constitute a taking.\" The Court also dismissed alleged Contract Clause violations because the state acquired no property for itself, but rather used its police power to implement regulation which served valid public interests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53361:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53362:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53362:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Louisiana law entitled the \"Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act\" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53362:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53362:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53362:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the law violated the Constitution. Using the three-pronged test that the Court had developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) to evaluate potential violations of the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan argued that Louisiana's law failed on all three prongs of the test. First, it was not enacted to further a clear secular purpose. Second, the primary effect of the law was to advance the viewpoint that a \"supernatural being created humankind,\" a doctrine central to the dogmas of certain religious denominations. Third, the law significantly entangled the interests of church and state by seeking \"the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53362:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53365:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53365:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUsing electronic beepers and aerial photography, police tracked certain drug making supplies to Ronald Dale Dunn’s ranch. The ranch had a fence surrounding the perimeter as well as several interior fences. Law enforcement officers entered the property without a warrant and crossed several fences to get near Dunn’s barn. The barn was about 60 yards away from Dunn’s house and a fence separated the two buildings. Police smelled phenylacetic acid and heard a motor running in the barn. Police approached the barn but did not enter. The officers did shine a flashlight through netting above the door and observed what looked like a drug laboratory. The officers made several similar visits, not entering, but looking into the barn, before obtaining a warrant to search the barn and Dunn’s house. During this search, police seized chemicals and equipment use for making drugs.\nAt trial, Dunn unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. A jury convicted him on federal drug charges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the barn was “within the curtilage” of Dunn’s house, so the police officers’ warrantless visits to the barn violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals judgment and remanded in light of Oliver v. United States. This time, the court of appeals found that the warrantless searches of the barn violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53365:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53365:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53365:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the barn and the area around it lay outside the protected area of curtilage around Dunn’s house. The barn was separated from the house by a fence and was a substantial distance away from the house, the officers had other data that lead them to suspect Dunn, and Dunn did little to protect the barn from observation. Even if Dunn did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search still did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers never entered the barn. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, writing that the officers perception of the way Dunn used the barn was not as important as the way the barn actually was used.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented, arguing that the barn was within the area of protected curtilage, and the officers violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy because the barn was an essential part of Dunn’s business. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53365:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53373:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53373:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRicky and Raymond Tison, brothers, conspired with several other family members to help their father, Gary, escape from prison. Gary was serving life in prison for murdering a guard during a previous escape attempt. Smuggling in a cooler full of guns, the Tisons helped Gary and his cellmate Randy escape. The group made a safe exit, but a few days later their car got a flat tire. They decided to flag down and steal a passing car. The group ordered the family of four out of the car while they transferred their belongings. When Ricky and Raymond went to get the family some water, Gary and Randy shot the family multiple times, killing them all. Ricky and Raymond did nothing to help the family. They continued to run with Randy and Gary until the chase ended in a shootout with police. Gary died in the desert of exposure before the police found him, and another brother died in the shootout. Ricky, Raymond, and Randy faced four counts of felony murder through accomplice liability. All three received the death penalty.\nThe Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the sentences, holding that while the Tisons had not specifically intended to kill the family, they conspired with known killers and did nothing to aid the family when they had the chance. The Court held that the son’s anticipation that lethal force might be used in their endeavor satisfied the “intent” requirement for the death penalty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53373:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53373:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53373:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, vacating the lower judgments. The Supreme Court remanded to determine whether the Tisons acted with a reckless indifference to human life. The Court held that anticipating lethal force is not enough to satisfy the “intent to kill” requirement, but the Tisons major participation in the felony along with a reckless indifference to human life may be.\nJustice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, expressing that this case illustrates how arbitrary capital sentencing is. The death penalty is always cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul Stevens joined the dissent in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53373:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53375:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53375:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRonald Calder was a native of Iowa working in Puerto Rico, He was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. After posting bail, he fled to his home state. Puerto Rico submitted a petition to Branstad, Iowa's governor at the time, to extradite Calder for court proceedings. Branstad refused.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53375:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53375:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53375:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court overturned its decision in Kentucky v. Dennison (1861) which had rendered federal courts powerless to enforce the Extradition Clause. The unanimous Court concluded that the precedent in Kentucky was \"the product of another age\" and \"fundamentally incompatible with more than a century of constitutional development.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53375:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53381:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53381:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case concerned the retrospective application of judge-made rules. Specifically, the Court had to decide whether a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, combined with his call to the jury clerk, violated the black petitioner's right to an impartial jury. The Court was called upon to decide whether the previous decision in Batson v. Kentucky was applicable to pending litigation but not final when Batson was decided. This case was decided together with Brown v. United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53381:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53381:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53381:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that after a new rule had been decided in a particular case, \"the integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review.\" The Court reasoned that selective application of new rules violated the principle of treating similarly situated defendants on an equal basis. The Court also refused to make an exception to the rule of retroactivity in cases where there was a \"clean break\" with past precedent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53381:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53383:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53383:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Transportation Agency, Santa Clara, California promoted Diane Joyce to road dispatcher over Paul Johnson. Both candidates were qualified for the job. As an affirmative action employer, the Agency took into account the sex of the applicants in making the promotion decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53383:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53383:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53383:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court affirmed the promotion procedures of the Agency. Justice Brennan argued that it was not unreasonable to consider sex as one factor among many in making promotion decisions, and that the Agency's actions did not create an absolute barrier to the advancement of men (a quota system did not exist).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53383:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53385:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53385:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPennzoil Co. obtained a jury verdict of $10.53 billion in a Texas state court suit. The suit alleged that Texaco Inc. tortiously induced a third party to breach its contract to sell stock to Pennzoil. Before the court entered a final judgment, Texaco sued in federal district court alleging that the Texas court proceedings violated its rights under the Constitution and several Texas statutes. Pennzoil argued that the district court should abstain from hearing the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Younger held that a federal court must abstain from hearing challenges to a state court proceeding while that proceeding is still underway. The district court did not abstain and granted a preliminary injunction. The court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter and that Texaco was likely to succeed in its suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the district court had jurisdiction, but should not have evaluated the claims that were discussed in the state trial. Meanwhile, the state court proceedings continued, and reduced the judgment to $8.53 billion", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53385:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53385:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53385:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have followed Younger and abstained from issuing an injunction until the state court proceedings concluded. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, writing that a federal court need not abstain when it does not have to decide any issue litigated in the state court. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the concurrence.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment, arguing that the district court did not have to abstain, but Texaco’s constitutional claims were without merit. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence. Justice Marshall separately concurred in the judgment, writing that venue was improper because the issues before the district court were inextricably linked to the Texas court proceedings. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the judgment, arguing that the district court should have abstained because unsettled questions of state law existed. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment, arguing that Younger did not apply. Justice Marshall joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53385:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53390:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53390:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Bourjaily was arrested after receiving a quantity of cocaine in a parking lot from Angelo Lonardo. At Bourjaily's trial, the government introduced statements Lonardo made in a telephone conversation with an informant regarding a \"friend\" who had questions about the cocaine. The district court, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, found that the government had established that a conspiracy existed between Bourjaily and Lonardo, and that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53390:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53390:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53390:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo; preponderance of the evidence; and no. When the existence and membership of a conspiracy are disputed, the traditional standard applies: the party offering the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) must prove these preliminary facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule 104(a) provides that, in determining preliminary questions concerning admissibility, the court \"is not bound by the rules of evidence\" (except those with respect to privileges). Therefore, hearsay, including the statements sought to be admitted, can be considered. Finally, since the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is rooted firmly in precedent, no independent inquiry into reliability is required by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53390:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53392:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53392:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo federally recognized Indian Tribes had reservation land within Riverside County, California where they conducted bingo and card games open to non- Indians. The gambling industry provided employment to many Indians on the reservation, and most clients were non-Indians. The State of California wanted to apply state gambling laws to reservation gaming and Riverside County wanted to apply local ordinances. Together, these laws would ban the card games and put charitable organizations in charge of bingo games. The Tribes claimed that the imposition of gambling laws by the state government violated their sovereignty. They brought suit against the state of California and Riverside County in federal district court. The district court ruled that neither the state nor the county had the authority to regulate gambling on reservation land. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53392:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53392:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53392:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. State laws require the consent of Congress in order to apply to Indian reservations. While the federal government consented to states enforcing criminal laws on reservation land, gambling regulations are types of civil law and therefore not enforceable. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 did not grant states the authority to regulate gambling either. Although the Act incorporated certain state gambling laws into federal laws regulating gambling on reservations, this did not grant states authority to enforce the new federal laws on reservations. Absent explicit permission for regulation, states can only enforce laws on reservations if their interests in regulation outweigh the interests of the federal government and tribal authorities. In this case, gambling provided revenue critical to the economic self-sufficiency of the reservation. Accordingly, the federal government's interest to ensure Indian self-government outweighed state concerns about organized crime developing because of unregulated reservation gaming.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53392:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53393:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53393:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53393:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53393:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53393:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Congress, acting indirectly to encourage uniformity in states' drinking ages, was within constitutional bounds. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of \"the general welfare,\" and that the means chosen to do so were reasonable. The Court also held that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss of highway funds was not unduly coercive.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53393:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53397:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53397:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert P. Groetzinger spent sixty to eighty hours a week placing bets on dog races. He had no other form of employment, and the winnings from these wagers were his only form of income. His net gambling loss for 1978 was $2,032. Groetzinger reported his loss in his tax return but did not compute it in his adjusted gross income. The Internal Revenue Service determined Groetzinger was subjected to the minimum tax since his gambling loss was an item of tax preference according to the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. The Internal Revenue Service sued Groetzinger and the tax court held that he was in the “trade of business” of gambling, which meant that no part of his gambling losses subjected him to a minimum tax. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53397:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53397:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53397:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that a taxpayer’s gambling activity does constitute a “trade or business” under the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. Since Groetzinger was in the “trade or business” of gambling, no part of his gambling losses was an item of tax preference subjecting him to a minimum tax. The Court held that the term “trade or business” has a broad definition within the statute. While a mere hobby does not constitute as a trade or business, activity with continuity and regularity with the purpose of making a profit or income is, so Groetzinger’s gambling activity qualifies.\nJustice Byron R. White delivered a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the 1982 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code made it clear that gambling was not a trade or business. Although the relevant year for this case is 1978, the later provisions indicate that the legislature did not intend to include gambling activity in constituting as a trade or business. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53397:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53402:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53402:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Booth was convicted of the murders of an elderly couple and chose to have the jury determine his sentence instead of the judge. A Maryland statute required that a victim impact statement \"describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his family\" be included in the pre-sentence report in felony cases. In this case, the victim impact statement described the victims, the impact of the crime on their family, and the family members' opinions of the defendant and the crime.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53402:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53402:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53402:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court found that the victim impact statement created \"a constitutionally unacceptable risk\" and violated the Eighth Amendment. Justice Powell argued that in a capital case, the jury's sentencing task is based on the defendant as a unique individual and not on the character or impact of the crime on the victim's family. Allowing the content of a victim impact statement to influence the jury could lead it to choose the death penalty for reasons which \"were irrelevant to the [defendant's] decision to kill,\" thus diverting attention from the facts of the crime. Furthermore, concluded Powell, introducing the \"emotionally-charged opinions\" of family members into the process would erode the \"reasoned decisionmaking\" which is crucial in capital cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53402:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53403:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53403:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOne of the types of fees that Pennsylvania used to finance the cost of its highway maintenance was lump-sum annual fees, also known as flat taxes. In 1980, Pennsylvania increased the fee for an identification marker required of every truck over a certain weight from $2 to $25, but exempted trucks registered in Pennsylvania from the fee _ the marker fee was \"deemed\" to be included in the registration fee that local truckers had to pay. In 1982, the marker tax was reduced to $5, but a new tax was introduced, taxing trucks by the axle. The axle tax applied to all trucks weighing more than 26,000 pounds, but the registration fee for Pennsylvania trucks was reduced in an amount calculated to offset that new tax for most trucks. These flat taxes were contested in two state court cases on the ground, inter alia, that they violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Since Pennsylvania-based trucks travel, on average, about five times as many miles in Pennsylvania as out-of-state trucks, the cost of the flat taxes was approximately five times as high per mile of road use for out-of-state vehicles as for local vehicles. For that reason, the lower courts in Pennsylvania found that both the marker tax and the axle tax violated the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered both cases together and reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53403:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53403:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53403:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the flat taxes violated the basic principle that the Commerce Clause created an area of trade free from interference by the states. One problem with the flat taxes is that they do not pass the \"internal consistency\" test, which is to say that they could not be applied by every state without interfering with free trade. If many states adopted them, truckers would pay more to go through those states than to drive the same distance in only one state. This would disrupt the market for interstate transportation services. In addition, because the cost to out-of-state truckers is approximately five times as heavy per mile, the taxes have a discriminatory effect. It is no defense that Pennsylvania's registration fee is fairly high, conferring a competitive advantage to trucks based in other states; the solution to that problem is to lower the level of the registration fee. It is also no defense to describe the flat taxes as user fees because such fees are acceptable only insofar as they are neither discriminatory nor excessive. Finally, Pennsylvania cannot appeal to administrative convenience because it has shown itself capable of administering taxes that reflect the quantity of highway use.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53403:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53406:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53406:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBaltimore police officers obtained a warrant for the apartment of Lawrence McWebb and “the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” When they obtained and executed the warrant, the police mistakenly believed that there was only one apartment on the third floor. By the time they discovered there were two apartments, the police were already in the process of searching the apartment of Harold Garrison. During that search, police discovered heroin. Garrison was tried and convicted of violating Maryland’s Controlled Substances Act. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the heroin discovered during the search, but the trial court denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53406:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53406:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53406:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the description of the place to be searched and the items to be seized in the original warrant was not unduly general given the information available to officers at the time. The fact that the officers found more information later did not invalidate the original warrant. The Court also held that the execution of the warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers proceeded only based on the knowledge they had and stopped their search immediately when they discovered their error.\nIn Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s dissent, he wrote that the Fourth Amendment values protection of the home above all else, and the actions of the police in this case violated the expectation of privacy. He argued that Court precedent required warrants to be specific when dealing with multi-tenant residences. He also found that the police officers’ mistake was not a reasonable one when there were several indicators that each floor of the building had multiple occupants. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53406:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53407:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53407:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVickie Rock was charged with manslaughter for the death of her husband, Frank Rock. Vickie and Frank had argued after Frank refused to let Vickie eat pizza and prevented her from leaving the apartment to get something else to eat. As the fight escalated, Vickie picked up a handgun and at some point Frank received a fatal gunshot wound to the chest. The police arrived and arrested Vickie. Because Vickie was unable to recall the shooting in any detail, on the advice of her attorney, she submitted to hypnosis in an attempt to refresh her memory. During one session, Vickie recalled that her finger had not been on the trigger and the gun had discharged accidentally when Frank had grabbed her arm. A gun expert examined the gun and found that it was defective and prone to fire when dropped or hit, even without the trigger being pulled, supported this revelation.\nBecause an Arkansas rule of evidence prohibited the admittance of any evidence obtained through hypnosis, the trial court barred Vickie from testifying to her memory of the shooting because it had been “hypnotically refreshed.” She was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Vickie appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed her conviction. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that, in the absence of a general consensus on the accuracy of evidence obtained through hypnosis, case-by-case inquiry into the accuracy of the evidence would be too burdensome on courts. In this case, the exclusion of Vickie Rock’s hypnotically refreshed memory did not infringe on her constitutional rights because her right to testify in her own defense was only limited by generally applicable rules of evidence intended to exclude confusing or misleading evidence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53407:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53407:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53407:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment protect the right of the individual to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial. Because the Arkansas rule was a blanket ban, it did not allow a trial court to consider the particular circumstances of individual cases. Although Arkansas has a state interest in preventing unreliable testimony from being admitted into evidence at trial, that interest does not justify a blanket ban on testimony that may be reliable in an individual case. Therefore the exclusion of the hypnotically refreshed testimony, without exploring the reliability of the testimony, infringed on the petitioner’s Constitutional right to testify in her own defense.\nIn his dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that an individual’s right to present evidence has always been subject to reasonable restrictions. Because Arkansas’s rule excluding evidence obtained by hypnosis is a reasonable attempt to ensure the reliability of evidence, he argued that it was appropriate to defer to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Justice Byron R. White, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53407:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53410:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53410:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo affiliate organizations of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints operated Deseret Gymnasium, a non-profit facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. These affiliates were the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB) and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). Arthur Frank Mayson worked for the Gymnasium for sixteen years as an engineer, but CPB and COP fired him when he failed to obtain a certificate authorizing him to attend the Church's religious temples. He filed a class-action lawsuit in District Court alleging that CPB and COP violated Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by dismissing him from nonreligious employment because he did not satisfy certain religious conditions. In response, CPB and COP claimed that Section 702 of the Act, as amended in 1972, exempts religious organizations from the Act's ban in Section 703 on religious discrimination. Mayson then claimed that Section 702 violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by allowing religious organizations to practice discriminatory hiring for nonreligious jobs. The District Court agreed that Mayson's job was nonreligious. It also held that Section 702 violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed religious adherents exclusive participation in nonreligious activities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53410:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53410:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53410:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Establishment Clause forbids the government from using state mechanisms to advance a religion. Section 702 passed a three-part test the Court established in Lemon v. Kurtzman for determining whether a state action violates the Establishment Clause. To be valid, the state action must first promote a \"secular legislative purpose.\" The Court found that Section 702 satisfied this criterion, since it ensured that the government would not determine for religious organizations what they could count as religious activities. Second, the state action can neither \"advance nor inhibit religion.\" The Court held that for a violation of this standard to occur, the \"Government itself must have advanced religion through its own activities and influence.\" In this case, the government allowed for a church to advance its religion but did not directly intervene. Third, the state action must not \"entangle\" church and state. By allowing religious organizations to employ whom they pleased, they state became less entangled in religion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53410:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53416:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53416:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJoseph Griffin, who had previously been convicted of a felony, was convicted in a Wisconsin state court of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and obstruction of an officer. He was put on probation. According to Wisconsin law, probationers are in the legal custody of the State Department of Health and Social services and must abide by that department’s rules and regulations of the department. One of the regulations permits the probation officer to search the probationer’s home without a warrant as long as there are “reasonable grounds” to believe illegal substances are in the premises. These grounds include: information provided by an informant, the reliability of that information and the informant, and the officer’s own experience with the probationer.\nGriffin’s probation officer received information from a detective that there might be guns in Griffin’s apartment. When the police searched Griffin’s apartment, they found a handgun and Griffin was charged with the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Griffin moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The trial court denied the motion and Griffin was convicted. Griffin appealed on the grounds that the evidence from the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53416:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53416:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53416:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence is “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted in accordance with a regulation that is a reasonable response to the “special needs” of a probation system. Supervision of probation is necessary to ensure the restrictions are followed and that the probation serves as a period of rehabilitation; therefore the state may depart from the usual warrant requirements. The “reasonable grounds” standard to search a probationer’s residence is an appropriate substitute for warrant requirements in this special situation, and in this case, the information received from the detective provided those reasonable grounds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53416:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53418:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53418:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1979, the County of Los Angeles passed an ordinance which prohibited construction or reconstruction on land which had been devastated by a flood one year earlier. The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned a campground which was affected by this ordinance and it was not allowed to reconstruct buildings on this land which the flood had destroyed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53418:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53418:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53418:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Noting that the fate of the Church's property had been in limbo for over six years (the suit which it had filed in 1979 had been denied a hearing as late as October of 1985), Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that, because the church was unable to use its property during this time, a \"taking\" of the property had occurred. Thus, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the government to exercise one of a number of \"options\" such as amending the regulation or fair payment for the use of the property in order to protect the Church's constitutional rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53418:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53422:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53422:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1981, officials at a hospital, including Executive Director Dr. Dennis O'Connor, suspected improprieties in Dr. Ortega's management of a residency program. The officials conducted an investigation of Ortega, which included multiple searches of his office and seizure of a number of items. The items were later used in proceedings before the California State Personnel Board to impeach the credibility of witnesses that testified on Dr. Ortega's behalf.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53422:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53422:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53422:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that \"the realities of the workplace\" made some expectations of privacy among public employees unreasonable when the intrusion was by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official. Work-related searches, the Court found, were \"merely incident to the primary business of the agency,\" and a warrant requirement would \"seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business.\" The Court thus held that a standard of \"reasonableness\" was sufficient for work-related intrusions by public employers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53422:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53424:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53424:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 3, 1982, Attina Cannaday, David Gray, and Dawn Bushart woke up Ronald Wojcik and Sandra Sowash in their Biloxi apartment and forced them to leave at knifepoint. They brought Wojcik and Sowash in Wojcik’s van to a remote wooded area. Grey raped Sowash at knifepoint in the van, but she later escaped. At sunrise, Ronald Wojcik’s body was found with nineteen stab wounds to the head, hands, upper body, and back. Later that month, David Randolph Gray was indicted in Harrison County, Mississippi on a capital charge for the stabbing death of Ronald Wojcik while committing the felony of kidnapping.\nDuring the jury selection process, the potential jurors were questioned individually. After the judge denied the prosecutor’s for-cause motions, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove eight panel members who expressed any degree of uncertainty in their ability to cast a vote in a case potentially involving the death penalty. The voir dire oath of panelist H.C. Bounds was confused, but she ultimately stated that she was capable of voting to impose the death penalty. The judge eventually excused Bounds for cause, however, implying that he had improperly denied the prosecutor the use of for-cause motions for the other panelists.\nThe jury convicted Gray of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi divided on whether Gray’s death sentence was invalid because the exclusion of Bounds violated Gray’s right to a fair and impartial jury. It ultimately affirmed Gray’s sentence despite the violation of Mississippi state procedure created by the trial court’s failure to follow voir dire guidelines in its dismissal of Bounds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53424:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53424:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53424:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court held that the exclusion of Bounds was a reversible constitutional error not subject to harmless-error review. He wrote that the state could only exclude jurors who would frustrate the administration of capital sentencing schemes by not following their oaths. Justice Blackmun noted that the Mississippi Supreme Court unanimously agreed that Bounds was qualified to sit as a juror.\nJustice Blackmun rejected Mississippi’s argument that the trial judge restored a peremptory challenge to the prosecutor to use against Bounds, pointing out that the trial judge explicitly stated that Bounds was removed for cause. He also rejected the state’s argument that the trial judge remedied an erroneous denial of a for-cause motion by granting an erroneous motion. Justice Blackmun reasoned that the court’s error was no less a constitutional violation because the trial judge may have improperly deprived the prosecution of peremptory challenges. He wrote that the relevant question was not whether the court excluded a prospective juror erroneously, but rather whether the composition of the jury panel could have been affected by the court’s error.\nFinally, Justice Blackmun rejected Mississippi’s argument that the exclusion of Bounds was a harmless technical error because it did not have prejudicial effect. He argued that courts could not say with confidence that an erroneous exclusion for cause of a scrupled, eligible, venire member was an isolated incident.\nJustice Louis Powell concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed with the plurality’s reliance on real-world factors such as the prosecutor’s use of the peremptory challenges, arguing that the reasons for the prosecutor’s use of those challenged was irrelevant.\nJustice Antonin Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Byron White, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. He argued that Bounds would have been excluded if the trial court properly granted the prosecutor’s for-cause motion, and thus the composition of the jury was ultimately unaffected.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53424:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53429:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53429:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGene Arline could no longer teach elementary school because she had tuberculosis, a contagious disease. The superintendent of schools in Nassau County, Florida dismissed her after it became clear that her illness was recurrent. The school system did not grant her financial relief. Arline claimed in a federal district court that this violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits state-funded programs from denying relief to applicants solely because they are handicapped. The school conceded it dismissed her solely because of her illness, but contended that a contagious disease like tuberculosis did not qualify her as handicapped. The court ruled that the Act did not define contagious illnesses as handicaps, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It found that Arline was \"otherwise qualified\" to teach except for her illness, and ruled that this qualified her for handicapped benefits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53429:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53429:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53429:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for a 7-2 court. The Court relied on the qualification criteria for \"handicapped status\" provided by the Department of Health of Human Services (HHS), which Congress authorized to implement the Act. HHS made it clear that the Act covers illnesses that cause a \"record of impairment\" upon a patient's \"major life activities.\" The Court found that both the \"contagious effects of a disease\" and \"the disease's physical effects\" can impair the patient's ability to work. The Act intended to cover \"those who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired,\" since both conditions can prevent a patient from finding work.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53429:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53447:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53447:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe City of San Jose enacted a rent-control ordinance in 1979 in an attempt to alleviate the problem of skyrocketing rent prices due to the growing shortage of and the increasing demand for housing. Part of the ordinance allowed a Mediating Hearing Officer to consider as one factor \"hardship to a tenant\" when evaluating rent increases imposed by landlords.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53447:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53447:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53447:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the ordinance was rationally crafted to protect the financial investments of landlords while simultaneously preventing tenants from becoming victims of burdensome rent increases. The City argued the ordinance satisfied a need. This view was uncontested and, according to Justice Rehnquist, represented a \"legitimate and rational\" means to protect \"consumer welfare.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53447:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53448:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53448:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 6, 1983, federal law enforcement agents tailing Michael F. Murray and James D. Carter for suspicion of illegal drug activities saw the two drive large vehicles into a warehouse in South Boston. When Murray and Carter left, the agents saw a tractor-trailer rig and a large container. The agents arrested Murray and Carter and lawfully seized their vehicles, which contained marijuana. Several agents then returned to the warehouse, forced entry without a search warrant, and found numerous wrapped bales of what was later confirmed to be marijuana. The agents did not disturb the bales and kept the warehouse under surveillance until they obtained a search warrant. In applying for the search warrant, the agents did not mention the unwarranted entry or the information they had obtained. Approximately eight hours later, the agents obtained the warrant, entered the warehouse, and seized the bales along with the notebooks indicating the destinations of the marijuana.\nBefore the trial, Murray and Carter moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warehouse and argued that the warrant was invalid because it was based on information obtained in the previous unwarranted entry. The district court denied the motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53448:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53448:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53448:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 4-3 plurality. The Court held that evidence that would be excluded under the Fourth Amendment is admissible if it comes from an independent source. If the police obtained information unlawfully but the evidence in question comes from an untainted source, it is still admissible. Because the officers in this case obtained a lawful warrant without relying on the information they obtained illegally, the evidence seized in the warranted entry can be considered to have come from an independent source and therefore not subject to exclusion.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the independent source exception is limited to cases in which the evidence in question stemmed from a wholly independent source. He argued that courts must keep in mind the incentives that police officers have to hide the use of illegal methods in obtaining evidence, and they must use a high standard of proof when determining whether evidence came from a truly independent source. Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that court decisions that incentivize police officers to obtain evidence through illegal means moves further away from the true meaning of and protections offered by the Fourth Amendment.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy did not participate in the decision or discussion of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53448:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53449:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53449:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53449:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53449:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53449:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was \"inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'\" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were \"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.\" The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53449:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53450:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53450:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1982, the New Jersey Legislature overrode the Governor's veto and enacted a statute requiring the state's public school teachers to permit students to observe a minute of silence before the start of each school day. A group of New Jersey public school teachers, students, and parents sued the New Jersey Department of Education, its Commissioner, and two township boards of education. The suit alleged that the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. After the named defendants and the New Jersey Attorney General refused to defend the statute, Alan J. Karcher, the Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly, and Carmen A. Orechio, the President of the New Jersey Senate, intervened as defendants on behalf of the Legislature. The district court ruled against them and declared the \"minute-of-silence\" statute unconstitutional. Karcher and Orechio appealed the ruling in their official capacities as presiding officers of the Legislature. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and shortly thereafter, Karcher and Orechio lost their respective officer positions. They subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, but the successors to their offices indicated to the Court that they were withdrawing the appeal on behalf of the Legislature. The plaintiffs argued that the withdrawal of the appeal ended the controversy and that the Court no longer had jurisdiction to review the case, according to Article III of the Constitution. Karcher and Orechio countered that they should be permitted to continue the appeal in their capacities as legislators and representatives of the legislative body that enacted the statute. Alternatively, they argued that the Court should vacate the judgment of the lower court upon their dismissal as appellants. They contended that New Jersey law does not authorize presiding legislative officers to represent the Legislature in litigation, and they argued that their loss of presiding officer status rendered the judgment unappealable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53450:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53450:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53450:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that once the individuals left their offices, the authority to pursue the lawsuit on behalf of the Legislature passed to their successors. Because Karcher and Orechio’s successors withdrew the appeal, there was no longer an active case or controversy, so the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case under Article III. The Court further held that the appellants' intervention and participation in the lawsuit as president and speaker did not entitle them to appeal as individual legislators. The Court rejected both theories that Karcher and Orechio offered in support of vacating the lower court's judgment and noted that the first argument appeared to be wrong as a matter of New Jersey State law and directly contrary to Karch and Orechio's representations to the district court. The Court also held that the loss of Karcher and Orechio's right to appeal from the appellate court's ruling did not render the case unreviewable, instead it was their successors' refusal to pursue the appeal that caused the judgment to become final.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed with the Court that Karcher and Orechio lost their authority to appeal on behalf of the New Jersey Legislature when they were no longer presiding officers of the General Assembly and Senate. Rather than hear this matter, Justice White argued that the Court should have reversed its prior order denying a motion by parents and school teachers to intervene as appellants before the Court. In his opinion, the parents and school teachers likely had standing to defend the law while the right of individual legislators to intervene in a non-representative capacity to defend legislation remained an open question, even after the Court's ruling in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53450:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53459:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53459:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, Robert Fulmer and Louis Molitoris — who have IQs of 67 and 60, respectively — were discovered working on the Kozminski dairy farm in Chelsea, Michigan. Ike Kozminski, his wife Margarethe, and his son John used the labor of Fulmer and Molitoris seven days a week, for approximately 17 hours a day since they brought the men to the farm. Margarethe picked up Fulmer from the side of road in 1967, and by doing so took him away from a farm where he previously worked. Ike Kozminski found Molitoris living on the streets in Ann Arbor in the early 1970s and brought him to the farm to work. At first, the men received $15 per day, and later they received no pay at all. Although both men were in their sixties, they had the mental capacity of children between 8 and 10 years old. The Kozminskis told Fulmer and Molitoris that they could not leave the farm, and on one occasion John Kozminski threatened Molitoris with institutionalization. They also failed to provide the men with adequate nutrition, housing, and medical care, and told them not to contact their families or any other outsiders.\nEventually, a herdsman who worked for the Kozminskis became concerned for the welfare of Fulmer and Molitoris and alerted the authorities. County officials removed the men, and the Kozminskis were tried in federal district court for holding Fulmer and Molitoris in involuntary servitude. Based on jury instructions that included forms of coercion other than purely physical, the jury found the Kozminskis guilty. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the convictions on the grounds that the District Court’s definition of involuntary servitude was too broad.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53459:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53459:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53459:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that precedent had established that the type of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment is limited to that “enforced by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion.” Involuntary servitude had never before been extended to cover labor compelled by the use of psychological coercion. The government’s use of a broader interpretation makes the criminal nature of the action dependent on the victim’s state of mind, which cannot always be foreseen. The mental state of the victim is only relevant in determining whether or not the physical or legal coercion was effective.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that the Court unnecessarily narrowed the definition of the involuntary servitude. He argued that there are many different methods of coercion that can all be equally effective in reducing the victim to a state of involuntary servitude. The proper understanding of the term is defined by the conditions of servitude that the Thirteenth Amendment was meant to eradicate: conditions similar to those of slaves before the Civil War. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in this concurring opinion.\nJustice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment. He argued that the attempt to define “involuntary servitude” based on hypothetical situations is irrelevant to the legal issues at hand. Rather, he found that the statute was written to be decided on a case-by-case basis. In this case, the defendants were rightfully convicted on the basis of jury instructions, but Justice Stevens agreed with the Court of Appeals finding that expert testimony was erroneously admitted. Therefore, he agreed with judgment of the Court that the case should be remanded. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53459:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53462:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53462:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing the death of US Marine helicopter pilot David A. Boyle, Delbert Boyle sued the helicopter's manufacturer (\"Sikorsky\") for defectively designing its copilot emergency escape hatch. On appeal from a state-law based jury verdict favoring Boyle, the Court of Appeals found that Sikorsky could not be held liable under Virginia tort law for any design flaws since it met the requirements of the \"military contractor defense.\" Boyle appealed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53462:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53462:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53462:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to4 decision, the Court held that despite the absence of specific legislation immunizing government contractors from liability for design flaws, questions of their liability are of unique federal concern. As such, to the extent that it holds military contractors liable for design flaws, state law may significantly conflict with federal interests thereby requiring its displacement. The Court added that in the instant case, such displacement is appropriate since the United States approved the helicopter's specifications, the equipment met those specifications, and Sikorsky warned the government of possible dangers in the helicopter's use. Finally, since the Court of Appeals' use of the \"military contractor defense\" failed to specify if a reasonable jury could have found for Boyle, the Court vacated its judgment and remanded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53462:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53465:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53465:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA federal grand jury subpoenaed Randy Braswell, president of Worldwide Machinery Sales Inc. and Worldwide Purchasing Inc., to produce the corporations’ books and records. Braswell refused to produce the documents, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The district court ruled against Braswell, holding that the “collective entity doctrine”, which treats corporations differently from individuals for Fifth Amendment purposes, applied. The court rejected Braswell’s argument that the doctrine does not apply where the corporation is so small that it is merely the individual’s alter ego. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53465:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53465:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53465:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion affirming. The Supreme Court held that corporations are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. An agent of the corporation holds the official records of the corporation in their representative, and not individual, capacity so the personal privilege is not applicable. Allowing corporations a privilege against self-incrimination would be detrimental to enforcement of government regulations and prosecution of white-collar crime.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53465:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53466:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53466:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Education of the Handicapped Act contains a provision, known as the \"stay-put\" provision, which provides that a handicapped child shall remain with his or her current educational placement pending completion of any review proceedings, unless the parents and state or local educational agencies agree to removal.\nJohn Doe was a student at the Louise Lombard School, a developmental center for disabled children. Doe had a disability which caused him considerable difficulty in controlling his impulses. On November 6, 1980, Doe was teased by a fellow student and responded by attacking the student and kicking out a school window. Doe was subsequently suspended pending expulsion proceedings. After unsuccessfully protesting the suspension by letter, Doe brought an action against school authorities under the Education of the Handicapped Act. Jack Smith was another handicapped student whose disability caused behavioral problems. Smith engaged in disruptive behavior and was eventually suspended indefinitely pending a hearing. Smith brought an action in district court essentially identical to the one brought by Doe. After learning of Doe's action Smith joined Doe's suit.\nThe handicapped students asked the district court to enter an order requiring the school to allow the students to return to their own schools. The district court granted the handicapped students' request and issued a permanent injunction, an order which prevented the school district from indefinitely suspending a student for disability-related misconduct. The school authorities appealed, and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. The school authorities appealed the appellate court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53466:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53466:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53466:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and Yes. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice William J. Brennan, held that since the Act covered individuals from ages 3 to 21, the claim of a 24-year-old who was no longer in school was moot, but that the claim of a 20-year-old was not moot. The Supreme Court further held that the \"stay-put\" provision of the Education of the Handicapped Act prohibited state or local school authorities from excluding disabled children from the classroom even for dangerous or disruptive conduct resulting from their disabilities. The Supreme Court thereby affirmed the lower court's opinion.\nChief Justice William H. Rehnquist concurred and wrote separately on the mootness issue. He agreed with the court's determination but emphasized that he would go further in relaxing the test of mootness, particularly when events giving rise to mootness occurred after certiorari was granted.\nJustice Antonin Scalia filed a dissent which Justice O'Connor joined. He stated that the controversy was moot because it was unlikely that the 20-year-old plaintiff would return to public school.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53466:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53467:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53467:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFor many years, Mark Erick Wheat allegedly participated in a far-flung marijuana distribution operation, acting mainly as an intermediary by receiving and storing shipments of marijuana in his home then distributing them around the region. Juvenal Gomez-Barajas and Javier Bravo were also allegedly involved in the operation. Attorney Eugene Iredale represented Gomez-Barajas and Bravo at trial. The trial court acquitted Gomez-Barajas on drug charges that overlapped with charges against Wheat, but Gomez-Barajas pleaded guilty to tax evasion and illegal importation of merchandise to avoid a second trial. At the beginning of Wheat’s trial, however, the court had not yet accepted Gomez-Barajas’ plea and he was free to withdraw it.\nOn August 22, 1985, Bravo pleaded guilty to one count of transporting 2,400 pounds of marijuana. Immediately after the proceedings, Iredale informed the court that Wheat contacted him to hire him as additional counsel; Gomez-Barajas and Bravo waived any objection. The United States expressed concern about the possibility of conflict arising from Iredale’s representation of both Iredale and Gomez-Barajas. The government pointed out that if Gomez-Barajas withdrew his plea, it was likely Wheat would be required to appear at his trial as a witness. In that event, Iredale would not be allowed to cross-examine Wheat. Further, it was possible that Bravo would be required to appear at Wheat’s trial as a witness as well.\nAlthough Wheat emphasized his right to his choice of counsel under the sixth amendment, the district court denied his motion for a substitution of counsel. Wheat was convicted of conspiracy to possess 1,000 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute and five counts of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. It held that the district court correctly balanced the sixth amendment’s rights to choice of counsel and to a defense by an attorney free of conflicts of interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53467:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53467:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53467:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that the possible conflict of interest was sufficient to justify denying Wheat’s motion to take on Iredale as his attorney. Justice Rehnquist noted that the Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel was limited in several ways; for example, a party could not hire a lawyer who had a previous or ongoing legal relationship with the opposing party. He also noted that the Court previously recognized that the representation of multiple defendants by the same lawyer created special dangers of conflict of interest, although it was not a per se constitutional violation.\nAlthough Wheat insisted that the waivers by all defendants cured any problems from multiple representations, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the federal courts had an independent interest in fair and ethical criminal trials. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that courts had the latitude to decline defendants’ waivers where the potential for a conflict of interest existed. Here, the persons Iredale wished to represent were allegedly three conspirators at various levels in a complex drug distribution operation, and there remained a possibility that either Bravo or Gomez-Barajas could be a witness at Wheat’s trial. Thus, Justice Rehnquist held that rejecting Wheat’s motion was within the district court’s discretion.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He argued that the majority granted unwarranted deference to the district court’s discretion, and that the potential for a conflict of interest in the case did not outweigh Wheat’s Sixth Amendment right to his choice of counsel.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Harry Blackmun. He emphasized that Wheat’s prior counsel planned to remain available to assist with his defense. Hence, the question was actually whether Wheat had the right to the additional counsel of his choice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53467:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53468:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53468:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe United States Forest Service was considering building a paved roadway that would cut through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. It was also considering timber harvesting in the area. A study commissioned by the Forest Service reported that harvesting the Chimney Rock area would irreparably damage grounds that had historically been used by Native Americans to conduct religious rituals. After the Forest Service decided to construct a road, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association took action against Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53468:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53468:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53468:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Forest Service was free to harvest the lands. Though the government's actions would have severe adverse effects on the Indians' practice oftheir religion, those effects were only incidental and did not constitute an attempt to coerce Native Americans to act in violation of their beliefs. The Court reasoned that government could not operate \"if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires,\" and that the First Amendment did not give any one group veto power over public programs that did not actually prohibit the free exercise of religion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53468:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53482:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53482:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlfred Smith and Galen Black worked at a private drug rehabilitation clinic. The clinic fired them because they used a hallucinogenic drug called peyote for religious purposes while worshipping at their Native American Church. The Oregon Employment Division denied them unemployment compensation because it deemed they were fired for work-related \"misconduct.\" The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that this violated their religious free exercise rights provided by the First Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53482:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53482:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53482:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUndecided. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for a 5-3 court. The Court instructed the Oregon Supreme Court to determine whether peyote usage for religious purposes is prohibited under Oregon law, or only by the employer. The Court required this information to consider the constitutionality of the denial of benefits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53482:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53486:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53486:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Coy was tried in an Iowa court for sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls. When the girls were testifying against Coy, the court placed a large screen in front of him so that the girls would not have to see him. The jury proceeded to convict him. Coy argued that Iowa Code 910A, which provides for the use of a screen in child sexual abuse cases, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers face-to-face. He also claimed that the code violated his right to due process, since having a screen placed between him and the girls made him appear guilty before he was properly tried. The trial court dismissed these claims and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53486:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53486:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53486:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of a 6-2 court. The Sixth Amendment explicitly states that the accused has the right \"to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\" The Court maintained this \"confrontation is essential to fairness.\" The screen clearly disrupted this confrontation in a way that could have biased the trial. While acknowledging that \"face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child,\" the Court insisted that \"by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult.\" A trial court cannot abridge the right to confrontation using a generalized law, and in Coy's case no specific reason was given for using a screen.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53486:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53488:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53488:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Doe, an unnamed defendant, was subpoenaed by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for possible fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. As part of the grand jury’s investigation, Doe was directed to produce records from bank holdings in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe proceeded to disclose some records but invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination regarding any other documents.\nThe United States then served subpoenas on three of Doe’s foreign banks, ordering them to release Doe’s information. The banks refused to release this information without Doe’s consent. The government then sought to have the district court order Doe to sign the bank forms authorizing his banks to release the information.\nThe district court refused, stating that Doe had not been indicted for any crime and that forcing him to disclose this information would amount to a “fishing expedition” for incriminating evidence; precisely the kind of action that the 5th Amendment sought to prevent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered that Doe be held in contempt if he did not consent to the release of records. Doe refused and appealed. The Fifth Circuit again affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53488:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53488:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53488:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for an 8-1 majority, held that such a court order does not implicate the Fifth Amendment. First, he noted that it is undisputed that the contents of foreign bank accounts are not privileged under the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment only protects individuals from being incriminated by their “own compelled testimonial communications.” The foreign bank statements, and the requisite authorization document, do not fit into this definition.\nThe Court made further analogies to situations where a defendant may be required to give “incriminating” information without invoking the Fifth Amendment. These include: blood samples, lineups, handwriting samples, voice samples, or wearing particular clothing. Finally, the authorization in this case did not list specific information that the government needed for the case. Rather, this authorization simply gave the government the ability to search for the evidence without providing any information on any accounts, documents, banks, or other incriminating evidence.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, made an argument distinguishing this situation from the other situations discussed by the Court. Unlike lineups, fingerprints, or blood samples, this case forced the defendant to use his mind in assisting the government’s case. Therefore, Justice Stevens felt that this action violated the Fifth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53488:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53495:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53495:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt the age of 15 years Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Thompson certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53495:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53495:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53495:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. After noting that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against \"cruel and unusual punishments\" applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the execution of a person under the age of 16 was unconstitutional. In noting the uniform ban among all relevant state statutes against the execution of one under the age of 16, the Court explained that such an act would violate the \"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.\" The case was reversed and remanded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53495:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53496:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53496:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a special court and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an \"independent counsel\" to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53496:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53496:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53496:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court addressed a number of constitutional issues in this case and upheld the law. The near-unanimous Court held that the means of selecting the independent counsel did not violate the Appointments Clause; the powers allocated to the special court did not violate Article III; and the Act was not offensive to the separation of powers doctrine since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the Executive Branch.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53496:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53497:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53497:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAbortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. and a collection of tax-paying and tax-exempt abortion rights supporters (ARM) sued the Secretary of the Treasury, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the United States Catholic Conference, and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (Conferences). ARM alleged that the Conferences participated in political activities in violation of U.S. laws governing tax-exempt organizations and that this participation created an unfair advantage over other, rule-abiding tax-exempt groups and infringed upon the plaintiffs’ ability to participate in the political process as voters. After the court granted the Conferences motion to be dismissed as parties to the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ARM sought financial documents and other information from the Conferences to support their claims against the remaining defendants. When the Conferences refused to comply, the district court held them in civil contempt. On appeal, the Conferences contended that ARM lacked standing to bring its case against the government officials and, therefore, the court did not have the power to issue the contempt citation under Article III. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed and held that witnesses may challenge a contempt citation only on the grounds that the issuing court lacked jurisdiction to hear the underlying dispute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53497:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53497:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53497:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority in which the Court reversed and remanded the appellate court’s ruling. The Court held that a nonparty witness may challenge the court’s jurisdiction over the underlying lawsuit in defense of a civil contempt citation. The Second Circuit’s jurisdiction standard impermissibly expanded the reach of judicial power because it permitted a court to act in issues without an actual case or controversy, as required by Article III of the Constitution. The Court also held that, because the judiciary may impose sanctions for the abuse of court processes, restricting a nonparty’s right to appeal a civil contempt citation is unnecessary.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that he agreed with the Second Circuit’s concern that allowing a witness to raise subject matter jurisdiction challenges while appealing a contempt citation invited collusion with defendants who, unlike witnesses, lack a right to appeal interlocutory orders prior to a final judgment in the action. allowing a witness to raise subject matter jurisdiction challenges while appealing a contempt citation invited collusion with defendants who, unlike witnesses, lack a right to appeal interlocutory orders prior to a final judgment in the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53497:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53506:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53506:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1980 Congress enacted a continuing disability review (CDR) process to ensure that the only people who were receiving disability benefits under the Social Security Disability Act (Act) were those who had medical conditions sufficient to warrant such benefits. This program led to a massive increase in the number of people who were denied continuance of their benefits. The respondents were three of those people who, in addition to pursuing remedies through the uniform appeal process, sued three high-ranking administrators of the CDR process in district court. The respondents argued that the government violated their Fifth Amendment rights to due process by adopting illegal polices that led to the wrongful termination of their benefits. Despite the Act’s explicit provision of a means for remedy, the respondents sought monetary damages for their emotional distress and loss of food. The district court dismissed the case and held that the government officials were protected from paying monetary damages by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that there might be enough facts to prove a violation of due process warranting monetary damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53506:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53506:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53506:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the respondents were not entitled to monetary damages because they were not mentioned in the extensive remedial options provided in the Social Security Disability Act (Act). The Court rejected the respondents’ argument that this case was analogous to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, a case in which the Court ruled that, when a government actor violates a citizen’s legal right, federal courts may use any available remedy to make the wronged party whole. In Bivens there were no special circumstances preventing monetary damages, and Congress provided no legal redress in the statute. In this case, the Act provides an extensive remedial program in which Congress carefully considered the possibilities for remedy and specifically left out monetary damages.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in which he disagreed with the majority opinion’s decision to ignore the Solicitor General’s argument that Congress had enacted a statute expressly requiring dismissal of this complaint.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that Congressional silence on the monetary damages issue does not mean that the explicitly stated remedial process was intended to be the only source of remedy. He argued that legislators of “normal sensibilities” would have wanted some form of remedy for citizens wronged to the extent that respondents were. Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53506:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53508:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53508:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLocal police suspected Billy Greenwood was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags Greenwood had left at the curb for pickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53508:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53508:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53508:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nVoting 6 to 2, the Court held that garbage placed at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court argued that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on public streets \"readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.\" The Court also noted that the police cannot be expected to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by \"any member of the public.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53508:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53512:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53512:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Adolescent Family Life Act (\"AFLA\") provided federal funding for organizational services and research in the area of premarital teenage sexuality. Among other requirements, AFLA beneficiaries had to involve religious and governmental agencies in dealing with the problems they faced. Over time, AFLA benefited several organizations with institutional ties to religious denominations. Chan Kendrick, on behalf of several federal taxpayers, clergymen, and the American Jewish Congress, challenged AFLA's constitutionality. On appeal from a ruling favoring Kendrick, the Supreme Court granted Bowen certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53512:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53512:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53512:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the \"advancement of religion\" was not AFLA's primary effect. Although it funded religious and other institutions without expressly prohibiting the use of such funds for religious purposes, AFLA required potential recipients to reveal what services they intended to provide and how they would provide them. Thus, the government could protect against the misuse of its funds. At the same time, however, such oversight did not create an \"excessive entanglement\" between church and state because AFLA merely authorized funding of religiously affiliated, rather than pervasively sectarian, organizations. Finally, the Court remanded the matter to the district court for further determination of whether AFLA violated the establishment clause \"as applied.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53512:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53513:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53513:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe City of New York amended its Human Rights Law prohibiting discrimination in public places to include certain social clubs that were not \"distinctly private.\" Particularly, the amendment applied anti-discrimination laws to social clubs and institutions that hosted dining regularly, retained more than four hundred members, and received funding from non-members in order to promote business interests. The amendment did not apply to religious, charitable, and education organizations because the city deemed that they were not centers of business activity. The New York State Club Association, a group of 125 clubs, contended in a state trial court that the new law violated its associational rights provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court ruled in favor of the city. A state appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed, finding that the city's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination justified the restrictions on associational rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53513:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53513:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53513:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court examined the clubs subjected to anti-discrimination laws closely and found \"no evidence of any club, let alone a substantial number of clubs, for whom the Law impairs the ability to associate or to advocate public or private viewpoints.\" In addition, many of the clubs showed characteristics of a public nature. Often strangers attended club functions, partook in meals, and made financial contributions. So long as the clubs were sufficiently open to this type of exposure to outsiders, the clubs could not be closed to certain types of people on account of their race, sex, or religion. Prohibiting this type of discrimination did not impair a club's ability to advance a viewpoint because clubs could still select people for membership based on whether they shared similar beliefs.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53513:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53517:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53517:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe state of Texas offered a tax exemption to religious publications during a 3-year period. Texas Monthly, Inc, a nonreligious publisher, claimed that this promoted religion in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Texas Monthly filed suit in a state court seeking to recover the taxes it had paid in 1985. The court ruled that the exemption violated the Establishment Clause by advancing religion and the Free Press Clause by discriminating based on the content of publications. Since the court did not have the authority to rewrite tax statutes, it instead invalidated taxes levied on nonreligious publications and ordered the state to refund Texas Monthly's tax payments. A state appeals court reversed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53517:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53517:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53517:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the judgment for 6-3 court a wrote a plurality opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Thurgood Marshall. In the Brennan's view, the Texas government \"directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations\" by providing the exemption. The Court referred to its decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which required legislation affecting religion to have a secular purpose. In this case, the exemption did not have a secular purpose since it could not \"reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion.\" Since taxing religious publications did not inhibit the exercise of religion, a state could not singularly remove taxes for religious publications while still taxing nonreligious publications. This would use state mechanisms to give religious publishers an advantage over nonreligious publishers in violation of the Establishment Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53517:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53519:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53519:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMajor Gerald E. Mansell and Gaye M. Mansell were married for 23 years until their marriage ended in 1979. Major Mansell received both Air Force retirement pay and, pursuant to a portion of that pay, disability benefits. Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, military retirement payments were considered community property that were to be divided evenly between the spouses based on the extent of military service performed during the marriage. Major Mansell asked the California Superior Court to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision asking him to share his retirement pay. That court denied the request without opinion. Major Mansell appealed and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review and Major Mansell appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53519:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53519:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53519:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court reversed the judgement and held that the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act exempted that portion of the retirement pay that a service member waived in order to receive disability benefits from the amount divisible upon divorce. While recognizing potential inequities to former spouses, the Court reasoned that the clear language of the statute could not be ignored.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53519:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53520:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53520:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPenry, a man with the mental age of barely seven years, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the trial's proceedings, the jury was not instructed that it could consider the mitigating circumstances of Penry's intellectual disability in imposing its sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53520:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53520:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53520:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court partially affirmed and partially reversed the lower court's decision. Justice O'Connor argued that the jury was improperly instructed and should have been told that it could have considered Penry's mental deficiencies when imposing its sentence. However, she rejected Penry's blanket claim that generally the Eighth Amendment does not allow death sentences for defendants who are intellectually disabled (\"retarded\" in the Court's words).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53520:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53521:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53521:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986, the United States Customs Service implemented a drug testing program for certain employees who either carry firearms, are involved in intercepting drugs as they enter the country, or are in high level positions involving classified information.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53521:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53521:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53521:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the \"substantial interests\" of the government in stifling the drug trade justified \"departure from the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements\" associated with searches. The fact that customs personnel are the country's \"first line of defense\" against drug smugglers and they are exposed to a sometimes aggressive criminal element, places them in a unique and important position in which they have a \"diminished expectation of privacy.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53521:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53525:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53525:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1976, Bonito Boats, Inc. (Bonito), a Florida corporation, developed a design for a fiberglass recreational boat and made a model to produce the finished fiberglass boats for sale. No patent application was ever filed for protection. In 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a statute making it unlawful to use a direct modeling process to duplicate and sell a vessel or part of a vessel. In 1984, Bonito sued Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (Thunder Craft), a Tennessee corporation, in the Florida district court for violating the statute. Thunder Craft successfully argued that the Florida statute conflicted with federal patent laws and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Eleventh Amendment. The Florida Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Florida law interfered with federal patent laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53525:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53525:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53525:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held that, under the Federal Constitution’s Supremacy Clause of the Eleventh Amendment, the federal patent system prevents the Florida statute. The Florida statute offered patent-like protection for ideas deemed unprotected under the federal patent system. This protection restricted the public’s ability to use unpatented designs, which conflicted with the free competition in ideas without patent protection that the federal patent system supported. Therefore, this Florida statute entered into a field of regulation that the patent laws have reserved for Congress, and Congress had declined to exercise.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53525:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53529:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53529:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCBS requested the criminal identification records of Charles Medico from the FBI. When the FBI refused the request, a CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) challenged the denial as a violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). RCFP claimed that since Medico was an identified organized crime figure with corrupt ties to a United States Congressman, Medico's criminal record was a matter of \"public record\" and \"interest.\" On appeal from an unfavorable appellate decision, the Supreme Court granted the U.S. Department of Justice certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53529:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53529:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53529:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that an individual's interest in nondisclosure of any criminal records that the FBI might have on him or her is precisely the sort of \"personal privacy\" that Congress intended to protect when it enacted FOIA exemptions. Balancing public knowledge interests against privacy considerations, the Court explained that RCFP's request was overly broad. The request sought access to all FBI records on Medico, rather than specific information concerning his file. Moreover, the Court stated that public interest in criminal record information is not increased simply because the requesting party is a news agency.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53529:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53532:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53532:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 23, 1984, William James Caldwell died when the stolen car he was driving crashed into a police roadblock. He had been driving at high speeds in an effort to elude the police. The police placed an 18-wheel truck across both lanes of a highway and behind a blind curve so that Caldwell could not see it as he approached.\nAfter Caldwell’s death, his heirs—including Georgia Brower, the administrator of his estate—sued the police in district court and alleged that such a roadblock constituted excessive force and violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53532:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53532:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53532:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the police intentionally acquire physical control of a person or possessions. In this case, the violation occurred because Caldwell clearly intended to continue driving, and the police actions intended to forcibly stop his car.\nJustice John Paul Stevens concurred in judgment. He argued that the majority’s opinion established a test for Fourth Amendment violations based on police intent. However, since not every Fourth Amendment violation is intentional, this test could not be used to decide all Fourth Amendment cases. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53532:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53537:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53537:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that \"[t]he life of each human being begins at conception,\" and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53537:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53537:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53537:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a controversial and highly fractured decision, the Court held that none of the challenged provisions of the Missouri legislation were unconstitutional. First, the Court held that the preamble had not been applied in any concrete manner for the purposes of restricting abortions, and thus did not present a constitutional question. Second, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not require states to enter into the business of abortion, and did not create an affirmative right to governmental aid in the pursuit of constitutional rights. Third, the Court found that no case or controversy existed in relation to the counseling provisions of the law. Finally, the Court upheld the viability testing requirements, arguing that the State's interest in protecting potential life could come into existence before the point of viability. The Court emphasized that it was not revisiting the essential portions of the holding in Roe v. Wade.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53537:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53541:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53541:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRecognizing the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse by railroad employees, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) implemented regulations requiring mandatory blood and urine tests of employees involved in certain train accidents. Other FRA rules allowed railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53541:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53541:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53541:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the government's interest in assuring safety on the nation's railroads constituted a \"special need\" which justified a departure from standard warrant and probable-cause requirements in searches. Preventing accidents, the goal of most railroad regulations including the one in this case, argued Justice Kennedy, was such a significant concern that it warranted reduced \"expectations of privacy\" for railroad employees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53541:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53542:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53542:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen first questioned by police about the stabbing of a woman, suspect Gary Eagan did not make incriminating statements after signing a waiver and being told he would be provided a lawyer \"if and when you go to court.\" The following day, after Eagan was questioned again and signed a different waiver, he confessed to the stabbing and revealed physical evidence of the crime. Eagan later claimed that the language of the first waiver made his confession inadmissible.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53542:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53542:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53542:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a closely divided decision, the Court held that informing Eagan that an attorney would be appointed for him \"if and when you go to court\" did not render the Miranda warnings inadequate. The Court reasoned that officers did not have to use the specific language of the Miranda decision so long as they reasonably conveyed to suspects their constitutional rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the instructions given to Eagan accurately described the procedure for the appointment of counsel in Indiana.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53542:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53546:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53546:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1988, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to ban indecent and obscene interstate commercial phone messages. Sable Communications had been in the dial-a-porn business since 1983. A judge in District Court upheld the ban on obscene messages, but enjoined the Act's enforcement against indecent ones.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53546:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53546:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53546:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court upheld the District Court's ruling. Since the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech, as the Court found in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton (1973), the ban on obscene speech was legitimate. However, sexual expression that is simply indecent is protected. Thus, banning adult access to indecent messages \"far exceeds that which is necessary\" to shield minors from dial-a-porn services.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53546:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53547:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53547:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) made an oral agreement with James Reid, a sculptor, to produce a statue depicting the plight of the homeless for display at a 1985 Washington D.C. Christmas pageant. Upon completion, delivery, and joining of the work to a base that it prepared separately, CCNV paid Reid the final installment of the agreed-upon price. Shortly thereafter, the parties filed competing copyright claims over the sculpture. Holding, in accordance with the Copyright Act of 1976 (the \"Act\"), that the statue was a \"work made for hire,\" a district court ruled in favor of CCNV. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted CCNV certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53547:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53547:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53547:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the statue's preparation was not a \"work for hire\" as defined by the Act because Reid was not a CCNV employee. Instead, CCNV hired Reid as an independent contractor. Reid's independent status was evident because he supplied his own tools, worked in his own studio in another city, was retained for less than two months, decided his own work schedule, received salary that was contingent on the sculpture's completion, and had sole discretion over hiring and paying assistants. Moreover, CCNV did not pay social security taxes for Reid nor did it provide him any employee benefits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53547:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53554:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53554:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAs a result of a lawsuit in 1974, the Jefferson County Personnel Board in Birmingham, Alabama, entered into consent decrees that included hiring blacks as firefighters and for promoting them. The decrees were approved by a federal district court. Years later, Robert K. Wilks, a white firefighter, challenged the decrees and alleged that whites were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks. Wilks argued that such practices violated Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The personnel board agreed that it was making race-conscious decisions but argued it was doing so pursuant to the original decrees. The Court combined arguments in two companion cases: Personnel Board v. Wilks and Arrington v. Wilks.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53554:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53554:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53554:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that because \"a person cannot be deprived of his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a party,\" the white firefighters were not precluded from challenging employment decisions taken pursuant to the consent decrees. The Court argued that \"[t]he parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else the nature and scope of relief sought in the action\" and that they were better suited to intervene when their rights were immediately threatened. Conversely, the Court noted that \"[n]o one can seriously contend that an employer might successfully defend against a Title VII claim by one group of employees on the ground that its actions were required by an earlier decree entered in a suit brought against it by another, if the later group did not have adequate notice or knowledge of the earlier suit.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53554:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53566:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53566:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA) challenged the flat tax portion of Arkansas' Highway Use Equalization (HUE) tax, alleging that it violated the Commerce Clause. The Arkansas Supreme Court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, rejected this claim. Subsequently, on June 23, 1987, the Supreme Court decided American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), which held that state application of flat highway use taxes was unconstitutional. Pending re-hearing in the Arkansas Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun ordered, in August 1987, that all new taxes collected be kept in escrow. Subsequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that HUE was unconstitutional, but that Scheiner did not apply retroactively. The court went on to decide that taxes already collected for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, could remain in the state treasury, but that those funds placed in the escrow account ordered by Justice Blackmun should be refunded, as they had not been spent or budgeted for future spending.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53566:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53566:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53566:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. A plurality of the Court held that Scheiner did not apply retroactively, and that state collection of taxes for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, before the establishment of the escrow account, was unconstitutional. Applying the test of non-retroactivity articulated in Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Court found that Scheiner clearly established a new principle of law; that the purpose of the Commerce Clause did not support retroactive application; and that equitable considerations weighed heavily against retroactivity. The Court went on to reverse the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision not to refund taxes already collected for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, reasoning that the conduct to which Scheiner applied prospectively was the use of the highway, not the payment of money therefor. Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but disagreed with the plurality's retroactivity analysis. He found that the only reason to follow Scheiner, which he believed to be wrongly decided, was the doctrine of stare decisis, which only applies prospectively.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53566:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53580:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53580:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTom Okure was arrested for disorderly conduct, and while under arrest, was beaten by the police officers Javan Owens and Daniel Lessard. He sustained multiple injuries, including broken teeth and a sprained finger, and claimed to have suffered great mental anguish and distress as a result of the arrest and actions of the police. Twenty-two months after the incident occurred, Okure sued the two State University of New York (SUNY) police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the statute of limitations for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution is one year under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The trial court denied the motion by stating that New York's general statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53580:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53580:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53580:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion for unanimous majority. The Court held that, when states have multiple statutes of limitations for intentional torts, the courts should use the state’s general statute of limitations for claims of liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 instead of the statute of limitations for individual civil actions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53580:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53588:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53588:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIrwin Halper, the manager of a company that provided medical services to patients eligible for Medicare benefits, was charged and convicted in criminal court of submitting 65 separate false Medicare claims. He was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000.\nThe United States then brought additional civil charges under the False Claims Act, which authorized it to collect $2000 for each offense in addition to attorney's fees and twice the damages sustained. In this case the actual damages were just $585, but because of the number of offenses the total penalty was more than $130,000. The District Court, however, ruled that the penalty was \"entirely unrelated\" to the government's actual damages and would therefore be a second punishment for the same offense, violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The penalty was therefore limited to double the amount of actual damages and attorney's fees. The government appealed the decision directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53588:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53588:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53588:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Harry Blackmun, on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court, wrote that while previous cases had held penalties under the Act to be civil in nature, that did not foreclose the possibility of the penalty being so extreme and so unrelated to the actual damages as to constitute \"punishment.\" Because Halper had already been jailed and fined, additional punishment in a separate proceeding would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court remanded the case to the District Court so that the government could challenge the original assessment of its attorney's fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53588:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53589:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53589:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOfficers of the Canton Police Department arrested Geraldine Harris on April 26, 1978 and brought her to the police station. Upon arrival, the officers found Harris sitting on the floor of the patrol wagon. They asked if she needed medical attention, and she responded incoherently. Inside the station, Harris twice slumped to the floor, and the officers eventually left her lying on the floor. She received no medical care. An hour later, Harris was released and taken to a nearby hospital in an ambulance her family provided. Harris was diagnosed with various emotional conditions and hospitalized.\nHarris sued the city of Canton for violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process by denying her medical attention when she was in police custody. At the jury trial in federal district court, evidence indicated that the decision to provide medical attention is left to the discretion of shift managers who had not received adequate training on this subject. The jury found in favor of Harris. The city appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case because of unclear jury instructions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53589:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53589:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53589:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White wrote the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that municipalities may be liable for inadequate training of employees, but only when “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of the people with whom the employees will interact. A municipality is then only liable when the failure to train is a deliberate choice on the part of the city.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. makes clear that the Court of Appeals may remand the case for a new trial.\nIn an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agreed with the majority’s holding regarding the municipality’s liability for a conscious failure to train. However, she argued that it was unnecessary to remand the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court should simply apply the “deliberate indifference” standard to the facts of the case. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in Justice O’Connor’s opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53589:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53592:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53592:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 12, 1984, Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, had an insulin reaction while doing auto work at his home. He asked a friend, William Berry, to drive him to a convenience store in order to purchase some orange juice to counter his reaction. When they arrived at the store, Graham rapidly left the car. He entered the store and saw a line of four or five persons at the counter; not wanting to wait in line, he quickly left the store and returned to Berry’s car. Officer M.S. Connor, a Charlotte police officer, observed Graham entering and exiting the store unusually quickly. He followed the car and pulled it over about a half mile away.\nGraham, still suffering from an insulin reaction, exited the car and ran around it twice. Berry and Officer Connor stopped Graham, and he sat down on the curb. He soon passed out; when he revived he was handcuffed and lying face down on the sidewalk. Several more police officers were present by this time. The officers picked up Graham, still handcuffed, and placed him over the hood of Berry’s car. Graham attempted to reach for his wallet to show his diabetic identification, and an officer shoved his head down into the hood and told him to shut up. The police then struggled to place Graham in the squad car over Graham’s vigorous resistance. Officer Connor soon determined, however, that Graham had not committed a crime at the convenience store, and returned him to his home. Graham sustained multiple injuries, including a broken foot, as a result of the incident.\nGraham filed § 1983 charges against Connor, other officers, and the City of Charlotte, alleging a violation of his rights by the excessive use of force by the police officers, unlawful assault, unlawful restraint constituting false imprisonment, and that the City of Charlotte improperly trained its officers in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The City of Charlotte filed for a directed verdict, which the district court granted. Graham appealed the ruling on the use of excessive force, contending that the district court incorrectly applied a four-part substantive due process test from Johnson v. Glick that takes into account officers’ “good faith” efforts and whether they acted “maliciously or sadistically”. He instead argued for a standard of “objective reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, rejected this argument, reasoning that concepts such as \"good faith\" are relevant to determining the degree of force used. It affirmed the directed verdict, holding that a reasonable jury could not have found in Graham’s favor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53592:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53592:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53592:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. In a unanimous ruling written by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that claims of excessive force used by government officials are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. The Court vacated the directed verdict and remanded the case to the district court to be decided by that standard.\nRehnquist noted that § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but rather a means for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Rather, the Fourth Amendment stands as one of the two primary sources of protection against physically abusive government conduct, along with the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the validity of Graham’s claim must be judged by reference to the specific rights conferred by the Fourth Amendment, not by a generalized “excessive force” standard.\nJustice Rehnquist rejected Connor’s argument that “malicious and sadistic” is merely another way of describing conduct that is objectively unreasonable, noting that the subjective motivations of the officers are relevant under the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth. Rather, he explained that the “objective reasonableness” of a use of force should be judged by the perspective of an officer on the scene, and should take into account factors such as the severity of the crime, the threat posed by the suspect, and any attempts by the suspect to resist or evade arrest.\nJustices Harry Blackmun, William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall concurred, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun. Justice Blackmun argued that there was not sufficient precedent to hold that claims of use of excessive force will never be subject to Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53592:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53597:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53597:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, the Chase & Sanborn Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida made Paul Nordberg the trustee in bankruptcy. In 1985, Nordberg sued Granfinanciera, S.A. and Medex, Ltda. in district court. Nordberg alleged that they received $1.7 million in fraudulent transfers from Chase & Sanborn’s corporate predecessor a year before the bankruptcy filing. The district court referred the proceedings to bankruptcy court. Five months later, after the Colombian government nationalized Granfinanciera, Granfinanciera and Medex requested a jury trial. The bankruptcy court denied the request because fraudulent transfers were a non-jury issue under English common law. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court dismissed the actual fraud claim but found in favor of Nordberg on the constructive fraud claim in the amount of $1,500,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The district court affirmed the decision.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that Granfinanciera and Medex did not have a statutory right to a jury trial, nor did they have a right under the Seventh Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53597:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53597:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53597:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Seventh Amendment protected the right to a trial by jury in all cases in which a legal right, as opposed to an equitable right, was at issue. Since this case deals with the recovery of money, it is purely a legal issue. Under English common law, such a case would have received a jury trial as well. The Court also held that Congress may only legislate away the right to a trial by jury in cases where “public rights” are litigated. The Court declined to address Nordberg’s argument that Granfinanciera was barred from a jury trial because it was an agent of the Colombian government since the issue was not addressed in the lower courts, and this was not an exceptional case where the Court could overlook the lack of lower court discussion.\nJustice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He argued that “public rights” can only refer to situations where the government is involved. Because previous Supreme Court decisions had linked the idea of public rights with a waiver of sovereign immunity, which is only available to the government, public rights can only be at issue when the government is involved.\nIn his dissent, Justice Byron R. White argued that the majority’s opinion inappropriately overrules a previous decision that Congress can establish an alternative adjudication to a jury trial in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Seventh Amendment does not apply to all federal proceedings, specifically bankruptcy, which Congress has assigned to specialized courts. He also argued that there was no evidence to suggest such a case would have received a jury trial rather than a chancery trial according to English common law.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun dissented and argued that Congress has the right to establish alternative adjudication procedures in certain cases. Since a bankruptcy trial often requires expert knowledge, a jury might be detrimental to the proceedings, and therefore Congress had every right to fashion a modern bankruptcy system. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53597:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53599:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53599:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnn Hopkins worked at Price Waterhouse for five years before being proposed for partnership. Although Hopkins secured a $25 million government contract that year, the board decided to put her proposal on hold for the following year. The next year, when Price Waterhouse refused to re-propose her for partnership, she sued under Title VII for sex discrimination. Of 622 partners at Price Waterhouse, 7 were women. The partnership selection process relied on recommendations by other partners, some of whom openly opposed women in advanced positions, but Hopkins also had problems with being overly aggressive and not getting along with office staff.\nThe district court held that Price Waterhouse had discriminated, but Hopkins was not entitled to full damages because her poor interpersonal skills also contributed to the board’s decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but held that the employer is not liable if it can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53599:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53599:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53599:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes in part. In a 6-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the plurality opinion reversing the lower court and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals applied the right test, but should have placed the burden at “preponderance of the evidence” not “clear and convincing evidence”. On remand, Price Waterhouse would escape liability if it shows it would have denied Hopkins partnership even if she were not a woman.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a concurrence, stating that there was no requirement for the employer to submit objective evidence. The employer’s credible testimony alone was enough. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a concurrence, expressing that the Court’s opinion was only a supplement to McDonnell Douglas.\nJustice Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissent, stating that he would stick with the evidentiary standards from McDonnell Douglas. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53599:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53600:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53600:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Massachusetts) sued Richard N. Morash, the president of the Yankee Bank for Finance and Savings (Bank). Massachusetts alleged that, by failing to compensate two terminated employees for vacation time they accrued but did not use, Morash violated the Massachusetts Payment of Wages Statute (Statute). Massachusetts alleged the statute was pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). ERISA requires an employer to pay a discharged employee his full wages, including holiday or vacation payments, on date of discharge. The trial judge certified the preemption question to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case to its docket on its own initiative and held that the policy constituted an employee welfare benefit plan and that the statute was pre-empted by ERISA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53600:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53600:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53600:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court which held that a policy of paying discharged employees for their unused vacation time does not constitute an employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, and that ERISA’s provisions do not foreclose a criminal action to enforce that policy. The employment welfare benefit plan is not meant to relate to ordinary vacation pay, but rather to include vacation benefit funds that accumulate over a period of time. The bank payment is not an employee welfare benefit plan just because the employees did not use their vacation days prior to their termination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53600:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53604:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53604:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53604:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53604:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53604:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that \"[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53604:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53607:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53607:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1984, four-year-old Joshua DeShaney became comatose and then profoundly retarded due to traumatic head injuries inflicted by his father who physically beat him over a long period of time. The Winnebago County Department of Social Services took various steps to protect the child after receiving numerous complaints of the abuse; however, the Department did not act to remove Joshua from his father's custody. Joshua DeShaney's mother subsequently sued the Winnebago County Department of Social Services, alleging that the Department had deprived the child of his \"liberty interest in bodily integrity, in violation of his rights under the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, by failing to intervene to protect him against his father's violence.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53607:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53607:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53607:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Due Process Clause does not impose a special duty on the State to provide services to the public for protection against private actors if the State did not create those harms. \"The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security; while it forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, its language cannot fairly be read to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53607:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53608:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53608:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn February 20, 1987, Consolidated Rail Corporation (\"Conrail\") announced its decision to include drug screening in all periodic and return-to-duty examinations. Conrail had always enforced Rule G of its agreement with its unionized employees, which forbids the use or possession of \"intoxicants, narcotics, amphetamines or hallucinogens\" by its employees. Previously, it routinely used drug screening urinalysis as part of return-to-duty medical examinations of employees with drug-related problems and in other examinations where the examining physician suspected drug use.\nThe Railway Labor Executives' Association (\"RLEA\")-- comprised of individuals in leadership positions at more than eighteen craft unions-- filed suit against Conrail, alleging that Conrail violated Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act (\"RLA\"). The RLA, passed in 1926 and amended in 1934, created the National Railroad Adjustment Board, an arbitration board designed to settle minor disputes between railroad companies and labor organizations. Under Sections 5 and 6 of the RLA, major disputes require an extensive mediation and conciliation process.\nDistrict court Judge Anthony J. Scirica found that the dispute was \"minor\" under the Railway Labor Act because Conrail's decision was arguably justified by the terms of its agreement with the unions, and that the court had no jurisdiction over the dispute. Judge Dolores Sloviter of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit reversed. Judge Sloviter rejected the district court's conclusion that Conrail's prior use of medical examinations arguably justified unilaterally changing its drug testing policy. The appeals court held that the dispute was \"major\" because it changed the terms and conditions governing employment relationships.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53608:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53608:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53608:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Writing for the majority, Justice Harry Blackmun held that if Conrail asserts that its agreement with the unions gives Conrail the discretion to change their drug testing policy –assuming that claim is arguably justified by the terms of the agreement-- Conrail may make that change and the courts must defer to the decision of the RLA's arbitration board. Conrail's claim of a right to unilaterally change its drug policy –although based on implied terms of its contract with the RLEA—was not \"frivolous or obviously insubstantial.\" Conrail does not have to wait until the arbitration board makes a decision to change its drug testing policy. The court believed this decision would diminish the risk of interruptions to commerce caused by labor disputes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53608:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53609:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53609:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam A. Frazee was laid off from his job with the state of Illinois. Kelly Services, a temp agency, offered him a job at a department store working Wednesday through Sunday. Frazee “as a Christian” refused to work Sundays. The store did not give Frazee the job. Frazee did not claim that he was part of a particular religious sect or church or that working on Sundays violated a tenant of an established religious body. When Frazee applied for unemployment benefits, the Illinois Department of Employment Security denied his claim because he turned down a job offer. The Circuit Court of the 10th Judicial Circuit of Illinois affirmed. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the free exercise clause does not require accommodations for “personal professed religious belief[s]”.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53609:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53609:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53609:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the lower court and remanded. The Supreme Court held that denying Frazee unemployment benefits violated the free exercise clause. The state had no interest compelling enough to override an individual's exercise of sincerely-held religious beliefs, even though they were not part of an established religious sect.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53609:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53611:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53611:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Riley lived in a mobile home situated on five acres of rural land in Florida. Riley owned a greenhouse that was located behind his home; from the ground, the contents of Riley’s greenhouse were shielded from view by its walls and the trees on his property. In 1984, the Pasco County Sheriff’s office received a tip that Riley was growing marijuana on his property. The investigating officer tried to see into the greenhouse from the ground but could not, so he circled in a helicopter at 400 feet and saw what he believed to be marijuana growing inside. Acting on this information, the investigating officer obtained a search warrant, searched the greenhouse, and found the marijuana. Riley was charged with possession of marijuana.\nRiley filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The trial court granted his motion and held that viewing his property from the air violated Riley’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, reversed the trial court’s decision and denied Riley’s motion to dismiss the evidence. The appellate court also certified the case to the Supreme Court of Florida, which reinstated the trial court’s order to suppress the evidence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53611:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53611:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53611:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Riley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in this case because anyone could view Riley’s property from a helicopter flying in navigable airspace and figure out what was inside. The police officer did not enter Riley’s land or interfere with it in any way. Furthermore, the manner in which he was flying the helicopter was well within the law; therefore, the police officer was within his rights to view Riley’s property from the air. The Court determined that the police action in this case did not violate Riley’s Fourth Amendment rights.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor filed a concurring opinion in which she cautioned the majority against relying on the fact that the helicopter was flying within Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. She argued that the FAA regulations were meant to promote air safety and did not protect citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, like the police activities in Katz v. United States, the officer’s actions in this case violated Riley’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that the burden of proving that a defendant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy should rest with the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53611:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53615:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53615:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress created the United States Sentencing Commission under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. This Commission was to attack the wide discrepancies in sentencing by federal court judges by creating sentencing guidelines for all federal offenses. It was to be part of the judicial branch, with members appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. John Mistretta (convicted of three counts of selling cocaine) claimed that the Act violated the delegation-of-powers principle by giving the Commission \"excessive legislative powers.\" This case was decided together with United States v. Mistretta.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53615:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53615:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53615:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found the Act to be valid because although Congress cannot generally delegate its legislative power to another Branch, the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from obtaining assistance from coordinate Branches. The test of validity is that an \"intelligible principle\" must be established by the legislature where the agency of the delegated authority must adhere to specific directives that govern its authority. The delegation to the Commission was sufficiently detailed and specific to meet these requirements. The Commission was given substantial authority and discretion in setting the guidelines; however, Congress established a classification hierarchy for federal crimes that the Commission was to use as an outline for its work.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53615:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53618:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53618:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGerald D. was the presumptive father of Victoria D. since she was born to his wife Carole D.. However, Carole had an adulterous partner, Michael H., who obtained blood tests indicating that he was likely the biological father. When Michael obtained visitation rights in a California state court, Gerald argued that Michael had no ground under California law to challenge Gerald's paternity since more than two years had passed since Victoria's birth. According to Cal. Evid. Code 621, the child is \"presumed to be a child of the marriage\" and another man can only challenge this presumption within two years of birth. The court ruled in favor of Gerald and canceled Michael's visitation rights. Michael claimed that Code 621 violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by denying him an opportunity to establish his paternity. A California Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Code 621.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53618:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53618:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53618:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the judgment for a 5-4 court. Based on its analysis of common-law tradition, the plurality opinion found that a possible biological father does not have a fundamental right to obtain parental rights after the presumptive father has exercised significant responsibility over the child. Therefore due process protection does not apply. Code 621 was based on common-law precedent which showed \"an aversion to declaring children illegitimate\" and supported \"the interest in promoting the 'peace and tranquility of States and families.'\" Restricting Michael's parental rights achieved this by granting Gerald the sole responsibility to play the role of Victoria's father.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53618:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53620:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53620:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDaniel Connaughton ran against the incumbent for the office of Municipal Judge of Hamilton, Ohio, in an election set for November 8, 1983. About a month before the election, the incumbent’s Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery charges. On November 1, 1983, the Journal News, a local newspaper owned by Harte-Hanks Communications, published a front-page story about the grand jury investigation. The story quoted a grand jury witness who accused Connaughton of using “dirty tricks” and offering her bribes in exchange for her assistance with the investigation. The Journal News also endorsed the incumbent Municipal Judge.\nConnaughton sued Harte-Hanks Communications and alleged that the article was false, that it damaged his professional reputation, and that it was published maliciously. The district court ruled in favor of Connaughton, and that United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.\nDaniel Connaughton ran against the incumbent for the office of Municipal Judge of Hamilton, Ohio, in an election set for November 8, 1983. About a month before the election, the incumbent’s Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery charges. On November 1, 1983, the Journal News, a local newspaper owned by Harte-Hanks Communications, published a front-page story about the grand jury investigation. The story quoted a grand jury witness who accused Connaughton of using “dirty tricks” and offering her bribes in exchange for her assistance with the investigation. The Journal News also endorsed the incumbent Municipal Judge.\nConnaughton sued Harte-Hanks Communications and alleged that the article was false, that it damaged his professional reputation, and that it was published maliciously. The district court ruled in favor of Connaughton, and that United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53620:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53620:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53620:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a public figure plaintiff in a libel case must prove that the libelous statement was false or made without any regard for its truth. The fact that the newspaper failed to interview one of the main witnesses to the supposed bribery strongly indicated a disregard for the truth of the story. Although there were many reasons to doubt the truth of the accusations against Connaughton, the newspaper failed to properly investigate, so the act of publishing the story constituted actual malice.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the Court did not overstep its bounds by looking at the facts of the case in order to determine whether or not the newspaper exhibited actual malice.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the Court might have looked at the facts of the case differently if the petitioner had not abandoned the defense that Harte-Hanks believed the report to be true. He also wrote that the failure of the majority opinion to mention the actual content of the article in question does not mean that the Court did not consider it relevant.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred with the majority’s decision because he did not feel it inconsistent with the analysis Justice Antonin Scalia provided in his concurrence.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in judgment where he argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily focuses its analysis on what the trial court jury found in favor of the plaintiff, rather than exercising its own independent judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53620:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53621:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53621:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required companies awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30 percent of their business to minority business enterprises. The J.A. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of the 30 percent set-aside, brought suit against the city.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53621:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53621:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53621:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that \"generalized assertions\" of past racial discrimination could not justify \"rigid\" racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts. Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to \"any injury suffered by anyone,\" and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. O'Connor further held that allowing claims of past discrimination to serve as the basis for racial quotas would actually subvert constitutional values: \"The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53621:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53624:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53624:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 29, 1983, 10-year-old David was abducted from a church carnival. The abductor molested and sodomized the boy, then returned him to the carnival an hour and a half later. David’s mother took him to the Kino Hospital, where a doctor examined him and used a sexual assault kit to collect evidence. The police collected the kit and the boy’s clothes. The evidence from the kit was refrigerated, but the clothing was not. Nine days after the attack, David positively identified Larry Youngblood as the abductor from a photo lineup. The next day, a police criminologist examined the sexual assault kit and determined that sexual contact had occurred, but he did not test the clothing at that time. Youngblood was indicted on charges of sexual assault, kidnapping, and child molestation. The state moved to compel him to provide samples to compare with those from the sexual assault kit, but the trial court denied the motion because there was not enough sample material in the kit to make a valid comparison. In January 1985, the police criminologist tested the boy’s clothing for the first time and received inconclusive data.\nAt trial, police witnesses testified as to what the tests might have shown had they been conducted closer to the time the evidence was gathered. The court instructed the jury to consider the facts “against the state’s interests” if they found the state had lost or destroyed evidence by conducting the tests later. The jury found the defendant guilty. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that, when identity is an issue at trial, the loss or destruction of evidence that could remove the defendant from suspicion is a denial of due process. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied the petition for review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53624:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53624:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53624:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant must show bad faith on the part of the police to prove that the loss or destruction of evidence was a denial of due process. Requiring the police to retain every potentially useful piece of evidence places an undue burden on the police, while the bad faith restriction limits the police’s duty to what serves the interests of justice. The Court also held that, in this case, the police’s failure to refrigerate the clothing could at worst be negligent, but not in bad faith.\nIn his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that, even without the Court’s ruling, the state has a strong interest in properly preserving as much evidence as possible. He also argued that there was no way to definitively say what the evidence might have shown and the jury still ruled in favor of the prosecution, which suggests that the evidence would not have been sufficient to exonerate Youngblood. Justice Stevens also argued that, while he concurred in the judgment, he found the majority’s opinion much broader than necessary to decide this case.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, regardless of the state’s intent, police action that results in the defendant’s failure to receive a fair trial represents a denial of due process. He also argued that there is no bright-line distinction between good faith and bad faith police action, and therefore that guideline does not adequately protect the rights of criminal defendants. Without any way to know what the evidence would have shown, there is no proof that it would not have been enough to exonerate Youngblood, so the police’s failure to preserve the evidence effectively deprived Youngblood of his rights to due process. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.\n\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53624:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53633:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53633:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Kansas City Missouri School District hired lawyers to argue a major desegregation case against the state of Missouri in federal district court. When the lawyers won the case after years of litigation, they sought compensation from Missouri under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. The district court calculated the amount owed using current market rates for attorney's fees. Missouri objected to paying the lawyers at current rates for work they performed in the past when rates were lower. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled against Missouri. Missouri alleged that the federal courts violated its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity privileges by forcing it to pay higher rates.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53633:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53633:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53633:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for a 7-1 court. The Court referred to its decision in Hutto v. Finney to establish that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply \"to an award of attorney's fees against a State.\" Therefore \"it follows that the same is true for the calculation of the amount of the fee.\" Charging current rates for lawyers compensated for the delay in payment to them. Further, charging current rates for legal assistants rather than their cost to attorneys during litigation took account of the entire service the lawyers provided. This constituted \"a reasonable attorney's fee\" under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53633:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53639:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53639:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDrug Enforcement Administration agents stopped Sokolow in Honolulu International Airport after his behavior indicated he may be a drug trafficker: he paid $2,100 in cash for airline tickets, he was not traveling under his own name, his original destination was Miami, he appeared nervous during the trip, and he checked none of his luggage. Agents arrested Sokolow and searched his luggage without a warrant. Later, at the DEA office, agents obtained warrants allowing more extensive searches and they discovered 1,063 grams of cocaine.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53639:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53639:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53639:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court upheld the search and reasoned that the agents had a \"reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in wrongdoing.\" Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the validity of such a stop should be based on the \"totality of the circumstances,\" (United States v. Cortez, 1981), which, in this case, gave agents a clear reason to suspect Sokolow of drug trafficking.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53639:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53640:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53640:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA reporter for the Florida Star wrote and printed an article about Betty Jean Freedman’s rape, including her full name. The reporter obtained all of his information, including the victim’s name, from the police report. The police department did not restrict access to the pressroom or police reports, but there were several signs in the area instructing not to print victim’s names. The newspaper also had a policy of not printing the full names of victims. After the article ran, Freedman and her family received several threatening phone calls, and Freedman sought mental counseling and police protection. Freedman sued, claiming emotional distress. The district court found Florida Star guilty of negligence under a Florida law that prohibits publishing the name of a victim of a sexual offense in any instrument of mass communication. The court awarded Freedman compensatory and punitive damages. The district court of appeal affirmed and the Supreme Court of Florida denied review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53640:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53640:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53640:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the civil damages imposed on Florida Star violated the First Amendment because the information was lawfully-obtained and truthful. The Court hinted that there may be a situation where a victim’s privacy interest outweighed a newspaper’s First Amendment rights. The Court also held that the Florida law prohibiting the printing of a victim’s name was under-inclusive because it did not limit the spread of a victim’s name through other means. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurrence, stating that the Florida statute was invalid because it did not protect a state interest of the highest order.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, expressing that the majority’s decision departs from past precedent. Justice White also rejected the majority’s assertion that the Florida law was under-inclusive. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53640:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53643:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53643:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt 17 years old, Kevin Stanford was convicted by a Kentucky jury of murder, sodomy, robbery, and the receipt of stolen property. Stanford was sentenced to death under a state statute which permitted juvenile offenders to receive the death penalty for Class A felonies or capital crimes. Stanford appealed his sentence and his case was consolidated with that of Wilkins v. Missouri, involving a 16 year old's appeal of his death sentence following a conviction for murder in Missouri. Both Stanford and Wilkins alleged that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders as young as themselves violated their constitutional rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53643:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53643:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53643:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that in weighing whether the imposition of capital punishments on offenders below the age of eighteen is cruel and unusual, it is necessary to look at the given society's evolving decency standards. With respect to American society, there is no national consensus regarding the imposition of capital punishments on 17- or 16-year-old individuals. Of the 37 states which permit capital punishment, 12 prohibit the death penalty for offenders below the age of 17 while 15 states prohibit capital punishment for 16 year olds. Moreover, discrepancies in national opinion polls, interest group views, and professional association studies, all indicate a lack of unanimity concerning the acceptability of death sentences for such relatively young offenders. Thus, the decision whether to subject 17 or 16 year olds to capital punishment must be made locally by the states and cannot be categorically pronounced as cruel and unusual punishment at this time.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53643:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53645:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53645:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo public-sponsored holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union. The first display involved a Christian nativity scene inside the Allegheny County Courthouse. The second display was a large Chanukah menorah, erected each year by the Chabad Jewish organization, outside the City-County building. The ACLU claimed the displays constituted state endorsement of religion. This case was decided together with Chabad v. ACLU and City of Pittsburgh v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53645:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53645:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53645:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the creche inside the courthouse unmistakably endorsed Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause. By prominently displaying the words \"Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ,\" the county sent a clear message that it supported and promoted Christian orthodoxy. The Court also held, however, that not all religious celebrations on government property violated the Establishment Clause. Six of the justices concluded that the display involving the menorah was constitutionally legitimate given its \"particular physical setting.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53645:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53654:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53654:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe respondents, a class of indigent Virginia death row inmates who did not have counsel to pursue post conviction proceedings, sued various state officials and argued that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution required that they be provided with counsel at the state’s expense for the purpose of pursuing collateral proceedings related to their convictions and sentences. The district court found that Virginia’s policy of either allowing death row inmates time in the prison law library or permitting them to have law books in their cells did not do enough to satisfy Virginia’s obligation to provide them some form of relief. That court also found the availability of attorneys to assist inmates was inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53654:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53654:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53654:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause requires states to appoint counsel for death row inmates looking for relief. States are not constitutionally obligated to provide relief post-conviction because the Constitution assures the right to counsel for an initial appeal from the judgment of the trial court. The Court also rejected the argument that capital cases require more legal assistance at collateral proceedings than non-capital cases.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that a post-conviction proceeding is not part of the criminal process but is a civil action that does not require the state to provide proceedings. Prisoners were still able to obtain counsel, despite Virginia not adopting procedures that are were as far-reaching as those of other states. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the concurrence.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent that claimed that Virginia’s procedure was unfair and did not provide indigent death row inmates an adequate opportunity to present their claims. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53654:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53656:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53656:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York City, responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a public forum interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53656:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53656:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53656:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court upheld the ordinance, giving broad deference to the government's interest in maintaining order. As long as \"the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest,\" a regulation will not be invalidated because a court concludes that the government's interest \"could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53656:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53658:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53658:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe city of Dallas, Texas passed an ordinance regulating the ages of admitted patrons and the hours of operation for dance halls. Charles M. Stanglin, the owner of the Twilight Skating Rink in Dallas, in compliance with this ordinance, split his skate rink into two sections: one section for patrons ages 14-18 and the other for anyone who pays the cost of admission. Stanglin sued the city to be able to un-divide the Twilight Skating Rink and argued that the ordinance placing age restrictions on dance halls violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nThe district court held that the ordinance did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments and that the ordinance's purpose was to benefit the welfare of teenagers in Dallas by limiting their exposure to illicit activities. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but that the ordinance unconstitutionally infringed on the First Amendment right to freedom of association.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53658:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53658:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53658:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the ordinance was intended to protect the youth of Dallas against corrupting activity, which they may have access to when intermingling with adults. Therefore, the age restrictions on youth activities were reasonable under the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of association and equal protection under the law considering they are enforced to protect the youth from corrupt activities.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the opportunity to socialize was protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, but that this case presented an issue of due process rather than freedom of association. He concurred with the judgment that the city ordinance protects teenagers and allowed them an even greater ability to associate than if the ordinance was not enforced. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53658:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53662:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53662:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWards Cove Packing Co. employed primarily nonwhite workers for unskilled seasonal jobs canning fish. A group of nonwhite workers filed suit in federal district court alleging that Wards Cove practiced discriminatory hiring in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As evidence, the group compared the high percentage of nonwhites in unskilled work with the high percentage of whites in skilled work. The District Court rejected this claim because it found that Ward received unskilled workers through a hiring agency that enrolled primarily nonwhites. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Ward had the burden of proof to show that its hiring practices were not discriminatory after the claimants presented evidence of racial disparity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53662:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53662:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53662:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 5-4 court. The fact that one class of jobs at a firm has a higher percentage of nonwhites than another class does not by itself prove that the firm practices discriminatory hiring. Comparisons of race percentages among different job classes could wrongfully blame the employer, since what appears to show racial discrimination could in reality reflect the racial differences that exist in the labor market at large. Instead, the Court held that \"the proper comparison is generally between the racial composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial composition of the qualified population in the relevant labor market.\" If a substantial difference is found, then the claimants must show that it is the result of a hiring practice of the employer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53662:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53665:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53665:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPaul Davis, a resident of Michigan, worked for the federal government and upon retirement received benefits. Michigan law exempts state retirement benefits from state taxes. Smith unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund on the state taxes he paid on his federal retirement benefits. He then filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims arguing that the state's tax policy violated 4 U.S.C. 111 by taxing benefits paid to federal employees but not to state employees. The court dismissed his suit and so did the Michigan Court of Appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53665:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53665:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53665:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for an 8-1 court. The Court emphasized the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity, which work to keep one part of the government from hindering the operations of another part. Section 111 allows a state to tax income paid by the federal government \"if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation.\" Because the Court found no \"significant differences between the two classes [federal and state employees],\" it held that the Michigan tax distinguished between employees solely on \"the source of the pay.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53665:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53673:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53673:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn May of 1976, Jimmy Wayne Jeffers and his girlfriend, Penelope Cheney, were arrested for possession of narcotics and receipt of stolen property. Jeffers posted bond for Cheney but was unable to post bond for himself. While in jail, Jeffers learned that Cheney was cooperating with the police. He offered another inmate money to kill Cheney, but a detention officer seized the note. Jeffers was released on bond in October of 1976. He quickly contacted Cheney and invited her to his motel room to give her heroin. When Doris Van der Veer, the woman with whom Jeffers had been living since his release from prison, entered the room a few hours later, she saw Cheney comatose on the bed and Jeffers injecting liquid into her arm. Van der Veer reported seeing Jeffers choke Cheney to death and then beat her body while calling her dirty names. Van der Veer and Jeffers then wrapped the body in newspapers and plastic bags and buried it in a shallow grave.\nA jury convicted Jeffers of first-degree murder. At sentencing, the court found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors, so Jeffers was sentenced to death under Arizona state law. On direct review, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. On a second direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the evidence and affirmed the death sentence. Jeffers petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus and argued that Arizona’s standard of an “especially heinous...or depraved” aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected Jeffers’ challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the standard was unconstitutionally vague as it applied to Jeffers and struck down the death sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53673:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53673:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53673:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal habeas corpus relief is not intended to find error in state laws but rather to determine whether a state court’s finding was so arbitrary and capricious that it violates the Eighth Amendment. The reviewing court should use the “rational factfinder” test, which asks whether a rational trier of fact when viewing the evidence as most favorable to the prosecution could find reasonable doubt. The Court also held that the Arizona Supreme Court applied a narrow and clearly defined construction of the standard that sufficiently prevented arbitrary and capricious sentencing. Therefore the standard as it applied to Jeffers was not unconstitutionally vague.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the way a court constructs a standard does not change the fact that the standard is unconstitutionally vague. Because the majority’s opinion provided no analysis on how the Arizona Supreme Court had constructed this standard in the past, there was no evidence to support the idea that the standard was being consistently narrowly applied. He also argued that the majority’s opinion incorrectly focuses on federal habeas courts’ review of state law, when there are federal implications as well. The district court has to review habeas corpus cases in light of others in order to determine whether the standards are being consistently and appropriately applied, so the “rational factfinder” test is not solely sufficient. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.\nIn his dissent, which also applies to Walton v. Arizona, Justice Brennan argued that the death penalty is contrary to the ideals of human dignity upon which the Constitution rests and that the majority’s opinion makes it easier for states to execute individuals with little regard for Eighth Amendment doctrine. Justice Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53673:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53674:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53674:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act which made it a crime to destroy an American flag or any likeness of an American flag which may be \"commonly displayed.\" The law did, however, allow proper disposal of a worn or soiled flag. Several prosecutions resulted from the Act. Eichman set a flag ablaze on the steps of the U.S. Capitol while protesting the government's domestic and foreign policy. Another prosecution (United States v. Haggerty) resulted from a flag-burning in Seattle protesting the passage of the Flag Protection Act.Both cases (Eichman's and Haggerty's) were argued together.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53674:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53674:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53674:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, coming on the heels of a similar holding in Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Court struck down the law because \"its asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression and concerned with the content of such expression.\" Allowing the flag to be burned in a disposal ceremony but prohibiting protestors from setting it ablaze at a political protest made that clear, argued Justice Brennan in one of his final opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53674:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53681:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53681:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA woman called police officers to a residence. She showed signs of having been beaten. She led police to another residence, where she said Edward Rodriguez was asleep inside. She alleged that he had beaten her earlier in the day. The woman had a key to the residence and referred to it as “our apartment” several times. She consented to a search of the residence and police entered without a warrant. Once inside, police found drug paraphernalia and containers filled with a white powder. Police arrested Rodriguez and he was later charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. At trial, Rodriguez attempted to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the woman did not have authority to consent to the search. The woman had moved out a few weeks before the incident and no longer lived at the apartment. With no valid consent, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53681:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53681:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53681:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that a warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the police reasonably believed that the person who consented to the search had the authority to do so. The case was remanded for consideration of whether the police officers reasonably believed that the woman had authority to consent to their search of the residence.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing that police cannot ignore the Fourth Amendment when an individual did not voluntarily give others concurrent authority over their property. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53681:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53682:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53682:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCalifornia law required retailers to pay a 6 percent sales tax on in-state sales of tangible personal property and residents to pay a 6 percent use tax on such property if purchased out of state. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, incorporated in Louisiana, sold religious materials to California residents through several direct and mail-order \"evangelistic crusades.\" After auditing his ministry, the California Board of Equalization (\"Board\") told Swaggart that under California law he had to register his ministry as a seller so the Board could collect the appropriate sales and use taxes. After paying the taxes, Swaggart petitioned the Board for a refund. When his petition was rejected, Swaggart challenged the Board in state court. Following two unfavorable rulings below, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Swaggart's petition for certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53682:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53682:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53682:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Basing its unanimous decision on the fact that California's sales and use tax was not a flat tax, affected only a small portion of retail sales, and was neutrally applied, the Court found the taxes constitutional. Moreover, since the taxes were not imposed as a precondition to spreading any given message and were due regardless of registration, the Court rejected Swaggart's claim that California's no-fee registration requirement acted as a prior restraint on his religious organization. Finally, the Court held that any administrative burdens associated with the payment of taxes did not give rise to an establishment conflict since they did not cause excessive entanglement between the government and Swaggart's organization.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53682:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53685:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53685:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe school administration at Westside High School denied permission to a group of students to form a Christian club with the same privileges and meeting terms as other Westside after-school student clubs. In addition to citing the Establishment Clause, Westside refused the club's formation because it lacked a faculty sponsor. When the school board upheld the administration's denial, Mergens and several other students sued. The students alleged that Westside's refusal violated the Equal Access Act, which requires that schools in receipt of federal funds provide \"equal access\" to student groups seeking to express \"religious, political, philosophical, or other content\" messages. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Court of Appeals found in favor of the students. The Supreme Court granted Westside certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53685:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53685:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53685:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In distinguishing between \"curriculum\" and \"noncurriculum student groups,\" the Court held that since Westside permitted other noncurricular clubs, it was prohibited under the Equal Access Act from denying equal access to any after-school club based on the content of its speech. The proposed Christian club would be a noncurriculum group since no other course required students to become its members, its subject matter would not actually be taught in classes, it did not concern the school's cumulative body of courses, and its members would not receive academic credit for their participation. The Court added that the Equal Access Act was constitutional because it served an overriding secular purpose by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of philosophical, political, or other types of speech. As such, the Act protected the Christian club's formation even if its members engaged in religious discussions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53685:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53689:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53689:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 30, 1986, a patrol officer saw Inocencio Muniz and another passenger in a car stopped on the shoulder of a highway. When the officer approached, he could smell alcohol on Muniz’s breath and saw that his eyes were bloodshot and his face was flushed. The officer advised Muniz to remain parked, but as he was leaving he saw Muniz drive off. The officer pulled Muniz over and had him perform three field sobriety tests, all of which Muniz failed. Muniz told the officer he failed them because he had been drinking. The officer arrested Muniz and took him to a booking center, where he was told that his actions and voice were being recorded, but no one read him his Miranda rights. Muniz answered a series of questions about himself and stumbled over an answer regarding the year he turned six. Muniz again failed three field sobriety tests and refused a breathalyzer test. The officer then read Muniz his Miranda rights, and Muniz signed a statement waiving them. In subsequent questioning, he admitted to being under the influence of alcohol.\nAt trial, the video and audio recordings of Muniz’s behavior at the booking center were admitted into evidence, along with the officer’s reports of Muniz’s failure of the field sobriety tests and his incriminating statements. Muniz was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a motion for a new trial and argued that the evidence of his behavior and statements prior to the Miranda warning should have been excluded from trial. The trial court denied the motion. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and held that the testimony regarding Muniz’s behavior and the results of the field sobriety tests was physical in nature, not testimonial, but that the audio portion of the recording should have been suppressed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the application for review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53689:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53689:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53689:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment distinguishes between real or physical evidence and testimonial evidence, of which only testimonial evidence is protected under the Amendment. Based on this analysis, the incriminating evidence drawn from physical evidence is admissible, but evidence drawn from the content of statements that relate factual information is not. The Court also held that the Fifth Amendment does not require the suppression of information not elicited by an officer.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that answers to an officer’s questions should be admissible when the questions are meant to elicit responses to ascertain the suspect’s mental state. In such a case, the questions serve the same purpose as the field sobriety tests, and the answers are not testimonial. Justice Byron R. White, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that creating an exception for routine booking questions and their answers undermined the rights the Miranda warning was meant to protect. He argued that the questions the police asked Muniz were intended to elicit incriminating responses, and because the police asked the questions before reading Muniz his Miranda rights, the evidence of the questions and their answers should be suppressed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53689:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53693:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53693:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile being held in jail, Perkins freely confessed to committing a murder to an undercover police officer who was posing as another inmate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53693:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53693:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53693:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that conversations between suspects and undercover officers are not afforded Miranda protection since they are not done in a \"police-dominated atmosphere\" where compulsion to confess is present. \"It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation,\" argued Justice Kennedy. There was no danger of coercion in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53693:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53694:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53694:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn November 1980, Governor James Thompson of Illinois issued an order that prohibited state officials from hiring new employees, promoting state employees, or recalling state employees after layoffs without the approval of the Governor's Office of Personnel. The Office of Personnel based hiring and promotion decisions on factors such as the applicant's contributions to the Republican Party, the applicant's record of service to the Republican Party, and the support of local Party officials. In the jointly decided case of Frech v. Rutan, Cynthia B. Rutan and a number of other potential and current state employees challenged this patronage system, alleging that the Governor was violating their First Amendment rights by practicing unfair political patronage and party-based discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53694:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53694:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53694:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Governor Thompson's practices amounted to an unconstitutional patronage system. The Court found that employees would feel \"a significant obligation to support political positions held by their superiors\" in lieu of their true beliefs in order to progress up the career ladder. The Court thus held that \"promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliations or support\" were impermissible infringements on the right to free expression of public employees. The Court noted that while the First Amendment was not \"a tenure provision\" protecting employees from \"constructive discharge,\" it nevertheless prevented the government from interfering with its employees' freedom \"to believe and associate.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53694:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53695:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53695:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1981, the Republic of Nigeria was interested in building an aeromedical center at Kaduna Air Force Base. Both W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. (Kirkpatrick) and Environmental Tectonics Corporation International (Environmental Tectonics) bid for the contract. Kirkpatrick established a deal with a Nigerian citizen who would attempt to ensure Kirkpatrick received the contract. In exchange, Kirkpatrick would pay two Panamanian companies owned by the Nigerian individual 20% of the contract price, which would be distributed as bribes to Nigerian officials. Kirkpatrick succeeded in obtaining the contract, and Environmental Tectonics brought the issue to the attention of the authorities. The United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey brought charges against Kirkpatrick and its CEO, and both pled guilty.\nEnvironmental Tectonics sued Kirkpatrick in district court and sought damages under anti-racketeering acts. Kirkpatrick moved to dismiss the complaint by arguing that the action was barred by state doctrine that prohibited courts from considering cases that would result in embarrassment for a sovereign nation or interfere with US foreign policy. The district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted the motion in favor of Kirkpatrick. The district court held that Environmental Tectonics would have to prove that Nigerian officials accepted bribes and allowed the bribes to influence governmental decisions. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that Kirkpatrick had not met its burden to show that the case could not proceed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53695:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53695:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53695:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that state doctrine only applies when the case requires a US court to declare an act of a foreign sovereign nation invalid. The Court held that this suit only requires the district court to rule on the motivation underlying an action rather than the validity of the action itself. Since nothing in this case required the court to declare an action by Nigeria’s government invalid, state doctrine does not apply, and the case should be allowed to proceed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53695:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53698:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53698:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn February 11, 1985, a Florida Highway Patrol officer stopped Martin Wells for speeding and smelled alcohol on his breath. Wells was arrested for driving under the influence and taken to the police station for a breathalyzer test. While in custody, police told Wells that his car would be impounded, and he granted permission to the officer to open the trunk. An inventory search of the car at the impoundment revealed two marijuana cigarette butts and a locked suitcase in the trunk. Under the direction of a trooper, impoundment employees opened the suitcase and found a garbage bag of marijuana.\nWells was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the marijuana evidence by arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. Wells pleaded nolo contendere but reserved the right to appeal on the motion to suppress. The Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District reversed the ruling on the motion to suppress, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53698:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53698:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53698:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for five members of the court. The Supreme Court held that there must be a policy in place that determines whether inventory searches include opening closed containers or not. Such a policy allows the situation to be regulated. Absent such a policy, as in this case, the search is not regulated sufficiently to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does allow police officers to use discretion in determining whether a container can be opened based on the nature of the search.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment where he argued that there must be a standard inventory search policy in place that limits police discretion to prevent the abuse of a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that the majority opinion went beyond the bounds of the case by allowing individual police discretion to determine whether to open a sealed container in an inventory search. Justice John Paul Stevens also wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment where he argued that the majority opinion represented blatant judicial activism by granting certiorari to a case that the Florida Supreme Court adequately handled. He also wrote that the majority’s opinion on the issue of police discretion extended beyond the question at hand.\n\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53698:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53699:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53699:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGary Peel, an attorney licensed to practice in three states, received a \"Certificate in Civil Trial Advocacy\" from the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA). This certificate is earned by compiling extensive trial experience, completing continuing legal education classes, and passing a day-long examination. In addition to listing the three states in which he was licensed to practice, Peel listed his NBTA certification on his letterhead. The Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois filed a complaint against Peel and argued that he was publicly presenting himself as a certified legal specialist in violation of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. At Peel's disciplinary hearing, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the Commission and held that Peel's letterhead was commercial speech that could be governed by the lawyer advertising regulations. The Illinois Supreme Court also held that Peel's letterhead amounted to an unwarranted claim of superior quality of service because it could lead the public to believe that his authority to practice trial advocacy was derived from his NBTA certification.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53699:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53699:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53699:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the letterhead was neither actually nor inherently misleading because advertising an NBTA certification did not suggest a greater degree of qualification than could be inferred by evaluating the certification's requirements. Furthermore, the Court held that, whether or not the letterhead was misleading, Illinois' categorical prohibition on providing this type of information was \"broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the perceived evil.\" Additionally, the concern about deception was insufficient to outweigh the \"constitutional presumption favoring disclosure over concealment.\"\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, because the letterhead may be deceiving, Illinois could enact regulations short of a complete ban to make sure the public is not misled by similar representations.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the letterhead could be potentially misleading and that the state should have the power to prevent these types of advertisements when they are not accompanied by a disclaimer aimed at avoiding the misconception. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which she argued that the Illinois rule barring this type of misleading speech is valid and that the public's comparative lack of knowledge justifies the state's interest in controlling this type of speech. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53699:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53703:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53703:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, the predecessor-in-interest to Eli Lilly & Co. sued Medtronic, Inc. for patent infringement to enjoin Medtronic’s research and marketing of an implantable cardiac defibrillator, a device used to treat heart problems. Medtronic argued that the information was used to develop and submit new information under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), and therefore it was exempt from the statutes governing patent infringement. The district court held that there was no such exemption and issued a permanent injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that Medtronic’s actions could not be considered patent infringement if they were reasonably related to obtaining approval under the FDCA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53703:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53703:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53703:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of a 6-2 majority. The Court held that, based on the phrasing of the FDCA, the exemption refers to all actions in the process of developing and submitting information to the FDA. Reading the statute in this way prevents distortions of patent law and allows the development of medical technology to logically proceed. The Court held that only the broader interpretation of the statute respects legislative intent.\nJustice Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissent where he argued that the FDCA refers specifically to an exemption for drugs, not medical devices and/or technologies. He argued that to read the statute in any broader manner is to unnecessarily twist Congress’ words from their normal meaning. He also wrote that Congress’ distinction between drugs and devices would be a logical one, as the use of a patent holder’s devices for medical testing would infringe on the patent holder’s sales in a way that the use of a drug would not. Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53703:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53706:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53706:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn September 24, 1985, a yacht owned by Everett Sisson caught fire while it was moored at a Lake Michigan marina. The fire destroyed the yacht and damaged several others in the vicinity. The owners of the other yachts sued Sisson for $275,000 for the damage to their yachts and the marina. Sisson filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief to limit his liability to $800, the value of his yacht after the fire. He argued that the district court had maritime jurisdiction, but the court disagreed and dismissed the petition. Sisson moved for reconsideration, and the district court denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53706:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53706:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53706:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of seven members of the court. The Court held that the district court has maritime jurisdiction when the incident in question represents a potential hazard to maritime commerce and bears a substantial relationship to maritime activity. In this case, although the fire caused minimal damage, it had the potential to be extremely destructive and disrupt the maritime activity of the marina. The Court held that such a determination should be made based on the nature of the incident rather than its actual result. The fire bore a substantial relationship to maritime activity because it stemmed from the maintenance of a vessel in a marina located on a navigable waterway, which is a part of traditional maritime activity.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the majority’s test is unnecessary because it merely proves that district courts have jurisdiction over all tort cases involving vessels in navigable waterways. He wrote that the use of such a test only adds confusion to an otherwise-settled area of law. Justice Byron R. White joined in the concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53706:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53708:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53708:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDennis and Francie Burnham were married in 1976 and moved to New Jersey in 1977. In July of 1987, they decided to separate and agreed that Mrs. Burnham would take custody of the children, move to California, and file for divorce citing irreconcilable differences. In October of 1987, Mr. Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey citing desertion. Mrs. Burnham successfully demanded that Mr. Burnham respect their previous agreement and filed for divorce in California in January 1988. Later that month, Mr. Burnham was in California on business and visited his children. While there, he was served with a California court summons and a copy of the divorce petition. Later that year, Mr. Burnham appeared before the California Superior Court and moved to quash the petition because the court lacked jurisdiction over him, as his only contacts with California were short business trips. The Superior Court denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53708:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53708:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53708:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that one of the most firmly established precedents in American judicial history is the fact that states have jurisdiction over nonresidents within their borders. As long as the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” are not offended by the state’s assertion of jurisdiction, there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the addition of a subjective jurisdiction determination to be made by a judge would make the process less fair.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that there is no evidence that the rule allowing states to have jurisdiction over nonresidents had arbitrarily or unfairly violated due process. In his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that historical precedent is not the only factor that should determine whether the jurisdictional issue satisfies the Due Process Clause. He argued that, when a person visits a state, they knowingly and willingly avail themselves of the benefits of that state’s laws, and therefore are subject to them as well. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment where he argued that the majority’s opinion was unnecessarily broad, but he agreed with its conclusion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53708:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53712:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53712:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited corporations from using treasury money for independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections for state offices. However, if a corporation set up an independent fund designated solely for political purposes, it could make such expenditures. The law was enacted with the assumption that \"the unique legal and economic characteristics of corporations necessitate some regulation of their political expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption.\" The Michigan Chamber of Commerce wanted to support a candidate for Michigan's House of Representatives by using general funds to sponsor a newspaper advertisement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53712:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53712:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53712:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In making its case, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce argued that it should have been excluded from the act's restrictions since the Chamber was a \"nonprofit ideological corporation\" which was more analogous to a political association than a business firm. The Court disagreed and upheld the Michigan law. Justice Marshall found that the Chamber was akin to a business group given its activities, linkages with community business leaders, and high degree of members (over seventy-five percent) which were business corporations. Furthermore, Marshall found that the statute was narrowly crafted and implemented to achieve the important goal of maintaining integrity in the political process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53712:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53714:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53714:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLaura Lee Wright and her ex-husband Louis Wright had jointly agreed that they would share custody of their daughter, while her half-sister would live with her parents, Laura Lee Wright and Robert Giles. In November 1986, when the girls were five years old and two years old, respectively, the older daughter told Cynthia Goodman, a friend of Louis Wright’s, that Giles had sexually assaulted her while Laura held her down and covered her mouth. The girl also said that she had seen the same thing happen to her younger sister. Goodman reported this information to the police and took the girl to the hospital where Dr. John Jambura examined her. Dr. Jambura found conditions highly suggestive of sexual intercourse that had occurred two or three days previously. Laura Wright and Giles were jointly charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor.\nDuring the trial, the court conducted a voir dire examination of the younger daughter, aged three years at the time of the trial, to determine whether she was capable of testifying. The court found, and the parties agreed, that she was not. Over the objection of the defense, the court allowed Dr. Jambura to testify to certain statements the younger daughter made during the examination. Laura Wright and Giles were convicted on both counts, and they appealed on the conviction regarding the conduct with the younger daughter. They argued that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Dr. Jambura. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the admission of the hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the testimony did not fall under a hearsay exception and the interview in question lacked procedural safeguards. The Idaho Supreme Court also noted that children are highly susceptible to suggestion and can easily be influenced by leading questions. Because the Idaho Supreme Court was not convinced that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the testimony been excluded, it reversed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53714:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53714:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53714:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the state bears the burden of showing that the testimony of a witness who is unavailable for trial is sufficiently reliable to withstand scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause. Testimony is deemed reliable when it otherwise falls within a hearsay exception or shows “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” In order to meet this high standard of trustworthiness, testimony must be so reliable that adversarial testing under cross-examination would not alter its credibility. Corroborating evidence is not enough to establish the trustworthiness of testimony; it must be inherently reliable. Because the state could neither show that the testimony fit within a hearsay exception nor could they prove that it was inherently trustworthy, it was unreliable and therefore inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion erred in establishing a rule that corroborating evidence is not sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of testimony. Because corroborating evidence is often the most commonly used and effective ways of determining the reliability of testimony, there is no reason for the majority to remove it as a method of determining whether testimony is sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause. Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Byron R. White, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53714:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53715:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53715:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1985 the Ohio legislature passed House Bill 319, which requires a physician to notify the parents of an unmarried minor who is requesting an abortion, unless the situation falls under one of the exceptions. Exceptions include: the minor providing a letter of parental consent; the physician providing the parents with actual notification 24 hours before the procedure or notification by mail 48 hours before the procedure; and a judicial bypass procedure that allows a minor to obtain the approval of a specified relative upon filing an affidavit with a juvenile court or receive a notification waiver from a juvenile court if parental notification would cause the minor emotional, sexual, or physical abuse. Before the law was put into effect, an abortion clinic, one of its doctors, and a minor seeking an abortion sued in federal district court and claimed that the judicial bypass procedures the law required violated a minor’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Ohio form enforcing the statute. Ohio appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53715:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53715:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53715:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority in which the Court held that the bill did not violate a minor’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it satisfied the four factors used to determine the constitutionality of this type of consent statutes. Those four factors are whether the minor was allowed to show that she was mature enough to make the abortion decision without her parents’ help, whether she was allowed to show that the abortion is in her best interest, whether the judicial bypass procedure took reasonable measures to ensure the minor’s anonymity, and whether the statute set reasonable time limits for judicial action. The Court ruled that requiring a minor to prove maturity by clear and convincing evidence is a fair evidentiary burden and that the requirement that the treating physician performs the notification is not an undue burden on the doctor or the minor.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he highlighted the importance of leaving abortion statutes such as this one to be decided by the majority-influenced state legislatures instead of by the “lawyerly dissection” of judicial precedent.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the judicial bypass procedure created a system that was a “tortious maze” and lacked the sensitivity required when dealing with such an intimate decision. Justice Blackmun also argued that the state lacked a sufficiently significant interest to interfere with the minor’s right to make this decision. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53715:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53719:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53719:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related \"misconduct.\" The state appellate court reversed the denial of benefits, finding that the denial violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The state supreme court affirmed the appellate court. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees, and returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not sacramental use of illegal drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws (485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause. The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in this new posture.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53719:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53719:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53719:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting religion \"would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.\" Scalia cited as examples compulsory military service, payment of taxes, vaccination requirements, and child-neglect laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53719:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53731:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53731:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGuadalupe Montalvo-Murillo (Montalvo) was held in pretrial custody on federal criminal charges for attempting to enter New Mexico from Mexico with 72 pounds of cocaine. Montalvo cooperated with authorities and agreed to make a controlled delivery to the intended purchasers in Chicago. The authorities took Montalvo to Chicago where the purchase fell through, so they transferred Montalvo back to New Mexico where the criminal complaint charging him with possession of cocaine was originally filed. Montalvo’s detention hearing was not held until 13 days after his initial arrest in New Mexico because of the need to transfer him, the passage of two weekends, a federal holiday, and the fact that the government attorneys were unprepared. At Montalvo’s detention hearing, the district court determined that the delays violated the timeliness of proceedings required by the Bail Reform Act (Act). The district court also determined that Montalvo did not pose a flight risk and, to remedy the untimeliness of the pre-trial proceedings, released him. Montalvo fled upon his release. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that the government’s failure to uphold the Act’s directions for a timely hearing justified Montalvo’s release.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53731:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53731:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53731:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Bail Reform Act (Act) does not require the government to remedy untimely proceedings by releasing someone who may pose a flight risk or endanger the community. Montalvo’s counsel argued that the government deviated from the time limits set forth in the Act; therefore, the hearing was not in accordance with the Act and the government should lose its authority to detain Montalvo. The Court rejected this argument and noted that no rule requires punitive sanction for every departure from a duty imposed upon the courts or government. The Court held that release in this and similar situations would defeat the Act’s purpose of providing fair bail proceedings, protecting the public, and assuring that defendants appear at trial.\nJustice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the severity of pre-trial detention and its deprivation of personal liberty requires strict procedural safeguards that cannot be sacrificed in the name of community safety with impunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53731:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53732:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53732:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn anonymous caller told Montgomery, Alabama police that Vanessa Rose White had cocaine in an attaché case in her car. The caller gave certain specific details about the car and White’s future movements. Following that tip, police followed Vanessa Rose White as she drove from an apartment complex to Doby’s Motel Court, where they pulled her over. When asked, White gave the officers permission to search her car and an attaché case found in the car. Police found marijuana in the case and arrested White. During processing at the police station, officers also found 3 milligrams of cocaine in White’s purse. After being charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine, White moved to suppress evidence of the drugs. The trial court denied the motion and White plead guilty. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama reversed the motion, finding that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and search White’s car. This search violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53732:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53732:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53732:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote for the majority, reversing the lower court. The Court held that the totality of the circumstances provided a sufficiently reasonable suspicion that White possessed illegal drugs. Even though police had no way to confirm the credibility of the caller, police verified many allegations made by the caller about White’s car and movements. Because the police had a reasonable suspicion, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented, stating that the majority’s standard allows anyone with enough knowledge of a person’s routine to cause police to search that person. The standard also gives officers too much freedom to claim that they received an anonymous tip to justify any search. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53732:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53734:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53734:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Wildlife Federation (NWF) challenged 1,250 land-use designations made by the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM). NWF filed suit under section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming that the actions were \"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.\" NWF argued that it had standing to sue because two of its members used public lands \"in the vicinity\" of lands affected by the BLM's decisions (four other members submitted affidavits claiming that they, too, used lands close to affected areas, but the District Court ruled that the affidavits had been submitted too late).\nThe BLM challenged the NWF's right to sue, and the District Court agreed. It found that the two affidavits filed in a timely manner did not show that the members had been sufficiently affected to have standing to sue. Furthermore, the court ruled that even if they had had standing to challenge those specific BLM decisions, they would not have had standing to challenge all 1,250.\nOn appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the initial two affidavits were enough to give them standing to challenge all 1,250 decisions. Moreover, the Court ruled that the District Court had abused its discretion by refusing to consider the additional four affidavits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53734:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53734:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53734:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court held that NWF did not have standing to challenge the land-use designations. The two timely affidavits were not enough to show that the group members had actually been affected by the BLM decisions. Even if they had been, and if the four additional affidavits had been considered (which the Supreme Court ruled had not been necessary), the right to challenge the individual decisions would not have conveyed a right to challenge all of them. The decisions were not a single \"agency action\" but rather a series of actions which would have to be challenged individually. \"The case-by-case approach that this requires is understandably frustrating to an organization such as [NWF], which has as its objective across-the-board protection of our Nation's wildlife and the streams and forests that support it,\" wrote Justice Scalia. \"But this is the traditional, and remains the normal, mode of operation of the courts. ... Until confided to us, ... more sweeping actions are for the other branches.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53734:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53738:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53738:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case challenged the constitutionality of two minority preference policies of the Federal Communications Commission. Under the first policy challenged by Metro Broadcasting, Inc., minority applicants for broadcast licenses were given preference if all other relevant factors were roughly equal. The second policy, known as the \"distress sale,\" was challenged by Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford Inc. This policy allowed broadcasters in danger of losing their licenses to sell their stations to minority buyers before the FCC formally ruled on the viability of the troubled stations. This case was decided together with Astroline Communications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcasting, in which Faith Center Inc. made a \"distress sale\" of its television license to a minority outfit owned by Astroline. Shurberg, a non-minority applicant for a similar license, challenged the FCC's approval of Faith Center's sale to Astroline.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53738:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53738:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53738:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that the FCC's minority preference policies were constitutional because they provided appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and were aimed at the advancement of legitimate congressional objectives for program diversity. The FCC's minority preference policies were closely related to, and substantially advanced, Congress's legitimate interest in affording the public a diverse array of programming options. The availability of program diversity serves the entire viewing and listening public, not just minorities, and is therefore consistent with First Amendment values. Finally, the Court noted that the FCC's minority preference policy did not unduly burden nonminorities. The FCC did not predetermine the number of distress sales, and could only invoke them in a small number of cases, when no competing bids were filed and the licensee elected to sell at a lower price rather than risk an FCC investigation (see also Adarand Constructors v. Pena).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53738:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53741:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53741:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn order to combat segregation in public schools in compliance with court directives, the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) sought to enhance the quality of schools and to attract more white students from the suburbs. The KCMSD's ability to raise taxes, however, was limited by state law. After determining that the District did not have alternative means of raising revenue for the program, federal district judge Russell G. Clark ordered an increase of local property taxes for the 1991-92 fiscal year. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision, but ruled that the courts should enjoin state tax laws that prevented the District from raising the necessary funds and allow the state to set tax rates.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53741:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53741:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53741:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the District Court \"abused its discretion\" by imposing a specific tax increase. The Court also held, however, that the modifications of the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals satisfied \"equitable and constitutional principles governing the District Court's power....\" The majority found that court orders directing local governments to levy their own taxes were \"plainly\" judicial acts within the powers of federal courts. When a constitutional justification existed, courts had the authority to order tax increases despite statutory limitations. The Court reasoned that \"[t]o hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53741:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53748:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53748:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAccording to Arizona state law, after a person has been convicted of first-degree murder, there is a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether the punishment will be death or life imprisonment. The court must determine whether aggravating or mitigating factors were present. The judge imposes the death sentence if one or more aggravating factors are proven to exist.\nOn March 2, 1986, Jeffrey Alan Walton, Robert Hoover, and Sharold Ramsey went to a bar in Tucson intending to rob someone at random and steal that individual’s car. The three robbed Thomas Powell at gunpoint and forced him into his car that they drove into the desert. They later stopped the car, forced Powell to lie on the ground, and Walton shot him in the head. After the body was found, the coroner determined that the shot did not kill Powell, but rather that he died from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia from being left in the desert. Walton was convicted of first-degree murder.\nAt the sentencing hearing, the prosecution argued that two aggravating factors were present: the murder was committed in “an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner” and for the purposes of financial gain. The defense argued that mitigating factors were present in the form of Walton’s history of substance abuse, possible sexual abuse as a child, and the fact that he was 20 years old at the time of the trial. The court found that the aggravating factors were present, and the judge sentenced Walton to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53748:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53748:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53748:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the Arizona method of death penalty sentencing is not arbitrary and does not place an undue burden on the defendant. The burden on the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances exist is not unconstitutional because it does not lessen the burden on the prosecution to prove that aggravating circumstances exist. The Court also held that a determination by a judge rather than a jury is constitutional because a judge has a great deal more legal expertise than even a well-instructed jury and is better able to make fair determinations. The wording of the statute itself is sufficiently clear to prevent arbitrary sentencing.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the judicial history of death penalty cases is based on contradictory lines of logic. The courts have attempted to reduce discretionary decision-making while at the same time affording each case individualized examination. Because the discretionary rule has less basis in judicial history, he argues that it should not be a consideration in the constitutionality of death penalty cases.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the death penalty is always a cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the Arizona statute places an unconstitutional burden on the defendant to prove that the mitigating factors are “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” A defendant can produce evidence of mitigating factors that will have no weight if a judge determines them to lack the necessary significance. He also argued that the wording of the Arizona statute was too vague to provide sufficient guidance to the sentencing judge. Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent where he argued that the Sixth Amendment requires death penalty sentencing to be conducted by a jury rather than a judge. He also argued that the individual facts of a case should have a bearing on sentencing decisions and that to ignore the role of discretion in such decisions would be unjust.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53748:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53752:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53752:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSandra Ann Craig, the operator of a kindergarten and pre-school facility, was accused of sexually abusing a six-year-old child. Over Craig's objections, a trial court allowed the alleged child victim to testify via one-way closed circuit television. The child testified outside the courtroom while Mrs. Craig, through electronic communication with her lawyer, could make objections. The judge and jury also viewed the testimony in the courtroom. This was done in order to avoid the possibility of serious emotional distress for the child witness. The trial court convicted Craig, but the Maryland high court reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53752:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53752:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53752:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees criminal defendants face-to-face meetings with witnesses against them at trial, was not absolute. The Court found that \"in certain narrow circumstances, 'competing interests, if closely examined, may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial.\" The State's interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of children, the Court held, could be sufficiently important to outweigh defendants' rights to face their accusers in court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53752:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53758:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53758:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 13, 1985, Erwin Paul Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club, returned home with the proceeds from the annual coin convention, which Terry Brice Horton attended. Upon entering his garage, two robbers accosted Wallaker; one was armed with a machine gun and the other with an electric shocking device. They threw him to the ground, shocked him, bound him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During this interaction, Wallaker was able to identify Horton by the sound of his voice. The three witnesses who discovered Wallaker partially corroborated his identification of Horton. They saw someone leaving the scene carrying what looked like an umbrella.\nSergeant LaRault determined there was enough evidence to search Horton’s home, and obtained a warrant to do so. His affidavit for the search warrant described both the weapons and the proceeds of the robbery, but the warrant only granted permission to look for the stolen property. While searching Horton’s house, Sergeant LaRault did not find the property, but he did find an Uzi machine gun, a .38 caliber revolver, two stun guns, and a handcuff key, along with other items linking Horton to the crime.\nThe evidence was admitted into evidence at trial, and Horton was found guilty. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict, and the California Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s request for review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53758:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53758:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53758:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the seizure of evidence in plain view does not constitute the invasion of privacy that the Fourth Amendment is meant to prohibit. Once an officer has a warrant to search a suspect’s house, that officer may seize any obviously incriminating evidence that the officer finds in plain view. The Court also held that the “inadvertent” limitation does not limit the scope of the search further than the warrant itself does. In this case, since the warrant was specifically for the stolen property, the officer had to limit his search to the likely places where the property might be kept. Since the officer also had probable cause to believe that certain types of weapons were used in the commission of the crime, he could legally seize the weapons if they were found in the course of that search.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Fourth Amendment requires police officers to obtain specific warrants from impartial judges and to limit their searches to the items described. He defines the “inadvertent” limitation much more narrowly. It applies only when the officer is legally in a location and did not anticipate the discovery of such evidence. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53758:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53761:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53761:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Charter of the Colony of Georgia described the Savannah River as its border with South Carolina. The Treaty of Beaufort (Treaty) further refined this boundary, which has since been disputed several times. This case was the third case since the Treaty that disputed this boundary. A Special Master was appointed to help resolve the dispute and filed two reports on the issue. This case was brought before the Supreme Court after Georgia and South Carolina filed disputes with the Special Master's reports .", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53761:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53761:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53761:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the majority opinion. The Court agreed with the portion of the Special Master's report that held that the disputed Barnwell islands (Hog Island, Long Island, and Barnwell Island No. 3) rightfully belonged to South Carolina because of South Carolina's history of taxing, policing, and prosecuting activities on those islands. The Court also held that the islands that emerged after the Treaty of Beaufort (Treaty) had no effect on the boundary line between the two states. These islands were granted to whichever state held the side of the existing boundary on which they fell. The Court ruled in favor of the Special Master's conclusion regarding the location of the mouth of the Savannah River and overruled Georgia's exception that would have granted that state possession of Oyster Bed Island. Additionally, the Court ruled in favor of Georgia's objection to the \"right angle principle\" that the Special Master used to determine the boundary when there was an island that would alter the assumed border from the middle of the river. The Court also found that the Special Master correctly gave Denwill, Horseshoe Shoal, and the entirety of Bird Island to Georgia. Finally, the Court approved the Special Master's recommendation regarding the lateral seaward boundary.\nJustice White wrote an opinion dissenting in part in which he argued that the Special Master's use of the \"right angle principle\" was a reasonable approach that was consistent with the Court's prior decisions. Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion dissenting in part in which he argued that precedent favored South Carolina's exception to the lateral seaward boundary. In his separate opinion dissenting in part, Justice Scalia wrote that the facts do not support the Court's decision to award Denwill and Horseshoe Shoal to Georgia. Justice Kennedy also wrote a separate opinion dissenting in part in which he argued that every new island that is created by natural forces should belong to Georgia unless it has been specifically granted to South Carolina.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53761:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53762:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53762:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles Richmond worked as a welder at the Navy Public Works Center in San Diego, California until 1981, when the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approved his application to for a disability retirement. OPM determined that Richmond’s poor eyesight prevented him from performing his job and entitled him to receive the benefits for disabled federal employees who have completed five years of service. Before 1982, an individual was ineligible for disability benefits if, in each of the two succeeding calendar years, the individual earns at least 80 percent of the current pay of the position occupied immediately prior to retirement. In 1982, this requirement was amended so that an individual becomes ineligible if he earns at least 80 percent of the pay of the previous position in any succeeding calendar year. Until 1985, Richmond worked part time and his earnings were low enough to keep him eligible for disability benefits. In 1985, he had the opportunity to earn more money, so he contacted OPM to make sure he would remain eligible. OPM provided him with the old requirements but not the new ones. Richmond subsequently accepted overtime work, earned more, and became ineligible for disability benefits. He lost six months of disability pay.\nRichmond appealed the denial of benefits to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and argued that the fact that he received incorrect information from OPM prevented them from denying his benefits. The MSPB denied Richmond’s appeal for review. Richmond appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53762:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53762:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53762:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution explicitly states that no money can be paid from the Treasury unless specifically authorized by a statute. Since there is a statute that denies Richmond his benefits, and there is not one that provides an exception, the Court held that Richmond’s receipt of incorrect information cannot affect the non-payment of his benefits. Any precedent that would force the government to make a payment from the Treasury in contravention of a statute forbidding it would essentially nullify the Appropriations Clause. The Court also held that a ruling that made the government liable for the statements of all its agents would result in restrictions on public information that would be detrimental, especially to those of little means.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the majority’s opinion does not foreclose the possibility of statutory restrictions being overturned and government actions changed if they violate other commands of the Constitution. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in judgment. He argued that the majority opinion’s reliance on the Appropriations Clause is not relevant to the overall issues at hand in the case.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that there was precedent for the Court to interpret statutes loosely when a strict interpretation would produce results that Congress would not have desired. Since the legislative intent behind the creation of the federal disability benefit system was to provide for former government employees who are now disabled, the principles of equitability support Richmond’s continued receipt of his benefits. Justice Marshall also argued that the majority’s opinion refused to analyze the burden the government must bear because of the false information it provided. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53762:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53766:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53766:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen and resident of Mexico. In cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Mexican police officers apprehended and transported him to the U.S. border, where he was arrested for various narcotics-related offenses. Following his arrest, a DEA agent sought authorization to search Verdugo-Urquidez's residences for evidence. The Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police authorized the searches, but no search warrant from a U.S. magistrate was ever received. At trial, the district court granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53766:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53766:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53766:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The text of the Fourth Amendment concerns \"the people,\" suggesting a concern with persons who are part of the national community, as contrasted with aliens without any substantial connection to the U.S. Moreover, extraterritorial aliens are not even entitled to rights under the Fifth Amendment, which speaks in the relatively more universal term of \"person.\" And non-\"fundamental\" rights are not even guaranteed to inhabitants of unincorporated territories under U.S sovereign control, much less aliens. Therefore, any restrictions on searches and seizures of nonresident aliens and their foreign property must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty or legislation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53766:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53768:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53768:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTo qualify for federal funding under the Medicaid Act, states must submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services a plan that establishes a system by which healthcare providers will be reimbursed. Under the Boren Amendment, the reimbursement rates must be \"reasonable and adequate\" to meet the costs of efficiently operated facilities.\nIn 1986, a group of hospitals brought sought against the state of Virginia, arguing that its reimbursement rates (which had been approved in 1982 and again in 1986 by the Secretary) were not \"reasonable and adequate.\" The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals or organizations to bring suit for the \"deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws.\" Virginia argued that the Boren Amendment had not been intended to create a an enforceable right, but simply to provide guidelines for the Secretary to follow, and that the hospitals therefore could not bring suit under 1983. The state also argued that Congress had intended to prevent private parties from bringing suit to enforce the provisions of the Amendment. The District Court disagreed, allowing the suit to proceed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53768:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53768:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53768:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Boren Amendment clearly established a right to reasonable and adequate reimbursement rates for the hospitals. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the majority, stated that a right exists if \"the provision in question was intend[ed] to benefit the ... plaintiff.\" The requirement of reasonable rates was clearly intended to benefit the hospitals, so it amounted to a right under 1983. Without explicit language within the Amendment preventing private suits under 1983, or an alternative remedial scheme that would make such suits unnecessary, it was not reasonable to conclude that Congress had intended to prevent private suits to enforce the right it had created.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53768:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53771:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53771:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAround 6:30 p.m. on October 3, 1987, Thomas Corbin drove his car across the yellow line that separated lanes of traffic and struck two oncoming cars on Route 55 near LaGrange, New York. Assistant District Attorney Thomas Dolan arrived on the scene and learned that Brenda and Daniel Dirago, the driver and passenger of one of the cars, had been injured. Later that night, Dolan learned Brenda Dirago had died in the hospital. Corbin received two misdemeanor tickets, one for driving while intoxicated and one for failing to keep to the right of the median.\nCorbin pled guilty to both misdemeanors. The judge was unaware of the fatality the accident caused. On January 19, 1988, a grand jury indicted Corbin on charges of manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and reckless assault. Corbin filed a motion to dismiss the charges by arguing double jeopardy, but the county court denied the motion. Corbin sought a writ of prohibition to prevent further prosecution, which the Appellate Division denied. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53771:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53771:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53771:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars subsequent prosecution if the offenses share identical elements or if one is a lesser-included offense within the other. A second prosecution is also prohibited if the second trial would require a re-litigation of the same factual issues as the first one. Because the state would use the crimes of which Corbin had already been convicted in order to establish elements of the subsequent charges, the Court held that the secondary charges violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a dissent where she argued that the majority’s opinion was inconsistent with the Court’s decision in a previous case from that term and takes too broad a view of the Double Jeopardy Clause.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Double Jeopardy Clause only prevents double prosecution for the same offense, not necessarily the same action. He argued that the Clause had historically been interpreted as allowing multiple prosecutions if a single action violated multiple laws. He argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily complicated and limited the courts’ ability to try a person for multiple crimes stemming from the same action. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53771:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53772:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53772:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAtlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) is an integrated oil company that sells gasoline to consumers through its own retail stations as well as independent ARCO-brand stations. USA Petroleum (USA), a competitor of ARCO, is an independent retail marketer that purchases gasoline from major petroleum companies and resells it under its own brand name. USA sued ARCO under the Clayton Act in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that ARCO had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with the independent ARCO-brand stations to sell gasoline at below-market prices (the Clayton Act allows private parties to bring suit when they have been harmed by anticompetitive practices that violate the Sherman Act).\nThe District Court ruled for ARCO, finding that even if USA could prove the conspiracy, it would not be an \"antitrust injury\" to USA under the Clayton Act unless it could also prove that the pricing was predatory (that is, that it was intended to drive USA and other competitors out of business). It would be impossible to prove this, the District Court concluded, because ARCO was not dominant enough in the market to exert that sort of power.\nA divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that it was not necessary to show predatory intent to prove an \"antitrust inquiry.\" All that was necessary was a showing that the party bringing the suit had been harmed by price fixing carried out by the party being sued.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53772:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53772:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53772:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that it was necessary to prove predatory intent in order for a competitor to establish a private cause of action under the Clayton Act. According to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.'s majority opinion, the standard for competitors is different than for affiliated dealers or consumers because competitors would only bring suit when the low prices that resulted from the price-fixing scheme hurt their business. As long as these prices are not predatory, however, they are actually good for consumers and increase competition. Allowing competitors to sue without showing predatory intent would therefore decrease competition, exactly the opposite of the intent of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53772:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53773:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53773:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn an effort to comply by its duty to promote programming diversity, under the Communications Act of 1934, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted two minority preference policies. The first policy awarded preferences to minority ownership bids for licenses for new radio or television broadcasting stations. The second policy allowed radio or television broadcasters with questionable license qualifications, to avoid an FCC investigation of their actions by making a \"distress sale\" of their licenses to a legitimate minority outfit. Upon FCC approval, Faith Center Inc. \"distress sold\" its television license to Astroline's minority-owned outfit. Shurberg, a nonminority applicant for a similar license, sought appellate review of Astroline's award. The appellate court agreed, and invalidated the distress sale policy as unconstitutional. Astroline appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53773:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53773:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53773:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court, in the last opinion authorer by Justice William J. Brennan,Jr., held that the FCC's minority preference policies are constitutional because they provide appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and are aimed at the advancement of the legitimate congressional objective of program diversity. The FCC's minority preference policies were closely related to, and substantially advanced, Congress's legitimate interest in affording the public a diverse array of programming options. The availability of program diversity serves the entire viewing and listening public, not just minorities, and is therefore consistent with First Amendment values. Finally, the Court noted that the FCC's minority preference policy did not unduly burden nonminorities. The FCC did not predetermine the number of distress sales, and could only invoke them in a small number of cases, when no competing bids are filed and the licensee elects to sell at a lower price rather than risk an FCC investigation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53773:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53775:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53775:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter obtaining a warrant, Ohio police searched the home of Clyde Osborne and found explicit pictures of naked, sexually aroused male adolescents. Osborne was then prosecuted and found guilty of violating an Ohio law that made the possession of child pornography illegal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53775:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53775:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53775:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that Ohio could constitutionally proscribe the possession of child pornography. The Court argued that the case at hand was distinct from Stanley v. Georgia, \"because the interest underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley.\" Ohio did not rely on \"a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne's mind;\" rather, Ohio merely attempted to protect the victims of child pornography. The Court argued that regulations on production and distribution of child pornography were insufficient and could not dry up the market for pornographic materials. The Court also found that an error in jury instructions in the lower courts mandated Osborne be given a new trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53775:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53778:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53778:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn February 3, 1986, two men robbed a Godfather’s Pizza in Prince George’s County, Maryland. One of the men was wearing a red running suit. Later that day, the police obtained warrants for the arrest of Jerome Edward Buie and Lloyd Allen and put Buie’s house under surveillance. On February 5, the police arrested Buie in his house. Police found him hiding in the basement. Once Buie emerged and was handcuffed, an officer went down to determine if there was anyone else hiding. While in the basement, the officer saw a red running suit in plain view and seized it as evidence.\nThe trial court denied Buie’s motion to suppress the running suit evidence, and he was convicted. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53778:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53778:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53778:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the potential risk to police officers of another person on the arrest site must be weighed against the invasion of privacy. Because the arrest in this case happened in the suspect’s home, the officer was put at even greater risk because of the possibility of an ambush. This risk justified the protective sweep. The Court also held that a protective sweep was meant to be a cursory one, and not an in-depth search of the premises that would require a specific warrant.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the state has the burden to prove that the search was protective in nature. He argued that the state must show that the officers had a “reasonable basis” for believing that there was a risk to themselves.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that he disagreed with Justice John Paul Stevens. He argued that the protective sweep was an element of police safety procedure, so the state did not have as high of a burden as Justice Stevens’ concurrence implied.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that the protective sweep represented the type of intrusive unwarranted search that the Fourth Amendment was created to prevent. He also argued that the majority opinion’s limits as to the scope and timeliness of the protective search are not enough to prevent the police from abusing such an unwarranted search. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53778:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53780:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53780:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarsha Kokinda and Kevin Pearl were volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee. They set up a table on a sidewalk near a post office to solicit contributions and sell political literature. After post office employees received a large number of complaints, Kokinda and Pearl were asked to leave. They refused, at which point postal inspectors arrested them. They were charged and convicted of violating 39 CFR 232.1(h)(1)(1989), which prohibits \"soliciting alms and contributions ... on postal premises.\" They appealed the convictions, arguing that they violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court, ruling that the sidewalk in question (which was entirely on Postal Service property and was intended only for traffic to and from the Post Office) was not a public forum, found that the restrictions were reasonable and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. On appeal, however, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the sidewalk was a traditional public forum and that the government's regulations were therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Because the government had no significant interest in banning solicitation, the convictions were unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53780:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53780:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53780:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a divided opinion, the Court ruled that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for a four-member plurality, wrote that the sidewalk was not a public forum. \"Regulation of speech activity on governmental property that has been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity, such as public streets and parks, is examined under strict scrutiny. ... But regulation of speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment activity is examined only for reasonableness.\" The need to prevent solicitors from interrupting postal business satisfied this \"reasonableness\" test, so the convictions were constitutional. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing separately, held that it was unnecessary to determine whether the sidewalk was a public forum because the regulation met the traditional standard applied to time, place, and manner restrictions of protected expression.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53780:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53784:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53784:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986, the Michigan State Police Department created a sobriety checkpoint program aimed at reducing drunk driving within the state. The program included guidelines governing the location of roadblocks and the amount of publicity to be given to the operation. Before the first roadblock went into effect, Rick Sitz, a licensed Michigan driver, challenged the checkpoints and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Sitz was victorious in the Michigan lower courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53784:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53784:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53784:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the roadblocks did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that \"no one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it.\" The Court then found that \"the weight bearing on the other scale--the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints--is slight.\" The Court also found that empirical evidence supported the effectiveness of the program.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53784:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53790:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53790:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Milkovich, Maple Heights High School’s wrestling coach, testified at a hearing concerning a physical altercation at a recent wrestling meet. After the hearing, Theodore Diadiun published an article in the local newspaper saying that anyone at the wrestling meet “knows in their heart” that Milkovich lied at the hearing. Milkovich sued Diadiun and the paper for defamation, alleging that the article accused him of perjury, damaged his occupation, and constituted libel. The court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that Milkovich failed to show the article was published with actual malice. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.\nOn remand, the trial court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that the article was a constitutionally-protected opinion. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded, holding that Milkovich was not a public figure and the defamatory statements were factual assertions, not constitutionally-protected opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53790:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53790:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53790:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that there is no special constitutional privilege for opinions. The statements in the newspaper were sufficiently factual to be proved true or false. Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, expressing that the statements could not reasonably be interpreted as defamatory. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53790:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53796:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53796:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRosalie Tung was an Asian-American professor who believed that she was denied tenure because of her sex and her race. To investigate her claim, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission asked the University for access to Tung's confidential peer review file. Citing the protection of academic freedom, the University refused to cooperate so as to avoid breaching the confidentiality promised to reviewers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53796:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53796:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53796:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA unanimous Court held that the need to ferret out invidious discrimination served a compelling government interest which justified inspection of confidential files. Since the EEOC was not interested in forcing the University to accept specific standards for promotion and it did not attempt to control the content of speech on campus, Justice Blackmun dismissed Pennsylvania's argument that the EEOC's actions violated academic freedom.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53796:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53799:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53799:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 1, 1984, officers of the New York City Police Department found Thelma Staton murdered in her apartment. Various facts of the case linked Bernard Harris to the crime. On January 16, police officers responded to Harris’ house to take him into custody. Although the police had not obtained an arrest warrant, when they knocked on his door, Harris let them enter. The police officers read Harris his Miranda rights, and Harris admitted to committing the murder. The police officers arrested Harris and took him to the police station, where he was read his Miranda rights again and signed an inculpatory statement. The police then videotaped an incriminating interview between Harris and the district attorney, despite Harris' requests to cease the interrogation.\nThe trial court suppressed Harris’ initial confession and video interview but allowed the signed statement into evidence. After a bench trial, Harris was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed and found the signed statement inadmissible because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53799:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53799:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53799:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule was designed to protect the physical sanctity of the home, not to grant criminal suspects protection from statements made outside the premises when the police have probable cause for arrest. Since the police had probable cause for an arrest, Harris was not unlawfully in custody when he was read his Miranda rights at the station and made the statement in question.\nIn his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that Harris’ arrest without a warrant and without exigent circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment, and the signed statement was therefore inadmissible because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest. He argued that the exclusionary rule was meant to prevent police officers from violating the Fourth Amendment in general, and it did not specifically apply to the home. He also argued that there is no evidence that a statement made at the police station is removed from the taint of an illegal arrest. Whether or not Harris was unlawfully in custody at the time his statement was made, he was in custody as a result of an illegal arrest, so the statement was still affected. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53799:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53800:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53800:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in an automobile accident which left her in a \"persistent vegetative state.\" She was sustained for several weeks by artificial feedings through an implanted gastronomy tube. When Cruzan's parents attempted to terminate the life-support system, state hospital officials refused to do so without court approval. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state's policy over Cruzan's right to refuse treatment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53800:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53800:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53800:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that while individuals enjoyed the right to refuse medical treatment under the Due Process Clause, incompetent persons were not able to exercise such rights. Absent \"clear and convincing\" evidence that Cruzan desired treatment to be withdrawn, the Court found the State of Missouri's actions designed to preserve human life to be constitutional. Because there was no guarantee family members would always act in the best interests of incompetent patients, and because erroneous decisions to withdraw treatment were irreversible, the Court upheld the state's heightened evidentiary requirements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53800:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53801:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53801:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Section 2 of a Minnesota statute regulating a minor's access to abortion, women under 18 were denied access to the procedure until 48 hours after both their parents had been notified. Exceptions were made in the cases of medical emergencies and women who were victims of parental abuse. Section 6 of the law allowed the courts to judicially bypass Section 2 if the young woman could maturely demonstrate that notification would be unwise.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53801:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53801:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53801:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found Section 2 of the statute unconstitutional because requiring notification of both parents, whether or not both wanted to know or had taken responsibility for raising the child, did not serve a legitimate state interest. The Court favored notification of only one parent and a 48 hour waiting period. The Court upheld Section 6 of the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53801:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53805:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53805:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames was a youth arrested for the murder of another adolescent. During his trial a witness testifying on his behalf described James's appearance on the night of the supposed crime. This description contradicted statements which James had made to police officers the day after the crime. To expose this perjured testimony, prosecutors moved to introduce James's statements into the trial even though they were obtained illegally.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53805:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53805:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53805:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the statements could not be used. Justice Brennan argued that prosecutors are allowed to introduce illegally obtained evidence when using it to impeach a defendant's own testimony. However, in this case, the Illinois Supreme Court wrongly expanded that practice making it applicable to all defense witnesses. Brennan concluded that this expansion \"would frustrate rather than further the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53805:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53812:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53812:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFMC Corporation (FMC) provided its employees with a self-funded health benefit plan (Plan). The daughter of an FMC employee, Gerald Holliday (Holliday), was seriously injured in a car accident and the Plan paid for a portion of her medical expenses. Holliday also received, in settlement of a negligence action he brought on behalf of his daughter, payment from the driver of the automobile in which his daughter was injured. FMC sought reimbursement under the terms of the Plan. Holliday obtained a declaratory judgment that Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law - which precludes reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery for benefit payments by a program, group contract, or other arrangement - prohibited FMC's exercise of subrogation rights. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which applies to employee welfare benefit plans such as FMC's Plan, did not preempt Section 1720.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53812:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53812:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53812:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Three provisions of ERISA speak to the question of preemption: the preemption clause, the saving clause, and the deemer clause. The preemption clause establishes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that \"relate[s] to\" an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. The saving clause returns to the states the power to enforce those state laws that \"regulat[e] insurance.\" The deemer clause dictates that an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be deemed an insurance matter. The Pennsylvania law is covered by the preemption clause since it relates to an employee benefit plan. It also falls within the saving clause because it invalidates certain insurance subrogation provisions. The deemer clause, however, exempts self-funded ERISA plans from being governed by state laws regulating insurance within the meaning of the saving clause. As a result, Section 1720 is preempted insofar as it prohibits FMC's self funded Plan from exercising its subrogation rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53812:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53815:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53815:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn May 5, 1983, an Eastern Airlines flight departed from Miami, bound for the Bahamas. After takeoff, one of the plane’s jet engines lost pressure. The flight crew shut down the failing engine and turned the plan around to return to Miami. The flight crew informed the passengers that the plane would be ditched in the Atlantic Ocean, but the crew managed to restart the engine and land the plane safely at Miami International Airport. A group of passengers, including Rose Marie Floyd, sued Eastern Airlines for mental distress caused by the incident. Eastern Airlines argued the engine failure and preparations for ditching the plane amounted to an accident under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and also that Article 17 requires physical injury a condition of liability. The district court concluded than mental distress alone is not enough to receive compensation under Article 17. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held the language in Article 17 encompasses purely emotional distress.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53815:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53815:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53815:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Thurgood Marshall deliver the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention does not allow recovery for purely mental injuries. The translation of the direct language of the Convention can only be interpreted as “bodily injury,” which is consistent with the negotiating history of the Convention.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53815:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53816:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53816:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nShirley Irwin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he had been unlawfully fired by the federal Veterans Administration on the basis of his race and disability. In order to sue the federal government for unlawful discrimination, one must obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC (which is a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity from private suits). The EEOC mailed right-to-sue letters to both Irwin and his attorney. His attorney was out of the country, however, so while the letter arrived at his office on March 23, the attorney did not receive it until April 10. Irwin receive his copy of the letter on April 7. Less than a month from when Irwin received the letter, but more than a month from when the letter arrived at his attorney's office, Irwin filed suit in federal District Court. The court dismissed the suit, however, because it was filed more than a month after the attorney's office received the letter. Under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c), suits against the government must be filed within 30 days \"of receipt of notice of final action taken\" by the EEOC. The court ruled that the 30-day window began when the attorney's office received the letter. On appeal, Irwin argued that the window should have started when he or his attorney - not just the attorney's office - actually received the letter. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, however, upholding the District Court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53816:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53816:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53816:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe 30-day window begins as soon as either the attorney's office, the attorney, or the client receives notification - whichever comes first. In an opinion written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that lower courts have consistently held that notice to an attorney's office qualifies as notice to the client. \"The practical effect of a contrary rule would be to encourage factual disputes about when actual notice was received, and thereby create uncertainty in an area of the law where certainty is much to be desired,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53816:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53817:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53817:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo police officers dressed in street clothes and wearing jackets with the word “Police” on the front and back were on patrol in Oakland, California in an unmarked car. As they approached a group of youths near Foothill Blvd. and 63rd Ave., the youths panicked and ran. One of the officers left the car and ran after Hodari D. Hodari tossed away something that looked like a small rock just before the officer tackled him and handcuffed him. The officer retrieved the rock, which turned out to be crack cocaine.\nAt trial, Hodari moved to suppress evidence relating to the cocaine, arguing that the officer obtained it during an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Hodari was “seized” when he saw the officer running towards him and that seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The California Supreme Court denied the state’s application for review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53817:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53817:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53817:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that a Fourth Amendment seizure requires some sort of physical force with lawful authority, or submission to an assertion of authority. Hodari had not been touched when he discarded the cocaine, and had not submitted to authority because he was still attempting to escape.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented, writing that a seizure takes place when a police officer conveys the message that a citizen is not free to leave. In this situation, when the officer started chasing Hodari, he made it clear that Hodari was not free to leave. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53817:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53826:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53826:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing his conviction under Michigan law for possession of over 650 grams of cocaine, Ronald Harmelin was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Harmelin challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual, claiming it was disproportionate to the crime he committed and was statutorily mandated without consideration for the fact that he had no prior felony convictions. On appeal from an affirmance by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53826:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53826:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53826:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that since the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality guarantee, the determination of whether a punishment is \"cruel and unusual\" is not made with reference to the particular offense. Moreover, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause protects against unusual methods of punishment, not necessarily cruel ones. As such, while Harmelin's life sentence may have been cruel, it was not constitutionally unusual or unprecedented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53826:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53827:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53827:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile detained at the Hocking Correctional Facility in Nelsonville, Ohio, Pearly Wilson claimed he experienced cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Wilson sought financial awards and an injunction against the prison under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He filed suit in a federal district court against two state prison officials, Richard P. Seiter and Carl Humphreys. The District Court ruled against Wilson, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that Wilson had to show that the prison officials had a \"culpable state of mind\" when inflicting harm upon him.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53827:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53827:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53827:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court referred to its earlier decisions in Francis v. Resweber and Estelle v. Gamble to establish that cruel and unusual punishment required the \"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.\" For this to occur, the prison officials had to exhibit intentional cruelty, which would result in a \"culpable state of mind.\" However, \"deliberate indifference\" to a prisoner's conditions also constituted abusive treatment according to this standard. Therefore the Court of Appeals should have considered this aspect of Wilson's grievances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53827:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53828:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53828:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Louisiana Supreme Court had 7 judges. The First Supreme Court District elected 2 judges, and the 5 other districts elected 1 judge each. The Orleans Parish was 1 of 4 parishes in the First Supreme Court District and the majority of its registered voters were black. However, more than 75% of the other 3 parishes' registered voters were white. Ronald Chisom and the other petitioners in this case, representing New Orleans's black majority, filed an action in the District Court against Louisiana's governor, Charles E. Roemer, and state officials, arguing that the state's justice election procedure weakened the minority's voting power, allegedly violating section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The 1982 amendment to this act prohibited any voting procedure which caused minority voters to \"have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.\" The District Court ruled against the petitioners. When the Court of Appeals evaluated the case, it sent the case back to the District Court with instructions to maintain the original ruling based partly on its claim that the 1982 amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the election of judges. The District Court maintained their original opinion, but the petitioners and the United States appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53828:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53828:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53828:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a majority decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court rejected the possibility that Congress had intended for the 1982 amendment to exclude judicial elections. The Court determined that if Congress had that aim, it would have indicated this exclusion explicitly. Consequently, the Court favored a broad interpretation of the word \"representative\" in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, considering it to encompass all winners of popular elections. Thus, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, sending the original case back to be reevaluated in light of the reversal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53828:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53832:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53832:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen arrested for armed robbery, Paul McNeil did not initially invoke his Miranda right to counsel provided by the Fifth Amendment. However, he had a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing at a county court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. After the hearing, sheriffs asked him about his involvement in a unrelated set of crimes, including murder. The sheriffs informed McNeil of his Miranda rights again, but he signed a waiver authorizing his testimony. His answers incriminated him for the crimes and he was charged in a state trial court. He unsuccessfully petitioned the court to invalidate his testimony as evidence. A jury convicted him and sentenced him to 60 years in prison. He contended that having the public defender represent him invoked his Miranda rights, which were later violated. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against him.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53832:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53832:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53832:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Sixth Amendment ensures competent legal representation in courts of law, whereas the Fifth Amendment ensures adequate counsel when confronting police. Because the Amendments have different purposes, invoking the Sixth Amendment by retaining a public defender does not invoke the Fifth Amendment when speaking with the police about an unrelated criminal charge. The Court reasoned that \"[o]ne might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel present concerning many matters, but not the matter under prosecution.\" McNeil's decision to have a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing for armed robbery could not possibly indicate the choices he wished to make in the future regarding other confrontations with police.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53832:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53835:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53835:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1972, a federal district court issued an injunction ordering the Board of Education of Oklahoma City to implement the \"Finger Plan,\" which bused black students to white schools. In 1977, the district court withdrew its enforcement of the plan, declaring that the Board had complied with the plan and reached \"unitary\" racial composition. In 1984, the Board passed the Student Reassignment Plan (SRP), which lessened busing in an effort to reduce travel time for black students. The group that originally protested segregation sought to restore the court-ordered desegregation, claiming that the school system again became segregated. The district court declined, but on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the injunction was never formally removed. On reconsideration, the district court again declined to restore the injunction because it found the original \"Finger Plan\" unworkable. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53835:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53835:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53835:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 5-3 court. The Court held that the \"federal supervision of local school systems [has always] been intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination.\" Once a school system demonstrates earnest compliance with an injunction, the federal court can consider removing it. The district court's finding in 1977 that the plan had achieved its goal of racially \"unitary\" schools was not sufficiently clear to dissolve the 1972 injunction. Instead, the district court could remove the injunction upon finding that \"that the school system was being operated in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, and that it was unlikely that the Board would return to its former ways.\" If the Board satisfied these goals, the district court could remove the injunction and consider the SRP separately and on its own merits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53835:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53837:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53837:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1987, Arkansas amended its Gross Receipts Act (GRA), imposing a tax on cable television but not on print media. Cable companies and others filed suit in the State Chancery Court, alleging that taxing cable services, but not print and satellite broadcast services, violated their First Amendment expressive rights and 14th Amendment equal protection rights. In 1989, after the Chancery Court upheld the amendment, Arkansas again amended the GRA, extending the tax to satellite broadcast services. On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the GRA. However, the court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits differential taxation among members of the same medium. Therefore, because cable and scrambled satellite television services are essentially the same, the tax was unconstitutional when it applied only to cable services.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53837:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53837:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53837:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held 7-2 that without the intent or effect of suppressing expression, the First Amendment allows differential taxation of different media and differential taxation of some members of the same medium. Specifically, the Court held that the GRA was a generally applicable sales tax, and that its burden on cable television, while exempting the print media, was content-neutral, not directed at a select few, and not intended to interfere with expression. The Court went on to rule that the First Amendment allows a differential tax burden on some members of pay television services (that is, a tax on cable but not satellite services), if the tax is not intended to suppress expression. The Court ordered the State Supreme Court to address the 14th Amendment claim on remand. Dissenting, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, argued that the First Amendment non-discrimination principle prohibits a heavier tax burden on one medium and not other media.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53837:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53845:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53845:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCentennial Savings Bank exchanged interests in one set of mortgage loans for another set of mortgage loans of the same market value. The mortgages were worth substantially less at the time they were exchanged than they had been at the time they were acquired, however, and Centennial reported the difference as lost income on its income tax return. In a separate set of transactions, Centennial collected early withdrawal penalties from customers who withdrew their certificates of deposit before they were scheduled. Centennial reported the early withdrawal penalties as \"income from the discharge ... of indebtedness,\" meaning that it did not need to be reported as income under 26 U.S.C. 108(a)(1)(C).\nWith regard to the exchanged mortgages, the IRS did not allow the deduction, ruling that the properties exchanged had not been \"materially different\" and that the exchange therefore did not actually produce a reportable loss. With regard to the withdrawal penalties, the IRS ruled that they had to be reported as income. Centennial took the issue to federal District Court, where a judge ruled for the IRS on the mortgage exchange issue but for Centennial on the withdrawal penalty one. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the mortgage exchange holding and upheld the withdrawal penalty holding, siding with Centennial on both issues.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53845:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53845:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53845:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. On the exchanged mortgage question, the Supreme Court referred to a companion case, Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 499 U.S. 554, decided at the same time, in holding that the mortgages exchanged were \"materially different\" and could therefore be deducted as losses.\nOn the question of early withdrawal penalties, however, the Court sided with the IRS. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the majority, stated that income comes from the \"discharge ... of indebtedness\" only when it is the result of the forgiveness of an obligation to repay assumed by the debtor (in this case the bank) at the outset of the debtor-creditor relationship. Because the early withdrawal fee was stipulated in the contract agreed upon at the outset of the certificate of deposit agreements, its payment was not the forgiveness of any obligation on behalf of the bank but rather the fulfillment of an obligation on behalf of the creditor. The bank was therefore required to list the penalties as income.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53845:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53847:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53847:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFor certain contract disputes within admiralty jurisdiction, an action in rem is authorized against the vessel herself, even when jurisdiction cannot be asserted over her owner or operator. To satisfy a judgment for the plaintiff, the court may order the vessel sold at public auction. Such an action is permitted those who go unpaid after furnishing a vessel with supplies essential for her continued voyaging. But maritime law long distinguished the contracts of middlemen, that is, agents or brokers procuring supplies for a vessel from other sources. Such intermediary contracts were considered ordinary agency agreements, and therefore outside admiralty jurisdiction. The Supreme Court embraced this distinction in Minturn v. Minyard, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 477 (1854).\nIn this case, EXXON sued a cargo ship, the William Hopper, in rem and her owner, Central Gulf Lines, in personam for the price of fuel delivered to the ship in the ports of New York and Jeddah. Exxon had a contract with Waterman Steamship Company to supply fuel for its fleet anywhere in the world. Sometimes EXXON furnished its own fuels; otherwise, EXXON procured fuels from other sellers. Among the vessels operated by Waterman was the William Hopper, leased from Central Gulf Lines. When she visited New York, Exxon supplied her with its own fuel. When she visited Jeddah, EXXON got her fuel from Arabian Marine Operating Company. EXXON paid Arabian Marine, but Waterman went bankrupt before paying EXXON. In the bankruptcy proceedings, Central Gulf agreed to pay EXXON if a court found the William Hooper liable in rem. Invoking Minturn and its progeny, the Southern District of New York agreed with Central Gulf Lines that Exxon's claim for the fuel procured in Jeddah was one of agency, and therefore outside admiralty jurisdiction. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed without opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53847:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53847:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53847:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. A unanimous Court reversed and remanded, finding Minturn v. Maynard obsolete in light of subsequent developments in maritime law. Because the modern test for admiralty jurisdiction in contract cases turns not on the contract's type but on its purpose, a contract like this one between EXXON and Waterman, i.e., an agency contract for services maritime in nature, ought to qualify.\nAbstract prepared by Professor John Paul Jones, University of Richmond School of Law", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53847:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53848:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53848:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCalifornia police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Acevedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle ( U.S. v. Ross ), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container ( U.S. v. Chadwick ). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53848:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53848:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53848:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the \"automobile exception\" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a \"curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile.\" In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: \"The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.\" Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53848:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53850:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53850:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrank Garner was convicted of defrauding Coy Grogan and ordered to repay him. Garner then filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, asking the Bankruptcy Court to discharge (that is, nullify) his court-ordered repayment to Grogan. Grogan argued that the debt should not be discharged because section 523(a) of the bankruptcy code exempts obligations for money obtained by \"actual fraud.\" The Bankruptcy Court, based on portions of the fraud case, agreed and did not allow Garner to discharge the debt. The District Court affirmed, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the standard of proof used in the original fraud case - the \"preponderance of the evidence\" standard - was lower than the standard of proof demanded under section 523(a) - a \"clear and convincing evidence\" standard. The Court found that most states used the \"clear and convincing\" standard in fraud cases and that Congress would have explicitly stated it if they used a different standard. Moreover, it argued that the intention of the bankruptcy code to provide a \"fresh start\" suggested that the standard most favorable to bankruptcy filers should be used (that is, the more demanding \"clear and convincing\" standard).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53850:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53850:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53850:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nCourts should apply the \"preponderance of the evidence\" standard. Justice John Paul Stevens, for a unanimous Supreme Court, wrote that the lack of a specified standard of evidence in section 523(a) implied that Congress had intended the preponderance of the evidence standard to be used. That lower standard was generally used in civil actions between private parties (including bankruptcy filings) unless particularly important interests were at stake. Protecting a bankruptcy filer who had previously been convicted of fraud was not sufficiently important to demand a higher level of evidence.\nStevens also wrote that the \"fresh start\" intention of the bankruptcy laws did not suggest a higher standard of evidence. \"In the same breath that we have invoked this 'fresh start policy,\" he wrote, \"we have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor.'\" A debtor previously convicted of fraud did not fit this description.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53850:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53852:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53852:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department officers regularly boarded buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to search their luggage. Terrance Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search his belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining Bostick's permission, the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. Following an affirmance and certification from the Florida Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that the bus searches were per se unconstitutional because police did not afford passengers the opportunity to \"leave the bus\" in order to avoid questioning. Florida appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53852:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53852:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53852:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court, in a 6-to-3 decision, noted that when deciding if a search request is overly coercive, within a confined space such as a bus, one must not look at whether a party felt \"free to leave,\" but whether a party felt free to decline or terminate the search encounter. The Court held that in the absence of intimidation or harassment, Bostick could have refused the search request. Moreover, the fact that he knew the search would produce contraband had no bearing on whether his consent was voluntarily obtained. The test of whether a \"reasonable person\" felt free to decline or terminate a search presupposes his or her innocence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53852:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53854:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53854:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act, which established five categories, or “schedules,” of substances for the purposes of regulation and prosecution. The Act grants the Attorney General the authority to add or remove substances and to move substances among the schedules. The Act also lays out specific procedures in order for the Attorney General to exercise this authority. Because the procedures lengthened the process of making any changes to the enforcement of the Act, drug manufacturers were able to develop products that took advantage of unforeseen loopholes in the Act. In 1984, Congress amended the Act to allow the Attorney General to temporarily schedule drugs, which expedited the enforcement process. The Attorney General then delegated these temporary scheduling powers to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which temporarily scheduled the designer drug “Euphoria” as a Schedule I substance.\nDuring this time, the DEA executed a valid search warrant on the home of Daniel and Lyrissa Touby, where they found a fully operational Euphoria laboratory. The Toubys were indicted for manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture Euphoria. They moved for dismissal by arguing that the Controlled Substances Act unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Attorney General and the Attorney General improperly delegated authority to the DEA. The district court denied the motion, and the Toubys were convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53854:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53854:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53854:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the nondelegation doctrine allows Congress to seek the assistance of other branches of government by leaving a certain degree of discretion up to other actors. By providing sufficient guidance to, and placing specific restrictions on, the Attorney General in the Controlled Substances Act, Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power. The Court also held that the Act permits the Attorney General to delegate authority to other officers and employees of the Department of Justice, so the delegation to the Drug Enforcement Agency was appropriate.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that the Controlled Substances Act allows judicial review as a method of ensuring the constitutionality of the temporary scheduling and delegation. He also argued that the issue of delegation of powers within a branch of government is addressed by the Due Process Clause, and the majority’s decision does not examine the case within that framework.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53854:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53861:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53861:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohnson Controls, Inc. (\"Johnson\") manufactures batteries whose assembly process entails exposure to high levels of lead. After discovering that eight of its female employees became pregnant while maintaining blood lead levels in excess of those thought safe by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Johnson barred all its female employees - except those with medically documented infertility - from engaging in tasks that require exposure to lead in access of recommended OSHA levels. Following its passage, the United Automobile Workers (UAW) challenged Johnson's fetal-protection policy as sexually discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Act). When the Appellate Court affirmed a district court decision in favor of Johnson, the UAW appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53861:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53861:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53861:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, the Court noted that even well intentioned proposals are forbidden if they result in discrimination. Johnson's fetal-protection plan discriminated against women by not requiring their male counterparts to demonstrate proof of medical sterility, despite the fact that lead exposure has also proved hazardous to male reproductive systems. The Court added that Johnson's fetal-protection plan fell outside the bona fide occupational qualification exception of Title VII, since the exception only permits employers to discriminate based on qualities that detrimentally impact on an employee's job performance. In the present case, although lead exposure may be harmful to the unborn, Johnson furnished no proof that it detracted from its female employees' abilities to perform any of their essential tasks.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53861:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53868:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53868:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Article V, Section 26, of Missouri's Constitution, state court judges must retire at the age of seventy. The two petitioners in this case, both of whom were Missouri state judges, challenged the state constitution's retirement requirement on legislative and constitutional grounds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53868:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53868:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53868:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. Missouri's mandatory retirement requirement for its state court judges did not violate either the ADEA or the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In addition to emphasizing Missouri's, or any other state's, Tenth Amendment right to define the qualifications of its highest state officials, the Court held that the regulations of the ADEA did not apply to \"policy-making\" appointees such as state court judges. With respect to the petitioners' Equal Protection challenge, the Court employed a rational basis test to examine whether a rational relationship existed between Missouri's goal of promoting competent state court judges and its retirement requirement. Noting the connection between increasing age and declining mental and physical capacities, the Court held that Missouri's retirement requirement for judges who reach the age of seventy was not unreasonable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53868:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53873:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53873:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Dade County police officer overheard Enio Jimeno arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone. He followed in his car, and eventually pulled Jimeno over for a traffic violation. He told him he had reason to believe Jimeno had drugs in the car, and asked for permission to search it. Jimeno consented, and a search revealed a brown paper bag with cocaine inside it. At trial, Jimeno argued that his consent to the search of the car did not extend to the closed paper bag within the car. The trial court agreed, excluded the drugs found inside the bag as the product of an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court both affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53873:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53873:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53873:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. \"The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,\" wrote Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in the majority opinion. \"We think it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53873:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53875:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53875:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe national government provides funds for family planning services (Title X). The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations limiting the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities. Title X funds were to be used only to support preventive family planning services.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53875:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53875:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53875:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The intent of Congress in the enactment of Title X is ambiguous with regard to abortion counseling. Consequently, the Court will defer to the expertise of the administrative agency. The Court held that the \"regulations promulgated by the Secretary [of HHS] do not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful constitutional questions' that would lead us to assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance.\" Should government subsidize one protected right (family planning), as it does in this case, it does not follow that government must subsidize analogous counterpart rights (abortion services).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53875:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53891:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53891:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Tennessee court tried Pervis Payne for murdering Charisse Christopher and her daughter Lacie. In hopes of avoiding the death penalty, Payne provided four witnesses testifying to his good character. The prosecution had Charisse's mother share how Charisse's death had impacted her surviving son Nicholas. In closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced Nicholas' loss of his mother when calling for the death penalty. The jury convicted him and sentenced him to death. Payne argued that the prosecution could not use testimony of how the victim's death impacted family members when contending for the death penalty. The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled against him.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53891:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53891:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53891:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court overruled Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers which prohibited the submission of evidence relating to the harms caused by the victim's death. The Court reasoned that since \"[v]irtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances,\" the prosecution must be allowed to submit similar counter evidence. Evidence regarding the \"assessment of the harm caused by the defendant has long been an important factor in determining the appropriate punishment, and victim impact evidence is simply another method of informing the sentencing authority about such harm.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53891:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53893:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53893:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert S. Minnick and James Dyess escaped from the Clark County Jail. The next day, they broke into a mobile home to search for weapons. While in the home, the owner returned with a friend and the friend’s infant son. Minnick and Dyess shot and killed the two adults and tied up two young women who arrived later. Minnick and Dyess fled to Mexico, but after a falling out, Minnick went to California alone where police arrested him on a warrant for the Mississippi murders.\nAfter the arrest, two FBI officers came to interview Minnick at the San Diego Jail. Minnick refused, asking the officers to “Come back Monday when I have a lawyer.” Minnick did meet with an appointed lawyer on two or three occasions. The next Monday, the deputy sheriff of Clark County came to question Minnick. Prison officials told Minnick he “could not refuse” to speak to the sheriff. The deputy sheriff advised Minnick of his rights and Minnick refused to sign a waiver form. Minnick then confessed to one of the murders, saying that Dyess forced him to shoot. At trial, Minnick moved to suppress those statements, but the court denied the motion, reasoning that Edwards v Arizona only required counsel to be made available to an accused. Minnick argued that he was entitled to have counsel present at all questioning. The jury found Minnick guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, holding that Minnick’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel was satisfied because he had met with counsel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53893:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53893:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53893:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-2 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that once counsel is requested, no interrogation can take place without counsel unless the accused waives that right. The right to counsel is not satisfied by merely meeting with counsel outside the interrogation room. The Edwards protection did end as soon as an accused meets with counsel.\nJustice Antonin Scalia dissented, writing that there was no justification for creating a rebuttable presumption that an accused has not waived his right to counsel after invoking that right. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53893:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53895:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53895:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCohen was a campaign associate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race. He gave court records concerning another party's candidate for lieutenant governor to the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. Though he had received a promise of confidentiality from the reporters, the papers identified Cohen in their stories. He was fired as a result. Cohen sued the papers in state court, alleging a breach of contract. At trial, Cohen won compensatory damages and the state appellate court upheld the award. But the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Cohen's claim relied on state \"promissory estoppel\" law, a law that essentially prevented a promisor from breaking a promise. The court ruled that the First Amendment's free press guarantee prevented promissory estoppel from applying to the newspapers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53895:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53895:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53895:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Byron White, the Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel suit against the press. The Court first affirmed that such a cause of action, though private, triggered the First Amendment's protection. But the Court went on to rule that the state's promissory estoppel law was generally applicable and did not target the press. The law's enforcement against the press thus did not require stricter scrutiny than would its enforcement against other individuals or institutions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53895:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53902:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53902:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRural Telephone Service Company, Inc. is a public utility that provides telephone service to several communities in northwest Kansas. Rural also publishes a telephone directory that consists of white and yellow pages. Feist Publications, Inc. is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories that cover a much larger geographic range than Rural's directories. When Rural refused to license its white pages listings to Feist, Feist extracted the listings it needed from Rural's directory without consent. Although Feist altered many of Rural's listings, several were identical to listings in Rural's white pages. The District Court granted summary judgment to Rural in its copyright infringement suit, holding that telephone directories are copyrightable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53902:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53902:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53902:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural's combined white and yellow pages directory. The Court reasoned that Rural's white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection because the information they contained lacked the requisite originality, as Rural had not selected, coordinated, or arranged the uncopyrightable facts in any original way. \"Because Rural's white pages lack the requisite originality, Feist's use of the listings cannot constitute infringement,\" wrote Justice O'Connor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53902:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53904:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53904:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFirst American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI) began a \"freeze-out\" merger in which the First American Bank of Virginia (Bank) merged into Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI), a wholly owned subsidiary of FABI. VBI already owned 85% of the Bank's shares, and would acquire the remaining 15% from the Bank's minority shareholders. The Bank's executive committee and full board approved the merger at $42 a share. The directors then solicited proxies for voting on the proposed merger at the next annual meeting. In their solicitation, the directors stated that they approved the plan because the price allowed the minority shareholders to achieve a \"high\" value for their stock. Sandberg did not give her approval of the merger and brought suit, the federal ground for which was soliciting proxies in violation of SEC Rule 14a-9, which prohibits the solicitation of proxies by means of materially false or misleading statements. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find for Sandberg as long as the proxy solicitation involved material misstatements, and the proxy solicitation was an \"essential link\" in the merger process. The jury found for Sandberg, awarding her $18 a share, finding that she would have received that much more if the stock had been valued adequately.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53904:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53904:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53904:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no, respectively. Terms like \"high value,\" in a commercial context, are reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis, and so could be shown to be misleading by garden-variety evidence. Furthermore, they can be materially misleading even if other information is available in the statement upon which an expert could deduce that they are false. A proxy statement should inform, not challenge the reader's critical wits. However, the link between the statement and the merger process is too speculative and too procedurally intractable to find an implied private right of action in cases in which the minority shareholders' votes are not required by law or corporate bylaw, and where the plaintiff's theory is that the vote was cosmetic.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53904:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53905:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53905:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder 26 U.S.C. 7443A(b), the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court (an Article I Court established by Congress) may appoint special trial judges to certain specified proceedings explicitly laid out in the statute, in which the special trial judges may issue decisions. He may also appoint them to \"any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate,\" but in those unspecified cases the special trial judge may not issue a final decision, only draft an opinion which must be reviewed by a regular judge of the Tax Court.\nFreytag and several other defendants were charged with using a tax shelter to avoid paying roughly $1.5 billion in taxes. They consented to have their case heard by a special trial judge. The trial judge eventually drafted an opinion unfavorable to their position, which was reviewed and adopted by the Chief Judge. They then appealed the case, arguing that their case was too complex to assign to a special trial judge under section 7443A. Congress's decision to allow the Chief Judge to make such an assignment, they argued, violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Article II Section 2), which provides that Congress may \"vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.\" Freytag asserted that the \"Courts of Law\" referred to there were only Article III courts (Federal District Courts, Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, all of which have judges with lifetime tenure), and that the Chief Judge was part of an Article I court, meaning that Congress could not assign him the power of appointment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, affirming the Tax Court's decisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53905:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53905:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53905:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. On the question of whether 7443A permitted the assignment of complex cases to special trial judges, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the statute unambiguously did allow such appointments. Justice Harry Blackmun, in the majority opinion, wrote, \"The plain language of 7443A(b)(4) surely authorizes the Chief Judge's assignment of petitioners' cases to a special trial judge. When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry should be complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances.\"\nOn the Appointments Clause question, however, the Court was divided 5-to-4. Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority that Article I Courts, like Article III Courts, exercised the judicial power of the United States and were therefore \"Courts of Law\" for purposes of Article II Section 2. While they may have been more dependent on Congress than the other branches, they were nevertheless independent, and it therefore did not violate the separation of powers to allow them to make appointments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53905:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53906:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53906:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Arizona prosecutor brought a charge of first-degree murder against Schad after he was found with a murder victim's vehicle and other belongings. In Arizona, first-degree murder is murder committed with premeditation or murder committed in an attempt to rob. Schad maintained that circumstantial evidence established at most that he was a thief. The jury's instructions addressed first-and second-degree murder, not theft. The jury convicted Schad of first-degree murder. The judge sentenced Schad to death.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53906:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53906:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53906:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a complex decision, Souter's plurality opinion acknowledged that jury instructions offering all-or-nothing alternatives in capital cases may overstep the Due Process Clause. But Schad's jury was not faced with such a choice. His jury had been instructed on the non-capital offense of second-degree murder.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53906:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53915:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53915:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGlen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana, operated entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear \"pasties\" and a \"G-string\" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53915:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53915:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53915:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court was fractured and there was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion, conceded that nude dancing was a form of expressive activity. But he maintained that the public indecency statute is justified despite the incidental limitations on such expressive activity. The statute \"furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality.\" The proscription on public nudity is unrelated to the erotic message the dancers seek to convey.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53915:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53916:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53916:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nArizona law officials suspected that Oreste Fulminante murdered his stepdaughter. He was later arrested in New York for an unrelated crime after the murder and incarcerated. While in prison he became friends with Anthony Sarivola, an inmate paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect information on other inmates while he served his term. Fulminante initially denied killing his stepdaughter to Sarivola, but admitted it when Sarivola offered him protection from other inmates in exchange for the truth. After his release, Fulminante also confessed to Donna Sarivola, Anthony's wife. Fulminante was indicted for murder in Arizona. Fulminante argued in trial court that his two confessions to the Sarivolas could not be used as evidence since the first was coerced and the second based on the first. The court admitted his confessions as evidence, convicted him, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court ordered Fulminante to be retried without the use of the confessions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53916:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53916:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53916:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. Justice Byron R. White and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered parts of the opinion, both majorities by a 5-4 vote. The Court held that Fulminante was coerced to confess in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court found that \"it was fear of physical violence, absent protection from his friend Sarivola, which motivated Fulminante to confess.\" This motivation invalidated his confession. Since Fulminante's confession to Donna Sarivola was closely tied to his first coerced confession, the Court dismissed both. The Court also found that the confessions played a determinative role in the trial. It maintained that a \"successful prosecution depended on the jury's believing the two confessions.\" Because the confessions were critical to the outcome of the trial, the fact that they were obtained coercively could not be dismissed as a harmless error. Four justices dissented to using harmless error analysis for coerced confessions on the ground that confessions always significantly affect a trial's outcome.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53916:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53918:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53918:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFor tax purposes, Cottage Savings Association exchanged its interests in the mortgages of 252 single family homes with several other savings and loan associations, receiving in return 305 mortgages that, taken together, had the same market value. The fair market value of the mortgages it gave away, however, were worth $2.5 million less than their original value. In accordance with the accounting procedures of the federal regulatory body of savings and loan corporations, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), Cottage Savings recorded the exchanged properties as \"substantially identical\" (because they had the same fair market value).\nWhen Cottage Savings filed its federal income tax return, however, it claimed a $2.5 million loss - the difference between the original value of the mortgages it gave away and the current value of the mortgages it received in return. The IRS refused to recognize the difference as a deductible loss, however, because under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code, the change in a property's value is only taken into consideration when it is realized through the \"sale or disposition of [the] property.\" An exchange of property only constitutes a \"disposition\" if there is a \"material difference\" between the properties exchanged. Because Cottage Savings had reported the properties exchanged as \"substantially identical,\" the IRS ruled, a \"disposition\" could not have taken place and the loss in value could not be deducted. Cottage savings took the issue to a federal Tax Court, which disagreed with the IRS and ruled the deduction permissible. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, siding with the IRS.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53918:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53918:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53918:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the definition of \"substantially identical\" under the FHLBB regulations was intentionally flexible and broad enough to include even properties that were \"materially different\" for IRS purposes. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in the majority opinion, wrote that exchanged properties are \"materially different\" if they \"embody legally distinct entitlements.\" The properties involved in this exchange clearly satisfied that test. \"Because the participation interests exchanged by Cottage Savings and the other S & L's derived from loans that were made to different obligors and secured by different homes, the exchanged interests did embody legally distinct entitlements. Consequently, we conclude that Cottage Savings realized its losses at the point of exchange.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53918:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53925:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53925:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMcLaughlin was arrested without a warrant and argued that Riverside did not act promptly (within 48 hours) on judicial probable cause determinations and arraignment procedures in his case and others.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53925:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53925:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53925:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that Riverside's actions did not comply with the Gerstein precedent. Justice O'Connor argued that it was the state's burden to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances when delaying probable cause determinations beyond 48 hours. The lower court in this case had placed that responsibility on the accused. Intervening weekends or complicated pretrial proceedings were not legitimate reasons for delay.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53925:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53934:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53934:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position at the Sigmund Freud Archives, Janet Malcolm interviewed him for an article in the New Yorker magazine. Malcolm_s article included many long direct quotations from Masson. The article presented Masson as extremely arrogant and condescending; at one point, he was quoted as calling himself \"the greatest analyst who ever lived.\" However, Malcolm fabricated many of the more distasteful quotations. Masson sued for libel. The District Court dismissed the case on First Amendment free speech grounds because Masson was a public figure.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53934:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53934:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53934:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 vote, the Court ruled that the First Amendment s free expression clause could not protect the distortions in Malcolm s article. Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion also explained when a direct quotation can be considered false, and therefore potentially libelous. The First Amendment limits libel suits by public figures. A report about a public figure cannot be considered \"false\" unless it is a gross distortion of the truth. Justice Kennedy's opinion explained that a direct quotation will qualify as such a distortion if the quoted words differ in their factual meaning from anything the public figure really said. Malcolm_s fabrication qualified as a \"gross distortion,\" and the Court granted Masson standing to sue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53934:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53935:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53935:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLarry Joe Powers, a white male, was indicted on the charges of two counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted aggravated murder. He pleaded not guilty, and invoked his right to a jury trial. During the jury selection process, Powers objected when the prosecution excluded a black individual from the jury without explanation. The court denied the request for explanation. The prosecution struck nine more possible jurors, of which six were black. Powers objected each time, but the court overruled his objection. The jury convicted Powers on all charges. Powers appealed his conviction and argued that the prosecution’s discriminatory selection of jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution, and that his own race was irrelevant to the right to object. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal. The petitioner sought review before the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53935:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53935:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53935:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the prosecution is prohibited from excluding an unbiased and qualified juror based on the person’s race regardless of the race of the defendant. Although an individual does not have the right to sit on a jury, every citizen has the right not to be deprived of the opportunity to participate in this aspect of civil life. The Court also held that a criminal defendant has the right to raise objections on racial discrimination when excluding certain potential jurors because it could cause potential injury to the defendant. The defendant must feel that he is receiving a fair trial and that the integrity of the judicial system is upheld. Therefore the defendant, as well as the juror, has the right to eliminate racial discrimination in the courtroom and the color of his skin is irrelevant to these objections of racial discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53935:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53940:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53940:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53940:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53940:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53940:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates \"a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school.\" Such conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53940:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53945:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53945:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, a census must be conducted every ten years and the distribution of Representatives in Congress adjusted to provide proportional representation. The census is designed and carried out by the Secretary of Commerce before the results are forwarded to the President, who determines the number of Representatives each state will receive. In 1990, for only the second time since 1900, the census allocated employees of the Department of Defense who were stationed overseas to the states designated their \"homes of record.\" Massachusetts claimed that this adjustment of the census shifted one Representative from Massachusetts to Washington state. They brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Constitution, arguing that the allocation of overseas personnel to their \"homes of record\" was arbitrary and capricious under the APA standards and did not meet the constitutional requirement of counting the number of people \"in each State.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53945:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53945:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53945:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Secretary's decision was not reviewable under the APA because it was not a \"final agency action.\" Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in the majority opinion, wrote that only agency decisions that complete the decision-making process and directly affect the party bring suit may be challenged under the APA. In this case the Secretary's decision resulted merely in a set of findings reported to the President that he could ask to have revised using a different formula. Also, the recommendation (and therefore the procedure used to arrive at it) did not directly affect Massachusetts; the President had to take action before the findings would affect the number of Representatives apportioned to the State. The procedure and the findings that resulted from it, therefore, was not a \"final agency action\" challengeable under the APA, and the actions of the President are also not challengeable under the APA.\nEvaluating the Secretary's chosen procedure under Article I Section 2 of the Constitution, however, Justice O'Connor ruled that the decision to include overseas personnel of the Department of Defense was a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution's intent. \"The Secretary's judgment does not hamper the underlying constitutional goal of equal representation, but, assuming that employees temporarily stationed abroad have indeed retained their ties to their home states, actually promotes equality,\" wrote Justice O'Connor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53945:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53946:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53946:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn a statewide ballot, California residents approved the addition of Article XIIIA to their State Constitution. Article XIIIA's \"acquisition value\" provision limited property assessment value increases to two percent, if caused by changes in ownership or new construction improvements. Article XIIIA exempted two types of transfers from this reassessment limit: first, if the principal seller is 55 or older and moved to a home of equal or lower value, and second, when a transfer occurred between parents and children. One of Article XIIIA's effects is that over time the taxes of new property owners, adjusted to reflect recent values, would be substantially higher than long-term property owner's taxes. A new property owner filed suit to challenge the state constitutional amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53946:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53946:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53946:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court, through Justice Blackmun, held that California's new property tax system rationally and plausibly furthered legitimate state interests in restraining increasing property taxes and preserving local neighborhood stability. The discrepancy which Article XIIIA created between new and long time property owners is warranted, because the latter had a far greater reliance interest in their property than the former. Thus, long-time property owners deserved more protection from higher property taxes than new property owners. This demonstrated a significant difference between the two property owner types. In addition, both of Article XIIIA's exemptions rationally promoted a legitimate state interest. The first exemption did not discourage older people from moving to a smaller home that is likely to better suit their smaller family and income. The second exemption aimed at preserving family unity and neighborhood stability. Accordingly, the Court held that Article XIIIA did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53946:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53954:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53954:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the district court held that the conditions at the Suffolk County Jail were constitutionally deficient, the Suffolk County officials and the inmates of Suffolk County Jail entered into a consent decree for construction of a new jail. In the decree, the parties agreed single-occupancy cells would be provided for pretrial inmates. During the delay of the construction, the sheriff of Suffolk County moved to modify the decree to allow double bunking in certain cells to raise the jail’s occupancy. The sheriff argued that with the increasing number of pretrial detainees and a recent court decision, there was a change in fact and in law that was required to modify the decree. The district court refused the modification because the sheriff is required to show a grievous wrong by new and unforeseen circumstances to modify the decree and that the increase of pretrial detainees was neither new nor unforeseen. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53954:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53954:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53954:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the grievous wrong standard does not apply to requests to modify consent decrees and that changes of conduct or conditions may be revised if necessary for future events based on a flexible standard. Under a flexible standard, the party seeking modification of an institutional reform consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants a revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is tailored to that change of circumstances. This requirement will be satisfied if the change was unforeseen or would be detrimental to public interests without the modification.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, with whom Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that after the institution was found by the district court to be deficient, it is the district court’s duty to command an effective remedy. In this case, the remedy was to have single-occupancy cells for pretrial detainees and it is important that the court apply a strict standard when considering modification request that undermines the central purpose of a consent decree. The modification of the consent decree should be denied.\nJustice Clarence Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53954:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53955:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53955:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe pre-emption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) prohibits states from enforcing any law relating to airline rates, route, or service. The ADA was enacted to ensure that states would not undo the anticipated benefits of federal deregulation of the airline industry. In 1987, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) adopted Air Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines, which govern the content and format of airline advertising and award frequent flyers and payment to passengers who voluntarily gave up their seats on overbooked flights. The Attorney General of Texas sent letters to airlines, including Trans World Airlines, notifying them of the intent to sue if they did not follow the guidelines. Trans World Airlines sued and claimed that state regulation of fare advertisements is prohibited by the ADA. The district court found in favor of Trans World Airlines and held that states cannot take any enforcement action, which would restrict any aspect of the fare advertising or operations relating to rate, routes, or services. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53955:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53955:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53955:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the ADA prevents the enforcement of the NAAG fare-advertising guidelines through a state’s general consumer protection. When the ADA was enacted, Congress intended to prevent the state enforcement action if it has a connection with, or references airline rates, routes, or services, including advertisements. The NAAG guidelines explicitly refer to the rates within the meaning of the ADA and would have a significant impact on the airline’s ability to market their product and upon the fares they charge.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued the words “relate to” in the ADA should not be given a broad meaning because it gives the ADA pre-emption provision a meaning beyond the words and the legislative history behind the enactment. Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined the dissent\nJustice David H. Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53955:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53957:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53957:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53957:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53957:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53957:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a bitter 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an \"undue burden,\" which is defined as a \"substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.\" Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. In a rare step, the opinion for the Court was crafted and authored by three justices: O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.\nLearn more about the Supreme Court and abortion law in Body Politic, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53957:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53958:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53958:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter 17 years of litigation, Mississippi's public university system remained racially divided. The state had operated legally segregated universities, but had since adopted race-neutral policies to dismantle its de jure segregated system. All students could choose which school to attend, though the choices produced nearly all white and all black institutions of higher learning. This case was decided together with that of Ayers v. Fordice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53958:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53958:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53958:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. A state's duty is not discharged \"until it eradicates policies and practices traceable to its prior de jure dual system that continues to foster segregation.\" Race-neutral admissions are not a sufficient corrective to constitutional violations of a dual system. Different admissions criteria, and different missions for university system components, may have racially discriminatory effects perpetuating the old system. The Court did not declare the present system unconstitutional, only that Mississippi had not done enough to eliminate segregation. The Justices turned the matter back to state officials -- and to the courts -- to determine what must be done to fulfill its duty under the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53958:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53959:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53959:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLechmere owned and operated a large retail store in a shopping plaza. Nonemployee union organizers campaigned to organize the store employees by entering the company's parking lot and placing handbills on car windshields. Lechmere prohibited solicitation and literature distribution on its property. The union organizers persisted in their leafleting campaign despite continued objections from Lechmere. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Lechmere. An NLRB judge ruled in the union's favor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53959:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53959:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53959:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, reasoned Justice Clarence Thomas, except in situations where inaccessibility makes communication through normal channels ineffective. There were alternatives short of trespass, such as signs, mailings, and newspaper ads. (Thomas's defense of private property rights may offer a clue to his budding jurisprudence.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53959:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53971:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53971:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRose Cipollone died at 58 from lung cancer. She smoked for 42 years. Before her death, she and her husband sued several cigarette manufacturers in federal court for damages resulting from Mrs. Cipollone lung cancer. A trial court judgment of $400,000 was reserved in the U.S. Court of Appeals. The Cipollone family appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53971:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53971:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53971:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a complicated 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that federally mandated warnings do not bar smokers from suing manufacturers under state personal-injury laws. The justices ruled that such suits cannot be based on claims that cigarette advertising failed to warn smokers of smoking dangers. But the justices also ruled that individuals may press claims alleging that the tobacco companies made fraudulent or inaccurate statements in their advertising or that the companies conspired to mislead people about the health hazards of smoking.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53971:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53974:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53974:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A 1986 amendment to the act limited it scope to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the new amendment erred by providing for a geographic limit on the original law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53974:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53974:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53974:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Even if the Court were to assume that the agency-funded projects at issue threatened listed species, there was no proof that these actions would produce \"actual or imminent\" injuries to particular respondents who might some day wish to visit the foreign countries in question. The Court disregarded the proposed theory of \"ecosystem nexus\" which claimed that any person who used any part of of a \"contiguous ecosystem\" adversed affected by a funded activity had standing to sue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53974:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53975:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53975:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRespondents -- the Seattle Audubon Society, the Portland Audubon Society, and several other environmental groups -- filed two separate suits in federal district court seeking to enjoin harvesting timber in forests managed by the United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. The suits challenged five federal statutes. In response, Congress enacted §318 of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, which required harvesting in certain areas, while prohibiting it in others. §318 included the names of the lawsuits and specifically stated that it was enacted to address the challenges from the lawsuits. Respondents argued that §318 violated Article III of the Constitution because it directed the results of the two pending cases, a job for the judiciary, not the legislature. The district courts rejected that claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, holding that Congress was directing the result in pending cases without repealing or amending the underlying litigation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53975:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53975:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53975:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that §318 did not violate Article III because it made changes to the law by replacing the legal standards of the five challenged statutes. It did not make any findings of law or fact, or compel any results in the pending cases. The explicit reference to the cases only served to identify the statutes underlying those cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53975:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53979:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53979:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 20, 1987, Paul Wade was found dead in his apartment with multiple stab wounds to his chest, head, and back. Forty-five hours later, David Riggins was arrested and charged with the murder. A few days after being taken into custody, Riggins complained to Dr. R. Edward Quass, the psychiatrist who treated patients in jail, that he was hearing voices. Dr. Quass prescribed the antipsychotic drug Mellaril and, when the voices did not stop, gradually increased the dosage. In January of 1988, Riggins successfully moved for determination of his competence to stand trial, and he was found to be competent. As the trial moved forward, Riggins moved to suspend his treatment with Mellaril because he planned to offer an insanity defense at trial and asserted that he had the right to show the jury his true mental state. The district court denied Riggins motion. Riggins was found guilty and sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53979:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53979:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53979:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that an individual has the right to freedom from an unwanted antipsychotic drug. In order for the state to administer an antipsychotic drug against the patient’s wishes, the state must establish the pressing need for the administration of the drug. Because the district court did not reach a finding on the necessity of the Mellaril, the Court held that its administration was an error that infringed on Riggins’ constitutional rights.\nIn Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s concurring opinion, he wrote that the Due Process Clause prohibits the state from administering unwanted psychotic drugs to a defendant in order to make the defendant competent to stand trial. He argued that, since the administration of the antipsychotic drug can significantly alter the demeanor of the defendant during the trial and on the stand, it can amount to a manipulation of evidence by the state.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent where he argued that the issue of whether or not the state should have issued the antipsychotic medication without Riggins’ consent is a separate legal issue from his trial. He argued that there was no evidence that the Mellaril rendered Riggins’ trial anything less than “full and fair,” and therefore Riggins was not entitled to have his conviction reversed. Because he was found to be competent to stand trial under the influence of Mellaril, the Mellaril could not have significantly interfered with his ability to take part in his own defense. Justice Thomas also argued that, since Riggins approached the jail psychiatrist for medication because he was hearing voices, the district court did not order Riggins to take the Mellaril. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53979:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53980:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53980:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTaco Cabana, a fast food Mexican restaurant chain in San Antonio, Texas, had a specifically-designed look or “trade dress”. Two Pesos, another similar restaurant chain based in Houston, Texas, opened a few years later with a remarkably similar look. Taco Cabana sued Two Pesos for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Two Pesos allegedly copied Taco Cabana’s distinctive trade dress. The judge instructed the jury that trade dress must be inherently distinctive of have acquired a secondary meaning. The jury found that Taco Cabana’s trade dress was inherently distinctive, but had not acquired a secondary meaning. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Two Pesos argument that a finding of no secondary meaning necessarily means the trade dress is not inherently distinctive and is not protected under the Lanham Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53980:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53980:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53980:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that trade dress can be protected under the Lanham Act based on inherent distinctiveness even if there is no proof of a secondary meaning. Recovery is usually available for trademark infringement without a secondary meaning, and there is no persuasive reason for treating trade dress differently from other types of trademark. Requiring a secondary meaning would go against the purposes of the Lanham Act.\nJustice Antonin Scalia concurred, stating that the Lanham Act and its common law counterpart were broad enough to cover trade dress. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment, expressing that the majority’s decision was supported by stare decisis. Justice Clarence Thomas also concurred in the judgment, arguing that the common law roots of the Lanham Act justify this decision better than the majority’s reasoning.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53980:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53981:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53981:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThrough its Tax Commissioner, the state of North Dakota filed an action in state court to force the Quill Corporation, an out-of-state mail-order office equipment retailer, to charge a North Dakota use tax on Quill merchandise to be used within the state. The state court ruled in favor of Quill, grounding its decision on Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753. In this 1967 case, the United States Supreme Court found a similar Illinois statute to be in violation of both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on a rejection of Bellas Hess in light of the \"tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations\" since it had been decided.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53981:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53981:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53981:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and No. In a majority opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court admitted that, over time, subsequent cases have allowed for more flexibility than Bellas Hess. Nevertheless, the Court maintained that this evolution does not suggest a rejection of Bellas Hess. The Court also determined that North Dakota's imposition of the use tax did not constitute a breach of the Due Process Clause because the Quill Corporation had sufficient contact with the state's residents and benefited from the state's tax revenue. However, it found the use tax to be unconstitutional because it interfered with interstate commerce, rendering it a violation of the Commerce Clause. Consequently, the Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision by ruling in favor of the Quill Corporation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53981:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53983:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "53983:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Cortland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "53983:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "53983:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "53983:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review, reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. The third provision, the \"take-title\" qualification, stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act. \"Either type of federal action,\" wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, \"would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments.\" This last provision violated the Tenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "53983:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54000:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54000:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York City's airport authority banned repetitive solicitation of money within airline terminals. Solicitation was permitted outside the terminals. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness solicits funds in public places. It challenged the regulation. A federal district court granted an injunction against the airport authority. The authority appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54000:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54000:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54000:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. An airport terminal is not a public forum. The regulation banning such activity need only satisfy a reasonableness standard. The regulation is reasonable. Solicitators may slow the path of possible contributors, cause duress or commit fraud. Therefore, the regulation is permissible. In a related case, the Court held invalid the airport authority's ban on literature distribution in airport terminals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54000:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54002:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54002:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe principal focus of Alabama County Commission members is the construction and maintenance of roads. In 1987, Etowah County Commission passed the \"Common Fund Resolution\", combining all of the commission's funds into one county-wide budget and eliminating each commissioner's power over the distribution of funds allocated for his or her own road district. Newly elected black member, Commissioner Lawrence C. Presley, claimed that the changes in the distribution of authority were a form of racial discrimination and a violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which permits a state government to alter practices related to voting only after receiving judicial preclearance. The Etowah County Commission had not received this preclearance, and neither had the Russell County Commission when, in 1979, its members instituted the \"Unit System.\" This system transferred full authority over Russell County roads, highways, bridges, and ferries from the commissioners to the appointed county engineer. When the first 2 black commissioners were elected in Russell County, they joined Presley in filing a suit against Etowah and Russell Counties in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The District Court determined that preclearance was unnecessary in both 2 instances, but Presley appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54002:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54002:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54002:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court determined that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act covers only changes that directly relate to voting. More specifically, the Court found that case law outlines 4 areas in which alterations require preclearance under section 5: the method of voting, the requirements for candidacy, the composition of the electorate, and the formation or elimination of an elected office. In the Court's opinion, neither the \"Common Fund Resolution\" nor the \"Unit System\" fell in any of the 4 categories. Instead, those 2 changes merely concern the \"internal operation of an elected body\". Thus, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54002:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54003:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54003:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFreeman, a Tennessee political campaign treasurer, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Code forbidding the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities. On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 100-foot ban was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Burson certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54003:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54003:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54003:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. After subjecting Tennessee's statute to exacting scrutiny, since it constituted a facial content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, the Court held that the statute was narrowly drafted to serve a compelling state interest. By creating a safe zone around polling sites, the statute served the state's interest in protecting its citizen's right to vote freely and effectively. Moreover, the 100-foot zone was acceptable since it was not so large as to completely block out the presence of political messages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54003:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54007:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54007:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA), the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) may enter into \"trackage rights\" agreements to use tracks owned and used by freight railroads. Section 562(d) of the act also states that Amtrak may buy tracks from private railroads, and may ask the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to condemn tracks owned by those railroads if they cannot agree on sale terms, provided that the tracks in question are \"required for intercity rail passenger service.\" Amtrak's need for the tracks is established unless the private railroad can show either that its ability to carry out its obligations as a common carrier (that is, a transporter of public goods) will be seriously hampered or that Amtrak's needs can be met by the purchase of alternative property.\nAmtrak had a \"trackage rights\" agreement with Boston and Maine Railroad (B & M). Amtrak claimed that it was forced to discontinue this agreement because B & M did not properly maintain its tracks. Amtrak then entered into an agreement with the Central Vermont Railroad (CV), under which it would acquire the B & M track and sell it to CV, which would take over maintenance of the track but grant \"trackage rights\" to Amtrak and usage rights to B & M. When B & M declined Amtrak's offer to purchase the track, Amtrak asked the ICC to condemn the track (thus allowing Amtrak to seize it). The ICC granted Amtrak's request. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, sent the case back to the ICC for reconsideration, because Amtrak had not demonstrated the need for ownership, just for use (demonstrated by its intent to convey the property to CV). Amtrak petitioned the appeals court to rehear the case, and while the petition was pending Congress amended the RPSA to explicitly allow Amtrak to seize property with the ICC's permission and then convey it to another party if that would further its mission. The appeals court denied rehearing, however, holding that the condemnation had been invalid because it was not \"required for intercity rail passenger service.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54007:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54007:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54007:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the ICC was entitled to deference and that its decision had been reasonable. In the majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that by interpreting the statute's use of \"required\" to mean that the track must be useful but not absolutely indispensable to Amtrak's operation, the ICC had better accommodated the underlying intention of the RPSA than the appeals court. That finding was reinforced by Congress's amendment to the act, which would only be effective under the ICC's interpretation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54007:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54012:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54012:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1990, white respondents, Thomas McCollum, William Joseph McCollum, and Ella Hampton McCollum, were charged with assaulting two black individuals. Before the criminal trial, the prosecution moved to bar the defense from using its peremptory challenges to eliminate black people from the juror pool. The term \"preemptory challenge\" refers to the right to reject a potential juror during jury selection without giving a reason. The trial judge denied the prosecution's motion, and, when the prosecution appealed, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54012:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54012:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54012:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court found that the exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner not only violates the rights of potential jurors, but also undermines the integrity of the judicial system. Since the Court also determined that a peremptory challenge did constitute state action, it found the use of peremptory challenge for the purpose of racial discrimination to be a breach of the Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court was reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54012:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54013:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54013:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACW) provides that, in order to be reimbursed for adoption and foster care services, a state must submit a plan for the administration of those services to the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. In order to be approved, the plan must be \"in effect in all\" a state's political subdivisions and \"be mandatory upon them,\" and must state that \"reasonable efforts will be made\" to prevent removal of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification of families where removal has occurred. Several children in the Illinois foster care program brought suit against the Director and the Guardianship Administrator of the Illinois program under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides private individuals a right to sue for \"deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws.\" They charged that Illinois had failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunite families, and that it was required to do so by the AACW. The Director and Guardianship Administrator argued that the children had no standing to sue because the AACW did not create substantive rights that had to be reinforced, but merely stated what contents an administrative plan needed to have in order to receive approval. The federal District Court sided with the children, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54013:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54013:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54013:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 only required that a state have a plan for the administration of adoption and foster care programs in order to receive federal reimbursement, not that the plan be correctly carried out. The language of the statute requiring that the plan be \"in effect in all\" political subdivisions of the state meant only that the plan had to apply to all of them, not that they were actually required to carry it out. The Secretary of Health and Human Services could reasonably withhold approval of a plan if it was clear that the plan would not be applied, but nothing in the Act suggested that Congress had intended to create a private right to sue for the enforcement of the plan.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54013:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54016:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54016:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the Illinois judicial system, the jury chosen to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence also sentenced the defendant. And, the trial court, not the attorneys, performed voir dire, which involves questioning potential jurors during jury selection to determine their ability to be impartial. Before Derrick Morgan's capital murder trial, he requested that the court ask the potential jurors whether they would automatically sentence him to the death penalty upon conviction. The trial court denied Morgan's request, and he was convicted and sentenced to death. When he appealed, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, Morgan's conviction, and his sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54016:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54016:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54016:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the impartial jury requirement of the Sixth Amendment, in combination, indicate that the criminally accused have a right to an impartial jury. It found that a juror who would automatically vote for the death penalty in criminal sentencing would be prejudiced. The Court also concluded that, in order to detect this prejudice, an adequate voir dire is necessary. Therefore, an adequate voir dire would include a question to determine whether a juror would automatically vote for the death penalty, upon request. Thus, the decision of the Illinois State Supreme Court was reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54016:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54017:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54017:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKeith Hudson, a Louisiana inmate, claimed that he was beaten by Marvin Woods and Jack McMillian, two prison guards, while their supervisor, Arthur Mezo, watched. Hudson sued the guards in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals to bring suit for the \"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.\" Hudson argued that they had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court ruled that the guards had used force when there was no need to do so, violating the Eighth Amendment, and that Hudson was therefore entitled to damages. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, finding that an inmate must demonstrate \"significant injury\" when he claims that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated by the use of excessive force.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54017:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54017:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54017:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the degree of injury suffered by an inmate is one of several important factors in an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment, but that the absence of \"significant injury\" alone does not mean his rights have not been violated. Instead, the Court should consider whether the punishment inflicted was malicious and sadistic. \"When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency are always violated,\" Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote in the majority opinion. \"This is true whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Such a result would have been as unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth Amendment as it is today.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54017:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54018:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54018:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral abortion clinics sued to prevent Jayne Bray and other anti-abortion protesters from conducting demonstrations at clinics in Washington, D.C. The clinics claimed that the protesters had violated 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive \"any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.\" The protesters had sought to deny women their \"right to abortion\" and their right to interstate travel, the clinics argued. The District Court agreed, holding that Bray and others, by blocking access to the clinics, had conspired to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The District Court also ruled for the clinics on state law trespassing and public nuisance claims, ordering the protesters to stop trespassing on or obstructing access to clinics. Finally, the District Court ordered the protesters to pay the clinics' attorney's fees and costs on the 1985(3) claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54018:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54018:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54018:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the protesters had not violated section 1985(3) by obstructing access to the abortion clinics. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the majority opinion, wrote that under the Court's decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, there must be a \"class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [underlying] the conspirators' action\" for it to violate 1985(3). The clinics' claim that the protesters had demonstrated \"animus\" toward women as a class was unfounded because the demonstrations were not directed at women but rather were intended to protect the victims of abortion, stop its practice, and reverse its legalization. Opposition to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect gender-based intent, Justice Scalia wrote, because there are common and respectable reasons for opposing abortion other than a derogatory view of women.\nIn addition to holding that the protesters did not exercise discriminatory animus, Scalia also addressed the specific rights on which the clinics based their arguments. The right to interstate travel, Scalia pointed out, was not affected here because the protests were carried out entirely within the District of Columbia and were not aimed specifically at interstate travelers. Nor was the \"right to abortion\" implicated, he wrote, because that right was merely one to be free of governmental interference in the decision. The protesters, acting as private individuals, could not possibly violate that right.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54018:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54019:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54019:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBefore the Child Protection Act of 1984 rendered it illegal, Keith Jacobson, the petitioner, purchased a magazine including photographs of nude minors. In 1985, government agencies began investigating Jacobson's interest in child pornography. Over the course of about 2 1⁄2 years, they sent him mailings from 5 fictitious organizations and one non-existent pen pal all promoting sexual liberation and challenging government censorship. After Jacobson was somewhat responsive, a government agency attempted to sting him by selling him child pornography which he purchased, resulting in his arrest and conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54019:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54019:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54019:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a majority decision authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court determined that, the prosecution was unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jacobson was inclined to commit the criminal act of purchasing child pornography independent of government interference. Doubt stems from the fact that government agencies may have actually encouraged Jacobson to break the law in their effort to prosecute him. Since the Court found that the prosecution failed, the decision of the Court of Appeals and Jacobson's conviction were reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54019:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54025:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54025:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1981, Argentina instituted a foreign exchange insurance contract program (FEIC), under which it effectively assumed the risk of currency depreciation in cross-border transactions. When Argentina could not cover the FEIC contracts, it issued \"Bonods,\" which provided for repayment in U.S. dollars through transfer on the market in one of several locations. Subsequently, when Argentina concluded that it lacked sufficient foreign exchange to retire the Bonods, it unilaterally extended the time for payment and offered bondholders substitute instruments as a means of rescheduling the debts. Ultimately, two Panamanian corporations and a Swiss bank brought a breach-of-contract action in Federal District Court. The court denied Argentina's motion to dismiss. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that the District Court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which subjects foreign states to suit in American courts for acts taken \"in connection with a commercial activity\" that have \"a direct effect in the United States.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54025:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54025:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54025:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court properly asserted jurisdiction under the FSIA. The Court reasoned that the issuance of the Bonods was a \"commercial activity\" and that the rescheduling of the maturity dates on those instruments was taken \"in connection with\" that activity because Argentina had acted as a private player within a market and not as a regulator of that market. Moreover, the Court concluded that the unilateral rescheduling of the Bonods had a \"direct effect in the United States\" because Argentina had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment and had made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54025:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54028:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54028:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring Randall D. White’s trial on charges related to a sexual assault of a 4-year-old girl, Illinois state prosecutors twice-attempted to call the child, who was by then five years old, as a witness, but each time she experienced emotional difficulty and left the stand without testifying. The trial court then allowed the admission of testimony by the girl’s babysitter, mother, emergency room nurse, doctor and an investigating officer that recounted statements she made describing the crime. This testimony was allowed into evidence under state-law hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of a medical examination. The jury subsequently convicted White. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected White’s claims that the introduction of the out-of-court statements violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary review of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54028:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54028:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54028:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not require that a declarant be produced at trial or found unavailable before his out-of-court statements may be admitted into evidence. Instead, when the statements fall within a “firmly-rooted” exception to the hearsay rule, they satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Statements made in certain contexts carry special guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness, such as when the prospect of misdiagnosis or mistreatment deters a declarant from making false statements while obtaining medical treatment. Consequently, the Court held that cross-examination does not aid the truth-finding process with respect to these types of statements as much as it might for out-of-court statements that do not come under an exception to the hearsay rule.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring the judgment in which he urged that the Confrontation Clause be applied more narrowly and only to extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, or confessions. According to Justice Thomas, the Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause as permitting out-of-court statements that fall within a “firmly-established” hearsay exception does not comport with the text of the Sixth Amendment or with the history of extending cross-examination rights to defendants. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54028:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54039:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54039:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPlaintiffs filed two state-law tort actions in New Hampshire state courts, alleging that one of them had contracted AIDS from a transfusion of contaminated blood during surgery. The second action was brought against the Red Cross after plaintiffs discovered that it had supplied the tainted blood. Before the state court could decide a motion to consolidate the cases, the Red Cross invoked the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1441, to remove the second suit to federal court. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court, holding that the Red Cross' charter provision allowing it to \"sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United States,\" 36 U.S.C. Section 2, conferred original jurisdiction on the federal district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54039:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54039:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54039:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. A congressional charter's \"sue and be sued\" provision confers federal-court jurisdiction if, but only if, it specifically mentions the federal courts. The Red Cross Charter provision does specifically mention the federal courts. This holding leaves the jurisdiction of the federal courts well within the Article III limits, because the Court has consistently held that Article III's \"arising under\" jurisdiction is broad enough to authorize Congress to confer federal-court jurisdiction over actions involving federally chartered corporations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54039:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54045:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54045:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54045:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54045:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54045:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court relied on the trial court's finding that Lucas's lots had been rendered valueless by the state law. \"[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good...he has suffered a taking.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54045:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54048:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54048:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1969, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ordered the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) to eliminate its previously legal racial segregation and its inequitable byproducts under judicial control. However, in 1986, DCSS officials filed a motion, intending for the District Court to declare the DCSS officially desegregated and withdraw supervision. Green v. School Board of New Kent County, outlines 6 categories in which a school district should achieve desegregation, and the District Court found that the DCSS was successful in 4 of these categories. Consequently, the court decided to relinquish control over the DCSS in these 4 areas, while it maintained control and mandated further improvements in the areas in which segregation still existed. Both the respondents, black schoolchildren and their parents, and the petitioners, the DCSS officials, appealed the District Court's decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed it. The Court of Appeals argued that the District Court should have authority over the DCSS until it is fully desegregated in all 6 categories for several years.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54048:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54048:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54048:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court found that a district court must only maintain control over a school system in the categories in which it has failed to abide by its court-ordered desegregation plan. The Court argued that this incremental approach provides district courts with a systematic and orderly means to their ultimate goal: to fully withdraw supervision. In addition, it allows the district court to focus more attention and resources where they are needed most. In compliance with the Court's determination, it reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54048:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54049:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54049:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Port Authority of New York and New Jersey banned the distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets and other printed material at its airport terminals. Members of a religious group wanted to perform a ritual involving the distibution of literature at these airports. The group challenged the regulation on free expression and and free exercise grounds of the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54049:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54049:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54049:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a short per curiam opinion, the court held 5 to 4 that the ban on literature distribution violated the Free Speech Clause. (A related case, also Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, addressed a ban on the solicitation of funds.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54049:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54051:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54051:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which \"arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.\" The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54051:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54051:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54051:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 9-to-0 vote, the justices held the ordinance invalid on its face because \"it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.\" The First Amendment prevents government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. Under the ordinance, for example, one could hold up a sign declaring all anti-semites are bastards but not that all Jews are bastards. Government has no authority \"to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow the Marquis of Queensbury Rules.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54051:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54054:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54054:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTo keep criminals from profiting from crimes by selling their stories, New York State's 1977 \"Son of Sam\" law ordered that proceeds from such deals be turned over to the New York State Crime Victims Board. The Board was to deposit the money into escrow accounts which victims could later claim through civil suits. In 1987 the Board ordered Henry Hill, a former gangster who sold his story to Simon & Schuster, to turn over his payments from a book deal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54054:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54054:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54054:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court concluded that \"New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other income.\" This discrimination could only be justified if the state could show \"that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end\" (Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)). The Board failed to explain why victims' compensation had to come from the criminals' storytelling rather than other assets.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54054:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54057:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54057:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Board of Commissioners for Forsyth County enacted an ordinance that permitted the county administrator to charge a fee of not more than $1,000 per day for a permit to hold a parade, assembly, or demonstration on public property in the county. The law allowed the administrator to adjust the fee to correspond with the estimated cost of maintaining public order during the activity. In January 1989, The Nationalist Movement (Movement) applied for a permit to hold a rally on the courthouse steps in Cumming, Georgia, to protest the federal holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr. The county charged $100 for the permit, but that amount that did not include a calculation for expected law enforcement expenses during the rally. The Movement did not pay the fee and did not hold the rally; instead the Movement sued the county in federal district court and challenged its authority to interfere with the Movement’s free speech and assembly rights. The district court found that the county administrator did not unconstitutionally apply the ordinance to the Movement’s permit application because the fee was based solely on content-neutral criteria such as the costs of processing the application. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that the permit fee of up to $1,000 a day exceeded the constitutional requirement that governments charge only a nominal fee for using public forums.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54057:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54057:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54057:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the ordinance violated the free speech guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it contained no reasonable or definite standards to guide the county administrator’s calculation of permit fees. Additionally, the ordinance required the administrator to examine the speech’s content to assess the likelihood of public hostility to the message and adjust the fee accordingly to account for security and law enforcement costs. In the Court’s view, a nominal fee lower than $1000 could not save the ordinance from the constitutional infirmities it found.\nChief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent in which he disagreed with the argument that the Constitution limits a parade license fee to a nominal amount and argued that the Court should have remanded the case to determine the scope of the ordinance and how it was administered. Justice Byron R. White, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined the dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54057:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54058:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54058:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAndrew Hill, a teacher at North Gwinnett High School, sexually harassed Christine Franklin throughout her 10th grade year. Franklin reported the harassment to teachers and school district administrators, but the administration did nothing. They also encouraged Franklin to refrain from pressing charges. Hill resigned in 1988 on the condition that all matters pending against him were dropped. After Hill’s resignation the school closed its investigation.\nFranklin brought this action against the school district under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for failing to take action against Hill. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that Title IX did not authorize an award for damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54058:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54058:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54058:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White wrote the Court's unanimous decision, holding that monetary damages are available under Title IX because there is a presumption that any appropriate relief is available to remedy the violation of a federal right. In this case, back pay and prospective relief were not sufficient remedies. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a special concurrence, stating that when causes of action are judicially implied, it is proper to imply limitations on the remedies for those actions as well.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54058:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54059:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54059:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1980, Marc Gilbert Doggett was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida on federal drug charges. When Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents went to his home to arrest him, they found he had left for Colombia four days earlier. The DEA later found out that Doggett was in custody in Panama on unrelated charges. While the Panamanian government promised to expel Doggett back to the United States after the proceedings in Panama were over, Doggett was allowed to continue on to Colombia. The DEA agent in charge did not follow up on the case and Doggett reentered the United States without issue in 1982 where he lived openly under his own name and in accordance with the law. No one looked into Doggett’s whereabouts, but in 1988 a random credit check of individuals with outstanding warrants revealed his place of residence.\nAfter being arrested, Doggett moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government’s failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. A federal magistrate found that the length of time between indictment and arrest was presumptively prejudicial, but recommended dismissal of Doggett’s motion because he did not show actual prejudice. The district court followed the magistrate’s recommendation. Doggett then entered a conditional guilty plea, allowing him to appeal the subsequent conviction on the speedy trial claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54059:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54059:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54059:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. Justice David H. Souter, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the government’s egregious failure to locate and prosecute Doggett warranted relief even without showing actual prejudice. Doggett was unaware of the indictment prior to be arrested 8 1⁄2 years later, so he could not be penalized for failing to raise the speedy trial defense earlier.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented, arguing that the possibility of prejudice is not enough to prove that the right to a speedy trial has been violated. Justice Clarence Thomas also dissented, arguing that the right to a speedy trial was meant to prevent oppressive incarceration and the anxiety accompanying public accusation. Because Doggett was never incarcerated and had no knowledge of the charges against him until his arrest, neither of those purposes were served by this decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54059:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54060:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54060:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNineteen States and many private plaintiffs filed complaints alleging that the defendants -- domestic primary insurers, trade associations, and a reinsurance broker, along with London-based as well as domestic reinsurers -- violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1, by engaging in various conspiracies aimed at forcing certain other primary insurers to change the terms of their standard domestic commercial general liability insurance policies. After the actions were consolidated for litigation, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the conduct alleged fell within the grant of antitrust immunity contained in Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1012(b), and that none of the conduct amounted to a \"boycott\" within the meaning of the Section 3(b), 15 U.S.C. Section 1013(b), exemption to that grant of immunity. The court of appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54060:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54060:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54060:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes to the first; no to the second. The Court, speaking through Justice Antonin Scalia, held that a boycott exists when, in order to coerce a target into certain terms on one transaction, parties refuse to engage in other, unrelated transactions with the target. On most counts, the plaintiffs' allegations, construed favorably, described boycotts. Justice David H. Souter wrote for the Court on jurisdiction over foreign conduct, holding that it was appropriate in this case because there is no true conflict between domestic and foreign law. That is, because the London reinsurers can comply with both British law and the Sherman Act, international comity does not counsel against exercising subject matter jurisdiction in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54060:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54063:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54063:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 9, 1989, while exiting an apartment building with a history of cocaine trafficking, Timothy Dickerson spotted police officers and turned to walk in the opposite direction. In response, the officers commanded Dickerson to stop and proceeded to frisk him. An officer discovered a lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket, and, upon further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it was cocaine. The officer reached into Dickerson's pocket and confirmed that the lump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Consequently, Dickerson was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He requested that the cocaine be excluded from evidence, but the trial court denied his request and he was found guilty. Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54063:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54063:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54063:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court recalled that a police officer may seize contraband when it is in plain sight, and \"its incriminating character is immediately apparent\". It held that instances in which an officer uses the sense of sight to discover illegal goods are analogous to those involving the sense of touch. The Court also reasoned that the tactile detection of contraband during a lawful pat-down search does not constitute any further invasion of privacy, therefore warrantless seizure was permissible. The Court also concluded that the police officer frisking Dickerson stepped outside the boundaries outlined in Terry v. Ohio which requires a protective pat-down search to involve only what is necessary for the detection of weapons. In fact the officer was already aware that Dickerson's jacket pocket did not contain a weapon, when he detected the cocaine through further tactile investigation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54063:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54067:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54067:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBetween January and April 1990, Thomas Lee Deal committed six bank robberies. In each robbery, he used a gun. Subsequently, Deal was convicted, in a single proceeding, of six counts of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Section 924(c)(1) prescribes a 5-year prison term for the first such conviction, in addition to the punishment provided for the crime of violence, and requires a 20-year sentence \"in the case of [a] second or subsequent conviction under this subsection.\" The District Court sentenced Deal to 5 years' imprisonment on the first section 924(c)(1) count and to 20 years on each of the five other counts, the terms to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54067:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54067:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54067:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Deal's second through sixth convictions in a single proceeding arose \"in the case of his second or subsequent conviction\" within the meaning of section 924(c)(1), finding that the statute was not ambiguous. The Court rejected that the rule of lenity applied because Deal's \"105-year sentence 'is so glaringly unjust.'\" Writing for the court, Justice Scalia said the 105 years sentence for the gun offenses was not unjust \"simply because [Deal] managed to evade detection, prosecution and conviction for the first five offenses and was ultimately tried for all six in a single proceeding.\" Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Harry A. Blackmun joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54067:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54070:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54070:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrom 1975 to 1985, the United States Government contracted with Williams Brothers Engineering Company (WBEC) to conduct the federal oil drilling in Kern County, California. By 1981, WBEC had accrued a state tax deficit of $14 million. After the Board of Equalization rejected WBEC's claim that those taxes were invalid, the company paid its deficit, and, according to WBEC's contract, was subsequently reimbursed by the United States Government. In January of 1988, WBEC continued to challenge the taxes by filing an action in state court. This action concluded with an agreement between the state of California and WBEC that the company receive a $3 million refund. The Federal Government filed a suit in the Eastern District of California in May of 1988, arguing that the remaining state taxes totaling $11 million were also illegitimate. The District Court ruled in favor of the state of California, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54070:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54070:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54070:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court determined that regardless of the fact that the Federal Government reimburses WBEC for its taxes, the private company is still the taxpayer. And, the taxpayer had its opportunity to go to court and challenge the state taxes imposed upon it, and accepted the result. The Court found that the Federal Government does not have a separate right to do so.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54070:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54072:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54072:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHazen Paper Company fired Walter F. Biggins, a 62-year-old employee who worked for Hazen for just under 10 years. Biggins’ pension was set to vest at the completion of 10 years of service. Biggins sued Hazen and its owners, alleging that his termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and several provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). At trial, the jury ruled in favor of Biggins, finding that Hazen violated ERISA and “willfully” violated the ADEA. The willful violation gave rise to liquidated damages. The district court judge granted Hazen’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reversing the finding of willfulness which eliminated the liquidated damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and reversed the finding of willfulness, holding that Hazen knowingly violated the ADEA by showing a “reckless disregard” for the matter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54072:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54072:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54072:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for a unanimous court, vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that interfering with an employee’s pension does not automatically violate the ADEA, though it is a clear ERISA violation. While older employees may have more years of service, age and years of service are independent of each other. On remand, the court of appeals should reconsider whether there is sufficient evidence to support an ADEA violation independent of the pension interference. The Court also held that the court of appeals applied the proper definition of willfulness.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred, noting that nothing in the majority opinion should be read as supporting the “disparate impact” theory of Title VII. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54072:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54073:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54073:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA class of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons brought suit against Kentucky in a Kentucky federal court challenging the constitutionality of the state's involuntary commitment procedures. The district court agreed that the procedures were unconstitutional and prevented the enforcement of the applicable statute. After multiple appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit instructed the state to amend its procedures.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54073:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54073:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54073:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that Kentucky's procedures for involuntarily committing mentally retarded persons did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that because retarded persons are not a suspect classification, Kentucky's statute warranted only rational basis scrutiny – the Court's lowest level of scrutiny. Consequently, the Court concluded that the state met its burden that its procedures were rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and were constitutional.\nJustice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote separately, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. She argued, in contrast to the majority, that Kentucky's commitment procedures were irrational. Justice Harold A. Blackmun also dissented. He argued that laws that discriminate against the mentally retarded warrant heightened scrutiny by the Court. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, and in part by Justice O'Connor, dissented. He argued that Kentucky's commitment procedures were not supported by any rational justification.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54073:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54074:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54074:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard Allen Moran allegedly shot three people and attempted to kill himself. He pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder in Nevada state court. After a court-ordered psychiatric examination, Moran was found competent to stand trial. Two and a half months later, Moran told the court he wanted to discharge his attorney and change his pleas to guilty. Moran said he wanted to prevent anyone from introducing any favorable evidence. After some questioning, the judge accepted Moran’s waiver of his right to counsel and the guilty pleas. The court sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed as to two of the murders.\nAfter sentencing, Moran claimed he was mentally incompetent to represent himself and sought post-conviction relief in state court. The court rejected Moran’s claim based on findings from the psychiatric evaluations. The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed his appeal. Moran then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that there was enough doubt at the time Moran pleaded guilty that the trial court should have held a hearing to evaluate whether Moran could make a “reasoned choice” among the alternatives given. The record did not support a finding that Moran was capable of making a reasoned choice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54074:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54074:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54074:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that pleading guilty and waiving a right to counsel do not require a higher level of competency that standing trial. There is no reason to believe waiving these rights requires a higher mental capacity than waiving other constitutional rights. Whether a defendant is able to adequately defend himself without an attorney is irrelevant to this decision.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing that using the same competency standard for pleading guilty without counsel and standing trial with counsel does not violate due process. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun dissented, arguing that courts should conduct a specific inquiry to determine whether a defendant can proceed without counsel when the accused’s competency to stand trial has already been questioned. Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54074:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54076:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54076:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames Zobrest was deaf since birth. He attended public school through the eighth grade where the local school board provided a sign-language interpreter. Zobrest's parents elected to send their son to a Roman Catholic high school and requested that the local school board continue to provide their son with a sign-language interpreter. The school board denied the request on constitutional grounds. The Zobrests then filed suit, alleging that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the school district to provide the interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not bar such relief. The District Court granted the school district summary judgment on the ground that the interpreter would act as a conduit for the child's religious inculcation, thereby promoting his religious development at government expense in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54076:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54076:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54076:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not bar the school district from providing the requested interpreter. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, the presence of an interpreter is not linked to the state and is the result of the private decision of individual's parents. \"The service at issue in this case is part of a general government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handicapped' under the IDEA, without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54076:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54078:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54078:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn May 13, 1981, 17-year-old Gary Graham accosted Bobby Grant Lambert in the parking lot of a Safeway grocery store in Houston, Texas, and attempted to steal his wallet. When Lambert refused to hand it over, Graham shot and killed him. Graham was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.\nGraham petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus by arguing that the sentencing jury should have considered the mitigating circumstances of his youth and troubled family life. The district court denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, and a panel reversed the district court’s ruling. Upon an en banc review, the Court of Appeals vacated the panel’s decision", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54078:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54078:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54078:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a decision in favor of Graham would create a new constitutional rule by extending beyond the reasoning of the precedents that were in place at the time of the conviction. Unless a jurist at the time of Graham’s conviction could have found reasonable precedent to decide the case in his favor, to do so now would extend beyond the Court’s purview. Since the precedent at the time would not have provided a valid reason to overturn Graham’s sentence, the Court found that it must uphold it.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that he fully supported the Court’s decision. He also wrote that the case Graham chiefly relied on, Penry v. Lynaugh, was wrongly decided. He argued that the specific questions a sentencing jury is asked to consider before sentencing a defendant to death make the consideration of mitigating factors redundant.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent where he argued that the consideration of mitigating factors by a sentencing jury is a crucial safeguard against discriminatory sentencing. He strongly disagreed with Justice Clarence’s view that Penry v. Lynaugh was wrongly decided.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice David H. Souter argued that a decision in favor of Graham would not create a new constitutional rule in this case because such a decision would not impose a new burden on the prosecution in sentencing hearings. He also found that the jury instructions did not allow the jury to fully consider the implications of mitigating factors. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54078:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54086:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54086:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring his murder case, Robert Williams argued that statements he had made to police should be excluded. Some of those statements had been made before he was given his Miranda warnings and others, while made after the Miranda warnings had been given, were the direct product of those earlier, un- Mirandized statements and should also be excluded, he argued. The state trial court (and subsequently the appeals court) disagreed, and Williams was convicted.\nWilliams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing only that the claims made before the Miranda warnings were given should have been excluded. The court agreed but went further, ruling that the statements made after the Miranda warnings were inadmissible as well because they were the products of the earlier, un-Mirandized statements. On appeal, the state argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, which barred federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims when the state had already given defendants a fair chance to raise such claims in state court, should also apply to questions regarding Fifth Amendment claims stemming from a failure to give Miranda warnings in a timely manner. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's grant of the petition, however, rejecting the state's argument.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54086:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54086:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54086:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion written by Justice David H. Souter, the Supreme Court held that the decision in Stone had been one of prudence rather than one of jurisdiction. In Stone, the Court had decided against using the \"exclusionary rule\" in federal habeas cases dealing with unreasonable searches and seizures (the exclusionary rule prevents evidence discovered as the result of an unconstitutional search from being introduced in Court). The Court's decision had been based on an expectation that, even in the unlikely case that a state court had erred in its consideration of the constitutionality of a given search, that procedural error was not likely to produce a wrongful conviction. In Fifth Amendment involuntary testimony cases, though, it was possible that a suspect would given false statements about his own guilt because of confusion or fear. The question was not merely a procedural one, therefore, and the prudential concerns of Stone did not apply.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54086:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54087:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54087:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe U.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina congressional reapportionment plan because the plan created only one black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than the interstate road along which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, alleging that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54087:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54087:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54087:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. The unusual district, while perhaps created by noble intentions, seemed to exceed what was reasonably necessary to avoid racial imbalances. After concluding that the residents' claim did give rise to an equal protection challenge, the Court remanded - adding that in the absence of contradictory evidence, the District Court would have to decide whether or not some compelling governmental interest justified North Carolina's plan.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54087:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54091:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54091:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) allows public employers to give employees compensatory time off instead of overtime pay in some situations. The employees of the Harris County Sheriff’s Department had a union representative who dealt with workers' compensation and filing grievances, but Texas law prohibited collective bargaining agreements. Each employee had an individual employment agreement with the Sheriff’s Department. These agreements provided that employees would receive 1 1⁄2 hours of compensatory time for each hour of overtime work.\nLynwood Moreau, president of the union, sued the Sheriff’s Department for giving compensatory time instead of overtime pay. He argued that where there is a designated union representative, the FLSA requires a collective bargaining agreement to authorize this kind of compensation. The Sheriff’s Department argued that, because Texas prohibited collective bargaining agreements, there was no properly designated union representative, and the individual employment agreements were effective. The district court ruled in favor of the Sheriff’s Office and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54091:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54091:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54091:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Court held that the individual employment agreements authorized compensatory time. The union representative did not qualify under the FSLA because, under Texas law, he could not enter into a collective bargaining agreement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54091:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54094:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54094:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 7, 1989, Todd Mitchell, a young black man, instigated an attack against a young white boy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated battery in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County. According to Wisconsin statute, Mitchell's sentence was increased, because the court found that he had selected his victim based on race. Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of the increase in his penalty, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claims. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54094:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54094:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54094:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the Wisconsin statute paralleled antidiscrimination laws which had been found to comply with the First Amendment. It also determined that the consequences for the victim and the community tended to be more severe, when the victim of a crime was chosen on account of his or her race. Thus, when the Wisconsin statute increased the sentence for such crimes, it was not punishing the defendant for his or her bigoted beliefs or statements, but rather the predicted ramifications of his or her crime. Finally, the Court concluded that the Wisconsin statute did not violate the right to free speech because the occasion in which an average person's racist comments would be used against him or her in a court of law would arise so rarely that he or she would not feel forced to suppress them.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54094:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54098:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54098:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-hour use of school property and facilities. The Center Moriches School District, acting under the statute, prohibited the use of its property by any religious group. The District refused repeated requests by Lamb's Chapel to use the school's facilities for an after-hours religious-oriented film series on family values and child rearing. The Chapel brought suit against the School District in federal court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54098:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54098:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54098:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, by a unaminous vote. The Supreme Court's holding consisted of two parts. First, the District violated freedom of speech by refusing the Chapel's request to show movies on school premises solely because such movies were religiously oriented. While non-public schools are permitted under New York law to restrict access to their premises based on subject matter or speaker identity, such restrictions must be reasonable and \"viewpoint neutral.\" In this case, the District's restriction was neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral, since it allowed the presentation of all other views about family values and child rearing - except those which were presented from a religious perspective. Second, a grant of permission to the Chapel to use the District's premises would not have amounted to an establishment of religion. This is because the showing of the films would neither be school-sponsored during school hours nor closed to the public.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54098:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54104:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54104:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn September 29, 1981, Officers Enrique Carrisalez and David Rucker were shot within several minutes of each other in a rural part of Texas along the Mexico border known as “the Valley.” Enrique Hernandez, who was riding along in Officer Carrisalez’s squad car, was an eyewitness to Carrisalez’s shooting. The shootings led to a massive hunt for the killer across the Valley. The police arrested Leonel Herrera on October 4, 1981 near Edinburg and took him to the police station. During a heated exchange, Herrera struck a police officer and was restrained. When defense counsel arrived several hours later, Herrera was badly beaten, unconscious, and partly paralyzed; he was subsequently transported to a hospital emergency room. Officer Carrisalez died soon thereafter.\nThe police discovered evidence at the scene of arrest implicating Herrera in both murders. The car pulled over by Carrisalez was registered in the name of Herrera’s live-in girlfriend, and Herrera had a set of keys to that car when he was arrested. The police found drops of Type A blood on jeans recovered from a laundry room and in Herrera’s wallet. They also found a letter in Herrera’s pocket with Herrera’s fingerprints; the letter contained apparent confessions to both murders. Hernandez could not specifically identify Herrera from an array of six photographs, but later identified him as the shooter when presented with a mug shot. Herrera was convicted of the murder of Officer Carrisalez, and pleaded guilty to the murder of Trooper Rucker.\nHerrera filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming actual innocence and alleging that various Valley police officials were involved in the drug trade and were working with the person actually responsible for the murders, Raul Herrera. The trial court denied relief. Herrera filed another petition, presenting the affidavit of Raul Herrera’s son that he witnessed the killings and that Herrera did not commit them. The district court dismissed most of Herrera’s claims, but granted a stay of execution as to his claim of innocence. The Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, vacated the stay of execution, agreeing with Texas that innocence was irrelevant to Herrera’s petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54104:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54104:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54104:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that the rejection of Herrera’s petition did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that evidence of Herrera’s actual innocence was not relevant to his petition for a writ of habeas corpus absent some constitutional violation by the state of Texas. This rule was grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts existed to ensure that individuals were not unconstitutionally imprisoned, not to correct errors of fact. Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Court sometimes examined the sufficiency of evidence in death penalty cases, but only to determine whether there was an independent constitutional violation.\nChief Justice Rehnquist also rejected Herrera’s argument that the federal courts’ failure to accept Herrera’s petition violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist outlined the history of American principles of justice in criminal trials, determining that Texas’ refusal to entertain Herrera’s newly discovered evidence did not violate traditional notions of fundamental fairness. Moreover, Herrera could still avail himself of Texas’ procedures for requesting clemency. Chief Justice Rehnquist also questioned the evidentiary value of Herrera’s affidavits.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy. She rejected the notion that the question before the Court was whether a state may constitutionally execute an innocent person, and emphasized that the evidence strongly suggested Herrera’s guilt.\nJustice Antonin Scalia concurred, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. He argued that there was no basis in text, tradition, or contemporary practice for finding a constitutional right to demand consideration of new evidence of innocence.\nJustice Byron White concurred, arguing that Herrera would only be entitled to relief if he proved that no rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nJustice Harry Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter. He wrote that executing an innocent person was contrary to contemporary standards of decency. Justice Blackmun argued that Herrera should have been granted relief if he showed both a reasonable doubt about his guilt and that he was actually innocent. He also expressed doubts about the constitutionality of the death penalty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54104:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54105:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54105:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nShirley and Larry McQuillan were the southwest distributors for products made with sorbothane, a patented elastic polymer. They had an agreement with the manufacturer to be one of five regional distributors. Gradually, the manufacturer began to take away the McQuillan’s right to distribute certain types of products, eventually revoking their rights altogether. The manufacturer only allowed one national distributor, Spectrum Sports, Inc., which was co-owned by the president of the manufacturer’s son. When the McQuillan’s business failed, they sued Spectrum for violations of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act makes it a felony to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any part of the interstate commerce.\nThe district court instructed the jury to infer specific intent and dangerous probability of monopolization if they found that Spectrum engaged in predatory conduct. The jury found Spectrum guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was enough evidence to show specific intent and a dangerous probability of monopolization even if the jury only considered Spectrum’s predatory conduct.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54105:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54105:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54105:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the opinion of the court reversing the lower judgment. The Supreme Court held that Spectrum is not liable without proof of a dangerous probability of monopolization and specific intent. The Court held that although predatory conduct may be enough to prove intent, a dangerous probability of monopolization requires an analysis of the product involved, and the offender’s power in its geographic market.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54105:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54109:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54109:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54109:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54109:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54109:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to the church. The ordinances singled out the activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious belief was burdened. The ordinances targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict scrutiny.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54109:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54110:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54110:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTodd Brecht was charged with murder for shooting his brother-in-law. During his trial, he testified that the shooting was an accident. In addition to presenting other evidence, the prosecution pointed out his silence (both prior to his receiving the Miranda warnings and after) in an attempt to discredit his testimony. Brecht was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.\nBrecht appealed, claiming that the prosecution's reference to his post-Miranda silence violated his right to due process according to Doyle v. Ohio. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals overturned the conviction, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reinstated it. They found that the mention of post-Miranda silence was impermissible under Doyle, but was also harmless error according to the \"beyond a reasonable doubt\" standard from Chapman v. California.\nBrecht sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The District Court upheld his Doyle claim and found that the violation was not harmless error under Chapman. Brecht's conviction was thus overturned again, only to be reinstated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.\nThe Seventh Circuit held that Chapman was not the appropriate standard under which to review Doyle error in federal habeas petitions. Rather than adhering to the Chapman standard, the court applied the Kotteakos v. United States test, which requires that the Doyle error have a \"substantial and injurious effect\" on the jury's verdict. Brecht's Doyle claim did not meet this standard, and the Seventh Circuit denied the writ.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54110:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54110:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54110:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that the \"substantial and injurious effect\" test was preferable to the \"beyond a reasonable doubt\" test in requests for habeas corpus relief. Habeas proceedings are not to be the primary avenue for resolving disputes; Rehnquist called the writ \"an extraordinary remedy\", reserved for the victims of grave injustice. The Kotteakos standard, then, was sufficient to determine whether Brecht deserved habeas relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54110:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54113:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54113:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam McKinney, a Nevada state prisoner, sued his warden and several other prison officials for violating his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to unhealthy levels of second-hand smoke. McKinney shared a cell with a man who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. He claimed that his health - both current and future - was being harmed by the smoke, and that the prison officials were \"deliberately indifferent\" to the risk in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294. After a federal magistrate ruled that he did not have an Eighth Amendment right to a smoke-free environment and that he had failed to prove any \"serious medical needs,\" the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that he should have been given another opportunity to prove that the smoke levels were sufficient to constitute an unreasonable danger to his future health.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54113:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54113:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54113:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that McKinney's suit stated a reasonable claim that, if proven, could be grounds for relief under the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Byron White, in the majority opinion, rejected the government's argument that the \"deliberate indifference\" test established by the Court in Wilson (which held that withholding medical care from prisoners only violated the Eighth Amendment if it was done with \"deliberate indifference\" to serious health risks) only applied to current medical conditions. If McKinney could prove that the second-hand smoke posed a serious threat to his future health and that the prison officials had deliberately ignored that threat, White wrote, McKinney would be entitled to relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54113:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54126:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54126:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1984, the Minority Business Enterprise Participation ordinance was passed in Jacksonville, Florida which set aside 10 percent of the budget for city contracts to hire minority-owned businesses. On April 4, 1989, the Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, an association of individuals and companies that worked in construction in Jacksonville, filed an action against the city and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court ruled in favor of the association, but when the city appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the association lacked standing to file the action because it did not demonstrate that one or more of its members would have received a reserved city contract but for the ordinance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54126:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54126:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54126:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court noted that, in order to file an action, the petitioner must have demonstrated that, as a result of the challenged ordinance, its members suffered injury or that injury was imminent, and that a favorable ruling could have been expected to rectify the injury. The majority determined that the association members' possible lack of fair opportunity as a consequence of the ordinance would have constituted injury. Since the association members would have competed for the reserved city contracts in the absence of the ordinance, the Court found that they did have standing and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54126:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54129:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54129:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSection 602(7)(B) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 provides that cable television systems be franchised by local governmental authorities, but exempts facilities serving \"only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless such...facilities use any public right-of-way.\" When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled that satellite master antenna television (SMATV) systems, which typically receive a satellite signal through a rooftop dish and then retransmits the signal by wire to units within a building or a building complex, are subject to the franchise requirement if their transmission lines interconnect separately owned and managed buildings or if its lines use or cross any public right-of-way, Beach Communications, Inc. and other SMATV operators petitioned the Court of Appeals for review. Among other things, the appellate court found that section 602(7) violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because there was no rational basis for distinguishing between those facilities exempted by the statute and SMATV systems linking separately owned and managed buildings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54129:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54129:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54129:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that section 602(7)(B)'s common-ownership distinction is constitutional because the statutory classification neither proceeded along suspect lines nor infringed fundamental constitutional rights. \"As we have indicated,\" Justice Thomas concluded, \"there are plausible rationales unrelated to the use of public rights-of-way for regulating cable facilities serving separately owned and managed buildings. The assumptions underlying these rationales may be erroneous, but the very fact that they are 'arguable' is sufficient, on rational-basis review, to 'immunize' the congressional choice from constitutional challenge.\" Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54129:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54131:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54131:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard Lyle Austin was indicted on four counts of violating South Dakota’s drug laws. He pleaded guilty to one count of possession cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years in jail. The United States then filed an in rem action, seeking forfeiture of Austin’s mobile home and auto body shop under federal statutes that provide for forfeiture of property that is used or intended for use to facilitate the transportation of controlled substances, or related materials. Austin argued that forfeiture of his property would violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court rejected Austin’s argument and entered summary judgment in favor of the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil in rem actions for forfeiture of property to the government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54131:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54131:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54131:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for five members of the court, reversed the Eighth Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment did apply because the forfeiture was a punishment for an offense and did not only serve a remedial purpose. On remand, the Eighth Circuit should consider whether the forfeiture was constitutionally “excessive.”\nJustice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing that the proper question for determining whether the forfeiture is excessive is whether the property had a close enough relationship to the offense, rather than how much the property is worth. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing that the majority should not have decided whether in rem forfeitures always amount to a punishment of the owner. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in Kennedy’s opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54131:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54134:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54134:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nActing upon a belief that Cardinal Chemical (\"Cardinal\") violated two of its patents on chemical compounds used in polyvinyl chloride, Morton International (\"Morton\") challenged Cardinal's actions in a South Carolina District Court. Cardinal counterclaimed that Morton's patents were invalid. The District Court ruled that although none of Morton's patents were violated, they were both invalid. Morton appealed to the Federal Circuit Court which sustained the lower courts infringement finding but issued a per se reversal of its determination as to the validity of Morton's patents based on a practice dating back to 1987. Cardinal appealed the per se rejection of its validity counterclaim and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54134:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54134:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54134:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that two questions of law do not always necessarily cancel each other out when only one is resolved. The Court observed that in matters of patent law, noninfringement and invalidity are two separate questions. Therefore, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may find that a patent has not been infringed but it may not rely on such a determination as a per se basis for vacating a judgement holding the same patent invalid. Although the Court of Appeals' dogmatic practice existed since 1987, it was unsupported by the \"case or controversy\" requirement of Article III, and imposed undue burdens on those who remained convinced of the disputed patent's invalidity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54134:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54136:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54136:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Angus Smith offered to trade an automatic weapon, a MAC-10, to an undercover officer for cocaine. Subsequently, he was charged with numerous firearm and drug trafficking offenses. Federal law imposes mandatory sentence enhancement penalties, specifically 30 years for a \"machinegun\", if a defendant \"during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime[,] uses . . . a firearm.\" A jury convicted Smith on all counts, which triggered the sentence enhancement. On appeal, Smith argued that the federal penalty for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense covers only situations in which the firearm is used as a weapon, not as a medium of exchange. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the plain language of the penalty does not require that a firearm be used as a weapon, but that it applies to any use of a gun that facilitates, in any fashion, the perpetration of a drug offense.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54136:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54136:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54136:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that a criminal who trades his or her firearm for drugs \"uses\" it \"during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime,\" which is within the bounds of the sentence enhancement. Justice O'Connor wrote that Congress intended to make the word \"use\" as broad as possible when it wrote the law. The law does not require proof that a defendant used the gun as a weapon.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54136:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54145:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54145:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlvin J. Dixon was arrested on second-degree murder charges and released on bond with an order not to commit any criminal offense. Violation of the order would result in prosecution for contempt of court. While awaiting trial, Dixon was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found Dixon guilty of contempt. Dixon moved to dismiss a subsequent indictment for cocaine possession, arguing that it violated the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. The Superior Court granted the motion.\nMichael Foster’s wife obtained a civil protection order requiring that he not “molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or physically abuse” her, or he would face prosecution for contempt of court. Foster’s wife later moved to have him held in contempt for threatening her. Foster was found guilty of contempt on two occasions, but acquitted on three others. Foster was later indicted on several counts of assault arising out of those same threats. He moved to have the charges dismissed arguing that it violated double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit consolidated the two cases, holding that the subsequent prosecutions were barred by Grady v. Corbin, which held that subsequent prosecutions violate the double jeopardy clause if the two prosecutions require proof of the same “essential element.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54145:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54145:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54145:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the judgment of the court. Though not agreeing on an opinion, five justices agreed that the proper test was whether the offense in the second prosecution contained the same elements as the offense in the first. Five justices also agreed that double jeopardy did not bar the subsequent prosecutions in either case. Justice Scalia noted that Grady was wrongly decided and must be overruled. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the judgment.\nChief Justice Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part, writing that the subsequent prosecutions did not violate double jeopardy under the same elements test. Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas joined in the opinion. Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, arguing that double jeopardy bars prosecution for an offense if the accused has already been held in contempt for its commission. Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice David H. Souter joined in the opinion. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, writing that none of the subsequent prosecutions were barred because the interests served by contempt proceedings were fundamentally different from the interests served by criminal prosecution. Justice Souter concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, arguing that the same elements test was inadequate and Grady had been correctly decided. Justice Stevens joined in the opinion", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54145:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54162:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54162:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 23, 1986, Dorsie Lee Johnson, Jr., who was 19, shot Jack Huddleston in the course of a convenience store robbery by telling Huddleston to get on the ground and then shooting Huddleston in the back of the neck. A few weeks later, Johnson was arrested for a subsequent robbery and attempted murder. At that time he confessed to the murder of Jack Huddleston.\nJohnson was tried and convicted of capital murder. After a jury determined that he was guilty, a separate proceeding was held to determine whether Johnson would be sentenced to death or to life in prison. Pursuant to the Texas capital sentencing statute, the court instructed the jury to determine two special issues, whether Johnson caused the death of Jack Huddleston intentionally and whether Johnson was likely to constitute a continuing threat to society. Under Texas law, if the jury answered yes to both questions Johnson would be sentenced to death. The court further instructed the jury that it may consider any aggravating or mitigating evidence. However, the jury was given no special instruction to consider Johnson's youth. A unanimous jury found that the answer to both special issues was yes, and the trial court sentenced Johnson to death.\nJohnson appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the conviction. Johnson later filed a motion for rehearing arguing that the special issues did not allow for adequate consideration of Johnson's youth. The court of appeals rejected Johnson's argument concluding that the jury was able to express a reasoned and moral response to Johnson's mitigating evidence. Johnson then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54162:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54162:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54162:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority and held that the procedure set forth by the Texas capital sentencing statute was constitutional with respect to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a lengthy discussion of past decisions regarding the constitutional requirements regarding the consideration of mitigating circumstances in capital cases, the Court ultimately held that the Texas capital sentencing statute allowed adequate consideration of Johnson's youth because the jury was instructed to determine the probability that the petitioner would be a continuing threat to society and to consider any mitigating evidence with which they were presented.\nJustice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion. He emphasized that the sentencer's consideration of relevant mitigating evidence ought to be channeled. He stated that the kind of channeling of mitigating discretion practiced in Texas should not merely be permitted, but required.\nJustice Clarence Thomas also filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the ruling, but added that he believed the Court wrongly decided Penry v. Lynaugh.\nJustice Sandra Day O'Connor dissented, joined by Justices Harry A. Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, and David Souter. In her opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that the jury was not allowed to give full effect to the mitigating evidence of Johnson's youth and stated that the sentence should have been remanded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54162:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54163:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54163:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAccording to Executive Order No. 12807 signed by President George H. W. Bush in 1992, the Coast Guard was required to force the return of all passengers discovered illegally traveling by sea from Haiti to the United States before reaching its borders without determining whether they qualify as refugees. The Haitian Centers Council, Inc., a collection of organizations representing illegal Haitian aliens and Haitians detained at Guantanamo, requested that the District Court for the Eastern District of New York delay the implementation of the order. The council argued that the order violated section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which protect individuals escaping potential prosecution from forced repatriation. The District Court denied the council's request, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54163:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54163:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54163:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a majority opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court observed that Acts of Congress do not generally have application outside of United States territory, unless explicitly noted. And, it found that both section 243(h) and Article 33 are silent regarding extraterritorial application. In fact, the language of both suggests that only individuals who have already arrived on United States soil are protected, and their use throughout history confirms this interpretation. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54163:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54168:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54168:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFerris Alexander was the owner of a chain of stores and theaters in Minnesota that distributed sexually explicit media. He was charged with violating federal obscenity laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The federal District Court in Minnesota found him guilty of both charges. The court ordered him to forfeit his businesses, sentenced him to a six-year prison term, and fined him $100,000.\nAlexander appealed, claiming that the confiscation of his stores for his dealings in obscene material amounted to 'prior restraint' on his subsequent distribution of adult materials, and therefore violated his First Amendment rights. He also claimed that the seizure of his business violated his Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment on the First Amendment claim, and declined to review the Eighth Amendment claim on the ground that no sentence less severe than life imprisonment without parole could justify an Eighth Amendment review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54168:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54168:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54168:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and undecided. Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote for a 5-4 majority that the application of RICO in Alexander's case was neither a 'prior restraint' on speech, nor a criminalization of speech typically protected under the Constitution. His sentence established no conditions on his behavior after its completion; once he paid the fine, surrendered his business and went to prison, he could theoretically distribute adult media without prejudice from the government. \"To accept petitioner's argument,\" Rehnquist wrote, \"would virtually obliterate the distinction [...] between prior restraints and subsequent punishments.\"\nIn a separate and unanimous vote, the Court ruled that the forfeiture did in fact merit Eighth Amendment review. The case was returned to the Eighth Circuit for an analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54168:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54175:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54175:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWalter Nixon, a Federal District Judge, was convicted of a felony, making false statements to a grand jury. The House of Representatives voted three articles of impeachment; impeachment in the Senate followed. In accordance with Senate Rule XI, a Senate committee heard the evidence and reported its findings. The full Senate convicted Nixon and sought to remove him from office. Nixon challenged Senate Rule XI in federal court on the ground that the rule violated the impeachment clause of the Constitution, which declares that \"the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.\" The lower courts deemed the issue nonjusticiable and declined to intervene in the dispute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54175:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54175:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54175:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. A unanimous Court held that the question of whether or not the Senate rule violated the U.S. Constitution was nonjusticiable since the Impeachment clause expressly granted that the \"Senate shall have sole Power to try any impeachments.\" The clause laid out specific regulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelines were observed the courts would not rule upon the validity of other Senate procedures regarding impeachments. Chief Justice William Rehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the \"ultimate intrepreter of the Constitution,\" a matter would be deemed nonjusticiable when there was \"a constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54175:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54179:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54179:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAcuff-Rose Music, Inc. sued 2 Live Crew and their record company, claiming that 2 Live Crew's song \"Pretty Woman\" infringed Acuff-Rose's copyright in Roy Orbison's \"Oh, Pretty Woman.\" The District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that its song was a parody that made fair use of the original song. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54179:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54179:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54179:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a parody's commercial character is only one element to be weighed in a fair use enquiry and that insufficient consideration was given to the nature of parody in weighing the degree of copying. The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the presumption that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair, as no such evidentiary presumption was available to address either the character and purpose of the use or the market harm. Justice Souter wrote that the appellate court \"erred in holding that 2 Live Crew had necessarily copied excessively from the Orbison original, considering the parodic purpose of the use.\" Justice Anthony M. Kennedy filed a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54179:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54180:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54180:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1989, the New York legislature passed a school districting law that intentionally drew its boundaries in accordance with the boundaries of the Village of Kiryas Joel, a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim who practice a strict form of Judaism. Shortly before the new district commenced operations, the taxpayers and the association of state school boards embarked on a lawsuit claiming that the statute created a school district that limited access only to residents of Kiryas Joel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54180:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54180:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54180:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the statute's purpose was to exclude all but those who lived in and practiced the village enclave's extreme form of Judaism. This exclusionary intent failed to respect the Establishment Clause's requirement that states maintain a neutral position with respect to religion, because it clearly created a school zone which excluded those who were non-religious and/or did not practice Samtar Hasidism. Indeed, the very essence of the Establishment Clause is that government should not demonstrate a preference for one religion over another, or religion over non-religion in general.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54180:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54186:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54186:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Shannon Carter was classified as a learning disabled student, school officials met with her parents to formulate an individualized education program (IEP) as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Unhappy with the IEP developed by the school district, Shannon's parents challenged its appropriateness and enrolled her in a private school while their challenge was pending.\nWhen state and local educational authorities concluded that the IEP was adequate, Shannon's parents sued in Federal District Court, claiming the school district had failed to provide a \"free appropriate public education\" as required by IDEA and demanding reimbursement for Shannon's education at the private school. The school district argued that the private school did not meet all the requirements of IDEA and therefore did not meet the \"appropriate\" standard. Because of it was not \"appropriate,\" the school district argued, reimbursement was not required.\nThe District Court and the Fourth Circuit of Appeals both ruled against the school district, requiring it to reimburse Shannon's parents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54186:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54186:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54186:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Supreme Court unanimously held that parents have a right to withdraw their child from a public school providing an inappropriate education under the meaning of IDEA and enroll them in a private school, as long as the private school provides an \"appropriate\" education. The Court further held that the specific requirements of the Act need not be met when a student is placed in a private school by his or her parents, because the IDEA requirements were not intended to apply to parental placements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54186:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54187:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54187:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Organization for Women (NOW) sued a coalition of anti-abortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. N.O.W. alleged that Scheidler and other anti-abortion protesters were members in a nationwide conspiracy to obstruct women's access to abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity including the actual or implied threat of violence. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the voluntary contributions are not proceeds of racketeering and that a \"racketeering enterprise\" must have an economic motive, a fact that NOW could not demonstrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54187:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54187:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54187:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe unanimous Court held that organizations without an economic motive can detrimentally \"affect interstate or foreign commerce,\" satisfying the RICO definition of a racketeering enterprise. An \"enterprise\" does not have to be an economic organization or a principally criminal organization to trigger the RICO act. Consequently, the Court reversed the appeals court decision which allowed the original case to proceed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54187:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54188:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54188:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIllinois police obtained a warrant to arrest Kevin Albright after he was seen selling a substance which look liked an illegal drug. Upon hearing of the warrant, Albright surrendered to police detective Roger Oliver. A trial court dismissed the charge because it did not state an offense under Illinois law.\nAlbright claimed that Oliver violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right by prosecuting him without probable cause. He filed suit against Oliver under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides relief to those deprived of civil rights. The federal District Court dismissed the suit because it did not state a claim under Section 1983. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that relief provided by Section 1983 for prosecution without probable cause is valid only if the prosecution caused a consequence such as loss of employment or incarceration.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54188:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54188:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54188:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled that Section 1983 relief for prosecution without probable cause is only valid if the prosecuted party claims Fourth Amendment (pretrial rights) violations. In a 7-2 decision authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Courtt reaffirmed its commitment not to extend substantive due process indefinitely and held that substantive due process does not guarantee non-interference by criminal investigations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54188:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54195:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54195:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1989, Oregon Legislature imposed a surcharge on solid waste generated out-of-state and disposed of within the state. The Department of Environmental Quality, determined the amount of the surcharge to be $2.25 per ton, significantly higher than the $0.85 per ton fee charged for in-state waste. Two waste disposal companies —Waste Systems Inc. and Columbia Resource Company (CRC) — disposed of waste generated out-of-state in Oregon. Waste Systems Inc. managed and owned a landfill in Oregon, and CRC transported waste from Washington State to Oregon. The companies challenged the surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that it breached the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. However, the appellate court upheld the surcharge, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54195:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54195:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54195:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a majority decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court noted that the Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, and a regulation is discriminatory if it \"taxes a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines.\" The majority determined that the surcharge was clearly discriminatory because waste disposal companies were required to pay three times more to dispose of waste produced out-of-state. Thus, for the surcharge to comply with the Commerce Clause, the Department of Environmental Quality needed to demonstrate that it had no choice but to use discriminatory means to serve some local purpose, but it failed to do so. Consequently, the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court was reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54195:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54198:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54198:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nConsolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) employee James Gottshall observed a fellow worker, Richard Johns, die of a heart attack while on duty. Gottshall's boss postponed seeking medical assistance during Johns' heart attack, insisted that the crew keep working, and left the body at the work site for the remainder of the work day. Shortly after Johns's death, Gottshall was admitted to a psychiatric institution. Gottshall sued Conrail under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for exposing him to distressing circumstances which he claimed caused his illness. A District Court rejected the suit.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and found that Gottshall's injuries were \"genuine and severe.\" The Third Circuit contrasted the liberal injury recovery policy embodied in FELA over the more limited injury relief recovery policy embodied in common law standards, which often applied harsh tests to prove employee injury.\nConrail employee Alan Carlisle also filed a FELA action against Conrail. He claimed that Conrail subjected him to unsafe working conditions, which caused him stress and lead to health problems. Because the stress related health problems were foreseeable to Conrail, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment for Carlisle.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54198:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54198:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54198:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a 7-2 Court. The Court categorized FELA emotional stress claims closely with common law treatments of emotional stress claims. The Court rejected the Third Circuit's assertion that common law tests were arbitrary and could be disregarded. Instead, common law standards should be used to verify claims filed under FELA. The Court adopted the \"zone of danger test\" from common law, which limits relief to those employees who sustain physical injury resulting from emotional stress caused by employer negligence. The Court held that this test would best distinguish between genuine and fraudulent claims, and provide relief in the case of injury. The Court rejected the Third Circuit's holding that employers were liable for causing foreseeably stressful conditions, reasoning that this would extend to many types of everyday employment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54198:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54205:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54205:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA New York town, Clarkstown, allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste processing plant within town limits. The revenue from the plant would help compensate the contractor. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive 120,000 tons of solid waste each year, and permitted the contractor to charge an $81 \"tipping fee\" for each ton received. To meet the 120,000 ton quota, Clarkstown adopted a \"flow control ordinance.\" The ordinance required that all solid waste flowing into and out of the town pass through the new plant. C & A Carbone, Inc. operated a similar plant within the town. To avoid paying the $81 fee, Carbone trucked processed waste directly to an Indiana landfill. In 1991, a Carbone truck carrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating the ordinance. Clarkstown sued Carbone in a New York Supreme Court. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. The District Court agreed but dissolved its injunction against Clarkstown when the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54205:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54205:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54205:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Tthe Court held 6-3 that the Commerce Clause invalidates local laws that discriminate against interstate commerce, disrupt the flow of articles of commerce, and grant municipalities disproportionate market gains. In an opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court found that \"the article of commerce...is the service of processing and disposing of [waste].\" The Court held that the flow ordinance was discriminatory because \"[i]t hoards solid waste...for the benefit of the preferred processing facility.\" For the ordinance to be constitutional, the municipality would have had to prove that its effects on commerce are nondiscriminatory and justified by a \"legitimate local interest.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54205:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54206:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54206:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBFP, a partnership formed by two private investors, bought a home in Newport Beach, CA in 1987. BFP secured the property by obtaining a deed of trust from Imperial Savings Association (Imperial). Imperial owned the property until BFP could pay off the amount borrowed. BFP defaulted on loan repayment and Imperial proceeded to sell the property for $433,000 to settle the loan (foreclosure). Before the title of ownership transferred to the buyer, BFP filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. BFP asked bankruptcy court to nullify the original foreclosure sale because the home was valued at over $725,000. BFP argued that the low sales price constituted a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. Section 548(a)(2)(A), which guarantees that debtors receive \"reasonably equivalent value\" for property foreclosed. BFP claimed \"reasonably equivalent value\" was equal to the market value of the property in question. The bankruptcy court denied BFP's claim, and a District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54206:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54206:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54206:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, The Court ruled 5-4 that the value received for a property at a foreclosure sale can be reasonable even if it is different from the \"fair market value.\" A foreclosure sale alters market conditions and can lower a property's selling price. If a foreclosure sale is necessary to settle a debt, the price at which the property is sold is reasonable so long as \"all the requirements of the State's foreclosure law have been complied with.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54206:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54207:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54207:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTeresa Harris was sexually harassed by her employer. She filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the harassment created an \"abusive work environment\" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer countered that the harassment had not been severe enough to seriously affect her psychologically or impair her ability to work, and that it therefore did not create an abusive work environment under the meaning of Title VII. The district court agreed, stating that the decision was a \"close case\" but that the harassment had not been severe enough to create an abusive work environment in violation of the Act. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54207:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54207:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54207:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court found that the district court had been wrong to focus on whether or not the harassment had caused \"concrete psychological harm.\" Instead, Justice O'Connor wrote that the court should have focused on whether the conduct was hostile or abusive. \"Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive... there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious (in order to find that it violates Title VII).\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54207:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54208:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54208:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThree days after his arrest by local police on state narcotics charges, Pedro Alvarez-Sanchez confessed to the Secret Service that federal reserve notes found in his home were counterfeit. When he was subsequently charged with the federal offense of possession of counterfeit currency, Alvarez defended himself by claiming that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered his confession inadmissible. Alvarez cited 18 U.S.C. Section 3501(c), which pronounced separate charge-based confessions inadmissible if obtained after the first six hours of detention. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's decision to uphold the confession, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54208:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54208:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54208:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the provisions of the federal statute in question do not apply to suspects being held solely on state charges. The Court explained that no delay is said to occur until the suspect is arrested and detained for a federal crime. The six-hour period only begins to expire from the point of a suspect's federal arrest and charging. In this case, Alvarez-Sanchez was presented before a federal judge within six hours of his arrest on a federal counterfeit charge. The fact that he was held for some two and a half days prior has no bearing on his federal status under the statute since he was detained on state and local charges only during this time.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54208:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54209:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54209:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986 and 1988, the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority issued $26 million worth of bonds to fund public improvements and residential and commercial developments. The Central Bank of Denver served as a trustee on the bonds. In 1988, there was concern that the land was no longer worth 160% of the value of the bonds’ outstanding principals and interests as required by the bond covenant. Before a review was completed, the Public Building Authority defaulted on the bonds.\nFirst Interstate Bank of Denver and the other respondents had purchased $2.1 million of the bonds, and after the default, sued for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The respondents argued that Central Bank was also liable for aiding and abetting the violations. Central Bank petitioned the district court for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54209:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54209:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54209:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Securities Exchange Act only prohibits manipulative or deceitful actions, and it can only be used to prosecute such actions. Since the charge of aiding and abetting is not directly covered in the statute, companies cannot be liable for such actions. The Court also held that if Congress intended the statute to be used in such a way, it would have added a section that specifically addressed the issue.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the judicial history of similar cases showed that those who aid and abet in violations of the Securities Exchange Act are considered liable. He also argued that, given the liberal background to the construction of the Act, it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended it to have a broad applicability. Justices Harry A. Blackmun, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54209:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54211:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54211:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing Missouri's imposition of a 1.5% statewide \"use tax,\" the Associated Industries of Missouri - representing Missouri businesses that had to collect the tax and a manufacturing firm that had to pay it - filed suit alleging that the tax violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. Such discrimination was said to result from the fact that the use tax exceeded many in-state localities' sales tax rate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54211:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54211:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54211:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the use tax was discriminatory in those localities where it exceeded the local sales tax. Such discrepancies, between certain localities' sales taxes and the state use tax, prevented the latter tax from being a valid \"compensatory\" tax, since it obviously did not impose a \"substantially similar\" burden on the interstate and intrastate commerce of such localities. The Court added that in those localities where the use tax did not exceed the local sales tax, no discriminatory treatment resulted and so the use tax's application would not be struck down in its entirety. Instead, the Court remanded the case back to Missouri for a decision on how to best correct certain of its localities' existing tax discrepancies.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54211:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54221:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54221:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLenard Ray Beecham was convicted in Federal District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. Beecham argued that according to the statute's exemption clause (\"Any conviction...for which a person...has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction...\") he was no longer a convicted felon because Tennessee had restored his civil rights. Prosecutors pointed to the statute's \"choice of law clause,\" which states that \"What constitutes a conviction...shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.\" They argued that because Beecham's prior conviction was under federal law, no state could restore his right to possess a firearm.\nThe District Court ruled that a state could restore civil rights barred by a federal conviction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision. The Fourth Circuit's rule conflicted with those of the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which held that the since the exemption clause applied to \"any conviction,\" it also permitted states to undo restrictions caused by federal convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54221:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54221:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54221:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court applied the choice of law clause to the exemption clause and reasoned that no rights could be restored unless by the jurisdiction that first barred the rights. The Court ruled that though the federal government did not currently have any procedures in place to restore the civil rights of felons, only the federal government had jurisdiction over federal convictions. Therefore, Beecham's state-law restoration of civil rights was insufficient to restore his right to possess a firearm in light of 18 U.S.C. 922(g).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54221:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54231:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54231:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDee Farmer, a biological male, underwent estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants and underwent unsuccessful sex reassignment surgery. Farmer was convicted and sentenced to prison on federal criminal charges. Prison medical personnel diagnosed Farmer as a transsexual. Farmer was generally kept separate from the general male population, in part because of Farmer’s misconduct, but also because of safety concerns.\nFarmer was transferred to the U.S. Penitentiary Terre Haute and placed in the general male population in accordance with prison policy. Within two weeks, a cellmate allegedly beat and raped Farmer. Farmer sued in federal district court, alleging that prison officials deliberately and indifferently failed to protect a prisoner. This violated Farmer’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer sought damages and an injunction against future incarceration in any prison. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials, noting that Farmer never complained or expressed any safety concerns prior to the incident. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54231:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54231:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54231:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe. Justice David H. Souter, writing for seven members of the court, vacated the lower court judgment and remanded. The Supreme Court held that prison officials may be liable if they showed “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm when the official was subjectively aware of the risk and disregarded it. The Court remanded the case for further consideration of whether prison officials were aware of the risk to Farmer. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, writing that inhumane prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment regardless of a prison official’s state of mind. Justice John Paul Stevens also concurred writing that he agreed with Justice Blackmun, but joined in the majority because it followed prior precedent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment arguing that conditions of confinement do not violate the Eighth Amendment unless they are imposed as part of a sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54231:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54239:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54239:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter successfully defending against a copyright infringement suit filed against him by Fantasy Inc. (Fantasy), John Fogerty sought to recover the cost of his attorney's fees from Fantasy. Fogerty based his claim on 17 U.S.C. section 505 which states in part that: \"the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.\" On appeal from an unfavorable district court ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed as it found that Fogerty did not demonstrate that Fantasy's original suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith. Fogerty appealed again, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54239:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54239:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54239:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that while attorney's fees are awarded from time to time to prevailing defendants or plaintiffs, this practice is entirely subject to the deciding court's discretion. Indeed, the Court observed, that the statute in question emphasizes such discretion by stating in relevant part that a court \"may\" award attorney's fees. The Court concluded that such discretion is to be applied evenhandedly between victorious defendants and plaintiffs.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54239:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54241:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54241:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Digital Equipment Corporation and Desktop Direct, Inc. arrived at a settlement agreement in a trademark infringement suit, the federal District Court dismissed the case. Several months later, after Desktop claimed that Digital had misrepresented important facts during the settlement negotiations, the Court reopened the case and cancelled the agreement. Digital appealed, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hear the case, holding that it was not immediately appealable under the guidelines laid out by the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463. The court held that the \"right not to go to trial\" claimed by Digital under the settlement was not sufficiently important to merit an immediate appeal and was different from immunity rooted in an explicit statutory or constitutional provision or compelling public policy rationale, the denial of which had been held immediately appealable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54241:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54241:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54241:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the denial of immunity - while cause for concern - does not automatically create a right to immediate appeal. It is important to have final judgments before appeals are made, Justice David H. Souter wrote for the Court, and exceptions should only be made in particularly important cases. A \"right not to go to trial,\" while significant, is rarely the key factor in a settlement agreement, and cannot compare in importance to the right to be free from \"double jeopardy\" in criminal court or the encroachment on public duties caused by a denial of immunity to public officials.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54241:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54243:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54243:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSilvia Safille Ibanez practiced law in White Haven, Florida, and had been a member of the Florida Bar since 1983. She was also a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) licensed by the Florida Board of Accountancy (Board) and was authorized by the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards—a private organization—to use the designation Certified Financial Planner (CFP). Ibanez used both of these titles in her advertising and on her law office's stationery. When the Board learned that Ibanez advertised these designations, she was charged with practicing public accounting at an unlicensed firm, which violated the Public Accountancy Act. The officer who heard the case recommended that the Board dismiss the charges due to a lack of proof. The Board refused and declared Ibanez guilty of \"false, deceptive, and misleading\" advertising. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First Circuit, affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54243:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54243:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54243:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that Ibanez's use of her CPA and CFP designations constituted commercial speech, which can only be restricted if it can be proven to be false or misleading and the state has a substantial interest in restricting it. Because Ibanez is fully licensed, her use of the designations was neither false nor misleading. Without evidence that the commercial speech caused \"real harms\" and that limiting it would restrict those harms, the Board did not meet its burden to show a substantial state interest.\nJustice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which she argued that Ibanez's use of the CFP designation was misleading. Because it appears in conjunction with the CPA designation, Justice O'Connor argued that the average consumer would be led to believe that a state licensing board controlled the use of both titles, which is not the case. Without listing the agency that regulates the use of the CFP title, the average consumer would be unable to verify this information. Because this designation is potentially misleading, the Board properly disciplined Ibanez with regard to the CFP designation. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54243:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54245:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54245:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Edward Stansbury, an ice cream truck driver, was taken to the Pomona Police Department for questioning as a potential witness in the investigation of the death of a 10-year-old girl. Stansbury was not a suspect in the death, and did not receive Miranda warnings, but during questioning, made a statement that put him under suspicion. After further questioning, Stansbury admitted to prior convictions for rape, kidnapping and child molestation. At this point the interrogating officer advised Stansbury of his Miranda rights and Stansbury refused to make any further statements. Stansbury requested an attorney and was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. The trial court held that Stansbury was not truly in custody and therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings until suspicion focused on him. The court refused to suppress Stansbury’s statements made prior to the warning. Stansbury was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54245:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54245:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54245:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court and remanded. The Court held that an officer’s subjective view is irrelevant to the determination of whether a person being interrogated is “in custody.” On remand, the Supreme Court of California should consider whether the objective circumstances showed that Stansbury was in custody during his entire interrogation. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, writing that the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the constraints of the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54245:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54249:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54249:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKarl Oberg was driving an all-terrain vehicle when it overturned, causing him severe, permanent injuries. The jury in his trial assessed almost $1 million in compensatory damages, and an additional $5 million in punitive damages. A 1910 amendment to the Oregon state constitution prohibited judicial review of jury awards.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54249:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54249:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54249:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The denial of judicial review creates the possibility that juries might make arbitrary and excessive awards without offering a way to adjust them. The common-law practice of allowing judicial review for jury awards is important in ensuring that juries do not ignore guidelines.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54249:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54253:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54253:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter employee Michael Manson gave a false excuse for being late to work, ABF Freight System, Inc. (ABF) fired him for tardiness. Manson repeated his false excuse while under oath at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, during which he argued that ABF had fired him in retaliation for his previous union activities. The National Labor Relations Board reversed the judge, ruling that ABF had used Manson's tardiness as a pretext to fire him. The Board reinstated him with backpay.\nABF appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, claiming that the Board could not reinstate an employee who lied under oath. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the Board could determine whether or not to pardon Manson for giving a false excuse.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54253:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54253:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54253:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that the National Labor Relations Act gave the Board broad authority to adopt laws regarding the reinstatement of employees. The Court called perjury \"intolerable in a formal proceeding,\" but ruled that the National Labor Relations Board was under no obligation to adopt a blanket rule against reinstating employees who have perjured themselves. Reducing the Board's discretion in making rules for employee reinstatement \"might force the Board to divert its attention from its primary mission and devote unnecessary time and energy to resolving collateral disputes about credibility.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54253:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54257:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54257:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGranderson, convicted for mail destruction, faced potential imprisonment of 0-6 months under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced him to five years of probation. When Granderson tested positive for cocaine, the court resentenced him under section 3565 of the U.S. Code. The section says that if a person serving a sentence of probation possesses illegal drugs, \"the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence.\" The district court interpreted the phrase \"original sentence\" to refer to the term of probation imposed (60 months), rather than the 0-6 month imprisonment range set by the Guidelines. The court resentenced Granderson to 20 months' imprisonment.\nThe 11th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Granderson's new sentence. Citing \"lenity,\" the court agreed with Granderson that \"original sentence\" referred to the potential imprisonment range under the Guidelines, not to the actual probation sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54257:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54257:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54257:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held 7-2 that the U.S. Code's section 3565 refers to the original sentence range set by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the minimum revocation sentence for drug possession while on probation is one third the maximum of the Guidelines range of imprisonment; the maximum revocation sentence is the Guidelines maximum. The Court pointed out that the statute differentiates between \"sentence of probation\" and \"original sentence.\" Moreover, the history of the language shows that Congress may not have given it careful attention and that it \"may have been composed with an obsolete federal sentencing regime in the drafter's mind.\" In \"circumstances, where the text, structure, and statutory history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct, the rule of lenity... resolve[s] the statutory ambiguity in Granderson's favor.\"\nJustices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy concurred separately. Dissenting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, with whom Justice Clarence Thomas concurred, argued that \"original sentence\" should be interpreted as the term of probation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54257:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54263:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54263:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 28, 1992, in response to the serious financial hardships of Massachusetts dairy farmers, the Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture issued a pricing order. The order required all dealers who sold milk to Massachusetts retailers to make a monthly premium payment to be distributed among in-state dairy farmers. Two Massachusetts milk dealers --West Lynn Creamery and LeComte's Dairy -- sell dairy products in Massachusetts. West Lynn Creamery relies on out-of-state producers; LeComte purchases all of its milk from West Lynn. The dealers filed an action in state court claiming that the order violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The state court rejected their claims; the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54263:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54263:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54263:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a majority decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court determined that the pricing order violated the Commerce Clause because it discriminated against interstate commerce. The majority found that while the pricing order taxed all dealers, the benefit of the tax was reserved exclusively for in-state dairy farmers and outweighed the tax they were required to pay. Thus, the Court concluded that, in effect, the pricing order functioned like a tariff, and was clearly unconstitutional. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54263:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54264:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54264:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 1990, Jonathan Dale Simmons beat an elderly woman to death in her home. The week before his trial for capital murder was scheduled to begin, Simmons pled guilty to first-degree robbery and two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection with two previous assaults. These guilty pleas rendered him ineligible for parole if convicted of any other violent-crime offense. Prior to jury selection, the trial court judge granted the prosecution’s motion to bar any questions pertaining to parole during the jury selection process. Simmons was convicted of murder and brought forth mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. In closing arguments, the prosecution focused on the issue of the future danger the defendant presented to society as a reason to sentence him to death. The defense requested that the trial judge give a specific jury instruction clarifying the meaning of “life imprisonment” in this case, and the trial judge refused to do so. The jury sentenced Simmons to death. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to reach a decision on the merits and instead held that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury satisfied the substance of Simmons’ request.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54264:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54264:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54264:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 7-2 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the lack of a specific instruction regarding the actual consequences of the jury’s decision led to Simmons being sentenced on the basis of essentially false information. The Due Process Clause grants defendants the right to “deny or explain” the evidence against them, and Simmons was not given the opportunity to do so regarding his potential future danger to society. Because evidence of future dangerousness often plays an important role in sentencing, preventing the jury from having access to the relevant information does not conform to the precedents established in Due Process jurisprudence. The Supreme Court also held that the South Carolina Supreme Court erred in holding that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury were sufficient. The instructions the trial judge gave did nothing to dispel any misunderstanding the jury members might have had regarding the meaning of the possible sentences.\nJustice David H. Souter wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the trial judge has a responsibility to dispel jury misunderstandings of sentencing terms, particularly when the jury explicitly requests such guidance. Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the concurrence. In her separate concurrence, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the most basic right the Due Process Clause protects is the right to be heard, which was denied to Simmons when he was prevented from clarifying his parole situation. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in judgment in which she argued that the Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant’s right to rebut the prosecution’s evidence against him. In a sentencing trial in which the prosecution bases its argument on the defendant’s future dangerousness, the Constitution requires that the defendant have the opportunity to provide evidence to the contrary. Proof that the defendant will not be released is sometimes the only way to rebut the prosecution’s evidence. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony Kennedy joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion creates an overbroad reading of the Due Process Clause’s power to override state law regarding the admissibility of parole information. Such an issue should be left to the states to decide individually, as there is no indication in the Constitution that the Due Process Clause requires such a strict national standard. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54264:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54265:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54265:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn the Charleston Naval Base, Keith Shackleton lost a game of pool and a $30 wager to Robert L. Davis. Shackelton refused to pay, and was later found behind the pool club beaten to death with a pool cue. The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) questioned Davis after finding a bloodstain of one of the pool cues Davis owned. Before questioning, Davis waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel both orally and in writing. About an hour and a half into questioning, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” The interviewing agents attempted to clarify the statement and reminded Davis he could remain silent and/or speak to counsel, but Davis said, “No, I don’t want a lawyer.” Questioning continued for another hour before Davis said, “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else.” At this point questioning ceased.\nAt trial, Davis was convicted on one count of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to confinement for life and dishonorable discharge. Davis appealed, arguing that the NIS investigators violated his right to counsel, as laid out in Edwards v. Arizona, when they continued questioning after Davis indicated he “maybe” should talk to a lawyer. The U.S. Court of Military Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that Davis’ statements were ambiguous and the NIS appropriately clarified Davis’ wishes before continuing questioning.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54265:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54265:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54265:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for five members of the court, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that, assuming Edwards applies in military proceedings, investigators do not need to cease questioning when an accused makes an ambiguous statement like “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” The Court noted that, while it was proper for the investigators to clarify Davis’ intentions, the Court does not require investigators to adopt that practice in future interrogations. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, writing that the Court should consider the federal statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions the next time a similar case comes before the court.\nJustice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment, but expressed that investigators have a legal obligation to clarify ambiguous statements that could reasonably be understood as a request to consult with a lawyer. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the concurrence in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54265:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54267:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54267:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act required cable systems to allocate a percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations, the must-carry rules. The rules limit the cannels available for exclusive control by cable programmers and increase competition for the remaining channels.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54267:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54267:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54267:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the must-carry provisions were content neutral, thus not a violation of the First Amendment. The rules were not determined by the programming content, but by broadcast method. The rules promote fair competition in television programming. Congress recognized that the public television stations had an intrinsic value to the American public and were in economic peril of disappearing due to the cable television industry's monopoly. The rules do not force the cable companies to alter their message.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54267:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54268:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54268:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoy Heck was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the death of his wife in Indiana state court and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He filed an action in federal district court claiming that the prosecution engaged in an “unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation” before his arrest and knowingly destroyed favorable evidence. Heck sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983, but did not seek a release from custody. The district court dismissed the action. While his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was pending, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Heck’s petition for habeas corpus was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Heck’s damages action, stating that the action challenged the legality of the conviction, so Heck must exhaust all state remedies before seeking §1983 relief like he would under the habeas corpus statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54268:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54268:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54268:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for five members of the court, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot claim damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment without showing that the conviction or sentence has been overturned in some way. The defendant must also exhaust state court remedies before bringing a §1983 action. The Court derived its analysis from the common law tort of malicious prosecution which requires termination of the criminal proceeding before it can begin. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred, writing that the majority’s opinion limited the scope of §1983. Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment, arguing that the proper way to resolve the case would be to interpret § 1983 in light of the habeas corpus statute instead of common law torts. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the concurrence in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54268:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54269:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54269:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWomen's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer-zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54269:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54269:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54269:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Yes, No, Yes, Yes, and Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the state of Florida could only restrict protesters to the extent necessary to allow the clinic to run and the staff to live in their homes without interference. Thus, the majority approved of the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic because it was essential to allow patients and staff to enter and leave the building freely, but disapproved of the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the building because it found no indication that protesting in these areas interfered with the function of the clinic. The Court also determined that the limitations placed on noise-making were necessary to insure the well-being of the patients, whereas those placed on images were not because they were easier to ignore. Finally, the Court concluded that both 300-foot radius rules were too broad, thus restricting the protestors more than was necessary. Therefore, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54269:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54271:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54271:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCalifornia used a \"worldwide combined reporting\" method to determine tax liability for multinational corporations operating inside the state. Under this method, the multinational's income was taxed in proportion to the average percentage of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located inside the state. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal) was wholly owned by a multinational corporation, Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI). Barcal did not include financial data for BBI in its 1977 tax filings. The California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) determined that Barcal misrepresented the proportion of income subject to taxation, causing a tax deficiency of over one hundred thousand dollars. Barcal and BBI paid, but then sued for the amount paid, complaining that the cost to provide BBI's worldwide financial data was disproportionately large considering that Barcal operated largely independently of BBI and BBI operated largely outside of California. Barcal and BBI contended that this violated the Commerce Clause-derived anti-discrimination requirement, which prevents States from imposing disproportionately large tax compliance burdens upon corporations. The Tax Board allowed BBI to make a \"reasonable approximation\" of financial data to minimize costs, but BBI claimed that this action violated Due Process by admitting financial data that was possibly inaccurate.\nThe California Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and remanded the case to a California Court of Appeals, which also did not find the burden disproportionate. Barcal and BBI also contended that the \"worldwide combined reporting\" method risked double taxation by the state and the federal government. Additionally, The \"worldwide combined reporting\" method deviated from taxing methods employed by other states, thus transgressing the federal government's interest in providing uniform standards for taxing foreign commerce. (The case was consolidated with Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board Of California.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54271:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54271:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54271:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Ruth Ginsburg wrote the opinion for a 7-2 Court. (1) The Court dismissed the alleged Due Process violation because a corporation could take action against the Tax Board if it felt the approximated amount was inaccurate. (2) Reasoning that the use of \"reasonable approximations\" minimized a multinational's compliance burden, the Court also dismissed the alleged Commerce Clause violation. The Court recognized that the \"worldwide combined reporting\" method carried a risk of double taxation by both the state and the federal government, but reasoned that this did not violate the Commerce Clause because every other method employed by the state to tax foreign commerce carried the same risk. Also, the Court found no \"specific indications of congressional intent\" to enforce uniformity in taxation of foreign commerce by preempting the California tax laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54271:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54273:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54273:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMargaret Gilleo placed a 24-by-36-inch sign calling for peace in the Persian Gulf on her front lawn. The original sign disappeared and a subsequent sign was knocked down. She reported these incidents to the police who advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue. She sued the city and the District Court ordered a preliminary injunction. Ladue repealed the law and replaced it with a new one which also banned window signs. Gilleo then placed another anti-war sign in her second-story window and amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54273:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54273:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54273:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Although acknowledging Ladue's police power to minimize visual clutter associated with signs, the Court ruled that the law \"almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important.\" The Court held a \"special respect\" for an individual's right to convey messages from her home.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54273:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54279:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54279:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Miller, a Mississippi resident who had moved north to find work, was injured while working as a seaman for American Dredging Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Miller returned home to Mississippi, and filed a suit against the company in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. The suit was filed under the Jones Act, a federal law that allows a seaman to sue his employer in either federal or state court when he suffers personal injury.\nAmerican Dredging moved to dismiss the case under the doctrine of \"forum non conveniens,\" which allows a court to dismiss a case if it is filed in a place that is unnecessarily and significantly inconvenient to the defendant. The trial court agreed, holding that a Louisiana law making the doctrine of \"forum non conveniens\" inapplicable in Jones Act cases was superseded by federal maritime law (law that deals with oceanic commerce). An appeals court affirmed the decision, but the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned it, holding that the Louisiana law was not superseded by federal maritime law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54279:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54279:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54279:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court decided that \"forum non conveniens\" claims were only procedural, not substantive, and that national uniformity was therefore not required by the Constitution. Writing for the seven-member majority, Justice Antonin Scalia stated \"venue is a matter that goes to process rather than substantive rights -- determining which among various competent courts will decide the case. Uniformity of process (beyond the rudimentary elements of procedural fairness) is assuredly not what the law of admiralty seeks to achieve, since it is supposed to apply in all the courts of the world.\" Further, Scalia wrote that the amount of discretion left to the trial court by the forum non conveniens doctrine necessarily meant that, even if it was embraced by every state, it would still not result in uniformity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54279:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54280:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54280:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B.(the putative father). A jury found for T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54280:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54280:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54280:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection bars the exclusion of potential jurors on the basis of their sex, just as it bars exclusion on the basis of race. \"[G]ender-based classifications,\" wrote Justice Harry Blackmun for the majority, \"require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.\" As a consequence, \"[P]arties still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54280:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54282:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54282:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Endangered Species Act requires that no person \"take\" an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines take as \"harass, harm, pursue,\" \"wound,\" or \"kill.\" The Secretary of the Interior further characterizes \"harm\" as including \"significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.\" Several persons within forestry industries sued the Secretary, asserting that Congress did not intend for the regulation to include changes in habitat. The District Court found for the Secretary of the Interior.\nThe Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of words is determined by the words around it. Thus, \"harm\" could only include actions applying direct force to the animal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54282:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54282:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54282:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that habitat modification is a legitimate application of the word \"harm.\" First, the Court found that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in assuming that the words in the definition of \"take\" only apply to actions involving direct contact with endangered animals. Then, based on the Act itself, the Court determined that the ordinary meaning of harm would in fact include changes in habitat that hurt the endangered animals. Also, the Court held that the intent of the Act to give broad protection to endangered species must include even actions that may have minimal or unforeseeable effects.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54282:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54283:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54283:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCoors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for an approval of proposed labels. The approval was rejected because it violated the Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s (FAAA) prohibition of disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or advertisements. Coors filed a claim arguing the regulation violated the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. The government argued the regulation was necessary to prevent “strength wars” among brewers, which in this case, refers to breweries competing on the basis of the potency of their alcohol.\nThe district court found in favor of Coors, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court subsequently upheld the ban of alcohol content in advertising, but not on labels. The government appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court by concluding that the label ban did not prevent strength wars.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54283:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54283:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54283:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that for the government to regulate commercial speech, the government must have a substantial interest that the regulation directly affects. In this case, the interest the government intended to protect by banning the display of alcohol content on beer labels was to limit the “strength wars” of competing beer companies, which could lead to greater alcoholism. However, the Court concluded that this interest was not substantial enough, since there was no reason to believe that banning the alcoholic content on beer labels would prevent such social harms. The regulation also does not directly advance the suppression of strength wars, especially since other provisions of the FAAA directly counteract its effects. Finally, the Court held the regulation was more extensive than necessary, since there were available and effective alternatives that would not violate the First Amendment.\nJustice John Paul Stevens delivered a concurring opinion emphasizing the regulation is unconstitutionality of the regulation because it did not increase consumer awareness, but instead blinded the public to the truth of the alcohol content.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54283:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54285:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54285:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames Ryder, an enlisted member of the Coast Guard, was convicted of drug offenses by a court-martial. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review affirmed. On rehearing, the court rejected Ryder's claim that its composition violated the Appointments Clause because two of the judges on the three-judge panel were civilians appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. The Court of Military Appeals agreed with Ryder that the appointments violated the Clause under its previous decision in United States v. Carpenter that appellate military judges are inferior officers who must be appointed by a President, a court of law, or a head of a department. The court nonetheless affirmed Ryder's conviction on the ground that the actions of the two civilian judges were valid de facto.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54285:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54285:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54285:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the judges' actions were not valid de facto. The Court reasoned that a defendant who made a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case was entitled to a decision on the merits of the question and whatever relief may be appropriate if a violation had occurred. The Court also noted that review by the properly constituted Court of Military Appeals did not necessarily give Ryder all the possibility for relief that review by a properly constituted Coast Guard Court of Military Review would have given him.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54285:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54288:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54288:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1987, several Spendthrift Farm shareholders, including Ed Plaut, brought suit against the corporation claiming stock sales in 1983 and 1984 had violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf v Gilbertson (1991) set a universal time limit of three years after an alleged violation for suits stemming from the relevant portion the Securities and Exchange Act. Based on this ruling, a district court judge dismissed the shareholders' case on August 13, 1991. On December 19, 1991, Congress enacted the FDIC Improvement Act, which required courts to reinstate cases dismissed under the Supreme Court's limitation in Lampf. The shareholders filed a motion to reinstate. A district court judge agreed the act required the case be reinstated, but denied the request on the ground that Congress had violated separation of powers in requiring the courts to reopen settled matters. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion on the same ground.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54288:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54288:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54288:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court concluded that Congress had usurped power assigned to the judiciary by Article III and thus had violated the separation of powers principle. Justice Scalia notes that Article III assigns to the courts the \"judicial power of the United States\" and the power to \"say what the law is.\" According to the Court, this clearly includes \"the power to render final judgments,\" and by enacting what Justice Scalia describes as \"retroactive legislation, that is, legislation that prescribes what the law was at an earlier time,\" Congress intruded upon the power of the courts to issue \"the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy.\" Thus, Congress had violated separation of powers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54288:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54289:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54289:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA on the ground that there had been a change in conditions such that Rambo was no longer disabled. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA authorizes modification only where there has been a change in an employee's physical condition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54289:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54289:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54289:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that a disability award may be modified under the LHWCA where there is a change in the employee's wage-earning capacity, even without any change in the employee's physical condition. The Court reasoned that, because an interpretation of the term \"change in conditions\" to include not only changes in physical condition but also changes in other conditions relevant to the initial entitlement to benefits, such as a change in wage-earning capacity is consistent with the purpose of the LHWCA. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that the term refers to the physical condition of the person receiving compensation and should not be departed from absent any indication from Congress.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54289:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54290:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54290:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAsgrow Seed Company (Asgrow) held two Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) certificates protecting different varieties of soybean seed. These PVPA certificates act like patents in order to promote research on new varieties of plants and to protect the owners of seed varieties from unauthorized sales. However, there is an exemption for farmers who sell seed to other farmers whose primary occupation is growing crops for sale. In 1990, Winterboer planted and harvested 265 acres of land with two Asgrow soybean varieties. He then sold enough to plant 10,000 acres to other farmers for use as seed. Asgrow claimed that the PVPA prohibits anyone from selling for seed more than would be needed to replant his own fields - an amount greatly exceeded by Winterboer's sales. Winterboer argued that the exemptions in the statute protect sales of unlimited amounts of seed as long as both seller and buyer grow crops primarily for \"other than reproductive purposes.\" The District Court ruled in favor of Asgrow, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and denied Asgrow's petition for rehearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54290:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54290:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54290:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a farmer may sell for reproductive purposes only such seed as he has saved for the purpose of replanting his own fields. While the statute allows farmers to save seed to replant and then sell that saved seed to other farmers for planting, the statute prohibits growing protected seed as a \"step in marketing\" it as seed for planting. The Court held that because Winterboer's planting and harvesting were conducted solely to market (that is, to sell) Asgrow's protected seed varieties, he forfeited eligibility for the PVPA exemption and infringed on Asgrow's protective certificates.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54290:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54297:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54297:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the October 1987 stock market crash, First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, demanded that Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI) immediately pay the entire MKI debt. When First Options' demands for payment went unsatisfied, it sought arbitration by a panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange based on workout agreements, which governed the working out of debts owned by Kaplan, his wife, and MKI. MKI, which had signed the only workout document containing an arbitration agreement, submitted to arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not signed that document, filed objections with the panel. The Kaplans argued that their disagreement with First Options not was arbitrable. After deciding that they had the power to rule on the dispute's merits, the arbitrators ruled in First Options' favor. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the award, finding that the dispute was not arbitrable. The appellate court concluded that courts should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute, and that it would apply ordinary standards of review when considering the District Court's denial of a motion to vacate the arbitration award.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54297:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54297:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54297:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts and that, rather than a special abuse of discretion standard, courts of appeals should apply ordinary standards when reviewing district court decisions upholding arbitration awards. \"We conclude that, because the Kaplans did not clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts,\" wrote Justice Breyer for the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54297:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54299:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54299:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBetween 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was called a \"geographic monstrosity\" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, \"the social, political, and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54299:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54299:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54299:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In some instances, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on race. Applying the rule laid down in Shaw v. Reno requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the \"overriding, predominant force\" in the redistricting process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54299:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54302:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54302:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 prohibited the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual materials containing children engaged in sexually explicit acts. Richard Gottesman, owner and manager of X-Citement Video, sold forty-nine tapes to undercover officers. Gottesman shipped the videos, containing pornographic acts by industry legend Traci Lords before she turned eighteen, to Hawaii. Although he claimed he did not know the tapes contained underage pornographic acts, Gottesman was arrested for violating the sexual exploitation act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54302:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54302:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54302:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court relied on an awkward grammatical construction as it held that the term \"knowingly\" applied to the entire passage of the law. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated that other interpretations failed to make sense since Congress obviously did not envision people accidentally mailing underage pornographic materials. All the law required was a showing that alleged violators intentionally distributed illegal pornography, regardless of whether they knew it depicted underage performances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54302:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54306:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54306:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program, AAdvantage, challenged American's retroactive changes in program terms and conditions. Specially, the participants alleged that American's imposition of capacity controls and blackout dates to mileage credits they had previously accumulated violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted a breach of contract. American responded that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) preempted the claim. The ADA prohibits States from \"enacting or enforcing any law...relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services.\" The Illinois Supreme Court ruled to allow the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, American petitioned for certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54306:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54306:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54306:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the ADA bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers, thus claims brought under a state's consumer fraud act are preempted; but that the ADA allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves, which permits breach of contract claims to proceed. \"A remedy confined to a contract's terms simply holds parties to their agreements -- in this instance, to business judgments an airline made public about its rates and services,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justice Thomas Clarence. Justice Antonin Scalia took no part in the decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54306:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54307:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54307:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAdarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by \"socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.\" [The clause declared that \"the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities....\" Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54307:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54307:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54307:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. In other words, they \"must serve a compelling government interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.\" The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. However, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54307:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54315:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54315:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Ethics in Government Act of 1978, amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, prohibits members of Congress, federal officers, and other government employees from accepting an honorarium for making an appearance, speech, or writing an article. The prohibition applies even when neither the subject of the speech or article nor the person or group paying for it has any connection with the employee's official duties. The National Treasury Employees Union filed suit challenging the honorarium ban as an unconstitutional abridgement of its freedom of speech. A District Court held the ban unconstitutional and enjoined the government from enforcing it against Executive Branch employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54315:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54315:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54315:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6 to 3 decision delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court declared that a flat ban violated free-speech rights. Concerns about impropriety do not apply if there is no link between a government employee's job and \"the subject matter of the expression or the character of the payor.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54315:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54317:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54317:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986 and 1987, the FBI investigated Michael Rudy Tham and Abe Chapman as part of a nationwide investigation into healthcare provider fraud. The judge on the case authorized a wiretap of Tham and Chapman’s phones. He kept these wiretaps secret. Chapman was distantly related to U.S. District Court Judge Robert P. Aguilar. When Chapman asked Aguilar for help in the case, Aguilar talked to the judge on the case and learned about the wiretap. Though the wiretap order had expired, Aguilar told Chapman about it. When FBI agents questioned Aguilar on the matter, he lied about his knowledge and participation in the case. Aguilar was tried and convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for disclosing a wiretap and endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that disclosing an expired wiretap does not violate the law, and Aguilar did not obstruct justice because the grand jury investigating the case did not order the FBI investigation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54317:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54317:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54317:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Yes. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court, affirming in part and reversing in part. The Supreme Court held that making false statements to an FBI agent who may or may not testify at trial is not sufficient to support a conviction for obstruction of justice. Aguilar’s conviction for disclosing a wiretap was proper, however, because the statute does not require that the wiretap is currently in force. The First Amendment did not require excluding expired wiretaps from the statute either.\nJustice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that Aguilar’s conviction for obstructing justice should be overturned, but arguing that the wiretapping conviction should be overturned as well. There was no way Aguilar could interfere with a wiretap that no longer existed.\nJustice Antonin Scalia also concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing to affirm the disclosure of wiretapping conviction, but arguing that the obstruction of justice should be affirmed as well.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54317:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54320:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54320:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRonald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it \"primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality,\" as prohibited by University guidelines.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54320:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54320:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54320:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furthermore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54320:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54324:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54324:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54324:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54324:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54324:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. A unanimous court held that the State Court's ruling to require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group expressing a message that the organizers do not wish to convey violates the First Amendment by making private speech subordinate to the public accommodation requirement. Such an action \"violate[s] the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54324:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54326:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54326:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1992, Sharlene Wilson sold illicit narcotics to undercover agents of the Arkansas state police. Police officers then applied for and obtained warrants to search Ms. Wilson's home and to arrest her. When the police arrived, they found the main door to Ms. Wilson's house open. The officers opened the unlocked screen door and walked in, identified themselves as police officers, and said that they had a warrant. Ms. Wilson's attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming it was invalid on the grounds that the officers had failed to \"knock and announce\" before entering.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54326:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54326:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54326:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. A unanimous Court held that the common-law \"knock-and announce\" principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. \"Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement, and the wealth of founding-era commentaries, constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases espousing or supporting the knock-and-announce principle,...the Amendment's Framers thought that whether officers announced their presence and authority before entering a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing a search's reasonableness.\" Countervailing law enforcement interests, such as officer safety, may, however, establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54326:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54328:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54328:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe city of Chicago hired the Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company (Great Lakes) to perform work that would prevent ships from bumping into piers. To that end, Great Lakes used a crane to drive piles into the riverbed, which potentially weakened the structure of the freight tunnel that ran below the river. On April 13, 1992, water from the Chicago River poured into a freight tunnel, which subsequently flooded into the basements of several buildings. After the flood, many victims sued Great Lakes in state court and argued that the flood was the result of the weakening of the tunnel. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock removed the case to federal district court and argued federal admiralty court had jurisdiction of marine cases. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54328:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54328:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54328:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice David Souter delivered the opinion of the 7-0 majority. The Court held the federal district court has admiralty jurisdiction to determine and limit the extent of the Great Lakes’ tort of liability. Admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate when a party can prove either that the tort occurred on navigable water or that the injury on land was caused by actions on navigable water. In this case, this condition is satisfied since the alleged tort was committed on navigable water, and it is not necessary to prove that the subsequent damage was close in time and space. Great Lakes proved the connection with maritime activity by showing how the damage caused by a vessel on navigable water to an underwater structure is potentially disruptive to maritime commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54328:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54330:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54330:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1987, Steven Gwin, a homeowner in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime \"Termite Protection Plan\" from a local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Company. The termite prevention contract specified that any controversy would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After the Gwins sold their house and transferred their plan to the Dobsons, the Dobsons initiated suit against the Gwins, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix following a termite infestation. Allied- Bruce and Terminix asked for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act. In affirming, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. The court also found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply because the parties entering the contract contemplated transactions that were primarily local and not substantially interstate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54330:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54330:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54330:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act applied to all disputes involving commerce, and thus the arbitration clause was valid and enforceable. The Court reasoned that the word \"involving\" in section 2 of the Act signaled an intent to exercise Congress' commerce clause power to the full and that section 2 is to be read requiring only that the \"transaction\" in fact \"involve\" interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas filed dissenting opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54330:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54331:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54331:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids \"any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone.\" Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54331:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54331:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54331:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with \"commerce\" or any sort of economic activity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54331:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54333:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54333:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn January 1991, Phoenix police officer Bryan Sargent observed Isaac Evans driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Sargent directed Evans to pull over and asked to see his license. Evans informed Sargent that his license was suspended, and upon running the license, Sargent found that there was also an outstanding warrant for Evans’ arrest. During the arrest, Evans dropped a hand-rolled cigarette that smelled of marijuana, so officers searched his car and discovered a bag of marijuana. When Evans was charged with possession of marijuana, the police were informed that his arrest warrant had been quashed and only remained on the record due to a clerical error. Evans moved to exclude the marijuana evidence because it was discovered during the course of an illegal arrest. The trial court granted the motion.\nThe Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that the exclusionary rule was not intended to deter government employees who were not directly associated with the arrest. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and held there was no meaningful distinction between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and those committed by court employees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54333:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54333:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54333:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review cases from state courts that deal primarily with federal law. The Court also held that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect against intrusions into a home or onto private property, or the conduct of police officers. The exclusionary rule therefore does not apply to the conduct of judicial officers.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion where she argued that the majority’s decision does not allow any evidence that is the result of a clerical error. Rather, the police must rely on accurate record-keeping systems in order to admit evidence found based on the information in those records. Justice David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the concurrence. In his concurrence, Justice Souter wrote that the majority’s opinion should be read as dealing solely with the issue of this type of clerical error, and not as dealing with the concept of how deterrence by exclusion extends to the government as a whole. Justice Breyer joined in the concurrence.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent and argued that the Fourth Amendment was meant as a constraint on governmental power as a whole, and not merely on its agents, namely the police. He also argued that the exclusionary rule does not place the government at a disadvantage in trial; the government is merely in the position it would be if it had not conducted the illegal search at all. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed because the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on the issue based on its constitutional analysis, rather than federal law, so the U.S. Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction. She also argued that the exclusionary rule should apply to judicial clerical errors because such errors become magnified and can hugely impact an innocent citizens life. Justice Stevens joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54333:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54336:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54336:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn Washington State, the City of Edmonds' zoning code provides that the occupants of single-family dwelling units must compose a family, defined as \"persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons.\" Under the code, Oxford House, which operates a group home for 10-12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences, was issued a citation. Oxford House asserted that under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibits discrimination in housing against persons with handicaps, the city had failed to make reasonable accommodations permitting the maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. Edmonds sought a declaration that the FHA did not apply to the city's zoning code. The District Court held that the city's zoning code rule defining family was exempt from the FHA under as a reasonable restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54336:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54336:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54336:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Edmonds' zoning code definition of the term \"family\" is not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA. Noting that it was designed to foster the family character of a neighborhood, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the provision was a family composition rule and was not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from FHA scrutiny because, while it capped the number of unrelated persons allowed to occupy a single-family dwelling at five, it did not cap the total number of people permitted to live in such a dwelling. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54336:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54343:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54343:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of \"Concerned Parents and Tax Payers.\" Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54343:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54343:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54343:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and \"extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes.\" When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies \"exacting scrutiny,\" upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54343:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54346:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54346:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMatthew Wayne Tome was charged with sexually abusing his daughter, who was four years old at the time of the alleged crime. Tome and the child’s mother were divorced and Tome had primary physical custody of the child, but the mother was awarded custody in 1990. The prosecution argued that the sexual abuse occurred while the child was with Tome, but was not discovered until the child spent vacation time with her mother. Tome argued that the allegations were fabricated to keep the child from being returned to him. The prosecution produced six witnesses who testified to verify the out of court statements made by the child. The out of court statements were all made after the motive to fabricate would have arisen. The district court admitted the statements into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which state that prior statements of a witness are not hearsay is they are consistent with the witness’ testimony and are offered to rebut a charge of “recent fabrication or improper influence of motive.” Tome was convicted. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, holding that the proper test was to weigh the probative value against their prejudicial effect, not whether statements were made before or after the motive to fabricate arose.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54346:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54346:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54346:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that, consistent with common law, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) requires that prior consistent statements be made before the motive to fabricate arose in order to be admissible. While hearsay evidence is often relevant, relevance is not the only criterion for determining admissibility. The Court held that the 10th Circuit’s balancing approach involved too much judicial discretion, reduced predictability, and enhanced difficulties of trial preparation. The Court also noted that the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confirm their analysis. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing that the Advisory Committee Notes should have no authoritative effect and the case could be resolved without resorting to the Notes.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the basic issue in the case was relevance, not hearsay. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not codify the common law, and it permits the district court to allow prior consistent statements made at any time when they are probative. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54346:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54353:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54353:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54353:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54353:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54353:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The reasonableness of a search is judged by \"balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.\" In the case of high school athletes who are under State supervision during school hours, they are subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy interests compromised by urine samples are negligible since the conditions of collection are similar to public restrooms, and the results are viewed only by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental concern over the safety of minors under their supervision overrides the minimal, if any, intrusion in student-athletes' privacy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54353:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54354:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54354:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 18, 1975, Margaret Whitecotton received her vaccine against diptheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT vaccination) as a four-year old. That evening and the following morning, Margaret suffered seizures that were a symptom of encephalopathy. Her parents filed a claim on her behalf and alleged that the vaccine caused her encephalopathy, a condition that impairs brain function.\nIn order to prove their claim under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, claimants must meet the requirements of the Vaccine Injury Table, which lists the conditions associated with each vaccine and the timeframe of their expected occurrence. The Special Master, empowered to hear such claims, determined that Margaret’s symptoms indicated encephalopathy, but that she exhibited symptoms of the condition prior to the vaccination, and therefore her symptoms did not fit within the timetable. The Master denied compensation and the Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54354:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54354:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54354:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice David H. Souter delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that a claimant must show that the symptoms did not exist prior to the administration of the vaccine. The Act specifically states that the first symptom must occur within the timeframe set by the table in order for the claim to be valid. If the first symptom occurs before the vaccination, any further symptoms do not fulfill the requirement.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote that the Court’s ruling properly held the claims allowed by the Act to a high standard of proof, which adhered to the purpose of the Act. She also emphasized that the decision of the Court solely dealt with defining the burden of the claimant, and did not address any subsequent factual challenges on the part of the Whitecottons against the decision of the Special Master. Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54354:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54355:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54355:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54355:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54355:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54355:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The display was private religious speech that \"is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.\" Because Capitol Square is designated as a traditional public forum, any group may express their views there, and the Board may regulate the content of the Klan's expression on the plaza only if a restriction is necessary and narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54355:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54357:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54357:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter a ship owned by the Cement Division of National Gypsum Co. sank in a winter storm while berthed in a slip owned by Milwaukee, National Gypsum brought an admiralty suit for damages, alleging that the city had negligently breached its duty as a wharfinger. The city denied fault and filed a counterclaim for damage to its dock, alleging that National Gypsum was negligent in leaving the ship virtually unmanned. The District Court found that both parties were negligent, apportioned liability primarily to National Gypsum, and entered a partial judgment for the stipulated amount of National Gypsum's damages, excluding prejudgment interest. The court held that the fact that National Gypsum's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence and the existence of a genuine dispute over the City's liability were special circumstances justifying a departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that mutual fault cannot provide a basis for denying prejudgment interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54357:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54357:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54357:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that neither a good-faith dispute over liability nor the existence of mutual fault justifies the denial of prejudgment interest in an admiralty collision case. In calculating the amount of the loss for which the relatively innocent party is responsible, the Court found that a denial of prejudgment interest on the basis of mutual fault would unfairly penalize a party twice for the same mistake. \"The existence of a legitimate difference of opinion on the issue of liability is merely a characteristic of most ordinary lawsuits. It is not an extraordinary circumstance that can justify denying prejudgment interest,\" wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54357:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54359:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54359:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA collision between a car and a truck occurred in Ohio. More than three years later, Carol Hyde, a passenger in the car, sued the truck driver and his employer for negligence in the Court of Common Pleas. Ohio had a two-year statute of limitations for such actions, but because the truck driver and his employer were from out of state, a special provision tolled the running of the statute of limitations. 10 months after this suit began, the Supreme Court decided in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) that the tolling provision placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court of Common Pleas applied Bendix and dismissed Hyde's suit as untimely. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed on the ground that Bendix could not be retroactively applied to claims that commenced prior to that decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54359:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54359:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54359:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, Justice Stephan G. Breyer wrote for the majority, holding that the Bendix rule must be retroactively applied. Hyde conceded that the Supreme Court had already decided in Harper v Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) that when the court applies a new legal rule courts must treat the new rule as retroactive. The Court rejected Hyde's claim that applying the rule would unfairly deny her a remedy. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a special concurrence stating that Bendix did not announce a new rule and merely applied existing precedent. Following this reasoning, the discussion of retroactivity was unnecessary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54359:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54360:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54360:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice officers found Houston Jones, a diabetic, on the street while he was having an insulin seizure. The officers arrested Jones because he appeared drunk. Later, Jones found himself with several broken ribs. Jones brought a constitutional tort action against the officers, claiming that they used excessive force when they arrested him and that they beat him at the police station. As government officials, the officers were entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense. Three of the officers moved for summary judgment arguing that he could point to no evidence that these three had beaten him or had been present during beatings. Holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting Jones's theory of the case, the District Court denied the motion. The officers sought an immediate appeal, arguing that the denial was wrong because the evidence in the pretrial record was not sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54360:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54360:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54360:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a defendant, who is entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a District Court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court reasoned, in part, that the competing considerations underlying questions of finality, including the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review, the danger of denying justice by delay, the comparative expertise of trial and appellate courts, and the wise use of appellate resources, argue against allowing immediate appeals of orders of the kind in question and in favor of limiting interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54360:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54362:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54362:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCurtis Lee Kyles was charged with murdering 60-year-old Delores Dye in a Schwegmann’s parking lot. After an initial trial with a hung jury, Kyles was tried again, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision on direct appeal. Then Kyles sought state collateral review, where he was unsuccessful, but he uncovered evidence favorable to him that the prosecution failed to disclose before or during trial. Kyles filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, citing Brady v. Maryland, which held that the prosecution violates due process if they fail to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant. The district court denied relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54362:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54362:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54362:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe, maybe. Justice David H. Souter, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that Kyles was entitled to a new trial because the net effect of the suppressed evidence raised a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result. The Fifth Circuit used the wrong standard and failed to consider the cumulative effect of all the evidence that the prosecution failed to disclose. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred, supporting the decision to grant certiorari and review the case on the merits. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Antonin Scalia dissented, arguing that the case should be dismissed as improvidently granted. The suppressed evidence did not create a reasonable probability that the jury would reach a different result given the large amount of negative evidence the prosecution presented. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54362:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54366:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54366:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLondon Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group, which was involved in litigation over the ownership and operation of Texas oil and gas properties, under several commercial liability insurance policies. After a verdict was entered against the Hill Group, the underwriters sought a federal declaratory judgment that their policies did not cover the Hill Group's liability. The Hill Group filed a state court suit and moved to dismiss or to stay the underwriter's action. The District Court entered a stay on the ground that the state suit encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the federal action. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that a district court has broad discretion to grant or decline to grant declaratory judgment, the appellate court did not require application of the exceptional circumstances test. The appellate court also reviewed the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion and found none.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54366:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54366:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54366:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. In a 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the discretionary standard of Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, governs a district court's decision to stay a declaratory judgment action during the pendency of parallel state court proceedings and that a district courts' decisions about the propriety of hearing declaratory judgment actions should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Court also concluded that the District Court acted within its bounds in staying the declaratory relief action in this case, since parallel proceedings, presenting an opportunity for the ventilation of the same state law issues, were underway in state court. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54366:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54369:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54369:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. The \"Term Limitation Amendment,\" in addition to limiting terms of elected officials within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any person who served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54369:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54369:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54369:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Constitution prohibits States from adopting Congressional qualifications in addition to those enumerated in the Constitution. A state congressional term limits amendment is unconstitutional if it has the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and \"has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly.\" Furthermore, \"...allowing individual States to craft their own congressional qualifications would erode the structure designed by the Framers to form a 'more perfect Union.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54369:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54371:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54371:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWent For It, Inc., (a lawyer referral service) and John T. Blakely (a Florida attorney) were sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives who had been injured in an accident. According to Florida Bar rules, such direct and targeted mailings are prohibited for thirty days following an accident or disaster.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54371:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54371:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54371:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Lawyer advertising is commercial speech and as such, is accorded only a limited measure of First Amendment protection. Under this \"intermediate scrutiny,\" restriction on commercial speech is permissible if the government (1) asserts a substantial interest in support of its regulation; (2) establishes that the restriction directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) demonstrates that the regulation is narrowly drawn.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54371:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54373:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54373:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFred P. Gardner was treated in a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facility. Afterwards, he experienced weakness in his left leg, allegedly a result of the surgery. He claimed disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which requires the VA to pay disability compensation if an injury occurs as a result of or is worsened by treatment. The VA and the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the claim, stating that the statute, as interpreted by VA regulation 38 CFR 3.358 (c)(3), requires that the claimant prove that the injury arose due to negligence or error by the VA facility. The Court of Veterans Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that the fault-or-accident requirement in 38 CFR 3.358 was not warranted by Section 1151. The decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54373:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54373:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54373:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice David Souter, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision and ruled for Gardner. The Court held that Section 1151 contains no language requiring proof of fault, and it rejected the Government's claims that the requirement was implicit in the language of the statute. The Court acknowledged the 60-year longevity of the regulation and the post-1934 legislative silence on the issue, but neither concern could overcome the plain language of Section 1151.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54373:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54375:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54375:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) authorizes a civil enforcement action by aggrieved employees or their union against a covered employer who fails to give 60 days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff, but provides no limitations period for such an action. In 94-835, the United Steelworkers of America filed a WARN claim, charging Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. with laying off 85 employees without giving the required 60-day notice. In rejecting Crown Cork's contention that the statute of limitations had run, the District Court held that the source of the limitations period for WARN suits is state law and that the union's suit was timely under any of the arguably applicable Pennsylvania statutes. In 94-834, another District Court granted summary judgment for North Star Steel Company, holding the nonunion employees' suit barred under a limitations period borrowed from the National Labor Relations Act, which the court believed was more analogous to WARN than any state law. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and held that a WARN limitations period should be borrowed from state, not federal, law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54375:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54375:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54375:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that State law is the proper source of the limitations period for civil actions brought to enforce WARN. Where a federal statute fails to provide any limitations period for a new cause of action, the Court noted that its longstanding practice has been to borrow the limitations period from the most closely analogous state statute. The Court reasoned that North Star did not fall within the exception where the relevant state limitations periods would frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies or be at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54375:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54378:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54378:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLockheed Corporation hired Paul L. Spink when he was sixty-one. He was excluded from participation in Lockheed's retirement program. Later changes in federal law required Lockheed to add Spink to the retirement program. Lockheed added Spink, but refused accrued benefits for the years he had worked at Lockheed before federal law changed. Lockheed also offered an increased pension benefit to employees who would retire early in exchange for their waiver of any employment claims against the corporation. Spink refused to be added without earning the extra benefits for the previous years he had worked. Spink filed suit alleging he should receive full benefits. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Spink. It held the law applied retroactively which would cover Spink.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54378:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54378:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54378:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In unanimous and 7-2 decisions, announced by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that businesses may condition early retirement benefits on the forfeiture of the right to sue in a job-related claim. The Court also ruled that the government could not retroactively apply retirement income benefit laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54378:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54379:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54379:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames O'Connor, 56, was fired by Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. and replaced by a 40-year-old worker. O'Connor filed suit alleging that his discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The District Court granted Consolidated's summary judgment motion. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that O'Connor failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination because he failed to show that he was replaced by someone outside the age group protected by the ADEA since his replacement was 40 years old.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54379:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54379:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54379:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 limits its protection to those who are 40 or older, it prohibits discrimination against those protected employees on the basis of age, not class membership. \"That one member of the protected class lost out to another member is irrelevant, so long as he lost out because of his age. The latter is more reliably indicated by the fact that his replacement was substantially younger,\" wrote Justice Scalia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54379:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54380:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54380:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMary Lu Redmond, a former police officer, received extensive counseling from a licensed clinical social worker after she shot and killed Ricky Allen. Carrie Jaffee, special administrator for Allen, filed suit in federal District Court alleging that Redmond had violated Allen's constitutional rights by using excessive force in the encounter. During the trial, Jaffee sought access to the notes from Redmond's counseling. Redmond's counsel resisted asserting the conversations were protected against involuntary disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The District Court judge rejected the argument, but the notes were not released. The judge instructed the jury that they could presume that the contents could have been unfavorable to Redmond. The jury awarded monetary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It found that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 prompted the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54380:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54380:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54380:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 protects the conversations between Redmond and her therapist from compelled disclosure. The Rule recognizes a \"psychotherapist-patient privilege.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54380:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54381:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54381:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRay Lewis, a mail handler for the United States Postal Service, was observed opening several pieces of mail and pocketing the contents. Subsequently, Lewis was charged with two counts of obstructing the mail, where each charge carries a maximum authorized prison sentence of six months. Lewis requested a jury trial. Denying his request, the Magistrate Judge ordered a bench trial, explaining that because she would not sentence him to more than six months' imprisonment, he was not entitled to a jury trial. The District Court affirmed. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right pertains only to those offenses for which the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty of over six months' imprisonment. The Court continued that, because each offense charged was petty in character, the fact that Lewis was facing more than six months' imprisonment in the aggregate did not entitle him to a jury trial. The court also reasoned that because the offense's characterization as petty or serious determined the right to a jury trial, a trial judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing could not deprive a defendant of that right.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54381:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54381:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54381:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is prosecuted for multiple petty offenses. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury trial does not extend to petty offenses, and its scope does not change where a defendant faces a potential aggregate prison term in excess of six months for the petty offenses charged. Because the Court ruled that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is charged with multiple petty offenses, it did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54381:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54382:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54382:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nResidents of North Carolina challenged a plan to create two congressional districts on the ground that the proposed districts were racially gerrymandered. On initial review, a three-judge District Court panel dismissed the action only to have its decision reversed and remanded to it by the Supreme Court. However, the Court's standard for review left very little room for racial engineering of congressional voting districts. On remand, the District Court found the redistricting plans to be racially tailored and, therefore, unconstitutional. Again, the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54382:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54382:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54382:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court first confronted the threshold question of \"standing.\" It held that some of the appellants lacked proper standing to challenge the redistricting plan. Only those voters who resided in a congressional district alleged to have been created by racial gerrymandering had proper standing to challenge the constitutionality of that district's creation. Those voters who did not reside in one of the two allegedly racially gerrymandered districts, and who failed to provide evidence that they were assigned to their district of residence on the basis of race, lacked proper standing to participate in the racial gerrymandering claim. After noting the challenged district's unusually non-compact serpentine shape, and the appellants' admission that the districts' were primarily designed to create black voting majorities, the Court applied \"strict scrutiny\" to the facts at hand. Finding no narrowly tailored plans aimed at serving a compelling state interest that would justify the creation of racially gerrymandered districts, the Court concluded that the redistricting plans violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54382:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54383:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54383:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt his trial on a federal marijuana charge, Charles Carlisle filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after the jury returned a guilty verdict. The District Court granted the motion even though it was filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c), which provides that \"[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty..., a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period.\" In reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the verdict and for sentencing, the Court of Appeals held that under Rule 29(c) a district court has no jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, or to enter such a judgment after submission of the case to the jury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54383:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54383:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54383:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court had no authority to grant the petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day outside the Rule 29(c) time limit. Judges may not stretch the deadline by even one day; Justice Scalia wrote for the court that, \"[t]here is simply no room...for the granting of an untimely post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, regardless of whether the motion is accompanied by a claim of actual innocence....\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54383:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54384:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54384:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChristopher Lee Armstrong and others were indicted on federal charges of \"conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) and conspiring to distribute the same.\" The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had monitored Armstrong and others prior to their indictment and arrest. Armstrong filed a motion for discovery or dismissal, alleging that he was selected for prosecution because he was black. The District Court granted the discovery order. It ordered the government to provide statistics on similar cases from the last three years. The government indicated it would not comply. Subsequently, the District Court dismissed the case. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. It held that the proof requirements for a selective-prosecution claim do not require a defendant to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54384:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54384:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54384:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that in order to file selective-prosecution claims, defendants must show that the government failed to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races. \"If the claim . . . were well founded,\" wrote Rehnquist, \"it should not have been an insuperable task to prove that persons of a different race were not prosecuted.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54384:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54385:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54385:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Constitution's Census Clause, Congress is vested with the responsibility of conducting an \"actual enumeration\" of the American public every ten years, primarily for the purpose of aportioning congressional representation among the states. Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce who, in the 1990 census, decided not to use a statistical correction, known as the post-enumeration survey (PES), to adjust an undercount in the initial population count. Acting on behalf of several citizens' groups, states, and cities, Wisconsin challenged the Secretary's decision not to use the PES; claiming that it resulted in an undercounting of certain identifiable minority groups.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54385:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54385:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54385:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that the decision not to use the PES-based statistical correction would not be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard of \"one person - one vote\" because there was no showing of intentional discrimination by the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary's decision was consistent with past census practices in which the promotion of distributive accuracy, rather than numerical accuracy, was the primary objective. This is because errors in numerical accuracy are less likely than errors in distributive accuracy to impact on the apportionment of representatives among the states. Moreover, the Court added that significant deference - regarding how best to conduct the census - must be accorded to the Secretary since he directly received such latitude from Congress which, in turn, received such latitude from the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54385:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54386:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54386:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHolly Farms Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc., is a vertically integrated poultry producer. In 1989, the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391, filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board, seeking an election in a proposed unit that included live-haul employees working out of Holly Farms' Wilkesboro processing plant. The unit included workers described as \"live-haul\" crews, or teams of chicken catchers, forklift operators, and truckdrivers, who collect for slaughter chickens raised as broilers by independent contract growers, and transport the birds to the processing plant. Classifying the live-haul workers as employees protected by the National Labor Relations Act, rather than agricultural laborers excluded from the Act's coverage, the Board approved the bargaining unit. On petition for review, the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order, holding that the Board's classification rested on a reasonable interpretation of the Act and was consistent with the Board's prior decisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54386:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54386:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54386:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the NLRB's determination that the producer's live-haul workers were covered employees rather than exempt agricultural laborers, was a reasonable interpretation to which a reviewing court properly deferred. The Court was also split 5-4 in upholding the Board's classification for forklift operators who work in the chicken industry. In a 9-0 vote, the Court upheld the Board's classification for the live-haul crew's truck drivers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54386:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54387:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54387:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) paid a tax on insurance premiums it paid to foreign insurers to insure exports from the U.S. to foreign countries. IBM sought a refund on the tax and filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims when its refund claim was denied by the IRS. IBM contended the tax violated the Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that \"[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.\" The court agreed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54387:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54387:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54387:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-2 decision, announced by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled the tax did violate the Export Clause and was therefore unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54387:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54388:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54388:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA federal District Court sentenced Meirl Gilbert Neal on two plea-bargained convictions involving possession of LSD with intent to distribute. The amount of LSD was determined, under both the federal statute directing minimum sentences and the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, by the whole weight of the blotter paper, or carrier medium, containing the drug. The combined weight of the blotter paper and LSD actually sold by Neal was 109.51 grams. Thus, the court ruled that Neal was subject to 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (1)(A)(v), which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on anyone convicted of trafficking in more than 10 grams of \"a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount\" of LSD. After the Commission revised the Guidelines' calculation method by instructing courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight, Neal filed a motion to modify his sentence, contending that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was only 4.58 grams, well short of 841(b)(1)(A)(v)'s 10-gram requirement, and that the Guidelines' presumptive-weight method controlled the mandatory minimum calculation. The District Court held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, was determinative of whether Neal crossed the 10-gram threshold and that the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence still applied to him notwithstanding the Guidelines. In affirming, an en banc Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54388:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54388:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54388:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Section 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual requires a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54388:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54390:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54390:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFletcher Casey, Jr. and other inmates of various prisons operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), brought a class action against ADOC officials, alleging that the ADOC officials were furnishing them with inadequate legal research facilities and thereby depriving them of their right of access to the courts, in violation of Bounds v. Smith. Bounds held that \"the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.\" The District Court found the ADOC officials in violation of Bounds and issued an injunction mandating detailed, systemwide changes in ADOC's prison law libraries and in its legal assistance programs. The Court of Appeals affirmed both the finding of a Bounds violation and the injunction's major terms.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54390:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54390:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54390:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the success of Casey's systemic challenge was dependent on the ability to show widespread actual injury, and the District Court's failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual injury rendered its finding of a systemic Bounds violation invalid. Justice Scalia said the court's 1977 ruling in Bounds v. Smith \"does not guarantee [inmates] the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54390:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54391:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54391:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter purchasing a new vehicle from an authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had been repainted. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54391:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54391:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54391:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that while a state may impose punitive damages to further its interest in deterring unlawful conduct, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause prohibits states from imposing grossly excessive punishments on tort-feasors. In the present case, the punitive damage's excessive nature is indicated by the 500 to 1 ratio between the jury's punitive and actual damage awards, the relatively insignificant amount of damage, and the lack of statutory fines that remotely parallel the present award's magnitude. BMW's due process rights were also violated because it could not have possibly anticipated, nor did it receive fair notice, that it might face such a severe punishment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54391:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54392:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54392:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUmbehr was an independent trash-hauling contractor for Wabaunsee County, Kansas. He frequently criticized the County's Board of Commissioners (the Board). When the Board voted to terminate his contract, supposedly because the Board grew tired of his constant criticisms, Umbehr filed suit against two of the Board's members. Umbehr alleged that his termination resulted from his criticisms of the Board and, therefore, infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. On appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Board, the Tenth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted Umbehr's petition for certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54392:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54392:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54392:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech shielded Umbehr, as a government employee, from termination due to things he might have said about the Board. Umbehr successfully proved that his criticisms of the Board preceded his termination and were the primary motivating factor behind its retaliatory termination of his contract. The Court added that, in balancing an employee's interest in commenting on public concerns against an employer's interest in promoting efficient performance by its employees, it could not find any countervailing county interest justifying its infringement of Umbehr's freedom of speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54392:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54393:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54393:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTo prevent \"local media monopolies,\" Section 533(b) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 barred local phone service providers (local exchange carriers or LECs) from directly providing video programming to their local phone service subscribers. The government claimed that because LEC- controlled phone lines could also transmit video signals, allowing LECs to provide video programming would hurt competing cable companies. First, LECs could deny competitors access to their data lines. Second, LECs could offer lower cable prices than competitors by raising the costs of telephone service and using the extra profits to subsidize the costs of cable service.\nChesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia (Chesapeake) challenged the constitutionality of the statute, pointing out that \"video programming\" is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The government argued that the statute's regulation of the cable market had a \"content-neutral\" objective. The District Court ruled that the statute's restrictions were not \"narrowly tailored\" to serve the statute's objective. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adding that the statute did not leave open \"ample alternative channels for communication\" between LECs and local residents. The Supreme Court consolidated the case with National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54393:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54393:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54393:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. After the Court heard oral arguments, the President signed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 into law. The Act repealed Section 533(b), allowing LECs to provide local cable service if they complied with a series of regulatory measures. The Court instructed the Fourth Circuit to reconsider the case and determine whether it had become moot.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54393:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54394:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54394:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPaul Casarotto, a Subway sandwich shop franchisee, sued franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and its agent, Nick Lombardi, in a Montana state court when a dispute arose between the parties with regard to a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of the shop. The court stayed the lawsuit pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out in ordinary type on page nine of the franchise agreement. In reversing, the Montana Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it did not meet the state-law requirement, 27-5-114(4), that \"[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration\" be \"typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.\" DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued that the state-law requirement was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which declares written provisions for arbitration \"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.\" The Montana Supreme Court focused on the question of whether the application of 27-5-114(4)'s notice requirement would undermine the FAA's goals and policies. In the Montana court's judgment, the notice requirement did not undermine these goals and policies, for it did not preclude arbitration agreements altogether.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54394:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54394:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54394:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 8-1 decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that Montana's first-page notice requirement, 27-5-114(4), which governs not \"any contract,\" but specifically and solely contracts \"subject to arbitration,\" conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and is therefore displaced by the federal measure. Justice Ginsburg wrote that Congress \"precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status\" when it passed the FAA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54394:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54395:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54395:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTown & County Electric, Inc., a non-union company, sought to fill several positions for a construction job in Minnesota. Town & Country received applications from union staff, but refused to interview any of the applicants except one, who was eventually hired and fired soon thereafter. These individuals applied with the intention to organize Town & Country and were to remain on Union payroll during their time of employment. The union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town & Country had refused to interview and retain the workers because of their union affiliation, a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board held that the 11 individuals met the definition of employees under the Act and rejected Town & Country's claims that the individuals had been refused for other reasons.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the term \"employee\" does not include those individuals who remain on Union payroll during their time of employment with another company.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54395:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54395:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54395:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Supreme Court ruled for the Board and held that individuals can meet the definition of employee even if they are paid by a union to organize a non-union company while on company payroll. The Court found this result consistent with the language and purpose of the Act as well as the dictionary definition of \"employee.\" The Court also reasoned that the language of the Act seemed to specifically take into account the possibility of workers who are paid union organizers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54395:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54396:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54396:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Department of Transportation expelled Lane, a student, from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy because he was diagnosed with diabetes. Lane sued the Department of Transportation alleging that his termination violated section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, which barred \"any program or activity under any executive agency\" from discriminating on the basis of disability. The district court reinstated Lane, but refused to award damages because the federal government's sovereign immunity had not been waived by Congress. The appeals court affirmed the district court decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54396:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54396:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54396:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Although the related provisions of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and the 1991 Civil Rights Act might in combination be read as waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity, absent an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity, the court cannot permit damages to be awarded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54396:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54397:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54397:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEllis Felker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellate or certiorari review, and stay of execution after having his convictions for capital murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment affirmed on appeal. Felker's habeas petition challenged the constitutionality of Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the \"Act\"). Title I of the Act requires that all motions for filing a second or successive habeas appeal from a district court be reviewed by an appellate panel whose decision shall not be appealable by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54397:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54397:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54397:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The unanimous Court held that the Act's creation of an appellate panel, charged with reviewing all second or successive habeas applications, is not unconstitutional. The Act simply transfers the duty of habeas review from the district courts to an appellate panel. While the Act prevents an appeal to the Court from an appellate panel's denial of leave to file a second habeas petition, it does not repeal the Court's authority to entertain original habeas petitions. Thus, the shift in habeas \"gatekeeping\" duties to an appellate panel is neither an unconstitutional \"suspension\" of the habeas writ which would violate the Exceptions Clause of Article III, nor a deprivation of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54397:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54399:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54399:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlleging that Ursery manufactured marijuana on his property, the United States government initiated criminal proceedings against Ursery and began civil forfeiture proceedings against his property. On appeal from his conviction in District Court, the Court of Appeals reversed on double-jeopardy grounds. The government then initiated a second set of proceedings against Ursery's property, which was reversed on new double-jeopardy grounds. The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54399:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54399:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54399:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in an 8-to-1 decision, held that civil property forfeitures did not constitute a \"punishment\" for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. While the double jeopardy clause protects a defendant from being punished twice for the same offense, criminal and civil sanctions for the same offense are distinguishable. The civil property forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction not a punitive criminal \"punishment.\" Applying a two-part test to determine if a forfeiture constitutes a \"punishment\" in terms of the double jeopardy clause, the Court held that it was both Congress's intention that property forfeitures be civil in nature and that they be remedial rather than punitive. The mere resemblance between Ursery's property forfeiture and criminal drug and money-laundering punishments, did not constitute the \"clearest proof\" that Congress did not intend to levy both civil and criminal sanctions on Ursery's conduct. Furthermore, property forfeiture's non-punitive remedial nature is also evident in its goal of encouraging owners to care for their property by guarding against its illegal usage.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54399:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54404:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54404:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLarry Grant Lonchar was sentenced to death for murder nine years ago. After the affirmance of Lonchar's conviction and sentence, his sister and brother filed \"next friend\" state habeas corpus petitions. Lonchar opposed both. Lonchar then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed. Shortly before Lonchar's scheduled execution, he filed another state habeas corpus petition. When the petition was denied, Lonchar filed an \"eleventh hour\" federal petition, his first, on the day of his scheduled execution. The District Court held that Lonchar's conduct in waiting almost nine years to file his federal petition did not constitute an independent basis for rejecting the petition and granted a stay to permit time for consideration of other grounds for dismissal raised by the State. The court had reasoned that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some generalized equitable authority to dismiss, governed the case. The Court of Appeals vacated the stay. Setting aside the Rules and traditional habeas doctrine, the court held that equitable doctrines independent of Rule 9 applied and it concluded that Lonchar did not merit equitable relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54404:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54404:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54404:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some general \"equitable\" power to create exceptions to the Rule, should have determined whether or not a petition's dismissal was appropriate. Justice Breyer wrote for the court that a long delay does not generally constitute an abuse of the system, adding, \"[d]ismissal of a first habeas petition is a particularly serious matter for that dismissal denies the petitioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54404:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54405:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54405:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe IRS filed claims in Bankruptcy Court for taxes, interest, and penalties that accrued when Thomas R. Noland, the trustee of the in-debt First Truck Lines, Inc., sought relief under federal Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court held that the claims for taxes and interest were the first priority in the case. Consequently, the court subordinated the penalties, to be adjudicated following the taxes and interest, because the penalties were not financial losses for the IRS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54405:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54405:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54405:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that giving tax-penalty claims a lower priority than other claims contradicts Congress_ scheme of priorities regarding federal bankruptcy law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54405:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54407:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54407:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Seminole Tribe brought suit against the State of Florida for violating the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under the IGRA, the Tribe may engage in gaming (i.e., casino gambling) activities subject to Florida's good faith regulations. Florida moved to dismiss the Tribe's action, alleging that the lawsuit violated Florida's sovereign immunity. On appeal from the District Court's denial of Florida's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from federal suit and that under Ex Parte Young, the Tribe may not enforce its right to good faith negotiations by naming Florida's governor as a party to the suit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54407:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54407:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54407:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, The Court held that Congress did intend to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the IGRA but that the Indian Commerce Clause (and by implication the Commerce Clause) did not give Congress that power. Under the Eleventh Amendment, all states are regarded as sovereign entities. Such sovereignty inherently implies that states may not be sued by parties without their consent, even if they are given authority to regulate those parties' activities through receipt of federal funds. Finally, Ex Parte Young's ruling does not justify the Tribe's suit against Florida's governor in light of certain IGRA provisions which specifically prohibit such an action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54407:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54408:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54408:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 obligated CF&I Steel Corporation (CF&I) to make annual funding contributions to pension plans they sponsored. The required contribution for the 1989 plan totaled $12.4 million. CF&I failed to make the payment and petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for Chapter 11 reorganization. The Government filed a proof of claim for tax liability arising under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 4971(a), which imposes a 10 percent \"tax\" on any \"accumulated funding deficiency\" of plans such as CF&I's. The court allowed the claim, but rejected the Government's argument that the claim was entitled to priority as an \"excise tax\" under the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court also subordinated the Section 4971 claim to those of all other general unsecured creditors under the Bankruptcy Code's provision for equitable subordination. The court later approved a reorganization plan for CF&I giving lowest priority (and no money) to claims for non-compensatory penalties. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54408:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54408:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54408:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In an opinion authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Internal Revenue Code's 10% tax liability claim on any \"accumulated funding deficiency\" in pension plans, 26 U.S.C. Section 4971(a), does not create an excise tax under the Bankruptcy Code. Additionally, the Court held that the subordination of the Government's tax claim to those of other creditors was an error.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54408:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54409:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54409:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Gasperini, a journalist and photographer, loaned 300 original slide transparencies to the Center for Humanities, Inc. When the Center lost the transparencies, Gasperini commenced suit in the District Court. The Center conceded liability. A jury awarded Gasperini $1,500 per transparency, the asserted \"industry standard\" of compensation for a lost transparency. The Center moved for a new trial contending that the verdict was excessive. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals observed that New York law governed the controversy in this diversity case. Under New York law appellate courts are empowered to review the size of jury verdicts and to order new trials when the jury's award \"deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.\" Contrarily, under the Seventh Amendment, \"the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.\" Guided by New York Appellate Division decisions reviewing damage awards for lost transparencies, the court held that the $450,000 verdict \"materially deviates from what is reasonable compensation.\" The court vacated the judgment entered on the jury verdict and ordered a new trial, unless Gasperini agreed to an award of $100,000.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54409:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54409:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54409:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a split majority decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that New York's law controlling compensation awards for excessiveness or inadequacy can be given effect, without detriment to the Seventh Amendment, if the review standard is applied by the federal trial court judge, with appellate control of the trial court's ruling confined to \"abuse of discretion.\" Justice John Paul Stevens dissented regarding the judgment of the Court but agreed with most of the majority's reasoning. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54409:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54410:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54410:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring the 1960s, the United States government contracted with several chemical manufacturers, including Hercules Incorporated and Wm. T. Thompson Company, to manufacture the herbicide known as Agent Orange. After health problems arose, Vietnam veterans and their families began filing lawsuits against the manufactures. The manufacturers incurred substantial costs defending, and then settling, the claims. The manufactures then filed suit under the Tucker Act to recover such costs from the Government on theories of contractual indemnification and warranty of specifications provided by the government. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected the theory of implied warranty of specifications and the theory of implied promise to indemnify for liabilities incurred in performing the contracts. The appellate court also held that, by settling, the manufactures had voluntarily assumed liability for which the Government was not responsible.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54410:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54410:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54410:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the manufacturers may not recover on their warranty-of-specifications and contractual-indemnification claims. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that the manufactures could not recover from the government because the contracts did not contain warranties or indemnification provisions for costs in defending and settling third-party tort claims resulting from chemical manufacture and use. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the context in which the government compelled the manufacturer to manufacture Agent Orange did not give rise to an implied-in-fact indemnity agreement. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent that was joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Justice John Paul Stevens did not participate in the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54410:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54411:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54411:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnthony Petrarca commenced an action in Ohio state court to collect rent allegedly owed by Child World, Inc. under two commercial leases and to enforce Cole National Corporation's guarantee of Child World's performance under the leases. After Child World filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, Cole's successor in interest, Things Remembered, Inc., removed the action to federal court under the bankruptcy removal statute and the general federal removal statute. The Bankruptcy Court held that the removal was timely and proper and that it had jurisdiction. The District Court reversed and remanded the case to state court, holding that the removal was untimely and that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed Things Remembered's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54411:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54411:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54411:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that if an order remands a removed bankruptcy case to state court because of a timely raised defect in removal procedure or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review the order under the provisions of the general federal removal statute. The Court reasoned that the general removal statute bars appellate review of any order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed so that only remands based on the grounds recognized by the statute, such as a timely raised defect in removal procedure or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, are immune from review under the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54411:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54414:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54414:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Expedited Funds Availability Act requires banks to make deposited funds available for withdrawal within specified time periods. The act provides for administrative enforcement and civil liability. After a BankOne Chicago customer deposited a check drawn on a Midwest Bank and Trust account, the check was forwarded, but returned unpaid because BankOne's endorsement stamp was illegible. Subsequently, when the check was resubmitted, the account did not have sufficient funds to cover the withdrawal. Bank One then sued Midwest Bank for failing to meet its obligations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) pursuant to the act. The District Court entered summary judgment for BankOne. The Court of Appeals, vacating the lower court's decision, ordered the action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the act authorizes original federal-court jurisdiction only when a \"person other than [a] depository institution\" sues a \"depository institution,\" or when a depositor sues a bank.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54414:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54414:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54414:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the act provides for federal-court jurisdiction not only in suits between customers and banks, but also in cases initiated by one bank against another bank. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that section 4010 of the act authorizes claims for relief that are enforceable in federal court. Moreover, Justice Ginsburg continued, \"it is implausible that Congress directed the Board to handle such disputes administratively, for [section 4010] does not explicitly confer adjudicatory authority on the Board, nor set forth the relevant procedures for resolution of private disputes.\" Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia wrote concurring opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54414:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54415:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54415:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLotus Development Corporation (Lotus) copyrighted a computer spreadsheet program called Lotus 1-2-3. The program's menu options were arranged in a specific menu command hierarchy. Lotus 1-2-3 also allowed users to write \"macros,\" which designate a certain series of commands to be executed with a single keystroke. Competing software-company Borland International, Inc. (Borland) released a similar program called Quattro that contained a program called \"Key Reader.\" Lotus claimed that Key Reader infringed on its copyright because it copied Lotus 1-2-3 macros and arranged them according to the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy. Borland explained that it did this to allow users already familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 to also operate Quattro and argued that the Lotus menu command hierarchy did not constitute copyright-protected material.\nAfter the District Court ruled in favor of Lotus, Borland appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the command menu hierarchy was a \"method of operation\" - a category excluded from copyright protection under 17 U.S.C.102(b).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54415:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54415:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54415:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit without opinion in an equally divided, per curiam decision. Justice John Paul Stevens did not take part in the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54415:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54416:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54416:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLloyd Henderson, a merchant mariner, was injured while working aboard a United States vessel. After exhausting administrative remedies, Henderson filed a seaman's personal injury action against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act. Henderson's complaint was filed close to, but within, the two-year limit set on complaints by the Act. Henderson then followed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the service of the summons and complaint, or service of process, to the proper authorities. The United States argued that Henderson failed to serve the complaint \"forthwith,\" or without delay. This deprived the court of jurisdiction because \"forthwith\" service is a prerequisite for the government's waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act. The government's argument prevailed and the federal District Court dismissed Henderson's suit. Henderson lost on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54416:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54416:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54416:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-3 opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg contended that process of service was primarily a means to notify another of impending legal action in a way that provides the defendant adequate time to answer and present defenses. The Court held that \"[t]he federal rules thus convey a clear message: Complaints are not to be dismissed if served within 120 days, or within such additional time as the court may allow.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54416:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54418:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54418:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRailroad cars are connected by couplers consisting of knuckles - clamps that lock with their mates - joined to the ends of drawbars, which are fastened to housing mechanisms on the cars. Cars automatically couple when they come together and one car's open knuckle engages the other car's closed knuckle. The drawbar pivots in its housing, allowing the knuckled end some lateral play to prevent moving cars from derailing on a curved track. As a consequence of this lateral movement, drawbars may remain off-center when cars are uncoupled and must be realigned manually to ensure proper coupling. William J. Hiles injured his back while attempting to realign an off-center drawbar on a car at one of Norfolk & Western Rail Company's yards. Hiles sued in Illinois state court, alleging that Norfolk & Western had violated Section 2 of the federal Safety Appliance Act (SAA), which requires that cars be equipped with \"couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles.\" The trial court granted Hiles a directed verdict on liability, and the state appellate court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54418:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54418:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54418:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Section 2 of the Safety Appliance Act does not make a railroad liable as a matter of law for injuries incurred by a railroad employee while trying to straighten a misaligned drawbar. \"We are understandably hesitant to adopt a reading...that would suggest that almost every railroad car in service for nearly a century has been in violation of the SAA,\" wrote Justice Thomas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54418:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54419:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54419:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nColeman Wayne Gray was tried for the murder of Richard McClelland in Virginia. The prosecution acknowledged that if the trial reached the capital penalty phase they would introduce Gray's admissions to other inmates that he had previously murdered 2 other people. Gray's attorney moved to exclude the evidence because Gray had not been officially charged with such crimes. Gray also claimed such evidence was a surprise tactic and that he could not pose the proper defense immediately. The Virginia trial court denied the motion to exclude. Subsequently, Gray was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, Gray sough federal habeas corpus relief. He claimed that inadequate notice of evidence prevented him from a fair defense in the penalty phase of his capital trial in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court initially denied the petition because it found Gray had no constitutional right to notice of individual testimony. Later, the District Court amended its ruling, holding that Gray was denied due process when the state failed to provide notice of what murder evidence would be presented. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found that to grant the habeas corpus relief would be to recognize a new federal constitutional law regarding notice-of-evidence claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54419:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54419:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54419:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that the notice-of-evidence claim would require the adoption of a new constitutional rule and therefore could not be raised in a habeas petition. In her dissent, Justice Ruth Bader maintained that due process allows Gray the right to a \"full, fair, potentially effective opportunity to defend against the State's charges.\" Gary was not given that right.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54419:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54420:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54420:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSaul Ornelas and Ismael Ornelas-Ledesma were arrested in Wisconsin after suspicious activity led to the discovery of cocaine in the defendants' car. In a motion to suppress the evidence, the defendants alleged that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in their detainment and in the police search of the car. The District Court denied the motion and the defendants pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the District Court but for different reasons.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54420:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54420:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54420:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held \"[t]he ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo.\" The principle details in such a review should be an analysis of events leading up to the search and the objective review of the search.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54420:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54423:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54423:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTommy L. Rutledge was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. The District Court convicted Rutledge on both counts. It sentenced him to life imprisonment without possible release on each count. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It rejected Rutledge's argument that his convictions and concurrent life sentences punished him twice for the same offense.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54423:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54423:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54423:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled one of the two sentences must be dropped. Both of the offenses were based on the same criminal act. Justice Stevens wrote, \"A guilty verdict on a (continuing criminal enterprise) charge necessarily includes a finding that the defendant also participated in a conspiracy.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54423:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54424:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54424:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHerbert Markman owns the patent to a system that tracks clothing through the dry-cleaning process using a keyboard and data processor to generate transaction records, including a bar code readable by optical detectors. According to the patent's claim, the portion of the patent document that defines the patentee's rights, Markman's product can \"maintain an inventory total\" and \"detect and localize spurious additions to inventory.\" Westview Instruments, Inc.'s product also uses a keyboard and processor and lists dry-cleaning charges on bar-coded tickets that can be read by optical detectors. In an infringement suit, after hearing an expert witness testify about the meaning of the claim's language, a jury found that Westview's product had infringed Markman's patent. However, the District Court directed a verdict for Westview on the ground that its device is unable to track \"inventory\" as that term is used in the claim. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the interpretation of claim terms is the exclusive province of the court and that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is consistent with that conclusion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54424:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54424:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54424:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court. Justice Souter wrote that \"judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54424:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54425:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54425:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBefore the Colorado Republican Party selected its 1986 senatorial candidate, its Federal Campaign Committee bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit charging that the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee had violated the \"Party Expenditure Provision\" of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), which imposes dollar limits upon political party \"expenditure[s] in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate.\" The Colorado Party defended itself by claiming that the FECA expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment as applied to its advertisements, and filed a counterclaim seeking to raise a challenge to the Provision as a whole. The District Court held that the Provision did not cover the expenditure at issue. Therefore, the court entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party and it dismissed the counterclaim as moot. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Provision covered this expenditure and satisfied the Constitution. Subsequently, the court ordered judgment for the FEC.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54425:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54425:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54425:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a plurality decision, Justice Stephen G. Breyer announced the judgment of the Court and authored an opinion, in which the Court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) to the kind of expenditure at issue here-an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate. Justices O'Connor and Souter joined Justice Breyer. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, concluded that, on its face, FECA violates the First Amendment when it restricts as a \"contribution\" a political party's spending \"in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with_a candidate.\" Justice Thomas concluded that the Provision is unconstitutional not only as applied to the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, but also on its face. Dissenting, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg agreed with the judgment of the Court of Appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54425:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54426:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54426:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe day after Auciello Iron Works' contract offer was accepted by its union employees' collective-bargaining representative, Auciello disavowed the agreement because of a good-faith doubt, based on knowledge acquired before the offer's acceptance, that a majority of employees supported the Union. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that Auciello's withdrawal was an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act and ordered that the agreement be reduced to a formal written instrument. The Court of Appeals enforced the order as reasonable after the NLRB issued a supplemental opinion to justify its refusal to consider Auciello's defense of good-faith doubt about the Union's majority status.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54426:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54426:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54426:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the NLRB reasonably concluded that an employer challenging an agreement under these circumstances commits an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Court agreed with the NLRB that an employer's precontractual, good-faith doubt is inadequate to support an exception to the conclusive presumption of a union's majority status, which arises at the moment when a collective-bargaining contract offer has been accepted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54426:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54427:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54427:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nColorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial, legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their \"homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.\" Following a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54427:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54427:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54427:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution violated the equal protection clause. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and bisexual persons, imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause, even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group, so long as it can be shown to \"advance a legitimate government interest.\" Amendment 2, by depriving persons of equal protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate interest. Justice Kennedy concluded: \"If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54427:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54429:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54429:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing the 1990 census, Texas planned the creation of three additional congressional districts. Following the redistricting, registered voters challenged the plans as racial gerrymandering. A three-judge federal district court found the plans unconstitutional. The case moved to the Supreme Court on appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54429:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54429:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54429:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Texas redistricting plans were unconstitutional. Supporting its \"strict scrutiny\" approach, the Court noted that the proposed districts were highly irregular in shape, that their computerized design was significantly more sensitive to racial data, and that they lacked any semblance to pre-existing race-neutral districts. The Court also held that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the proposed districts would deprive minority groups of equal participation in the electoral political processes. Thus, the proposed districts violated the Voting Rights Act's \"results\" test prohibiting activity that \"results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen to vote on account of race or color.\" Finally, with respect to proposed district 18, the Court held that Texas deliberately designed it to hamper the local African-American minority's ability to elect representatives of their choice. This violated the Voting Rights Act's \"nonretrogression\" principle, prohibiting state action from obstructing a minority's ability to elect representatives of their choice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54429:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54431:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54431:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoland Bailey and Candisha Robinson were each convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1), which, in relevant part, imposes a mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who \"uses or carries a firearm\" both \"during and in relation to\" a predicate offense. Bailey's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded pistol which the police found inside a bag in the locked trunk of a car he was driving after they arrested him for possession of illegal drugs. Robinson's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on an unloaded, holstered firearm which the police, executing a search warrant, found locked in a trunk in her bedroom closet, along with drugs and money from an earlier controlled buy. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the Section 924(c)(1) convictions, interpreting \"use\" of a gun in violation of Section 924(c)(1) in accordance with an \"accessibility and proximity\" test.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54431:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54431:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54431:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The proximity and accessibility test for \"use\" is so broad that no independent role remains for \"carry.\" \"Use\" in Section 924(c)(1) requires more than proximity and accessibility that might embolden a defendant. It requires active employment of the firearm by the defendant, making the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54431:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54432:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54432:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board encouraged thrifts in good standing and outside investors to take over ailing thrifts in supervisory mergers. The Board agreed to permit acquiring entities to designate the excess of the purchase price over the fair value of identifiable assets as an intangible asset referred to as supervisory goodwill and to count such goodwill and certain capital credits toward the capital reserve requirements imposed by federal regulations. Subsequently, Congress's passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) forbade thrifts from counting goodwill and capital credits in computing the required reserves. Three thrifts, created through supervisory mergers who consequently ran into financial troubles, each filed suit against the United States for breach of contract. Agreeing with the thrifts, the District Court granted each summary judgment. The court rejected Government's arguments that surrenders of sovereign authority, such as the promise to refrain from regulatory changes, must appear in unmistakable terms in a contract in order to be enforceable and that a public and general sovereign act, such as FIRREA's alteration of capital reserve requirements, could not trigger contractual liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54432:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54432:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54432:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 plurality opinion delivered Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the terms assigning the risk of regulatory change to the Government are enforceable and that the Government is therefore liable in damages for breach, although Congress changed the relevant law, and thereby barred the Government from specifically honoring its agreements. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer joined all of the plurality opinion, and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined in part. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the unmistakability doctrine was not intended to displace the rules of contract interpretation applicable to the government. In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the contracts at issue gave rise to an obligation on the part of the government to afford the three thrifts favorable accounting treatment and the contracts were broken by the government's discontinuation of that favorable treatment. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented in an opinion joined in part by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54432:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54433:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54433:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 filed suit alleging that Brown Group, Inc. began to lay off workers in connection with the closing of one of its plants, Brown Shoe Company, before giving the union the closing notice required by the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the WARN Act). The union sought backpay for each of its affected members. Under modern associational standing doctrine, an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries when: 1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and 3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The District Court dismissed the compliant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that \"[e]ach union member who wishes to recover WARN Act damages from Brown Shoe must participate in the suit so that his or her right to damages can be determined and the quantum of damages can be calculated by the court on the basis of particularized proof.\" Therefore, the court concluded that the suit was barred because the union failed to meet the third part of the test for asserting associational standing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54433:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54433:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54433:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act grants unions authority to sue for damages on behalf of their members. Therefore, the union had standing to bring such an action. Justice Souter wrote that the court's ruling was based on previous decisions that state that \"an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries even without a showing of injury to the association itself.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54433:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54434:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54434:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter their collective-bargaining agreement expired, the National Football League (NFL) -- a group of football clubs -- and the NFL Players Association -- a labor union -- began to negotiate a new contract. The NFL presented a plan that would permit each club to establish a \"developmental squad\" of substitute players, each of whom would be paid the same $1,000 weekly salary. The union disagreed. When the negotiations reached an impasse, the NFL unilaterally implemented the plan. A number of squad players brought an antitrust suit, claiming that the employers' plan unfairly restrained trade. The District Court awarded damages to the players, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54434:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54434:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54434:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In affirming the Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court held that federal labor laws protect professional football franchises from anti-trust actions brought by their players when those franchises unilaterally impose terms after the collective bargaining process breaks down. Labor laws stabilize, encourage, and protect the collective bargaining process. When that process breaks down, labor laws provide adequate remedies. Employee suits under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, by contrast, might undermine the integrity of collective bargaining and preempt unnecessarily the labor laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54434:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54435:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54435:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRhode Island passed a statute banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices in places where liquor is not sold. Petitioners filed suit claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found the ban unconstitutional, noting that it did not serve any interest Rhode Island might have had in promoting temperance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that open competition for liquor pricing would be harmful insofar at it would increase consumption. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54435:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54435:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54435:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a fractious opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens found Rhode Island's statutory ban on liquor price advertising to be an unconstitutional infringement of the liquor sellers' First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In response to Rhode Island's claim that it passed the statutory ban to protect consumers from \"commercial harms,\" Justice Stevens held that governmental impediments to truthful and accurate commercial messages rarely protect consumers. On the contrary, courts must take \"special care\" when considering such \"protective\" measures since they often hinder public choice and obstruct necessary debate over public policy issues. Furthermore, Rhode Island failed to show that its statutory ban would lower market-wide liquor consumption, much less alter alcohol consumption among abusive drinkers who are most in need of assistance. Finally, Justice Stevens held that although the Twenty-first Amendment did empower Rhode Island to regulate the sale of liquor, such regulatory power is not to be exercised to the detriment of its constitutional obligation to protect and abide by the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54435:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54436:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54436:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter North Carolina levied an \"intangibles tax\" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax, the Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, filed a state-court action against the State Secretary of Revenue, seeking judgment that the tax violated the Federal Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for the Secretary, but North Carolina's Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taxable percentage deduction violated the Commerce Clause. In reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the State's scheme imposed a valid compensatory tax and that the intangibles tax imposed less of a burden on interstate commerce than the corporate income tax placed on intrastate commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54436:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54436:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54436:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that North Carolina's intangibles tax discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Souter reasoned that the tax discriminated on face against interstate commerce by taxing stock only to the extent that its issuing corporation participated in interstate commerce. \"North Carolina's intangibles tax facially discriminates against interstate commerce, it fails justification as a valid compensatory tax, and, accordingly, it cannot stand,\" wrote Justice Souter. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54436:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54437:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54437:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, the Republican Party of Virginia held a state convention to nominate the Republican candidate for United States Senator. A local political committee could certify any voter as a delegate to the convention by paying a registration fee of $35 or $45. Fortis Morse, Kenneth Curtis Bartholomew, and Kimberly J. Enderson, registered voters in Virginia willing to declare their intent to support the Party's nominee, were eligible to participate. Bartholomew and Enderson refused to pay the fee and did not become delegates. Morse paid the fee with funds advanced by supporters of the eventual nominee. Moore and others then filed a complaint seeking an injunction preventing the Party from imposing the fee, alleging that that the imposition of the fee violated sections 5 and 10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed the claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54437:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54437:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54437:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a 5-4 plurality opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, five Justices of the Court, although unable to agree on an opinion, agreed that the party's imposition of the registration fee was subject to the preclearance requirements of section 5 and that a private right of action existed to enforce section 10. \"By limiting the opportunity for voters to participate in the Party's convention, the fee undercuts their influence on the field of candidates whose names will appear on the ballot, and thus weakens the 'effectiveness' of their votes cast in the general election itself,\" wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the opinion, in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and David H. Souter joined. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy filed separate dissents. Each emphasized First Amendment concerns.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54437:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54438:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54438:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPetitioners Stacey C. Koon and Laurence M. Powell, Los Angeles police officers, were acquitted on state charges of assault and excessive use of force in the beating of Rodney King during an arrest. They were convicted under 18 U. S. C. Section 242 of violating the victim's constitutional rights under color of law. Although the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guideline, 1992 USSG Section 2H1.4, indicated that they should be imprisoned for 70 to 87 months, the District Court granted them two downward departures from that range. The first was based on the victim's misconduct, which significantly contributed to provoking the offense. The second was based on a combination of four factors: (1) that the petitioners were unusually susceptible to abuse in prison; (2) that the petitioners would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law enforcement; (3) that the petitioners had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions; and (4) that the petitioners posed a low risk of recidivism. The sentencing range after the departures was 30 to 37 months, and the court sentenced each petitioner to 30 months. The Court of Appeals reviewed the departure decisions utilizing a de novo standard and rejected all of them.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54438:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54438:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54438:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Court of Appeals should not review de novo a decision to depart from the Guideline sentencing range, but instead should ask whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. Furthermore, because the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting certain of the downward departure factors relied upon by the District Judge, wrote Justice Kennedy, significant parts of the appellate court's rulings require reversal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54438:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54439:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54439:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed, including Muriel Kole. Subsequently, Marjorie Zicherman and Muriel Mahalek, Kole's sister and mother sued KAL under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which governs international air transportation. Zicherman and Mahalek were awarded loss-of-society damages. The Court of Appeals set aside the verdict, holding that general maritime law supplied the substantive compensatory damages law to be applied in an action under the Warsaw Convention and that, under such law, a plaintiff can recover for loss of society only if he was the decedent's dependent at the time of death. The appellate court found that Mahalek had not established dependent status and remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether Zicherman was a dependent of the decedent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54439:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54439:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54439:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the relatives could not recover loss-of-society damages under the Warsaw Convention because Article 17 left it to the adjudicating court to specify what harm was cognizable as determined by domestic law, which is supplied by the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). Justice Scalia then reasoned that, because DOHSA permits only pecuniary damages, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover loss-of-society damages. The Court, therefore, did not reach the question whether, under general maritime law, dependency is a prerequisite for loss-of-society damages. Thus, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal's judgement insofar as it permitted Zicherman to recover loss-of-society damages if she could establish her dependency on the decedent and affirmed its decision with regards to vacating the award of loss-of-society damages to Mahalek is affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54439:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54440:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54440:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe California Insurance Commissioner filed a state court action against Allstate Insurance Co. seeking damages for Allstate's alleged breach of reinsurance agreements in an effort to gather the assets of the defunct Mission Insurance companies. Allstate removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Commissioner sought to remand the case to state court, arguing that the court should abstain from hearing the case, under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., because its resolution might interfere with California's regulation of insurance insolvencies and liquidations. The District Court agreed, concluded that an abstention was appropriate, and remanded the case to state court without ruling on Allstate's arbitration motion. After determining the appealability of the District Court's remand order, the Court of Appeals vacated the decision and ordered the case sent to arbitration. The court held that abstention was inappropriate in this damages action because a Burford abstention is limited to equitable actions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54440:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54440:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54440:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that an abstention-based remand order is appealable because the \"remand order here falls within that narrow class of collateral orders that are immediately appealable.\" Further, the Court held that the \"federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary,\" and because \"this was a damages action, the District Court's remand order was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine.\" Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy wrote concurring opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54440:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54441:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54441:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the Federal Home Loan Bank Board recommended that Robert Pelletier be replaced because of he was under investigation for potential misconduct relating to the collapse of another financial institution, he was fired as the provisional managing officer of Pioneer Savings and Loan Association. Pelletier then filed suit, seeking damages. John Behrens, the agent responsible for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's recommendation, asserted a statute-of-limitations defense and claimed qualified immunity from suit on the ground that his actions were taken in a governmental capacity. The District Court rejected Behrens' defense of qualified immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable \"final\" decision, that an official claiming qualified immunity is entitled to only one such pretrial appeal, and, ultimately, affirmed the District Court's rejection of Behrens' qualified immunity. On remand, the District Court denied Behrens' motion for summary judgment, which again claimed qualified immunity. On appeal from the latest denial, the Court of Appeals dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54441:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54441:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54441:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the court of appeals was not deprived of jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the agent was not limited in such circumstances to one interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. Justice Scalia wrote that, \"an order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a 'final' judgment subject to immediate appeal.\" In a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote, in such cases, \"the law normally permits a single interlocutory appeal, and not more than one such appeal.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54441:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54442:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54442:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1987, Jack L. Thomas filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) class action against his former employer Tru-Tech, Inc. and D. Grant Peacock, an officer and shareholder of Tru-Tech. Thomas alleged that they had breached their fiduciary duties to the class in administering Tru- Tech's pension benefits plan and sought the benefits due under the plan. The District Court ruled in Thomas's favor, but found that Peacock was not a fiduciary. After the Court of Appeals affirmed and attempts to collect from Tru-Tech failed, Thomas sued Peacock. The District Court, agreeing with Thomas to pierce the corporate veil, entered judgment against Peacock in the amount of the judgment against Tru-Tech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' suit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54442:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54442:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54442:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Thomas's subsequent suit. The Court found that neither ERISA's jurisdictional nor the general federal question jurisdictional provision supplied the District Court with subject matter jurisdiction over the suit against the corporate officer. The Court noted that is was unaware of any provision under ERISA for imposing liability under the circumstances for an extant ERISA judgment against a third party. Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dissent, argued that a federal court's jurisdiction encompasses a claim by a judgment creditor that a party in control of the judgment debtor has fraudulently exercised that control to defeat a judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54442:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54443:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54443:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThree years after complying with a county order to clean up petroleum contamination discovered on its property, KFC Western, Inc. brought an action under the citizen suit provision -- Section 6972 -- of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) to recover its cleanup costs from the Meghrigs. KFC claimed that the contamination had previously posed an \"imminent and substantial endangerment\" to health or the environment and that the Meghrigs were responsible for \"equitable restitution\" under the Act because, as prior owners of the property, they had contributed to the contaminated site. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that 6972(a) does not permit recovery of past cleanup costs and that 6972 does not authorize a cause of action for the remediation of toxic waste that does not pose an \"imminent and substantial endangerment\" at the time suit is filed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court on both issues.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54443:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54443:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54443:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor the Court held that section 6972 does not authorize a private cause of action to recover the prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not, at the time of suit, continue to pose an endangerment to health or the environment. Writing for the court, Justice O'Connor said the law only allows private citizens to sue to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment and is not directed at providing compensation for past cleanup efforts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54443:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54445:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54445:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles Howe and others used to work for Massey-Ferguson, Inc., a farm equipment manufacturer, and a wholly owned subsidiary of the Varity Corporation. These employees all were participants in, and beneficiaries of, Massey-Ferguson's self-funded employee welfare benefit plan, an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA protected plan that Massey- Ferguson administered itself. When certain divisions in Massey-Ferguson stared losing money, Varity decided to transfer them to a separately incorporated subsidiary, Massey Combines. Varity also persuaded the employees of the failing divisions to change employers and benefit plans, conveying the message that employees' benefits would remain secure when they transferred. Ultimately, the employees lost their nonpension benefits. The employees filed an action under ERISA, claim that Varity, through trickery, had led them to withdraw from their old plan and forfeit their benefits. The District Court found that Varity and Massey-Ferguson, acting as ERISA fiduciaries, had harmed plan beneficiaries through deliberate deception, which gave the employees to right to relief, including the reinstatement to the old plan. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54445:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54445:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54445:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that, under the specific factual circumstances, Varity and Massey-Ferguson acted in their capacity as an ERISA fiduciary when they significantly and deliberately misled the plan's beneficiaries, thereby violating their fiduciary obligations imposed by ERISA. Finding that ERISA's general purpose of protecting beneficiaries' interests also favors a reading that provides a remedy, Justice Breyer said that Varity and Massey-Ferguson violated the fiduciary obligations imposed upon the plan's administrator by ERISA, by knowingly and significantly deceiving the employees as to the financial viability of the new entity and the future of the new entity's benefits plan, in order to save the employer money at the expense of the beneficiaries and that they could thus be sued for equitable relief by the individual beneficiaries. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54445:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54447:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54447:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames Allen Egelhoff was tried in Montana courts for two counts of homicide. Egelhoff claimed that extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing or recalling the crimes. Montana law did not allow Egelhoff's intoxicated condition to be considered. Subsequently, Egelhoff was found guilty. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the decision. It held Egelhoff had a due process right to present all relevant evidence. Moreover, it held that Montana law's denial of such a presentation relieved the state from part of its burden of proof needed to convict Egelhoff.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54447:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54447:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54447:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court could not reach a majority on the reasons for its decision. Justice Antonin Scalia, who announced the judgment of the Court, declared that defendants do not have an absolute constitutional right to present all relevant evidence in their defense.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54447:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54448:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54448:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhren and Brown were driving in a 'high drug area.' Some plainclothes officers, while patrolling the neighborhood in an unmarked vehicle, noticed Whren and Brown sitting in a truck at an intersection stop-sign for an usually long time. Suddenly, without signaling, Whren turned his truck and sped away. Observing this traffic violation, the officers stopped the truck. When they approached the vehicle, the officers saw Whren holding plastic bags of crack cocaine. Whren and Brown were arrested on federal drug charges. Before trial, they moved to suppress the evidence contending that the officers used the traffic violation as a pretext for stopping the truck because they lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop them on suspicion of drug dealing. The District Court denied the motion to suppress and convicted the petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54448:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54448:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54448:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The unanimous Court held that as long as officers have a reasonable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, they may stop any vehicle. In the present case, the officers had reasonable cause to stop the petitioners for a traffic violation since they sped away from a stop sign at an 'unreasonable speed' and without using their turn signal. Thus, since an actual traffic violation occurred, the ensuing search and seizure of the offending vehicle was reasonable, regardless of what other personal motivations the officers might have had for stopping the vehicle. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the anxiety, confusion, and haste which the petitioners experienced from the stop-and-search outweighed the government's interest in traffic safety. While the Fourth Amendment does require a balancing test between a search-and-seizure's benefits and the harm it might cause to the individual, such a test only applies to unusually harmful searches and seizures. There was nothing unusually harmful about this traffic stop.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54448:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54449:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54449:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer \"substantively comparable\" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54449:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54449:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54449:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. Because it failed to show \"exceedingly persuasive justification\" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's \"substantive comparability\" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's \"substantive comparability\" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard, requiring that \"all gender-based classifications today\" be evaluated with \"heightened scrutiny.\" When evaluated with such \"heightened scrutiny,\" Virginia's plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection clause. [NOTE: Justice Ginsburg's announcement of the Court's opinion may be considered an address to the American public. It is a plain-spoken and forceful summary of the majority position.]", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54449:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54450:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54450:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBarbara Smiley, a resident of California, possessed credits cards issued by Citibank, a national bank located in South Dakota. Under certain circumstances, Citibank will issue late-payment fees. In 1992, Smiley brought a class action against Citibank on behalf of herself and other California holders of Citibank's credit cards, alleging that the late-payment fees charged by Citibank, although legal under South Dakota law, violated California law. In response, Citibank argued that a provision of the National Bank Act of 1864, which permits a national bank to charge its loan customers \"interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is located,\" pre-empted Smiley's state law claims. After accepting Citibank's argument that late-payment fees constituted \"interest,\" the California Superior Court ruled in its favor. The California Superior Court Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54450:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54450:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54450:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the National Bank Act of 1864 authorizes such charges because a regulation adopted by the Comptroller of the Currency, which defined interest to include late-payment fees, was a reasonable interpretation of the act and entitled to deference. The Court rejected arguments that late-payment fees do not constitute interest because they do not vary based on the payment owed or the time period of delay and because they are penalties.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54450:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54452:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54452:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nO'Hare Truck Service was one among several towing companies employed by the city of Northlake. Northlake kept a list of available towing companies and would only remove a company from its list after a showing of cause. In the present case, however, Northlake removed O'Hare Truck Service from its list because O'Hare's owner did not support Northlake's mayoral candidate in his reelection campaign. Instead, O'Hare's owner supported the opposition candidate. Upon removal from Northlake's employment list, O'Hare Truck Service filed suit alleging that its dismissal was a retaliation for its lack of support for Northlake's mayoral candidate. The dismissal was the cause of substantial loss in income. On appeal from the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a First Amendment violation, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54452:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54452:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54452:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, that independent contractors, such as O'Hare Truck Service, are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as those afforded to government employees. Accordingly, Northlake could not condition the towing company's employment on its political affiliations or beliefs unless Northlake could demonstrate that O'Hare's political affiliations had a reasonable and appreciable effect on its job performance. The Court held that Northlake neither attempted nor would it have been able to make such a demonstration. Therefore, Northlake's removal of O'Hare Truck Service from its employment list was unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54452:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54453:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54453:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1989, 12-year-old Natalie Calhoun died in a collision in territorial waters off Puerto Rico while riding a Yamaha jet ski. Natalie's parents, invoking Pennsylvania's wrongful-death and survival statutes, filed a federal diversity and admiralty action for damages against Yamaha. Yamaha argued that, because Natalie died on navigable waters, state remedies could not be applied, and that federal, judge-declared maritime law controlled to the exclusion of state law. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the District Court held that the federal maritime wrongful-death action excluded state law remedies, but that loss of society and loss of support and services were compensable. Both sides ask for an appeal. After granting the interlocutory review petition, the appellate panel held that state remedies remain applicable in accident cases of this type and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54453:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54453:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54453:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that state remedies remain applicable in such cases and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death action recognized in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375. The Court rejected Yamaha's argument that Moragne's wrongful-death action covers the waters, creating a uniform federal maritime remedy for all deaths occurring in state territorial waters, which replaces all state remedies previously available to supplement general maritime law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54453:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54454:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54454:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBrian Degen was indicted in 1989 for distributing marijuana, laundering money, and related crimes. On the same day the district court unsealed the indictment, it also unsealed a civil forfeiture complaint for properties allegedly worth $5.5 million and purchased with proceeds of Degen's drug sales or used to facilitate the sales. Degen is a citizen of both the U.S. and Switzerland, and in 1988 he and his family moved to Switzerland. He has not returned to the U.S. to face criminal charges and by treaty the Swiss are not obliged to extradite their nationals to the U.S. While residing in Switzerland, Degen filed an answer in the civil case, claiming that the forfeiture was barred by the statute of limitations and was an unlawful retroactive application of forfeiture laws. The district court did not consider his arguments. Instead, it entered summary judgment against him, holding that he was not entitled to be heard in the civil action because he remained outside the country, unamenable to criminal prosecution. On appeal, the government argued that the district court's inherent powers authorized it to strike Degen's claims under the \"fugitive disentitlement doctrine.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54454:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54454:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54454:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Principles of deference to the other branches of government require a court to invoke its inherent power only as a reasonable response to the problems and needs that provoke it. No sufficient reason justifies disentitlement here. Since the court's jurisdiction over the property is secure despite Degen's absence, there is no risk of delay or frustration in determining the merits of the government's forfeiture claims or in enforcing the resulting judgment. Also, the court has alternatives, other than disentitlement, to keep Degen from using liberal civil discovery rules to gain an improper advantage in the criminal prosecution, where discovery is more limited. Finally, disentitlement is an excessive response to the court's interests in redressing the indignity visited upon it by Degen's absence from the criminal proceeding, and in deterring flight from criminal prosecution in general; it is a response that erodes rather than enhances the dignity of the court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54454:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54455:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54455:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBennis's husband was convicted of gross indecency following his sexual activity with a prostitute in the couple's jointly-owned car. The local county prosecutor filed a complaint alleging the car was a public nuisance subject to abatement (i.e., to eliminate or confiscate the car). The Circuit Court entered the abatement order, but the Appeals Court reversed. After granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the appellate court's decision and re-entered the abatement order. Bennis appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54455:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54455:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54455:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWriting for a 5-to-4 majority, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist held that the abatement order against Bennis's car did not violate the takings clause. Her innocence and lack of knowledge concerning her husband's illegal and indecent activity, in the couple's jointly owned car, could not serve as a defense against her vehicle's forfeiture. Furthermore, under the present circumstances, the vehicle's forfeiture did not violate Bennis's property rights without due process. Michigan's abatement policy, aimed at deterring criminal uses of property, lawfully transferred her's vehicle to the state. As such, Michigan is not required to compensate Bennis for the vehicle's forfeiture.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54455:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54456:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54456:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Exxon oil tanker, the Houston, broke free from a mooring facility under control of the respondents, Sofec, Inc. Exxon filed a complaint alleging negligence and breach of warranty in federal district court. Sofec, Inc. filed a successful motion to bifurcate the trial. The trial court considered whether the conduct of the ship's captain, Coyne, was the \"superceding and sole proximate cause of the loss of the ship\" after the ship had broken free of the moorings in order to determine if the tanker would have been lost despite Coyne's actions. The cause of the ship's release from the moorings became a secondary issue. The court found Coyne negligent, which was the primary cause of the Houston's grounding and subsequent loss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Exxon petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54456:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54456:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54456:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a plaintiff in admiralty that is the superseding cause of its own injury, and thus the sole, proximate cause, cannot recover part of its damages from tort-feasors or contracting partners whose blameworthy actions were causes in fact of the injury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54456:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54457:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54457:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) provides for \"the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use,\" and classifies such devices based on their level of risk. Class III devices pose the greatest risk and, thus, are subject to a rigorous premarket approval (PMA) process. However, two statutory exceptions to this process exist. Because Medtronic, Inc.'s pacemaker is a Class III device found substantially equivalent to a pre-existing device, it can avoid the PMA process. In 1990, Lora Lohr's Medtronic pacemaker failed, allegedly according to a defect. Lohr and her spouse filed a Florida state-court suit, alleging both negligence and strict-liability claims. Medtronic removed the case to federal district court. The court then dismissed the case as pre-empted by 21 USC section 360k(a), which provides that \"no State...may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [the MDA] to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under [the Act].\" Reversing and affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Lohrs' negligent design claims were not pre-empted, but that their negligent manufacturing and failure to warn claims were. (This case was decided together with 95-886, Lohr et vir v. Medtronic, Inc.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54457:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54457:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54457:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals decision was reversed insofar as it held that any of the claims were pre-empted and affirmed insofar as it rejected any pre-emption defense. In a 9-0 vote, the Court allowed the lawsuit based on alleged defects in the pacemaker's design to proceed. In a 5-4 vote, the Court allowed the lawsuit to proceed on its claims of alleged defects in its manufacturing and failure to warn. Justice Stevens reasoned that the MDA was not intended to pre-empt \"traditional common-law remedies against manufacturers and distributors of defective devices,\" as long as they paralleled federal requirements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54457:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54458:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54458:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter purchasing cocaine, Juan Melendez was charged with violating federal drug laws. The law carried a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Melendez signed a plea agreement stating he would be cooperative. In turn the government agreed to give him a short sentence. The District Court thus sentenced Melendez to ten years in prison, the mandatory minimum. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54458:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54458:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54458:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, in the absence of a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court to \"impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence,\" a prison sentence must not violate the statutory sentencing minimum.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54458:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54459:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54459:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA general court-martial found Dwight J. Loving, an Army private, guilty of both premeditated murder and felony murder under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The court-martial sentenced Loving to death based on the aggravating factors that the premeditated murder was committed during a robbery and that he had committed a second murder. The commander who convened the court-martial approved the findings and sentence. In affirming, the U.S. Army Court of Military Review and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces rejected Loving's contention that the President lacked the authority to prescribe aggravating factors in capital murder cases that enabled the court-martial to sentence him to death. Loving claimed that the separation-of-powers principle prevented the President from promulgating the Executive Order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54459:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54459:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54459:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that not only does the Constitution require the aggravating factors of the military's death penalty, but that the President's prescription of the challenged aggravating factors did not violate the separation-of-powers principle. Justice Kennedy wrote, \"[a]lthough it may not delegate the power to make the law...Congress may delegate to others the authority or discretion to execute the law under and in pursuance of its terms.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54459:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54462:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54462:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSections 10(a) and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act (the Act) empower leased access channel cable operators to control programming that they believe is indecent and obscene. Section 10(b) of the Act requires public access channel cable operators to restrict \"patently offensive\" programming to a single channel, access to which must be restricted to those subscribers who submit written requests. Petitioners, television access programmers and cable television viewers, filed suit alleging that the Act's empowerments and restrictions violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. This case was consolidated with Alliance for Community Media v. FCC.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54462:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54462:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54462:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, The Court held that the Act's grant of authority to leased channel cable operators under 10(a) - allowing them to restrict the transmission of \"patently offensive\" or indecent programming - is consistent with the First Amendment. The authority's discretionary nature and ultimate objective of protecting young viewers from offensive programming, is a constitutionally permissible method of restoring editorial authority to cable operators. By contrast, the Court found provision 10(c), permitting cable operators to ban offensive or indecent programming on public access channels, to be unconstitutional. Public access channels are already supervised by both private and public elements and have never been edited by cable operators in the past. Furthermore, a \"cable operator's veto\" is likely to ban many programs that should have been aired, and the volume of \"patently offensive\" programming on public access channels has never been so high as to warrant severe restrictions on its content. Finally, with respect to Section 10(b), the Court held that its \"segregate and block\" requirements for public access channels is also unconstitutional. Section 10(b), by enabling cable operators to take as many as 30 days to respond to a consumer's request to unlock their restricted channel, is overly restrictive. Also, by blocking out an entire channel, 10(b) does not permit viewers or operators to discern between offensive and \"patently offensive\" programming.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54462:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54463:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54463:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJason Richards and others, who are privately employed in Jefferson County, filed a state court class action suit claiming that the county's occupation tax violates the Federal and Alabama Constitutions. The Alabama trial court found that their state claims were barred by a prior adjudication, Bedingfield v. Jefferson County. The unsuccessful Bedingfield adjudication of the tax was brought by Birmingham's acting finance director and the city itself, consolidated with a suit by three county taxpayers. However, the court found that their federal claims had not been decided in that case. On appeal, the county argued that the federal claims were also barred. The State Supreme Court agreed, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata applied because Richard and others were adequately represented in the Bedingfield action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54463:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54463:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54463:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that because Richards and others received neither notice of, nor sufficient representation in, the Bedingfield litigation, that adjudication, as a matter of federal due process, may not bind them and thus cannot bar them from challenging an allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of their property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54463:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54465:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54465:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1990, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. made a tender offer for the common stock of MCA, Inc., a Delaware corporation, which resulted in Matsushita's acquisition of MCA. Subsequently, two lawsuits followed. First, a class action filed in Delaware, alleged that, among other things, Matsushita and MCA conspired violating Delaware law. The second suit, filed in federal court, alleged that Matsushita's tender offer violated certain Securities and Exchange Commission Rules promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts in such suits. After Matsushita won the federal case, and while it was on appeal, the parties to the state action reached a settlement. The class-action settlement stated that class members who did not opt out of the class would waive all claims in connection with the tender offer, including those asserted in the federal action. As members of both state and federal plaintiff classes, who neither opted out of the settlement class nor appeared to contest the settlement or the representation of the class, pursued the federal appeal, Matsushita argued that the Delaware judgment was a bar to further prosecution under the Full Faith and Credit Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54465:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54465:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54465:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, absent a partial repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Act by another federal statute, a federal court must give the judgment the same effect that it would have in the courts of the State in which it was rendered. Writing for the court, Justice Thomas said the federal Full Faith and Credit Act \"is generally applicable in cases in which the state-court judgment at issue incorporates a class-action settlement releasing claims solely within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.\" Justice John Paul Stevens penned an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, and was joined in part by Justice David H. Souter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54465:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54466:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54466:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nByron Keith Cooper was charged with the murder of an 86-year-old man in the course of a burglary. After an Oklahoma jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and recommended punishment by death, the trial court imposed the death penalty. Cooper's competence was considered on five separate occasions, whether he had the ability to understand the charges against him and to assist defense counsel. Oklahoma law presumes that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial unless he proves his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Despite Cooper's bizarre behavior and conflicting expert testimony, he was found competent on separate occasions before and during his trial. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Cooper's argument that the State's presumption of competence, combined with its clear and convincing evidence standard, placed such an onerous burden on him as to violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54466:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54466:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54466:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that because Oklahoma's procedural rule allows the State to try a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent, it violates due process. Justice Stevens wrote for the court that the stringent standard is \"incompatible with the dictates of due process,\" and that criminal defendants must be allowed to avoid trial if they prove incompetence by a \"preponderance of the evidence.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54466:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54467:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54467:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring 1987, Robert F. Lundy and his wife had $10,131 in federal income taxes withheld from their wages. This amount was substantially more than what the Lundys owed in taxes that year, but they did not file their 1987 tax return when it was due, nor did they file a return or claim a refund of the overpaid taxes in the following 2 1/2 years. In 1990, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed Lundy a notice of deficiency for 1987. Subsequently, the Lundys filed their joint 1987 tax return, which claimed a refund of their overpaid taxes. Lundy also filed a petition in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the claimed deficiency and a refund. The Commissioner contended that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund, arguing that if a taxpayer does not file a tax return before the IRS mails the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, the Tax Court can only award the taxpayer a refund of taxes paid within two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. The Tax Court agreed, finding also that 2-year \"look-back\" period applies. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the applicable look-back period in these circumstances is three years and that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to award a refund.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54467:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54467:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54467:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that in these circumstances a 2-year look-back period applies and the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award a refund. Finding that the Tax Court properly applied the 2-year look-back period to Lundy's case, Justice O'Connor noted that Lundy's taxes were withheld from his wages such that they were deemed paid on the date his 1987 tax return was due, which is more than two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. The Lundy was thus seeking a refund of taxes paid outside the applicable look-back period. Justices John Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas filed dissents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54467:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54468:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54468:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPaula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She alleged that while she was an Arkansas state employee, she suffered several \"abhorrent\" sexual advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton. Jones claimed that her continued rejection of Clinton's advances ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors. Following a District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to the suit be suspended, pending a ruling on his prior request to have the suit dismissed on grounds of presidential immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit against him. While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request, the judge ordered the stay of any trial in the matter until after Clinton's Presidency. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial but reversed the trial deferment ruling since it would be a \"functional equivalent\" to an unlawful grant of temporary presidential immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54468:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54468:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54468:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not grant a sitting President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual circumstances. After noting the great respect and dignity owed to the Executive office, the Court held that neither separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidential immunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government's branches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any control over one another. This, the Court added, is true despite the procedural burdens which Article III jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of the Chief Executive.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54468:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54470:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54470:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, Mississippi attempted to simplify voter registration in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). A \"Provisional Plan\" for registration replaced the \"Old System,\" mandating that, among other things, driver's license applications could double as voter registration forms for state and federal elections. As required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), the U.S. Attorney General pre-cleared the Provisional Plan, confirming that it did not discriminate against minority voters. Mississippi abandoned the pre-cleared Provisional Plan in favor of a composite \"New System,\" which used the Old System for state elections and both the Provisional Plan and Old System for federal elections. Mississippi assumed that the Attorney General's pre-clearance of the Provisional Plan extended to the New System. Thomas Young, a Mississippi citizen, filed suit against Governor Kirk Fordice, alleging a violation of the VRA. A three-judge District Court ruled in favor of Mississippi.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54470:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54470:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54470:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The unanimous Court reversed the District Court and ruled that Mississippi must submit the New System to the Attorney General for pre-clearance. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that \"the New System contains numerous examples of new, significantly different administrative practices [....]\" Therefore, the Attorney General must ensure that the proposed policy does not discriminate against minorities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54470:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54471:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54471:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBased on the 1990 census, the Florida Legislature adopted a reapportionment plan for State Senate and House districts. After the Justice Department refused to preclear the plan and it appeared as if the Governor, Senate President, and House Speaker would not convene a session, the Florida Supreme Court revised the redistricting plan itself. In 1995, C. Martin Lawyer, III, and other residents filed suit against state and federal parties, alleging that his district, Senate District 21, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District permitted the State Senate and House of Representatives to intervene and ultimately, all the parties, but Lawyer, agreed to a settlement that revised District 21 under a new plan. The District Court rejected Lawyer's argument that the court had to find the original reapportionment plan unconstitutional, because race seemingly determined District 21's contours, before the settlement could be approved. The court approved the settlement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54471:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54471:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54471:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by David H. Souter, the Court held that the State exercised the choice to which it was entitled under our cases, that Lawyer had no right to block the settlement, and that he failed to point out any unconstitutionality in the proposed plan. The Court found that Lawyer's agreement to the provisional settlement did not require the District Court to adjudicate the constitutionality of the plan before approving the settlement and that the court, in redrawing the district, did not subordinate Florida's traditional districting principles to race. Justice Souter wrote that \"the evidence amply supports the trial court's views that race did not predominate over Florida's traditional districting principles....[Lawyer] has provided nothing that calls that conclusion into question, much less that points to any clear error.\" Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54471:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54472:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54472:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPrior to 1989, Hong Kong automatically granted Vietnamese immigrants temporary refuge. Due to increasing immigration rates from Vietnam, Hong Kong revoked the privilege in 1989 and began requiring that Vietnamese immigrants prove refugee status or be \"screened-out\" (advised to leave Hong Kong).\nThe United States consulate continued to process visas for \"screened-out\" applicants until 1993, when the State Department specifically instructed the consulate to buttress Hong Kong's immigration policy by sending \"screened-out\" applicants back to Vietnam. Two applicants claimed that the department had violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by denying visas to a class of applicants on the basis of their nationality and place of residence (8 U.S.C. 1152(a)). A district court held that the case was moot and granted summary judgment to the State Department.\nLegal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc. (LAVAS) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which reversed the decision and mandated that the foreign consulate continue to process the visa applications. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court and consolidated with Le v. United States Dept. of State.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54472:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54472:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54472:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. Before the Supreme Court could decide the case, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRA), which clarified that no provision in the INA \"shall be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications or the locations where such applications will be processed.\" The Supreme Court, in a unanimous per curiam decision, instructed the District Court to reconsider the case in light of the IIRA's clarification.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54472:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54473:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54473:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program took effect whenever the state prisons became overcrowded and authorized the conditional release of prisoners before their sentences expired. The Pardon and Parole Board determined who could participate in it, and an inmate could be placed on preparole after serving 15% of his sentence. An inmate was eligible for parole only after one third of his sentence had elapsed, and the Governor, based on the Board's recommendation, decided to grant parole. Program participants and parolees were released subject to similar constraints. Upon reviewing Leroy L. Young's criminal record and prison conduct, the Board recommended him for parole and released him under the Program. At that time, he had served 15 years of a life sentence. After he spent five months outside the penitentiary, the Governor denied him parole, whereupon he was ordered to, and did, report back to prison. Despite his claim that his summary reincarceration deprived him of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was denied habeas relief by the state trial court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Federal District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that preparole was sufficiently like parole that a Program participant was entitled to procedural protections.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54473:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54473:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54473:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program, as it existed when Leroy L. Young was released, was equivalent to parole and therefore he was entitle to procedural due process safeguards.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54473:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54474:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54474:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter stopping Robinette for speeding, an Ohio deputy warned him, returned his license, and asked him if he had any illegal contraband, weapons, or drugs in his car. Robinette answered \"no\" but after agreeing to have his car searched, the officer found some marijuana and a pill that later proved to be a powerful drug. On appeal from the Ohio Court of Appeals' reversal of his lower court conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the Ohio Supreme Court Affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Ohio certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54474:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54474:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54474:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. After establishing its federal jurisdiction, despite a claim that the matter involved aspects of Ohio's Constitution, the Court held that when looking at the totality of the circumstances it may be reasonably concluded that if a defendant consents to be searched, even if not first advised that he is \"free to go,\" the ensuing search will be recognized as voluntary. The Court also added that Robinette's arrest on drug possession charges was lawful, even though the arresting officer did not stop him on an initial suspicion of drug possession nor intend to even issue him a speeding ticket.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54474:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54475:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54475:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIsaac Boggs married Sandra Boggs, the petitioner, after the death of Dorothy, his previous wife. When Isaac retired in 1985, he received various benefits from his employer's retirement plans, including a lump sum savings plan distribution, shares of stock from the company's employee stock ownership plan, and a monthly annuity payment. In 1989, following Issac's death a dispute over ownership of the benefits arose between Sandra and Issac's sons, Thomas F., Harry M., and David B. Boggs. The sons' claim is based on Dorothy's purported testamentary transfer to them, under Louisiana law, of a portion of her community property interest in Isaac's undistributed pension plan benefits. Sandra contested the validity of that transfer, arguing that the sons' claim is pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The Federal District Court disagreed and granted summary judgment against Sandra. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54475:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54475:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54475:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts state community-property law allowing a non-participant spouse to transfer by a testamentary instrument an interest in undistributed pension plan benefits. Justice Kennedy said \"ERISA's solicitude for the economic security of surviving spouses would be undermined\" by allowing a previous spouse's heirs to claim a share of such benefits.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54475:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54476:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54476:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1937, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) to promote fair pricing and uniform marketing conditions in the agriculture business. Exempted from antitrust laws, the AMAA mandated uniform prices, product standards, and other conditions; all of which had to be approved by at least two-thirds of the affected producers and implemented by producer committees appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The AMAA's administrative expenses were to be covered by assessments imposed on activities such as product advertising and promotion. After suffering adverse rulings at the administrative, District, and Circuit Court levels, a group of California tree fruit growers, handlers, and processors appealed their constitutional challenge of the AMAA to the Supreme Court - which granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54476:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54476:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54476:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Exempting its financial regulations from the heightened review standard appropriate in most First Amendment issues, the Court's 5-to-4 decision held that just because the AMAA's economic regulations may indirectly result in the reduction of the complaining parties' advertising budgets, they did not violate their free speech. The relevant assessments did not force the growers, handlers, or processors to repeat unsuccessful ads, to respond to negative ads when they preferred to remain silent, or to be publicly identified with messages other than their own. All the AMAA required of these parties were contributions for ad campaigns which were ultimately aimed at promoting their own welfare by encouraging customers to buy their products.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54476:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54479:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54479:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral individual members of the 104th Congress, who voted against the passage of the Line Item Veto Act (Act) giving the President authority to veto individual tax and spending measures after having signed them into law, sued to challenge the Act's constitutionality. After granting them standing, the District Court ruled in the congressmen's favor as it found the Act unconstitutional. Direct appeal was granted to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54479:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54479:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54479:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-to-2 decision, which avoided the question of the Act's constitutionality, the Court held that the individual congressmen lacked proper Article III standing to maintain their suit. The Court explained that the congressmen failed to show how the allegedly unconstitutional Act resulted in their personal injury, since it applied to the entire institution of Congress. Moreover, the congressmen based their claim on a loss of political power rather than a demonstration of how the Act violated one of their particularized legally protected interests. The Court concluded that, having failed to meet both of these standing requirements, the congressmen did not present the Court with a case-or-controversy over which it had jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54479:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54480:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54480:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJ. M. Martinac & Co. built the fishing vessel M/V Saratoga. Martinac installed a hydraulic system designed by Marco Seattle Inc. in the Saratoga. The initial user, Joseph Madruga, bought the ship new and added extra equipment. Madruga then sold the Saratoga to Saratoga Fishing Co., the subsequent user. Saratoga Fishing used the ship until it caught fire and sank. Saratoga Fishing then filed an admiralty tort suit against Martinac and Marco. Precedent stated that an admiralty tort plaintiff cannot recover damages for the physical damage that a defective product caused to the \"product itself,\" but can recover damages for physical damage that the product caused to \"other property.\" The District Court found that the hydraulic system had been defectively designed and awarded Saratoga Fishing damages, including damages for the loss of the equipment added by Madruga. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the added equipment was part of the ship when it was resold to Saratoga Fishing and, therefore, was part of the defective product that itself caused the harm.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54480:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54480:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54480:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a decision authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that equipment added by the initial user before he sold the ship to the subsequent user is \"other property,\" and as Justice Breyer wrote, \"[e]quipment added to a product after the manufacturer . . . has sold the product to an initial user is not part of the product that itself caused the physical harm.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54480:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54481:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54481:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard J. Homar, a tenured policeman for East Stroudsburg University (ESU), was arrested for possession of illegal drugs. ESU, a Pennsylvania state institution, immediately suspended him without pay until his culpability could be determined. State police dropped the charges but the suspension continued. At a later hearing ESU demoted Homar to groundskeeper, relying on his confession to police. Homar argued that ESU president James Gilbert had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the suspension. A district court granted summary judgment to ESU. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, holding that it was illegal to withhold pay without first providing a hearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54481:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54481:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54481:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled unanimously that a pre-suspension hearing is not necessary to protect the rights of a tenured employee who is suspended without pay. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia balanced three factors relevant to constitutional due process: 1) the weight of the private interest of the accused; 2) the chance of wrongfully depriving the private interest; and 3) the weight of the government's interest. The Court held that \"[s]o long as the suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt post suspension hearing, the lost income is relatively insubstantial.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54481:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54482:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54482:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1992, Charlie Frank Robertson filed a class action suit in an Alabama trial court, alleging that Liberty National Life Insurance Company had fraudulently encouraged its customers to exchange existing health insurance policies for new policies that, according to Robertson, provided less coverage for cancer treatment. The trial court appointed Robertson as class representative and certified the class pursuant to provisions of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure that do not give class members the right to exclude themselves from a class. The trial court then approved a settlement agreement that precluded class members from individually suing Liberty National for fraud based on its insurance policy exchange program. Guy E. Adams and other petitioners, who had objected to the settlement in the trial court, appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The court's opinion only addressed state law issues and did not answer whether the certification and settlement of this class action suit violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54482:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54482:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54482:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The Court noted that the Alabama Supreme Court did not expressly address the question on which certiorari was granted and that the petitioners had failed to establish that they had properly presented the issue to that court. Therefore, the Court concluded that it could not reach the question presented without unbalancing our dual system of government to \"disturb the finality of state judgments on a federal ground that the state court did not have occasion to consider.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54482:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54484:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54484:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nStanley B. McGill, whose estate is administrated by Marion Brockamp, paid the Internal Revenue Service money he did not owe. McGill, or his representative, submitted an administrative refund claim several years past the end of the applicable filing period set forth in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. McGill asked the court to extend the statutory period for an \"equitable\" reason, namely that he had a mental disability that caused the delay. Although such a reason is not mentioned in the Internal Revenue Code, the Court of Appeals read the statute as if it contained an implied \"equitable tolling\" exception, which the court found justified, and therefore permitted the actions to proceed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54484:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54484:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54484:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that Congress did not intend the \"equitable tolling\" doctrine to apply to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986's time limitations for filing tax refund claims. Justice Breyer wrote that allowing such exceptions to the filing deadline \"could create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54484:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54485:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54485:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required \"local chief law enforcement officers\" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54485:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54485:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54485:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54485:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54486:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54486:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt the penalty phase of Joseph Roger O'Dell's state trial on capital murder, rape, and sodomy charges, the government presented evidence that he had been convicted of numerous other offenses. The court, subsequently, denied O'Dell's request for a jury instruction that he was ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison. After the jury determined that O'Dell presented a future danger, he was sentenced to death. The District Court, in granting O'Dell habeas relief, found that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, which requires that a capital defendant be permitted to inform his sentencing jury that he is parole-ineligible if the prosecution argues his future dangerousness, was not a \"new rule\" and, thus, entitled O'Dell to resentencing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54486:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54486:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54486:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the rule was new, and that it could not be used to disturb O'Dell's death sentence, which had been final for six years when Simmons was decided. Justice Thomas reasoned that the rule was new within the meaning of Teague v Lane, 489 U.S. 288. Moreover, Justice Thomas wrote that the rule was not a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding, so as to fall within an exception to Teague, thus making it applicable to O'Dell. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, arguing that the rule was not new and, if it was, its importance to the accuracy and fairness of a capital sentencing proceeding placed it within an exception to Teague.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54486:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54487:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54487:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMaria Kelly F. Yniguez, an Arizona state employee, sued the state and various state officials alleging provisions of the state constitution, which declare English \"the official language of the State,\" and allow state residents and businesses to bring suit to enforce the article, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Yniguez used both English and Spanish in her work and feared that the article would require her to face discharge or other discipline if she did not refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the state. The District Court dismissed the case against the state because of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, but held the article on English unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals accepted the case after Yniguez resigned and ultimately affirmed the District Court's ruling that the article violated the Free Speech Clause and announced that Yniguez was entitled to damages from the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54487:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54487:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54487:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the dispute was moot due to the previous resignation of Yniguez. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the article.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54487:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54488:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54488:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter a Maryland state trooper stopped the speeding car in which he was riding, a nervous Wilson was ordered to step out. As he did, a quantity of cocaine fell on the ground. When arrested for possession with intent to distribute, Wilson challenged the manner in which the evidence against him was obtained. After the Baltimore County Circuit Court ruled to suppress the evidence against Wilson, Maryland appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals - which affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Maryland certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54488:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54488:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54488:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that after lawfully stopping a speeding vehicle, an officer may order its passengers to step out. While burdening their personal liberty somewhat, officers must be permitted such authority over passengers if the overriding government's interest in officer safety is to be protected.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54488:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54489:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54489:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Tax Injunction Act provides that federal \"district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.\" In Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Act does not limit the power of federal courts if the U.S. sues to protect itself or its instrumentalities from state taxation. Four Production Credit Associations (PCA's), federally chartered corporate financial institutions organized by farmers primarily to make loans to farmers, sued, seeing a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting Arkansas from levying sales and income taxes against them. The PCA's argued that they constituted instrumentalities of the U.S. and that they were not subject to the Act's provisions. The District Court granted the PCA's summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54489:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54489:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54489:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Production Credit Associations are not included within the judicial exception to the Act by virtue of their designation as instrumentalities of the United States alone. Therefore, the Court continued, PCA's may not sue in federal court for an injunction against state taxation without the United States as co-plaintiff. \"The Tax Injunction Act is grounded in the need of States to administer their fiscal affairs without undue interference from federal courts,\" wrote Justice Kennedy, \"[a]s all parties concede, respondents have a 'speedy, plain, and efficient remedy' in state court.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54489:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54490:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54490:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBecause Monterey County, California is a jurisdiction covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it must obtain federal preclearance of any voting practice different from its practices on November 1, 1968. Between 1972 and 1983, the County merged its nine separate and independent inferior court districts into a single, countywide municipal court served by judges whom County residents elected at large. In 1991, five Hispanic voters, who resided in the County, sued, alleging that the County had violated section 5 by failing to obtain federal preclearance of its judicial district consolidation ordinances. The County did not submit its ordinances after a three-judge District Court ruled against it. Rather, the County began to work with the voters to develop a new judicial election plan. Ultimately, the District Court ordered the County to conduct judicial elections under an at-large, countywide election plan.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54490:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54490:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54490:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the District Court had erred in ordering the county to conduct the election under a plan that had not received federal approval pursuant to section 5. The Court reasoned that the County had not discharged its obligation of gaining preclearance of its election plan prior to its enactment. On remand, the Court left it to the District Court to decide whether changes in California law transformed the County into a state plan, for which section 5 preclearance is not required.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54490:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54491:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54491:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCamps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. (Camps) operates a children's church camp in Maine and finances its operations through a $400 per camper weekly tuition charge. The majority of its campers are out of state children. Maine's tax scheme exempts charitable institutions incorporated in the state, and provides a more limited tax benefit for institutions which principally benefit non- Maine residents so long as their weekly service charge does not exceed $30 per person. Ineligible for any exemptions, Camps challenged the constitutionality of Maine's tax exemption statute. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari following a reversal of a favorable Superior Court ruling by the Supreme Court of Maine.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54491:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54491:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54491:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that Maine's tax exemption statute violated the dormant commerce clause since it selectively awarded greater tax benefits to those institutions which served mostly state residents, while penalizing institutions that conducted mostly interstate business. By imposing such selective benefits on a commercial activity in which it did not directly participate, the Court found Maine's governmental tax regulations to be an unconstitutional form of economic protectionism favoring local consumers and business providers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54491:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54492:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54492:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act required cable television systems to set aside some of their channels for local broadcast television. In 1994, the Supreme Court held that these must-carry provisions pass constitutional muster. (See Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, decided June 27, 1994). The Court then remanded the case to determine whether Congress had adequate factual support for its conclusion that the must-carry provision is necessary. A special three-judge district court held that there was sufficient evidence that the must-carry provision furthered important governmental objectives and that the provision was narrowly tailored to promote those interests. The broadcasters appealed directly to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54492:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54492:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54492:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Congress \"has an independent interest in preserving a multiplicity of broadcasters.\" The outcome supported Congress's right to judge what approach would best insure a competitive communications marketplace.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54492:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54493:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54493:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile testifying before a federal grand jury, which was investigating the disposition of proceeds from the alleged drug trafficking of her boyfriend Earl James Fields, Joyce B. Johnson testified that she had received a box of cash that she had used to fund home improvements. Subsequently, Johnson was indicted for perjury under federal law, which proscribes \"knowingly mak[ing] any false material declaration\" under oath before a grand jury. Johnson did not object when the District Court judge instructed the jury that materiality was a question for him to decide, and that he had determined that her statements were material. Afterwards, Johnson was convicted of perjury. However, before her appeal, the Supreme Court handed down a precedent that a jury, rather than a trial judge, must decide the materiality of a false statement. The Court of Appeals concluded the District Court judge had erred, but that any such error did not affect \"substantial rights\" because its independent review of the record showed that there was overwhelming evidence of materiality and that no reasonable juror could conclude that Johnson's false statements about the money's source were not material to the grand jury's investigation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54493:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54493:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54493:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William J. Rehnquist, the Court held that the trial court's action in this case was not \"plain error\" of the sort which an appellate court may notice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The Court reasoned that there was no basis, on the record, for concluding that the materiality error had seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, in that the evidence supporting materiality was overwhelming. \"No 'miscarriage of justice' will result here if we do not notice the error and we decline to do so,\" concluded Chief Justice Rehnquist.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54493:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54494:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54494:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVehicles driven by Gisela Fredericks and Lyle Stockert collided on a portion of a North Dakota state highway that runs through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. The stretch of highway within the reservation is open to the public, affords access to a federal water resource project, and is maintained by North Dakota under a federally granted right of way that lies on land held by the United States in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members. While neither driver was a member of the Tribes or an Indian, Fredericks filed a personal injury action in the Tribal Court of the Three Affliated Tribes against Stockert and A-1 Contractors, who owned the truck Stockert was driving at the time of the collision. The Tribal Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Fredericks' claim and therefore denied A-1 Contractors and Stockert's motion to dismiss. The Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals affirmed. A-1 contractors and Stockert then filed a action in the District Court against Fredericks, the Tribal Court, and Tribal Judge William Strate, seeking a declaratory judgment that, as a matter of federal law, the Tribal Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate Fredericks' claims. A-1 Contractors and Stockert also sought an injunction against further Tribal Court proceedings. The District Court dismissed. It held that that the Tribal Court had civil jurisdiction over Fredericks' complaint. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54494:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54494:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54494:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an unanimous decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that when an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by the State pursuant to a federally granted right of way over Indian reservation land, a civil action against allegedly negligent nonmembers falls within state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory governance; absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers driving on the State's highway, tribal courts may not exercise jurisdiction in such cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54494:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54495:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54495:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan then filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits because of his increased earnings. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA only authorizes disability award modifications if there has been a change in an employee's physical condition. Later the appellate court reversed another order discontinuing compensation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54495:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54495:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54495:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that nominal compensation is proper when there is a significant possibility that the worker's wage-earning capacity will fall below the level of his pre-injury wages sometime in the future. The Court reasoned that a worker is entitled to nominal compensation under the LHWCA when a work-related injury has not diminished the worker's present wage-earning capacity under current circumstances, but when there is a significant possibility that the injury will cause diminished capacity under future conditions. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54495:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54496:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54496:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBeginning in 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a series of statutes authorizing the award of early release credits to prison inmates when the state prison population exceeded predetermined levels. In 1986, Kenneth Lynce received a 22-year prison sentence on a charge of attempted murder. In 1992, he was released based on the determination that he had accumulated five different types of early release credits totaling 5,668 days, including 1,860 days of \"provisional credits\" awarded as a result of prison overcrowding. Lynce was re-arrested and returned to custody shortly thereafter when the attorney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroactively canceled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder and attempted murder. Lynce filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution. The District Court rejected Lynce's argument dismissing the petition on the ground that the sole purpose of these credits was to alleviate prison overcrowding. The Court of Appeals denied a certificate of probable cause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54496:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54496:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54496:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the 1992 statute canceling provisional release credits violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54496:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54497:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54497:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Minnesota law, candidates for political office are prohibited from appearing on more than one party's ballot. When the Twin Cities Area New Party, a chapter of the national New Party, nominated someone for state representative who was already another political party's candidate, Minnesota election officials declined its petition. When the New Party challenged Minnesota's election laws the District Court upheld their constitutionality, but was reversed by the state's Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54497:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54497:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54497:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In its 6-to-3 opinion, the majority weighed the character and magnitude of the burden imposed by anti-fusion laws on association rights against Minnesota's stated interest in the necessity of such laws. It upheld Minnesota's interest in ballot integrity and political stability. According to the Court, prohibiting political parties from naming another party's candidate as their own did not overly burden their association rights since they were still free to endorse the other party's candidate. The only thing they could not do was \"fuse\" another party's candidate to their own petitions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54497:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54498:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54498:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Papai was injured while painting the housing structure of the tug Pt. Barrow. The Pt. Barrow is operated by Harbor Tug & Barge Co., which hired Papai to do the work, which involved no sailing with the vessel. Papai had been employed by Harbor Tug on twelve previous occasions in the two months before his injury, receiving those jobs through the Inland Boatman's Union hiring hall, which had provided Papai with short term jobs with various vessels for about two years. Most of Papai's jobs were deckhand work, which Papai said involved manning the lines on and off board vessels while they dock or undock. Papai sued Harbor Tug, claiming negligence under the Jones Act, which serves to protect seamen or workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. The District Court granted Harbor Tug summary judgment upon finding that Papai did not enjoy seaman status under the Jones Act. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial Papai's seaman status and his corresponding Jones Act claim. The court concluded that the relevant inquiry was not whether Papai had a permanent connection with the vessel, but whether his relationship with a vessel or an identifiable group of vessels was substantial in duration and nature, and found that this required consideration of his employment's total circumstances. Moreover, the court determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that Papai satisfied this test, for if the type of work a maritime worker customarily performs would entitle him to seaman status if performed for a single employer, he should not be deprived of that status simply because the industry operates under a daily assignment, rather than a permanent employment system.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54498:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54498:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54498:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that John Papai's record would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude that he is a Jones Act seaman. Jones Act coverage is confined to seamen, those workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. Justice Kennedy wrote, \"[a]n important part of the test for determining who is a seaman is whether the injured worker has a substantial connection to a vessel or to a fleet of vessels, and the latter concept requires a requisite degree of common ownership or control.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54498:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54499:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54499:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nYueh-Shaio Yang and his wife, former Taiwan residents, executed elaborate fraudulent schemes to gain entry to the United States and, later, to obtain Yang's citizenship. While Yang's naturalization application was pending, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) learned of his unlawful entry and issued an order to show cause why he should not be deported at the time of entry. Yang conceded that he was deportable and filed a request for a waiver of deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act with the Attorney General. An Immigration Judge denied Yang's request. In affirming, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that Yang was statutorily eligible for a waiver, but denied it as a matter of discretion. In vacating, the Court of Appeals held that the Board had abused its discretion by considering the adverse factors of Yang's participation in his wife's fraudulent entry and, secondly, his fraudulent naturalization application. The court reasoned that Yang's actions in his wife's fraudulent entry were \"inextricably intertwined\" with his own efforts to secure entry and must be considered part of the initial fraud, while his application must be considered an \"extension\" of that initial fraud.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54499:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54499:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54499:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that in deciding whether to grant a waiver under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General or her delegate, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, may take into account acts of fraud committed by the alien in connection to his entry into the United States. Justice Scalia wrote, the Act \"imposes no limitations on the factors that the INS may consider in determining who, among the class of eligible aliens, should be granted relief.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54499:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54501:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54501:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing a suit by Georgia residents challenging the constitutionality of a legislative redistricting plan (Miller v. Johnson, 515 US 900), and seeking an injunction against its further use, a District Court found the plan unconstitutional. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed - holding that race was a predominant factor in the plan's creation - and remanded it for redrafting. Shortly thereafter the composition of another of the plan's districts was challenged in a District Court which, after unsuccessfully deferring the matter to Georgia's Legislature for redrafting, drew its own plan creating one black-majority district in place of the proposed three. After the 1996 elections were held under the court's new plan, Abrams and several other voters challenged its constitutionality. Again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54501:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54501:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54501:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, in a five-to-four decision. First, the Court held that in re-drafting the plans, the District Court had no obligation to preserve all three of the old plan's black-majority districts, if this would result in racial gerrymandering. Second, the Court supported the District Court's decision not to preserve two black-majority districts as it held that the area's black population was not sufficiently compact to sustain such a plan. Third, the Court ruled that the plan's creation of only one black-majority district would not violate the 1965 Voting Rights Act by causing a retrogression in the political position of Abrams and his fellow plaintiffs. The Court, in addition to noting Abrams' failure to meet his retrogression claim's population density requirement, found that in the last election, held under the challenged plan, all three black incumbents won re-election, two of whom while running against white candidates from white-majority districts. Finally, the Court concluded that the District Court's redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution's guarantee of \"one person, one vote.\" In addition to finding that the plan's overall and average population deviations were acceptable, the Court held that even if these deviations were slightly \"off\" they must be tolerated given their six year tenure in an area which has seen significant population shifts. Accordingly, any minor errors would be best corrected by the next census rather than by judicial intervention.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54501:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54502:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54502:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAaron Lindh was convicted on multiple charges of murder and attempted murder in Wisconsin. Arguing that the Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial court barred him from questioning the motives of the State's psychiatrist, Lindh was denied relief on direct appeal. Lindh's subsequent federal habeas corpus application was also denied. After Lindh appealed again, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 amended the federal habeas statute. Following an en banc rehearing to consider the Act's impact, the Court of Appeals held that applying the new version of the law to pending cases would not have a retroactive effect because it would not attach new legal consequences to events preceding the Act's enactment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54502:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54502:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54502:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the 1996 version of the federal habeas statute, as to standards affecting the entitlement of state prisoners to federal habeas corpus relief, does not to apply to non-capital habeas corpus cases that were pending when the Act was enacted. The Court reasoned that the statute's retroactive application was improper because new legal consequences attached. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54502:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54504:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54504:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe volume and complexity of asbestos litigation led the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation to transfer all asbestos claims filed in federal courts, but not yet on trial, to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After this consolidation, counsel for the plaintiffs and the defendant manufacturers reached a partial global settlement: a class consisting of all individuals with potential asbestos claims who had not yet filed lawsuits would be certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(3) (FRCP) for purposes of settlement only. The proposed settlement created an administrative structure which provided set compensation for certain asbestos-related diseases. The District Court approved the plan, and certified the proposed class. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the lower court's order, finding that the requirements of class certification had not been met. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that while a class may be certified for the sole purpose of settlement, the certification requirements of FRCP 23 must still be met as though the case were going to trial. In this instance, the class failed to demonstrate that common issues predominated over other questions, FRCP 23(b)(3), or that the named plaintiffs would \"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54504:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54504:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54504:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, but a limited one. While the court of appeals had erred by stating that settlement was not relevant to class certification determinations, the lower court had, in fact, closely examined the terms of the settlement, and remand was therefore not merited. A court considering a class for settlement need not consider whether certification would present intractable management problems at the trial stage, but the remaining requirements of FRCP 23 must be met. Here those requirements were not fulfilled. First, despite the over-arching issue of asbestos-related health problems, common issues did not predominate given the very different injuries suffered by the plaintiffs, and the fact that some class members had not yet manifested physical disease. FRCP 23(b)(3). Second, the named parties would not adequately represent the class because those currently injured had interests distinct from those who had been exposed to asbestos but had not yet exhibited any physical symptoms. FRCP 23(a)(4). In resolving the case the Court declined to reach the issue of whether the settlement proceeding was a justiciable case or controversy under Article III because, it held, determination of class certification was logically antecedent to these issues.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54504:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54505:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54505:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJill Brown brought a damages action against Bryan County alleging that that its Deputy Stacy Burns had arrested her with excessive force, and that it was liable for her injuries because its Sheriff B. J. Moore had hired Burns without adequately reviewing his background. Burns had pleaded guilty to various driving infractions and other misdemeanors, including assault and battery. Moore, whom the county stipulated was its Sheriff's Department policymaker, testified that he had obtained Burns' driving and criminal records, but had not closely reviewed either before hiring Burns. The District Court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law, which asserted that a policymaker's single hiring decision could not give rise to municipal liability. Brown prevailed following a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the county was properly found liable based on Moore's decision to hire Burns.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54505:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54505:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54505:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that municipalities are not liable for hiring employees who violate someone's rights unless a reasonable policymaker would conclude that the \"plainly obvious consequence . . . would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected rights. Thus, the county was not financially liable for Sheriff Moore's isolated decision to hire Burns without adequate screening because Brown had not proved that the decision reflected a conscious disregard for a risk that Burns would use excessive force in violation of her federally protected rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54505:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54506:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54506:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles T. Robinson, Sr., was fired by Shell Oil Co. Thereafter, Robinson filed an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While that charge was pending, Robinson applied for a job with another company, which contacted Shell for an employment reference. Robinson, claiming that Shell gave him a negative reference in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC charge, then filed suit under Title VII, which makes it unlawful \"for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment\" who have availed themselves of Title VII's protections. The District Court dismissed the suit. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the term \"employees\" in Title VII refers only to current employees and therefore petitioner's claim was not justicible under Title VII.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54506:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54506:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54506:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that because the term \"employees,\" as used Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes former employees, Robinson may sue Shell for its allegedly retaliatory post-employment actions. Justice Thomas wrote for the court that barring such protection to former employees, while current employees have it, \"would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring . . . claims\" under Title VII.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54506:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54508:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54508:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder a Georgia statute, all candidates for elected state office must pass a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to their qualifying for nomination or election. Chandler, on behalf of several state office nominees from the Libertarian Party, challenged the statute's constitutionality, naming Georgia's governor and two other regulatory officials as defendants. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54508:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54508:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54508:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-to-1 opinion, the Court noted that while the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits officials from conducting search and seizures without individualized suspicion, there does exist a narrowly defined category of permissible suspicionless searches and seizures. The Court held, however, that Georgia's statute did not fall in this exceptional category, since it failed to show why its desire to avoid drug users in its high political offices should outweigh candidates' privacy interests. In addition to Georgia's failure to provide evidence of a drug problem among its state officials, the Court concluded that even if such a problem did exist, the affected officials would most likely not perform the kind of high-risk, safety sensitive tasks, which might justify the statute's proposed incursion on their individual privacy rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54508:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54509:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54509:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, formerly the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, hears appeals from the decisions of courts martial, and its decisions are subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals' judges may be officers or civilians. During the time in dispute, two civilian members sat on the court. The General Counsel of the Department of Transportation originally assigned both civilian judges to the court. Afterwards the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum adopting the General Counsel's assignments as appointments of his own. Jon E. Edmond and others were convicted while one or both civilian judges participated on the court. Subsequently, their convictions were upheld on appeal. Edmond and others argued that the civilian judges' appointments were invalid due to the Appointments Clause, which holds \"principle officers\" must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54509:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54509:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54509:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the judicial appointments were valid. The Court unanimously found that Congress has authorized the Secretary to appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the Court also reasoned that the Secretary's 1993 appointments of the two civilian judges in question were valid under the Appointments Clause, since such judges were inferior officers within the clause's meaning, by reason of the supervision of the judges' work by the General Counsel and by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Justice Scalia noted that the Appointments Clause gives the President the exclusive power to select principal officers by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, but authorizes Congress to \"vest the Appointment of...inferior Officers...in the Heads of Departments.\" Justice David H. Souter filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54509:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54510:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54510:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of \"obscene or indecent\" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes \"sexual or excretory activities or organs\" in a manner deemed \"offensive\" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54510:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54510:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54510:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to clearly define \"indecent\" communications, limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of \"offensive\" material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since the First Amendment distinguishes between \"indecent\" and \"obscene\" sexual expressions, protecting only the former, the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words \"or indecent\" from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.\nJustice Sandra Day O'Connor authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Justice O'Connor would invalidate the provisions only to the extent that they fail to adhere to the Court's principle that zoning restrictions may be valid if they do not unduly limit adult access to the material.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54510:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54511:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54511:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice in Madison, Wisconsin, suspected Steiney Richards of drug possession, but failed to receive a magistrate's authorization for a \"no-knock\" entry into his hotel room. Instead, they obtained a conventional search warrant requiring them to knock on Richards' door and identify themselves as officers prior to resorting to forcible entry. After arriving on the scene, an officer knocked on Richards' door identifying himself as a hotel custodian. When Richards opened the door, he saw a uniformed officer and quickly slammed it shut. The officers broke through the door, grabbed Richards while trying to escape, and found cocaine and cash in his bathroom. At trial, Richards challenged the constitutionality of the officer's search but was denied. On appeal, Wisconsin's Supreme Court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54511:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54511:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54511:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. After noting the general importance of following conventional \"knock-and-announce\" procedures, the Court held that in those circumstances when police have good reason to suspect that announcing their presence and intentions may be dangerous, futile, or result in the destruction of evidence, a \"no-knock\" entry is justified. The Court added that by immediately closing the door after witnessing the officers outside it, Richards gave police sufficient justification for breaking into his room - especially considering the disposable nature of the substances they were seeking.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54511:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54512:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54512:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMiguel Gonzales, Orlenis Hernandez Diaz, and Mario Perez were convicted in New Mexico state court on charges arising from their use of guns to holdup undercover officers during a drug sting. After they began to serve their state sentences, they were convicted by a District Court on federal drug and firearm charges related to the sting. Federal law requires a five-year prison sentence for carrying a gun while committing a crime. A Court of Appeals vacated the additional firearms sentences on the ground that they should have run concurrently with the state prison terms.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54512:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54512:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54512:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-to-2 decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court announced \"[t]he plain language of (the law) forbids a district court to direct that a term of imprisonment under the statute run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, whether state or federal.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54512:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54514:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54514:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen the Fish and Wildlife Service was notified that the operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project might affect two endangered species of fish, it concluded that the proposed long-term operation of the project was likely to jeopardize the species and decided to maintain minimum levels of water in certain reservoirs. The petitioners, irrigation districts receiving project water and operators of ranches in those districts, filed suit against the Service's director, regional directors, and the Secretary, claiming the determination and imposition of minimum water levels violated the Endangered Species Act's requirement that the designated area's economic impact be considered. The District Court dismissed the compliant because it lacked standing; economic interests were not enough to constitute a lawsuit in this matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54514:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54514:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54514:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In the unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the petitioners had standing to ask for judicial review of the minimum water level setting under the Endangered Species Act. The Act explicitly allows \"any person\" to sue the government over an alleged violation. Justice Scalia asserted this applies to the Secretary's actions over enforcement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54514:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54515:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54515:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Bossier Parrish School Board is subject to the preclearance requirements of ?5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Therefore, the Board must obtain the approval of either the Attorney General or the District Court before implementing any changes to a voting \"qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.\" Based on the 1990 census, the Board redrew its 12 single member districts, adopting the redistricting plan that the Attorney General had precleared for use in elections of the parish's governing body. The Board rejected a plan proposed by the NAACP, which would have created two majority black districts. The Attorney General then objected to the preclearance, finding that the NAACP plan demonstrated that black residents were sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority in two districts and that the Board's plan unnecessarily limited the opportunity for minority voters to elect their candidates of choice, thereby diluting their voting strength in violation of ?2 of the Act. Subsequently, the Attorney General withheld preclearance to prevent a violation of ?2 of the Act. The Board filed an action with the District Court. A three-judge panel granted the Board's preclearance request. The court rejected the contentions that a voting change's failure to satisfy ?2 of the Act constituted an independent reason to deny preclearance under ?5 and that a court must consider evidence of a ?2 violation as evidence of a discriminatory purpose under ?5.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54515:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54515:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54515:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Conner, the Court ruled that preclearance under ?5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 may not be denied solely on the basis that a covered jurisdiction's new voting \"standard, practice, or procedure\" violates ? 2 of the Act. Additionally, evidence showing that a jurisdiction's redistricting plan dilutes minorities' voting power may be relevant to establish a jurisdiction's \"intent to retrogress\" under ?5 of the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54515:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54516:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54516:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n28 USC section 994(h) directs the United States Sentencing Commission to \"assure\" that its Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence \"at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of\" adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. Initially, the Guidelines failed to delineate whether the basic statutory maximum persons convicted of a particular offense or the enhanced penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense should be applied. After the District Court used and the Court of Appeals affirmed the enhanced sentence for sentencing George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer, who qualified as career criminals, the Commission adopted Amendment 506, which precludes the consideration of statutory sentence enhancements. When the District Court split over whether reduce LaBonte, Hunnewell, and Dyer's sentences, the Court of Appeals found that Amendment 506 was a reasonable implementation of section 994(h)'s directive.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54516:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54516:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54516:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Commission's interpretation was inconsistent with section 994(h)'s plain language, and therefore \"maximum term authorized\" must be read to include all applicable statutory sentencing enhancements. \"Congress surely did not establish enhanced penalties for repeat offenders only to have the Commission render them a virtual nullity,\" wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Stephen G. Breyer in a dissent, in which Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, argued that the words \"maximum term authorized\" in section 994(h) were ambiguous, thus the Court should defer to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54516:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54517:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54517:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe executors of Otis C. Hubert's substantial estate filed a federal estate tax return about a year after his death. Subsequently, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, claiming underreporting of federal estate tax liability caused by the estate's asserted entitlement to marital and charitable deductions. While the estate's redetermination petition was pending in the Tax Court, the interested parties settled on the use of the estate's assets. The agreement divided the estate's principal, assumed to be worth $26 million, equally between marital trusts and a charitable trust. It also provided that the estate would pay its administration expenses either from the principal or the income of the assets. The estate paid about $500,000 of its nearly $2 million of administration expenses from principal and the rest from income. It then recalculated its tax liability, reducing the marital and charitable deductions by the amount of principal, but not the amount of income, used to pay the expenses. The Commissioner concluded that using income for expenses required a dollar for dollar reduction of the deductions. The Tax Court disagreed, finding that no reduction was required by reason of the executors' power, or the exercise of their power, to pay administration expenses from income. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54517:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54517:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54517:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court ruled that a taxpayer does not have to reduce the estate tax deduction for marital or charitable bequests by the amount of the administration expenses that were paid from income generated during administration by assets allocated to those bequests. \"When income is used . . . to pay administration expenses, this does not require the estate tax deductions be diminished,\" wrote Justice Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54517:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54519:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54519:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarvin Klehr purchased inadequate cattle feed containers from A. O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. (Harvestore) in 1974. Over a long period of time, the containers damaged Klehr's cattle feed. In 1993, Klehr filed a civil claim against Harvestore under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO). The District Court dismissed Klehr's suit, ruling that the four-year time limit for bringing a civil RICO suit had expired. Klehr claimed that he was not at fault for failing to discover the injury within four years, because Harvestore purposely designed the containers to conceal their inadequacy.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court. The Eighth Circuit held that Klehr should have discovered the pattern of racketeering activity much earlier. Since the statute of limitations began from the time Klehr could reasonably be expected to have discovered the pattern, Klehr was out of time. The Eighth Circuit's \"pattern of activity\" rule contradicted the Third Circuit's \"last predicate act\" rule, which allows a plaintiff to recover damages accumulated since the first injury as long as the last RICO violation (\"last predicate act\") happened within four years of the lawsuit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54519:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54519:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54519:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and No. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. The \"last predicate rule...lengthens the limitations period dramatically\" and thereby contradicts Congress's intention of ensuring a time limit for civil RICO claims. Also, \"the plaintiff cannot use an independent, new act as a bootstrap to recover for injuries caused by other predicate acts that took place outside the limitations period.\"\nRICO intends \"not only to compensate victims but also to encourage those victims diligently to investigate and thereby to uncover unlawful activity.\" To demonstrate \"fraudulent concealment\", a plaintiff must have failed to discover injuries inflicted upon him after acting with \"reasonable diligence\" to discover the source and pattern of the injuries.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54519:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54520:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54520:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDr. Harold Glucksberg -- along with four other physicians, three terminally ill patients who have since died, and a nonprofit organization that counsels individuals contemplating physician assisted-suicide -- brought this suit challenging the state of Washington's ban on physician assisted-suicide. The State of Washington has historically criminalized the promotion of suicide attempts by those who \"knowingly cause or aid another person to attempt suicide.\" Glucksberg alleged that Washington's ban was unconstitutional. Following a District Court ruling favoring Glucksberg and his fellow petitioners, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted Washington certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54520:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54520:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54520:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Analyzing the guarantees of the Due Process Clause, the Court focused on two primary aspects: the protection of our nation's objective fundamental, historically rooted, rights and liberties; and the cautious definition of what constitutes a due process liberty interest. The Court held that the right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause since its practice has been, and continues to be, offensive to our national traditions and practices. Moreover, employing a rationality test, the Court held that Washington's ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting medical ethics, shielding disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice which might encourage them to end their lives, and, above all, the preservation of human life.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54520:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54521:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54521:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), when they denied him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the Archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a district court's finding against Archbishop Flores, the Court granted Boerne's petition for certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54521:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54521:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54521:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993 exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy explained that RFRA imposed an overly strict standard—requiring laws to serve a \"compelling government interest\" and be the \"least restrictive means\" of furthering that interest—for evaluating laws that burdened religious exercise. That standard was inconsistent with the Court's precedent regarding the proper balance between religious freedom and governmental interests. While Congress may remedy and prevent constitutional violations, it cannot redefine the scope of constitutional rights or their limitations under the guise of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.\nThe Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving individuals of \"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law\" or denying them \"equal protection of the laws.\" Section 5 grants Congress the power to enforce these provisions through \"appropriate legislation.\" Notably, Section 5 does not give Congress the authority to create new constitutional rights or change the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees. Rather, it allows Congress to enact laws that remedy or prevent constitutional violations.\nTo be a valid exercise of Section 5 power, a law must be \"congruent and proportional\" to the constitutional injury it seeks to address. RFRA failed this test because it was not tailored to address any specific unconstitutional conduct by the states. Instead, RFRA broadly prohibited state laws that substantially burdened religious exercise, even if those laws were neutral and generally applicable. Thus, this broad prohibition was out of proportion to the relatively rare constitutional violations Congress had identified in the legislative record. This holding reaffirmed the Court's role as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and placed important limits on Congress's power to regulate the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54521:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54523:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54523:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKristine L. Fankell filed an action for damages in Idaho State Court, alleging that the termination of her state employment by Marian Johnson, and other officials of the Idaho Liquor Dispensary, deprived her of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court dismissed Johnson and others' motion to dismiss, which asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed their appeal from that ruling, explaining that the denial was neither an appealable final order under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) nor appealable as a matter of federal right.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54523:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54523:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54523:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In unanimous opinion delivered by John Paul Stevens, the Court held that defendants in a state-court section 1983 action do not have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. The Court reasoned that in construing state rules allowing appeals from final judgments, state courts did not need to accept the federal definition of a \"final decision\" within the meaning of federal law. The right to an interlocutory appeal of a denial of immunity \"is a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a non-federal forum,\" Justice Stevens wrote for the court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54523:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54524:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54524:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York's Health Facility Assessment (HFA) imposes a tax on gross receipts for patient services at diagnostic and treatment centers. The NYSA ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, which administers a plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), owns and operates New York treatment centers for longshore workers, retirees and their dependents. The Fund's trustees discontinued paying the New York tax and filed to enjoin the state from making future assessments and to obtain a refund. Lawyers for the Fund alleged that the HFA is preempted by the ERISA, as it applies to hospitals run by it. The District Court ruled that the HFA is not preempted because it is a tax of general application having only an incidental impact on benefit plans. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the HFA directly reduces the amount of Fund assets that would otherwise be available to provide plan members with benefits, and could cause the plan to limit its benefits or to charge plan members higher fees; therefore, the HFA was preempted by the ERISA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54524:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54524:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54524:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not preclude New York from imposing a gross receipts tax on ERISA funded medical centers. Justice Stevens wrote, \"Any state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees\" will affect the benefit plan, \"but that simply cannot mean that every state law with such an effect is pre-empted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54524:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54525:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54525:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA late nineteenth century congressional Indian land program resulted in the extreme fractionation of Indian lands as allottees passed their undivided interests on to multiple heirs. In 1983, Congress adopted the Indian Land Consolidation Act to reduce the fractionated ownership of allotted lands. Section 207 of the Act--the \"escheat\" provision--prohibited the descent of fractional interests that constituted 2 percent or less of the total acreage in an allotted tract and earned less than $100 in the preceding year. The interests described in Section 207 would escheat to the tribe, thereby consolidating the ownership of Indian lands. Section 207 made no provision for the payment of compensation to those who held such fractional interests. The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the original version of Section 207 on the ground that it was a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Congress then amended Section 207. which looks back five years instead of one year to determine the income produced from a small interest. The will of William Youpee, an enrolled member of the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes, devised to the respondents, all of them enrolled tribal members, his several undivided interests in allotted lands on reservations. An administrative law judge found that interests devised to each of the respondents fell within amended Section 207 and should therefore escheat to the relevant tribal governments. The respondents, asserting the unconstitutionality of amended Section 207, appealed the order to the Board of Indian Appeals, which dismissed the appeal. The respondents then filed a suit against the Secretary of the Interior, alleging that amended Section 207 violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court agreed with respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54525:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54525:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54525:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Court ruled that the amended Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act does not cure the constitutional deficiency The Court identified in the original version of Section 207, which amounted to a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg wrote Section 207 is unconstitutional because it \"severely restricts the right of an individual to direct the descent of his property.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54525:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54526:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54526:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe State of Ohio imposes general sales and use taxes on natural gas purchases from all sellers, whether in-state or out-of-state, that do not meet its statutory definition of a \"natural gas company.\" Ohio's state-regulated natural gas utilities, known as local distribution companies or LDC's, satisfy the definition. Other producers and independent marketers, according to the State Supreme Court, generally do not. During the period in question, General Motors Corporation (GMC) bought virtually all the gas for its plants from out-of-state independent marketers, rather than from LDC's, making it subject to the Ohio tax. In front of the State Supreme Court, GMC argued that denying a tax exemption to sales by marketers but not LDC's violates the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. After an initial conclusion, the court held that GMC lacked standing to bring a Commerce Clause challenge. The court then dismissed the equal protection claim as buried in GMC's Commerce Clause argument.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54526:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54526:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54526:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Ohio's differential tax treatment of natural gas sales by public utilities and independent marketers violated neither the Commerce Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause. After concluding that GMC had standing to raise a Commerce Clause challenge, Justice Souter wrote for the Court, \"we conclude that Ohio's regulatory response to the needs of the local natural gas market has resulted in a noncompetitive bundled gas product that distinguishes its regulated sellers from independent marketers to the point that the enterprises should not be considered 'similarly situated' for purposes of a claim of facial discrimination under the Commerce Clause. GMC's argument that the State discriminates between regulated local gas utilities and unregulated marketers must therefore fail.\" Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54526:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54527:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54527:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) brought an action against William C. Dunn and Delta Consultants, Inc. claiming that they had solicited investments in and operated a fraudulent scheme involving transactions in foreign currency options in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and CFTC regulations. Dunn and Delta Consultants allegedly engaged in the transactions by contracting directly with international banks, rather than using a regulated exchange or board of trade. This is known as \"off exchange\" trading. Dunn, Delta Consultants, and their customers suffered heavy losses. The District Court appointed a temporary receiver to take control of Dunn and Delta Consultants' property. The court rejecting their defense that the transactions were exempt from the CEA under the \"Treasury Amendment,\" which excepts \"transactions in foreign currency\" unless they involve a sale \"for future delivery\" \"conducted on a board of trade.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54527:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54527:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54527:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, The Court ruled that the \"Treasury Amendment\" of the Commodity Exchange Act exempts from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulation off exchange trading in foreign currency options. \"The arguments favoring each side in the important public policy dispute over whether off exchange foreign currency options should be exempt from CEA regulation are best addressed to the Congress, not the Courts,\" wrote Justice Stevens.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54527:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54528:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54528:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCalifornia requires public works project contractors to pay its workers the prevailing wage in the project's locale, but allows payment of a lower wage to participants in state approved apprenticeship programs. Dillingham Construction subcontracted some of the work on its state contract to respondent Arceo, doing business as Sound Systems Media (SSM). SSM entered a collective bargaining agreement with Dillingham that included an apprenticeship wage scale and provided for affiliation with an apprenticeship committee that ran an unapproved program. SSM used that committee for its apprentices, to whom it paid the apprentice wage. The California Division of Apprenticeship Standards (the Division) issued a notice of noncompliance to both Dillingham and SSM, charging that paying the apprentice wage, rather than the prevailing journeyman wage, to apprentices from an unapproved program violated the state's prevailing wage law. Dillingham sued to prevent the Division from interfering with payment under the subcontract. Dillingham alleged that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted enforcement of the state law. The District Court ruled in favor of the Division. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship program was an \"employee welfare benefit plan\" under the ERISA, and that the state law \"relate[d] to\" the plan and was therefore superseded by it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54528:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54528:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54528:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that California's prevailing wage law does not \"relate to\" employee benefit plans, and thus is not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54528:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54529:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54529:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRonnie Lee McKnight, a prisoner at Tennessee's South Central Correctional Center (SCCC), filed suit, under 42 USC section 1983, against two prison guards after he was placed in extremely tight physical restraints. Previously, the SCCC's management had been privatized by the State. Ultimately, the prison guards, Darryl Richardson and John Walker, asserted a qualified immunity and moved to dismiss the action. The District Court denied the motion, finding that, since a private prison management firm employed them, they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54529:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54529:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54529:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that prison guards employed by a private firm are not entitled to a qualified immunity from suit by prisoners charging a section 1983 violation. Emphasizing that a private firm was systematically organized to manage the prison, Justice Breyer wrote that, \"[o]ur examination of history and purpose...reveals nothing special enough about the job or about its organizational structure that would warrant providing these private prison guards with a governmental immunity.\" Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the Court had routinely determined section 1983 immunity on the basis of the public function being performed. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined Justice Scalia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54529:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54530:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54530:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Buckley was exposed to insulation dust containing asbestos while employed as a pipefitter by Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. Buckley feared he would develop cancer, of which periodic medical check ups have revealed no evidence of an asbestos related disease. Buckley filed suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which permits a railroad worker to recover for an \"injury . . . resulting from\" his employer's \"negligence.\" He sought damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress and to cover the cost of future check ups. The District Court dismissed Buckley's case because since there had been no \"physical impact\" from his exposure, the FELA did not permit recovery for his emotional injury. Buckley's medical monitoring claim was not discussed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that that his contact with the insulation dust was considered a physical impact that, when present, permits a FELA plaintiff to recover for accompanying emotional distress. Furthermore, Buckley could recover the costs of check ups made necessary by the exposure.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54530:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54530:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54530:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court ruled that railroad workers cannot invoke the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sue their employers for emotional distress due to asbestos, or some other disease-causing carcinogen, exposure unless, and until, they manifest symptoms of a disease. Furthermore, workers are not legally entitled to recover medical monitoring costs insofar as they are contingent upon an underlying injury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54530:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54531:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54531:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEmployees of Santa Fe Terminal Services, Inc. (SFTS), a wholly owned subsidiary of The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. (ATSF), were entitled to pension, health and welfare benefits under the terms of their collective bargaining agreements. These benefit plans were subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In 1990, ATSF awarded the work performed by SFTS to In Terminal Services (ITS), and terminated those SFTS employees unwilling to continue work with ITS. The benefit plan offered by ITS was less favorable than the SFTS plan, and SFTS employees brought suit under, alleging that they had been discharged \"for the purpose of interfering with the attainment\" of rights to which they would have \"become entitled under [their SFTS] plan.\" ERISA Section 510. After the District Court dismissed the Section 510 claims, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated the employees' pension claims because Section 510 prevented interference with vested rights, but dismissed the employees' welfare benefit claims because such benefits did not vest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54531:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54531:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54531:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The plain language of Section 510 indicates that the applicability of its interference clause is not limited to vested rights. Congress used the word \"plan\" to refer to both pension and welfare benefits, and at the same time indicated that welfare plans are exempt from ERISA's stringent vesting requirements. This statutory language forecloses the possibility that Congress meant to limit the protections of Section 510 to vested rights. The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for determination of whether the fact that the SFTS employees were eligible for welfare benefits meant that they had already \"attained\" such rights, so that any subsequent actions taken by SFTS could not \"interfere\" with the \"attainment of . . . right[s] . . . under the plan.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54531:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54532:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54532:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Doe sued the University of California alleging that it had agreed to employ him at a laboratory it operated pursuant to a contract with the federal Department of Energy (DOE), and that it had wrongfully breached its agreement upon determining that he could not obtain a required security clearance. The university argued that it was immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Mr. Doe asserted that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to the case because any damages awarded would be paid by the DOE. The District Court held that the university was an arm of the state and therefore the Eleventh Amendment prohibited Mr. Doe from maintaining his breach-of-contract claim in federal court. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision citing the university's agreement with the DOE, under which the department was liable for any judgments rendered against the university, not the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54532:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54532:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54532:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that the California university could not be sued by Doe regardless of his claim that the job offer was illegally withdrawn and despite the fact the federal government would be responsible for the judgment. Stevens declared that the Eleventh Amendment shields the state from \"the risk of adverse judgments even though the state may be indemnified by a third party.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54532:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54533:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54533:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid W. Lanier was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while he served as a state judge. The jury had been instructed that the Government had to prove, as an element of the offense, that Lanier had deprived the victims of their Fourteenth Amendment due process right to liberty, which included the right to be free from sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. The District Court denied Lanier's motion, which sought to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the law is void for vagueness. The en banc Court of Appeals vacated Lanier's convictions for \"lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage.\" The Court of Appeals held that the law may be imposed only if the constitutional right, said to have been violated, is first identified in a decision of the U.S Supreme Court, and only when the right has been held to apply in a factual situation \"fundamentally similar.\" The court regarded these combined requirements as substantially higher than the \"clearly established\" standard used to judge qualified immunity in civil cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54533:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54533:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54533:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the standard of notice that the Court of Appeals employed was higher than the Constitution requires and too demanding. Justice Souter wrote that the Court of Appeals mistakenly concluded that it takes a Supreme Court decision in a \"fundamentally similar\" case to make a constitutional right specific enough that its violation can be prosecuted. Law makes it a crime to deprive anyone of rights \"secured . . . by the Constitution.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54533:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54534:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54534:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCathy Freestone and four other Arizona mothers, whose children are eligible for state child support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, filed suit against Linda J. Blessing, the director of the state child support agency, claiming that they properly applied for child support services; that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments for them; that these omissions were largely attributable to staff shortages and other structural defects in the State's program; and that these systemic failures violated their individual rights under Title IV-D to have all mandated services delivered in substantial compliance with the title and its implementing regulations. Freestone sought relief including a declaratory judgment that the Arizona program's operation violates Title IV-D provisions creating rights in them that are enforceable and an injunction requiring the director to achieve substantial compliance with Title IV-D throughout all programmatic operations. The District Court granted summary judgment for Blessing. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Freestone had an enforceable individual right to have the State achieve \"substantial compliance\" with Title IV-D. Additionally, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court that that Congress had foreclosed private Title IV-D enforcement actions by authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to audit and cut off funds to States whose programs do not substantially comply with Title IV-D's requirements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54534:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54534:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54534:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with Title IV-D. Justice O'Connor wrote for the court that parents cannot sue merely because a state fails to be in \"substantial compliance\" with federal collection standards.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54534:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54535:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54535:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis suit was brought by a New York parochial school board, and some of its student's parents, as a challenge to a District Court ruling upholding the twelve-year-old decision set out in Aguilar v. Felton (473 US 402). The decision in Aguilar prohibited public school teachers from teaching in parochial schools as a violation of the Establishment Clause. On appeal from the Second Circuit's affirmance of a District Court's denial of the parent's challenge, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54535:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54535:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54535:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court overruled its decision in Aguilar v. Felton. The Court held that there was no evidence to support its former presumption that the entrance of public school teachers into parochial schools will inevitably lead to the indoctrination of state-sponsored religion. The New York program under which public school teachers were sent into parochial schools did not provide parochial schools with any incentive, financial or other, to establish religion in order to attract public school teachers. The Court added that under its new view, only those policies which generate an excessive conflict between church and state will be deemed to violate the Establishment Clause. As such, one should no longer find that all entanglements between church and state have a distinctly positive or negative impact on religion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54535:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54536:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54536:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe United States disputed the ownership of submerged lands along Alaska's Arctic Coast. The Alaska Statehood Act expressly provided that the federal Submerged Lands Act (Act) applies to Alaska. The Act entitles Alaska to submerged lands beneath tidal and inland navigable waters and submerged lands extending three miles seaward of the State's coastline. The United States claimed a right to submerged lands along the Alaska's Arctic Coast for mineral leasing. Alaska, in a counterclaim, sought to quiet its title to coastal submerged lands within two federal reservations, the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, formerly known as the Arctic National Wildlife Range.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54536:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54536:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54536:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the federal government, the United States, owned the disputed submerged lands - adjacent to the National Wildlife Refuge and the National Petroleum Reserve - along Alaska's Arctic Coast.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54536:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54537:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54537:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn a divorce settlement, Joanne Siragusa forfeited her entitlement to one-half of her ex-husband's ownership share in Heart Institute of Nevada (HIN) in exchange for monthly payments. In 1987, ex-husband Vincent Siragusa defaulted on the monthly payments, declared bankruptcy, and relinquished his ownership share in HIN by reorganizing HIN into Cardiology Associates of Nevada. Joanne alleged that Vincent had filed bankruptcy in order to evade monthly payments and subsequently reorganized his company in order to undo her collateral in HIN. In 1994, Joanne sought a three-fold reimbursement for damages caused by Vincent's fraudulent actions in accordance with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO). Tom Grimmett, the original trustee for the divorce settlement, prosecuted on behalf of Joanne. Patricia Brown, the consultant responsible for reorganizing HIN, defended Vincent.\nThe District Court dismissed Joanne's suit because it was based on actions that started in 1987. (RICO claims expire after four years.) Grimmett argued that the time limit should not have begun until Joanne discovered Vincent's \"pattern\" of fraud in 1990. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Joanne's first court action against Vincent in 1989 signified the beginning of the time limit and thus her claim had expired. Grimmett appealed to the Supreme Court, citing disagreements among Circuit Courts as to when the four-year time limit began.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54537:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54537:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54537:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. The unanimous Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54537:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54538:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54538:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, a Mississippi Chancery Court terminated M.L.B.'s parental rights to her two minor children. M.L.B. filed a timely appeal from the termination decree, but Mississippi law conditioned her right to appeal on prepayment of record preparation fees estimated at $2,352.36. Because she lacked the funds, M.L.B. sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied her application on the ground that, under its precedent, there is no right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil appeals. In front of the U.S. Supreme Court, M.L.B. argued that a State may not, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54538:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54538:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54538:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, just as a State may not block an indigent petty offender's access to an appeal afforded others, so Mississippi may not deny M.L.B., because of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a parent. \"We place decrees forever terminating parental rights in the category of cases in which the State may not 'bolt the door to equal justice,'\" wrote Justice Ginsburg, \"recognizing that parental termination decrees are among the most severe forms of state action.\" Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54538:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54539:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54539:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Monroe County court sentenced Walter McMillian to death for murder. Later evidence, suppressed by Monroe County Sheriff Tom Tate, exonerated McMillian after six years on Alabama's death row. McMillian sued Monroe County, claiming that Tate's actions were unconstitutional. McMillian argued that under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a county is liable for the actions of its sheriffs that constitute county policy. A District Court decided that Monroe County was not liable for Tate's actions because the county had no authority over law enforcement.\nMcMillian appealed, claiming that since the county employed Tate, the county should be liable for Tate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of Monroe County. The Eleventh Circuit held that though Tate was employed by Monroe County, he acted under the authority of the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54539:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54539:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54539:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts. The opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that because the county had no authority to make law enforcement policy, Sheriff Tate as a policymaker represented the state rather than the county. According to the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code, the Court held, Alabama sheriffs \"act for the State when exercising their law enforcement functions.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54539:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54540:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54540:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrancis Bernard Auer, a St. Louis police sergeant, other St. Louis police sergeants, and a lieutenant sued the respondent police commissioners, including David A. Robbins, for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). The commissioners argued that Auer and the other petitioners were \"bona fide executive, administrative, or professional\" employees exempted from overtime pay requirements by the FLSA. Under the Secretary of Labor's regulations, that exemption applies to employees paid a specified minimum amount on a \"salary basis,\" which requires that the \"compensation...not [be] subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed.\" Auer claimed that that they did not meet this test because, under the terms of the Police Department Manual, their compensation could theoretically be reduced for a variety of disciplinary infractions related to the \"quality or quantity\" of their work. The District Court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with Auer's claim. Both courts held that the salary basis test was satisfied.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54540:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54540:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54540:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that sergeants and lieutenants are exempt as salaried employees from the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. The justices rejected the argument that the possibility of suspension without pay moves the officers out of the exempt category.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54540:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54541:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54541:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJerry E. Wells and Kenneth R. Steele were charged with knowingly making false and \"material\" statements to a federally insured bank in violation of federal law. At the trial's end, the District Court instructed the jury, at the Government's request, that withholding a \"material fact\" made a statement or representation false and that materiality of an allegedly false statement was for the judge, not the jury, to determine. Subsequently, the jury treated Wells and Steele's statements as material and convicted them. The U.S. Supreme Court then decided that materiality was a question for the jury to decide. On appeal, Wells and Steele argued that materiality was an element of knowingly making false and \"material\" statements to a federally insured bank in violation of federal law and it was a question for the jury to decide. The Government then argued materiality was not an element of the crime, so that no harm had been done when the trial judge had dealt with the issue. The Court of Appeals agreed with Wells and Steele, vacated their convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for a new trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54541:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54541:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54541:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the materiality of falsehood is not an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank. Justice Souter wrote for the court that prosecutors need not prove that a lie was relevant enough to affect the outcome of a bank's decision because the law does not require such materiality.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54541:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54542:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54542:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1990, Darlene Walters was fired by Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. (Metropolitan). Soon thereafter, Walters filed an employment discrimination charge against Metropolitan under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC sued Metropolitan alleging that the firing violated Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Metropolitan filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, claiming that it was not an \"employer\" covered by Title VII because, at the time of the alleged retaliation, it was not \"a person . . . who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.\" The parties stipulated that Metropolitan failed to satisfy the 15-employee threshold in 1989; that, during most of 1990, it had between 15 and 17 employees on its payroll on each working day; and that, during 1990, there were only nine weeks in which it was actually compensating 15 or more employees on each working day. The District Court dismissed the case. It reasoned that employees may be counted for Title VII purposes only on days on which they actually performed work or were being compensated despite their absence as opposed to any working day on which the employer maintains an employment relationship with the employee. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54542:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54542:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54542:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the ultimate touchstone under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is whether an employer has employment relationships with 15 or more individuals for each working day in 20 or more weeks during the year in question.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54542:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54543:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54543:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDr. Timothy E. Quill, along with other physicians and three seriously ill patients who have since died, challenged the constitutionality of the New York State's ban on physician-assisted suicide. New York's ban, while permitting patients to refuse lifesaving treatment on their own, has historically made it a crime for doctors to help patients commit or attempt suicide, even if patients are terminally ill or in great pain. Following a District Court ruling favoring the State of New York, the Second Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted New York certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54543:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54543:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54543:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Employing a rationality test to examine the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held that New York's ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting medical ethics, preventing euthanasia, shielding the disabled and terminally ill from prejudice which might encourage them to end their lives, and, above all, the preservation of human life. Moreover, while acknowledging the difficulty of its task, the Court distinguished between the refusal of lifesaving treatment and assisted suicide, by noting that the latter involves the criminal elements of causation and intent. No matter how noble a physician's motives may be, he may not deliberately cause, hasten, or aid a patient's death.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54543:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54545:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54545:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring Thomas J. Maloney's tenure as an Illinois judge, William Bracy was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death before him for a triple murder. Maloney was later convicted on federal charges of taking bribes from criminal defendants. In his federal habeas petition, Bracy argued that, because he had \"fixed\" other murder cases, Maloney had an interest in a conviction here to deflect suspicion. Bract contended that Maloney's interest violated the fair-trial guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District Court denied the claim, concluding that Bracy's allegations contained insufficient specificity or good cause. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also concluded that Bracy had not shown \"good cause\" for discovery to prove his claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54545:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54545:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54545:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Bracy had made a sufficient factual showing to establish \"good cause,\" as required by Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a), for discovery on his claim of actual judicial bias in his case. Chief Justice Rehnquist drew heavily on Bracy's contentions that his trial attorney, a former associate of Maloney's, had allegedly been involved in corruption and that he might have agreed to take Bracy's case to trial quickly so that the conviction would deflect any suspicion surrounding the rigged murder cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54545:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54546:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54546:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAsserting state law claims, Lewis, a Kentucky native, brought suit in Kentucky state court, for injuries sustained in a construction accident, against Caterpillar Inc. (Caterpillar), a Delaware corporation, and Whayne Supply Company (Whayne), a Kentucky corporation. Liberty Mutual Insurance Group (Liberty Mutual), a Massachusetts corporation, later intervened in the case as a plaintiff. Less than a year after filing his complaint Lewis entered into a settlement with Whayne. Caterpillar immediately moved to remove the action to federal court, arguing that the settlement between Lewis and Whayne meant that there was complete diversity. Lewis protested that complete diversity was not present because Liberty Mutual had not yet settled with Whayne, so that both Whayne and Lewis were still party to the lawsuit. The District Court denied Lewis' motion to remand, erroneously concluding that complete diversity was present. Five months before the trial, Liberty Mutual and Whayne reached a settlement and the District Court dismissed Whayne from the case. Complete diversity was present for the remainder of the case, including trial and judgment in favor of Caterpillar. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment, holding that the lower court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of removal because there was not complete diversity, and should have remanded the case to state court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54546:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54546:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54546:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. A failure to remand a case improperly removed is not fatal to federal adjudication of the case so long as federal jurisdictional requirements are met at the time judgment is entered. When a diversity case has been tried in federal court under state rules of decision, the importance of finality, efficiency and economy in judicial determinations becomes decisive. To remand this case for a new trial after several years of litigation, despite the fact that the jurisdictional defect had been cured by the time of judgment, would be to impose an exorbitant cost on the judicial system.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54546:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54547:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54547:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1992, Elray Rash filed a repayment plan under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Associates Commercial Corporation (ACC) was listed in the bankruptcy petition as a creditor holding a secured claim because it held a valid loan and lien on Rash's tractor truck. Ultimately to gain confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan and retain the truck, Rash invoked the \"cram-down\" provision of the Code. The cram-down provision allows a debtor to keep collateral over the objection of the creditor and requires the debtor to provide the creditor with payments that will total the present value of the collateral. At an evidentiary hearing, ACC maintained, under the \"replacement-value\" standard, that Rash would have to pay approximately $41,000 for a similar truck. Under the \"foreclosure-value\" standard, Rash maintained that the proper valuation was the net amount ACC would realize upon foreclosure and sale of the collateral, or approximately $31,875. The Bankruptcy Court adopted Rash's valuation figure and approved the plan. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54547:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54547:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54547:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs the value of a secured claim, directs the application of the replacement-value standard when debtor, in a repayment plan under Chapter 13, has exercised the cram-down provision. Justice Ginsburg wrote that, \"under [section 506(a)], the value of property retained because the debtor has exercised the [section 1325(a)(5)(B)] 'cram down' option is the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same 'proposed... use.'\" Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens expressed the view that the text of 506(a) pointed to foreclosure as the proper method of valuation in the case at hand.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54547:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54548:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54548:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBernadine Suitum owned an undeveloped lot near Lake Tahoe. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency determined that the lot was ineligible for development under agency regulations. However, the agency determined that Suitum was entitled to \"Transferable Development Rights\" (TDRs) that she could sell to other landowners with the agency's approval. Rather than sell her TDRs, Suitum filed suit claiming that the agency's determination amounted to a regulatory taking of her property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court held that Suitum's claim was unjusticible because she had not attempted to sell her TDRs. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that an agency action on a TDR transfer application would be the requisite \"final decision\" regarding Suitum's lot in order for her claim to be ripe for adjudication.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54548:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54548:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54548:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Suitum's regulatory taking claim was ripe for adjudication. Justice Souter reasoned that, by determining that Suitum's property was ineligible for development, the agency had had made final determination, even though she had not attempted to sell the TDRs which she had received, or was eligible to receive, under the agency plan. \"While the pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDRs both to the claim that a taking has occurred and to the constitutional requirement of just compensation, we have no occasion to decide, and we do not decide, whether or not these TDRs may be considered in deciding the issue of whether there has been a taking in this case, as opposed to the issue of whether just compensation has been afforded for such a taking,\" wrote Justice Souter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54548:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54550:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54550:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWarner Jenkinson Co. and Hilton Davis Chemical Co. both manufacture dyes from which impurities must be removed. Davis's \"'746 patent,\" which was issued in 1985, discloses an improved purification process involving the \"ultrafiltration\" of dye through a porous membrane at pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0. In 1986, Jenkinson developed its own ultrafiltration process, which operated at a pH level of 5.0. Davis sued for infringement of the '746 patent. Davis's suit relied solely on the \"doctrine of equivalents,\" under which a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is an \"equivalence\" between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Jenkinson argued that the Patent Act of 1952 had supplanted the doctrine. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against Jenkinson after a jury had found that Jenkinson had infringed upon the '746 patent. The en banc Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of equivalents continues to exist and that the jury had substantial evidence from which to conclude that petitioner's process was not substantially different from the process disclosed in the '746 patent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54550:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54550:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54550:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that it adheres to the \"doctrine of equivalents,\" which is not superseded by the Patent Act of 1952. However, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had not considered all of the requirements of the doctrine of equivalents as described by the Court in this case on which the case was reversed and remanded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54550:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54551:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54551:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAs the time neared for Leroy Hendricks' release from prison, having served for his long history of child sexual molestation, the State of Kansas sought his commitment under its Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act). After testifying that he agreed with the diagnosis that he still suffered from pedophilia and is likely to molest children again, Hendricks became a candidate for civil commitment under the Act which provided for the institutionalization of persons likely to engage in \"predatory acts of sexual violence\" brought on by \"mental abnormality\" or \"personality disorder[s].\" On appeal from a court ordered commitment, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Kansas certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54551:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54551:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54551:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Despite Hendricks' claim that a certification of \"mental illness\" alone was too arbitrary to sustain a civil commitment order, the Court held that the Act met substantive due process standards by requiring considerable evidence of past violent sexual behavior and a present mental inclination to repeat such offenses. Furthermore, the Court held that since it required the release of confined persons who became mentally stable and no longer dangerous, did not speak of scienter, and lacked other procedural safeguards characteristic of criminal trials, the Act did not violate double jeopardy guarantees since it merely authorized \"civil\" rather than \"criminal\" commitments", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54551:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54552:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54552:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) found James O'Hagan, a partner at Dorsey and Whitney law firm (Dorsey), guilty of 57 counts of fraud for profiting from stock options in Pillsbury Company based on nonpublic information he misappropriated for his personal benefit. O'Hagan knew that Dorsey's client, Grand Metropolitan PLC, was considering placing a tender offer (a public offer to pay shareholders a premium for their stock at a specified time) to acquire a majority share in Pillsbury Company. O'Hagan bought a large number of stock options without telling his firm and later sold his options for a $4.3 million profit.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed O'Hagan's convictions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Eighth Circuit applied the Act only to security-traders who wrongfully use confidential information pertaining to their own companies. The Circuit Court ruled that the SEC had exceeded the rule-making authority granted to it by the Act by making it a fraudulent action to trade securities on exclusive non-public foreknowledge of a tender offer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54552:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54552:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54552:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion in the Court's 6-3 decision. The Court ruled that a security-trader who fails to disclose personal profits gained from reliance on exclusive information is guilty of employing \"a deceptive device...in connection with the purchase of a security.\" The security-trader knowingly abuses the duty owed toward the source of information, whether the source is the company he works for or not.\nThe Court also held that the SEC has authority to \"define and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent...acts...in connection with any tender offer.\" Rule 14e-3(a) of the Exchange Act, adopted under this fraud-prevention authority, forbids security-traders from trading on the basis of information they know should be kept private unless they publicly disclose their trades.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54552:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54554:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54554:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Coeur d'Alene Tribe (the Tribe) of Idaho filed an action against the State of Idaho, various state agencies, and numerous state officials alleging ownership of the submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene and various navigable tributaries and effluents lying within the original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. The Tribe sought a declaratory judgment establishing its entitlement to the exclusive use and occupancy and the right to quiet enjoyment of the submerged lands, a declaration of the invalidity of all Idaho laws, customs, or usages purporting to regulate those lands, and a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from taking any action in violation of the Tribe's rights in the lands. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed all the components of the complaint on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the Eleventh Amendment barred all claims against the State and its agencies, as well as the title action against the officials. However, it allowed the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the state officials to proceed insofar as they sought to preclude continuing violations of federal law. The court reasoned that those claims were based on Idaho's ongoing interference with the Tribe's alleged ownership rights, and found it conceivable that the Tribe could prove facts entitling it to relief on the claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54554:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54554:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54554:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's suit against the state officials may not proceed in federal court because States enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits filed by Indian tribes. Justice Kennedy concluded, \"the present suit is barred unless it falls within the exception this Court has recognized for certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers in their individual capacities.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54554:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54556:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54556:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCity Federal Savings Bank (City Federal) lost a significant amount of its clients' money because of negligent investing by employee John Atherton. The client, Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), sued Atherton under state law for \"gross negligence,\" \"simple negligence,\" and \"breach of fiduciary duty.\" A three-judge District Court held that Atherton could only be sued for gross negligence, because the more lenient \"gross negligence\" standard for negligent conduct set by federal statutory law annulled stricter standards set by state law. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, and held that federal statutes only ensured a minimum standard of \"gross negligence.\" The stricter state standards still applied.\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), petitioning on behalf of RTC, argued that federal common law should set a uniform standard of negligent conduct for all employees at federally chartered banks. According to FDIC, allowing state statutes to regulate federally chartered banks would contradict the federal charter system's purpose of upholding federal common law. The Supreme Court was asked to decide which law applied to Atherton: state law, federal common law, or federal statutory law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54556:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54556:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54556:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. The unanimous Court concluded that \"state law sets the standard of conduct as long as the state standard is stricter than that of the federal statute.\" The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the federal \"gross negligence\" statute was only intended to set a \"floor\" or minimum standard for state laws governing negligent conduct. The Court also ruled that \"[t]here is no federal common law that would create a general standard of care applicable to this case.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54556:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54559:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54559:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter her death from toxic shock syndrome, Betty O'Gilvie's husband and two children received a jury award of $1,525,000 actual damages and $10 million punitive damages in a tort suit based on Kansas law against the maker of the product that caused Betty's death. The O'Gilvie's paid income tax on the portion of the award that represented punitive damages, but then sought a refund. Subsequently, Betty O'Gilvie's husband sued the Government for a refund and the Government sued the O'Gilvie children to recover the refund it had made earlier. In finding for the O'Gilvies, the District Court found that 26 USC section 104(a)(2), as read in 1988, excluded from gross income the \"amount of any damages received... on account of personal injuries or sickness.\" The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54559:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54559:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54559:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the punitive damages received by the O'Gilvies were not received \"on account of\" personal injuries,\" and therefore the provision did not apply and the damages were taxable. Agreeing with the Government's definition, Justice Breyer reasoned that the exclusionary provision applied to those personal injury lawsuit damages that were awarded by reason of, or because of, the personal injuries, and not to punitive damages that do not compensate injury, but are private fines to punish and deter reprehensible conduct. Justice Antonin Scalia, who was joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54559:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54560:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54560:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis action was filed by the Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (PCN), on behalf of health care providers, to enjoin Schenck and others from continuously staging blockades and other disruptive illegal activities in front of abortion clinics. After its restraining order proved ineffective, a District Court issued a preliminary injunction creating \"fixed buffer zones\" which prohibited demonstrations within fifteen feet of entrances to abortion clinics, parking lots, or driveways. The court also created \"floating buffer zones\" prohibiting demonstrators from coming within fifteen feet of people or vehicles seeking access to the clinics. Following the Appellate Court's decision to uphold the District Court's ruling that the \"buffer zones\" were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted Schenck certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54560:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54560:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54560:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that while the \"fixed buffer zones\" were constitutional, the \"floating buffer zones\" were not. It distinguished between the two types of \"buffer zones.\" The Court supported the \"fixed buffer zones\" because they protected the government's interest in public safety, by preventing protesters from engaging in unlawful conduct (i.e. spitting on and shouting in clinic users' faces, blocking doorways), while still allowing them to be heard from a short distance. \"Floating buffer zones,\" by contrast, were struck down by the Court since they imposed a greater burden on free speech than was required to protect the government's interest in public safety and free traffic flow. The Court found that forcing demonstrators to remain at least 15 feet away from the people they wished to communicate with would create an inordinate amount of dangerous confusion and congestion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54560:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54561:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54561:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter being exposed to asbestos while working for Ingalls Shipbuilding as a shipfitter, Jefferson Yates filed a claim for disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). While Ingalls and Yates settled, Yates also sued the manufacturers and suppliers of the asbestos products that were allegedly present in his workplace when he contracted asbestosis. Yates also settled with some of the manufacturers and suppliers he sued, each of whom required releases from Yates and his wife. Ingalls did not approve of any releases. When Yates died, his wife then filed for benefits under the LHWCA, which provides, \"If the person entitled to compensation... enters into a settlement with a third person... for an amount less than the compensation to which the person... would be entitled under this [Act], the employer shall be liable for compensation only if written approval of the settlement is obtained from the employer before the settlement is executed.\" Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed that at the time Mrs. Yates executed the predeath settlements, she was not a \"person entitled to compensation\" because her husband was still alive, thus her right to death benefits had not yet vested.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54561:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54561:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54561:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that before an injured worker's death, the worker's spouse is not a \"person entitled to compensation\" for death benefits and did not forfeit the right to collect death benefits under the LHWCA for failure to obtain the worker's employer's approval of settlements entered into by the worker's spouse with third parties before the worker's death. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provided that the \"agency\" had to be named respondent in an appeal of an order of a federal administrative agency or board to a Federal Court of Appeals, conferred upon the Director the right to appear as a respondent before the Courts of Appeals in appeals from final orders of the Benefits Review Board.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54561:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54562:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54562:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the sentencing phase of the trial at which Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted on two counts of first degree murder, the Florida state court jury rendered an advisory verdict recommending death sentences on both counts. Finding numerous aggravating circumstances in connection with both murders, and no mitigating circumstances as to either, the trial court sentenced Lambrix to death on both counts. After his conviction and sentence were upheld by the Florida courts, Lambrix filed a habeas corpus petition in the Federal District Court, which rejected all of his claims. While Lambrix's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, The U.S. Supreme Court handed down a ruling that if the sentencing judge in a \"weighing\" State (i.e., a State such as Florida that requires specified aggravating circumstances to be weighed against any mitigating circumstances at a capital trial's sentencing phase) is required to give deference to a jury's advisory sentencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Lambrix claimed that his sentencing jury was improperly instructed on the \"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel\" aggravator. The Court of Appeals held its proceedings in abeyance to permit Lambrix to present his claim to the Florida Supreme Court, which rejected the claim without considering its merits on the ground that the claim was procedurally barred. The Court of Appeals denied relief, ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court had announced a \"new rule\" which could not be applied retroactively on federal habeas corpus petitions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54562:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54562:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54562:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that a prisoner whose conviction became final before the ruling, which held that if the sentencing judge in a \"weighing\" State is required to give deference to a jury's advisory sentencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances, is foreclosed from relying on that decision in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Justice Scalia wrote for the court that the later ruling announced a \"new rule\" that could not be applied to already-finalized convictions challenged in federal habeas corpus petitions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54562:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54563:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54563:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1989, William J. Schumer filed an action against Hughes Aircraft Co. under the False Claims Act (FCA), specifically under the qui tam provision which allows suits by private parties on behalf of the United States against anyone submitting a false claim to the government. Schumer alleged that Hughes had submitted false claims related to two Air Force radar projects between 1982 and 1984. Hughes moved to dismiss the case claiming that the 1986 amendment to the FCA that Schumer had filed under was not retroactive and that the alleged conduct precluded the suit because the government already had the information on which the suit was based. The motion was dismissed; however, the District Court ruled in favor of Hughes based on the merits of the case. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected Hughes, finding that the FCA should be applied retroactively to suits pre-1986. The appellate court also found that, because no public disclosure of information possessed by the Government had been made, the action was not barred under the 1986 version of the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54563:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54563:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54563:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, because the 1986 amendment does not apply retroactively to qui tam suits regarding allegedly false claims submitted prior to its enactment, Schumer's action should have been dismissed, as required by the pre-1986 version of the FCA. The Court reasoned that, prior to 1986, disclosure to the Government of information about the allegedly false claim would have constituted a full defense, which the retroactive application of the 1986 amendment would deprive Hughes of that defense. \"Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the 1986 amendment to conduct completed before its enactment, we apply our presumption against retroactivity,\" concluded Justice Thomas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54563:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54564:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54564:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJerry B. Balisok, a Washington state prison inmate, was found guilty of prison rules infractions resulting in the loss of thirty days of good time, credit he had previously earned toward his release. Balisok alleged that the procedures used in his disciplinary hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Balisok also alleged that the proceedings were deceitful and biased. Under federal law Balisok filed for a statement declaring the procedures unconstitutional, compensatory and punitive damages for their use, and an injunction to prevent future violations. The District Court held a state prisoner's claim for damages is not conceivable if a judgement for him would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that claims challenging only the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing are always cognizable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54564:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54564:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54564:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Balisok's \"claim for declaratory relief and monetary damages, based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable....\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54564:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54565:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54565:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohnny Lynn Old Chief was involved in a disturbance involving gunfire. Subsequently, Old Chief was charged with violating federal law, 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. The earlier crime that was charged in the indictment against Old Chief was assault causing serious bodily injury. Old Chief moved for an order requiring the Government to refrain from revealing the name and nature of his prior assault conviction, which, he argued, would unfairly tax the jury's capacity to hold the Government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence, on current charges of assault, possession, and violence with a firearm. Old Chief offered to stipulate, or concede, to the fact of the prior conviction without releasing its name or nature. The Government refused to join the stipulation. The Government argued it had the right to present its own evidence of the prior conviction. The District Court ruled in favor of the Government. In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals found that the Government was entitled to introduce probative evidence to prove the prior offense regardless of the stipulation offer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54565:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54565:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54565:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that a district court abuses its discretion under the Federal Rules of Evidence if it spurns a defendant's offer to concede a prior judgment and admits the full judgment record over the defendant's objection, when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54565:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54567:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54567:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFederal employees subject to adverse actions by their respective agencies, each made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken against him or her to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The Board overturned each false statement charge. The Board held that an employee's false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee's underlying misconduct. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board and held that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54567:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54567:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54567:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that neither the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause nor the Civil Service Reform Act precludes a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding his alleged employment-related misconduct. \"The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. \"But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle,\" continued Chief Justice Rehnquist, \"the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this case that a 'meaningful opportunity to be heard' includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54567:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54568:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54568:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, Dolores Oubre, a scheduler at a power plant run by Entergy Operations, Inc., was given the option of either improving her job performance or accepting a voluntary arrangement for her severance. Accepting a severance package, Oubre signed a release of all claims against Entergy. Entergy failed to comply with several requirements for a release under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as set forth in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). After receiving all of her severance pay, Oubre filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Oubre then sued Entergy, alleging constructive discharge on the basis of her age in violation of the ADEA and state law. Entergy argued that Oubre had ratified the defective release by failing to return the $6,258 in severance she had received. The District Court entered summary judgment for Entergy. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54568:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54568:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54568:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because the release did not comply with OWBPA's requirements, the release could not bar Oubre's ADEA claim. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that an employee may not waive an ADEA claim unless the waiver or release satisfies the OWBPA's requirements. Accordingly, Oubre's retention of her severance did not amount to a ratification equivalent to a valid release of her ADEA claims, since the retention did not comply with the OWBPA any more than the original release did. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia wrote dissenting opinions. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined Justice Thomas' dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54568:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54569:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54569:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nL'anza Research International, Inc., a California based manufacturer and seller of hair care products, has copyrighted the labels that are affixed to its products. Compared to domestic markets, the price of L'anza products in foreign markets is substantially lower. L'anza's distributor in the United Kingdom arranged for the sale of L'anza products, affixed with copyrighted labels, to a distributor in Malta. The Malta distributor then sold the products to Quality King Distributors, Inc., who imported the products back to the U.S. and sold them at discounted prices to unauthorized retailers. In its suit, L'anza alleged that Quality King violated L'anza's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act of 1976 to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted material in the U.S. Rejecting Quality King's defense based on the \"first sale\" doctrine, the District Court ruled in favor of L'anza. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54569:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54569:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54569:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the \"first sale\" doctrine endorsed in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 is applicable to imported copies. Accordingly, Quality King's unauthorized importation and resale of copyrighted labels from L'anza's foreign distributor was not prohibited by the Act because L'anza's distribution right did not encompass Quality King's reselling, as lawful owners, under first sale doctrine. \"The whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution,\" wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54569:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54570:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54570:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLorelyn Miller was born in the Philippines, in 1970, to a Filipino national woman and an American soldier. Her parents were never married. In 1992, after the State Department rejected her first application for U.S. citizenship, Miller reapplied when a Texas court granted her father's petition for a paternity decree declaring him her father. When the State Department rejected her citizenship application again, claiming that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409(a) required foreign born illegitimate children of American fathers to be legitimated before age 18, Miller challenged the refusal. She claimed that since Section 1409(c) established at birth the citizenship of an illegitimate foreign-born child whose mother was an American citizen, the State Department's refusal to do the same under Section 1409(a), when the father is an American citizen, was unconstitutional. On appeal from an appellate court's decision to affirm the lower court's dismissal of the case, the Supreme Court granted Miller certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54570:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54570:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54570:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. After ruling that Miller had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute, the Court held that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court reasoned that different treatment of mothers and fathers of out-of-wedlock children was justified since the two parents are not \"similarly situated.\" While the child's relationship with its father may be undisclosed for several years, its blood relationship to its mother is usually apparent through hospital records. Moreover, whereas birth mothers will know immediately of their child's existence, birth fathers and their children may never know each other. The statutory requirement that a child born out of wedlock to a citizen father obtain formal proof of paternity by age 18, either through legitimization, written acknowledgment by the father under oath, or adjudication by a competent court, is well tailored to address the difficulties of establishing a child's citizenship based only on the relation to the father.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54570:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54571:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54571:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter purchasing a car, Diane Beasley gave Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. a promissory note for the purchase price. The car secured the note. 21 days later, Fidelity mailed Beasley the application to perfect its security interest under Missouri law. After Beasley filed for bankruptcy, Richard V. Fink, the trustee of Beasley's bankruptcy estate, moved to set aside Fidelity's security interest on the ground that the lien was a voidable preference under federal law. 11 USC section 547(c)(3)(B) prohibits the avoidance of a security interest for a loan used to acquire property if, among other things, the security interest is \"perfected on or before 20 days after the debtor receives possession of such property.\" Fink argued that this \"enabling loan\" exception was inapposite because Fidelity had not perfected its interest within the 20-day period. Affirming the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, the Court of Appeals held a transfer to be perfected when the transferee takes the last step required by state law to perfect its security interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54571:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54571:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54571:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a transfer of a security interest is perfected under section 547(c)(3)(B) on the date that the secured party has completed the steps necessary to perfect its interest, so that a creditor may invoke the enabling loan exception only by satisfying state law perfection requirements within the 20-day period provided by the federal statute. The Court turned to the text, structure, and history of the preference provisions to determine that the federal enabling loan exception of twenty-days controlled over otherwise applicable state law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54571:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54572:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54572:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLeonard Crawford-El, a prisoner in the District of Columbia's correctional system, was ultimately transferred to a federal prison in Florida. Crawford- El's belongings were transferred separately. A correctional officer had Crawford-El's brother-in-law pick his belongs rather than ship them. Crawford- El finally received his belongings months after reaching Florida. Crawford-El filed suit under 42 USC section 1983, which provides that \"Every person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....\" Crawford-El alleged that the diversion of his property was motivated by an intent to retaliate against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the complaint. In remanding, the en banc Court of Appeals conclude among other things, that in an unconstitutional-motive case, a plaintiff must establish motive by clear and convincing evidence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54572:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54572:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54572:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in fashioning a heightened burden of proof for unconstitutional-motive cases against public officials. \"Neither the text of [section 1983] or any other federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides any support for imposing the clear and convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the summary judgment stage or in the trial itself,\" wrote Justice Stevens. In a dissent joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that a government official was entitled to immunity from a motive-based tort suit if the official could proffer a legitimate reason and the plaintiff could not establish that the reason given was a pretext.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54572:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54573:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54573:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter searching his truck, Florida police arrested and charged George Rogers with knowingly possessing an unregistered firearm and a silencer. Rogers admitted during his arrest and trial that he knew he was in possession of a silencer. Nonetheless, he requested the District Court to instruct the jury to define the Government's burden of establishing \"knowing possession\" as proof that he deliberately possessed an item that he not only knew to be a \"firearm,\" but that he knew such possession was illegal. Following the court's refusal of his instruction request, Rogers was convicted. On appeal from the Eleventh Circuit's decision to affirm the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court granted Rogers certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54573:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54573:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54573:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court held that the Government only had to establish that Rogers knowingly possessed a firearm. The government did not have to show that Rogers knew such possession was unlawful or even that his weapons were unregistered. Looking at Rogers' state of mind, the Court reasoned that his repeated admissions during arrest and trial concerning his awareness and knowledge of the weapons found in his truck, sufficiently demonstrated that his possession of the weapons was intentional. The Court dismissed it grant of certiorari as improvidently granted", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54573:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54574:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54574:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Yankton Tribe established the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. The 1887 Dawes Act permitted the Government to allot tracts of tribal land to individual Indians and, with tribal consent, to open the remaining holdings to non-Indian settlement. In 1892, pursuant to the Dawes Act, an agreement between the Tribe and the Government, ratified in 1894, provided that nothing \"shall be construed to abrogate the [1858] treaty.\" In 1992, the Southern Missouri Recycling and Waste Management District acquired land for a solid waste disposal facility that lies on unallotted, non-Indian fee land, but falls within the reservation's original 1858 boundaries. In 1994, the Tribe filed suit to enjoin construction. Ultimately, the District Court declined to enjoin construction of the landfill, but granted a declaratory judgment that the landfill lies within the Yankton Sioux Reservation, where federal environmental regulations apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54574:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54574:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54574:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the 1894 statute's operative language and the circumstances surrounding its passage demonstrate that Congress intended to diminish the Yankton Reservation and as a result the unallotted lands ceded did not retain reservation status. Consequently, because the unallotted lands included the landfill site, which no longer constituted Indian country as defined by 18 USCS 1151(a), South Dakota has primary jurisdiction over the lands. Noting the repudiation of allotment philosophy, Justice O'Connor wrote that, \"we must give effect to Congress' intent in passing the 1894 Act. Here... we believe that Congress spoke clearly, and although 'some might wish [it] had spoken differently... we cannot remake history.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54574:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54575:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54575:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCurrently unknown.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54575:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54575:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54575:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nCurrently unknown.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54575:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54576:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54576:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter several expeditions, Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR) located the wreck of the S.S. Brother Jonathan and its cargo which sank off the California coast in 1865. When DSR sought rights to the wreck and her cargo, under Article III, Section 2, federal admiralty jurisdiction, California challenged DSR claiming that it had title to the wreck under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA). The ASA requires the federal government to transfer title over \"abandoned shipwrecks\" to the states in whose submerged lands the wrecks are found. California also noted that under Section 6313 of its own public code, title to all abandoned shipwrecks found off its coast vests in the state. In light of its claims to the Brother Jonathan, California claimed that DSR's federal title action violated its rights under the Eleventh Amendment, even though it lacked possession of the wreck.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54576:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54576:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54576:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that while precedent interpreting the Eleventh Amendment supports a limited bar on federal admiralty jurisdiction disputes centering on people or property that is in a state's possession, the same does not apply when the concerned state lacks possession of the disputed maritime property. The Court noted that in this case, neither the federal government nor the State of California had possession of the Brother Jonathan and, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional ban was inapplicable. The Court concluded by noting that since several outstanding insurance claims were made on the Brother Jonathan at the time of her sinking, the question of whether the wreck was truly \"abandoned\" remained unresolved. Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter for further consideration.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54576:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54577:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54577:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) requires employers who withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans to pay a \"withdrawal liability,\" which is dischargeable with an arranged series of periodic payments. The Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund (Fund) is a multiemployer pension plan for laundry workers. The Ferbar Corporation contributed to the Fund, but ultimately ceased doing so. Subsequently, the Fund's trustees demanded payment of Ferbar's withdrawal liability. The trustees decided to allow Ferbar to satisfy its obligation by making monthly payments. However, Ferbar never made a payment. Ultimately, the District Court granted Ferbar summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The court noted that the trustees had filed suit eight days too late. This was the date Ferbar was to make its first payment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the six-year period began to run on the date Ferbar withdrew from the Fund, in March 1985. Under this view, the trustees commenced suit nearly two years too late.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54577:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54577:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54577:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the MPPAA's six-year statute of limitations on a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability does not begin to run until the employer fails to make a payment on the schedule set by the fund. Justice Ginsburg reasoned that a plan's interest in receiving withdrawal liability does not ripen into a cause of action triggering the limitations period until the trustees determine and demand payment and the employer defaults on an installment. The Court's conclusion prompted a second decision, that a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability is timely as to any installment payments that came due during the six years preceding the suit, but payments that came due prior to that time are lost.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54577:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54578:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54578:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, the State of Maryland tried Anthony Bell and Kevin Gray jointly for the murder of Stacy Williams. The State entered Bell's confession into evidence at trial. According to the trial judge's order, the police detective who read the confession said the word \"deleted\" or \"deletion\" whenever Gray's name appeared. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked the detective if Bell's confession led to Gray's arrest. The detective answered that it did. Ultimately, Gray testified and Bell did not. When instructing the jury, the trial judge specified that the confession was evidence only against Bell. The jury convicted both Bell and Gray. Setting aside Gray's conviction, Maryland's intermediate appellate court applied Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, in which the Court held that, despite a limiting instruction that the jury should consider the confession as evidence only against the confessing codefendant, the introduction of such a confession at a joint trial violates the nonconfessing defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. Maryland's highest court reinstated the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54578:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54578:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54578:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the confession, which substituted blanks and the word \"delete\" for the respondent's proper name, falls within the class of statements to which Bruton's protections apply. Applying Bruton, Justice Breyer wrote that a jury will often react to an unredacted confession and a confession redacted with the word \"delete\" similarly by realizing that the confession refers to the defendant. Justice Anton Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that Bell's confession could constitutionally have been admitted with a limiting instruction to the jury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54578:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54579:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54579:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter being sentenced to 18 to 36 months in prison, Ronald Yeskey was recommended as a candidate for a Motivational Boot Camp for first-time offenders. Successful completion of the Boot Camp could have resulted in Yeskey's early parole after just six months. When the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections discovered Yeskey's medical history of hypertension, he was denied admission to the Boot Camp. Yeskey challenged the refusal as discriminatory. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54579:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54579:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54579:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that under the ADA no \"public entity\" may discriminate against qualified disabled individuals due to their disability. Moreover, the Court stated that the ADA's protections extended to cover prison inmates as well as any other liberated citizen.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54579:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54580:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54580:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, Cass County, Minnesota began assessing ad valorem taxes on 21 parcels of reservation land that had been alienated from tribal control under the Nelson Act and later reacquired by the Leech Lake Band of Chippewa, a federally recognized Indian tribe. In 1995, the Band filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that Cass County could not tax the 21 parcels. The District Court held that all of the land that had been alienated from tribal ownership under the Nelson Act was taxable. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals held that 13 parcels that had been allotted to individual Indians could be taxed so long as they had been patented after passage of the Burke Act proviso, because the explicit mention of \"taxation\" in the proviso expressed \"unmistakably clear\" intent. Reversing in part, the court held that the eight parcels sold as pine lands or homestead land could not be taxed because those sections did not incorporate the General Allotment Act or include any mention of an intent to tax lands distributed under them which might become reacquired by the Band.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54580:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54580:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54580:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that ad valorem taxes may be imposed upon such land. \"When Congress makes Indian reservation land freely alienable, it manifests an unmistakably clear intent to render such land subject to state and local taxation,\" wrote Justice Thomas. Repurchasing the land by an Indian tribe does not return the land to tax-exempt status. Justice Thomas concluded that \"[t]he eight parcels at issue here were therefore taxable unless and until they were restored to federal trust protection.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54580:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54581:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54581:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn granting Keith M. Scott parole, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the \"Board\"), stipulated that he refrain from owning or possessing weapons. When officers learned that Scott may be in possession of weapons, they searched his home and found a bow and arrow and some firearms. Despite objecting at his parole violation hearing that the search was unconstitutional, the seized weapons were admitted as evidence and Scott was ultimately recommitted. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Scott's challenge to the search and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the decision. The Supreme Court granted the Board certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54581:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54581:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54581:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings. Noting that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated, the Court explained that it applies only in situations where its deterrent benefits outweigh the utilities that accompany the consideration of reliable, probative evidence. Since officers are unaware of whether their search subjects are parolees or not, the danger of their deliberately conducting illegal searches is small. By comparison, the deleterious impact that an application of the exclusionary rule would have on traditionally flexible state parole revocation proceedings is great. State parole authorities must have greater legal latitude since they deal with individuals who, in light of past criminal activities, are more likely than average citizens to offend again.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54581:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54582:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54582:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter working for Burlington Industries for 15 months, Kimberly B. Ellerth quit because she allegedly suffered sexual harassment by her supervisor - Ted Slowik. Despite her refusals of Slowik's advances Ellerth did not suffer any tangible retaliation and was, in fact, promoted once. Moreover, while she remained silent about Slowik's conduct despite her knowledge of Burlington's policy against sexual harassment, Ellerth challenged Burlington claiming that the company forced her constructive discharge.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54582:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54582:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54582:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 opinion, the Court held that employers are vicariously liable for supervisors who create hostile working conditions for those over whom they have authority. In cases where harassed employee's suffer no job-related consequences, employers may defend themselves against liability by showing that they quickly acted to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and that the harassed employee failed to utilize their employer's protection. Such a defense, however, in not available when the alleged harassment culminates in an employment action, such as Ellerth's.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54582:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54583:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54583:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlberta Jefferson, an African American woman, died as a result of a fire in her home in the city of Tarrant, Alabama. Her survivors filed multiple complaints against Tarrant City: two under state law and two under federal law. The state law complaints alleged wrongful death and the common-law tort of outrage, while the two federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleged that Ms. Jefferson's death was the direct result of indifference and racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The City claimed that the complaints were governed by Alabama's Wrongful Death Act, which the Alabama Supreme Court had interpreted to provide only for punitive damages. The City then argued that it could not be sued under Section 1983 because the Supreme Court had ruled that Section 1983 plaintiffs are not entitled to sue a municipality for punitive damages.\nThe state court ruled in favor of Jefferson, but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back to the state court after determining that the state Act did in fact govern the claims. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the federal complaints. The City contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the Alabama Supreme Court's order because the case was not yet final.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54583:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54583:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54583:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. In an 8-1 decision the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the Court could not rule until the Alabama Supreme Court proceedings were completed and a final decision handed down. The case was dismissed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54583:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54584:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54584:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1990, Mack Trucks, Inc., sold its Allentown, Pennsylvania, branch to Allentown Mack Sales, Inc. A number of Mack employees made statement to the new owners suggesting that Local Lodge 724 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, had lost the support of bargaining-unit members generally. Subsequently, Allentown refused Local 724's request for recognition and commencement of collective-bargaining negotiations. Allentown, under a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent, claimed a good-faith reasonable doubt as to the union's support in order to conduct an internal poll of employee support for the union. The employees voted 19 to 13 against the union. Local 724 then filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with the NLRB. Ultimately, an Administrative Law Judge held that Allentown's poll was conducted in compliance with procedural standards, but that Allentown did not have an \"objective reasonable doubt\" about the majority status of the union. The Court of Appeals enforced the NLRB's order for Allentown to recognize and bargain with Local 724.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54584:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54584:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54584:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that \"the Board's 'reasonable doubt' test for employer polls is facially rational and consistent with the Act.\" However, in a separate 5-4 split, the Court held that \"the Board's factual finding that Allentown Mack Sales lacked such a doubt is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.\" Justice Scalia wrote, \"the Board must be required to apply in fact the clearly understood legal standards that it enunciates in principle, such as good-faith reasonable doubt....Reviewing courts are entitled to take those standards to mean what they say, and to conduct substantial-evidence review on that basis. Even the most consistent and hence predictable Board departure from proper application of those standards will not alter the legal rule by which the agency's factfinding is to be judged.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54584:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54585:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54585:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter resigning as a lifeguard, Beth Ann Faragher brought an action against the City of Boca Raton and her immediate supervisors, alleging that the supervisors had created a sexually hostile atmosphere by touching, remarking, and commenting. Faragher asserted that this conduct constituted discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court concluded that Faragher's supervisors' conduct was sufficiently serious to alter the conditions of her employment and constitute an abusive working environment. The court then held that the city could be held liable. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that Faragher's supervisors were not acting within the scope of their employment when they engaged in the harassing conduct, that knowledge of the harassment could not be imputed to the City, and that the City could not be held liable for negligence in failing to prevent it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54585:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54585:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54585:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor. The Court also held that such liability is subject to an affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of the plaintiff victim. \"The City had entirely failed to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment among the beach employees and that its officials made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of supervisors like [Faragher's],\" wrote Justice Souter, \"[u]nder such circumstances, we hold as a matter of law that the City could not be found to have exercised reasonable care to prevent the supervisors' harassing conduct.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54585:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54586:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54586:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) obligates exporters, importers, and domestic shippers to pay 0.125 percent of the value of the commercial cargo they ship through the Nation's ports. From April to June 1994, United States Shoe Corporation paid the HMT for articles it exported. U.S. Shoe then filed a protest with the Customs Service alleging that, to the extent the toll applies to exports, the HMT violates the Export Clause of the Constitution, which provides that \"No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.\" The Customs Service refuted the accusation, stating that the HMT is a statutorily mandated user fee. U.S. Shoe then sued for a refund in the Court of International Trade (CIT). Granting U.S. Shoe summary judgment, the CIT held that the HMT qualifies as a tax, reasoning that the tax is assessed ad valorem directly upon the value of the cargo itself, not upon any services rendered for the cargo. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54586:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54586:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54586:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that \"the [Harbor Maintenance Tax], which is imposed on an ad valorem basis, is not a fair approximation of services, facilities, or benefits furnished to the exporters, and therefore does not qualify as a permissible user fee.\" The Court noted that the Export Clause does not categorically bar Congress from imposing any tax on exports and that a charge designed as compensation for government-supplied services, facilities, or benefits would pass scrutiny.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54586:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54587:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54587:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnited Auto Workers and Caterpillar, Inc. were involved in a working agreement that provided for employees of Caterpillar, Inc. to devote part of their time to processing employee grievances on behalf of the union, while still maintaining full-time employment status and benefits. This agreement was eventually expanded to allow employees to continue receiving benefits from Caterpillar while working full time for the union. In 1991, Caterpillar refused to continue paying benefits to workers who were not directly providing services for the company. The union filed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) asserting that Caterpillar was engaging in unfair labor practices. Caterpillar claimed that the benefit payments violated section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Both the NLRB and the District Court found that the payments did in fact violate Section 302 of the LMRA.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and ruled for the union. The Third Circuit found that Congress had not intended the LMRA to ban the type of payments at issue. Then-Judge Samuel Alito dissented, arguing that the payments were illegal under the plain meaning of the legislation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54587:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54587:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54587:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAfter the Supreme Court heard oral arguments, but before it ruled, the Union reached a settlement with Caterpillar rendering the case moot.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54587:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54589:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54589:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBarkat U. Khan and his corporation contracted with State Oil to lease and run a gas station. Under the agreement, State Oil set a maximum profit margin for gasoline and required Khan to return any excess profits to State Oil. Khan fell behind in lease payments and was evicted. Khan then sued State Oil claiming that State Oil had engaged in price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which disallows restrictions on trade. State Oil claimed that in setting profit margins, they had not prevented Kahn from setting prices and therefore were not guilty of price fixing.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in favor of Kahn based on the logic of Albrecht v. Herald Co. in which the Supreme Court ruled that some restrictions on trade, such as price-fixing, always have such negative effects coupled with such little competitive benefit that these restrictions are always unlawful.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54589:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54589:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54589:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court overturned the Albrecht decision. The Court noted that antitrust cases are typically decided by weighing the costs and benefits of restrictions in each individual case instead of by per se rules as in Albrecht. Also, there was significant precedent contradicting the assertion that all trade restrictions are illegal, and there was evidence that the effects of price-fixing are not as detrimental as the Court thought at the time of Albrecht.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54589:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54590:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54590:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1904, the Crow Tribe ceded part of its Montana Reservation to the United States for settlement by non-Indians, with the U.S holding the rights to the minerals underlying the ceded strip in trust for the Tribe. In 1972, pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), Westmoreland Resources, Inc., a non-Indian company, entered into a mining lease with the Tribe for coal underlying the ceded strip. In 1975, Montana imposed a severance tax and a gross proceeds tax on all coal produced in the State, including coal underlying the reservation and the ceded strip. In 1978, the Tribe brought a federal action for injunctive and declaratory relief against Montana and its counties, alleging that the State's severance and gross proceeds taxes were preempted by the IMLA and infringed on the Tribe's right to govern itself. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that both taxes were preempted by the IMLA and void for interfering with tribal governance. The U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Subsequently, the Tribe sough to recover certain taxes paid by Westmoreland. The District Court then concluded that the disgorgement remedy sought by the Tribe was not appropriate. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54590:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54590:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54590:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the restitution sought for the Tribe of all severance and gross proceeds taxes paid by Westmoreland to Montana and certain counties, before the tribe's severance tax became valid, was not warranted. The Court decision was based on findings that Westmoreland had forfeited its entitlement to a refund, that neither the state nor the tribe enjoyed authority to tax to the total exclusion of the other, and that the tribe could not have taxed the company during the periods in question. The Court also concluded that the District Court had ruled properly where the tribe and the U.S. had argued for total disgorgement rather than a different form of relief. In a partial dissent in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined, Justice David H. Souter argued that nothing disentitled the tribe at least to press for disgorgement of some or all of Montana's tax revenues.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54590:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54591:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54591:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, Thomas M. Thompson was convicted of the rape and murder of Ginger Fleischli in California state court. The special circumstance found by the jury of murder during the commission of rape made Thompson eligible for the death penalty. In 1995, a federal District Court invalidated Thompson's death sentence by granted relief on his rape conviction and the rape special circumstance. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reinstated Thompson's death sentence, noting that the State presented strong evidence of rape at trial. The Court of Appeals then issued a mandate denying all habeas relief. Two days before Thompson's execution, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate and granted Thompson relief. The appellate court found that Thompson was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54591:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54591:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54591:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that although it was consistent with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the recall was a grave abuse of discretion. The Court established that \"where a federal court of appeals sua sponte recalls its mandate to revisit the merits of an earlier decision denying habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, the court abuses its discretion unless it acts to avoid a miscarriage of justice as defined by our habeas corpus jurisprudence.\" Accordingly, Justice Kennedy, noting that Thompson's evidence was not clear and convincing, concluded that California's judgment would not result in a miscarriage of justice. Justice David H. Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54591:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54592:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54592:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Elections Clause of the Constitution provides that \"the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.\" 2 USC sections 1 and 7 provide that the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in an even-numbered year is established as the date for federal congressional and presidential elections. In 1975, Louisiana adopted an \"open primary,\" which occurs before the uniform federal election day and in which all candidates appear on the ballot and all voters may vote. If a candidate for a given office receives a majority at the open primary, that candidate is elected and no further act is done on federal election day to fill that office. Louisiana voters challenged the open primary is a violation of federal law. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that Louisiana's system squarely \"conflicts with the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54592:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54592:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54592:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that when Louisiana's open primary is applied to select among congressional candidates in October, it conflicts with federal law and to that extent is void. The Court rejected the argument that Louisiana's system only concerns the manner, not the time, of a federal election. Justice Souter reasoned that a federal election occurs in Louisiana before the federal election date whenever a candidate receives a majority in the open primary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54592:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54593:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54593:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter working for General Motors Corporation (GM) for fifteen years as a vehicular fire analyst, Ronald Elwell sued GM for wrongful discharge. In an eventual settlement agreement reached in a Michigan county court, the parties agreed to a permanent injunction barring Elwell from testifying against GM without its consent, unless subpoenaed to do so by another court or tribunal. Thereafter, when Kenneth Lee Baker commenced a product liability action against GM in a Missouri county court, Elwell was subpoenaed to testify on Baker's behalf. When GM argued that Elwell was barred from testifying under the Michigan court injunction, the Missouri court disagreed and permitted his deposition and testimony. After suffering an adverse verdict in the Baker case, GM appealed on the basis that Elwell's testimony was illegally admitted. When a federal appeals court agreed with GM, Baker appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54593:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54593:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54593:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In unanimous decision, the Court held that GM's injunctive agreement with Elwell did not reach beyond the parties specific controversy to affect Elwell's conduct in other states. Noting Missouri's \"public policy,\" shielding from disclosure only confidential or privileged information, the Court reasoned that since Elwell's testimony in the Baker case was neither confidential nor privileged, its prohibition would not be necessary. Finally, the Court ruled that full faith and credit does not require states to adopt other state's practices regarding time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Such enforcement measures are subject to the \"even-handed\" control of local state forums.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54593:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54594:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54594:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Communications Act of 1934, AT&T must file \"tariffs\" containing all its charges for interstate services and all \"classifications, practices and regulations affecting such charges\" with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Under section 203(c) of the Act, a common carrier, such as AT&T, may not \"extend to any person any privileges or facilities in such communication, or employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as specified in such [tariff].\"In 1989, AT&T sold Central Office Telephone, Inc. its Software Defined Network, a long-distance service. Subsequently, Central Office experienced problems with the service and withdrew from the contract. Central Office sued AT&T in Federal District Court, asserting state-law claims for breach of contract and for tortious interference with contractual relations for failure to deliver various service, provisioning, and billing options in addition to those set forth in the tariff. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's damages award.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54594:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54594:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54594:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-1 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Communications Act's filed-tariff requirements pre-empt Central Office Telephone, Inc.'s state-law claims. Invoking the \"filed-rate\" doctrine, under which the rate a carrier duly files is the only lawful charge, the Court denied Central Office's claims of AT&T's failure to fulfill promised preferences not specified in its tariff filed with the FCC. \"Because [Central Office Telephone, Inc.] asks for privileges not included in the tariff,\" wrote Justice Scalia, \"its state-law claims are barred in either case.\" Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54594:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54595:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54595:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n18 USC section 924(c)(1) subjects a person who \"uses or carries a firearm\" \"during and in relation to\" a \"drug trafficking crime\" to a 5-year mandatory prison term. In 96-1654, police officers found a handgun locked in Frank J. Muscarello's truck's glove compartment. Muscarello was transporting marijuana for sale in his truck. Muscarello argued that his \"carrying\" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word \"carries.\" In 96-8837, federal agents found drugs and guns in Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana's car at a drug-sale point. The Court of Appeals, in both cases, found that the defendants had violated section 924(c)(1).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54595:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54595:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54595:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the phrase \"carries a firearm\" applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Exploring the meaning of \"carry,\" Justice Breyer concluded, among other things, that the statute's basic purpose to combat the dangerous combination of drugs and guns does not support limiting \"carry\" to an \"on the person\" application. In a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that \"carries a firearm\" means bearing a firearm in a manner as to be ready to use it as a weapon.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54595:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54596:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54596:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPhilip Lewis was a passenger on a motorcycle that was involved in a high-speed police chase. The chase ended when the motorcycle's driver lost control and tipped the bike over, hurling both riders to the pavement. James Smith, one of two pursuing Sacramento county sheriff's deputies, was unable to stop his car in time and skidded into Philip, causing fatal injuries. Philip's parents, Teri and Thomas Lewis, accused Smith and the Sacramento county police department of deliberate and reckless conduct which ultimately deprived their son of his due process right to life and his protection against unconstitutional seizure. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court decision favoring Smith, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54596:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54596:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54596:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision the Court first ruled that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standards prevented its illegal seizure protections from applying to high-speed police chases. Such incidents are merely pursuits and do not constitute actual seizures, especially if they fail due to the death of the subject. Moreover, addressing the Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the Court held that Smith's actions, while perhaps unwise, were not intended to injure or kill those pursued. As such, the negligent infliction of harm during a police chase does not violate due process since it is not an unexpectedly shocking or egregious result under the circumstances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54596:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54597:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54597:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLexecon Inc. was a defendant in a class action lawsuit. Under 28 USC section 1407(a), the lawsuit was transferred for pretrial proceedings to the District of Arizona. Section 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact \"to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,\" but provides that the Panel \"shall\" remand any such action to the original district \"at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings.\" After claims against it were dismissed, Lexecon brought suit against Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach and others (Milberg) in the class action lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois. Ultimately, the Panel, under section 1407(a), ordered the case transferred to the District of Arizona. Afterwards, Lexecon moved for the Arizona District Court to remand the case to Illinois. Milberg filed a countermotion requesting the Arizona District Court to invoke section 1404(a) to \"transfer\" the case to itself for trial.Ultimately, the court assigned the case to itself and the Court of Appeals affirmed its judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54597:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54597:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54597:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a district court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to section 1407(a) has no authority to invoke section 1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. The Court noted that the Panel's section 1407(a) instructions are crouched in the word \"shall,\" which \"creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.\" Justice Souter wrote for the Court that, \"the straightforward language imposing the Panel's responsibility to remand... bars recognizing any self-assignment power in a transferee court.\" The opinion was unanimous except insofar as Justice Antonin Scalia did not join Part II-C.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54597:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54598:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54598:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAngel Jaime Monge was convicted on three counts of violating California's drug laws, all felonies. Under California's \"three-strikes\" law a convicted felon with one prior felony conviction will have his prison term doubled. The state sought to have Monge's sentence enhanced based on a previous assault conviction and the resulting prison term. Subsequently the California trial court doubled his sentence and added a one-year enhancement for the prior prison term. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal ruled that the evidence was insufficient to trigger the sentence enhancement because the prior conviction allegations were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, a retrial to substantiate the allegations would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The California Supreme Court reversed the double jeopardy ruling, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause, though applicable in the capital sentencing context, does not extend to noncapital sentencing proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54598:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54598:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54598:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect convicted criminals from a second sentencing proceeding in noncapital cases. State prosecutors can try a second time to convince a court to impose an enhanced sentence under a state's \"three-strikes\" law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54598:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54599:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54599:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nArnold Hohn was convicted, among other things, of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Two years after his conviction became final, the Supreme Court decided that the term \"use\" in 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) required active employment of the firearm. Hohn filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his Section 942(c)(1) conviction on the ground that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove use of a firearm. While his motion was pending before the district court, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires a Section 2255 petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability from a circuit justice or judge before he can appeal the denial of a Section 2255 petition. 28 U.S.C. Section 2253(c)(1). The district court denied Hohn's petition and he appealed. The court of appeals treated the notice of appeal as an application for a certificate of appealability, and a three-judge panel declined to issue a certificate. Hohn then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the denial of the certificate, seeking to invoke the Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54599:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54599:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54599:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. A certificate application is a \"case in\" the court of appeals under Section 1254(1). It presents an immediate and redressable injury, and there is adversity as well as the other requisite qualities of a case. Indeed, Hohn's application moved through the Eighth Circuit as cases in general do, yielding a decision that has been regarded as precedential. Many other factors confirm this conclusion as well. This decision overrules that portion of House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 44 (1945) (per curiam), which held that the Court lacks statutory certiorari jurisdiction to review denials of certificates of probable cause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54599:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54600:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54600:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which completely extinguished all aboriginal claims to Alaska land. ANCSA revoked the Neets'aii Gwich'in Indians' reservation surrounding the Village of Venetie. Subsequently, two Native corporations established for the Neets'aii Gwich'in elected to use an ANCSA provision allowing them to take title to former reservation lands in return for forgoing the statute's monetary payments and transfers of nonreservation land. The title to the reservation was ultimately transferred to the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Tribe). In 1986, Alaska entered into a joint venture with a private contractor to construct a public school in Venetie. Afterwards, the Tribe notified the contractor that it owed the Tribe approximately $161,000 in taxes for conducting business activities on its land. The Federal District Court held that, because the Tribe's ANCSA lands were not \"Indian country,\" the Tribe lacked the power to impose a tax upon nonmembers. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54600:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54600:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54600:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Tribe's land is not \"Indian country.\" \"As noted, only one Indian reservation, the Annette Island Reserve, survived ANCSA,\" explained Justice Thomas in a footnote, [o]ther Indian country exists in Alaska post-ANCSA only if the land in question meets the requirements of a 'dependent Indian community' under our interpretation of [18 USC section 1151 (b)], or if it constitutes 'allotments' under [18 USC section 1151 (c)].\" \"The Tribe's ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements,\" concluded Justice Thomas, \"[a]fter the enactment of ANCSA, the Tribe's lands are neither 'validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such,' nor are they under the superintendence of the Federal Government.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54600:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54601:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54601:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJoseph Oncale, a male, filed a complaint against his employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., alleging that he was sexually harassed by co-workers, in their workplace, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (\"Title VII\"). On appeal from a decision supporting a district court's ruling against Oncale, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54601:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54601:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54601:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that while Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace, it does bar all forms of discrimination \"because of\" sex. Such discrimination, whether motivated by sexual desire or not, is actionable so long at it places its victim in an objectively disadvantageous working condition, regardless of the victim's gender.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54601:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54602:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54602:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile in route to testify, Alan Shelby, a dangerous prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences, escaped custody. An ATF Agent, based on an informant's information, observed a person resembling Shelby at Hernan Ramirez's home in Boring, Oregon. Subsequently, the Government obtained a \"no-knock\" warrant to enter and search the home. Executing the warrant, officers broke a single window in Ramirez's home. Awakened, Ramirez fired a pistol into the garage ceiling. After being arrested, because of a stash of weapons in his garage, Ramirez was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of firearms. Shelby was not found. Granting Ramirez's motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of the weapons, the District Court found that the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment because there were \"insufficient exigent circumstances\" to justify the police officer's destruction of property in their execution of the warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54602:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54602:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54602:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not hold police officers to a higher standard than the test articulated in Richards v. Wisconsin. In Richards, the Court held that a no-knock entry was justified if police had a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be dangerous, futile, or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime, when a no-knock entry resulted in the destruction of property. \"Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to suppression,\" noted the Chief Justice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54602:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54603:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54603:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring the 1993 investigation of the White House Travel Office (\"Travelgate\"), Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W. Foster, Jr., met with an attorney from Swidler & Berlin's law firm named James Hamilton. Nine days later, Foster committed suicide. During a subsequent investigation into the legalities of Travelgate, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Hamilton's notes about his meeting with Foster. When Swidler & Berlin challenged Starr's subpoena as a violation of the attorney-client privilege, a district court agreed. On appeal from an appellate court reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54603:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54603:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54603:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court reminded that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote public observance of the law by encouraging complete and truthful communication between attorneys and their clients. Confidentiality, even after the client's death, is essential for such honesty in both criminal and civil contexts. The Court held that absent a posthumous application of the attorney-client privilege, people would be likely to withhold information for fear of their friends' or family's reputation, civil liability, and general well-being.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54603:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54604:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54604:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1990, Kenneth Eugene Bousley pleaded guilty to \"using\" a firearm \"during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime,\" in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Ultimately, Bousley sough habeas relief, claiming his guilty plea lacked a factual basis because a connection between the firearms, located in the bedroom, and the location where the drug trafficking occurred, in the garage, was not shown in either the evidence or the plea. Dismissing the petition, the District Court found that a factual basis for the plea existed because the guns were in close proximity to the drugs and were readily accessible. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Bousley's argument, among others, that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was misinformed about the elements of a section 924(c)(1) offense.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54604:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54604:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54604:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that, although Bousley's claim was procedurally defaulted, Bousley may be entitled to a hearing on the merits of it if he makes the necessary showing to relieve the default. The Court's opinion made Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), which held that section 924(c)(1)'s \"use\" element requires the Government to show \"active employment of the firearm,\" retroactive. Accordingly, the Court ruled that Bousley need demonstrate no more than that he did not \"use\" a firearm as defined in Bailey to be entitled to have his defaulted claim of an unintelligent plea considered on its merits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54604:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54605:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54605:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1979, the United States sued Chris W. Beggerly and the Beggerly family to quiet title to Horn Island, located within the state of Mississippi, for a federal park. The Government argued that Beggerly did not have clear title because the Government had never patented the disputed land after acquiring it as part of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1982, a settlement quieted title in the Government's favor. However, in 1994, with new evidence, Beggerly sued, seeking to set aside the settlement agreement and obtain damages. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found jurisdiction under the Quiet Title Act and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as an \"independent action.\" The appellate court then vacated the settlement agreement and instructed the District Court to quiet title in Beggerly's favor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54605:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54605:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54605:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that this was a sufficient basis to justify reopening the judgment. \"[A]n independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, \"it should be obvious that [the Beggerlys'] allegations do not nearly approach this demanding standard.\" The Court also concluded that the Court of Appeals extension of the Quiet Title Act's statutory period by equitable tolling was unwarranted, given its generous nature. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54605:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54606:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54606:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring a visit to her dentist's office, in order to fill a cavity, Sidney Abbott disclosed that although she did not manifest any obvious symptoms she carried the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). When her dentist, Randon Bragdon, refused to treat her in his office, offering to conduct any necessary work at a hospital for no extra charge other than use of the facilities, Abbott challenged his policy as discriminatory. After both a federal trial and an appeals court ruled in Abbott's favor, Bragdon appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54606:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54606:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54606:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that although the ADA does not force care-givers to treat an \"individual [who] poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others,\" it also prohibits discrimination against any individual \"on the basis of disability in the enjoyment of the services of any place of public accommodation by any person who operates [such] a place.\" The Court then reasoned that since HIV \"substantially limits\" major life activities, such as reproduction, the infection is a \"disability\" that entitles its victims to ADA protections. Having said this, however, the Court concluded that only care-givers can determine if treating an HIV-positive individual would constitute a \"direct threat\" to themselves or others. Therefore, the Court remanded for further risk assessment based on objective medical evidence or risk.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54606:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54608:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54608:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTextron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local 187 are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that required Textron to notify the Union before entering into any agreement to \"subcontract out\" work that would otherwise be performed by Union members. In 1994, Textron announced plans to subcontract out work that would have caused approximately one-half of the Union members to lose their jobs. Subsequently, the Union filed suit, alleging that Textron had fraudulently induced the Union to sign the collective-bargaining agreement. The complaint invoked section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over \"suits for violation of contracts\" between an employer and a labor organization. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the cause of action alleged did not come within section 301(a). The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54608:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54608:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54608:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that neither it nor the lower federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction under section 301 because the Union's complaint alleged no violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. \"Suits for violation of contracts\" under [section 301(a)] are not suits that claim a contract is invalid, but suits that claim a contract has been violated, wrote Justice Scalia. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer filed concurring opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54608:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54609:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54609:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring the 1992 race for Arkansas' Third Congressional District, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC) -- a state-owned public television broadcaster -- sponsored a debate between the major party candidates. Running as an independent candidate with little popular support, Ralph Forbes sought to participate in the debate but was denied permission. After unsuccessfully challenging AETC's refusal in district court, Forbes appealed and won a reversal. AETC then appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54609:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54609:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54609:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that public broadcasters could selectively exclude participants from their sponsored debates, so long as these were not designed as \"public forums.\" The Court found that by reserving participation rights only to candidates for a particular congressional district, rather then hosting an open-microphone format, and selecting among those which were eligible to participate, based on objective indications of their popular support rather then their view points, AETC's debate was a \"nonpublic forum.\" As such, AETC could decide who should and should not participate in its sponsored event.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54609:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54610:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54610:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLynne Kalina, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for King County, Washington, commenced criminal proceedings against Rodney Fletcher, in connection with a school robbery, by filing the appropriate documents. Included in those documents was a \"Certification for Determination of Probable Cause.\" Based on the certification, the trial court found probable cause, and Fletcher was arrested. Kalina's certification contained two inaccurate factual statements: that Fletcher had \"never been associated with the school in any manner and did not have permission to enter the school or to take any property,\" and that Fletcher had been identified asking for an appraisal of a computer stolen from the school. Subsequently, Fletcher sued Kalina for damages, alleging that she had violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Federal District Court denied her motion for summary judgment, holding that she was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity and that whether qualified immunity would apply was a question of fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54610:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54610:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54610:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that section 1983 may create a damages remedy against a prosecutor for making false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant, since such conduct is not protected by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Noting that the Fourth Amendment requires that arrest warrants be based \"upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,\" Justice Stevens wrote that,\" [e]ven when the person who makes the constitutionally required 'Oath or affirmation' is a lawyer, the only function that she performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness.\" Thus, section 1983 may, under some circumstances, provide a damages remedy against such a prosecutor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54610:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54611:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54611:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) program, lawyers must deposit their client's funds into a special interest-bearing \"NOW\" account upon determination that the funds could not earn the client interest or compensate for other financial and accounting fees. Interest federally funded interest accrued on IOLTA accounts is then paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF) which supports legal services for low-income persons. Acting on behalf of others opposed to IOLTA, the Washington Legal Foundation (the \"Foundation\") challenged TEAJF's receipt and use of the IOLTA funds. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a favorable district court decision, the Supreme Court granted the Foundation certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54611:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54611:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54611:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that TEAJF's used of IOLTA interest funds violated the Takings Clause which prohibits the taking of \"private property for public use, without just compensation.\" The Court noted that since the principal client fees deposited into the IOLTA account are private property, any accrued interest on such fees attaches as a property right incident to ownership of the underlying principal. Thus, since they may not redistribute the principal deposits, TEAJF is also prohibited from assigning any interest accumulated thereon.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54611:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54612:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54612:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, Citizens For A Better Environment, a environmental protection organization, filed an enforcement action for relief under the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986's (EPCRA) Citizen-Suit Provision. Citizens alleged that the Chicago Steel And Pickling Company had violated the EPCRA by failing to file timely toxic-and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports since 1988. Ultimately, Chicago Steel filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies by the time the complaint was acted on. Arguing this fact and that the EPCRA does not allow suit for purely historical violations, Chicago Steel filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Citizens' allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for purely past violations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54612:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54612:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54612:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and the Court did not answer the question. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held, because none of the relief sought would likely remedy its alleged injury in fact, that Citizens For A Better Environment lacked standing to maintain suit and that the Court and lower federal courts lack the jurisdiction to entertain it. While all nine Justices agreed that the organization lacked standing, they disagreed on the reasons. Lacking jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the EPCRA authorizes suits for purely past violations. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Stephen G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote concurring opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54612:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54613:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54613:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile defending himself before a military court martial on, among other things, substance abuse charges, airman Edward G. Scheffer sought to introduce his polygraph examination results. The results indicated there was \"no deception\" in Scheffer's denial that he used drugs while enlisted. Relying on Military Rule of Evidence 707 (\"Rule 707\"), prohibiting the use of polygraph results in court-martial proceedings, the military judge refused Scheffer's request to admit his results into evidence. On successive appeals, following his conviction on all charges, the Air Force Court of Appeals affirmed but the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed, finding the evidentiary exclusion to be unconstitutional. The United States appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54613:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54613:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54613:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that Rule 707 was consistent with the legitimate interest of state and federal authorities to admit only reliable evidence. In addition to noting the even-handed scope of Rule 707, excluding from evidence both favorable and unfavorable polygraph results, the Court emphasized the poor reliability of polygraph evidence as a whole. In the absence of sounder detection methods, the Court noted that the fundamental premise of the criminal justice system is that juries are the ultimate and most reliable evaluators of credibility and truthfulness.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54613:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54614:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54614:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) prohibits anyone from \"willfully\" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The Government presented evidence at Sillasse Bryan's trial to show that he did not have a federal license to deal in firearms, that he was dealing in firearms, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful. No evidence was presented that Bryan was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that Bryan could be convicted only if he knew of the federal licensing requirement. The trial judge instructed that a person acts \"willfully\" if he acts with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, but that he need not be aware of the specific law that his conduct may be violating. A jury found Bryan guilty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the instruction was proper and that the Government had shown that Bryan had acted willfully.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54614:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54614:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54614:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the term \"willfully\" in section 924(a)(1)(D) requires proof only that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, not that he also knew of the federal licensing requirement. Justice Stevens wrote for that court that \"the willfulness requirement of [section 924(a)(1)(D)] does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required.\" In a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that ambiguously worded criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54614:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54615:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54615:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986, Garrit Bates was appointed to serve as the Acme Institute of Technology's treasurer. In 1987, James Jackson, as Acme's president, signed a program participation agreement with the Department of Education that authorized the school to receive student loan checks through the Title IV Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program. Under the GSL program, governing regulations required Acme to return a portion of a loan if the student withdrew from Acme before the term ended. In 1987, Jackson and Bates began a practice of not making GSL refunds. Ultimately, in 1994, Bates was indicted on of \"knowingly and willfully misapplying\" federally insured student loan funds, in violation of 20 USC section 1097(a). The District Court dismissed Bates's indictment because it lacked an allegation of his \"intent to injure or defraud the United States.\" Reinstating the prosecution, the Court of Appeals concluded that section 1097(a) required the Government to prove only that Bates knowingly and willfully misapplied Title IV funds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54615:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54615:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54615:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the specific intent to injure or defraud someone, whether the United States or another, is not an element of the misapplication of funds proscribed by section 1097(a). Justice Ginsburg wore for the Court that, \"the text of [section 1097(a)] does not include an 'intent to defraud' state of mind requirement, and we ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.\" In contrast, Justice Ginsburg noted that 20 USC section 1097(d), which makes it a felony \"knowingly and willfully\" to \"destroy or conceal any record relating to the provision of assistance under [Title IV] with intent to defraud the United States\" contained an \"intent to defraud\" element.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54615:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54616:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54616:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Eugene Woodard's death sentence was finalized, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority commenced a clemency investigation. The Authority informed Woodard of his voluntary interview and clemency hearing. Ultimately, Woodard filed suit, alleging that Ohio's clemency process violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that Woodard had failed to establish a life or liberty interest protected by due process arising out of the clemency proceeding itself. The appellate court, however, also held that Woodard's pretrial life and liberty interests were protected because a minimal amount of due process attached to clemency due to its distance from trial. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a determination as to what that process should be.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54616:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54616:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54616:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court unanimously held that Ohio had not violated the Woodard's privilege against compelled self-incrimination by giving him the option of voluntarily participating in a clemency interview without the benefit of counsel or a grant of immunity for any statements. In an 8-1 split, with Justice John Paul Stevens dissenting, the Court held that Ohio's clemency procedures do not violate due process. The eight-member majority was unable to agree on an opinion as to the extent of due process protections required in clemency proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54616:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54618:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54618:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRamon Martinez-Villareal was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Arizona. His first three federal habeas corpus petitions were denied because he had not exhausted his state remedies. Martinez-Villareal claimed in his fourth habeas petition that he was incompetent to be executed. The District Court dismissed that claim as premature, but granted the writ on other grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed the writ. Martinez-Villareal moved to reopen his petition despite the fact that review of his incompetency claim might be prevented by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, a prisoner must ask the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to consider such a petition. By now Arizona had obtained a warrant for Martinez-Villareal's execution. Subsequently, he was found fit to be executed. The District Court denied another motion to reopen his incompetency claim, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under AEDPA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the law did not apply to a petition that raises only a competency-to-be-executed claim and that Martinez-Villareal did not, therefore, need authorization to file his petition in the District Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54618:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54618:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54618:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled Martinez-Villareal cannot be barred from raising his incompetency claim in a successive petition because his claim was really amended. The ban imposed by the AEDPA only covers truly successive petitions. \"To hold otherwise,\" declared Rehnquist, \"would mean that a dismissal of a first habeas petition for technical procedural reasons would bar the prisoner from ever obtaining federal habeas review.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54618:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54619:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54619:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPursuant to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), the United States Forest Service developed a Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest. The Plan sets logging goals, selects the areas suited to timber production, and determines which probable methods of timber harvest are appropriate, but it does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees. Ultimately, the Sierra Club filed suit, alleging that erroneous analysis leads the Plan wrongly to favor logging and clearcutting. The District Court granted the Forest Service summary judgment, finding that the Forest Service had acted lawfully in making the various challenged determinations. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, finding both that the Sierra Club had standing to bring suit, and that since the suit was \"ripe for review,\" there was no need to wait \"until a site-specific action occurs,\" held that the Plan improperly favored clearcutting and therefore violated the NFMA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54619:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54619:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54619:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial review. Justice Breyer wore for the Court that \"'withhold court consideration' at present will not cause the parties significant 'hardship.'\" \"[B]efore the Forest Service can permit logging, it must focus upon a particular site, propose a specific harvesting method, prepare an environmental review, permit the public an opportunity to be heard, and (if challenged) justify the proposal in court,\" continued Justice Breyer, \"[t]he Sierra Club thus will have ample opportunity later to bring its legal challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and more certain.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54619:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54620:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54620:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1990, Randy G. Spencer began serving concurrent three-year sentences for convictions of felony stealing and burglary. In 1992, Spencer was released, but later that year his parole was revoked and he was returned to prison. Seeking to invalidate his parole revocation, Spencer filed unsuccessful habeas petitions in state court. Spencer then filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he had not received due process in the parole revocation proceedings. In 1993, Spencer was re-released on parole before the District Court addressed the merits of his habeas petition. Subsequently, the court dismissed Spencer's petition as moot. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54620:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54620:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54620:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the expiration of Spencer's sentence caused his petition to be moot because it no longer presented an Article III case or controversy. The Court concluded that once a petitioner's sentence has expired he must demonstrate a concrete and continuing injury to maintain suit. Accordingly, the Court rejected that Spencer's asserted injuries established collateral consequences sufficient to state an Article III case or controversy. \"The reincarceration that he incurred as a result of that action is now over, and cannot be undone,\" wrote Justice Scalia. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54620:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54622:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54622:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act (\"Act\"). In the first, the City of New York, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two health care unions, challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State of New York. In the second, the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of its individual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refiners and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a district court held the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54622:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54622:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54622:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected (i.e. vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect \"amended\" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the \"finely wrought\" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54622:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54623:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54623:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSandra K. Forney applied for Social Security disability benefits. A Social Security Judge determined Forney was minimally disabled, but that she was not disabled enough to qualify for benefits. Consequently she was denied her disability claim. The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council denied Forney's request for review. Forney then sought judicial review in federal District Court. The District Court found that the final determination was inadequately supported by the evidence and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. Forney appealed the remand order to the Court of Appeals. She contended that the agency's denial of benefits should be reversed outright. The Court of Appeals did not hear her claim, however, for it decided that Forney did not have the legal right to appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54623:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54623:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54623:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a person seeking Social Security disability benefits may appeal to a federal Court of Appeals when a District Court remands the case to the agency for further proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54623:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54624:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54624:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt Vincent Edwards, Reynolds A. Wintersmith, Horace Joiner, Karl V. Fort, and Joseph Tidwell's trial for \"conspiring\" to \"possess with intent to...distribute [mixtures containing two] controlled substances,\" the jury was instructed that the Government must prove that the conspiracy involved measurable amounts of \"cocaine or cocaine base (crack).\" After the jury returned guilty verdicts, the District Judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioners' illegal conduct involved both cocaine and crack. On appeal, the petitioners argued that their sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack, because the word \"or\" in the jury instruction meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine. The United States Sentencing Guidelines treats cocaine more leniently than crack. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54624:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54624:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54624:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that \"the judge was authorized to determine for sentencing purposes whether crack, as well as cocaine, was involved in the offense-related activities.\" Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that \"[t]he Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this one to determine both the amount and the kind of 'controlled substances' for which a defendant should be held accountable -- and then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind. Consequently, regardless of the jury's actual, or assumed, beliefs about the conspiracy, the Guidelines nonetheless require the judge to determine whether the 'controlled substances' at issue -- and how much of those substances -- consisted of cocaine, crack, or both.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54624:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54625:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54625:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHidalgo County agreed to take federal prisoners into its custody in return for federal money. During this agreement, Brigido Marmolejo, the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Texas, and Mario Salinas, his deputy, accepted money and two watches and a truck respectively, from Homero Beltran-Aguirr, a federal prisoner housed in the county jail, in exchange for permitting his girlfriend to visit him. Ultimately, Salinas was charged with one count of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC section 1962(c), one count of conspiracy to violate RICO, section 1962(d), and two counts of bribery, section 666(a)(1)(B). The jury convicted him on all but the substantive RICO count. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54625:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54625:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54625:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 666(a)(1)(B) does not require the Government to prove the bribe in question had a demonstrated effect upon federal funds. Additionally, the Court held that, to be convicted of conspiracy to violate RICO under section 1962(d), the conspirator need not himself have committed or agreed to commit the two or more predicate acts, such as bribery, requisite for a substantive RICO offense under section 1962(c). Justice Kennedy reasoned that section 666(a)(1)(B)'s \"expansive, unqualified language, both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered\" did not support the position that federal funds must be affected for a violation to occur.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54625:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54627:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54627:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) imposes recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon political committees which receive more than $1,000 in \"contributions\" or which make more than $1,000 in \"expenditures\" in a year \"for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.\" Certain assistance does not count toward the expenditure cap if it takes the form of a \"communication\" by a \"membership organization or corporation\" \"to its members\" as long as the organization is not \"organized primarily for the purpose of influencing [any individual's] nomination... or election.\" A complaint filed by a group of voters asked the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to order the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to make public the information that FECA demands of political committees. Ultimately, the FEC found that AIPAC was not a political committee because its major purpose was not the nomination or election of candidates. The en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the FEC's major purpose test improperly interpreted FECA's definition of a political committee.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54627:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54627:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54627:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that voters seeking information, to which they believe FECA entitles them, have standing to challenge the FEC's decision not to bring an enforcement action. Because FECA seeks to address the voters' injury, the failure to obtain relevant information, Justice Breyer concluded that the voters had prudential standing. Furthermore, because the voters' inability to obtain information constitutes an \"injury in fact,\" continued Justice Breyer, the voters had standing under Article III. The Court did not address the FEC's major purpose test, allowing the FEC to address the issue under newly proposed rules. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54627:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54628:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54628:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, a partnership mortgaged its interest in the Louisiana equivalent of a leasehold estate on a parcel of real property in New Orleans to Regions Bank of Louisiana. The partnership then granted a second mortgage to Mary Anna Rivet, Minna Ree Winer, Edmond G. Miranne, and Edmond G. Miranne, Jr. Later, the partnership filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of the estate to the Bank, which sold the property. Rivet filed suit in Louisiana state court, alleging that the transfer of the property without satisfying their rights under the second mortgage violated state law. The Bank removed the action to federal court, contending that federal-question jurisdiction existed because the prior Bankruptcy Court orders extinguished Rivet's rights. Denying Rivet's motion to remand, the District Court granted the Bank summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that removal is proper where a plaintiff's state cause of action is completely precluded by a prior federal judgment on a federal question.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54628:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54628:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54628:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a defense claim of preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment provides no basis for removal and emphasized that the claim is properly made in state proceedings. Differing the case from a removable case governed by a preemptive federal statute, Justice Ginsburg wrote that the \"prior federal judgment does not transform the plaintiff's state-law claims into federal claims but rather extinguishes them altogether.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54628:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54629:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54629:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n18 USC section 922(g)(1) forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any firearm. Section 924(e) requires that a three-time violent felon who violates section 922(g)(1) receive an enhanced sentence. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender's civil rights have been restored, \"unless such... restoration... expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms.\" In 1993, Gerald Caron was convicted of possessing six rifles and shotguns in violation of section 922(g). The District Court enhanced Caron's sentence based, in part, on three Massachusetts convictions. In vacating his sentence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a Massachusetts law that permitted Caron to possess rifles, but not handguns, had restored his civil rights. On remand, the District Court found that, because Massachusetts law allowed Caron to possess rifles, section 921(a)(20)'s \"unless clause\" was not activated. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54629:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54629:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54629:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that \"Massachusetts treats [Caron] as too dangerous to trust with handguns, though it accords this right to law-abiding citizens. Federal law uses this state finding of dangerousness in forbidding [Caron] to have any guns.\" Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that \"the unless clause is activated if a restoration of civil rights 'expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms.' Either the restorations forbade possession of 'firearms' and the convictions count for all purposes, or they did not and the convictions count not at all. The unless clause looks to the terms of the past restorations alone and does not refer to the weapons at issue in the present case. So if the Massachusetts convictions count for some purposes, they count for all and bar possession of all guns.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54629:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54630:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54630:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRandall Ricci owns Rudeway Enterprises, a telemarketing business. After the Arlington Heights police department determined that Ricci lacked the required business license and that one of Ricci's employees had an outstanding warrant, officers went to Rudeway Enterprises to arrest the employee. While arresting the employee, the officers also searched Ricci's business papers without a warrant. Subsequently, Ricci was arrested for violating Section 9-201 of the Village of Arlington Heights Code of Ordinances, which makes it unlawful to operate a business without a license. Ultimately, Ricci filed a claim that the officers violated his civil rights by subjecting him to a full custodial arrest for committing a fine-only offense. The District Court dismissed the claim. Finding the arrest reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court of Appeals rejected Ricci's argument that a full custodial arrest for violation of a fine-only ordinance is constitutionally permissible only if the violation involves a breach of the peace.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54630:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54630:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54630:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court did not answer the question. The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54630:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54631:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54631:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed. Representatives of three of the passengers (petitioners) sued KAL for damages for their decedents' pre-death pain and suffering. While their suit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. In Zicherman, the Court held that the Warsaw Convention permits compensation only for legally cognizable harm and that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) supplies the applicable U.S. law where an airplane crashes on the high seas. DOHSA allows certain relatives of a decedent to sue for their own pecuniary losses, but does not authorize recovery for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Subsequently, the District Court granted KAL's motion to dismiss petitioners' nonpecuniary damages claims on the ground that DOHSA does not permit recovery for such damages. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that general maritime law provides a survival action for pain and suffering damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54631:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54631:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54631:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that \"[b]ecause Congress has chosen not to authorize a survival action for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, there can be no general maritime survival action for such damages.\" Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that the \"comprehensive scope of DOHSA is confirmed by its survival provision, which limits the recovery in such cases to the pecuniary losses suffered by surviving relatives. The Act thus expresses Congress' 'considered judgment' on the availability and contours of a survival action in cases of death on the high seas. For this reason, it cannot be contended that DOHSA has no bearing on survival actions; rather, Congress has simply chosen to adopt a more limited survival provision.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54631:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54632:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54632:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1989, following the Chicago Landmarks Commission's preliminary determination that two of the International College of Surgeons and the United States Section of the International College of Surgeons' (ICS) buildings qualified for protection under the city's Landmarks Ordinance, the city enacted a Designation Ordinance creating a landmark district that included the buildings. After ICS applied for and was denied a permit to demolish all but the facades of the buildings, it sought judicial review of the Commission's decisions, alleging the ordinances and the manner in which the Commission conducted its proceedings violated the Federal and State Constitutions. Chicago removed the case to federal district court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision in favor of the city, ruling that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction of a case containing state law claims for on-the-record review of local administrative action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54632:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54632:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54632:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that a case containing claims that local administrative action violates federal law, but also containing state law claims for on-the-record review of the administrative findings, can be removed to federal district court. The Court reasoned that the landowners' actions fell within the District Court's original jurisdiction over federal questions and that the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. \"Because neither the jurisdictional statutes nor our prior decisions suggest that federal jurisdiction is lacking in these circumstances, we now reverse,\" wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent, in which Justice John Paul Stevens joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54632:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54633:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54633:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid and Linda Beach refinanced their Florida house in 1986 with a loan from Great Western Bank. In 1991, they stopped making mortgage payments. In 1992, Great Western began foreclosure proceedings. While the Beach's acknowledged their default, they alleged that the bank's failure to make disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act gave them the right under federal law to rescind the mortgage agreement. The Florida trial court rejected that defense, holding that any right to rescind had expired in 1989 under federal law which provides that the right of rescission shall expire three years after the loan closes. The state's intermediate appellate court affirmed, as did the Florida Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54633:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54633:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54633:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled no such defense could be raised after the three-year deadline of the federal Truth in Lending Act expires.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54633:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54635:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54635:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRandolph K. Reeves was charged with two counts of felony murder for the sexual assault and murder of Janet Mesner and Victoria Lamm, both of Lincoln, Nebraska. Under Nebraska law, felony murder is a form of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of certain felonies, including sexual assault. A conviction for felony murder renders a defendant eligible for the death penalty; however the jury does not charge the defendant because capital sentencing is a judicial function. In his trial Reeves requested the jury be given other options rather than just felony murder. The trial court judge denied Reeves's motion and he was subsequently convicted on both counts. A three-judge panel sentenced Reeves to death. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. After exhausting his state remedies, Reeves filed a federal habeas corpus petition that the trial court's failure to give the requested instructions was unconstitutional. The District Court granted relief on an unrelated due process claim. The Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's decision, but held that a constitutional error had occurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54635:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54635:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54635:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. The Court held 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, that (1) in capital cases, a state trial court is not required, under the Constitution, to instruct the jury on offenses that are not lesser included offenses of the charged crime under state law; and (2) the Nebraska trial court did not commit federal constitutional error in failing to give the requested jury instructions as to second-degree murder and manslaughter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54635:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54636:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54636:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1992, Robert Joiner, after being diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer, sued General Electric Co. in Georgia state court, alleging that his disease was promoted by workplace exposure to chemical \"PCBs\" and their derivatives, including polychlorinated dibenzofurans (furans) and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxins). Ultimately, Joiner provided the District Court with expert witnesses' depositions that testified that PCBs, furans, and dioxins can promote cancer and that this was the likely cause of his cancer. The court granted GE summary judgment, reasoning that there was no genuine issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins and that his experts' testimony had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of Joiner's expert witnesses. The appellate court applied a stringent standard of review to reach its conclusion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54636:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54636:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54636:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that abuse of discretion, the standard ordinarily applicable to review of evidentiary rulings, is the proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert scientific evidence. Additionally, the Court held that the proper application of the correct standard of review indicates that the District Court did not err in excluding the expert testimony at issue. \"The Federal Rules of Evidence,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, \"leave in place the 'gatekeeper' role of the trial judge in screening such evidence. A court of appeals applying 'abuse of discretion' review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54636:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54637:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54637:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile living on the federal Army base Fort Polk, Debra Faye Lewis was charged with the murder of her four year-old daughter. Under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which provides that \"whoever within... any [federal enclave], is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable... within the jurisdiction of the State... in which such place is situated, ...shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment,\" Lewis' indictment charged a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. Lewis was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the ACA did not apply because Congress made Lewis' acts punishable as federal second-degree murder. The appellate court, however, affirmed Lewis' conviction because the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54637:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54637:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54637:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that, because the ACA does not make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute part of federal law, the federal second-degree murder statute governs Lewis' crime. Because the federal second-degree murder statute does not mandate a life sentence, but rather provides for a sentence of \"any term of years or life,\" Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that Lewis was also entitled to resentencing. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54637:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54638:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54638:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn indictment returned in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri charged Vickie S. Cabrales with various charges of money laundering. The incident alleged that Cabrales deposited $40,000 with the AmSouth Bank of Florida, of which she later withdrew $38,000. The money was traceable to illegal cocaine sales in Missouri. Cabrales moved to dismiss the indictment for improper venue. Because the money-laundering activity occurred entirely in Florida, the court dismissed two of the three counts against Cabrales. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that Article III, the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 required that a person be tried where the charged offense was committed. The court also noted that laundering alleged in the indictment occurred entirely in Florida and that the Government did not assert that Cabrales transported the money from Missouri to Florida.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54638:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54638:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54638:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Missouri is not a place of proper venue for the money-laundering offenses with which Cabrales is charged. Rejecting the Government's \"continuing offense\" argument, under which Cabrales would have been triable in more than one place, the Court noted that the laundering transactions occurred only in Florida, making venue in Missouri improper. The Court also reasoned that if the Government could link Cabrales to the drug-trafficking activity, then she could be prosecuted for those violations in Missouri with her money laundering in Florida shown as overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54638:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54639:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54639:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1996, Keith Schacht filed a state-court suit against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections and several of its employees (defendants), in their \"personal\" and in their \"official\" capacity, alleging that his dismissal violated the Federal Constitution and federal civil rights laws. After removing the case to federal court, the defendants asserted that the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the claims against the Department and its employees in their official capacity. The District Court granted the individual defendants summary judgment on the \"personal capacity\" claims and dismissed the claims against the Department and the individual defendants in their \"official capacity.\" On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the removal had been improper because the presence of even one claim subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar deprives the federal courts of removal jurisdiction over the entire case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54639:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54639:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54639:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a State's claim of an Eleventh Amendment bar to a plaintiff's claims against the state places those claims beyond the power of the federal courts to decide, but that the State may remove the case to a federal court and that the court can decide the nonbarred claims. \"A State's proper assertion of an Eleventh Amendment bar after removal means that the federal court cannot hear the barred claim. But that circumstance does not destroy removal jurisdiction over the remaining claims in the case before us. A federal court can proceed to hear those other claims, and the District Court did not err in doing so,\" concluded Justice Breyer. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54639:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54640:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54640:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides an expedited review process for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases in States that meet certain conditions. California officials stated that they believed they qualified for Chapter 154. Troy Ashmus, a state prisoner sentenced to death, filed a class action suit, which included all capital prisoners in California whose convictions were affirmed on direct appeal after June 6, 1989, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve uncertainty over whether Chapter 154 applied. Holding that California did not qualify for Chapter 154, the District Court enjoined the State from invoking the Chapter in any proceedings involving class members. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit and that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54640:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54640:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54640:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that \"this action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief is not a justiciable case within the meaning of Article III.\" \"If the class members file habeas petitions, and the State asserts Chapter 154, the members obviously can litigate California's compliance with Chapter 154 at that time. Any risk associated with resolving the question in habeas, rather than a pre-emptive suit, is no different from risks associated with choices commonly faced by litigants,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice David H. Souter joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54640:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54641:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54641:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlida Star Gebser, a high school student in the Lago Vista Independent School District (\"Lago Vista\"), had a secret sexual affair with one of her teachers. At the time, Lago Vista had no official procedure for reporting sexual harassment nor any formal anti-harassment policy, as required by federal law. One day, after the two were discovered having sex, the teacher was arrested and fired. Claiming she was harassed in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (the \"Amendments\"), providing that no person \"be subjected to discrimination\" under any federally funded education program or activity, Gebser sought damages against Lago Vista. On appeal from a decision affirming a district court's ruling in favor of Lago Vista, the Supreme Court granted Gebser certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54641:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54641:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54641:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that two minimal criteria must be met in order for an aggrieved party to recover sexual harassment damages under the Amendments. First, the party must show that a school district official, with the ability to institute corrective measures, knew of the forbidden conduct. Second, a showing must be made that despite having knowledge of the forbidden conduct, the educational establishment deliberately failed to respond in a proper manner. The Court concluded that Lago Vista never showed indifference to Gebser's relationship since it never knew, either formally or informally, of its existence. Accordingly, Lago Vista was not liable for sexual harassment damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54641:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54643:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54643:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing Douglas Buchanan's conviction for the capital murders of his father, stepmother, and two brothers, the prosecutor sought the death penalty based on Virginia's aggravating factor that the crime was vile. The trial court instructed the jury that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Buchanan's conduct was vile, \"then you may fix the punishment...at death,\" but \"if you believe from all the evidence that...death...is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment...at life imprisonment.\" Buchanan sought four additional instructions on particular mitigating factors and a general instruction on the concept of mitigating evidence. The court denied Buchanan, refusing to single out certain mitigating factors to the sentencing jury. The jury returned with a verdict for the death penalty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54643:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54643:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54643:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the concept of mitigation generally and on the four mitigating factors did not violate Buchanan's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that the court's instructions, by directing the jury to base the decision on \"all the evidence,\" afforded the jurors an opportunity to consider mitigating evidence and did not constrain the manner in which the jury was able to give effect to mitigation. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, \"'there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors in [Buchanan's] case understood the challenged instructions to preclude consideration of relevant mitigating evidence offered by [Buchanan].'\" Justices Stephen G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg disagreed in a dissent by Justice Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54643:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54644:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54644:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Medicare Act a hospital may obtain a reimbursement for certain graduate medical education (GME) programs for interns and residents by preparing certain reports. The GME Amendment, section 9202(a), of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985 directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine, for a hospital's cost reporting period starting during fiscal year 1984, the amount \"recognized as reasonable\" for GME costs. The Amendment then directs the Secretary to use the 1984 amount, adjusted for inflation, to calculate a hospital's GME reimbursement for subsequent years. The Secretary's \"reaudit\" regulation permits a second audit of the 1984 GME costs to ensure accurate reimbursements in future years. A reaudit of Regions Hospital significantly lowered the Hospital's allowable 1984 GME costs. Subsequently, the Hospital challenged the validity of the reaudit rule. Ultimately, the District Court granted the Secretary summary judgment, concluding that the rule reasonably interpreted Congress' prescription and that the reauditing did not impose an impermissible \"retroactive rule.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54644:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54644:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54644:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the reaudit rule is a reasonable interpretation of the GME Amendment and that it is not impermissibly retroactive. Given that the timing of the \"recognized as reasonable\" determination is silent and thus ambiguous, the Court concluded that, because it reflects a reasonable interpretation of the law, the reaudit rule merits the Court's approbation. \"The Secretary's reaudit rule brings the base-year calculation in line with Congress' pervasive instruction for reasonable cost reimbursement,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54644:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54645:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54645:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard Trest sought a writ of habeas corpus that would cancel the sentence he was serving in Louisiana for armed robbery. The District Court rejected his claim. Trest appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but before hearing the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as a \"procedural default.\" The Court of Appeals ruled that Trent had failed to meet the deadline for filing his federal claims in state court. Though Louisiana had not raised the issue, the Fifth Circuit felt compelled to dismiss the case on its own initiative. Trest appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Fifth Circuit had incorrectly believed that it was required to decide the \"procedural default\" issue sua sponte - that is, without prompting from one of the parties.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54645:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54645:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54645:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. A Court of Appeals is not required to raise an issue of procedural default on its own initiative. In a unanimous opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer observed: \"We are not aware of any precedent stating that a habeas court must raise such a matter where the State itself does not do so.\" The Court held that it was the State's duty to raise issues of procedural default, but did not rule on the question of whether the Court of Appeals retained the option of ruling on the issue sua sponte.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54645:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54646:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54646:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nerry Campbell, a white man, was indicted for second-degree murder by a grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana. Campbell moved to quash the indictment by citing a long history of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons in Evangeline Parish. No African-American had served as a foreperson for the past 16 years despite the fact twenty percent of the registered voters were black. Campbell claimed such practices violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. A Louisiana trial judge denied Campbell's challenge, holding that he lacked standing as a white man complaining about the exclusion of African-Americans from serving as forepersons. The Louisiana Court of Appeal overruled the trial judge and decided Campbell had standing. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54646:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54646:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54646:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Without reaching the merits, the Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that \"a defendant has standing to litigate whether his conviction was procured by means or procedures which contravene due process.\" A white defendant could assert the right of the grand jury to be free of discrimination because racial discrimination in jury selection casts doubt on the integrity of the entire trial process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54646:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54648:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54648:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Hudson was chairman of the First National Bank of Tipton and the First National Bank of Hammon. Hudson used his position to regain bank stock he had used as collateral on defaulted loans through a series of bank loans to other parties. Upon investigation the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) found that the loans were made in violation of several banking statues and regulations. The OCC fined and debarred Hudson for the violations. Later, he faced criminal indictment in federal District Court for violations tied to those same events. Hudson objected, arguing that the indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.\nThe U. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit eventually found for the Government in light of United States v. Halper on the grounds that the original proceedings were civil in nature and not so disproportional to the proven damages to the Government as to qualify as a form of criminal punishment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54648:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54648:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54648:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Circuit's decision based on the distinction made in United States v. Ward between criminal and civil punishments. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to non-criminal penalties, even if the purpose of the penalty is to punish the offenders and deter future offenders. Since the first punishment handed down by the OCC - a Federal Banking Agency, not a court - was not a criminal punishment, the subsequent indictments were upheld.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54648:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54649:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54649:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAloyzas Balsys was subpoenaed by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to testify about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his subsequent immigration to the United States. Fearing prosecution by a foreign nation, Balsys refused the subpoena by claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court ruling granting OSI's subpoena enforcement petition, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54649:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54649:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54649:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that although resident aliens are entitled to the same Fifth Amendment protections as citizen \"persons\" the risk of their deportation is not sufficient to sustain a self-incrimination privilege intended to apply only to the United States government. The Court explained that since the Fifth Amendment does not bind foreign governments, and that would not be subject to domestic enforcement of immunity-for-testimony deals, one could not assert a self-incrimination protection against possible prosecution at their hands.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54649:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54651:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54651:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe U.S. holds in trust the Oklahoma land that the federally recognized Kiowa Tribe owns. In 1990, the then-Chairman of the Tribe's Business Committee signed a promissory note in the Tribe's name in order to purchase stock from Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. The note states that it was signed on tribal lands and provides that nothing in it subjects or limits the Tribe's sovereign rights. After the Tribe defaulted, Manufacturing Technologies sued the Tribe in state court, claiming that the note was executed and delivered beyond tribal lands. The Tribe moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Denying the motion, the trial court entered judgment for Manufacturing Technologies. In affirming, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that Indian tribes are subject to suit in state court for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54651:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54651:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54651:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from civil suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a reservation. Noting that an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity, Justice Kennedy deferred to Congress, which has not abrogated a tribe's immunity from civil suits on contracts. In a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the Court should consider \"whether a tribe is immune from a suit that has no meaningful nexus to the Tribe's land or its sovereign functions.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54651:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54652:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54652:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York Tax Law section 631(b)(6) denies only nonresident taxpayers a state income tax deduction for alimony paid. In 1990, Christopher Lunding and his wife, residents of Connecticut, were required to pay higher taxes on their New York income when the State denied their attempted deduction of a pro rata portion of the alimony Lunding paid a previous spouse. Lunding commenced suit, asserting that section 631(b)(6) discriminates against New York nonresidents in violation of the Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held that section 631(b)(6) was adequately justified because New York residents who are subject to taxation on all of their income regardless of source should be entitled to the benefit of full deduction of expenses, while personal expenses of a nonresident taxpayer are more appropriately allocated to the State of residence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54652:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54652:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54652:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that, in the absence of a substantial reason for the difference in treatment of nonresidents, section 631(b)(6) violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause by denying only nonresidents an income tax deduction for alimony payments. \"The alimony obligation may be of a 'personal' nature, but it cannot be viewed as geographically fixed in the manner that other expenses, such as business losses, mortgage interest payments, or real estate taxes, might be,\" wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54652:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54653:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54653:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act entrusts the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) with discretion to award financial grants to the arts. The NEA's broad decision guidelines are: \"artistic and cultural significance,\" with emphasis on \"creativity and cultural diversity professional excellence,\" and the encouragement of \"public education and appreciation of the arts.\" In 1990, Congress amended the criteria by requiring the NEA to consider \"artistic excellence and artistic merit taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.\" After suffering a funding rejection, Karen Finley, along with three other performance artists and the National Association of Artists' Organizations, challenged the NEA's amended statutory review proceedings as unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. After consecutive district and appellate court rulings in favor of Finley, the Supreme Court granted the NEA certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54653:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54653:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54653:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-to-1 opinion the Court held that, unlike direct sovereign regulation of speech, Congress enjoys wide latitude when setting spending priorities which may indirectly affect certain forms of expression. The funding of one activity believed to be in the public interest, to the exclusion of another, does not constitute viewpoint discrimination. Moreover, the statutory funding guidelines were not impermissibly vague since they involved selective subsidies rather than criminal or regulatory prohibitions. The Court noted that while the amended regulations may add some measure of imprecision to the existing guidelines, they do so to an already highly subjective selection process, made so by the inevitable nature of the subject matter with which it deals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54653:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54654:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54654:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 39. Chapter 39 holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement in the public schools. The State Commissioner of Education may select from various sanctions, including the appointment of a master or a management team and the contracting out of services, when a school district falls short of Chapter 39's accreditation criteria. Under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Texas submitted Chapter 39 to the United States Attorney General for a determination whether any of the sanctions effected voting and thus required preclearance. Ultimately, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights cautioned that such sanctions implementation might violate section 5. Subsequently, Texas sought a declaration District Court that section 5 did not apply to such sanctions. The court concluded that Texas's claim was not ripe.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54654:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54654:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54654:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Texas's claim is not ripe for adjudication. The Court's holding turning on the fact that Texas did not indicate any school district in which an application of Chapter 39 was \"foreseen or even likely.\" Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that, \"we find it too speculative whether the problem Texas presents will ever need solving; we find the legal issues Texas raises not yet fit for our consideration, and the hardship to Texas of biding its time insubstantial.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54654:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54655:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54655:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBoth a judgment lien and federal tax liens encumbered the real property of Francis Romani's Pennsylvania estate, worth $53,001, following his death. The estate's administrator sought a county court's permission to transfer the property to the judgment creditor. The Government objected to the conveyance, arguing that 31 USC section 3713(a), which provides that a Government claim \"shall be paid first\" when a decedent's estate cannot pay all of its debts, prioritized its payment. Nevertheless, the court authorized the conveyance. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The court concluded that Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 modified the Government's preference and recognized the priority of many state claims over federal tax liens.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54655:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54655:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54655:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that section 3713(a) does not require that a federal tax claim be given preference over a judgment creditor's perfected lien on real property. Justice Stevens reasoned that section 3713(a) has been limited by Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, which provides that says a federal lien for back taxes is not valid until the government files proper notice with state or local officials. Accordingly, Justice Stevens wrote that the Tax Lien Act \"represents Congress' detailed judgment as to when the Government's claims for unpaid taxes should yield to many different sorts of interests... in many different types of property... specifically crafted for tax collection purposes.\" Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54655:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54656:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54656:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSection 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act provides that that \"federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.\" The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) interprets section 9 to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple, unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond of occupation. Under this interpretation, the NCUA approved a series of charter amendments adding several unrelated employer groups to the membership of AT&T Family Federal Credit Union, which now has approximately 110,000 members nationwide only 35% of whom are employees of AT&T and its affiliates. Subsequently, a number of private actors brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the NCUA's decision was contrary to law because section 109 unambiguously requires that the same common bond of occupation unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union and members of the new groups did not share a common bond of occupation with AT&T Family Federal Credit Union's existing members. Ultimately, the District Court held that the private interests lack standing to challenge NCUA's decision and the Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54656:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54656:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54656:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that banks and professional associations have prudential standing under the APA to seek federal-court review of the NCUA's interpretation of section 109. By the same majority, the Court also held that the NCUA's interpretation of section 109, under which a common bond of occupation must unite only the members of each unrelated employer group, is impermissible. After concluding that the banks and professional associations' interests fall within the \"zone of interests\" protected by section 109, Justice Thomas wrote that the NCUA's interpretation \"has the potential to read [\"shall be limited\"] out of the statute entirely.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54656:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54657:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54657:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1983, Margaret Kawaauhau sought treatment from Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury. Later, Geiger cancelled Kawaauhau's transfer, by other physicians, to an infectious disease specialist. Ultimately, Kawaauhau required that her right leg be amputated below the knee. In the subsequently malpractice suit, a jury awarded Kawaauhau approximately $355,000 in damages. Geiger, who carried no malpractice insurance, ultimately filed for bankruptcy. Kawaauhau requested the Bankruptcy Court to hold the malpractice judgment nondischargeable under 11 USC section 523(a)(6), which provides that a \"discharge [in bankruptcy]... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt... for willful and malicious injury... to another.\" The court held the debt nondischargeable. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that section 523(a)(6)'s exemption from discharge is confined to debts for an intentional tort, so that a debt for malpractice remains dischargeable because it is based on negligent or reckless conduct.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54657:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54657:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54657:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that \"debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of [section 523(a)(6)].\" Therefore, the debt is dischargeable. Justice Ginsburg wore for the Court that \"[t]he word 'willful' in [section 523(a)(6)] modifies the word 'injury,' indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. Had Congress meant to exempt debts resulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead 'willful acts that cause injury.' Or, Congress might have selected an additional word or words, i.e., 'reckless' or 'negligent,' to modify 'injury.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54657:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54658:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54658:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring a routine check of departing international flight passengers, customs officers discovered $357,144 on the person of Hosep Bajakajian. In addition to charging him, under 31 U.S.C. Section 5316, of attempting to leave the United States with an unreported sum in excess of $10,000 cash, the government also sought forfeiture of the entire $357,144 under 18 U.S.C. Section 982 providing that the deliberate violation of Section 5316 shall result in the forfeiture of \"any property involved in such an offense.\" After having its forfeiture claim rejected in both a district court and the Ninth Circuit, as excessively unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted the government certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54658:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54658:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54658:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that the government's ability to extract fines is limited by the Excessive Fines Clause. The forfeiture of currency, when ordered for a violation of a reporting statute, is a punitive measure which constitutes a \"fine\" under the Eighth Amendment. Noting the importance of making punishments proportional to their crimes, the Court reminded that currency transportation is generally permissible. Bajakajian's failure to do so within statutory reporting guidelines was neither related to other illegal activity nor did it result in loss to the government. Therefore, forfeiture of the entire sum would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54658:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54659:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54659:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the local rent control administrator ordered Edward S. Cohen to refund $31,382.50 in excessive rents he had charged Hilda de la Cruz and other tenants, Cohen sought to discharge his debts under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The tenants filed an adversary proceeding, arguing that the debt Cohen owed to them was nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, which excepts from discharge \"any debt ... for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by ... actual fraud.\" The tenants also sought treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The Bankruptcy Court ruled in their favor, finding that Cohen had committed \"actual fraud\" within the meaning of ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code and that his conduct violated the New Jersey law. The court, therefore, awarded the tenants treble damages totaling $94,147.50, plus attorney's fees and costs. The District Court affirmed, as did the Court of Appeals, which held that debts resulting from fraud are nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, and that the award of treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) in this case was therefore nondischargeable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54659:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54659:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54659:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, The Court ruled that because Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge all liability arising from fraud, treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) awarded on account of the debtor's fraud fall within the scope of the exception. Justice O'Connor wrote, \"The bankruptcy code has long prohibited debtors from discharging liabilities incurred on account of their fraud, embodying a basic policy...of affording relief only to an honest but unfortunate debtor.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54659:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54660:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54660:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), a private-sector labor organization, represents pilots employed by Delta Air Lines. The collective-bargaining agreement between ALPA and Delta includes an \"agency shop\" clause that requires nonunion Delta pilots to pay ALPA a monthly service charge for representing them. 153 Delta pilots challenged in federal-court action the manner in which ALPA calculated agency fees. Under ALPA policy pilots who object to the fee calculation may request arbitration proceedings. When 174 Delta pilots filed objections to the agency-fee calculation, the ALPA treated the objections as requests for arbitration. The arbitrator sustained ALPA's calculation. The District Court concluded that the pilots seeking to challenge the fee calculation must exhaust arbitral remedies before proceeding in court. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found no legal basis for requiring objectors to arbitrate agency-fee challenges when they had not agreed to do so.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54660:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54660:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54660:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled the nonunion pilots cannot be forced to go through arbitration. \"Unless they agree to the procedure, agency-fee objectors may not be required to exhaust an arbitration remedy before bringing their claims in federal court,\" wrote Ginsburg.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54660:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54661:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54661:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder an 1834 compact between New York and New Jersey, Ellis Island was deemed part of New York. It was later determined, by the Supreme Court, that New Jersey would have sovereign rights over all submerged lands on its side of the Hudson River. During the time Ellis Island was used to receive immigrants, the Federal Government filled around the island adding some 24.5 acres to its original size over 42 years. When immigration was diverted from Ellis Island in 1954, New York and New Jersey asserted rival sovereignty claims over the Island's filled portions. New Jersey finally invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to solve the matter once and for all time.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54661:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54661:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54661:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the 1834 compact between the two states, although granting New York sovereignty over Ellis Island, did not support an inference that any portions added to the island's New Jersey side would also belong to New York. The lack of meets and bounds descriptions in the compact indicated that it merely applied to Ellis Island as it existed in 1834, and did not contemplate ownership of expanded portions. Moreover, the Court noted that under the common law doctrine of avulsion, sudden shoreline changes have no effect on boundaries. Thus, since New Jersey had sovereignty over previously submerged portions of Ellis Island, it would retain such sovereignty when these portions were filled until raised above the water line on its side of the Island.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54661:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54662:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54662:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe site of a chemical manufacturing plant was polluted over many years. During much of the time, the companies running the plant were wholly owned subsidiaries of, first, CPC International Inc. (CPC), and later Aerojet- General Corp (Aerojet). By 1981, the federal Environmental Protection Agency had undertaken to have the site cleaned up. To recover some of the money spent, the U.S. filed an action under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2). Section 107 allows the U.S. to seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from, among others, \"any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility.\" The first phase of the trial concerned only liability, and focused on whether CPC and Aerojet had \"owned or operated\" the facility.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54662:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54662:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54662:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, unless the corporate veil may be pierced. But a corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of the facility itself may be held directly liable in its own right as an operator of the facility.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54662:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54663:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54663:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen questioned by federal agents as to the receipt of gifts or money from a company whose employees were members of the union in which he was an officer, James Brogan falsely answered \"no.\" Brogan was subsequently indicted on federal bribery charges and the making of false statements within a federal agency's jurisdiction. Brogan challenged his conviction, arguing that false statements which merely deny wrongdoing, and do not impede federal functions, are protected under the Fifth Amendment. On appeal from an appeals court judgment upholding an adverse district court ruling, the Supreme Court granted Brogan certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54663:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54663:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54663:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the imposition of criminal liability for false statements is not limited only to those falsehoods that pervert governmental functions - it applies to statements \"of whatever kind.\" Moreover, even if the \"exculpatory no\" doctrine did apply to statements that do not impede federal functions, Brogan would not benefit from it since his falsehoods were intended to prevent federal agents from uncovering the truth. The Court concluded by noting that a literal reading of federal laws which prohibit the \"exculpatory no\" defense is consistent with the Fifth Amendment, since the Framers never intended to confer a privilege to lie.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54663:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54664:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54664:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n8 USC section 1326(a) makes it a crime, punishable by up to two years in prison, for a deported alien to return to the United States without special permission. In 1998, Congress added subsection (b)(2), which authorizes a maximum prison term of 20 years for \"any alien described\" in subsection (a), if the initial \"deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony.\" In 1995, Hugo Almendarez-Torres pleaded guilty to violating section 1326. Ultimately, the District Court sentenced Almendarez- Torres to 85 months' imprisonment. The court rejected his argument that, because his indictment failed to mention his aggravated felony convictions, the court could not sentence him to more than the maximum sentence authorized by section 1326(a). In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision which permits the imposition of a higher sentence when the unlawfully returning alien also has a record of prior convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54664:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54664:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54664:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that subsection (b)(2) of 8 USC section 1326(a) is a penalty provision, which authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist, and does not define a separate crime. \"[W]e note that the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism,\" wrote Justice Breyer, \"[t]hat subject matter -- prior commission of a serious crime -- is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine.\" Therefore, neither subsection (b)(2) nor the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment required that the government charge a prior aggravated felony conviction in the alien's indictment for the imposition of a sentence more than 2 years.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54664:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54666:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54666:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1991, Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., terminated agreements licensing several television series, including \"Who's the Boss,\" \"Silver Spoons,\" \"Hart to Hart,\" and \"T. J. Hooker,\" to three television stations owned by C. Elvin Feltner after the stations' royalty payments became delinquent. Columbia sued Feltner after his stations continued to broadcast the programs for copyright infringement. After winning partial summary judgment as to liability on its copyright infringement claims, Columbia attempted to recover statutory damages under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act. The District Court denied Feltner's request for a jury trial and awarded Columbia statutory damages following a bench trial. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that neither section 504(c) nor the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on statutory damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54666:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54666:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54666:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, despite section 504(c) of the Copyright Act's silence, the Seventh Amendment provides the right to a jury trial, which includes a right to a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages. Applying a historical Seventh Amendment analysis, Justice Thomas concluded that \"there is clear and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff.\" \"As a result, if a party so demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of statutory damages under [section 504(c)] in order 'to preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury,'\" wrote Justice Thomas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54666:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54667:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54667:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJanet Scott-Harris filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, the city's mayor, Daniel Bogan, the vice president of the city counsel, Marilyn Roderick, and others, alleging that the elimination of the city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. The jury found the city, Bogan and Roderick liable on the First Amendment claim. The First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city, but affirmed the judgments against Bogan and Roderick. The court held that although Bogan and Roderick had absolute immunity from civil liability for their performance of legitimate legislative activities, their conduct in voting for and signing the ordinance that eliminated Scott-Harris's office was motivated by considerations relating to a particular individual and was therefore administrative rather than legislative in nature.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54667:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54667:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54667:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Local legislators are entitled to the same absolute immunity from civil liability under Section 1983 for their legislative activities as are federal, state and regional legislators. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act itself, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. The acts at issue here were clearly legislative, and the ordinance itself bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54667:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54668:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54668:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to permit a beneficiary of an employer's group health plan to elect continuing coverage when he might otherwise lose that benefit because of a \"qualifying event,\" such as the termination of employment. In 1993, when Moore Medical Corporation fired James Geissal, it told him that COBRA gave him the right to elect continuing coverage under Moore's health plan. Later, Moore informed Geissal that he was not entitled to COBRA benefits because he was already covered by a group plan through his wife's employer. Geissal then filed suit against Moore, alleging that Moore was violating CORBA by renouncing an obligation to provide continuing coverage. Ultimately, a Magistrate Judge concluded that an employee with coverage under another group health plan on the date he elects COBRA coverage is ineligible for COBRA coverage under 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i), which allows an employer to cancel such coverage as of \"the date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of the election... covered under any other group health plan.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54668:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54668:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54668:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that an employer may not deny COBRA continuation coverage under its health plan to an otherwise eligible beneficiary because he is covered under another group health plan at the time he elects COBRA coverage. \"It is undisputed that both before and after James Geissal elected COBRA continuation coverage he was continuously a beneficiary of [his wife's employer's] group health plan,\" wrote Justice Souter, \"[b]ecause he was thus covered before he made his COBRA election, and so did not 'first become' covered under the [his wife's employer's] plan after the date of election, Moore could not cut off his COBRA coverage under the plain meaning of [section 1162(2)(D)(i)].\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54668:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54669:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54669:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Internal Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurers to fully deduct \"loss reserves,\" or unpaid losses. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 altered the deduction formula. Under the Act, increases in loss reserves that constitute \"reserve strengthening,\" or additions to the loss reserve, were excepted from a one time tax benefit because it would result in a tax deficiency. Treasury regulation and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue interpreted the law to say that any increase in loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then determined Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with the government's interpretation. It held reserve strengthening referred only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss reserves.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54669:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54669:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54669:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the IRS interpretation of reserve strengthening seemed a \"reasonable accommodation.\" It was fair and unabusive. Furthermore, the language of the provision was broad enough to embrace all increases in the reserves.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54669:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54670:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54670:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1980, Wayne K. Pfaff developed a new type of computer chip socket for Texas Instruments (TI). In early April 1981, TI confirmed they would order and use Pfaff's socket. No actual socket was made until July 1981. Pfaff applied for a patent in April 1982. A patent was not granted on Pfaff's socket until 1985. After the patent was issued, Pfaff sued Wells Electronics, who had developed a competing socket, for patent infringement. Pfaff claimed that Wells' socket infringed upon six of his patent's claims. The District Court held that Wells' socket violated three of Pfaff's patent claims. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Pfaff had sold the socket to TI more than a year before he applied for a patent. Thus, Wells' socket did not infringe on Pfaff's under the Patent Act of 1952, which states that no one can patent an invention that has been on sale for more than one year before filing a patent application.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54670:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54670:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54670:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled federal patent law does not permit patents to be granted if an invention has been on sale for more than one year in this country before the patent application is filed. Moreover, a patent is on sale when a commercial sale offer has been made and when the inventor has made the invention, prepared drawings, or described the invention enough to be produced.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54670:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54671:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54671:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Darren Boerckel's state convictions of rape, burglary, and aggravated battery were affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The petition asked for relief on six grounds: (1) that Boerckel had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights; (2) that his confession was not voluntary; (3) that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (4) that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest; (5) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (6) that his right to discovery of exculpatory material was violated. In denying the petition, the District Court found that Boerckel had procedurally defaulted his first three claims by failing to include them in his petition to the Illinois Supreme Court. In reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeals concluding that Boerckel had not procedurally defaulted those claims because he was not required to present them in a petition for discretionary review to the Illinois Supreme Court in order to satisfy 28 U. S. C. Sections 2254(b)(1), (c), the exhaustion requirement. Under the exhaustion requirement federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted their claims in state court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54671:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54671:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54671:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision, delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review when that review is part of the State's ordinary appellate review procedure. Justice O'Connor wrote for the court that \"state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the state's established appellate review process.\" Inmates can use federal habeas petitions as shortcuts only if their state's highest court does not allow them to raise all claims before it, she said.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54671:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54672:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54672:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nImmediately after the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Act) changed patent laws to abrogate state's sovereign immunity, College Savings Bank (College) filed a patent infringement suit against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity. Florida Prepaid asked that College's suit be dismissed and that the Act be declared unconstitutional, based on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (517 US 44) which upheld state sovereign immunity. The United States joined College looking to uphold the Act's constitutionality. After agreeing with College, the District Court denied Florida Prepaid's dismissal motion. When the Federal Circuit affirmed, Florida Prepaid appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54672:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54672:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54672:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court began by noting that there was no doubt that the Act intended to abrogate states' immunity from patent infringement. The Court then added that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause give Congress the power to curtail state sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims. The Court reasoned that although the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to pass \"appropriate legislation\" to protect parties from being deprived of property without due process, this in itself does not permit the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Only a showing of a consistent pattern of state patent violations, and a lack of adequate legal remedies to address such violations, would justify a limited effort to suspend a state's sovereign immunity. Since College made no such showing, and since the Act's language was overly broad in its scope, the Court dismissed College's suit and declared unconstitutional corresponding segments of the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54672:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54673:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54673:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nStanley I. Jacobson and other retired employees of Hughes Aircraft Company were beneficiaries of Hughes Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan. Jacobson and the others claimed in their class-action lawsuit that Hughes violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the federal pension protection law, when it amended the plan twice in response to a $1.2 billion dollar surplus. ERISA requires that some of the surplus be distributed to cover employees when a pension plan is terminated. Hughes' first amendment to the plan established an early retirement program that provided significant additional retirement benefits to certain eligible active employees. The second amendment disallowed new participants from contributing to the plan. Jacobson and others argued that Hughes had terminated one plan and started another by stopping its pension plan contributions. Thus, the company had used the plan's surplus to benefit new employees at the expense of the retirees. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court by finding that the early retirement program and noncontributory benefit structure were prohibited by the ERISA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54673:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54673:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54673:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held Hughes did not violate the ERISA by establishing an early retirement program and creating a noncontributory benefit structure for new participants. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, said the plan amendments \"did not affect the rights of pre-existing plan participants and Hughes did not use the surplus for its own benefit.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54673:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54675:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54675:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOver several years, the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs contracted with Blaze Construction Company to build, repair, and improve roads on several Indian reservations located in Arizona. When the various contracts expired, the Arizona Department of Revenue issued a tax deficiency assessment against Blaze for its failure to pay Arizona's transaction privilege tax, the tax levied on the gross receipts of companies doing business in the state, on the proceeds from its contracts with the Bureau. Blaze protested the assessment and prevailed in administrative proceedings. On review, the Arizona Tax Court granted summary judgment for the Department. In reversing, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that federal law pre-empted the tax's application to Blaze. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54675:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54675:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54675:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a \"State generally may impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon a private company's proceeds from contracts with the Federal Government, regardless of whether the federal contractor renders its services on an Indian reservation.\" Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, \"[a]bsent a constitutional immunity or congressional exemption, federal law does not shield Blaze (a federal contractor) from Arizona's transaction privilege tax.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54675:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54676:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54676:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo U.S. District Judges, William M. Acker, Jr., and U. W. Clemon, who maintain their principal offices in Jefferson County, Alabama, resisted payment of a state-approved, county-authorized occupational tax on the ground that it violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. The county instituted collection suits in Alabama small claims court against the judges, who removed the suits to the Federal District Court under the federal officer removal statute. The federal court denied the county's motions to remand and granted summary judgment for the judges, holding the county tax unconstitutional under the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine to the extent that it reached federal judges' compensation. The en banc Court of Appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Jefferson County's initial petition for certiorari and remanded for further consideration of whether the Tax Injunction Act deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its prior en banc decision. Certiorari was granted again to consider whether the removal from state court to federal court was unauthorized by the federal officer removal statute, the Tax Injunction Act issue, and the merits of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54676:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54676:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54676:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes, and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Jefferson County may impose an occupation tax on the U.S. District Judges, for \"Jefferson County's tax operates as a nondiscriminatory tax on the judges' compensation, to which the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 consents when it allows States to tax the pay that federal employees receive if the taxation does not discriminate against [that] employee because of the source of the pay or compensation.\" Further, the Court held that the case was properly removed under the federal officer removal statute because the Jefferson County tax effects the judges' \"performance of federal judicial duties in the county and risks interfering with the Federal Judiciary's operation in violation of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.\" The Court also concluded that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar federal-court adjudication of the matter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54676:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54678:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54678:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States provides importers a partial exemption from duties otherwise imposed for articles which were assembled abroad, but that were not enhanced abroad, except by operations incidental to the assembly process. A regulation issued by the United States Customs Service deems permapressing operations to be an additional step in manufacture, not part of or incidental to the assembly process. The Haggar Apparel Company sought a refund for duties imposed on a collection of its men's trousers that it had shipped to the U.S. from an assembly plant in Mexico. The trousers' pre-treated fabric had been cut in the U.S. and then shipped to Mexico, along with the thread, buttons, and zippers necessary to complete the garments. Under the HTSUS, had the trousers only been sewn and reshipped they would have been eligible for the duty exemption that Haggar sought. However, Haggar also permapressed the trousers by baking them in an oven at the Mexican facility before shipping them to the U.S. The Customs Service claimed that the baking was a process in addition to assembly and denied the duty exemption. Haggar contended that the baking was simply part of the assembly process. Subsequently, Haggar filed suit, seeking the refund, in the Court of International Trade. The court declined to treat the Customs Service's regulation as controlling and ruled in Haggar's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54678:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54678:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54678:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court did not expressly answer the question. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court vacated and remanded the case. The Court concluded that the regulation in question was subject to further analysis. Additionally, the Court held that if the regulation was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, then it required judicial deference in the Court of International Trade.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54678:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54680:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54680:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames T. Goldsmith, an Air Force major, defied an order from a superior officer to inform his sex partners that he was infected with HIV and to take measures to block any transfer of bodily fluids during sexual intercourse. Goldsmith was convicted by general court-martial under several counts and sentenced to six years' confinement and partial forfeiture of salary. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Goldsmith sought no review of the decision in the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) and his conviction became final. Subsequently, the Air Force notified Goldsmith that it was taking action to drop him from the rolls under a newly enacted statute. Goldsmith then petitioned the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act, which authorizes courts established by Congress to \"issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions,\" to redress the unrelated alleged interruption of his HIV medication during his incarceration, but did not immediately contest his removal from the Air Force rolls. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to act. On appeal to the CAAF from this determination, Goldsmith first asserted the claim that the Air Force's action to drop him violated the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution. He argued that the statute had been enacted after the date of his court-martial conviction and that the action would inflict successive punishment based on the same conduct underlying his first conviction. The CAAF granted his petition for extraordinary relief to redress the interruption of his HIV medication and relied on the All Writs Act in enjoining the President and other officials from dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54680:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54680:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54680:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that because the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' resort to the All Writs Act was neither in aid of its strictly circumscribed jurisdiction to review court-martial findings and sentences nor \"necessary or appropriate\" in light of a servicemember's alternative opportunities to seek relief, that court lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction against dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls. Justice Souter's opinion emphasized the alternative avenues of relief available to Goldsmith.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54680:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54681:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54681:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe 1996 Telecommunications Act (Act) fundamentally altered local telephone markets by ending the monopolies traditionally given to local exchange carriers (LECs) by states and subjecting LECs to a host of duties meant to facilitate market entry. Among these was the imposition of an obligation on incumbent LECs to share their networks with competitors. Following the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) issuance of regulations implementing the Act's guidelines, AT&T challenged their constitutionality on behalf of itself and other existing phone service providers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54681:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54681:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54681:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a complicated split opinion, the Court held that the FCC has rulemaking authority to uphold those provision of the Act in question. Despite the local nature of some of the LECs involved, the Court emphasized their interconnectivity with regional and national carriers. As such, the FCC could also reach local LEC markets and regulate their competitive business practices. Such regulatory authority would include the ability to tell LECs what portions of their services they had to share with new competitors, allow new competitors to use local networks without having to own them, and forbid incumbent LECs from separating their network elements before leasing them to competitors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54681:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54683:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54683:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWanda Johnson was run over by a truck in May 1992 and was rushed to the Humana Hospital-University of Louisville, Kentucky, now Galen of Virginia, Inc. After about six weeks at Galen, during which time Johnson's health remained in a volatile state, Galen's agents arranged for her transfer to the Crestview Health Care Facility in Indiana. Johnson was transferred to Crestview in July, and upon arrival her condition deteriorated significantly. Johnson was taken to the Midwest Medical Center where she remained for many months and incurred substantial medical expenses as a result of her deterioration. Jane Roberts, Johnson's guardian, then filed a federal action under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), alleging violations of Section 1395dd(b) of the Act. Section 1395dd of the Act places obligations of screening and stabilization upon hospitals and emergency rooms that receive patients suffering from an \"emergency medical condition.\" The District Court granted summary judgment for Galen on the ground that Roberts had failed to show that \"either the medical opinion that Johnson was stable or the decision to authorize her transfer was caused by an improper motive.\" In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that in order to state a claim in an EMTALA suit alleging a violation of Section 1395dd(b)'s stabilization requirement, a plaintiff must show that the hospital's inappropriate stabilization resulted from an improper motive such as one involving the indigency, race, or sex of the patient.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54683:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54683:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54683:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Section 1395dd(b) of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act contains no expressed or implied \"improper motive\" requirement. According o the Court's opinion, \"there is no question that the text of Section 1395dd(b) does not require an \"appropriate stabilization, nor can it reasonably be read to require an improper motive.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54683:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54684:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54684:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe California Dental Association (CDA), a nonprofit association of local dental societies, provides its members with insurance and financing arrangements, and engages in lobbying, litigation, marketing, and public relations for members' benefit. Members agree to abide by the CDA's Code of Ethics, which prohibits false or misleading advertising. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought a complaint against the CDA, alleging that the CDA's guidelines restricted two types of truthful, non-deceptive advertising: price advertising and advertising relating to the quality of dental services and therefore had violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that the FTC had jurisdiction over the CDA and found a violation of section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC adopted most of the ALJ's factual findings and held that the price advertising, as well as the non-price, restrictions were violations of the Sherman and FTC Acts under an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis. In affirming, the Court of Appeals sustain the FTC's jurisdiction and concluded that an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was proper in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54684:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54684:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54684:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the FTC's jurisdiction extends to associations like the CDA, which provide substantial economic benefit to their for-profit members, but that because the disputed anti-competitive efforts were not obvious, more than the abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis, performed in this case, was required. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that, \"[n]onprofit entities organized on behalf of for-profit members have the same capacity... to engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair and deceptive acts.\" Justice Souter, however, concluded that the Court of Appeals should have used a less-abbreviated standard of review to determine whether the FTC's invalidation of the CDA's rules was justified.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54684:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54685:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54685:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBashar Amer, Aiad Barakat, Julie Mungai, Amjad Obeid, Ayman Obeid, Naim Sharif, Khader Hamide, and Michel Shehadeh, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), were marked for deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The PFLP is characterized by the government as an international terrorist and communist organization. The resident aliens filed suit alleging the Attorney General and other federal parties had targeted them for deportation because of their affiliation with a politically unpopular group, in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. Initially, the District Court enjoined the deportation proceedings. During the case, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). The IIRIRA restricts judicial review of the Attorney General's \"decision or action\" to \"commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act.\" Reno then filed motions arguing that the IIRIRA deprived the courts of jurisdiction over the aliens' selective-enforcement claim. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision on the merits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54685:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54685:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54685:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the IIRIRA deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over the selective-enforcement claim. Justice Scalia wrote, \"[a]s a general matter -- and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present case -- an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54685:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54686:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54686:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCeasar Wright worked as a longshoreman. He belonged to the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, a union that supplied workers to the South Carolina Stevedores Association (SCSA). In 1992, Wright sustained a worked-related; he sought compensation for permanent disability under federal law. In 1995, Wright returned to Longshoremen's Association to be referred for work. When the stevedoring companies, to which he was referred, discovered that he had previously settled a claim for permanent disability, they informed the union they would not accept Wright for employment. Under the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Longshoremen's Association and the SCSA, Wright was not qualified to perform longshore work if he was permanently disabled. Wright chose not to file a grievance under the CBA, but instead to file a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). He alleged the stevedoring companies and the SCSA had discriminated against him by refusing him work. The District Court dismissed the case because Wright had failed to pursue the grievance procedure -- arbitration -- provided by the CBA. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54686:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54686:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54686:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the CBA's arbitration clause did not require Wright to use the arbitration procedure for the alleged violation of the ADA. In his opinion, Scalia wrote that the CBA did not contain a waiver of the employee's right to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54686:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54687:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54687:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, Laura and Arlinda Neztsosie, and others, filed separate lawsuits in the Navajo Tribal Courts, claiming damages for injuries suffered as a result of El Paso Natural Gas Corporation's and Cyprus Foote Mineral Company's uranium mining operations. El Paso and Cyprus Foote, defendants in those suits, each filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing their tribal court claims. The District Court denied preliminary injunctions except to the extent that the Neztsosies sought relief in the Tribal Courts under the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act provides certain federal licensees with limited liability for claims of \"public liability\" arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident, converts such actions into federal claims, grants federal district courts removal jurisdiction over such actions, and provides the mechanics for consolidating the actions and for managing them once consolidated. The District Court left the determinations whether the Act applied to the Neztsosies' claims to the Tribal Courts. On El Paso's and Cyprus Foote's consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decisions not to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing non-Price-Anderson Act claims and to allow the Tribal Courts to decide whether the Neztsosies' claims fell under that Act. Further, although the Neztsosies had not appealed the partial injunctions, the Court of Appeals moved on its own to reverse them.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54687:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54687:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54687:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that requiring a district court to stay its hand while a tribal court determines its own jurisdiction, or the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion, does not apply in this case, which if brought in a state court would be subject to removal. \"By the Price-Anderson Act's unusual preemption provision Congress expressed an unmistakable preference for a federal forum, at the behest of the defending party,\" wrote Justice Souter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54687:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54688:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54688:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlabama requires each corporation doing business in that state to pay a franchise tax based on the firm's capital. A domestic firm, organized under the laws of Alabama, has leeway in controlling its own tax base and tax liability. A foreign firm, organized under the laws of a State other than Alabama, does not have similar leeway to control its tax base. In 1986, the Reynolds Metals Company and other foreign corporations sued Alabama's tax authorities, seeking a refund of the foreign franchise tax they had paid on the ground that the tax discriminated against foreign corporations in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected Reynolds' claims, holding that the special burden imposed on foreign corporations simply offset a different burden imposed exclusively on domestic corporations by Alabama's domestic shares tax. During the Reynolds case, the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others brought a suit asserting similar Commerce and Equal Protection Clause claims. The Alabama trial court agreed with South Central Bell that the tax substantially discriminated against foreign corporations, but nonetheless dismissed their claims as barred by res judicata in light of the State Supreme Court's Reynolds decision. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54688:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54688:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54688:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Alabama franchise tax was unconstitutional. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that, \"Alabama law gives domestic corporations the ability to reduce their franchise tax liability..., while it denies foreign corporations that same ability. And no one claims that the different tax rates for foreign and domestic corporations offset the difference in the tax base. The tax therefore facially discriminates against interstate commerce and is unconstitutional unless the State can offer a sufficient justification for it.\" The Court concluded the State could not justify the tax. The Court also held that the State Supreme Court's decision was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee because the South Central Bell case was unrelated to the court's prior judgement and thus could not be bound by it. Furthermore, the Court rejected the State's argument that the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54688:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54689:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54689:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, a magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the search of Paul and Erma Berger's Montana ranch for evidence of the taking of wildlife in violation of federal law. Later, a multiple-vehicle caravan consisting of government agents and a crew of photographers and reporters from CNN proceeded to the ranch. In executing the warrant, the federal officers allowed the media crew to accompany and observe them. Subsequently, the Berger's filed suit, asserting that the officials, special agents of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and an assistant United States attorney, had violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court concluded that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, as no clearly established law protecting individuals from the commercial recording of a search of their premises existed at the time. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54689:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54689:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54689:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that, although the agents did violate the Fourth Amendment, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The opinion stated that \"police violate the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners when they allow members of the media to accompany them during the execution of a warrant in their home. We also hold there that because the law on this question before today's decision was not clearly established, the police in that case were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.\" Justice John Paul Stevens, concurring and dissenting in part, argued that the constitutional rule recognized had been clearly established long before 1992.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54689:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54690:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54690:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Commonwealth of Virginia charged Tommy David Strickler with capital murder and related crimes. Strickler's counsel did not file a pretrial motion for discovery of all possible exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland because an open file policy gave him access to all of the evidence in the prosecutor's files. At Strickler's trial, Anne Stoltzfus gave detailed eyewitness testimony about the crimes and Strickler's role as one of the perpetrators. The prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory materials in the police files, consisting of notes taken by a detective during interviews with Stoltzfus, and letters written by Stoltzfus to the detective, that cast serious doubt on significant portions of her testimony. The jury found Strickler guilty and he was sentenced to death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. In subsequent state habeas corpus proceedings, Strickler advanced an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to file a motion for disclosure of all exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution or in its possession under Brady. In response, the Commonwealth asserted that such a motion was unnecessary because of the prosecutor's open file policy. The trial court denied relief and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Strickler then filed a federal habeas corpus petition and was granted access to the exculpatory Stoltzfus materials. The District Court vacated Strickler's capital murder conviction and death sentence on the grounds that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose those materials and that he had not, in consequence, received a fair trial. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Strickler had procedurally defaulted his Brady claim by not raising it at his trial or in the state collateral proceedings. Ultimately, the court concluded that the claim was, in any event, without merit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54690:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54690:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54690:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes, and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that although Strickler demonstrated cause for his failure to raise a Brady claim, Virginia did not violate Brady by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to him. Further, the Court held that Strickler received a fair trial in the absence of the exculpatory evidence and did not show a \"reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence would have been different had these materials been disclosed,\" wrote Justice Stevens for the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54690:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54692:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54692:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWayne Thomas Carter, Melvin Johns, and Kimberly Thompson were arrested after a police officer observed them through a window bagging cocaine in Thompson's apartment. During the trial in Minnesota state court, the defendants moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence. They argued the officer's initial observation was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Subsequently, they were all convicted on state drug charges. The Minnesota trial court held that because they were not overnight social guests they were not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the court held that the officer's window-based observation was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the state intermediate appellate court held Carter did not have standing for an objection to the officer's action because his use of the apartment for drug purposes removed any legitimate expectation of privacy. The court also affirmed Johns' conviction . The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. It held that the defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place and that the officer's observation constituted an unreasonable search. Minnesota sought a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54692:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54692:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54692:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, that people who visit someone's home for a short time do not have the same protection against unreasonable police searches and seizures as do the residents or their overnight guests. Short-term visits for commercial transactions are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that nothing in the case served to show that Carter was accepted into the household.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54692:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54695:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54695:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlliance Bond Fund, Inc., an investment fund, purchased approximately $75 million in unsecured notes (Notes) from Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A., (GMD) a Mexican holding company involved in a tool road construction program sponsored by the Government of Mexico. Four GMD subsidiaries guaranteed the Notes. After GMD fell into financial trouble and missed an interest payment on the Notes, Alliance accelerated the Notes' principal amount and filed suit for the amount due in Federal District Court. Alliance requested a preliminary injunction restraining GMD from transferring its assets alleging that GMD was at risk of insolvency, or already insolvent, that it was preferring its Mexican creditors by its planned allocation to them of its most valuable assets, and that these actions would frustrate any judgment that Alliance could obtain. Alliance sought monetary damages and no lien or equitable interest was claimed. The District Court issued the preliminary injunction and ordered GMD to post a $50,000 bond. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54695:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54695:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54695:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court lacked the authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing defendants being sued by creditors from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of the creditor's contract claim for monetary damages because such a remedy was historically unavailable from a court of equity. Allowing federal courts to grant creditors such injunctions \"could radically alter the balance between debtors' and creditors' rights,\" Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, and \"might induce creditors to engage in a race to the courthouse...which might prove financially fatal to the struggling debtor.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54695:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54696:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54696:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case is the second tier of a patent infringement action. College Savings Bank, a New Jersey chartered bank, markets and sells certificates of deposit designed to finance college costs. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity, administers a tuition prepayment program. In addition to its original patent infringement action, College Savings filed an action alleging that Florida Prepaid violated section 43 of the Lanham Act by making misstatements about its tuition savings plans in its brochures and annual reports. The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) subjects states to suits brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for false and misleading advertising. The District Court granted Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The court rejected arguments from College Savings and the United States that Florida Prepaid had waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in interstate marketing and administration of its program after the TRCA made clear that such activity would subject it to suit; and that Congress's abrogation of sovereign immunity in the TRCA was effective, since it was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54696:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54696:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54696:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that \"the federal courts are without jurisdiction to entertain this suit against an arm of the State of Florida.\" Justice Scalia concluded that \"the sovereign immunity of the State of Florida was neither validly abrogated by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the State's activities in interstate commerce.\" Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Stephen G. Breyer expressed the view that Congress possesses the authority to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity where necessary and proper to the exercise of a congressional power under the Constitution's Article I. Justice John Paul Stevens filed his own dissenting opinion and joined that of Justice Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54696:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54697:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54697:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMary Forsyth, the beneficiary of a group health insurance policy issued by Humana Health Insurance of Nevada, Inc., received medical care at a hospital owned by Humana Inc. Humana Insurance agreed to pay 80 percent of Forsyth's hospital charges over a designated deductible. Forsyth bore responsibility for the remaining 20 percent of the charges. Forsyth complained that the hospital gave Human Insurance large discounts on their portion of the hospital charges. Thus, Humana Insurance paid the hospital significantly less than the actual 80 percent of the original bill and, in turn, Forsyth paid significantly more than her 20 percent of the hospital charges. Forsyth alleged that Humana Insurance and Humana Inc. had violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through fraudulent activity. The District Court ruled in favor of Humana, citing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which prevents acts of Congress from encroaching on state insurance law unless the act specifically relates to insurance. The Court of Appeals reversed and adopted a \"direct conflict\" test for determining when a federal law \"invalidate[s], impair[s], or supersede[s]\" a state insurance law. Under such a test, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar Forsyth's suit because the Act does not preclude application of a federal statute prohibiting acts that are also prohibited under state insurance laws. The Act and Nevada law only provided for different damages to be collected.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54697:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54697:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54697:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, announce by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that because RICO advances states' interests in preventing insurance fraud, and since RICO does not encroach on Nevada law, the McCarran- Ferguson Act did not block Forsyth's recourse to RICO in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54697:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54698:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54698:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter pulling Sandra Houghton's friend over during a routine traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer noticed a needle in the driver's shirt pocket. Upon learning that the needle was used for drugs, the officer searched the car and Houghton's purse, where he found more drug paraphernalia. Houghton challenged her subsequent arrest on drug charges, alleging that the officer's search of her purse was unconstitutional. On appeal from an adverse appeals court ruling, overturning a favorable trial court decision, the Supreme Court granted Wyoming certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54698:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54698:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54698:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court held that so long as there is probable cause to search a stopped vehicle, all subsequent searches of its contents are legal as well. The Court added that such searches are especially warranted if aimed at looking into objects or personal belongings capable of concealing items that are the object of the search.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54698:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54700:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54700:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLos Angeles County Deputy District Attorneys David Conn and Carol Najera, prosecutors in the retrial of the Menendez brothers, learned that Lyle Menendez had written a letter to Traci Baker, in which he may have instructed her to testify falsely at the first trial. After being subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury and to produce any correspondence that she had received from Menendez, Baker responded that she had given all of Menendez's letters to her attorney, Paul L. Gabbert. When Baker appeared as directed before the grand jury, accompanied by Gabbert, Conn directed police to secure a warrant to search Gabbert for the letter. While Gabbert was being searched, Najera called Baker before the grand jury for questioning. Gabbert brought suit against the prosecutors contending that his Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession without unreasonable government interference was violated when the prosecutors executed a search warrant at the same time his client was testifying before the grand jury. The Federal District Court granted Conn and Najera summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals held that Conn and Najera were not entitled to qualified immunity on Gabbert's Fourteenth Amendment claim because their actions were not objectively reasonable. The court concluded that Gabbert had a right to practice his profession without undue and unreasonable government interference.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54700:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54700:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54700:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that \"[a] prosecutor does not violate an attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession by executing a search warrant while the attorney's client is testifying before a grand jury.\" Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, \"[w]e hold that the 14th Amendment right to practice one's calling is not violated by the execution of a search warrant, whether calculated to annoy or even to prevent consultation with a grand jury witness.\" Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54700:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54701:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54701:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAurelia Davis sued the Monroe County Board of Education (the \"Board\"), on behalf of her fifth grade daughter LaShonda, alleging that school officials failed to prevent Lashonda's suffering sexual harassment at the hands of another student. Davis claimed that the school's complacency created an abusive environment that deprived her daughter of educational benefits promised her under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX). On appeal from successive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Davis certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54701:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54701:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54701:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court began by noting that because there is an implied private right to education under Title IX, private damage actions may lie against schools that act with deliberate indifference to harassment that is severe enough to prevent victims from enjoying educational opportunities. The Court added that Title IX's prohibitions against harassment in school are clear enough to have served proper notice to school boards in general and the Board in particular. As such, consistent with the Spending Clause, the Title IX guidelines that Congress attached to its school funds obligate all recipient schools to comply or face the pain of legal action. The Court also observed that the Board acted with deliberate indifference, since it ignored several complaints by Davis, and that the harassment in question was serious and systematic.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54701:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54702:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54702:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nYour Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. provides home health care services to Medicare beneficiaries. Under the Medicare Act, providers seeking reimbursement for covered health services submit a yearly cost report to a fiscal intermediary, usually a private insurance company. The intermediary then issues a Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR) determining the provider's reimbursement. The Act allows the provider up to 180 days to appeal a reimbursement determination to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. The provider also has up to three years to ask the intermediary to reopen a determination of the Board. Your Home Visiting Nurse submitted cost reports for 1989 to its intermediary and did not appeal the reimbursement decision. However, within three years Your Home Visiting Nurse asked its intermediary to reopen its 1989 reimbursement determination on the ground that \"new and material\" evidence demonstrated entitlement to additional compensation. The intermediary denied the request. Your Home Visiting Nurse appealed the denial to the Board, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that lacked it jurisdiction to review an intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Your Home Visiting Nurse then brought action in Federal District Court, seeking review of the Board's dismissal and of the intermediary's refusal to reopen. The District Court agreed that the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the refusal to reopen. Moreover, it rejected Your Home Visiting Nurse's contention that the federal-question statute or the mandamus statute gave the District Court jurisdiction to review the intermediary's refusal directly. Subsequently, the court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54702:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54702:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54702:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the Board does not have jurisdiction to review a fiscal intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Moreover, the Court held that the federal-question statute and mandamus statute do not entitle Your Home Visiting Nurse to judicial review of the intermediary's reopening decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54702:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54703:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54703:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAmanda Mitchell and others were indicted for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Mitchell was charged with one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. Mitchell pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count during her sentencing hearing. Before accepting her plea, the District Court told Mitchell that she faced a mandatory minimum of 1 year in prison for distributing cocaine and a 10-year minimum for conspiracy if the government could show the required 5 kilograms. The court also explained to Mitchell that by pleading guilty she would be waiving her right \"at trial to remain silent.\" At Mitchell's sentencing hearing, the District Court found, after hearing testimony that included some of Mitchell's codefendants, that Mitchell's alleged drug sales of 1 1/2 to 2 ounces of cocaine twice a week for year and a half put her over the 5-kilogram threshold. Mitchell did not testify to rebut the Government's evidence about drug quantity; however, her counsel argued the quantity of cocaine attributable to her for sentencing purposes. The District Court ruled that as a consequence of Mitchell's guilty plea, she had no right to remain silent about her crime's details; found that the codefendants' testimony put her over the 5-kilogram threshold, thus mandating the 10-year minimum; and noted that her failure to testify was a factor in persuading the court to rely on the codefendants' testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54703:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54703:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54703:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that in the federal criminal system, a guilty plea does not waive the self-incrimination privilege at sentencing and that a sentencing court may not draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence in determining facts relating to the circumstances and details of the crime. \"Treating a guilty plea as a waiver of the privilege at sentencing would be a grave encroachment on the rights of defendants,\" wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court. Justice Kennedy continued that \"by holding [Mitchell's] silence against her in determining the facts of the offense at the sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise of the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination.\" Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the dissenting minority, expressed the view that, while the Court properly held Mitchell did not waive her privilege, she \"did not have the right to have the sentencer abstain from making the adverse inferences that reasonably flow from her failure to testify.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54703:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54704:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54704:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996) which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunity the probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54704:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54704:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54704:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54704:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54705:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54705:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter decades of litigation, Fibreboard Corporation and a group of plaintiffs' lawyers reached a \"Global Settlement Agreement\" of its asbestos personal-injury liability. Subsequently, a group of named plaintiffs filed the present action in Federal District Court, seeking certification for settlement purposes of a mandatory class that comprised three certain groups. Intervening objectors argued that the absence of a \"limited fund\" precluded Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provides that \"an action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of... (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.\" The court ruled that both the disputed insurance asset liquidated by the global settlement, and, alternatively, the sum of the value of Fibreboard plus the value of its insurance coverage, as measured by the insurance funds' settlement value, were relevant \"limited funds.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed both the class certification and the adequacy of the settlement. The appellate court approved the class certification, under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), on a limited fund rationale based on the threat to other class members' ability to receive full payment from the manufacturer's limited assets.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54705:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54705:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54705:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that \"applicants for contested certification [of a mandatory settlement class on a limited fund theory under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)] must show that the fund is limited by more than the agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants belonging within the class by a process addressing any conflicting interests of class members.\" \"The record on which the District Court rested its certification of the class for the purpose of the global settlement did not support the essential premises of mandatory limited fund actions. It failed to demonstrate that the fund was limited except by the agreement of the parties, and it showed exclusions from the class and allocations of assets at odds with the concept of limited fund treatment and the structural protections of Rule 23(a) explained in [Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor],\" concluded Justice Souter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54705:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54706:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54706:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires designated states and political subdivisions to obtain federal pre-clearance before giving effect to changes in their voting laws. Hispanic voters, residing in Monterey County, California, filed suit in federal court claiming the county had failed to obtain the required pre-clearance for a series of ordinances changing the method for electing county judges. A three-judge District Court ultimately dismissed the case because the section of the Voting Rights Act that requires pre-clearance did not cover California. Moreover, California had passed legislation requiring the voting changes forged by Monterey County.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54706:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54706:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54706:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the county is covered by the Act's pre-clearance requirement, but the state was not. Justice O'Connor wrote, \"We conclude that the county is required to seek pre-clearance before implementing California laws that effect voting changes in that county.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54706:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54707:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54707:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBenjamin Lee Lilly, his brother Mark Lilly, and Gary Barker were arrested after stealing liquor and guns and abducting Alex DeFilippis, who was later shot and killed. Under police questioning, Mark admitted stealing liquor, but claimed that Benjamin and Barker stole the guns and that Benjamin shot DeFilippis. When Virginia called Mark as a witness at Benjamin's subsequent criminal trial, Mark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court then admitted his statements to the police as declarations of an unavailable witness against penal interest. The court overruled Benjamin's objections that the statements were not against Mark's penal interest because they shifted responsibility for the crimes to Barker and Benjamin, and that their admission would violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Subsequently, Benjamin was convicted of the DeFilippis murder and other crimes. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied because Mark's statements fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. The court also held that the statements were reliable because Mark knew that he was implicating himself as a participant in numerous crimes and because the statements were independently corroborated by other evidence at trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54707:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54707:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54707:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the admission of Mark's confession violated Benjamin's Confrontation Clause right \"to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\" All nine justices voted to overturn the Virginia Supreme Court's decision that had allowed such hearsay testimony under an exception for statements made against penal interest. Justice Stevens wrote for a plurality that the confession could not be considered \"sufficiently reliable as to be admissible without allowing [the defendant] to cross-examine him.\" Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Stephen G. Breyer wrote concurring opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54707:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54708:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54708:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCarole Kolstad sued the American Dental Association (ADA) for gender discrimination, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, when it promoted a man instead of her. At trial, the District Court denied Kolstad's request for punitive damages based on a showing that the ADA acted with \"malice\" and \"reckless indifference\" to her federally protected rights. When the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, Kolstad appealed and the Supreme Court granted he certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54708:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54708:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54708:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a complicated split opinion, the Court held that if an employee can show their employer knowingly acted in violation of federal law then punitive damages may be sustained. The Court explained that the \"malice\" or \"reckless indifference\" standard applied to the relationship between employers and federal law, and is not a characterization of the severity threshold that the discrimination itself must meet. In other words, if an employer maliciously or recklessly violates a federal anti-discrimination law, regardless of the severity of their discriminatory acts, them punitive damages may be imposed. The Court remanded Kolstad's case for renewed consideration of her employer's state of mind during the alleged violations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54708:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54709:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54709:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBefore starting his job as a truck driver for Albertsons Inc., Hallie Kirkingburg underwent an eye examination during which he was erroneously certified as meeting basic Department of Transportation (DOT) visual standards. Two years later, in 1992, the error of Kirkingburg's earlier diagnosis was discovered during a routine physical examination. Kinrkingburg was told that he had to obtain a DOT waiver if he wanted to continue driving. Before he could do so, however, Albertsons fired him for failing to meet minimum visual requirements and refused to rehire him even after he obtained the waiver. Kirkingburg challenged his dismissal under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On appeal from an adverse Ninth Circuit Court ruling reversing a favorable district court finding, the Supreme Court granted Albertsons certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54709:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54709:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54709:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that not all individuals who suffer some sort of physical difficulty are per se \"disabled\" under the ADA. Instead, those who believe they suffer from a disability must prove their claim on a case-by-case basis by showing that their alleged disability substantially impacts on a major life activity. Moreover, such impact could be mitigated by the availability of artificial aids, such as medications or technical devices, and the body's own corrective measures. As such, Kirkingburg's visual limitation was not reflexively covered under the ADA and so his challenge was inappropriate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54709:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54710:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54710:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, Sylvester Mosley was arrested after robbing two banks in eleven days. At the first bank, Mosley displayed a \"HOLD UP\" sign and asked the teller \"Can I have all your money?\" At the second bank, Mosley told the teller \"This is a holdup, open your bottom draw and give me all your big bills.\" Because he merely asked for the money, Mosley asked the trial judge to instruct the jury that it could find him guilty of larceny as a lesser-included offense of robbery. Mosley argued that the federal bank robbery statute, 18 USC 2113(a), requires that the robber take the money \"by force or violence, or intimidation.\" The court denied the motion, finding that Mosley had intimated the tellers. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that larceny could not be considered a lesser offense of robbery because an element of larceny is intent and intent is not contained in the robbery definition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54710:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54710:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54710:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court did not answer the question. In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the order granting the writ of certiorari and dismissed the petition. The Court was \"advised that [Sylvester Mosley] died in Springfield, Missouri, on November 16, 1998.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54710:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54711:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54711:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUNUM Life Insurance Company of America (UNUM) issued a long-term group disability policy to Management Analysis Company (MAC) as an insured welfare benefit plan governed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The policy provides that proof of claims must be furnished to UNUM within one year and 180 days after the onset of disability. John E. Ward, a California MAC employee, became permanently disabled in May 1992. Ward informed MAC of his disability in late February or early March 1993. UNUM received proof of Ward's claim on April 11, 1994. Ward was notified that his claim was denied as untimely because his notice was late under the terms of the policy. Ward then filed suit under ERISA's civil enforcement provision to recover the disability benefits provided by the plan. Ward argued that, under California's common-law agency rule, an employer administering an insured group health plan should be deemed to act as the insurance company's agent; therefore, his notice of permanent disability to MAC, in late February or early March 1993, sufficed to supply timely notice to UNUM. The District Court rejected Ward's argument and ruled in favor of UNUM, citing ERISA's preemption clause, which states that ERISA provisions \"shall supersede ... State laws\" to the extent that those laws \"relate to any employee benefit plan.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that Ward might prevail under California's \"notice-prejudice\" rule, under which an insurer cannot avoid liability although the proof of claim is untimely, unless the insurer shows it suffered actual prejudice from the delay.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54711:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54711:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54711:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that California's agency rule is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that California's common-law agency rule \"would have a marked effect on plan administration,\" adding that it would force employers to take on a role for which they had not volunteered. Further, the Court held that California's notice-prejudice rule is not preempted by ERISA because it is a \"law ... which regulates insurance.\" Thus, Ward's insurance claim may go forward even though he filed for benefits after the deadline because UNUM did not suffer any prejudice from the delay. \"By allowing a longer period to file than the minimum filing terms mandated by federal law, the [California] rule complements rather than contradicts ERISA and the regulations,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54711:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54712:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54712:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJacinto Rodriguez-Moreno and others were hired by a drug distributor to find a drug dealer who stole cocaine from the distributor while holding captive the botched deal's middleman, Ephrain Avendano. In pursuit of the dealer, Rodriguez-Moreno took Avendano from Texas to New Jersey to New York to Maryland. In Maryland, Rodriguez-Moreno took possession of a revolver and threatened to kill Avendano. However, Avendano escaped and called the police. Rodriguez-Moreno was then arrested. Rodriguez-Moreno was charged in a federal District Court with, among kidnapping and other violations, using and carrying a firearm in relation to Avendano's kidnapping, in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1), which proscribes using or carrying a firearm \"during and in relation to any crime of violence.\" Rodriguez-Moreno moved to dismiss the firearm count for lack of venue. Rodriguez-Moreno argued that the only place where the Government had proved he had actually used a gun was Maryland and, therefore, venue was proper only in Maryland. The court denied the motion and a jury found Rodriguez-Moreno guilty of the count. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied a \"verb test,\" under which a violation of section 924(c)(1) is committed only in the district where a defendant \"uses\" or \"carries\" a firearm. Thus, the New Jersey court venue for the firearm count was improper.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54712:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54712:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54712:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that \"[v]enue in a prosecution for using or carrying a firearm 'during and in relation to any crime of violence' in violation of section 924(c)(1) is proper in any district where the crime of violence was committed.\" Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, \"A kidnapping...does not end until the victim is free. It does not make sense...to speak of it in discrete geographic fragments....[I]t does not matter that respondent used the revolver...only in Maryland because he did so 'during and in relation to' a kidnaping that was begun in Texas and continued in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland.\" Justice Antonin Scalia, with joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented, expressing the view that the crime defined in 924(c)(1) could be \"committed only where the defendant both engages in the acts making up the predicate offense and uses or carries the gun.\" Moreover, Justice Scalia argued, because the accused's use of the gun occurred only in Maryland, venue was proper only there.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54712:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54713:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54713:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEverett Hadix and other prisoners in the Michigan prison system filed a class action lawsuit against prison officials claiming that the conditions of their confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Thereafter, Hadix and the officials entered into a consent decree to remedy the situation. In 1987, the District Court ruled that Hadix was entitled to attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring of compliance with the decrees. The court established specific market rates for awarding fees. By April 26, 1996, the effective date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the market rate was $150 per hour. The PLRA limited the size of fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits to a maximum hourly rate of $112.50. When first presented with the issue, the District Court concluded that the PLRA cap did not limit attorney's fees for services performed in these cases prior to, but that were still unpaid by, the PLRA's effective date. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Next, fee requests were filed with the District Court for services performed during a period encompassing work performed both before and after the PLRA's effective date. The District Court reiterated its earlier conclusion. The Court of Appeals held that the PLRA's fee limitation does not apply to cases pending on the enactment date because if it did, it would have an impermissible retroactive effect, regardless of when the work was performed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54713:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54713:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54713:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 \"limits attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA's effective date, but does not limit fees for monitoring performed before that date.\" \"To impose the new standards now, for work performed before the PLRA became effective, would upset the reasonable expectations of the parties,\" Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court. All nine justices agreed that the PLRA should apply to services performed after the law's effective date. However, the Court split over whether the new fee limits contained in the law apply to work performed after April 26, 1996, in cases begun before that date. A 7-2 majority said that the new limits do apply to such cases. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens dissented from that part of the Court's conclusion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54713:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54715:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54715:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSection 5 of the Voting Rights Act on 1995 prohibits Bossier Parish, Louisiana from enacting any change in a \"voting qualification[,] prerequisite[,] standard, practice, or procedure\" without first obtaining preclearance from either the Attorney General or the District Court. Following the 1990 census, the District Court granted Bossier Parish preclearance to redistrict. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471, vacated the court's judgment and remanded for the court to question whether the section 5 purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent. The District Court again granted preclearance. The court found that there was no evidence of discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. The court left open the question of whether section 5 prohibits preclearance of a plan enacted with such a purpose.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54715:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54715:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54715:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that section 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. \"As we have repeatedly noted, in vote-dilution cases [section 5] prevents nothing but backsliding, and preclearance under [section 5] affirms nothing but the absence of backsliding,\" wrote Justice Scalia. Justices David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the opinions of Justices Souter and Stevens. \"Now executive and judicial officers of the United States will be forced to preclear illegal and unconstitutional voting schemes patently intended to perpetuate discrimination,\" argued Justice Souter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54715:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54718:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54718:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNathaniel Jones was indicted on federal offenses for using a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence and carjacking. Federal law prescribed varying prison terms based on the extent of the carjacking crime. Specifically, it imposed a maximum of 25 years for crimes resulting in serious bodily injury, but not-more-than-fifteen-years and life sentence clauses were included in the law. The Magistrate Judge explained to Jones that he faced a maximum of fifteen years on the carjacking charge. Based on the Magistrate's judgment, the District Court's instructions to the jury rested on the fact that the government only had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a carjacking had occurred to convict Jones for up to fifteen years. Subsequently, the jury found Jones guilty. However, a later report showed one of the carjacking victims had sustained a serious injury to the head as a result of the carjacking. Thus, the District Court imposed a twenty-five year sentence on Jones. The court rejected Jones' arguments that a serious bodily injury had neither been pleaded in the indictment nor proved before the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It held that a serious bodily injury was a sentencing factor, not an element of an offense.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54718:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54718:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54718:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law established three separate offenses by the specification of elements, each of which must be charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54718:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54719:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54719:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLand patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 (the Acts) reserve all rights to the coal contained in the subject properties to the United States. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe has equitable title to coal within its reservation lands. These lands contain large quantities of coalbed methane gas (CBM gas), now considered a valuable energy source, within the coal formations. In 1981, the Department of the Interior issued an opinion that concluded that the reservation of coal under the Acts did not encompass CBM gas. Energy companies then entered into leases with landowners holding title under the Acts to produce CBM gas. The Tribe field suit against the Amoco Production Company and others, royalty owners and producers under the oil and gas leases covering that land, and various federal entities, seeking a declaration stating CBM gas to be coal reserved by the Acts and therefore belonging to the Tribe. The District Court disagreed and concluded that the plain meaning of the term \"coal\" was limited to the solid rock substance and did not include the CBM gas. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Acts' use of the term \"coal\" was ambiguous, and ambiguities in land grants must be resolved in favor of the sovereign. Therefore, the Acts' reservation of coal included the CBM gas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54719:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54719:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54719:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that, \"[t]he term 'coal' as used in the 1909 and 1910 Acts does not encompass CBM gas;\" therefore, CBM gas is not included in the reserved coal rights. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that \"[t]he common understanding of coal in 1909 and 1910 would not have encompassed CBM gas, both because it is a gas rather than a solid mineral and because it was understood as a distinct substance that escaped from coal as the coal was mined, rather than as part of the coal itself.\" Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that Congress, at the time the Acts were passed, would have assumed that the coal owner had dominion over and responsibility for the CBM gas. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54719:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54720:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54720:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo months after officers observed Tyvessel Tyvorus White using his car to deliver cocaine, he was arrested at his workplace on unrelated charges. At the same time, the arresting officers seized his car, without securing a warrant, because they believed that it was subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. During a subsequent inventory search, the police discovered cocaine in the car. White was then charged with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Florida law. At White's trial on the drug charge, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, arguing that the car's warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, thereby making the cocaine the \"fruit of the poisonous tree.\" After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court denied the motion. On appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The court also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure of an automobile under the Act violated the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court answered that the warrantless seizure did violate the Fourth Amendment, quashed the lower court opinion, and remanded. The court reasoned that although the police developed probable cause to believe a violation of the Act had occurred, this alone did not justify a warrantless seizure.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54720:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54720:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54720:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband. Thomas wrote: \"Although the police here lacked probable cause to believe that [White's] car contained contraband, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under Florida law. ... [T]he need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away...is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure.\" In dissenting, Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concluded that the seizure was not reasonable without a warrant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54720:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54722:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54722:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael A. Haddle, an at-will employee for Healthmaster, Inc., filed suit in federal court alleging his employer, along with 2 previous Healthmaster, Inc. officers, Jeanette Garrison and Dennis Kelly, conspired to have him fired in retaliation for obeying a federal grand jury subpoena and later testifying in a criminal trial against Healthmaster, Inc. for Medicare fraud. Haddle claimed his employers' acts had had \"injured [him] in his person or property\" in violation of federal law, specifically the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The District Court, relying on precedent, dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The precedent the court cited held that an at-will employee discharged pursuant to a conspiracy proscribed by the Act has suffered no actual injury because he has no constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54722:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54722:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54722:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that such interference may give rise to a claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. \"The kind of interference with at-will employment relations alleged here is merely a species of the traditional torts of intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54722:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54723:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54723:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSun-Diamond Growers of California (Sun-Diamond), an agricultural trade association, was charged with violating a federal statute that prohibited the giving of anything valuable to a present, past, or future official \"for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official.\" Sun-Diamond's indictment alleged that it gave illegal gratuities to former Agriculture Secretary Michael Espy while he was considering two matters in which Sun-Diamond had a vested interest. The indictment, however, did not claim a connection between the gratuities in question and either of the matters under Espy's review. Based on this lack of connectivity, Sun-Diamond challenged its indictment but lost in district court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reserved part of the district court decision and the government appealed. Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54723:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54723:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54723:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that to sustain conviction for federal bribery there must be a clear quid pro quo link between the gratuity received and performance of a specific past, present, or future \"official\" act. The Court reasoned that a statutory interpretation that punished the giving of any gifts to public officials would not fit comfortably with the legislation's spirit and traditions. The Court noted that the giving of gratuities to officials, by virtue of their position, is not the same as bribery of officials for the performance of specific conduct.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54723:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54724:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54724:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJonathan Zimring, on the consolidated behalf of two female patients with mental disabilities, challenged Tommy Olmstead, the Commissioner of Georgia's Department of Human Resources, for the Georgia Regional Hospital's (GRH) decision to keep the two women in psychiatric isolation. Zimring argued that under Title II of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the women had to be moved to the most communally integrated setting possible. Defending GRH's decision, Olmstead argued that although the women were medically cleared for a more integrated treatment setting, financial constraints and the need to fundamentally alter treatment programs prevented this from happening.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54724:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54724:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54724:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court began by noting that the question in this case was still ripe even though the two women at issue were placed in communal care since their controversies were initiated. The Court then found that the ADA required the placement of patients with mental disabilities in \"integrated settings\" when they are medically cleared for such settings, they themselves express a desire for such settings, and the resources for such a transfer are available. The Court added that financial constraints might be significant if the state can show that allocation of resources to one patient will cause harm to others. The case was remanded for a better analysis of GRH spending priorities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54724:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54725:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54725:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice officers of the city of West Covina lawfully seized Perkins Lawrence's personal property from his home. The officers left a notice form specifying the facts of the search, its date, the searching agency, the date of the warrent, the issuing judge and his court, the persons to be contacted for information, and an itemized list of the property seized. The officers did not leave the search warrant number. Lawrence filed suit after attempts to obtain the seized property failed. The District Court ultimately ruled in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It held that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that Lawrence be provided a detailed notice of state procedures for the return of seized property and the information to be able to invoke the procedures, along with the information he was already provided. This meant the search warrant number must be furnished or at least the method for obtaining it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54725:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54725:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54725:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a decision authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause does not require police officers to provide property owners with information on how to recover their property in a lawful seizure. The Due Process clause only requires that officers inform property owners that something they own has been seized. Justice Kennedy said the property owner could turn to public sources to learn about the procedures available.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54725:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54726:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54726:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act (Act) provides that once an employer's liability for an employee's injury has been established, then either the self-insured employer or insurer (collectively insurers) is responsible for paying for the employee's \"reasonable\" and \"necessary\" medical treatment. In 1993, this system was amended to allow insurers to withhold payment for disputed treatments, pending the outcome of an independent utilization review. Ten employees and two organizations representing employees that had received benefits under the Act filed suit against state officials, the self-insured school district of Philadelphia, and a number of private insurance companies. Their complaint alleged that the state and private defendants, acting under color of state law, had deprived them of property in violation of due process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54726:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54726:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54726:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo to both. A finding of state action requires both that the deprivation be caused by actions taken under state law and that the deprivation be fairly attributable to the state. While the alleged deprivation in this case was clearly taken pursuant to state law, the decision of private insurers to withhold medical payments for disputed treatment is not fairly attributable to the state. Mere creation of a new dispute resolution mechanism by the state does not constitute state encouragement or authorization. Nor has Pennsylvania delegated to private insurers powers that were exclusively those of the state, as Pennsylvania has simply authorized insurers to do what they would do in the absence of regulation: dispute payment of unreasonable and unnecessary treatment. Further, under Pennsylvania law no due process protection attaches to payment of disputed medical expenses before the reasonableness and necessity of those expenses is determined. The Act does not entitle an employee to payment of all medical treatment, but only that treatment which is reasonable and necessary. In order to assert a protected property interest a worker must demonstrate not only that his or her employer was liable for a work related injury, but also that the treatment for which payment is sought was reasonable and necessary. In this case the plaintiffs had only established their initial eligibility for treatment, not that treatment was reasonable and necessary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54726:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54728:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54728:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Hunt (517 US 899), declaring North Carolina's 12th district to have been unconstitutionally drawn, the state made a new districting plan in 1997. Acting on behalf of other residents, Martin Cromartie again challenged the new make-up of the 12th district as the product of racial gerrymandering. However, even before an evidentiary hearing, a three-judge District Court granted Cromartie summary judgment. Hunt appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54728:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54728:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54728:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that despite strong evidence of racial gerrymandering, the North Carolina General Assembly's motivations were in dispute. As such, further inquiry was warranted on this alone. Moreover, since accusations of racial gerrymandering rise to the level of being constitutionally significant, they must be evaluated with strict scrutiny. Therefore, the dismissal of such serious accusations with a summary judgment was erroneous.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54728:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54729:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54729:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out and the vehicle overturned. One passenger died in the accident and several others were severely injured. Subsequently, the Carmichaels brought a diversity suit against the Kumho Tire Company and others, claiming that the tire was defective. A significant part of the Carmichaels' case turned on the testimony of Dennis Carlson, Jr., an expert in tire failure analysis. Carlson intended to testify to support the Carmichaels' conclusion that a defect in the tire's manufacture or design caused the blow out. To support this conclusion, Carlson used a methodology that was partly disputed. Kumho moved to exclude Carlson's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides: \"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact..., a witness qualified as an expert...may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.\" The Federal District Court granted the motion, excluded Carlson's testimony, and entered summary judgment for Kumho. The court found that Carlson's methodology was insufficiently reliable. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that a federal trial judge's \"gatekeeping\" obligations under the Federal Rules of Evidence were limited to scientific context, and not Carlson's testimony, which the court characterized as skill-or experience-based.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54729:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54729:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54729:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a federal trial judge's \"gatekeeping\" obligation applies not only to \"scientific\" testimony, but to all expert testimony. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 \"makes no relevant distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized knowledge. It makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony.\" The Court concluded that this interpretation of Rule 702 would insure that an expert witness's testimony rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. The Court also concluded that the District Court's determination that Carlson's methodology was not reliable was within the court's discretion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54729:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54730:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54730:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nColorado practices an initiative-petition process in which citizens can make laws directly through balloting initiatives. Acting on behalf of ballot petitioners, the American Constitutional Law Foundation (Foundation) challenged the constitutionality of six limitations imposed by Colorado on the petitioning process. After mixed rulings in both trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review three of the six original restrictions. The first required petition circulators to be registered voters. The second required them to wear identification badges with their names, status as \"volunteer\" or \"paid,\" and if the latter then their employer's phone number. The third required initiative proponents to report names, addresses, and registration voting counties for all paid circulators, as well as salary per petition signature, and each circulator's total salary. Proponents also had to report, on a monthly basis, all proponent names, names and addresses of circulators, circulators' monthly salary and debt totals, and the name of each proposed ballot measure.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54730:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54730:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54730:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court found the name, badge, and disclosure requirements to be unconstitutional. Weighing Colorado's need to protect the integrity of the initiative-petition process against the burdens that its guidelines placed on political expression, the Court found that the latter outweighed the former. Noting that the appellate court upheld a requirement that each circulator submit an affidavit setting out, among several particulars, his or her name and address, the Court explained that the vital information sought by the three additional restrictions at issue was already being secured either directly or indirectly.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54730:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54731:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54731:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1976, Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company acquired Marathon Petroleum Norge (Norge) and Marathon Petroleum Company (Norway) (MPCN). Following the acquisition, Norge assigned its license to produce gas from the North Sea's Heimdal Field to MPCN, which then contracted to sell 70 percent of its share of the Heimdal gas production to a group of European buyers, including Ruhrgas AG. MPCN's sales agreement with Ruhrgas and the other European buyers provided that disputes would be settled by arbitration in Sweden. In 1995, Marathon Oil Company, Marathon International Oil Company, and Norge sued Ruhrgas in Texas state court, asserting state-law claims of fraud, tortious interference with prospective business relations, participation in breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. Ruhrgas removed the case to the District Court, asserting three bases for federal jurisdiction. Ruhrgas then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the parties. Marathon moved to remand the case to the state court for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the category of claim in the suit. The District Court granted Ruhrgas' motion. Noting that Texas' long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the court addressed the constitutional question and concluded that Ruhrgas' contacts with Texas were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that, in removed cases, district courts must decide issues of subject-matter jurisdiction first, reaching issues of personal jurisdiction only if subject-matter jurisdiction is found to exist.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54731:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54731:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54731:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that in cases removed from a state court to federal court there is \"no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy requiring the federal court to adjudicate subject-matter jurisdiction before considering a challenge to personal jurisdiction.\" Customarily, however, a federal court would first resolve doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter. Justice Ginsburg wrote, \"[w]here...a district court has before it a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the alleged defect in subject matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54731:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54732:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54732:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Federation of Federal Employees, a federal employees' union, proposed to include a provision obligating the Interior Department to negotiate midterm matters not in the original contract between the union and the Agency. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, that created the Federal Labor Relations Authority, requires federal agencies and their employees' unions to negotiate in good faith to arrive at a collective bargaining agreement. Initially, the Authority held that the good-faith bargaining clause did not extend to union-initiated proposals during the term of the basic contract. The Court of Appeals did not agree and, in turn, the Authority reversed its decision. The Interior Department refused the proposal on the ground that union-initiated midterm bargaining is inconsistent with the Statute. The Authority then ordered the Agency to comply with the bargaining.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54732:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54732:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54732:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute gave the Federal Labor Relations Authority power to determine whether parties must engage in midterm bargaining. Justice Breyer wrote, \"Congress delegated to the authority the power to determine -- within appropriate legal bounds...whether, when, where and what sort of midterm bargaining is required.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54732:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54734:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54734:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNaomi Marquez, part-time actress, auditioned successfully for a role in a television series produced by Lakeside Pictures. Pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement, Lakeside contacted the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) to confirm that Marquez met the \"union security clause\" of the agreement that requires union \"membership\" as a condition for employment. The clause stated one must be a member \"in good standing.\" Subsequently, Marquez was denied the part because she had not paid her dues. Marquez filed suit alleging SAG breached its duty of fair representation with its union security clause. First, Marquez argued she should have been made aware of her established legal right not to join the union, but only to pay for its representational activities. Second, Marquez claimed that the clause required repetitious thirty-day previous work periods every time motion picture employment ceased. The District Court summarily ruled against Marquez because the clause followed the National Labor Relations Act; therefore, it did not breach its duty of fair representation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on the first claim, but held the second claim was in the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54734:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54734:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54734:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled collective bargaining contracts do not have to spell out what it means to be \"in good standing.\" Justice O'Conner noted that requiring membership to be specified in a contract would force all terms to be specified. There would be no limit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54734:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54735:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54735:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nShareholders sought to appeal from a federal District Court settlement of a stockholder derivative suit. The suit arose out of claims that managers conspired with rival sellers thereby exposing the corporation to criminal and treble-damages liability. The Court of Appeals held that shareholders who had not intervened and were not parties to the derivate action could not appeal an unsatisfactory settlement. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54735:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54735:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54735:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court did not answer the question. An equally divided Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54735:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54736:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54736:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1992, the District Court sentenced Manuel D. Peguero to 274 months of imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to federal drug charges. During sentencing, the court did not inform Peguero of his right to appeal the sentence. In 1996, in a later motion for habeas relief, Peguero claimed that the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(2) by failing to advise him of his right to appeal. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that, although it failed to advise Peguero of his right, he knew of his right when the sentencing hearing occurred. Thus the court, rejecting Peguero's claim that any violation of Rule 32 is enough to vacate a sentence, held that he was not entitled to relief because he was aware of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that a Rule 32 violation was subject to harmless-error review and concluded that the rule's purpose had been served since Peguero was aware of his right to appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54736:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54736:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54736:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that \"a district court's failure to advise the defendant of his right to appeal does not entitle him to habeas relief if he knew of his right and hence suffered no prejudice from the omission.\" Noting the importance of the rule and acknowledging that the omission was an error, Justice Kennedy stated \"[t]rial judges must be meticulous and precise in following each of the requirements of Rule 32 in every case.\" The Court concluded that Rule 32 violations do not entitle defendants to relief in all circumstances, rather only when the defendant is prejudiced by the court's error.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54736:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54737:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54737:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMary E. Zurko, and others, applied for a patent upon a method for increasing computer security. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) patent examiner concluded that Zurko's method was obvious in light of prior art and, therefore, denied the application. The PTO's review board, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, upheld the examiner's decision. Zurko sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In reviewing PTO's decision to deny Zurko's patent application, the Federal Circuit analyzed the PTO's factual finding using a \"clearly erroneous\" standard of review, which generally governs appellate review of district court findings of fact (court/court review), rather than the less stringent standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permit a court to set aside agency findings of fact found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found the PTO's factual finding to be clearly erroneous. The Federal Circuit then heard the matter en banc. After examining relevant precedents, the en banc court concluded that its use of the stricter court/court standard was legally proper. The Solicitor General, representing the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Q. Todd Dickinson, sought certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54737:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54737:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54737:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit must use the framework set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act when reviewing PTO findings of fact. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that, \"[A] close examination of the...cases reviewing PTO decisions do not reflect a well-established court/court standard.\" Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, dissented, noting that at the time of the enactment of the APA judicial review of fact-finding by the PTO under the \"clearly erroneous\" standard was an \"additional requiremen[t]...recognized by law.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54737:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54738:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54738:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBank of America National Trust and Savings Association issued a $93 million loan to 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the debtor's principal asset, part of a Chicago office building. When the debtor defaulted on the loan, the bank began foreclosure. LaSalle filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code. The debtor's purposed reorganization plan called for only previous equity holders to contribute new capital in exchange for the debtor's entire ownership of the reorganized entity. The Bank of America objected. The bank's objection prevented confirmation of the plan. LaSalle resorted to a judicial \"cramdown\" process for imposing the plan on Bank of America. The cramdown process requires a reorganization plan to be fair and equitable with respect to the creditors so a judge will authorize it. Bank of America argued the plan violated the cramdown's \"absolute priority rule,\" which prevents debtor's equity holders from receiving ownership when claims will not be paid in full and, thus, the plan should have been denied. Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court approved the plan. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54738:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54738:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54738:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled a debtor's prebankruptcy equity holders may not, over the objections of creditors, contribute new capital and receive ownership in the debtor's reorganized entity if no one else has been given a chance to come up with an alternative reorganization plan.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54738:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54739:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54739:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), states receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) can pay the benefit amount of another State's TANF program to residents who have lived in the State for less than 12 months. When California announced it would enforce this option, Brenda Roe brought this class action, on behalf of other first year residents, challenging the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement. On appeal from successive adverse rulings in the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Rita Saenz, the Director of California's Department of Social Services, certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54739:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54739:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54739:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to travel in three ways by: allowing citizens to move freely between states, securing the right to be treated equally in all states when visiting, and securing the rights of new citizens to be treated like long-time citizens of a state. The Court explained that by paying first-year residents the same TNF benefits they received in their state of origin, states treated new residents differently than others who have lived in their borders for over one year. As such, enforcement of the PRWORA power unconstitutionally discriminated among residents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54739:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54740:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54740:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1991, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permit victims of intentional employment discrimination, whether within the private sector or the federal government, to recover compensatory damages. Thereafter, Michael Gibson filed a complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleging that the Department had discriminated against him by denying him a promotion on the basis of his gender. The Department found against Gibson. Afterwards, however, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) awarded Gibson the promotion plus backpay. Later Gibson filed suit, in the District Court, seeking compensatory damages and a court order for the Department to comply with the EEOC's order. Subsequently, the Department voluntarily complied with the EEOC's order, but it opposed Gibson's claim for compensatory damages. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Gibson's complaint. On appeal, the Department supported the District Court's dismissal with the argument that Gibson had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in respect to his compensatory damages claim; therefore, he could not bring that claim in court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals rejected the Department's argument. The court viewed the EEOC as lacking the legal power necessary to award compensatory damages. Consequently, there was no administrative remedy to exhaust.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54740:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54740:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54740:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission possess the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they discriminate in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the dissenting minority, expressed the view that that the EEOC could not have awarded compensatory damages against the United States under Title VII because the statute did not authorize such awards in explicit terms. Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, it did not provide the required waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54740:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54742:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54742:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Census Clause (Art. I, Sect. 2, Cl. 3), Congress is authorized to conduct a census of the American public every 10 years. Among other purposes, the census provides a basis for apportionment of congressional districts. Under the Census Act, Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary). When the Census Bureau (Bureau) announced plans to use two new forms of discretionary statistical sampling in the 2000 census, various United States residents, counties, and the House of Representatives challenged the constitutionality of the new sampling methods in two separate suits. On direct appeals from three-judge district courts enjoining the use of the new sampling methods, the Supreme Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54742:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54742:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54742:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes with regard to the Census Act. The Court began by noting that the plaintiffs in the joined cases had good standing to bring their challenges because they stood to suffer a decrease in the number of their congressional representatives and a corresponding dilution of voting strength. The Court then added that the disputed Amendment to the Census Act, authorizing the discretionary use of statistical sampling, did not alter the Act's older statutory prohibition against the use of sampling. Consequently, the Court struck down the sampling provision on statutory grounds and avoided the constitutional question.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54742:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54743:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54743:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLouis Jones, Jr., kidnapped Private Tracie Joy McBride at gunpoint from the Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas. After sexually assaulting McBride, Jones killed her with repeated blows to the head from a tire iron. The Federal Government charged Jones with kidnapping resulting in the victim's death, in violation of 18 USC section 1201(a)(2), an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. Pursuant to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, the government sought the death sentence. A jury found Jones guilty. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty at Jones's sentencing hearing. The District Court imposed the death sentence in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The court refused Jones' request to include in the jury instructions an instruction that in the event of a jury deadlock concerning what sentence to impose -- either death or life imprisonment without possibility of release -- the District Court would impose no less of a sentence than of life imprisonment without possibility of release. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54743:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54743:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54743:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Jones was not entitled to an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not require such an instruction and the Court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to require such an instruction in every capital case. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, \"in a capital sentencing proceeding, the Government has 'a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.' [A] charge to the jury of the sort proposed by petitioner might well have the effect of undermining this strong governmental interest.\" Furthermore, the Court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury had been led to believe that Jones would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that the jury could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that, \"'[a]ccurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a [jury's] determination of whether a defendant shall live or die.' That 'indispensable prerequisite' was not satisfied in this case.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54743:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54744:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54744:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter stopping him for speeding, an Iowa police officer issued Patrick Knowles a citation and conducted a full search of his car without probable cause or Knowles' consent. When his search turned up a \"pot pipe\" and some marijuana, the officer arrested Knowles on state drug charges. Knowles challenged these on grounds that because he was not arrested at any time prior to the search, the search was unconstitutional. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Knowles certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54744:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54744:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54744:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that full-stopped car searches can only be conducted when the safety of the officers is at risk. One significant indication of such danger is when an officer arrests the subject as a reaction to possible or actual threat. In the present case, no serious danger accompanied the stop of Knowles car as evidenced by the officer's initial decision not to arrest Knowles or even issue him a ticket. As such, regardless of its uncovered contents, the subsequent search violated the \"search incident to arrest\" power and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unlawful search and seizures.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54744:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54745:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54745:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt the time of his hiring by United Parcel Service (UPS) to a mechanics position that required him to drive commercial trucks, Vaughn Murphy was misdiagnosed as meeting Department of Transportation (DOT) health guidelines. When UPS discovered that Murphy's blood pressure exceeded DOT requirements, they fired him. Murphy challenged his dismissal as a form of discrimination prohibited under Title I of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Following defeat in trial and appellate courts, Murphy appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54745:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54745:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54745:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the determination of whether one is \"disabled\" under the ADA must be made in light of available mitigating circumstances. In the present case, the Court did not find Murphy \"disabled\" since he could function normally with the help of blood pressure medication. Moreover, although no longer able to serve as a commercial truck driver for UPS, Murphy could still work as a mechanic - the position for which he was officially hired. The Court concluded that in order to be designated as \"disabled\" an employee must be unable to perform more than just one task.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54745:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54746:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54746:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVerdan Technology, Inc.,, a prime contractor, failed to pay Blue Fox Inc., a subcontractor, for work completed on a construction project for the Department of the Army. Under the Miller Act, a contractor working on any public building or public work of the US must post a bond for possible defaults. However, the Army treated the work agreement as a \"services contract,\" and removed Verdan's bond requirements. When Verdan failed to pay Blue Fox, it directly sued the Army. Blue Fox sought an \"equitable lien\" on any funds from the Verdan contract not paid to Verdan, or any funds available or appropriated for the completion of the project, and an order directing payment of those funds to it. The District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter, and thus ruled in favor of the Army because the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not apply to Blue Fox's claim. The Court of Appeals held that the APA waives immunity for equitable actions, thus allowing Blue Fox's equitable lien.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54746:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54746:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54746:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that \"unless waived by Congress, sovereign immunity bars subcontractors and other creditors from enforcing liens on government property or funds to recoup their losses.\" The APA prohibits people and companies with grievances from suing the government for monetary damages. Blue Fox's lien was ruled \"merely a means to the end of satisfying a claim for the recovery of money.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54746:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54748:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54748:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides asylum to aliens who can demonstrate that they will be persecuted if deported, it does not protect aliens who commit \"serious nonpolitical crimes\" before their arrival in the United States. After burning busses, assaulting passengers, and vandalizing private property in his native Guatemala, Juan Aguiree fled to and, sought asylum in, the United States. Despite Aguirre's claims that his acts constituted political protest, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) overturned an administrative court's finding in favor of asylum. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed as it found the BIA's analysis deficient in three parts: it failed to balance the severity of Aguirre's offenses against the threat of political persecution; it failed to qualify the atrocities of Aguiree's acts in comparison with others it faced in the past; and it did not consider whether Aguree's acts were politically necessary or successful. When the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54748:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54748:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54748:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion, the Court noted that withholding of deportation is mandatory if an alien establishes that it is more likely than not that he or she will suffer political persecution if deported. The Court added that the BIA was not required to balance the severity of the acts in question against threats of political persecution, compare the actions with others, or pronounce on their political success or necessity. Likelihood of political persecution is the overarching issue when considering an alien's deportability, followed by a determination of whether the crimes at issue were serious and nonpolitical.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54748:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54749:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54749:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGarret F., a minor and student in Cedar Rapids Community School District, requires a wheelchair and is dependent upon a ventilator. He requires assistance in attending to his physical needs during the school day. The school district declined to accept financial responsibility for Garret's services in order for him to be able to attend school. The school district believed it was not legally obligated to provide one-on-one care. An Administrative Law judge concluded that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) required the school district to provide \"school health services,\" which are provided by a \"qualified school nurse or other qualified person,\" but not medical services, which are limited to services provided by a physician. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed despite arguments from the school district that such one-on-one care is too costly and too involved to be considered anything but medical in nature.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54749:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54749:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54749:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that if the services in question are \"related\" to keeping the child with disabilities in school and able to access educational opportunities available to others IDEA funded school districts must provide such services. The Court added that although the nature and cost of providing certain IDEA \"related services\" is not determinative of whether their financial burdens must be met, potential financial burdens shall inform any decision governing their provision. In the present case, the benefits of providing Garret with his needed care outweighed the burdens.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54749:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54750:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54750:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDel Monte Dunes sought to develop property it owned within the jurisdiction of the city of Monterey. Monterey continuously denied Del Monte Dunes' proposals to develop the property. Each rejection was followed by stricter and more rigorous demands for a smaller, less intrusive development. After years of rejection, Del Monte Dunes decided Monterey would not allow development under any circumstances. Del Monte Dunes sued the city in federal court under 42 USC Section 1983, alleging that the denial of their final proposal was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, Del Monte Dunes claimed, the continuous demands constituted regulatory abuse. The District Court submitted Del Monte Dunes case to the jury. The judge instructed the jury to find for Del Monte Dunes if the jurors found Del Monte Dunes had been denied every economically viable use for its property or if the city's decision to reject the development did not directly advance a legitimate public purpose. The jury found for Del Monte Dunes on the equal protection and abuse claims, and it awarded monetary damages. The city prevailed on the due process claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings despite the city of Monterey's objection to the use of a jury in government land-use regulation cases. It found no errors in the use of the jury or the jury's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54750:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54750:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54750:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held, in an opinion authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, that property owners who file a Section 1983 civil rights suit seeking compensation for an alleged taking of their property can have a jury trial in some circumstances. \"[T]he disputed questions were whether the government had denied a constitutional right outside the bounds of its authority, and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages.\" Justice Kennedy then added: \"These were questions for the jury.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54750:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54751:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54751:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA federal criminal statute, 21 U.S.C. section 848(a), proscribes any person from engaging in \"continuing criminal enterprise (CCE),\" which is defined as involving a violation of federal drug statutes where such a violation was part of a \"continuing series of violations.\" Eddie Richardson, who had organized and managed the Chicago street gang called the Undertaker Vice Lords in order to sell drugs, was charge with a CCE violation. At trial, Richardson proposed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree not only that he committed some \"continuing series of violations\" but also that the he committed each of the individual \"violations\" necessary to make up that \"continuing series.\" In other words, the proposed instruction would have required the jury to unanimously agree on which three acts constituted the alleged series of violations. The judge rejected Richardson's proposal and, instead, instructed the jurors that they must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses, but did not have to agree as to the particular offenses. Subsequently, the jury convicted Richardson. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's jury instruction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54751:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54751:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54751:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a jury in a \"continuing criminal enterprise\" case is required to agree unanimously not only that accused committed continuing series of violations, but also which specific violations made up the continuing series. Looking to the language of the statute, Justice Breyer concluded that in the law \"each 'violation' amounts to a separate element\" and that combined with a \"tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law,\" calls for juror unanimity. In dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed the view that the Court's decision \"rewards those drug kingpins whose operations are so vast that the individual violations cannot be recalled or charged with specificity.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54751:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54752:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54752:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 26, 1996, Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. (Michetti), filed a complaint in Alabama state court seeking damages for an alleged breach of contract and fraud by Murphy Bros., Inc. (Murphy). Michetti did not serve Murphy then, but three days later it faxed a \"courtesy copy\" of the complaint to a Murphy vice president. Michetti officially served Murphy under local law by certified mail on February 12, 1996. On March 13, 1996, 30 days after service but 44 days after receiving the faxed copy of the complaint, Murphy removed the case under 28 U. S. C. ?1441 to the Federal District Court. Michetti moved to remand the case to the state court on the ground that Murphy filed the removal notice 14 days too late under 28 U. S. C. ?1446(b), which specifies that the notice \"shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the [complaint].\" Michetti asserted that the removal was untimely because the notice had not been filed within 30 days of the date on which Murphy's vice president received the facsimile transmission. The District Court denied the remand motion on the ground that the 30-day removal period did not commence until Murphy was officially served with a summons. On an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, instructing the District Court to remand the action to state court. The court held that the defendant's receipt of a faxed copy of the filed initial pleading sufficed to commence the 30-day removal period, emphasizing the statutory words \"receipt...or otherwise.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54752:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54752:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54752:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 decision, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a named defendant's time to remove a state-court action to a federal court is triggered by the simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, \"through service or otherwise,\" after and apart from service of the summons, but not by the mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service. Justice Ginsburg wrote for that Court that, \"[i]t would take a clearer statement than Congress has made to read its endeavor to extend removal time...to effect so strange a change_to set removal apart from all other responsive acts, to render removal the sole instance in which one's procedural rights slip away before service of a summons.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54752:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54753:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54753:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn a New York State court, Tsui Yuan Tseng alleged El Al Israel Airlines subjected her to an intrusive security search resulting in assault and false imprisonment before a flight from New York to Tel Aviv. Tseng alleged that psychic or psychosomatic personal injuries followed the incident, but no bodily injury occurred. El Al moved the case to federal court. The District Court dismissed the case due to the Warsaw Convention treaty. Convention provisions describe air carrier liability for international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods. Bodily injury, baggage or goods destruction, loss, or damage, and damage caused by delay are compensable under the Convention. Psychic or psychosomatic injury is not covered. Thus, Tseng's claim was not justicible. Moreover, New York tort law prevents El Al from liability suits covered under the Convention. The Court of Appeals held, in reversing, that the Convention drafters did not intend to remove all liability from an airline carrier, that the Convention does not shield routine operating procedures from the laws of signatory nations, and that the Convention precludes recourse to local law only when an incident is not exclusively covered. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the Convention would create uniformity because doing so would supplant applicable laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54753:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54753:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54753:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that the Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when her claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention. In her opinion, Justice Bader wrote, \"[w]e would be hard put to conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject air carriers to the distinct, non-uniform liability rules of the individual signatory nations.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54753:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54754:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54754:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians ceded land in present-day Minnesota to the U.S. in an 1837 treaty. In return, the U.S. granted the Mille Lacs Band certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded land. An 1850 Executive Order by President Taylor ordered the removal of the Mille Lacs Band and revoked their usufructuary rights. An 1855 treaty set aside reservation lands for the Mille Lacs Band, but did not mention their rights. The Mille Lacs Band sued, seeking a declaratory judgment stated that they retained their usufructuary rights and an injunction to prevent the state's interference with those rights. The District Court ultimately ruled that the Mille Lacs Band retained their usufructuary rights under the 1837 treaty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The courts rejected arguments that the 1850 Executive Order abrogated the usufructuary rights guaranteed by the 1837 treaty and that Minnesota's entrance into the Union in 1858 extinguished any Indian treaty rights under the \"equal footing doctrine.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54754:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54754:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54754:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians does have usufructuary rights that were guaranteed to them by the 1837 treaty. After an examination of the historical record, the Court held that the 1850 Executive Order was ineffective to terminate Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights, that the Mille Lacs Band did not relinquish its 1837 treaty rights in the 1855 treaty, and that the Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights were not extinguished when Minnesota was admitted to the Union.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54754:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54755:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54755:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFranois Holloway, a.k.a. Abdu Ali, was charged with several federal offenses, including carjacking. Federal law defines carjacking as \"tak[ing] a motor vehicle ... from ... another by force and violence or by intimidation\" \"with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.\" Holloway's accomplice testified that there was no intent to harm the drivers of the cars, just steal their vehicles. However, he said he would have used his gun if he had been given a \"hard time.\" The District Court judge instructed the jury that the requisite intend under law may be conditional. Moreover, the government would satisfy this condition if it had proved to them that the defendant intended to cause death or bodily harm if the drivers refused to turn over their cars. Subsequently, the jury found Holloway guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that a conditional intent to harm was within a reasonable interpretation of the legislative purpose of the carjacking law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54755:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54755:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54755:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law applies to carjacking crimes committed with \"conditional intent\" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands. \"The intent requirement...is satisfied when the government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car,\" wrote Justice Stevens.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54755:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54756:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54756:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile working for Policy Management Systems (PMS), Carolyn Cleveland suffered a stroke. Ultimately, she lost her job but was awarded Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits because she claimed she was unable to work due to her stroke-induced disability. A week before her SSDI award, Cleveland challenged her termination by PMS as a violation of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). PMS defended itself by stating that Cleveland's SSDI award negated her ADA suit, because her receipt of SSDI funds proved she was not terminated in spite of an ability to perform her duties. On appeal from adverse rulings in both the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Cleveland certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54756:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54756:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54756:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that SSDI and ADA claims do not conflict in such a way as to automatically bar anyone from raising them jointly. The Court explained that when determining SSDI eligibility, the significant ADA question of whether someone would have been capable of performing their job if \"reasonable accommodations\" had been made by their employer, is not considered. As such, the \"reasonable accommodation\" issue is left open for resolution during an ADA claim. The Court added that any inconsistencies between ADA and SSDI claims are even more trivial if the ADA claim is brought prior to an actual SSDI award - as Cleveland did. Even in clear cases, where a contradiction would seem to lie between the two claims, alleged victims must still have the opportunity to present their cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54756:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54757:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54757:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association (Association) wanted to run advertisements for lawful private casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi. The Association challenged the government's prohibition against such radio-and television-based advertising. After suffering defeat in both trial and appellate courts, the Association appealed and the Supreme Court granted them certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54757:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54757:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54757:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, the Court found the advertising restrictions unconstitutional insofar as they applied to Louisiana-based advertisers - where the gambling activities being promoted are legal. The government failed to demonstrate that its restriction would alleviate harmful gambling practices to any material degree. Instead, the Court noted, the regulations in question provided only ineffective and remote support for the government's concerns, since all sorts of other gambling activities would continue unaffected. Thus, the government restrictions unfairly singled out a specific form of speech for regulation while leaving others untouched.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54757:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54758:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54758:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits \"criminal street gang members\" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54758:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54758:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54758:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a plurality ruling, Justice John Paul Stevens delivered an opinion for a majority on several key points. The Court held that Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and provided law enforcement officials too much discretion to decide what activities constitute loitering. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that the ordinance's definition of loitering as \"to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose\" does not give people adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if a person does not violate the law until he refuses to disperse. \"'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'\" noted Justice Stevens, \"[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54758:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54759:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54759:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Postbaccalaureate Bylaw of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a private organization, only allows a postgraduate student-athlete to participate in intercollegiate athletics at the institution that awarded her undergraduate degree. Under this rule, Renee M. Smith, who played undergraduate volleyball at St. Bonaventure University, was denied permission from the NCAA to play at two other institutions she attended as a graduate student. Subsequently, Smith filed suit alleging that the NCAA's refusal to waive the bylaw denied her from playing intercollegiate volleyball on the basis of her sex in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which proscribes sexual discrimination in \"any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.\" The NCAA responded by moving to dismiss the case on the ground that Smith failed to allege that the NCAA is a recipient of federal financial assistance. Smith, in turn, argued that \"the NCAA governs the federally funded intercollegiate athletics programs of its members, that these programs are educational, and that the NCAA benefited economically from its members' receipt of federal funds.\" The District Court concluded that the alleged connections between the NCAA and federal financial assistance to member institutions were too attenuated to sustain a Title IX claim and dismissed the suit. Smith then moved for leave to amend her complaint. The court denied the motion as moot. Reversing that denial, the Court of Appeals, in addressing Smith's proposed amended complaint, held that the NCAA's receipt of dues from federally funded member institutions would suffice, if proven, to bring the NCAA within the scope of Title IX as a recipient of federal funds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54759:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54759:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54759:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that dues payments from recipients of federal funds do not suffice to subject the NCAA to suit under Title IX. Justice Ginsburg distinguished the coverage of Title IX in that \"[e]ntities that receive federal assistance, whether directly or through an intermediary, are recipients within the meaning of Title IX; entities that only benefit economically from federal assistance are not.\" Justice Ginsburg then concluded that \"the Association's receipt of dues demonstrates that it indirectly benefits from the federal assistance afforded its members,\" which without more, \"is insufficient to trigger Title IX coverage.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54759:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54760:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54760:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter enacting the Inspector General Act (IGA), which created an Office of Inspector General (OIG) in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other federal agencies, Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor- Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS). The FSLMRS permits union participation at an employee examination conducted \"by a representative of the agency\" if the employee believes that the examination will result in disciplinary action and requests such representation. In January 1993, NASA's OIG (NASA-OIG) conducted an investigation of certain threatening activities of a NASA employee. A NASA-OIG investigator interviewed the employee and permitted the employee's union representative to attend. Subsequently, the employee's union filed a charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority), alleging that NASA and its OIG had committed an unfair labor practice when the investigator limited the union representative's participation in the interview. In ruling for the union, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that the OIG investigator was a \"representative\" of NASA within FSLMRS' meaning, and that the investigator's behavior had violated the employee's right to union representation. On review, the Authority agreed and granted relief against both NASA and NASA-OIG. The Court of Appeals upheld the Authority's rulings and granted the Authority's application for enforcement of its order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54760:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54760:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54760:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that an investigator from NASA's Office of Inspector General is a \"representative\" of NASA when conducting an employee examination covered by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, such that the right to union representation in the FSLMRS may be invoked. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, declared: \"[E]mploying ordinary tools of statutory construction...we have no difficulty concluding that [the law] is not limited to agency investigators representing an entity that collectively bargains with the employee's union.\" Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia, dissented, citing the independence guaranteed Inspectors General by the Inspector General Act as reason for investigators not representing management with the meaning of the FSLMRS.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54760:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54761:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54761:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTeresa L. Cunningham, an attorney representing a plaintiff, was served with a request for interrogatories and documents with responses due within 30 days after service. Cunningham failed to comply with those discovery orders, and a Magistrate Judge granted Hamilton County's motion for sanctions against her under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4). The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge's order for sanctions. The court also disqualified Cunningham as counsel. Although the District Court proceedings were ongoing, Cunningham immediately appealed the order affirming the sanctions award. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because federal appellate court jurisdiction is ordinarily limited to appeals from \"final decisions of the district courts.\" The court also held that the sanctions order was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, which provides that certain orders may be appealed, notwithstanding the absence of final judgment, because Cunningham's appeal was not completely separate from the merits of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54761:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54761:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54761:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an order imposing sanctions on an attorney pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4) is not a \"final decision,\" even where the attorney no longer represents a party in the case. \"To permit an immediate appeal from such a sanctions order would undermine the very purposes of Rule 37(a), which was designed to protect courts and opposing parties from delaying or harassing tactics during the discovery process,\" Justice Thomas wrote for the Court. The Court concluded that piecemeal appeals and concomitant delays would preclude final judgement if such immediate appeals were possible. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54761:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54763:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54763:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the mid-1980's, Ellis E. Neder, Jr., engaged in a number of real estate transactions financed by fraudulently obtained bank loans and schemes involving land development fraud. He was indicted on numerous counts of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and of filing false federal income tax returns. At trial, the District Court instructed the jury that, to convict on the bank and tax offenses, it did not need to consider the materiality of any false statements, or whether Neder's actions, in fact, caused others to be defrauded. In instructing the jury on mail and wire fraud, the court did not include materiality as an element of either offense. Neder objected. Thereafter, Neder was convicted of filing false federal income tax returns and of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the court erred in failing to submit the materiality element of the tax offense to the jury. However, under harmless-error analysis, the appeals court concluded the error was harmless because the error \"'did not contribute to the verdict obtained.\" The appeals court also determined that materiality is not an element of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. Thus, the District Court did not err in failing to submit materiality to the jury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54763:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54763:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54763:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chef Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held 6-3 that under the harmless-error rule, which applies to a jury instruction that omits an element of an offense, the trial court's error did not render Neder's trial \"fundamentally unfair.\" Thus, the error was harmless. In dissent, Justices Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that depriving a criminal defendant of the right to have a jury determine his commission of every element of the crime charged could not constitute a harmless error. Additionally, the Court unanimously held that materiality is an element of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54763:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54765:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54765:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDiscon Incorporated sold services to remove obsolete telephone equipment to Material Enterprises Company, a subsidiary of NYNEX Corporation. When Material Enterprises started to buy removal services from AT&T Technologies instead, Discon filed suit alleging NYNEX had engaged in unfair and anticompetitive practices. Discon claimed that Material Enterprises paid AT&T more than Discon would have received. Material Enterprises passed on the extra cost to the customers of NYNEX. Material Enterprises then received a rebate from AT&T and shared it with NYNEX. Discon alleged these practices were intended to them and to benefit their competitor, AT&T, because Discon refused to participate in the scheme. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, but held Discon's claims were founded under the Sherman Act. Discon had a valid claim in antitrust rules that prohibit group boycotts because the practices were anticompetitive. Moreover, the complaint stated a valid conspiracy to monopolize. NYNEX argued that this case did not constitute a group boycott and therefore it could not proceed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54765:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54765:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54765:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled the group boycott rule does not apply to claims with a single buyer and a single supplier. In the competitive environment antitrust laws seek to encourage, NYNEX had the freedom to switch its vendor. As for the conspiracy to monopolize claim, the Court remanded the case to provide Discon a chance to show that NYNEX agreements possibly harmed the competitive process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54765:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54766:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54766:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKaren Sutton and Kimberly Hinton (the Suttons) are identical twins who suffer from acute visual myopia. They brought suit against United Airlines (United) under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Section12101 et seq., after United failed to hire them as commercial airline pilots because their uncorrected vision was worse than 20/100. Although each sister suffered from severe myopia, their vision was correctable with glasses and both sisters were able to function normally in their daily lives. The Suttons claimed that they were disabled within the meaning of the ADA either because, under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(A), they suffered from a physical impairment that \"substantially limits . . . major life activities,\" or because, under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(C), they were regarded as having such an impairment. The district court granted United's 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the Suttons' complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54766:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54766:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54766:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. Determination of disability under the ADA should be made in reference to an individual's ability to mitigate his or her impairment through corrective measures. This reading is in harmony with the statutory language and history of the ADA because (1) the phrase \"substantially limits\" requires consideration of present, not future or hypothetical, impairment; (2) the ADA calls for individualized assessments of impairment; and (3) Congress found that approximately 43 million Americans were disabled, a number that would be far too low if Congress had meant to include all those with correctable impairments. Also, assuming without deciding that working is a major life activity for purposes of the ADA, poor vision cannot be regarded as a substantially limiting impairment because it has only foreclosed the Suttons from pursuing work as \"global airline pilots,\" not from numerous other positions in the aviation industry.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54766:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54767:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54767:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, Floyd J. Carter donned a ski mask and entered the Collective Federal Savings Bank unarmed. In the process, Carter pushed an exiting customer back into the bank and startled customers already inside. Carter removed almost $16,000 from the bank and fled. After his apprehension, Carter was charged with federal bank robbery, 18 USC Section 2113(a), which punishes \"[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes... any... thing of value [from a] bank.\" Carter pleaded not guilty, claiming that he had not taken the bank's money by force, violence, or intimidation as required of robbery. Carter moved that the District Court instruct the jury that they could consider whether he committed federal bank larceny, USC Section 2113(b), as a lesser included offense in the broader crime of robbery, in which case, Carter could be guilty of larceny without being guilty of robbery. The larceny law punishes \"[w]hoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any... thing of value exceeding $1,000 [from a]... bank,\" with a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison, as opposed to robbery's 20-year maximum. The District Court denied the motion. The jury, instructed on robbery alone, returned a guilty verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54767:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54767:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54767:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that federal bank larceny is not a \"lesser included offense\" of federal bank robbery. The \"[p]etitioner is accordingly prohibited as a matter of law from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction,\" wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas concluded that the larceny law requires proof of three elements not included in robbery: the intent to steal, property worth more than $ 1,000, and proof that the defendant \"takes and carries away\" the property. Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer, expressed the view that the Court's decision gave \"short shrift to the common-law origin and statutory evolution of [18 USC Section 2113].\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54767:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54768:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54768:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe former version of the California public records statute required a state or local law enforcement agency to make public the name, address, and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency. In 1996, the state amended the statute to require that a person requesting an arrestee's address declare, under penalty of perjury, that the request was being made for journalistic, scholarly, political, governmental, or investigative purposes, and that the address would not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service. The United Reporting Publishing Corporation publishes the \"JAILMAIL\" list, which provides the names and addresses of recently arrested individuals for its customers. United received its information from the Los Angeles Police Department and other California law enforcement agencies under the former version of the statute. United sought declaratory and injunctive relief to hold the amendment unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Federal District Court granted United summary judgment, on the ground that the amended statute was an impermissible restriction on commercial speech and thus violated the First Amendment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the amended statute restricted commercial speech, which was entitled to a limited measure of First Amendment protection; and that although an asserted governmental interest in protecting an arrestees' privacy was substantial, the amended statute's numerous exceptions precluded the statute from directly and materially advancing such an interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54768:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54768:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54768:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the amended statute was not an abridgment of anyone's right to engage in speech, commercial or otherwise, but simply a law regulating access to information in the hands of law enforcement agencies. The Court concluded that United's facial challenge to the statute was not warranted, as there was \"'no possibility that protected speech would be muted.'\" Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, \"California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment.\" Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens expressed the view that the amended statute was invalid as applied to the service, because California was denying access to information based on their intended use of the information for a constitutionally protected purpose, and that such discrimination was not justified by state interests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54768:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54769:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54769:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, Eddie Shanklin was struck and killed by a Norfolk Southern train at a railroad intersection. At the time of the accident, the intersection was equipped with advanced warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks, which were installed with federal funds under the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program and were fully compliant with the federal standards for such devices. Afterwards, Dedra Shanklin, Mr. Shanklin's widow, brought a diversity wrongful death action against Norfolk Southern. Shanklin alleged, based on Tennessee statutory and common law, that Norfolk Southern had been negligent by failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing. Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA) pre-empted Shanklin's suit. The FRSA contains an express pre-emption provision, which allows States to enforce their railroad safety measures until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. The District Court held that Shanklin's allegation that the signs installed at the crossing were inadequate was not pre-empted and, ultimately, entered judgement for her. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reasoned that federal funding alone was insufficient to trigger pre-emption of state tort actions under the FRSA. The court concluded that because the Tennessee Department of Transportation had installed the signs for the purpose of providing \"minimum protection,\" no individualized determination of adequacy had be made by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) under the Crossings Program.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54769:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54769:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54769:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that railroads cannot b sued under state tort law over allegedly inadequate warning devices at rail crossings if the equipment installed was federally funded. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that \"[o]nce the FHWA approved the project and the signs were installed using federal funds, the federal standard for adequacy displaced Tennessee statutory and common law addressing the same subject, thereby pre-empting [Shanklin's] claim.\" Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote that the consequence of the Court's decision \"is that state negligence law is displaced with no substantive federal standard of conduct to fill the void.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54769:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54771:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54771:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, Irma Drye died, leaving a $233,000 estate. The sole heir to the estate under Arkansas law was Rohn Drye, Jr., her son. Drye owed the Federal Government approximately $325,000 in unpaid tax assessments. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had valid tax liens against all of Drye's \"property and rights to property\" under federal law, 26 USC section 6321. Several months after Drye was appointed the administrator of his mother's estate, he disclaimed his interest in the estate, which then passed under state law to his daughter. Arkansas law provides that the disavowing heir's creditors may not reach property thus disclaimed. Drye's daughter then proceeded to use the estate's proceeds to establish a family trust (Trust), of which she and her parents are the beneficiaries. Under state law the Trust was shielded from creditors seeking to satisfy the debts of the Trust's beneficiaries. After Drye revealed his beneficial interest in the Trust to the IRS, the IRS filed a notice of federal tax lien against the Trust. Ultimately, the District Court ruled in favor of the Government and its lien. In affirming, the Court of Appeals interpreted precedent to mean that state law determines whether a given set of circumstances creates a right or interest, but federal law determines whether that right or interest constitutes \"property\" or \"rights to property\" under section 6321, thus subjecting it to federal tax liens.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54771:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54771:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54771:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Drye's disclaimer did not defeat the federal tax liens. The Court read the Internal Revenue Code to look to state law for a delineation of a taxpayer's rights or interests, but to leave to federal law the determine whether those rights or interests constitute \"property\" or \"rights to property\" under section 6321. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that \"Drye had the unqualified right to receive the entire value of his mother's estate...or to channel that value to his daughter. The control rein he held under state law, we hold, rendered the inheritance 'property' or 'rights to property' belonging to him within the meaning of [section] 6321, and hence subject to the federal tax liens that sparked this controversy.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54771:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54772:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54772:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate, among other items, \"drugs\" and \"devices.\" In 1996, the FDA asserted jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products, concluding that, under the FDCA, nicotine is a \"drug\" and cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are \"devices\" that deliver nicotine to the body. Accordingly, the FDA promulgated regulations governing tobacco products' promotion, labeling, and accessibility to children and adolescents. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, and a group of tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and advertisers, filed suit challenging the FDA's regulations. Brown moved for summary judgement on the ground that the FDA lacked the jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed, or without manufacturer claims of therapeutic benefit. The District Court ruled that the FDA had jurisdiction over tobacco as a device, but that the agency had overstepped its authority in attempting to restrict tobacco advertising. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Congress had not granted the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. The court found that the FDA's definition of tobacco as a device was flawed because the agency could not prove that the impact of tobacco products on the body was \"intended\" under the act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54772:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54772:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54772:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that \"Congress has not given the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed.\" The ruling was based on the FDCA as a whole and in conjunction with Congress' subsequent tobacco-specific legislation. \"By no means do we question the seriousness of the problem that the FDA has sought to address,\" Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. Nonetheless, Justice O' Connor wrote, \"Congress, for better or for worse, has created a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco products, squarely rejected proposals to give the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco, and repeatedly acted to preclude any agency from exercising significant policymaking authority in the area.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54772:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54773:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54773:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, Cortez Byrd Chips hired Bill Harbert Construction to install a chip mill in Mississippi. Byrd and Harbert agreed that any ensuing disputes would be decided by arbitration. After the installation, Harbert demanded an upward adjustment on the bill. Byrd refused, claiming that Harbert had not submitted a written statement requesting additional compensation as required under their contract. Harbert called in the American Arbitration Association. Arbitration was conducted in Alabama and Harbert received an award. In response, Byrd sought to vacate or modify the award in a Federal District Court of Mississippi, where the contract was performed. Harbert then sought to confirm the award in Alabama. The latter court refused to dismiss, transfer, or stay its action, concluding that venue was proper only there because \"[t]he place of arbitration determines the jurisdiction of the court,\" and it entered judgment for Harbert. Byrd appealed, claiming that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provided that the case should be deferred to Mississippi because the suit had been filed there first. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, under the FAA, venue for motions to confirm, vacate, or modify awards was exclusively in the district where the arbitration award was made, and thus venue was limited to the Alabama court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54773:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54773:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54773:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the \"FAA's venue provisions are permissive, allowing a motion to confirm, vacate, or modify to be brought either in the district where the award was made or in any district proper under the general venue statute.\" Writing for the Court, Justice Souter reasoned that because both the history and function of the FAA's venue provisions dictate that they were meant to expand, not limit, venue choice, it was appropriate for Cortez Byrd to seek to vacate the arbitrator's award in federal court in Mississippi.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54773:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54774:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54774:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJeffrey Fischer, while president and part owner of Quality Medical Consultants, Inc. (QMC), arranged for QMC to receive a $1.2 million loan from West Volusia Hospital Authority (WVHA), a municipal agency that operates two hospitals, which participate in and receive funding from the federal Medicare program. To get the loan, Fischer pledged QMC's accounts receivables and offered a $1 million letter of credit. After a 1994 audit of WHVA raised questions about the QMC loan, Fischer was indicted for federal bribery, including defrauding an organization which \"receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program.\" A jury convicted him and the District Court sentenced him to imprisonment, imposed a term of supervised release, and ordered the payment of restitution. On appeal, Fischer argued that the Government failed to prove WHVA, as the organization affected by his wrongdoing, received \"benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program,\" as required by the federal bribery statute. In rejecting that argument and affirming the convictions, the Court of Appeals held that funds received by an organization constitute \"benefits\" within the statute's meaning if the source of the funds is a federal program, like Medicare, which provides aid or assistance to participating organizations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54774:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54774:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54774:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that \"Health care providers such as the one defrauded by [Fischer] receive 'benefits' within the meaning of [the federal bribery statute].\" Thus, the Medicare funds hospitals receive for treating Medicare patients subject people who bribe hospital officials to federal prosecution. \"The government has a legitimate and significant interest in prohibiting financial fraud or acts of bribery being perpetrated upon Medicare providers,\" Justice Kennedy wrote for the court. \"Fraudulent acts threaten the program's integrity. They raise the risk participating organizations will lack the resources...to provide the level and quality of care envisioned by the program.\" Justice Clarence Thomas, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, argued that \"[t]he only persons who receive 'benefits' under Medicare are the individual elderly and disabled Medicare patients, not the medical providers who serve them.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54774:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54775:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54775:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPrior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court enjoined the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student-led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether \"invocations\" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54775:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54775:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54775:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as \"private,\" wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the \"disturbing\" tone of the Court's opinion that \"bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54775:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54776:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54776:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nScott Carmell was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his stepdaughter from 1991 to 1995, when she was 12 to 16 years old. Before September 1, 1993, the relevant Texas statute specified that a victim's testimony alone about a sexual offense could not support a conviction unless corroborated by other evidence or if the victim had informed another person of the offense within six months of its occurrence (outcry). However, the statute provided that if a victim was under 14 at the time of the offense, the victim's testimony alone could support a conviction. A 1993 amendment allowed the victim's testimony alone to support a conviction if the victim was under 18. Carmell argued, before the Texas Court of Appeals, that four of his convictions could not stand under the pre-1993 version of the law, which was in effect at the time of his alleged conduct, because they were based solely on the testimony of the victim, who was not under 14 at the time of four of the offenses and had not made a timely outcry. The court held that applying the 1993 amendment retrospectively did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because the amended statute did not alter the punishment or the elements of the offense that the State must prove. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54776:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54776:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54776:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the retrospective application of Texas's amended statutory provision allowing alleged sexual offense victim's uncorroborated testimony to support a conviction violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that, \"[a] law reducing the quantum of evidence required to convict an offender is as grossly unfair as, say, retrospectively eliminating an element of the offense, increasing the punishment for an existing offense or lowering the burden of proof.\" For the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the amended statute accords victims of a sexual offense \"full testimonial stature,\" and that \"such a witness competency rule validly may be applied to offenses committed before its enactment.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54776:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54777:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54777:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLucio Flores-Ortega, who does not speak English fluently, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. At his sentencing, the trial judge advised him that he had 60 days to file an appeal. His counsel, a public defender, did not file a notice of appeal in the period set by the court even though her file contained the words \"bring appeal papers.\" Flores-Ortega's subsequent attempt to file such notice was rejected as untimely. Flores-Ortega's efforts to secure state habeas corpus relief were unsuccessful. Represented by a federal defender, Flores-Ortega then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based his counsel's failure to file the notice after promising to do so. The District Court denied relief. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Flores-Ortega was entitled to relief because, under its precedent, a habeas petitioner need only show that his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal was without the petitioner's consent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54777:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54777:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54777:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that counsel is not always required to file a notice of appeal after their clients plead guilty unless the clients specifically ask them to so. \"We cannot say, as a constitutional matter, that in every case counsel's failure to consult with the defendant about an appeal is necessarily unreasonable and therefore deficient,\" Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. \"We therefore reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal,\" concluded Justice O'Connor. In dissent, Justice David Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens, wrote that attorneys should be required to consult with their clients about possible appeals in virtually all cases, even those in which the defendants plead guilty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54777:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54779:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54779:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid H. Baral made two remittances to the Internal Revenue Service towards his 1988 income tax, which was due on April 15, 1989. The first was a standard withholding from Baral's wages throughout 1988 by his employer. The second was an estimated income tax remitted in January 1989 by Baral himself. Baral received an extension until August 15, but did not file the return until June 1, 1993. On the return, Baral claimed a $1,175 overpayment and asked the IRS to apply this excess as a credit toward his outstanding tax obligations for the 1989 tax year. The IRS denied the requested credit citing 26 U. S. C. Section 6511, which states that \"the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return.\" According to the IRS, Baral had paid no portion of the overpaid tax between February 1, 1990 and June 1, 1993, and therefore he faced a ceiling of zero on any allowable refund or credit. Baral commenced suit for a refund in the Federal District Court, which granted the IRS summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that both remittances were paid on April 15, 1989.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54779:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54779:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54779:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that remittances of withholding tax and estimated income tax are paid on the due date of a calendar year taxpayer's income tax return. The Court concluded that the ceiling on Baral's requested credit was zero, because, rather than being paid within the look-back period, between February 1, 1990 and June 1, 1993, both the withholding and the estimated taxes had been paid on April 15, 1989. The decision means that the three-year time limit for seeking a refund begins running when someone's withholding and estimated tax payments are made to the government. The deadline does not depend on when the person's income tax return is filed, the court said.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54779:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54781:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54781:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1991, Cynthia Herdrich, after feeling an unusual pain in her stomach, was examined by Lori Pegram, a physician affiliated with Carle Clinic Association, P. C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. (hereafter Carle). Carle functions as a health maintenance organization (HMO) organized for profit. Pegram then required Herdrich to wait eight days for an ultrasound of her inflamed abdomen, which was to be performed at a facility staffed by Carle more than 50 miles away from Herdrich. During that period, Herdrich's appendix ruptured. Herdrich sued Carle, including Pegram, in State court for medical malpractice and two counts of fraud. Carle and Pegram, under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), removed the case to federal court. Ultimately, Herdrich was only able to pursue one fraud count, which was amended to allege that Carle's HMO organization provisions rewarding its physician owners for limiting medical care, entailed an inherent or anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, because the terms create an incentive to make decisions in the physicians' self-interest, rather than the plan participants' exclusive interests. The District Court granted Carle's motion to dismiss on the ground that Carle was not acting as an ERISA fiduciary. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54781:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54781:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54781:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that mixed treatment and eligibility decisions to delay medical treatment by sending a patient to a HMO owned facility, with adverse consequences, made by a health maintenance organization through its physician, are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA. Thus, Herdrich did not state an ERISA claim. \"Herdrich's remedy -- return of profit to the plan for the participants' benefit -- would be nothing less than elimination of the for-profit HMO,\" wrote Justice Souter for the Court, \"no HMO organization could survive without some incentive connecting physician reward with treatment rationing.\" Justice Souter noted that \"the Federal Judiciary would be acting contrary to the congressional policy of allowing HMO organizations if it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim portending wholesale attacks on existing HMOs solely because of their structure.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54781:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54785:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54785:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1998, William Stoecker formed Chandler Enterprises, Inc., which purchased a plane out of state and moved it to Illinois. By the time the Illinois Department of Revenue, having discovered that the corporation had failed to file a use tax return or pay the tax on the plane, issued a notice of tax liability against the corporation and a notice of penalty liability against the debtor in the District Court, the corporation was defunct and Stoecker was in bankruptcy. Under Illinois law, any corporate officer who is responsible for filing tax returns and making payments, and who \"willfully\" fails to do so, is personally liable for a penalty \"equal to the total amount of tax unpaid by the corporation.\" There was no proof that Stoecker was responsible for payment of the tax and the court ruled that while Chandler owed taxes on the plane, Stoecker should not be penalized. However, Illinois law shifted the burden of proof, both on production and persuasion, to the purportedly responsible officer, the trustee in bankruptcy, Thomas Raleigh, once a notice of penalty liability was issued. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Department, holding that the burden of proof remained with Raleigh, just as it would have been on Stoecker had the proceedings taken place outside of bankruptcy, and finding that Raleigh had not satisfied the burden of persuasion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54785:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54785:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54785:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that \"[w]hen the substantive law creating a tax obligation puts the burden of proof on a taxpayer, the burden of proof on the tax claim in bankruptcy court remains where the substantive law put it (in this case, on the trustee in bankruptcy).\" The Court concluded that the bankruptcy estate's obligation to the Department was established by the state's tax code and that the Bankruptcy Code made no provision for altering the burden on a tax claim, and its silence said that no change was intended.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54785:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54787:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54787:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections with various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based on his homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54787:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54787:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54787:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that \"applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association.\" In effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, \"[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill,\" and that a gay troop leader's presence \"would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54787:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54788:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54788:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1981, Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. and Marathon Oil Co. both paid the Federal Government over $150 million in return for the rights to explore for and develop oil off the coast of North Carolina, provided that the companies received exploration and development permissions in accordance with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), and the regulations promulgated pursuant to OCSLA and CZMA. In 1990, the companies submitted an exploration plan, as required by OCSLA and CZMA, to the Department of the Interior for approval. Thereafter, the Outer Banks Protection Act (OBPA) became effective. The OBPA prevented the Secretary of the Interior from approving the exploration plan for at least 13 months. The state of North Carolina then objected to certification of the companies' plans under the CZMA. Before the Secretary of Commerce rejected Mobil's request to override North Carolina's objection, the companies filed a breach-of-contract lawsuit. In granting summary judgement for the companies, the Court of Federal Claims found that the Federal Government had broken its contractual promise to follow OCSLA's requirement to approve an exploration plan that satisfied OCSLA's requirements within 30 days of the plan's submission, which constituted the repudiation of the contract and entitled the companies to restitution of the payments. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Federal Government's refusal to consider the companies' final exploration plan was not the operative cause of any failure to carry out the contracts' terms, because North Carolina's objection would have prevented the companies from exploring.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54788:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54788:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54788:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Federal Government broke its promise, repudiated the contracts, and must give the companies their money back. \"We find that the oil companies gave the United States $158 million in return for a contractual promise to follow the terms of pre-existing statutes and regulations. The new statute prevented the Government from keeping that promise,\" wrote Justice Breyer for the Court, \"therefore the Government must give the companies their money back.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54788:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54789:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54789:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA California state-court jury convicted Lee Robbins of second degree murder and grand theft auto. After the trial, in which Robbins defended himself, his appointed counsel on appeal concluded that an appeal would be frivolous. Under a new California procedure, established in People v. Wende, Robbins' counsel then filed with the California Court of Appeal to allow him to withdraw or to let the court dispose of the case by filing a brief that was silent on the merits of the case and offered to brief issues at the court's direction. The court affirmed and, after Robbins appealed his own case, the California Supreme Court denied review. After exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, Robbins sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that he had been denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. The Federal District Court granted Robbins' petition and concluded that his counsel failed to meet even the minimum duty to further a client's case after determining that his appeal was without merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded the case for the District Court to consider other trial errors raised by Robbins.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54789:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54789:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54789:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that \"States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant's right to appellate counsel,\" as does California's procedure. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that California's procedure \"reasonably ensures that an indigent's appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal. Whatever its strengths or weaknesses as a matter of policy, we cannot say that it fails to afford indigents the adequate and effective appellate review that the Fourteenth Amendment requires.\" The dissenting minority collectively noted that California's procedures allowed attorneys to remain too passive.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54789:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54790:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54790:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn California, candidates for public office can gain access to the general ballot by winning a qualified political party's primary. In 1996, voter approved Proposition 198 changed California's partisan primary from a closed primary, in which only a political party's members can vote on its nominees, to a blanket primary, in which each voter's ballot lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among them. The candidate of each party who wins the most votes is that party's nominee for the general election. The California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party have historically prohibited nonmembers from voting in their party's primary. Each political party filed suit against Bill Jones, the California Secretary of State, alleging that the blanket primary violated their First Amendment right of association. Jones countered that a blanket primary will intensify the election and allow for better representation in elected office. Siding with Jones, the District Court held that the primary's burden on the parties' associational rights was not severe and was justified by substantial state interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54790:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54790:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54790:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that California's blanket primary violates a political party's First Amendment right of association. \"Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with -- to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by -- those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival,\" wrote Justice Antonin Scalia for the majority. \"A single election in which the party nominee is selected by nonparty members could be enough to destroy the party.\" Justice Scalia went on to state for the Court that Proposition 198 takes away a party's \"basic function\" to choose its own leaders and is functionally \"both severe and unnecessary.\" Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. \"This Court's willingness to invalidate the primary schemes of 3 States and cast serious constitutional doubt on the schemes of 29 others at the parties' behest is,\" Justice Stevens wrote, \"an extraordinary intrusion into the complex and changing election laws of the States.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54790:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54791:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54791:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Colorado statute makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to \"knowingly approach\" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass \"a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person....\" Leila Hill and others, sidewalk counselors who offer abortion alternatives to women entering abortion clinics, sought to enjoin the statute's enforcement in state court, claiming violations of their First Amendment free speech rights and right to a free press. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment after holding that a provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment. In affirming, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated the lower court's conclusions. The court concluded that the statute struck a proper balance between a person's right to protest and a person's right to medical treatment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54791:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54791:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54791:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Colorado statute's restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. The Court concluded that the statute \"is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur.\" \"Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities,\" Justice Stevens wrote for the Court. \"The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases.\" Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony M. Kennedy dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54791:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54792:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54792:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobin Free and Renee Free, consumers of infant formula, sued Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, and Mead Johnson & Company (collectively Abbott), under Louisiana's antitrust laws alleging a price-fixing conspiracy. After Abbott successfully removed the case to federal court, the District Court granted the Frees' motion to remand, holding that it lacked federal question jurisdiction and that it had diversity jurisdiction only over the named plaintiffs' claims, not over the other class members. Ultimately concluding that federal jurisdiction extended to the case, the Court of Appeals held that the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs because it had diversity jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs' claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54792:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54792:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54792:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals by an equally divided 4-4 ruling. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54792:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54793:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54793:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Hawaiian Constitution limits the right to vote for the nine trustees of the state agency known as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). The agency administers programs designed for the benefit of two subclasses of Hawaiian citizenry, \"native Hawaiians,\" defined as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Islands before 1778, and \"Hawaiians,\" defined as descendants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. Only \"Hawaiians\" may vote in the statewide election for the trustees. Harold Rice, born in Hawaii and a Hawaiian citizen, does not have the requisite ancestry to be a \"Hawaiian\" under state law. However, Rice applied to vote in OHA trustee elections. After Rice's application was denied, he sued Hawaiian Governor Benjamin J. Cayetano, claiming that the voting exclusion was invalid under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Federal District Court granted the state summary judgment. The court examined the voting qualifications with the latitude applied to legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power over Indian affairs, and found that the electoral scheme was rationally related to the state's responsibility to utilize a part of the proceeds from certain public lands for the native Hawaiians' benefit. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Hawaii \"may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the trustees ought to be.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54793:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54793:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54793:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that \"Hawaii's denial of Rice's right to vote in OHA trustee elections violates the Fifteenth Amendment,\" in creating a race-based voting qualification. \"A state may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, and this law does so,\" Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court. The court rejected the state's argument that the voting limitation was one based on ancestry, not race. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for himself and Ruth Bader Ginsburg that the majority's decision \"rests largely on the repetition of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the state of Hawaii.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54793:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54794:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54794:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJonathan Stevens, a former attorney for the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, filed suit against his former employer, the agency, alleging that it had submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in order to induce the EPA to disburse more grant money than it was entitled to receive. Stevens filed suit under the False Calms Act (FCA), which provides for a private person to bring a qui tam civil action \"in the name of the [Federal] Government,\" against \"any person\" who \"knowingly presents...to...the...Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment.\" The State of Vermont moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that a State or state agency is not a \"person\" subject to liability under the FCA and that a qui tam action in federal court against a State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion. Vermont then filed an interlocutory appeal. Thereupon, the court stayed its proceedings and the United States intervened in the appeal in support of Stevens. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54794:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54794:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54794:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act, but that the False Claims Act does not subject a state or state agency to liability in such actions. The Court concluded that the False Claims Act does not include states as \"persons\" who can be sued under the law. Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54794:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54795:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54795:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile serving a life sentence for murder in Georgia, Robert Jones escaped and committed a second murder in 1982. Jones was sentenced to a second life term. At the time of Jones' second offense, Georgia law required the State's Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to consider inmates serving life sentences for parole after seven years and if it was not granted at that time, that it be reconsidered every three years thereafter. Jones was initially considered for parole in 1989, seven years after his 1982 conviction, and parole was denied. After Jones was incarcerated but before his first parole hearing, the Board amended its rule to require that parole reconsideration take place only once every eight years. Subsequently, the Board scheduled Jones for reconsideration eight years later, in 1997. However, a Federal Court of Appeals ruling, that such board actions could not be applied retroactively, allowed Jones to be reconsidered for parole in 1992 and again in 1995. Then a U.S. Supreme Court decision was read to allow for retroactive adjustments in parole and Jones was scheduled for reconsideration in 2003 (eight years later), rather then in 1998. Jones sued the Board members, claiming that retroactive application of the amended rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The District Court ruled in favor of the Board. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the amended Rule's retroactive application was necessarily an ex post facto violation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54795:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54795:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54795:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the retroactive application of the Georgia provision permitting extension of intervals between parole considerations does not to necessarily violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court concluded that the key element in deciding whether an increase in the interval between a state's parole hearings for prison inmates violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is whether the change creates a sufficient risk of increasing the punishment attached to the covered crimes. \"States must have due flexibility in formulating parole procedure and addressing problems associated with confinement and release,\" wrote Justice Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54795:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54796:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54796:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSalvador Martinez, a self-described self-taught paralegal with 25 years of experience at 12 different law firms, was working for a Santa Ana, California law firm when a client gave him $6,000.00 to bail her boyfriend out of jail. The bail was never posted and Martinez was subsequently charged with grand theft and the fraudulent appropriation of the property of another. Martinez chose to represent himself at trial before a jury, which acquitted him of theft, but convicted him of embezzlement. Martinez then filed a timely notice of appeal, a motion to represent himself, and a waiver of counsel. The motion to represent himself was denied by the California Court of Appeal. The court explained: \"There is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right. The right to counsel on appeal stems from the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth Amendment....The denial of self-representation at this level does not violate due process or equal protection guarantees.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54796:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54796:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54796:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that here is no constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction. \"We are not aware of any historical consensus establishing a right of self-representation on appeal,\" wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Noting that the rights established by the Sixth Amendment \"are presented strictly as rights that are available in preparation for trial and at the trial itself\" and that the Amendment \"does not include any right to appeal,\" Justice Stevens concluded, \"[i]t necessarily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal.\" Justice Stevens added \"[o]ur experience has taught us that \"a pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney.\" Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Antonin Scalia wrote concurring opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54796:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54797:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54797:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1998, Dewey Jones, of Detroit, tossed a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin, James Walker, Jr., in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Walker's home was severely damaged. Subsequently, Jones was convicted in U.S. District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. section 844(i), which makes it a federal crime to \"maliciously damage or destroy, ...by means of fire or an explosive, any building... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction. Before both courts, Jones unsuccessfully argued that section 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54797:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54797:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54797:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property \"used in\" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, such that arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under section 844(i). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court that \"[w]ere we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of section 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54797:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54798:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54798:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Council), an association of nursing homes participating in Medicare, sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, challenging the validity of various Medicare regulations establishing sanctions and remedies for nursing homes found guilty of violating minimum health and safety standards. The Council alleged that certain terms in the new regulations were unconstitutionally vague, that the regulations created administrative procedures inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause, and that the regulations' legislative rules that were not promulgated consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. The Council invoked the Federal District Court's federal-question jurisdiction, which states that \"district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,\" to rule on its claims. The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. The court concluded that set of special statutory provisions under the Medicare Act create a separate, virtually exclusive, system of administrative and judicial review for such claims. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54798:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54798:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54798:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Medicare Act barred federal-question jurisdiction of the Council's challenges to the validity of various Medicare regulations. The Court concluded that the Council must proceed instead through the special review channel that the Medicare statutes create. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in his dissent that, \"[d]elayed review...may mean no review at all. For when the costs of presenting a claim via the delayed review route exceed the costs of simply complying with the regulation, the regulated entity will buckle under and comply, even when the regulation is plainly invalid.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54798:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54800:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54800:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Taylor Grazing Act grants the Secretary of the Interior authority to divide the public rangelands into grazing districts, to specify the amount of grazing permitted in each district, and to issue grazing leases or permits to \"settlers, residents, and other stock owners.\" When Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt announced new regulations governing the administration of livestock on 170 million acres of public range, the Public Lands Council (Council), a group of nonprofit ranching-related organizations, objected. The Council's members who held grazing permits brought an action against Secretary Babbitt challenging 10 of the new federal grazing regulations issued by the Secretary in 1995. The Council claimed that the Secretary acted beyond his power in regulating the grazing patterns. The District Court found 4 of the 10 regulations unlawful. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals upheld three previously overturned regulations, which changed the definition of \"grazing preference,\" permitted those who were not \"engaged in the livestock business\" to qualify for grazing permits; and granted the United States title to all future range improvements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54800:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54800:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54800:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that \"[t]he regulatory changes do not exceed the Secretary's Taylor Grazing Act authority.\" \"Congress itself has directed development of land-use plans, and their use in the allocation process in order to preserve, improve and develop the public rangelands,\" wrote Justice Stephen G. Breyer. \"And the secretary [of the Interior] has always had the statutory authority...to reclassify and withdraw range land from grazing use.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54800:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54801:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54801:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles C. Apprendi, Jr. fired several shots into the home of an African- American family. While in custody, Apprendi made a statement, which he later retracted, that he did not want the family in his neighborhood because of their race. Apprendi was charged under New Jersey law with second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carries a prison term of 5 to 10 years. The count did not refer to the state's hate crime statute, which provides for an enhanced sentence if a trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate a person or group because of race. After Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the sentence. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a 12-year term on the firearms count. In upholding the sentence, the appeals court rejected Apprendi's claim that the Due Process Clause requires that a bias finding be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The State Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54801:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54801:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54801:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that \"the New Jersey procedure challenged in this case is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system.\" Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen G. Breyer wrote dissenting opinions that were joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54801:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54802:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54802:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Nebraska law prohibited any \"partial birth abortion\" unless that procedure was necessary to save the mother's life. It defined \"partial birth abortion\" as a procedure in which the doctor \"partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the... child,\" and defined the latter phrase to mean \"intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the [abortionist] knows will kill the... child and does kill the... child.\" Violation of the law is a felony, and it provides for the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor's state license to practice medicine. Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting, brought suit seeking a declaration that the statute violates the U.S. Constitution, claiming the law was unconstitutionally vague and placed an undue burden on himself and female patients seeking abortions. The District Court held the statute unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54802:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54802:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54802:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a complicated 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that \"Nebraska's statute criminalizing the performance of \"partial birth abortion[s]\" violates the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted in Casey and Roe.\" The sharply divided Court struck down the statute because it placed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and did not allow for exception in cases of threatened health. \"All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment,\" that results in \"an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision,\" wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent concluded that \"[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States... prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd.\"\nLearn more about the Supreme Court and abortion law in Body Politic, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54802:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54803:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54803:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSamara Brothers, Inc. designs and manufactures a line of children's clothing. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., contracted with a supplier, Judy-Philippine, Inc. (JPI), to manufacture outfits based on photographs of Samara garments and to be offered under Wal-Mart's house label, \"Small Steps.\" When JPI manufactured the clothes, it copied sixteen of Samara's garments with some small modifications to produce the line of clothes required under its contract with Wal-Mart. After discovering that Wal-Mart and other retailers were selling the so-called knockoffs, Samara brought an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946. The jury found for Samara and awarded the company more than $1 million in damages. Wal-Mart then renewed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Samara's clothing designs could be legally protected as distinctive trade dress for purposes of section 43(a). The District Court denied the motion and awarded Samara relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion and concluded that \"copyrights depicting familiar objects, such as the hearts, daisies, and strawberries in Samara's copyrights are entitled to very narrow protection. It is only the virtually identical copying...which will result in a successful claim of infringement of familiar objects.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54803:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54803:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54803:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that \"[i]n a section 43(a) action for infringement of unregistered trade dress, a product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning. The fact that product design almost invariably serves purposes other than source identification not only renders inherent distinctiveness problematic; it also renders application of an inherent-distinctiveness principle more harmful to other consumer interests,\" Justice Scalia wrote for the Court. \"Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness,\" Justice Scalia concluded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54803:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54804:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54804:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMark Rotella was admitted to a Brookhaven Psychiatric Pavilion in 1985 and discharged in 1986 after Brookhaven allegedly coerced him to stay longer than he intended. In 1994, the facility's parent company pleaded guilty to charges of fraud, conspiracy and violations of RICO, for giving physicians monetary incentives to needlessly admit, treat and retain patients at their hospitals. Rotella learned of the plea that same year, and in 1997 he filed a civil damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), claiming that the Brookhaven doctors and related business entities, had conspired to keep him hospitalized to maximize their profits. RICO makes it criminal \"to conduct\" an \"enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.\" A \"pattern\" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, the last of which occurred within 10 years after the commission of a prior act. Brookhaven countered that the statute of limitations under RICO had run on the charge. The District Court granted Brookhaven summary judgment on the ground that the 4-year limitation period for civil RICO claims had expired in 1990, four years after Rotella admitted discovering his injury. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Rotella's argument that the limitations period does not begin to run until a plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) both the injury and the pattern of racketeering activity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54804:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54804:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54804:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Rotella's action was not timely, because the start of the 4-year limitations period applicable to a civil RICO action was not governed by an \"injury and pattern discovery\" accrual rule under which such a civil claim would accrue only when the claimant discovered, or should have discovered, both an injury and a pattern of racketeering activity. In a footnote, Justice Souter noted that \"[w]e do not...settle upon a final rule.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54804:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54805:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54805:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert A. Beck, II, of Southeastern Insurance Group (SIG), alleged that after he discovered former senior officer and director Ronald M. Prupis' unlawful conduct and contacted regulators, Prupis enacted a scheme to remove him from SIG. Beck sued Prupis under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Beck alleged that his injury, the loss of his employment, served to further Prupis' conspiracy and therefore provided a cause of action under RICO. The District Court dismissed Beck's RICO conspiracy claim. The court agreed with Prupis that employees who are terminated for refusing to participate in RICO activities, or who threaten to report RICO activities, do not have standing to sue under RICO for damages from their loss of employment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the act causing Beck's injury was not an act of racketeering, it could not support a RICO cause of action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54805:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54805:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54805:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not give rise to a cause of action under RICO. Thus, because Prupis' scheme to remove Beck from SIG was not an act of racketeering itself, Beck had no ground to sue him under RICO. Although Prupis did engage in acts of racketeering, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, \"the alleged overt act (terminating) in the present case was not independently wrongful under any substantive provision of RICO.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54805:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54806:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54806:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 13, 1995 Miami-Dade police received an anonymous tip that a black male wearing a plaid shirt was standing near a bus stop carrying a gun. The two officers who responded found three black males, one of which, J.L., a 15 -year-old, was wearing a plaid shirt. After frisking him, the officers did find a firearm. J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed weapon without a license. At trial, he moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing that the frisking performed by the officers was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court granted the motion, but was reversed by the immediate appellate court. The Florida Supreme Court overruled the appellate court and suppressed the evidence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54806:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54806:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54806:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court concluded that J.L. the anonymous tip did not meet the minimum requirements to perform a warrantless search. Justice Ginsburg, drawing from the Court's logic in Terry v. Ohio and Adams v. Williams, indicated that an anonymous tip must posses a moderate level of reliability, including \"predictive information\" that offers police a \"means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility.\" An accurate description of a person without a reliable assertion of illegality or description of the crime in question, as was the anonymous tip in this case, does not meet this standard. \"All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believe he had inside information.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54806:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54807:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54807:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nState departments of motor vehicles (DMVs) require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person's name, address, telephone number, Social Security number, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver's license or registering an automobile. Congress enacted the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),which establishes a regulatory scheme that restricts the States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent, after finding that many States sell such information. The DPPA conflicts with South Carolina law, under which information contained in the State's DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester's name and address and stating that the information will not be used for telephone solicitation. The Attorney General of South Carolina filed suit, alleging the DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The District Court concluded that the DPPA was incompatible with the principles of federalism, granted summary judgement for the State, and permanently enjoined the DPPA's enforcement against the State. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also concluded that the DPPA violated the constitutional principles of federalism.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54807:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54807:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54807:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and doesn't run afoul of federalism principles. The law \"does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens,\" Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. \"It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals,\" the Chief Justice added.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54807:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54808:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54808:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBonnie Weisgram died of carbon monoxide poisoning during a fire in her home. Chad Weisgram, her son, brought a diversity suit in federal District Court, seeking wrongful death damages, alleging that a defective heater, manufactured by Marley Company and used by Bonnie Weisgram, cause both the fire and her death. At trial, Weisgram introduced the testimony of three supposed experts to prove the alleged heater defect and its causal connection to the fire. Marley's objection that the testimony was unreliable, and therefore inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, was overruled by the District Court. After Weisgram's evidence was introduced, Marley again unsuccessfully moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Weisgram had failed to meet his burden of proof on the issues of defect and causation. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for Weisgram. Afterwards, Marley, once again, requested judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, Marley requested a new trial. The court denied the motions and entered judgment for Weisgram. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Marley's motion for judgment as a matter of law should have been granted because the testimony of Weisgram's expert witnesses, the sole evidence supporting the product defect charge, was speculative and not shown to be scientifically sound. The appeals court did not order a new trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54808:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54808:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54808:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 permits an appellate court to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law when it determines that evidence was erroneously admitted at trial and that the remaining, properly admitted, evidence is insufficient to constitute a submissible case. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that \"if...the court of appeals concludes that further proceedings are unwarranted because the loser on appeal has had a full and fair opportunity to present the case, including arguments for a new trial, the appellate court may appropriately instruct the district court to enter judgment against the jury-verdict winner. \"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54808:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54809:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54809:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1976, Buckley v. Valeo established a $1,000 cap on individuals' contributions to candidates for federal office. Missouri law imposes campaign contribution limits, ranging from $250 to $1,000, to candidates for state office. The statute allows for periodic adjustments, which increased the 1998 contribution limit to $1,075 for candidates for statewide office, including state auditor. In 1998, Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor, and the Shrink Missouri Government PAC, a political action committee, filed suit, alleging that the Missouri statute imposing limits on contributions to candidates for state office violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The PAC had contributed $1,075 to Fredman and argued, without the limitation, it would contribute more to Fredman's campaign. Additionally, Fredman alleged he could campaign effectively only with more generous contributions. The Federal District Court, applying Buckley v. Valeo, upheld the statute. The court rejected Fredman's and the PAC's contention that inflation since Buckley's approval of a federal $1,000 restriction meant that the state limit of $1,075 for a statewide office could not be constitutional today. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, found that Missouri's interest in avoiding the corruption or the perception of corruption caused by candidates' acceptance of large campaign contributions was insufficient to satisfy Buckley's strict scrutiny standard of review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54809:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54809:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54809:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no, and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Buckley is the authority for comparable state regulation and, but that the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, do not define the scope of permissible state limitations. The Court held the Missouri statute not to violate the First Amendment. \"Even without the authority of Buckley, there would be no serious question about the legitimacy of the interests claimed, wrote Justice Souter for the Court, \"the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.\" Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, voting to overturn Buckley as a violation of First Amendment speech rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54809:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54810:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54810:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 provides for the allocation of funds for educational materials and equipment, including library materials and computer software and hardware, to public and private elementary and secondary schools to implement \"secular, neutral, and nonideological\" programs. In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, about 30% of Chapter 2 funds are allocated for private schools, most of which are Catholic or otherwise religiously affiliated. Mary Helms and other public school parents file suit alleging that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The District Court initially agreed, finding that Chapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion because the materials and equipment loaned to the Catholic schools were direct aid and that the schools were pervasively sectarian. However, after the presiding judge who made the initial ruling retired, the case was reviewed by a new judge, who reversed that decision. Thereafter, based on different precedent, the court upheld Chapter 2. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Chapter 2 unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54810:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54810:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54810:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 plurality decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, is not a law respecting an establishment of religion simply because many of the private schools receiving Chapter 2 aid in the parish are religiously affiliated. Turning to neutrality to distinguish between indoctrination attributable to the State and that which is not, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court, \"[i]f the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54810:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54811:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54811:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) makes it unlawful for a private employer \"to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual...because of such individual's age.\" In 1974, Congress extended the ADEA's substantive requirements to the states. First, in 1994, employees of the University of Montevallo filed suit against the university, a branch of the State of Alabama, alleging that the university had discriminated against them on the basis of their age. The federal District Court dismissed the case based on the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court determined that, although the ADEA shows Congress' intent to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress did not enact or extend the ADEA under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. The court, therefore, held that the ADEA did not abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, in 1995, a group of faculty and librarians of Florida State University filed suit against the Board of Regents, alleging that the university's fiscal actions had violated the ADEA because the actions had a disparate impact on the pay of older employees. When the Florida Board of Regents moved to dismiss the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the District Court denied the motion, holding that Congress expressed its intent to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in the ADEA, and that the ADEA is a proper exercise of congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, in 1996, a third case, involving an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections, was similarly decided. The Court of Appeals, in deciding all three cases, held that the ADEA does not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54811:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54811:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54811:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the ADEA contains a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity, but that the abrogation exceeds Congress' authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. \"States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest,\" wrote Justice O'Connor for the Court. Justice O'Connor noted that, \"[o]ld age also does not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience it.\" Justice O'Connor concluded that \"[i]n contrast, when a State discriminates on the basis of race or gender, we require a tighter fit between the discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve.\" Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54811:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54812:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54812:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1975, inmates at the Pendleton Correctional Facility filed a class action lawsuit, which ultimately led the District Court to issue an injunction to remedy Eighth Amendment violations regarding conditions of confinement. In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), which sets a standard for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions. The PLRA provides that a motion to terminate such relief \"shall operate as a stay\" of that relief beginning 30 days after the motion is filed and ending when the court rules on the motion. In 1997, the State of Indiana filed a motion to terminate the remedial order against the correctional facility. Under the PLRA, the motion stayed the court's original remedial order. The prisoners of Pendleton moved to enjoin the operation of the automatic stay, arguing that the automatic stay provision of the PLRA violated due process and the separation of powers doctrine. The District Court enjoined the stay. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that the provision precluded courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin the stay, but concluded that the statute was unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54812:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54812:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54812:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Congress clearly intended to make operation of the PLRA's automatic stay provision mandatory, precluding courts from exercising their equitable power to enjoin the stay and that the PLRA does not violate separation of powers principles. Thus, Congress lawfully imposed deadlines for federal judges to review states officials' motions to discontinue court monitoring and supervision of state prison conditions. Justice O'Connor, in addressing whether the PLRA violated the separation of powers, remarked in a footnote that, \"[t]he PLRA does not deprive courts of their adjudicatory role, but merely provides a new legal standard for relief and encourages courts to apply that standard promptly.\" Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer and John Paul Stevens dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54812:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54813:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54813:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, Webster Hubbell, in a plea agreement, promised to provide the Independent Counsel with information about matters relating to the Whitewater investigation. Subsequently, the Independent Counsel served Hubbell with a subpoena calling for such information, and Hubbell invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to state whether he had the documents the Independent Counsel demanded. After being granted immunity, pursuant to 18 USC section 6003 (a), Hubbell produced the desired documents. The Independent Counsel then used those documents to indict Hubbell on tax and fraud charges. The District Court dismissed the indictment because the evidence that would be used against Hubbell was derived either directly or indirectly from his immunized act of producing those documents. Vacating that decision, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to determine the scope of the Government's knowledge of Hubbell's financial affairs on the day the subpoena was issued. The court determined that if the Government could not demonstrate with reasonable particularity that there existed a prior awareness of the contents of the documents and that those documents were in Hubbell's possession, then the indictment was tainted. After acknowledging he could not meet this standard, the Independent Counsel entered into a conditional plea agreement providing for the dismissal of the indictment, unless the Supreme Court's disposition of the case made it reasonably likely that Hubbell's immunity would not pose a significant bar to his prosecution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54813:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54813:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54813:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court, in order to determine the precise scope of a grant of immunity with respect to the production of documents in response to a subpoena, held that a person responding to subpoena, pursuant to a court order granting immunity, could not be prosecuted on the basis of information in the documents produced if the government did not have any prior, independent knowledge of the documents. Thus, the indictment against Hubbell was dismissed because it was not derived from sources independent of documents produced under his grant of immunity. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, \"we have no doubt that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects the target of a grand jury investigation from being compelled to answer questions designed to elicit information about the existence of sources of potentially incriminating evidence.\" Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist was the lone dissenter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54813:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54815:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54815:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact to establish procedures for resolution of one state's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another state. Under the Compact Clause, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. In order to resolve outstanding murder and robbery charges against Michael Hill, an Ohio prisoner, the State of New York lodged a detainer against him under the IAD. Hill filed a request for disposition of the detainer, pursuant to IAD Article III, and was returned to New York. Article III provides that, upon such a request, that the prisoner be brought to trial within 180 days. Thereafter, Hill's counsel agreed to a trial date outside the 180-day period. Subsequently, Hill moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the IAD's time limit had expired. The trial court denied Hill's motion, concluding that his defense counsel's explicit agreement to the trial date constituted a waiver or abandonment of Hill's IAD rights. After his conviction and subsequent appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to dismiss. In reversing, the state Court of Appeals ordered that Hill's indictment be dismissed because his counsel's agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive his IAD speedy trial rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54815:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54815:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54815:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the period provided for by the IAD bars the defendant from seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did not occur within that period. Noting scheduling matters are generally controlled by counsel without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, Justice Scalia wrote, \"[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue.\" In such cases, \"[a]bsent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel's word on such matters is the last.\" Thus, defense counsel's agreement to a later trial date waived Hill's speedy trial rights under the IAD.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54815:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54816:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54816:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel's relationship, which ended in 1991, they had two daughters. Until Brad's suicide in 1993, Brad's parents Jenifer and Gary Troxel, the paternal grandparents, had regularly seen their granddaughters on weekends. However, after Brad's suicide, Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to reduced their visitation time to one short visit per month. The Troxels filed suit for the right to visit their grandchildren, under section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington, which permits \"any person\" to petition for visitation rights \"at any time\" and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child's best interest. Granville did not oppose the petition outright but did oppose the amount of visitation time sought by the Troxels. Subsequently, a Washington Superior Court ordered more visitation than Granville desired. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that non-parents lacked standing to sue under the statute. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the statute unconstitutionally interfered with parents' right to rear their children.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54816:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54816:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54816:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Washington Statute violated the right of parents, under the due process clause of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that \"[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.\" Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54816:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54817:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54817:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile checking the immigration status of passengers on a bus in Texas, Border Patrol Agent Cesar Cantu squeezed the soft luggage which passengers had placed in the overhead storage space. When Agent Cantu squeezed a canvas bag above Steven Dewayne Bond, Agent Cantu noticed that it contained a \"brick-like\" object. After Bond admitted owning the bag and consented to its search, Agent Cantu discovered a \"brick\" of methamphetamine. Bond was indicted on federal drug charges. Bond moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the agent conducted an illegal search of his bag, when squeezing it, in alleged violation of the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The District Court denied the motion and subsequently found Bond guilty. On appeal, Bond conceded that other passengers had access to his bag, but contended that Agent Cantu manipulated the bag (by squeezing)in a way that other passengers would not, thus constituting an unreasonable search. In affirming the denial of the motion, the Court of Appeals held that Agent Cantu's manipulation of the bag was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54817:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54817:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54817:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that \"Agent Cantu's physical manipulation of petitioner's carry-on bag violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches.\" The Court concluded that Bond \"possessed a privacy interest in his bag,\" and that such an expectation of privacy is reasonable. \"Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection,\" Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, a bus passenger \"does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner.\" Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissented, seeing no \"reasonable expectation\" that strangers would not manipulate luggage in a bus.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54817:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54818:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54818:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Department of Transportation, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, which required auto manufacturers to equip some of their 1987 vehicles with passive restraints. To comply with FMVSS 208, Honda installed manual seat belts and a warning light, instead of a driver-side airbag, for the 1987 Honda Accord. Alexis Geier suffered severe head and facial injuries in an accident while driving a 1987 Honda Accord that did not have a driver-side airbag. Geier and her parents sought damages under District of Columbia tort law, claiming that American Honda Motor Company was negligent in not equiping the Accord with a driver's side airbag. The District Court ruled in favor of Honda, finding that Geier's claims were expressly pre-empted by the Act because a jury verdict in Geier's favor \"might establish a safety standard that was not identical to Standard 208.\" In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that, because Geier's state tort claims posed an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of FMVSS 208, those claims conflicted with that standard and that the Act consequently pre-empted the lawsuit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54818:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54818:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54818:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that \"[Geier's] 'no airbag' lawsuit conflicts with the objectives of FMVSS 208 and is therefore pre-empted by the Act.\" Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that a rule of state tort law imposing a duty to install airbags in cars such as Honda's would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought and to the phase-in that the federal regulation deliberately imposed. It would also have made adoption of state mandatory seatbelt laws less likely.\" The dissent found fault in the majority's \"unprecedented use of inferences from regulatory history and commentary as a basis for implied pre-emption.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54818:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54819:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54819:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be \"excessive.\" Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54819:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54819:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54819:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States.\" Dissenting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the majority opinion \"illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone.\" Additionally, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA contained a \"mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54819:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54820:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54820:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRay Agard was tried in New York on sodomy, assault, and weapons counts. Ultimately, Agard's trial turned on whether the jury believed the testimony of the victim and her friend or the conflicting testimony of Agard. The prosecutor challenged Agard's credibility. During summation, the prosecutor remarked, \"[h]e gets to sit here and listen to the testimony of all the other witnesses before he testifies,\" and \"[t]hat gives [him] a big advantage, doesn't it?\" The prosecutor alleged that Agard had tailored his testimony to fit evidence that he heard from witnesses through the course of the trial. The trial court rejected Agard's objection that these comments violated his right to be present at trial. After exhausting his state appeals, Agard petitioned for federal habeas corpus, claiming that the prosecutor's comments violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to be present at trial and confront his accusers, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court denied his petition. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54820:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54820:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54820:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the prosecutor's comments did not violate Agard's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and that the prosecutor's comments also did not violate Agard's right to due process. \"Allowing comment upon the fact that a defendant's presence in the courtroom provides him a unique opportunity to tailor his testimony is appropriate and...sometimes essential to the central function of the trial, which is to discover the truth,\" Justice Scalia wrote for the Court. Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice David H. Souter, observed that the majority's holding \"transforms a defendant's presence at trial from a Sixth Amendment right into an automatic burden on his credibility.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54820:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54821:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54821:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced most forms of parole with supervised release. If release conditions are violated, the sentencing court may revoke the release and order the violator to serve part or all of the release term in prison without credit for time previously served on release. In 1994, Cornell Johnson was convicted of conspiring to produce and use counterfeit credit cards. Johnson was sentenced to imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release. While on supervised release, Johnson violated its terms. Subsequently, the District Court revoked Johnson's release and ordered him to serve an 18-month prison term to be followed by an additional 12 months of supervised release. The court cited no authority for ordering the new supervised release. The court could have cited a subsection added to the Act in 1994, 18 USC section 3583(h), which explicitly gave it the authority to add the new term; however, Congress made the amendment after Johnson's conviction. On appeal, Johnson argued that the application of the federal law established after his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54821:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54821:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54821:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that 18 USC section 3583(h) is not retroactively applicable; however, its prior version, 18 USC section 3583(e)(3), authorizes a Federal District Court to impose additional term of supervised release after revocation of initial term and reimprisonment. Thus, Johnson's judgment was affirmed because the federal sentencing statute, which was in effect at the time of his original offense, permitted the imposition of supervised release following recommitment. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that \"[p]re-Guidelines practice, linguistic continuity from the old scheme to the current one, and the obvious thrust of congressional sentencing policy confirm that, in applying the law as before the enactment of subsection (h), district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment.\" Justice Antonin Scalia dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54821:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54822:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54822:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSection 406(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) bars a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan from causing the plan to engage in certain prohibited transactions with a \"party in interest.\" Such a party encompasses entities that a fiduciary might be inclined to favor at the expense of the plan's beneficiaries. After the Ameritech Pension Trust (APT), an ERISA pension plan, allegedly entered into a transaction prohibited by ERISA with Salomon Smith Barney Inc., APT's fiduciaries sued Salomon under section 502(a)(3), which authorizes a fiduciary to bring a civil action to obtain appropriate equitable relief.\" Salomon arguing that section 502(a)(3) only authorizes a suit against the fiduciary who caused the plan to enter the prohibited transaction. Ultimately, the District Court held that ERISA provides a private cause of action against nonfiduciaries who participate in a prohibited transaction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the authority to sue under section 502(a)(3) does not extend to a suit against a nonfiduciary \"party in interest\" to a transaction barred by section 406(a).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54822:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54822:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54822:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Section 502(a)(3)'s authorization to a plan \"participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary\" to bring a civil action for \"appropriate equitable relief\" extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary \"party in interest\" to a prohibited transaction barred by section 406(a). \"We reject,\" wrote Justice Thomas that, \"absent a substantive provision of ERISA expressly imposing a duty upon a nonfiduciary party in interest, the nonfiduciary party may not be held liable under [section 502(a)(3)].\" Justice Thomas concluded that \"[section 502(a)(3)] itself imposes certain duties, and therefore that liability under that provision does not depend on whether ERISA's substantive provisions impose a specific duty on the party being sued.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54822:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54823:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54823:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHen House Interstate, Inc. filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. During the reorganization attempt, Hen House obtained workers' compensation insurance from Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company. Hen House repeatedly failed to make the monthly premium payments required by the policy. Ultimately, Hen House's reorganization failed and the court converted the case to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding and appointed a trustee. Hartford, learning of the bankruptcy proceedings, sought to recover its premiums as an administrative expense. Recognizing that the estate lacked unencumbered funds to pay the premiums, Hartford attempted to charge the premiums to Union Planters Bank, the secured creditor for all of the property of Hen House, by filing a claim with the Bankruptcy Court under 11 USC Section 506(c). The Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of Hartford and the ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en banc and reversed, on the ground that an administrative claimant could not invoke section 506(c).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54823:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54823:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54823:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that \"Section 506(c) does not provide an administrative claimant of a bankruptcy estate an independent right to seek payment of its claim from property encumbered by a secured creditor's lien, or subject to secured claims. Justice Scalia noted that plain meaning of the language in Section 506(c) and the \"most natural reading\" of the section persuaded the court that no one other than the trustee has an independent right to seek payment of administrative claim, like premiums from property secured by a creditor's lien, under the section.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54823:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54824:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54824:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Organic Act of Guam provides that that \"if no [slate of] candidates [for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Guam] receives a majority of the votes cast in any election...a runoff election shall be held.\" The Election Commission certified that the Democratic slate of Carl T.C. Gutierrez for governor and Madeleine Z. Bordallo for lieutenant governor had defeated the Republican slate, Joseph F. Ada and Felix P. Camacho. Gutierrez and Bordallo had received a majority of the votes cast for gubernatorial slates in the 1998 Guam general election, but did not receive a majority of the total number of ballots that voters cast due to voters selecting write-in candidates, people voting for both slates, and blank ballots. The opposing Republican slate sought a writ of mandamus ordering a runoff election. According to Ada and Camacho, the phrase \"in any election\" means the majority as measured by the votes cast in the entire election, not simply in the race for governor. Gutierrez responded that \"votes cast\" meant actual votes cast for governor and lieutenant governor, rather than ballots in which the governor's contest is left blank. The District Court issued the writ and the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, interpreting the statutory phrase \"majority of the votes cast in any election\" to require that a slate receive a majority of the total number of ballots cast in the general election.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54824:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54824:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54824:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that \"[t]he Guam Organic Act does not require a runoff election when a candidate slate has received a majority of the votes cast for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the Territory, but not a majority of the number of ballots cast in the simultaneous general election.\" Justice Souter wrote for the Court that an \"obvious reading\" of the law requires only a majority of votes cast in that one specific race, \"Congress did not shift its attention when it used 'any election' unadorned by a gubernatorial reference or other definite modifier.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54824:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54825:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54825:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLonnie Weeks, Jr., was found guilty of capital murder in the death of Virginia State Trooper Jose Cavazos. During the penalty phase of his trial, the prosecution sought to prove two aggravating circumstances. Weeks' defense presented 10 witnesses in mitigation. During deliberations, the jurors sent the trial judge a note asking whether, if they believed Weeks guilty of at least one of the aggravating circumstances, it was their duty to issue the death penalty, or whether they must decide whether to issue the death penalty or a life sentence. In responding, the trial judge only referred the jury to their instructions, which stated: \"If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either of the two [aggravating circumstances], and as to that alternative, you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment...at death, or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment...at life imprisonment.\" The defense counsel objected, arguing for the judge to instruct the jury it could find one or both of the aggravating circumstances and still impose a life sentence. In finding one of the aggravating circumstances and after considering the evidence in mitigation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict fixing Weeks' punishment at death. On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Weeks' presented 47 assignments of error, of which his assignment of error respecting the judge's answering the jury's question about mitigating circumstances was number 44. The court affirmed Weeks' conviction and sentence. Weeks' petition for federal habeas relief was ultimately denied.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54825:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54825:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54825:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Constitution was not violated by the Virginia trial judge who, during a capital trial's penalty phase, directed the jury's attention to the allegedly ambiguous paragraph of the jury's instruction in response to the jury's question as to mitigating evidence. \"Given that petitioner's jury was adequately instructed, and given that the trial judge responded to the jury's question by directing its attention to the precise paragraph of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its inquiry, the question becomes whether the Constitution requires anything more,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, \"[w]e hold that it does not.\" Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that \"[t]he record in this case establishes, not just a 'reasonable likelihood' of jury confusion, but a virtual certainty that the jury did not realize that there were two distinct legal bases for concluding that a death sentence was not 'justified.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54825:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54827:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54827:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Carpenter was indicted on charges of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, pleaded guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment, with parole possible after 30 years. On direct appeal, Carpenter unsuccessfully challenged only the length of the minimum sentence. After unsuccessfully pursuing state post-conviction relief and represented by new counsel, Carpenter petitioned the Ohio Court of Appeals to reopen his direct appeal on the ground that his original appellate counsel had been constitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and sentence. The court dismissed the application as untimely, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Carpenter then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, raising the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, and alleging that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not raising that claim on direct appeal. The District Court determined that, while the sufficiency claim had been procedurally defaulted, the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could excuse that default; concluded that Carpenter's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective; and granted the writ. The Court of Appeals concluded that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of the sufficiency claim, regardless of whether the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim had been procedurally defaulted; and found prejudice from counsel's failure to raise the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54827:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54827:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54827:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a state prisoner's procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim only if the inmate can demonstrate that the poor lawyering rises to a constitutional level, not only that it prejudiced them at trial. The 7-2 decision means that ineffective-assistance claims filed too late in a state appellate court generally cannot be used in federal court to excuse an inmate's default on other claims. Justice Scalia wrote for the court that it is not enough to say such a claim \"was presented to the state courts even though it was not presented in the manner that state law requires.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54827:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54828:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54828:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoy Lee Johnson had been serving time in federal prison for multiple drug and firearms felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. The District Court ordered his immediate release. Johnson's 3-year term of supervised release that was yet to be served on the remaining convictions then went into effect. As a result of serving time for the two invalid convictions, Johnson had served 2.5 years' too much prison time. After his release, Johnson filed a motion to credit the excess two and one-half years he was erroneously incarcerated toward his three-year supervised release sentence. The District Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release commenced upon Johnson's actual release from incarceration, not before. In reversing, the Court of Appeals accepted Johnson's argument that his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left prison, but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54828:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54828:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54828:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the length of a supervised release term cannot be reduced by reason of excess time served in prison. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, \"[t]he objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release.\" The Court found that Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life and that supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54828:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54831:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54831:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter a state agency denied Juatassa Sims' application for Social Security disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits, she obtained a hearing before a Social Security Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ also denied Sims' claims, concluding that, although she did have some medical impairments, she had not been and was not under a \"disability.\" Sims then sought review by the Social Security Appeals Council, which denied review. She next filed suit in the Federal District Court, contending that the ALJ erred in three ways by making selective use of the record, by posing defective questions to a vocational expert, and by failing to order a consultative examination. The District Court rejected her contentions. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the contentions because they were not included in Sims' request for review by the Appeals Council.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54831:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54831:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54831:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held, 5 to 4, that Social Security claimants who exhaust administrative remedies need not also exhaust issues administratively in order to preserve judicial review of those issues. Justice Thomas wrote that the issue-exhaustion requirement, usually required even in the absence of a statute or regulation, does not apply in a non-adversarial proceeding, as in Social Security cases. Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54831:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54833:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54833:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the State of Washington created the Office of Marine Safety, which was directed to establish standards to provide the \"best achievable protection\" (BAP) from oil spill damage. The agency promulgated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), a trade association of tanker operators, filed suit against the state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Intertanko argued that Washington's BAP standards had entered an area occupied by the federal government and imposed unique requirements in an area where national uniformity was mandated. Further, Intertanko argued that if every political subdivision were to promulgate such maritime regulations, the goal of national governments to develop effective international environmental and safety would be undermined. The District Court upheld Washington's regulations. Thereafter, the Federal Government intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54833:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54833:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54833:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Washington's regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures, crew English-language skills and training, and maritime casualty reporting are pre-empted by the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers. \"The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is now well established,\" wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court. Justice Kennedy also noted that States may regulate their own ports and waterways so long as the rules are based on \"the peculiarities of local waters\" and do not conflict with federal regulation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54833:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54834:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54834:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) permits governmental entities to compensate their employees for overtime work by granting them compensatory time in lieu of cash payment. If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer must pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. Harris County, Texas, found that too many of its deputy sheriffs had too many hours of accrued compensatory time. Fearing a budget crisis, the county adopted a policy under which its employees could be ordered to schedule compensatory time at specified times in order to reduce the amount of accrued time that would otherwise require cash payment. Edward Christensen and 128 other deputy sheriffs in Harris County believed they had the right to use their compensatory time when they saw fit. The sheriffs sued, claiming that the FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an employee to use compensatory time in the absence of an agreement permitting the employer to do so. The District Court ruled in favor of the sheriffs, concluding that the policy violated the FLSA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the FLSA did not address the issue in question and thus did not prohibit the county from implementing a compensatory time policy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54834:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54834:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54834:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held 6-3 that \"[n]othing in the FLSA or its implementing regulations prohibits a public employer from compelling the use of compensatory time.\" Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, \"under the FLSA, an employer is free to require an employee to take time off work, and an employer is also free to use the money it would have paid in wages to cash out accrued compensatory time. The compelled use of compensatory time challenged in this case merely involves doing both of these steps at once.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54834:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54835:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54835:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1996, the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricted state entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, was passed. Afterwards, Congress also imposed mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma. Businesses with ties to Burma landed on Massachusetts' \"restricted trade\" list. The list came to include 34 members of the National Foreign Trade Council (Council), a non-profit advocate for American companies that do business abroad. The Council filed suit against Stephen Crosby, the Massachusetts Secretary of Administration and Finance, and other state officials in federal court, claiming that the state act unconstitutionally infringes on the federal foreign affairs power, violates the Foreign Commerce Clause, and is preempted by the Federal Burma Law. The District Court permanently enjoined the state act's enforcement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court also found that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated the Supremacy Clause because the state was acting in an area of unique federal concern, foreign policy, through a balanced, tailored approach.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54835:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54835:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54835:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that \"the state Act is preempted, and its application unconstitutional, under the Supremacy Clause.\" Justice Souter wrote for the Court that Massachusetts' law created an obstacle to the President's discretion to control economic sanctions against Burma, interfered with Congress's intention to limit economic pressure against the Burmese Government, and was at odds with the President's authority to speak for the United States among the world's nations to develop a comprehensive, multilateral Burma strategy. Therefore, the Massachusetts Burma Law \"is invalid under the Supremacy Clause...owing to its threat of frustrating federal statutory objectives.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54835:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54836:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54836:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAbel Martinez-Salazar was charged with a variety of federal narcotics and weapons offenses. The District Court allotted him 10 peremptory challenges exercisable in the selection of 12 jurors. After prospective juror Don Gilbert indicated several times that he would favor the prosecution, Martinez- Salazar's counsel challenged him for cause. The court declined to excuse Gilbert. After twice objecting, unsuccessfully, to the for-cause ruling, Martinez-Salazar used a peremptory challenge to remove him. Subsequently, Martinez-Salazar exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Thereafter, Martinez-Salazar's counsel did not object to the final seating of the jurors. Martinez-Salazar was then convicted on all counts. On appeal, Martinez-Salazar argued that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Gilbert for cause and that this error used one of his peremptory challenges wrongly. The Court of Appeals agreed that the District Court's refusal to strike Gilbert for cause was an abuse of discretion. Ultimately, the court found that the District Court's error resulted in a violation of Martinez- Salazar's Fifth Amendment due process rights because it forced him to use a peremptory challenge curatively, which impaired his right to a full complement of peremptory challenges. The Court of Appeals held that the error required an automatic reversal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54836:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54836:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54836:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use such a challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that \"if the defendant elects to cure such an error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right.\" The Court also concluded that the loss of a peremptory challenge did not constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54836:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54837:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54837:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Wayne Williams was sentenced to death after he was convicted of two capital murders. Ultimately, Williams sought federal habeas relief, in which he requested an evidentiary hearing on three constitutional claims, regarding the fairness of his trial, which he had tried unsuccessfully to develop in the state-court proceedings. The District Court granted Williams' evidentiary hearing. However, before any hearing could be held, the Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth's requests for an emergency stay and for a writ of mandamus and prohibition. The Commonwealth argued that Williams' evidentiary hearing was prohibited by federal law as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). On remand, the District Court dismissed Williams' petition citing the AEDPA statute and finding that Williams failed to show \"actual innocence.\" In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Williams could not satisfy the statute's conditions for excusing his failure to develop the facts of his claims and barred him from receiving an evidentiary hearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54837:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54837:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54837:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that under federal law, as amended by the AEDPA, \"a 'failure to develop' a claim's factual basis in state court proceedings is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or his counsel.\" Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that \"comity is not served by saying a prisoner 'has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim' where he was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort. In that circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is not barred.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54837:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54838:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54838:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCalifornia's \"unitary business\" income-calculation system for determining the State's taxable share of a multistate corporation's business income authorizes a deduction for interest expense. The system, however, permits use of that deduction only to the extent that the amount exceeds certain out-of-state income arising from the unrelated business activity of a discrete business enterprise. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. is a successor in interest to a nondomiciliary corporation that incurred interest expense. California disallowed a deduction for the expense insofar as it had received nonunitary dividend and interest income. Hunt-Wesson challenged the validity of the disallowance. The California Court of Appeal found the disallowance constitutional. The California Supreme Court denied review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54838:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54838:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54838:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the provision violates the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. \"California's statute does not directly impose a tax on nonunitary income. Rather, it simply denies the taxpayer use of a portion of a deduction from unitary income..., income which does bear a 'rational relationship' or 'nexus' to California,\" wrote Justice Breyer. \"Because California's offset provision is not a reasonable allocation of expense deductions to the income that the expense generates, it constitutes impermissible taxation of income outside its jurisdictional reach,\" concluded Justice Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54838:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54839:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54839:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGrace Olech asked the Village of Willowbrook to connect her property to the municipal water supply. The Village conditioned the connection on Olech's granting of a 33-foot easement. Olech refused, claiming that the Village only required a 15-foot easement from other property owners seeking access to the water supply. Olech sued the Village claiming that the Village's demand of an additional 18-foot easement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff can allege an equal protection violation by asserting that state action was motivated solely by a \"spiteful effort to 'get' him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54839:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54839:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54839:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Olech's allegations were sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. \"Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment,\" stated the unanimous, unsigned opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54839:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54840:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54840:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoger Reeves, 57, and Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, were supervisors in different Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. departments. Reeves' duties included making sure workers under his supervision were on time and at work and logging such data. Reeves' department was managed by Russell Caldwell, 45, who was responsible for reviewing Reeves' work. Caldwell informed the company's director of manufacturing, Powe Chesnut, that production in Revees' department was down because employees were often absent, coming in late, and leaving early. Chesnut ordered an audit, which revealed numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations by Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut recommended that Reeves and Caldwell be fired and, subsequently, their employment was terminated. Reeves filed suit, alleging that he had been terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). At trial, Sanderson contended that Reeves was fired because of his failure to maintain accurate attendance records. Reeves attempted to demonstrate that this explanation was a pretext for age discrimination and introduced evidence that he had accurately recorded the attendance of employees under his supervision and that Chesnut had demonstrated age-related animosity when dealing with him. Ultimately, the case went to a jury, which returned a verdict for Reeves. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Reeves had not presented sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of age-based discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54840:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54840:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54840:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion deliver by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that \"[a] plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, may be adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination under the ADEA.\" The ruling means that an employer is liable to a former employee under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 if a reasonable jury can find that the employer's explanation for the employee's dismissal was pretext for discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54840:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54841:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54841:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, Maria Ohler was arrested and charged with importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, after a customs inspector noticed that someone had tampered with one of Ohler's van interior panels and discovered approximately 81 pounds of marijuana. Before the trial, the government filed in limine motions to admit Ohler's prior felony conviction as character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and as impeachment evidence under Rule 609(a)(1). Also before the trial, the District Court denied the motion to admit the conviction as character evidence. After the beginning of the trail, the court ruled that if Ohler testified, evidence of her prior conviction would be admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). While testifying, Ohler admitted on direct examination that she had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 1993. Subsequently, Ohler was found guilty. On appeal, Ohler challenged the District Court's in limine ruling, allowing the government to use her prior conviction for impeachment purposes. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Ohler waived her objection by introducing evidence of the conviction during her direct examination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54841:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54841:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54841:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that \"a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error.\" Thus, federal defendants, who choose to acknowledge their prior convictions, waive the right to appeal the evidence's admissibility. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice David H. Souter argued, [t]here is no reason to discourage the defendant from introducing the conviction herself, as the majority's waiver rule necessarily does.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54841:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54842:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54842:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSam Wardlow, who was holding an opaque bag, inexplicably fled an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking after noticing police officers in the area. When officers caught up with him on the street, one stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. The officers arrested Wardlow after discovering that he was carrying handgun. In a trial motion to suppress the gun, Wardlow claimed that in order to stop an individual, short of actually arresting the person, police first had to point to \"specific reasonable inferences\" why the stop was necessary. The Illinois trial court denied the motion, finding that the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. Wardlow was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the right to \"go on one's way.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54842:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54842:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54842:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held, 5 to 4, that the police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stopped Wardlow, because the officer was justified in suspecting that the accused was involved in criminal activity and, therefore, in investigating further. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that, \"[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion\" to justify a stop. The Chief Justice noted that \"flight is the consummate act of evasion.\" Stevens, joined by three other justices, concurred in avoiding a per se rule but dissented from the majority holding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54842:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54843:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54843:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1952, Arizona invoked the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to resolve a dispute with California over the extent of each state's right to use water from the Colorado River. The United States intervened, seeking water rights on behalf of five Indian reservations. Culminating in Arizona I, the Court held that the United States had reserved water rights for the five reservations. In a 1964 decree, the Court specified the water entitlements for the parties and the reservations, but held that the water rights for the reservations would be subject to adjustment in the event that the reservations' disputed boundaries were finally determined. Thereafter in Arizona II, the Court concluded that the reservations' boundaries had yet to be determined. Ultimately, the Quechan Tribe (Tribe) of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation and the United States entered an agreement returning land encompassing some 25,000 acres of disputed boundary lands not attributed to that reservation in earlier litigation. In 1983, the Court of Claims consented to the settlement. The Tribe and the United States then filed claims seeking increased water rights for the Fort Yuma Reservation. In 1989, the Court granted the motion of Arizona, California, and two municipal water districts (State parties) to reopen the 1964 decree to determine whether the Fort Yuma Reservation was entitled to claim additional boundary lands and, if so, additional water rights. The State parties asserted that the Fort Yuma claims of the Tribe and the United States were precluded by Arizona I and by the Claims Court consent judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54843:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54843:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54843:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a opinion deliver by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court rejected both grounds for preclusion and remanded the case to a Special Master for a determination on the merits of the outstanding claims for additional water rights associated with disputed Fort Yuma Reservation boundary lands. \"Those claims are the only ones that remain to be decided in Arizona v. California; their resolution will enable the Court to enter a final consolidated decree and bring this case to a close,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54843:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54844:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54844:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n\"Kandyland,\" operated by Pap's A. M. in Erie PA, featured totally nude female erotic dancing. The city council enacted an ordinance making it an offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a \"state of nudity,\" To comply with the ordinance, dancers had to wear, at a minimum, \"pasties\" and a \"G-string.\" Pap's filed suit against Erie, seeking a permanent injunction against the ordinance's enforcement. The Court of Common Pleas struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional, but the Commonwealth Court reversed. In reversing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the ordinance's public nudity sections violated Pap's right to freedom of expression as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court explained that, although one purpose of the ordinance was to combat negative secondary effects, there was also an unmentioned purpose to \"impact negatively on the erotic message of the dance.\" Additionally, because the ordinance was not content neutral, the court subjected it to strict scrutiny and found that it failed the narrow tailoring requirement of such a test. After the U.S Supreme Court granted certiorari, Pap's filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot, noting that Kandyland no longer operated as a nude dancing club, and that Pap's did not operate such a club at any other location. The Court denied the motion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54844:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54844:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54844:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Erie's public indecency ordinance did not violate any cognizable First Amendment protections of expressive conduct. In splintered voting that did not yield a majority opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that, \"[e]ven if Erie's public nudity ban has some minimal effect on the erotic message by muting that portion of the expression that occurs when the last stitch is dropped, the dancers... are free to perform wearing pasties and G-strings.\" \"The requirement... is a minimal restriction in furtherance of the asserted government interests, and the restriction leaves ample capacity to convey the dancers' erotic message.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54844:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54845:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54845:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAntonio Tonton Slack was convicted of second-degree murder in Nevada. In 1991, after an unsuccessful direct appeal, Slack filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. In federal court, Slack attempted to litigate claims he had not yet presented to the Nevada courts and was prevented from doing so. Slack, therefore, filed a motion to hold his federal petition in abeyance while he returned to state court to exhaust his new claims. The Federal District Court ordered the habeas petition dismissed and granted Slack leave to file an application to renew upon his exhaustion of state remedies. In 1995, after unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Slack filed again in the federal court. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that Slack's petition raised claims that had not been presented to the state courts and that claims not raised in Slack's 1991 federal petition had to be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. The District Court granted the state's motion. Slack then filed a notice of appeal. The court denied Slack leave to appeal, concluding the appeal would raise no substantial issue. The Court of Appeals also denied Slack leave to appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54845:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54845:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54845:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that a federal habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner, after an initial petition was dismissed without adjudication on the merits, does not constitute a \"second or successive\" petition, subject to dismissal for abuse of writ. That \"a vexatious litigant could inject undue delay into the collateral review process,\" wrote Justice Kennedy, can be countered, \"the State remains free to impose proper procedural bars to restrict repeated returns to state court for postconviction proceedings.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54845:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54847:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54847:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Ohio Cellular Products Corporation (OCP) sued Adams USA, Inc. (Adams), for patent infringement. After the District Court ruled in Adams' favor by dismissing the suit, Adams motioned for attorney fees and costs. In granting the motion, the court found that Donald Nelson, who was at all relevant times president and sole shareholder of OCP, had acted in a way that constituted inequitable conduct chargeable to OCP. Fearing it would be unable to collect the award, Adams moved under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend its pleading to add Nelson, personally, as a party from whom fees could be collected. Additionally, Adams asked the court, under Rule 59(e), to amend the judgment to make Nelson immediately liable for the fee award. The District Court granted the motion in full. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision simultaneously making Nelson a party and subjecting him to judgement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54847:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54847:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54847:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the District Court erred in amending the judgment immediately upon permitting the amendment of the pleading. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that \"[d]ue process, as reflected in Rule 15 as well as Rule 12, required that Nelson be given an opportunity to respond and contest his personal liability for the award after he was made a party and before the entry of judgment against him.\" Thus, the District Court's granting of Adams' motion to simultaneously make Nelson a party and personally liable violated due process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54847:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54849:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54849:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Terry Williams was convicted of robbery and capital murder; his punishment was fixed at death. In state habeas corpus proceedings a judge determined that his conviction was valid. However, the judge also found that Williams' counsel's failure to discover and present significant mitigating evidence violated his right to effective counsel and recommended that he be re-sentenced. Rejecting this, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Williams had not suffered sufficient prejudice to warrant relief. In habeas corpus proceedings under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal trial judge also found that the death sentence was constitutionally weak on ineffective-assistance grounds. The court, under the AEDPA, concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision \"was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that it could not conclude that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision on prejudice was an unreasonable application of standards established by the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54849:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54849:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54849:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a judgment announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court, with different majorities of Justices for each holding, held that Williams had been deprived of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and that the Virginia Supreme Court's refusal to set aside the Williams death sentence was a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Court. This conclusion followed from \"'a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different' if competent counsel had presented and explained the significance of all the available evidence.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54849:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54850:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54850:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring questioning about a robbery he was connected to, Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities admitting that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies. Dickerson was then placed under arrest. The timing of his statement is disputed. The FBI and local detectives testified that Dickerson was advised of his Miranda rights, established in Miranda v. Arizona, and waived them before he made his statement. Dickerson said he was not read his Miranda warnings until after he gave his statement. After his indictment for bank robbery, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the statement that he made on the ground that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The government argued that even if the Miranda warnings were not read, the statement was voluntary and therefore admissible under 18 USC Section 3501, which provides that \"a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.\" The District Court granted Dickerson's motion, finding that he had not been read his Miranda rights or signed a waiver until after he made his statement, but the court did not address section 3501. In reversing, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but held that section 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. The court held that \"Congress enacted section 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54850:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54850:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54850:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. \"Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture,\" wrote Rehnquist. \"Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. We decline to overrule Miranda ourselves,\" concluded the Chief Justice. Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, blasted the Court's ruling, writing that the majority opinion gave needless protection to \"foolish (but not compelled) confessions.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54850:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54851:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54851:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Virginia jury found Bobby Ramdass guilty of murdering Mohammed Kayani, a clerk in the 7-Eleven he held up, and recommended the death sentence. At the time of the sentencing phase of his trial, final judgment had been entered against Ramdass for an armed robbery and he had been found guilty of a second armed robbery, but no final judgment had been entered. Under Virginia law, a conviction does not become final until the jury returns a verdict and the judge enters a final judgment of conviction and pronounces sentence. The Kayani judge paused and scheduled a future hearing to consider whether to impose the recommended sentence. During the interval between the jury trial and this hearing, final judgment had been entered on the second armed robbery conviction. At the sentencing hearing in the capital murder case, Ramdass, in arguing for a life sentence, claimed that his prior convictions made him ineligible for parole under Virginia's three-strikes law. The court sentenced Ramdass to death, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. On remand from the U.S Supreme Court, the Virginia Supreme Court again affirmed the sentence over Ramdass' argument that he should have been allowed to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. The court declined to apply a previous U.S Supreme Court holding that a jury considering imposing death should be told if the defendant is parole ineligible under state law. The court concluded that Ramdass was not parole ineligible when the jury was considering his sentence because the second armed robbery, in which no final judgment had been entered, did not count as a conviction for purposes of the three-strikes law. Ultimately, Ramdass sought federal habeas corpus relief. The District Court granted his petition, ruling that the jury should have been advised that he was ineligible for parole. In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that Ramdass was not, at the time of his sentencing proceedings, legally ineligible for parole.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54851:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54851:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54851:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Ramdass was not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because he was not entitled to instruction on parole ineligibility at sentencing since conviction had not been entered yet on the earlier jury verdict making him parole ineligible. In a plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the Virginia Supreme Court's finding that the state's three-strikes law did not cover the defendant until shortly after he was sentenced must be honored because it \"was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application\" of a decision in which the justices said that defendants have the right to tell jurors about their parole status in such cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54851:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54852:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54852:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe University of Wisconsin, a public university, requires students to pay an activity fee. The fee supports various campus services and extracurricular student activities including the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats and Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. Scott Harold Southworth filed suit against the University, alleging that the fee violated his rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. Southworth argued that the University must grant him the choice not to fund registered student organizations (RSO) that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to his personal beliefs. In granting Southworth judgment, the Federal District Court concluded that the fee program compelled students to support political and ideological activities with which they disagree in violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The court declared the fee program invalid and enjoined the University from using the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fee program was \"not germane to the University's mission, did not further a vital University policy, and imposed too much of a burden on [Southworth's] free speech rights.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54852:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54852:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54852:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the \"First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral.\" Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, \"[w]hen a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others.\" Justice David H. Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment only.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54852:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54853:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54853:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. bought a wastewater treatment plant, it was granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The permit authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water and limited pollutants. Laidlaw's discharge of mercury into the North Tyger River repeatedly exceeded the limits set by the permit. Ultimately, Friends of the Earth and others (FOE) filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Laidlaw, alleging noncompliance with the NPDES permit, seeking injunctive relief and an award of civil penalties. Laidlaw moved for summary judgement on the ground that FOE lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The District Court denied the motion. Ultimately, the District Court found that Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limitation. In issuing its judgment, the District Court concluded that a civil penalty of $405,800 would be adequate to forestall future violations, given that Laidlaw would have to reimburse the plaintiffs for a significant amount of legal fees and had itself incurred significant legal expenses. The court declined to order injunctive relief because Laidlaw, after the lawsuit began, had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of its permit. FOE appealed to the amount of the District Court's civil penalty judgment, but did not appeal the denial of declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals ordered the case to be dismissed. The appellate court held that the case had become moot once Laidlaw complied with the terms of its permit. The court reasoned that the only remedy currently available to FOE, civil penalties payable to the Government, would not redress any injury FOE had suffered.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54853:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54853:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54853:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a citizen suitor's claim for civil penalties need not be dismissed as moot when the defendant, after commencement of the litigation, has come into compliance with its NPDES permit. \"A defendant's voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a case,\" Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court. \"Congress has found that civil penalties in the Clean Water Act cases do more than promote immediate compliance... they also deter future violations,\" concluded Justice Ginsburg. The Court also ruled that FOE had standing to bring the suit on behalf on its members.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54853:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54854:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54854:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, Jaime Castillo and other Branch-Davidians were involved in a violent confrontation with federal agents near Waco, Texas. Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder federal officers. A jury determined that Castillo, by using firearms in connection with the alleged conspiracy, had violated 18 USC Section 924(c)(1), which read in relevant part: \"Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years... and if the firearm is a machinegun... to imprisonment for thirty years.\" During sentencing, the District Court found that Castillo had possessed machineguns and imposed the mandatory 30-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Courts of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of whether Castillo had used, rather than merely possessed, machineguns. The court also concluded that statutory terms such as \"machinegun\" did not state elements of a crime separate from that of using a firearm, but instead established factors enhancing a sentence and that the District Court could reimpose the 30-year sentence if it found that machineguns had been actively used. The District Court then reimposed the 30-year sentence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54854:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54854:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54854:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that \"Section 924(c)(1) uses the word \"machinegun\" (and similar words) to state an element of a separate, aggravated crime.\" Therefore, the federal law that subjects anyone who carries a machine gun during a violent crime to an additional 30 years in prison states an element of an offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury rather than determined by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence as are sentencing factors. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that \"our consideration of Section 924(c)(1)'s language, structure, context, history and such factors that typically help courts determine a statute's objectives leads us to conclude that the relevant words create a separate substantive crime.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54854:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54855:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54855:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1996, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act, of which section 505 required that cable operators, providing channels \"primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming,\" either to \"fully scramble or otherwise fully block\" those channels or to broadcast those channels during the \"safe-harbor\" hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. - times when young children were unlikely to be watching. The purpose of section 505 was to protect non-subscribers, and their children, from \"signal bleed,\" or when audio and visual portions of the scrambled programs might be heard or seen. In February 1996, Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. filed suit challenging section 505's constitutionality. A three-judge District Court panel found that section 505's content-based restriction on speech violated the First Amendment because the Government might further its interests in less restrictive ways. The court also found that the Act provided for a less restrictive alternative than section 505, in that section 504 stated that cable operators had an obligation to block channels at a customer's request.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54855:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54855:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54855:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because the Federal Government failed to show that section 505 was the least restrictive means to further its interests, requiring cable television operators to fully scramble or limit time when sexually-oriented programming was transmitted violated the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. In finding section 505 a content-based regulation, Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that \"[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.\" In dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer maintained that the majority had not made a \"realistic assessment of the alternatives.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54855:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54856:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54856:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, the United States Customs Service is authorized to classify and fix the rate of duty on imports under rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury. Under the Secretary's regulations, any port-of-entry Customs office and the Customs Headquarters Office may issue \"ruling letters\" setting tariff classifications for particular imports. The Mead Corporation's imported \"day planners,\" were classified as duty-free until the Customs Headquarters issued a ruling letter classifying them as bound diaries subject to tariff. Subsequently, Mead filed suit in the Court of International Trade. The court granted the Government summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that ruling letters should not be treated like Customs regulations, which receive the highest level of deference, because they are not preceded by notice and comment as under the Administrative Procedure Act, do not carry the force of law, and are not intended to clarify importers's rights and obligations beyond the specific case. The court gave no deference at all to the ruling letter at issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54856:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54856:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54856:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the \"administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for [the greatest level of deference accorded under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council] when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.\" Justice Souter wrote that \"a tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under Chevron, there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law, but we hold that under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54856:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54857:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54857:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLeatherman Tool Group, Inc., manufactures a multifunction pocket tool, the Pocket Survival Tool (PST). In 1996, Cooper Industries, Inc. used photographs of a modified PST to introduce a competing tool, the ToolZall. The photographs were used in posters, packaging, and advertising materials. Subsequently, Leatherman filed an action asserting claims of trade-dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising under the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). Ultimately, a trial jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages. The District Court then entered judgment, rejecting Cooper's argument that the punitive damages were grossly excessive. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, using an \"abuse of discretion\" standard, concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce the award.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54857:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54857:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54857:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Courts of Appeals should apply a de novo standard when reviewing district court determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards. Because the Court of Appeals applied an \"abuse of discretion\" standard, a less demanding standard, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a determination on whether the award was grossly excessive under the correct standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54857:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54858:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54858:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress has provided the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) with the statutory authority to reduce the prison term of an inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony by up to one year, if the prisoner successfully completes a substance abuse program. The BOP's implementing regulation categorically denies early release to prisoners whose offense is a felony attended by \"the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm.\" In 1997, Christopher A. Lopez was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Additionally, the court found that Lopez possessed a firearm in connection with his offense. While incarcerated, Lopez requested substance abuse treatment. The BOP found Lopez qualified for its residential drug abuse program, but was found him categorically ineligible for early release. The District Court, in ordering the BOP to reconsider Lopez for early release, held that the BOP may not, based on weapons possession, categorically count out inmates, whose underlying conviction was for a nonviolent crime. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54858:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54858:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54858:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the categorically denial of early release to a prisoner who committed felony using firearm is a permissible exercise of the BOP's discretion, even if the prisoner has successfully completed a substance abuse program. \"The Bureau reasonably concluded that an inmate's prior involvement with firearms, in connection with the commission of a felony, suggests his readiness to resort to life-endangering violence and therefore appropriately determines the early release decision,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg for the majority. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54858:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54859:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54859:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid A. Egelhoff designated his wife, Donna Rae Egelhoff, as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy and a pension plan provided by his employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Two months after the Egelhoffs divorced, Mr. Egelhoff died. His children then sued Donna Rae to recover the insurance proceeds and the pension plan benefits. The children relied on a Washington state statue that provides that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset - defined to include a life insurance policy or employee benefit plan - is revoked automatically upon divorce. Subsequently, the proceeds would pass to the children as Mr. Egelhoff's statutory heirs under state law. Under ERISA, the state trial courts granted Donna Rae summary judgment. In reversing, the Washington Court of Appeals found that the statute was not pre-empted by ERISA. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute does not \"refer to\" ERISA plans to an extent that would require pre-emption.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54859:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54859:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54859:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that the Washington statute has a \"connection with\" ERISA plans and is therefore pre-empted. \"Differing state regulations affecting an ERISA plan's 'system for processing claims and paying benefits' impose 'precisely the burden that ERISA pre-emption was intended to avoid,'\" wrote Justice Thomas. He continued: \"The statute at issue here directly conflicts with ERISA's requirements that plans be administered, and benefits be paid, in accordance with plan documents.\" Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice John Paul Stevens joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54859:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54860:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54860:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1984, after firing two bullets at police during a car chase, Tony Bruce Bennett was convicted of attempted murder, among other crimes. Bennett moved pro se to vacate his judgment of conviction in 1995. A New York trial court orally denied Bennett's motion. Bennett claimed that he never received a copy of a written order reflecting the denial. In 1998, Bennett filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging violations of his rights to present witnesses in his defense and to a fair trial, to be present at all material stages of the trial, and to the effective assistance of counsel. The Federal District Court dismissed Bennett's federal habeas corpus petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which set a 1-year period of limitation on federal habeas corpus applications by state prisoners. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Bennett's habeas petition was not time-barred because his 1995 motion was still pending, under the AEDPA's tolling provision, since he had never received notification of the state's decision regarding it. Thus, the time for appealing the denial of that motion had not yet expired. Additionally, the court found that the 1995 motion was a \"properly filed\" application, even though the claims contained in the motion were procedurally barred under two New York statutory provisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54860:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54860:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54860:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that an application for state postconviction relief containing procedurally barred claims is properly filed within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Antonin Scalia said that \"[o]nly individual claims, and not the application containing those claims, can be procedurally defaulted under state law.\" \"An application is 'filed,' as that term is commonly understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record,\" noted Justice Scalia. \"By construing 'properly filed application' to mean 'application raising claims that are not mandatorily procedurally barred,' [the Federal Government] elides the difference between an 'application' and a 'claim,'\" argued Justice Scalia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54860:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54861:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54861:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, a federally recognized Tribe, entered into a contract with C & L Enterprises, Inc., for the installation of a roof on a Tribe-owned building in Oklahoma. The property rests outside the Tribe's reservation and is not held in trust by the Federal Government for the Tribe. The contract contains clauses requiring disputes arising out of the contract to be decided by arbitration and a choice-of-law clause that reads: \"The contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located.\" Thus, Oklahoma law governed the contract. After the contract was executed, but before performance commenced, the Tribe retained another company to install the roof. C & L then submitted an arbitration demand. The Tribe asserted sovereign immunity. The arbitrator awarded C & L a monetary award. Ultimately, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the Tribe was immune from suit. The court noted that the contract seemed to indicate the Tribe's willingness to expose itself to suit on the contract, but concluded that the Tribe had not waived its suit immunity with the requisite clarity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54861:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54861:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54861:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that \"under the agreement the Tribe proposed and signed, the Tribe clearly consented to arbitration and to the enforcement of arbitral awards in Oklahoma state court; the Tribe thereby waived its sovereign immunity from C & L's suit.\" Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that \"the Tribe agreed, by express contract, to adhere to certain dispute resolution procedures.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54861:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54862:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54862:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter an increase in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) started to cooperate with Charleston to formulate a policy to prosecute mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. MUSC obstetrical patients were arrested after testing positive for cocaine. They filed suit challenging the policy's validity on the theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches. Among the District Court's actions was an instruction to the jury to find for the patients unless they had consented to such searches. The jury found in favor of the city. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the searches were reasonable, reasoning that special needs may, in certain exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54862:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54862:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54862:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the diagnostic tests constituted an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure. The interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine cannot justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. Examining the \"special needs\" exception to the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens wrote that a special need is \"divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement,\" and that under the city's view \"virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate...purpose.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54862:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54863:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54863:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn Shaw v. Hunt, the U.S Supreme Court found that North Carolina's legislature violated the Constitution by using race as the predominant factor in drawing its Twelfth Congressional District's 1992 boundaries. In 1997, after the State redrew those boundaries, the District Court found that the new boundaries had also been created with dominating racial considerations. In reversing, the Court found, in Hunt v. Cromartie, that the evidence was insufficient to show an unconstitutional race-based objective. On remand, the District Court again found that North Carolina's legislature had used race driven criteria in drawing the 1997 boundaries based on the district's shape, its splitting of towns and counties, and its heavily African-American voting population. The court newly found that the legislature had drawn the boundaries to collect precincts with a high racial, rather than political, identification. (Argued and decided with 99-1865, Smallwood v. Cromartie.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54863:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54863:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54863:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the District Court's conclusion that the state violated the Equal Protection Clause in drawing the 1997 boundaries is based on clearly erroneous findings. Justice Breyer wore for the Court that \"the primary evidence upon which the District Court relied for its 'race, not politics,' conclusion is evidence of voting registration, not voting behavior; and that is precisely the kind of evidence that we said was inadequate the last time this case was before us.\" Justice Clarence Thomas's dissented, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54863:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54864:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54864:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, Earthy D. Daniels, Jr., was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence on anyone convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and who has three previous convictions for a violent felony, Daniels' sentence was enhanced. After an unsuccessful appeal, Daniels filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. Daniels argued that his sentence violated the Constitution because it was based in part on two prior convictions that were themselves unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54864:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54864:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54864:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the nonexistent or unsuccessful pursuit of available challenges to the constitutionality of prior state convictions, which were used to enhance a federal sentence, precluded such challenge to collaterally attack a federal sentence. \"[Daniels] could have pursued his claims while he was in custody on those convictions,\" wrote Justice O'Connor for the majority. \"As his counsel conceded at oral argument, there is no indication that [Daniels] did so or that he was prevented from doing so by some external force.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54864:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54865:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54865:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Fiore and his co-defendant, David Scarpone, were convicted of operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit in violation of Pennsylvania State law after deliberately altering a monitoring pipe. Fiore appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the conviction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then denied further review of Fiore's case, and his conviction became final. Scarpone appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which noted the existence of a \"valid permit\" and set aside the conviction. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed and found that Scarpone's conduct did not constitute the operation of the facility without a permit because the law Fiore and Scarpone were convicted under does not apply to those who possess a permit but deviate radically from the permit's terms. Fiore had asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his case after it had agreed to review Scarpone's case and twice more after it decided Scarpone. The court denied Fiore's requests.\nFiore sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the U.S. Constitution required that his conviction be set aside because his conduct was not criminal under the statutory section charged. The District Court granted his petition. .The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on the ground that it would require a retroactive application of a new rule of law.\nFollowing oral argument, a unanimous court in an opinion by Justice Stephen J. Breyer certified the question whether the court's interpretation of the statute set forth in Scarpone's case stated the correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law on the date when Fiore's conviction became final. The Court also reserved judgment and further proceedings in the case pending a response by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that \"the answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case.\"\nThe Pennsylvania Supreme Court replied that the decision \"did not announce a new rule of law,\" but \"merely clarified the plain language of the statute.\" The U.S. Supreme Court then took up the pending constitutional question.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54865:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54865:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54865:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that Fiore's conviction was unconstitutional. Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision was not a new rule, it governed Fiore's case even though the case was final before the decision was handed down. The Court found that since Fiore had a permit, his offense was not covered by the statute he was convicted under. The Court concluded that \"Fiore's conviction fails to satisfy the Federal Constitution's demands.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54865:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54866:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54866:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) expressly precludes courts of appeals from exercising \"jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against any alien who is removable by reason of \"a conviction for certain criminal offenses, including any aggravated felony.\" Deboris Calcano-Martinez, Sergio Madrid, and Fazila Khan are all lawful permanent residents of the United States subject to administratively final orders of removal because they were convicted of aggravated felonies. Each filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals and a habeas corpus petition in the District Court to challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that they were ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. The court also held that they could pursue their claims in a District Court habeas action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54866:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54866:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54866:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions for direct but petitioners can proceed with their habeas petitions if they wish to obtain relief. \"As petitioners in this case were convicted of 'aggravated felonies' within the meaning of the relevant statutes,\" wrote Justice Stevens, \"the plain language of [IIRIRA] fairly explicitly strips the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to hear their claims on petitions for direct review.\" Justice Stevens continued that \"Congress has not spoken with sufficient clarity to strip the district courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions raising identical claims.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54866:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54867:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54867:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act mandates that fresh mushroom handlers pay assessments used primarily to fund advertisements promoting mushroom sales. United Foods, Inc. refused to pay the assessment, claiming that it violated the First Amendment. Ultimately, United Foods sought review in the District Court. In granting the Government summary judgement, the court relied on Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., which held that the First Amendment was not violated when agricultural marketing orders, as part of a larger regulatory marketing scheme, required producers of California tree fruit to pay assessments for product advertising. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Glickman did not control because the mandated payments in this case were not part of a comprehensive statutory agricultural marketing program.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54867:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54867:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54867:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the assessment requirement violates the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy wore for the Court that \"the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity.\" \"We have not upheld compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the principal object is speech itself,\" continued Justice Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54867:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54868:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54868:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1949, Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact. Article IV-D provided that future development of the river basin could not materially deplete the usable quantity or availability to other users of the river's waters. In 1986, Kansas filed suit alleging that Colorado had violated the Compact. Ultimately, the Special Master found that post-Compact increases in groundwater well pumping in Colorado had materially depleted the waters in violation of Article IV-D. The Special Master, in his second report, recommended that damages be awarded to Kansas. In his third report, the Special Master recommended that such damages be measured by Kansas' losses attributable to Compact violations since 1950, be paid in money not water, and include prejudgment interest from 1969 to the date of judgment. Colorado filed four objections to the third report, Kansas filed one, and the United States submitted that all objections should be overruled.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54868:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54868:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54868:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes, no, no, and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court remanded the case to the Special Master for preparation of a final judgment consistent with its opinion. The Court unanimously concluded that the recommended damages award does not violate the Eleventh Amendment and that the Special Master properly determined the value of the crop losses attributable to Compact violations. In a 6-3 split, the Court ruled that the unliquidated nature of Kansas' money damages does not bar an award of prejudgment interest and that the Special Master determined the appropriate rate for the prejudgment interest award, which should begin running in 1969.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54868:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54869:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54869:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe City of Waukesha, Wisconsin requires sellers of sexually explicit materials to obtain and annually renew adult business licenses. City News and Novelty, Inc. (City News), owned and operated an adult-oriented shop in Waukesha. City News had first obtained a license in 1989. In 1995, City News applied for a renewal of its license. Waukesha's Common Council denied the application. The Council found that City News had violated Waukesha ordinances by permitting minors to loiter on the premises, failing to maintain an unobstructed view of booths in the store, and allowing patrons to engage in sexual activity inside the booths. Waukesha's refusal to renew City News's license was upheld in administrative proceedings and on judicial review in the state courts. Among other questions raised in its petition for certiorari, City News asked the Court to \"resolve...whether the guarantee of prompt judicial review that must accompany [an adult business] licensing scheme means a prompt judicial determination or simply the right to promptly file for judicial review.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54869:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54869:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54869:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court did not answer the question. In a unanimous opinion deliver by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari because City News was not properly situated to raise the question on which the Court granted review. The city of Waukesha had argued the case was moot after City News decided to withdraw its renewal application and close its business upon the city's grant of a license to another business, with which the Court agreed. \"We do not doubt that an ongoing adult enterprise facing loss of its license to do business may allege First Amendment injuries. Such an establishment's typical concern, however, is not the speed of court proceedings, but the availability of a stay of adverse action during the pendency of judicial review, however long that review takes,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54869:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54870:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54870:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBecause it is a recipient of federal financial assistance, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department) is subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. Under section 602, the Department of Justice issued a regulation forbidding funding recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. Martha Sandoval brought a class action suit to enjoin the Department from administering state driver's license examinations only in English. Sandoval argued that the English-only policy violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Ordering the Department to accommodate non-English speakers, the District Court enjoined the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. James Alexander, the Director of the Department, unsuccessfully argued before both courts that Title VI did not provide a cause of action to enforce the regulation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54870:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54870:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54870:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI. \"Title VI itself directly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination,\" wrote Justice Scalia, \"[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under [section 602].\" Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, which was join by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54870:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54871:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54871:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLouisiana law authorizes the State to award nontransferable, annually renewable licenses to operate video poker machines. In 1992, Fred Goodson and his family formed Truck Stop Gaming, Ltd. (TSG), a video poker business. Carl Cleveland, a lawyer, assisted Goodson in preparing TSG's video poker license applications, each of which identified Goodson's children as the sole beneficial owners of the partnership. From 1992 through 1995, TSG successfully renewed its license. In 1996, Cleveland and Goodson were charged with money laundering under federal law, along with racketeering and conspiracy in connection with a scheme to bribe state legislators to vote in a manner favorable to the video poker industry. Acts supporting these charges came from federal mail fraud charges, defined as \"any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining...property by means of...fraudulent...representations.\" The indictment alleged that Cleveland and Goodson fraudulently concealed that they were the true owners of TSG in the license applications they had mailed to the State because they had tax and financial problems that could have undermined their ability to receive a video poker license. Before trial, Cleveland moved to dismiss the mail fraud counts on the ground that the alleged fraud did not deprive the State of \"property.\" The District Court denied the motion, concluding that licenses constitute property even before they are issued. A jury found Cleveland guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54871:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54871:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54871:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that State and municipal licenses in general, and Louisiana's video poker licenses in particular, do not rank as \"property,\" for purposes of federal law, in the hands of the official licensor. Thus, Cleveland's conviction for making false statements to obtain state video poker license was vacated. \"Equating issuance of licenses or permits with deprivation of property would subject to federal mail fraud prosecution a wide range of conduct traditionally regulated by state and local authorities,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54871:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54872:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54872:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter a final removal order is entered, an alien ordered removed is held in custody during a 90-day removal period. If the alien is not removed in those 90 days, the post-removal-period detention statute authorizes further detention or supervised release. After being ordered deported based on is criminal record, efforts to deport Kestutis Zadvydas failed. When he remained in custody after the removal period expired, Zadvydas filed a habeas action. In granting the writ, the District Court reasoned that his confinement would be permanent and thus violate the Constitution. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Zadvydas' detention did not violate the Constitution because eventual deportation was not impossible. Conversely, in ordering Kim Ho Ma's release, the District Court held that the Constitution forbids post-removal-period detention unless there is a realistic chance that an alien will be removed, and that no such chance existed here because Cambodia has no repatriation treaty with the United States. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that detention was not authorized for more than a reasonable time beyond the 90-day period.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54872:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54872:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54872:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that \"the statute, read in light of the Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States\" and \"does not permit indefinite detention.\" \"Based on our conclusion that indefinite detention of aliens in the former category would raise serious constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an implicit 'reasonable time' limitation, the application of which is subject to federal court review,\" wrote Justice Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54872:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54873:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54873:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Patricia Garrett, Director of Nursing for the University of Alabama in Birmingham, was diagnosed with breast cancer, her treatment forced her to take a substantial leave from work. Upon her return, her supervisor informed her she would have to give up her position. Milton Ash, a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services, who suffers from chronic asthma, requested that his employer modify his duties to accommodate him. Ultimately, none of Ash's requested relief was granted and his job performance evaluations fell. Both Garrett and Ash filed discrimination suits against their Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits the States and other employers from \"discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of that disability... in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.\" The District Court disposed of both cases by ruling that the ADA exceeds Congress' authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54873:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54873:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54873:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the state's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Chief Justice wrote for the majority that \"in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.\" Rehnquist added that none of these requirements had been met. Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Stephen G. Breyer's dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54873:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54874:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54874:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) administers the Klamath Irrigation Project (Project), which uses water from the Klamath River Basin to irrigate parts of Oregon and California. In order for the Department to provide water allocations among competing uses and users, it asked the Klamath and other Indian Tribes (Basin Tribes or Tribes) to consult with Reclamation. A memorandum of understanding solidified this relationship. When the Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs (Bureau) filed claims on behalf of the Klamath Tribe in Oregon to allocate water rights, the two exchanged written memorandums on the appropriate scope of the claims submitted by the Government for the benefit of the Tribe. Afterwards, the Klamath Water Users Protective Association (Association), a nonprofit group, whose members receive water from the Project and, generally, have interests adverse to the tribal interest because of the scarcity of water, filed requests with the Bureau under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to gain access to communications between the Bureau and the Basin Tribes. Some documents were turned over, but the Bureau held other documents under the deliberative process privileges incorporated in FOIA Exemption 5, which exempts from disclosure \"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.\" The Association sued to compel release of the documents. The District Court granted the government summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled out any application of Exemption 5 on the ground that the Tribes with whom the Department has a consulting relationship have a direct interest in the subject matter of the consultations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54874:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54874:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54874:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court that there is no exemption under FOIA for the correspondence between the Tribes and the Bureau. Because the Klamath Tribe advocated its own positions in the water allocation proceedings, the communications between it and the Bureau did not equate to the role that personnel fulfils, in that personnel do not represent their own interests. Therefore, the documents were not exempt from public disclosure as inter-agency or intra-agency communications. \"All of this boils down to requesting that we read an 'Indian trust' exemption into the statute, a reading that is out of the question,\" wrote Justice Souter for the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54874:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54875:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54875:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) regulate medical devices. Under the MDA, Class III devices \"present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury\" and thus require the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) strictest regulation. In 1985, after a previously failed attempt, the AcroMed Corporation sought approval for its orthopedic bone screw device, a Class III device, for use in spinal surgery with the assistance of Buckman Company, a regulatory consultant to medical device manufacturers. The FDA also denied the second application. On the third attempt, instead of trying to show the bone screw device was \"substantially equivalent\" to similar devices already on the market and thus as safe and effective, AcroMed and Buckman split the device into its component parts, renamed them, and altered the intended use of the parts. Thus, the FDA approved the component devices for long bone surgery. Subsequently, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has directed over 2,300 civil actions related to these medical devices to the Federal District Court. Many actions claim, under state tort law, that AcroMed and Buckman made fraudulent representations to the FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws and that, as a result, the devices were improperly given market clearance, which injured the plaintiffs. The District Court dismissed the fraud claims as pre-empted by the MDA. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54875:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54875:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54875:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the plaintiffs' state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflicted with, and were therefore pre-empted by, the FDCA, as amended by the MDA. \"The conflict,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist for the Court, \"stems from the fact that the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the Agency, and that this authority is used by the Agency to achieve a somewhat delicate balance of statutory objectives. The balance sought by the Agency can be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law.\" Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the \"FDA...has at its disposal a variety of enforcement options that allow it to make a measured response to suspected fraud upon the Agency.\" Justices John Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas concurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54875:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54876:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54876:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the wake of U.S Term Limits v. Thornton, Missouri voters adopted an amendment to Article VIII of their State Constitution, which \"instructs\" each Member of Missouri's congressional delegation \"to use all of his or her delegated powers to pass the Congressional Term Limits Amendment\" set forth in section 16 of the Article. The Article also directs the Missouri Secretary of State to determine whether a statement reflecting a candidate's position on term limits should be placed by his or her name on the general election ballot. Don Gralike, a non-incumbent House of Representatives candidate, brought suit to enjoin the Secretary from implementing the Article. The District Court, granting Gralike summary judgment, found that Article VIII infringed upon the Qualifications Clauses of Article I of the Federal Constitution by creating additional qualifications for Congress and that the Article burdened a candidate's First Amendment right to speak freely on the issue of term limits. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54876:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54876:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54876:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Article VIII of the Missouri Constitution, which required the placement of negative labels next to state candidates for federal office, who failed to comply with voter-mandated support of federal term limits, was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate electoral outcomes, rather than a permissible regulation of state elections. Justice Stevens explained for the Court that Article VIII is designed to favor candidates who are willing to support a term-limits amendment and, \"[t]hus, far from regulating the procedural mechanisms of elections, Article VIII attempts to 'dictate electoral outcomes.' Such 'regulation' of congressional elections simply is not authorized by the Elections Clause.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54876:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54877:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54877:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, Saint Clair Adams, who was hired as a sales counselor, signed an employment application with Circuit City. A provision in Adams' application required all employment disputes to be settled by arbitration. In 1997, Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in California state court. Circuit City then filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the state-court action and to compel arbitration of Adams' claims under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The District Court entered the requested order. The court concluded that Adams was obligated by the arbitration agreement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the arbitration agreement between Adams and Circuit City was contained in a \"contract of employment,\" and thus not subject to the FAA under section 1 of the Act. Section 1 of the FAA excludes \"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" from the Act's coverage.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54877:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54877:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54877:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 1 exemption is confined to transportation workers. \"The wording of [section 1] calls for the application of the maxim ejusdem generis, the statutory canon that 'where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words,'\" wrote Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy continued that \"[u]nder this rule of construction the residual clause should be read to give effect to the terms 'seamen' and 'railroad employees,' and should itself be controlled and defined by reference to the enumerated categories of workers which are recited just before it; the interpretation of the clause pressed by respondent fails to produce these results.\" Therefore, section 1 \"exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54877:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54878:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54878:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires a prisoner to exhaust \"such administrative remedies as are available\" before suing over prison conditions. Timothy Booth, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, Pennsylvania, initiated a suit in District Court, claiming that corrections officers violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in various ways. Booth sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages. At the time of Booth's suit, Pennsylvania provided an administrative grievance and appeals system, which addressed Booth's complaints but had no provision for recovery of money damages. After the prison authority denied his administrative grievance, Booth did not seek administrative review. Subsequently, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Booth's argument that the exhaustion requirement was inapplicable because the administrative process could not award him the monetary relief he sought (At this point, Booth was only seeking money).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54878:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54878:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54878:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that even though the prison grievance procedure did not provide for requested monetary relief, Booth was nonetheless required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit with respect to prison conditions. Justice Souter wrote for the Court, \"we think that Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54878:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54879:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54879:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWashington State's Community Protection Act of 1990 (Act) authorizes the civil commitment of \"sexually violent predators,\" or persons who suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. After his imprisonment for committing six rapes, Andre Brigham Young was scheduled to be released from prison in 1990. Prior to his release, the state successfully filed a petition to commit Young as a sexually violent predator. Ultimately, Young instituted a federal habeas action. Initially, the District Court granted the writ, finding that the Act was criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees of the Constitution. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court denied Young's petition. The court determined that the Act was civil and, therefore, it could not violate the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the case turned on whether the Act was punitive \"as applied\" to Young.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54879:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54879:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54879:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because the Washington Community Protection Act of 1990 had been found to be civil, it could not be deemed punitive as applied to Young for the purposes of double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority that an \"as-applied\" analysis would be \"unworkable\" because it would \"never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the scheme's validity under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.\" Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54879:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54881:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54881:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe 2000 presidential election remained in limbo with the outcome dependent on the winner of the popular vote in Florida. Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush held a slim lead in the tally. Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore challenged the decision of Florida's Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, to certify the results of the presidential election on November 14, the deadline provided by Florida's election law. Gore also challenged Harris's decision to ignore the outcome of manual recounts his campaign had requested in four Florida counties, recounts available under another provision of Florida's election code. The Florida Supreme Court heard Gore's challenges and held that Harris could not certify the outcome until November 26. The Florida Supreme Court also held that Harris must include the results of manual recounts in the certified results. Governor Bush intervened. Harris and Bush appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54881:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54881:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54881:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, a unanimous court held that there was \"considerable uncertainty\" as to the reasons for the Florida Supreme Court's decision. Accordingly the court did not review the federal questions presented by the case. Instead it vacated the Florida Supreme Court's decision and remanded the case for clarification of two questions. One, did the Florida Supreme Court think that the Florida Constitution circumscribed the plenary power of the Florida Legislature in election matters conferred by the US Constitution? And two, how much weight did the Florida Supreme Court give to 3 USC Section 5?", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54881:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54884:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54884:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n28 USC section 2244(d)(2) provides that the \"time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.\" In 1996, Sherman Walker filed a federal habeas petition under section 2254. The District Court dismissed the petition because it concluded that Walker had not exhausted available state remedies. In 1997, without returning to state court, Walker filed another federal habeas petition. Th District Court dismissed the petition because it had not been filed within a reasonable time from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's effective date. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Walker's first federal habeas petition was an application for \"other collateral review\" that tolled the limitation period under section 2244(d)(2) and made his current petition timely.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54884:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54884:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54884:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that an federal habeas corpus petition is not an \"application for State post-conviction or other collateral review\" within the meaning of 28 USC section 2244(d)(2). \"Section 2244(d)(2) therefore did not toll the limitation period during the pendency of [Walker's] first federal habeas petition,\" wrote Justice O'Connor. \"[I]f the statute were construed so as to give applications for federal review the same tolling effect as applications for state collateral review, then [section] 2244(d)(2) would furnish little incentive for individuals to seek relief from the state courts before filing federal habeas petitions,\" concluded Justice O'Connor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54884:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54885:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54885:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVarious freelance authors wrote articles for various print publishers. The publishers treated the authors as independent contractors under contracts. The publishers each licensed rights to copy and sell articles to LEXIS/NEXIS, owner and operator of a computerized database containing articles in text-only format. NEXIS does not reproduce the print publication's formatting. The authors filed suit alleging that their copyrights were infringed when the print publishers placed their articles in the electronic publishers' databases, such as LEXIS/NEXIS. In response, the print and electronic publishers raised the privilege accorded collective work copyright owners by section 201(c) of the Copyright Act. In granting the publishers summary judgment, the District Court held that the electronic databases reproduced and distributed the authors' works, under section 201(c), \"as part of...[a] revision of that collective work\" to which the authors had first contributed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the databases were not among the collective works covered by section 201(c), and specifically, were not \"revisions\" of the periodicals in which the Articles first appeared.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54885:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54885:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54885:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 201(c) does not authorize the copying at issue. \"The publishers are not sheltered by [section 201(c)], we conclude, because the databases reproduce and distribute articles standing alone and not in context, not 'as part of that particular collective work' to which the author contributed, 'as part of...any revision' thereof, or 'as part of...any later collective work in the same series.' Both the print publishers and the electronic publishers, we rule, have infringed the copyrights of the freelance authors,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, argued that \"[e]ach individual file still reminds the reader that he is viewing 'part of' a particular collective work. And the entire editorial content of that work still exists at the reader's fingertips.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54885:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54886:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54886:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986, after being convicted for simple assault, institutional vandalism, and criminal mischief, Edward R. Coss, Jr., filed a petition for relief, but the Pennsylvania courts never ruled on the petition. In 1990, after he had served the full sentences for his 1986 convictions, Coss was convicted of aggravated assault. Ultimately, the sentencing court did not consider Coss' 1986 convictions in determining his eligible sentencing range. In choosing a sentence within the applicable range, the court considered several factors including Coss' extensive criminal record, making reference to his 1986 convictions. Coss then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 1986 convictions were constitutionally invalid. The Federal District Court denied the petition reasoning that Coss had not been prejudiced by his 1986 counsel's ineffectiveness. The Court of Appeals found that Coss would not have been convicted in 1986 but for the ineffective assistance. The court remanded the case ordering a retrial or resentencing without consideration of the 1986 conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54886:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54886:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54886:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that \"once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a [federal habeas petition] on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.\" Justice David H. Souter filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54886:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54887:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54887:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile officers were investigating marijuana sales at Florida home, Robert Thomas drove up to the house. An officer asked Thomas for his name and driver license. Thomas was arrested when a search on his license revealed an outstanding warrant. After taking Thomas inside the house, the officer searched Thomas' car and found methamphetamine. Subsequently, the trial court granted Thomas' motion to suppress. In reversing, the appellate found the search valid under New York v. Belton. In New York v. Belton, the U.S. Supreme Court established a \"bright-line\" rule permitting an officer who has made a lawful custodial arrest of a car's occupant to search the car's passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest. In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court held Belton did not apply because it is limited to situations where the officer initiates contact with a vehicle's occupant while that person remains in the vehicle.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54887:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54887:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54887:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Florida Supreme Court's decision did not fit any of the categories where the Court \"treated state-court judgments as final for jurisdictional purposes although there were further proceedings to take place in the state court.\" Thus, the Court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court's decision was not final.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54887:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54888:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54888:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder a grievance settlement agreement, the Cleveland Indians Baseball Company owed 8 players backpay for wages due in 1986 and 14 players backpay for wages due in 1987. The Company paid all of the back wages in 1994. No award recipient was a Company employee in that year. The Company also paid its share of employment taxes on the back wages according to 1994 tax rates and wage bases. The payments were subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and taxes on wages to fund unemployment benefits under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). Both tax rates and the amount of the wages subject to tax have risen over time. After the Internal Revenue Service denied the Company's claims for a refund of the payments, the Company initiated suit in Federal District Court. The court, bound by precedent, ordered the Government to refund FICA and FUTA taxes. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54888:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54888:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54888:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that back wages are subject to FICA and FUTA taxes by reference to the year the wages are in fact paid. \"Although the regulations, like the statute, do not specifically address backpay, the Internal Revenue Service has consistently interpreted them to require taxation of back wages according to the year the wages are actually paid, regardless of when those wages were earned or should have been paid,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54888:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54889:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54889:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) selected an abandoned sand and gravel pit as a solid waste disposal site. Excavation trenches on the site had previously become ponds for migrating birds. Because some trenches would have to be filled in, the SWANCC contacted the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to determine if a landfill permit was required under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes the Corps to issue permits allowing the discharge of dredged or fill material into \"navigable waters.\" Under the CWA, \"navigable waters\" are defined as \"the waters of the United States\" and the Corps regulations define such waters to include intrastate waters, of which damage could affect interstate commerce. Subsequently, the Corps denied the SWANCC a permit. The District Court found the Corps had jurisdiction over the site. The Court of Appeals held that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate waters.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54889:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54889:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54889:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and unanswered. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the provision of the CWA, which requires those discharging fill material into navigable waters to obtain a permit from the Corps, does not extend to isolated, abandoned sand and gravel pits with seasonal ponds, which provide migratory bird habitats. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that \"[t]he term 'navigable' has...the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.\" In answering the first question no, the Court did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54889:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54890:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54890:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. Members of the tobacco industry filed suit challenging the regulations. Lorillard Tobacco Company and others asserted that under the Supremacy Clause the cigarette advertising regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which prescribes mandatory health warnings for cigarette packaging and advertising and that the regulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings that the cigarette advertising regulations are not pre-empted by the FCLAA and that neither the regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground nor the sales practices regulations restricting the location and distribution of tobacco products violated the First Amendment. Reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate court found that the point-of-sale advertising regulations requiring that indoor advertising be placed no lower than five feet from the floor were valid.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54890:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54890:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54890:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the highly fractured Court held that the FCLAA preempts Massachusetts' regulations governing outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising and that Massachusetts' outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations related to smokeless tobacco and cigars violate the First Amendment, but that the sales practices regulations related to all three tobacco products are constitutional. \"We conclude that the Attorney General has failed to show that the outdoor advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to advance the State's substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use,\" wrote Justice O'Connor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54890:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54891:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54891:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUsing a 1993 building permit issued by the District of Columbia, Tri County Industries, Inc. spent nearly $600,000 readying a site for a \"soil remediation\" facility, which would decontaminate soil tainted by hazardous wastes. After protests and a dispute over whether the company was violating its permit by storing contaminated soil on the site, the city issued a stop-work order. Tri County filed suit against the District of Columbia for suspending its building permit on the facility claiming its due process rights had been violated. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reinstated a 1998 jury's $5 million award. The appellate court rule that the District Court should have conducted a \"more searching inquiry\" than it had to preserve the Seventh Amendment right to jury trials in civil cases. The appellate court normally applies a \"abuse of discretion\" standard. Under the \"more searching inquiry,\" the appellate court discounted the reasons the district judge had cited in ordering a new trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54891:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54891:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54891:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The dismissal had the effect of leaving in place the ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that new-trial grants demand a \"more searching inquiry\" than the usual abuse-of-discretion review and reinstating the appellate court's decision that upheld the first jury's verdict that awarded Tri County $5 million in damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54891:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54892:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54892:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDale G. Becker, an Ohio prisoner, instituted a pro se civil rights action to contest the conditions of his confinement. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Becker's complaint. In appealing, Becker, still pro se, filed his notice of appeal using a government-printed form, on which he filled in all of the required information. On the line labeled \"Counsel for Appellant\" Becker typed, but did not sign, his name. The form contained no indication of a signature requirement. The District Court docketed the notice, sent a copy to the Court of Appeals, and granted Becker leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, after notifying Becker that the court would not hold him to the same standards it required of attorneys in stating his case, dismissed the appeal on its own motion. The court held that the notice of appeal was fatally defective because it was not signed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54892:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54892:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54892:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that when a party files a timely notice of appeal in district court, the failure to sign the notice does not require the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that \"if the notice is timely filed and adequate in other respects, jurisdiction will vest in the court of appeals, where the case may proceed so long as the appellant promptly supplies the signature once the omission is called to his attention.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54892:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54893:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54893:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile incarcerated in Montana State Prison, Kevin Murphy sent a letter to an inmate to assist him with his defense after he assaulted a correctional officer. In accordance with prison policy, the letter was intercepted. Based on the letter's content, the prison sanctioned Murphy for violating prison rules prohibiting insolence and interfering with due process hearings. Murphy sought relief, alleging that the disciplinary action violated his First Amendment rights, including the right to provide legal assistance to other inmates. Ruling against Murphy, the District Court, based on precedent, found that reasonably related penological interests allowed the prison regulations to impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that an inmate's First Amendment right to give legal assistance to other inmates outweighed the government's interests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54893:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54893:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54893:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that inmates do not possess a special First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates that enhances the protections otherwise available. \"Augmenting First Amendment protection for inmate legal advice would undermine prison officials' ability to address the 'complex and intractable' problems of prison administration,\" wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas added that \"[p]risoners have used legal correspondence as a means for passing contraband and communicating instructions on how to manufacture drugs or weapons.\" Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also wrote a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54893:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54894:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54894:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe California Labor Code requires that contractors and subcontractors on public works project pay their workers a prevailing wage that is determined by the state. The Code authorizes the state to withhold payments from contractors who fail to pay the prevailing wage. The contractor can, in turn, withhold payments to subcontractors who fail to pay the wage. To recover the wages or penalties withheld, the Code permits the contractor to sue for breach of contract. After the State Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) determined that G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., a public works subcontractor, had violated the Code, it withheld from the contractors an amount equal to the wages and penalties forfeited due to G & G's violations. After its payment was withheld, G & G filed suit against DLSE, claiming that the lacking of a hearing deprived it of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Granting G & G summary judgment, the District Court declared the relevant Code sections unconstitutional. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that G & G's rights were violated not because it was deprived of immediate payment, but because the state statutory scheme afforded no hearing at all.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54894:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54894:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54894:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that because California state law affords G & G sufficient opportunity to pursue its claim for payment under its contracts in state court, the statutory scheme does not deprive it of due process. A contractor's claim for payment is \"an interest...that can be fully protected by an ordinary breach-of-contract suit,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. The Chief Justice continued that \"if California makes ordinary judicial process available to [G & G] for resolving its contractual dispute, that process is due process.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54894:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54895:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54895:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCasey Martin has a degenerative circulatory disorder that prevents him from walking golf courses. His disorder constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). When Martin made a request to use a golf cart for the duration of the qualification tournament onto the professional tours sponsored by PGA Tour, Inc., PGA refused. Martin then filed suit under Title III of the ADA, which requires an entity operating \"public accommodations\" to make \"reasonable modifications\" in its policies \"when... necessary to afford such...accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such...accommodations.\" Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against PGA, requiring it to allow Martin to use a cart. The court found that the purpose of the PGA's walking rule was to insert fatigue into the skill of shot-making, and that Martin suffered significant fatigue due to his disability, even with the use of a cart. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that golf courses are places of public accommodation during professional tournaments and that permitting Martin to use a cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of those tournaments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54895:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54895:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54895:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Title III of the ADA, by its plain terms, prohibits the PGA from denying Martin equal access to its tours on the basis of his disability and that allowing Martin to use a cart, despite the walking rule, is not a modification that would \"fundamentally alter the nature\" of the game. \"The purpose of the walking rule is... not compromised in the slightest by allowing Martin to use a cart,\" wrote Justice Stevens, noting Martin's fatiguing disability. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54895:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54896:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54896:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (Association) is a not-for-profit membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members, a large portion of the public and private high schools in Tennessee. The Association's role in regulating interscholastic competition in public schools has been long acknowledged by the State Board of Education. Brentwood Academy sued the Association after it penalized the academy for placing \"undue influence\" on football recruits. At the time, all the voting members of the Association were public school administrators. Brentwood claimed that the rule's enforcement was state action that violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court agreed and enjoined the rule's enforcement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no state action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54896:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54896:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54896:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the ostensibly private organization, which regulated school sports, and the state education board's acknowledgment of the organization, indicated that the organization is a state actor for civil rights purposes. \"The nominally private character of the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and there is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards to it,\" wrote Justice Souter for the majority. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined Justice Clarence Thomas' dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54896:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54897:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54897:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative was organized to distribute marijuana to qualified patients for medical purposes. In 1998, the United States sued to enjoin the Cooperative and its executive director. The government argued that the Cooperative's activities violated the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. Although the District Court enjoined it, the Cooperative continued to distribute marijuana. Rejecting the Cooperative's medical necessity defense, the court found the Cooperative in contempt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the medical necessity defense was a legally cognizable defense. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court modified its injunction to incorporate a medical necessity defense, under which medically necessary distributions were to be permitted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54897:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54897:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54897:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that there is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing marijuana. \"The statute reflects a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception, \" wrote Justice Thomas, therefore, \"medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana.\" Justice John Paul Stevens' concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that \"[b]ecause necessity was raised in this case as a defense to distribution, the Court need not venture an opinion on whether the defense is available to anyone other than distributors.\" Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54897:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54898:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54898:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Interstate Agreement on Detainers creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, a legal order that requires a state to hold a currently imprisoned individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime. In 1997, Michael Bozeman was serving a federal prison sentence at a federal prison in Florida. In January, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama sought temporary custody of Bozeman to arraign him on state firearm charges for which an earlier detainer had been filed. The Agreement provides that a state that obtains a prisoner for purposes of trial must try him within 120 days of his arrival, and if it returns him to his \"original place of imprisonment\" prior to that trial, charges shall be dismissed. After appearing in Alabama court, Bozeman was returned to federal prison in Florida. When Bozeman returned to Alabama court, his local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that Bozeman had been \"returned to the original place of imprisonment\" (the federal prison) \"prior to\" \"trial\" on state charges being \"had.\" Ultimately, Bozeman was convicted and an appellate court affirmed. In reversing, the Alabama State Supreme Court held that the literal language of the Agreement required dismissal of the state charges.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54898:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54898:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54898:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the literal language of Article IV(e) of the Agreement bars any further criminal proceedings when a defendant is returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial. The Court rejected the argument that the one-day breach did not interrupt rehabilitation significantly for two reasons. First, \"the language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception, for it is absolute,\" wrote Justice Breyer. Second, continued Justice Breyer, \"even were we to assume for argument's sake that the Agreement exempts violations that...are de minimis...we could not say that the violation at issue here qualifies as trivial.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54898:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54899:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54899:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, while under arrest for an unrelated offense, Raymond Levi Cobb confessed to a home burglary. Cobb, however, denied knowledge of the disappearance of a woman and child from the home. In 1995, after counsel was appointed to represent him in the burglary case, Cobb confessed to killing the woman and child to his father, who contacted the police. Cobb, now in custody, waived his rights under Miranda and confessed to the murders. Cobb was then indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cobb argued that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which he claimed attached when counsel was appointed in the burglary case. In reversing, the court held that once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely factually related to the offense charged.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54899:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54899:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54899:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is \"offense specific,\" it does not necessarily extend to offenses that are \"factually related\" to those that have actually been charged. Since the right to counsel was offense specific, and the offenses were separate, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the \"Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar police from interrogating [Cobb] regarding the murders, and [Cobb's] confession was therefore admissible.\" Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54899:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54900:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54900:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAtkinson Trading Company, Inc. owns the Cameron Trading Post, which is located on non-Indian fee land within the Navajo Nation Reservation. The Cameron Trading Post consists of a hotel, restaurant, cafeteria, gallery, curio shop, retail store, and recreational vehicle facility. In 1992, the Navajo Nation enacted a hotel occupancy tax, which imposed an 8 percent tax upon any hotel room located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. Atkinson challenged the tax under Montana v. United States. Under Montana, with two limited exceptions, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation. The District Court upheld that tax. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the tax fell under Montana's first exception because a \"consensual relationship exists in that the nonmember guests could refrain from the privilege of lodging within the confines of the Navajo Reservation and therefore remain free from liability for the [tax].\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54900:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54900:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54900:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Navajo Nation's imposition of a hotel occupancy tax upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within its reservation is invalid. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that \"Indian tribes are 'unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,' but their dependent status generally precludes extension of tribal civil authority beyond these limits. The Navajo Nation's imposition of a tax upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within the reservation is, therefore, presumptively invalid. Because respondents have failed to establish that the hotel occupancy tax is commensurately related to any consensual relationship with [Atkinson] or is necessary to vindicate the Navajo Nation's political integrity, the presumption ripens into a holding.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54900:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54901:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54901:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWesley Aaron Shafer, Jr., was found guilty of murder, among other things. During the sentencing phase, Shafer's counsel argued that Simmons v. South Carolina required the trial judge to instruct the jury that under South Carolina law a life sentence carries no possibility of parole. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Simmons that where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process requires that the jury be informed of the defendant's parole ineligibility. The prosecution responded that because the state did not plan to argue to the jury that Shafer would be a danger in the future that no Simmons instruction was required. During deliberations, the jury asked under what conditions someone convicted of murder could become available for parole. The trial judge stated that parole eligibility or ineligibility was not a matter for the jury's consideration. Ultimately, the jury recommended the death penalty and the judge imposed the sentence. In affirming, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Simmons generally did not apply to the State's sentencing scheme because an alternative to death other than life without the possibility of parole exists.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54901:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54901:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54901:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that \"whenever future dangerousness is at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding under South Carolina's new scheme, due process requires that the jury be informed that a life sentence carries no possibility of parole.\" Justice Ginsburg wrote that \"[i]t is only when the jury endeavors the moral judgment whether to impose the death penalty that parole eligibility may become critical. Correspondingly, it is only at that stage that Simmons comes into play, a stage at which South Carolina law provides no third choice, no 30-year mandatory minimum, just death or life without parole.\" Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas filed dissenting opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54901:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54902:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54902:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLarketta Randolph financed the purchase of a mobile home through Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama. Randolph's financing agreement with Green Tree required that she buy insurance against default and provided that disputes under the contract would be resolved by binding arbitration. Randolph sued Green Tree, alleging that it violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by failing to disclose the insurance requirement as a finance charge and that it violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by requiring her to arbitrate her statutory causes of action. The District Court granted Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration and denied her request for reconsideration, which stated that she lacked the resources to arbitrate and, therefore, would have to forgo her claims. The Court of Appeals, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which allows appeals from \"a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title,\" held that it had jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court concluded that because the agreement was silent with respect to payment of arbitration expenses, it was unenforceable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54902:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54902:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54902:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that an order compelling arbitration pursuant to the parties' agreement is a \"final decision with respect to an arbitration\" within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act making it immediately appealable pursuant to the FAA. In a 5-4 split, the Court held that an arbitration agreement that is silent on arbitration costs and fees is not unenforceable. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that \"[a]lthough the existence of large arbitration costs may well preclude a litigant...from effectively vindicating [her statutory rights], the record does not show that Randolph will bear such costs if she goes to arbitration.\" Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54902:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54904:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54904:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a taxpayer may carry back its \"product liability loss\" up to 10 years in order to offset prior years' income. United Dominion Industries, Inc. predecessor in interest, AMCA International Corporation, was the parent of an affiliated group filing consolidated returns for the years 1983 through 1986. AMCA calculated its product liability loss (PPL) on a consolidated basis, or a \"single-entity\" approach. The government's \"separate-member\" approach would have prohibited 5 of AMCA's 26 members from contributing to the group's total PPL. In 1986 and 1987, AMCA petitioned the Internal Revenue Service for a refund based on its PPL calculations. Ultimately, the District Court applied AMCA's single-entity approach, concluding that if the affiliated group's consolidated return reflects consolidated net operating losses in excess of the group's aggregate product liability expenses, the total of those expenses is a PLL that may be carried back. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied the separate-member approach.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54904:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54904:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54904:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that an affiliated group's product liability loss must be figured on a consolidated, single-entity basis, and not by aggregating product liability losses separately determined company by company. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that \"'the Internal Revenue Code vests ample authority in the Treasury to adopt consolidated return regulations to effect a binding resolution of the question presented in this in this case.' To the extent that the Government has exercised that authority, its actions point to the single-entity approach as the better answer. To the extent the Government disagrees, it may amend its regulations to provide for a different one.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54904:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54905:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54905:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarketing Displays, Inc. (MDI) held utility patents for a \"dual-spring design\" mechanism that keeps temporary road and other outdoor signs upright in wind. After the patents expired, TrafFix Devices, Inc. began marketing sign stands with a dual-spring mechanism copied from MDI's design. MDI brought suit under the Trademark Act of 1964 for, among other things, trade dress infringement. MDA claimed that its sign stands were recognizable to buyers and users because the patented design was visible. In granting summary judgement for TrafFix, the District Court concluded that MDI had not established a \"secondary meaning,\" or that consumers did not associate the look of the dual-spring design with MDI. The court also found that there could be no trade dress protection for the design because it was functional. In reversing, the Court of Appeals suggested that the District Court committed legal error by looking only to the dual-spring design when evaluating MDI's trade dress because a competitor had to find some way to hide the design or otherwise set it apart from MDI's and noted the issue whether an expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of trade dress protection in the product's design.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54905:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54905:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54905:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because MDI's dual-spring design is a functional feature for which there is no trade dress protection, MDI's claim is barred. \"A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional, \" wrote Justice Kennedy. Focusing on the dual-spring design, Justice Kennedy continued that \"[w]here the expired patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.\" \"MDI did not, and cannot, carry the burden,\" concluded the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54905:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54906:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54906:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSection 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant for which \"air quality criteria\" have been issued under section 108. In 1997, Carol Browner, the Administrator of the EPA, revised the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. Afterwards, her revised NAAQS were challenged in court. The District of Columbia Circuit found that section 109(b)(1), which instructs the EPA to set standards, delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Federal Constitution because the court found that the EPA had interpreted the statute to provide no \"intelligible principle\" to guide the agency's exercise of authority. The court remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The courts also held to its rule that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting the NAAQS. Additionally, the court rejected the EPA's position that the implementation provisions for ozone found in Part D, Subpart 2, of Title I of the CAA, were so tied to the existing ozone standard that the EPA lacked the power to revise the standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54906:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54906:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54906:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no, and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the CAA properly delegated legislative power to the EPA, but that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting primary and secondary NAAQS. Moreover, the Court held that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA related to the implementation of the revised ozone NAAQS; however, the EPA's interpretation of Part D was unreasonable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54906:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54907:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54907:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all \"under-votes\" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54907:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54907:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54907:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNoting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by \"later arbitrary and disparate treatment,\" the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and other procedural difficulties, the court held, 5 to 4, that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the \"safe harbor\" provided by 3 USC Section 5).\nLoathe to make broad precedents, the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case. Rehnquist (in a concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount scheme was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's decision made new election law, which only the state legislature may do. Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Court's recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause, but they dissented with respect to the remedy, believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Time is insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake. Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism, the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Moreover, the Florida decision was fundamentally right; the Constitution requires that every vote be counted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54907:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54908:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54908:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1977, a dispute between New Hampshire and Maine over lobster fishing rights resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court entering a consent judgment setting the precise location of the States' \"lateral marine boundary,\" or the boundary in the marine waters off the coast. Utilizing a 1740 decree of King George II, the States agreed that the decree's words \"Middle of the River\" referred to the middle of the Piscataqua River's main navigable channel. Ultimately, the 1997 consent judgment defined \"Middle of the River\" as \"the middle of the main channel of navigation of the Piscataqua River.\" The consent judgment did not fix the inland Piscataqua River boundary. In 2000, New Hampshire brought an original action against Maine, claiming that the inland river boundary runs along the Maine shore and that the entire Piscataqua River and all of Portsmouth Harbor belong to New Hampshire. In response, Maine filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the 1740 boundary determination by King George II and the 1977 consent judgment barred the complaint.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54908:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54908:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54908:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that \"judicial estoppel bars New Hampshire from asserting that the Piscataqua River boundary runs along the Maine shore.\" Under the judicial estoppel doctrine, \"[w]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg. \"New Hampshire's claim that the Piscataqua River boundary runs along the Maine shore is clearly inconsistent with its interpretation of the words 'Middle of the River' during the 1970's litigation,\" concluded Ginsburg.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54908:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54909:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54909:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMelvin Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder. Ultimately, Tyler filed his sixth state habeas petition after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cage v. Louisiana, which held that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Tyler claimed that that a jury instruction in his trial was similar to the one ruled unconstitutional in Cage. Ultimately, Tyler filed a second federal habeas petition pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The District Court denied relief. In affirming, the Court of Appeals stated the District Court had failed to determine whether Tyler had satisfied the AEDPA's successive habeas standard, which requires a district court to dismiss a claim in a second or successive application unless the applicant \"shows\" that the \"claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.\" The court concluded that Tyler did not meet this standard because he \"could not show that any Supreme Court decision renders the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54909:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54909:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54909:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Cage rule was not \"made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.\" Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that \"[b]ecause 'made' means 'held'...it is clear that the Cage rule has not been 'made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.' Cage itself does not hold that it is retroactive. The only holding in Cage is that the particular jury instruction violated the Due Process Clause.\" Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54909:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54910:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54910:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDonald Saucier, a military police officer, arrested Elliot Katz, who was protesting during a speech by Vice President Gore at the Presidio Army Base in San Francisco. Katz filed suit against Saucier alleging that Saucier had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in arresting him. Rejecting Saucier's motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the District Court held that the immunity inquiry is the same as the inquiry made on the merits. In affirming, the Court of Appeals made a two-part qualified immunity inquiry. After finding that the law governing Saucier's conduct was clearly established when the incident occurred, the court moved to determined whether a reasonable officer could have believed, in light of the clearly established law, that his conduct was lawful. The court then reasoned that this step and the merits of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim were identical because both concern the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct in light of the circumstances the officer faced at the scene. Subsequently, the court found that summary judgment based on qualified immunity was inappropriate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54910:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54910:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54910:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that \"the ruling on qualified immunity requires an analysis not susceptible of fusion with the question whether unreasonable force was used in making the arrest.\" \"The approach the Court of Appeals adopted -- to deny summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on the excessive force claim -- could undermine the goal of qualified immunity to 'avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment,'\" wrote Justice Kennedy. The majority then concluded that the military policeman was entitled to qualified immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54910:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54911:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54911:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFloyd Hicks is a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes of western Nevada. After tribal police observed that Hicks was in possession of two California bighorn sheep heads, state game wardens obtained search warrants from state court and from the tribal court. After the warrants were executed, Hicks filed suit in Tribal Court, alleging trespass to land and chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civil rights, specifically denial of equal protection, denial of due process, and unreasonable search and seizure. The Tribal Court held that it had jurisdiction over the claims and the Tribal Appeals Court affirmed. Agreeing, the District Court held that the wardens would have to exhaust their qualified immunity claims in Tribal Court. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fact that Hicks's home is on tribe-owned reservation land is sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their activities on that land.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54911:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54911:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54911:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, a unanimous Court held that \"[b]ecause the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes lacked legislative authority to restrict, condition, or otherwise regulate the ability of state officials to investigate off-reservation violations of state law, they also lacked adjudicative authority to hear respondent's claim that those officials violated tribal law in the performance of their duties. \"[S]ince the lack of authority is clear,\" continued Scalia, \"there is no need to exhaust the jurisdictional dispute in tribal court. State officials operating on a reservation to investigate off-reservation violations of state law are properly held accountable for tortious conduct and civil rights violations in either state or federal court, but not in tribal court.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54911:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54912:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54912:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Farm Credit Act of 1933 created various lending institutions, including banks for cooperatives, which are designated as federally chartered instrumentalities of the United States. CoBank ACB is the successor to all rights and obligations of the National Bank for Cooperatives. In 1996, CoBank filed amended returns on behalf of that bank, requesting an exemption from all Missouri corporate income taxes and refunds on the taxes it paid for 1991 through 1994. CoBank asserted that the Supremacy Clause accords federal instrumentalities immunity from state taxation unless Congress has expressly waived this immunity, which the Act did not expressly do. The state of Missouri denied the request, but the State Supreme Court reversed, stating that because the Act's current version is silent as to the banks' tax immunity, Congress cannot be said to have expressly consented to state income taxation and, thus, the banks are exempt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54912:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54912:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54912:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that banks for cooperatives are subject to taxation. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that nothing in the 1985 amendments to the Farm Credit Act indicated a repeal of the previous express approval of state taxation and that the structure of the Act indicated by negative implication that banks for cooperatives were not entitled to immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54912:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54913:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54913:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSharon Pollard sued her former employer, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Ultimately, the Federal District Court found that Pollard was subjected to co-worker sexual harassment of which her supervisors were aware. The court awarded her $300,000 in compensatory damages, the maximum permitted under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 for such damages. The court then noted that the award was insufficient to compensate Pollard. On appeal, Pollard argued that \"front pay,\" the money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement, was not an element of compensatory damages, but a replacement for the remedy of reinstatement in situations in which reinstatement would be inappropriate. Rejecting Pollard, the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54913:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54913:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54913:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that front pay is not an element of compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and thus is not subject to the damages cap imposed by the Act. \"Because front pay is a remedy authorized under [the Civil Rights Act of 1964], Congress did not limit the availability of such awards in [the Civil Rights Act of 1991]. Instead, Congress sought to expand the available remedies by permitting the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in addition to previously available remedies, such as front pay,\" wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. All members of the Court joined Justice Thomas' opinion, except Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54913:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54914:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54914:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all \"related\" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were \"related\" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54914:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54914:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54914:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Court of Appeals properly reviewed the District Court's \"''functional consolidation'\" decision deferentially \"[i]n light of the fact-bound nature of the legal decision, the comparatively greater expertise of the District Court, and the limited value of uniform court of appeals precedent.\" Rejecting Buford's arguments for de novo review, Justice Breyer wrote that \"the district court is in a better position than the appellate court to decide whether a particular set of individual circumstances demonstrates 'functional consolidation.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54914:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54915:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54915:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Department of the Interior agent, suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana, used a thermal-imaging device to scan his triplex. The imaging was to be used to determine if the amount of heat emanating from the home was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. Subsequently, the imaging revealed that relatively hot areas existed, compared to the rest of the home. Based on informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home. The search unveiled growing marijuana. After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager \"did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life,\" only \"amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54915:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54915:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54915:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that \"[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.\" In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the \"observations were made with a fairly primitive thermal imager that gathered data exposed on the outside of [Kyllo's] home but did not invade any constitutionally protected interest in privacy,\" and were, thus, \"information in the public domain.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54915:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54916:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54916:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Legal Services Corporation Act authorizes the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to distribute funds, appropriated by Congress, to local grantee organizations, which provide free legal assistance to indigent clients in welfare benefits claims. The Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 prohibited the LSC from funding any organization that represented clients in an effort to amend or challenge existing welfare law, among other things. The prohibition was such that grantees could not continue representation in a welfare matter even where a constitutional or statutory validity challenge became apparent after representation was well under way. LSC grantee lawyers and others filed suit to have the restriction declared unconstitutional. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction. However, the Court of Appeals invalidated the restriction, concluding that it was impermissible viewpoint discrimination that violated the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54916:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54916:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54916:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the funding provision that limited arguments legal services attorneys were allowed to make on behalf of indigent welfare claimants violated the First Amendment by regulating private speech and insulating federal law from legitimate judicial challenge. Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that, \"the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message.\" Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, arguing that the Appropriations Act \"does not directly regulate speech, and it neither establishes a public forum nor discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54916:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54917:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54917:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1998, James F. Lewis, a deckhand aboard the M/V Karen Michelle owned by Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., claimed that he was injured when he tripped over a wire on the boat. Lewis then sued Lewis & Clark in Illinois County Court, for personal injuries claiming negligence under the Jones Act. Lewis & Clark had already filed a complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in the District Court under the Limitation of Liability Act (Act). Subsequently, the court approved a surety bond of $450,000, representing Lewis & Clark's interest in the vessel, ordered that any claim related to the incident be filed with the court within a specified period, and enjoined the filing or prosecution of any suits related to the incident. The injunction prevented Lewis from litigating his personal injury claims in state court and he moved to dissolve it. The District Court noted that federal courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner is entitled to limited liability, but also recognized that the statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime suits to federal courts saves to suitors \"all other remedies to which they are other wise entitled.\" Ultimately, the court dissolved the injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54917:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54917:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54917:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because state courts may adjudicate claims like Lewis' against vessel owners so long as the owner's right to seek limitation of liability is protected, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the District Court's decision to dissolve the injunction. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Conner rejected the respondent's proposal to make \"run of the mill personal injury actions involving vessels a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction except where the claimant happens to seek a jury trial.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54917:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54918:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54918:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54918:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54918:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54918:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because the checkpoint program's primary purpose was indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment. \"We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime,\" wrote Justice O'Connor. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the reasonableness of the city's roadblocks depended on whether they served a \"significant state interest with minimal intrusion on motorists.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54918:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54919:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54919:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971's definition of \"contribution\" includes \"expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents.\" The U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, held that the limitations on political campaign contributions in the Act were generally constitutional, but that the Act's limitations on election expenditures infringed political expression in violation of the First Amendment. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Act to \"an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate.\" In the wake of this decision, the Committee's broader claim remained, that the congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties themselves are facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate. The District Court ruled in favor of the committee and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54919:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54919:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54919:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that \"a party's coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution limits.\" Justice Souter noted that \"'there is little evidence to suggest that coordinated party spending limits adopted by Congress have frustrated the ability of political parties to exercise their First Amendment rights to support their candidates.'\" Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy. Justice Thomas argued that the spending limit \"sweeps too broadly, interferes with the party-candidate relationship, and has not been proved necessary to combat corruption.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54919:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54920:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54920:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Madera Canal, a federal facility leased to the Madera Irrigation District (MID), flows through Central Green Co.'s 1,000 acres of pistachio orchards in California. Central Green filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States and the MID alleging that their negligence in the canal's design, construction, and maintenance caused subsurface flooding resulting in damage to the orchards and increased operating costs. The Federal Government moved for judgment on the pleadings based on immunity granted by the Flood Control Act of 1928, which states that \"no liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.\" The complaint was then dismissed because the canal was a part of the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project, whose purpose was flood control. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that although the canal serves no flood control purpose, immunity is attached solely because it is a branch of the larger project.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54920:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54920:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54920:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that in determining whether, under the Flood Control Act of 1928, immunity attaches, courts should consider the character of the waters that caused the relevant damage and the purposes behind their release rather than the relation between that damage and a flood control project. Thus, the Federal Government's immunity from liability for flood damage required a determination of whether actual flows through the Federal Government's canal constituted flood waters, regardless of the canal's flood control purpose.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54920:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54921:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54921:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilbert K. Rogers was convicted in Tennessee of second degree murder. The victim, James Bowdery, died 15 months after Rogers stabbed him. On appeal, Rogers argued that the Tennessee common law \"year and a day rule,\" under which no defendant could be convicted of murder unless his victim died by the defendant's act within a year and a day of the act, persisted and precluded his conviction. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. In affirming, the Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately abolished the rule and upheld Rogers' conviction. The court rejected Rogers' contention that abolishing the rule would violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Tennessee and Federal Constitutions. The court reasoned that those provisions referred only to legislative acts. Additionally, the court concluded its decision would not offend due process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54921:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54921:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54921:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Tennessee Supreme Court's retroactive application to a defendant of its decision abolishing the year-and-a-day rule did not deny Rogers due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. \"The Tennessee court's abolition of the year and a day rule was not unexpected and indefensible,\" wrote Justice O'Connor. \"Far from a marked and unpredictable departure from prior precedent, the court's decision was a routine exercise of common law decisionmaking in which the court brought the law into conformity with reason and common sense,\" continued O'Connor. Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia and Stephen G. Breyer wrote separate dissents. Justices Clarence Thomas, Stevens and Breyer joined Justice Scalia's dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54921:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54922:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54922:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn return for United International Holdings, Inc.'s assistance in preparing its application, contracts, system, and financing for a cable television system in Hong Kong, Wharf Holdings Ltd. orally granted United an option to buy 10% of stock in the system. The parties never reduced the agreement to writing. Ultimately, Wharf refused to allow United to exercise its option. United then sued Wharf in Federal District Court, claiming that Wharf violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits using \"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance...in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.\" Wharf's internal documents, which suggested that Wharf never intended to carry out its promise, supported United's claim. A jury found in United's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54922:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54922:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54922:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that an oral agreement to give an option to buy stock while secretly intending never to honor that option violates the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's prohibition of deceptive devices. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that there was no \"convincing reason to interpret the Act to exclude oral contracts as a class. The Act itself says that it applies to 'any contract' for the purchase or sale of a security.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54922:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54923:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54923:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, a labor union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to represent a unit of all the employees at the Caney Creek Developmental Complex, which is operated by Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. Kentucky River objected to the inclusion of its registered nurses in the unit because they were \"supervisors\" under National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Under the NLRA, employees are deemed to be \"supervisors\" and thereby excluded from the NLRA if they exercise \"independent judgment\" in \"responsibly...directing\" other employees \"in the interest of the employer.\" At the ensuing representation hearing, the NLRB placed the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River and found that it had not carried its burden. The NLRB rejected Kentucky River's proof of supervisory status on the ground that employees do not use \"independent judgment\" under the NLRA when they exercise \"ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with employer-specified standards.\" Kentucky River then refused to bargain with the union. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce a bargaining order issued by the NLRB at an unfair labor practice proceeding. The court rejected the NLRB's interpretation of \"independent judgment\" under the NLRA's test for supervisory status and held that NLRB had erred in placing the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54923:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54923:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54923:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the burden of proving the applicability of the supervisory exception of the Act falls on the party asserting it. Justice Scalia wrote that the \"Act does not...expressly allocate the burden of proving or disproving a challenged employee's supervisory status. The Board therefore has filled the statutory gap with the consistent rule that the burden is borne by the party claiming that the employee is a supervisor.\" Additionally, in a 5-4 split, the Court held that the NLRB's application of its interpretation of \"independent judgment\" to create categorical exclusion for nurses who exercised ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services was unlawful under the NLRA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54923:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54924:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54924:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBuckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. operates care homes that provide assisted living to their residents. Buckhannon filed an inspection by the West Virginia fire marshal's office because some residents were incapable of \"self-preservation.\" Buckhannon brought suit against the State and others arguing that the \"self-preservation\" requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Afterwards the state legislature eliminated the requirement and the District Court dismissed the case as moot. Buckhannon then requested attorney's fees as the \"prevailing party\" under the FHAA and ADA. Buckhannon based its claim on the \"catalyst theory,\" which posits that a plaintiff is a \"prevailing party\" if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54924:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54924:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54924:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the \"catalyst theory\" is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney's fees under the FHAA and ADA. \"In the United States, parties are ordinarily required to bear their own attorney's fees -- the prevailing party is not entitled to collect from the loser,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, \"[u]nder this 'American Rule,' we follow 'a general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority.'\" Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that \"Congress prescribed fee-shifting provisions like those included in the FHAA and ADA to encourage private enforcement of laws designed to advance civil rights. Fidelity to that purpose calls for court-awarded fees when a private party's lawsuit, whether or not its settlement is registered in court, vindicates rights Congress sought to secure.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54924:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54925:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54925:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnthony Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel of land in Rhode Island. Most of the property is salt marsh, subject to tidal flooding. The Rhode Island Resources Management Council's Coastal Resources Management Program regulations designate salt marshes as protected \"coastal wetlands,\" on which development is greatly limited. After multiple development proposals of his were denied, Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court. Palazzolo asserted that the State's wetlands regulations had taken his property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the Council's action had deprived him of \"all economically beneficial use\" of his property. Ruling against Palazzolo, the court held that his takings claim was not ripe, that he had no right to challenge the regulations predating his acquisition of the property's title, and that he could not assert a takings claim based on the denial of all economic use of his property in light of undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value remaining on an upland parcel of the property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54925:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54925:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54925:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that \"the State Supreme Court erred in finding [Palazzolo's] claims were unripe and in ruling that acquisition of title after the effective date of the regulations barred the takings claims. The court did not err in finding that [Palazzolo] failed to establish a deprivation of all economic value, for it is undisputed that the parcel retains significant worth for construction of a residence.\" Discussing the post-regulation acquisition of title, Justice Kennedy wrote, \"[w]ere we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54925:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54926:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54926:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 8, 1996, Enrico St. Cyr, a lawful permanent resident, pled guilty in a Connecticut court to a charge of selling a controlled substance. That conviction made him deportable. Before the effective dates of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was interpreted to give the Attorney General broad discretion to waive deportation of resident aliens. The AEDPA and IIRIRA restricted the class of aliens depending on section 212(c) for relief. St. Cyr's removal proceedings commenced after AEDPA's and IIRIRA's effective dates. Subsequently, the Attorney General claimed that the AEDPA and IIRIRA withdrew his authority to grant St. Cyr a waiver. The District Court accepted St. Cyr's habeas corpus application and agreed that the new restrictions do not apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien who pleaded guilty to a deportable crime before their enactment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54926:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54926:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54926:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that habeas jurisdiction was not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA. Additionally, the Court held that \"[section 212(c)] relief remains available for aliens, like [Enrico St. Cyr], whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for [section 212(c)] relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect.\" Justice Stevens wrote that \"[w]e find nothing in IIRIRA unmistakably indicating that Congress considered the question whether to apply its repeal of [section 212(c)] retroactively to such aliens.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54926:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54927:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54927:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the 1980's and early 1990's, Paul Glover was the Vice President and General Counsel of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union. Ultimately, Glover was convicted of federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion, among other things, after using his control over the union's investments to enrich himself through kickbacks. Glover's probation officer, in his pre-sentence investigation report, recommended that Glover's federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion convictions be grouped under the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual section 3D1.2, which allows the grouping of counts involving substantially the same harm. The Federal Government objected to the grouping and the District Court agreed. Glover's offense level was thus increased by two levels, resulting in an increased sentence of between 6 and 21 months. Glover's counsel did not pursue the grouping issue on appeal. Glover then filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his counsel's failure to pursue the issue was ineffective assistance, without which his offense level would have been lower. The District Court denied Glover's motion, concluding that a 6 to 21 month sentencing increase was not significant enough to establish prejudice under the test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington. Thus, the court denied his ineffective-assistance claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54927:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54927:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54927:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Court of appeals erred in engrafting onto the prejudice branch of the Strickland test the requirement that any increase in sentence must meet a standard of significance. Thus, the denial of Glover's motion to correct his sentence was reversed and remanded. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the Court of Appeals erred \"because there is no obvious dividing line by which to measure how much longer a sentence must be for the increase to constitute substantial prejudice. ... Although the amount by which a defendant's sentence is increased by a particular decision may be a factor to consider in determining whether counsel's performance in failing to argue the point constitutes ineffective assistance, ...it cannot serve as a bar to a showing of prejudice.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54927:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54928:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54928:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Johnny Paul Penry had been sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment after finding that Texas' special issues questions did not permit the jury to consider mitigating evidence involving his mental retardation. On retrial in 1990, Penry was again found guilty of capital murder. The defense again put on extensive evidence regarding Penry's mental impairments. Ultimately, a psychiatric evaluation, which stated that Penry would be dangerous to others if released, prepared at the request of Penry's former counsel, was cited. Upon submission to the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury to determine Penry's sentence by answering the same special issues in the original Penry case. Additionally, the trial judge gave a supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence. The court sentenced Penry to death in accordance with the jury's answers to the special issues. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Penry's claims that the admission of language from the psychiatric evaluation violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and that the jury instructions were constitutionally inadequate because they did not permit the jury to consider and give effect to his particular mitigating evidence. Penry's petitions for state and federal habeas corpus relief failed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54928:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54928:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54928:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the supplemental instruction was constitutionally inadequate. \"Any realistic assessment of the manner in which the supplemental instruction operated would therefore lead to the same conclusion we reached in Penry I,\" wrote Justice O'Connor \"'A reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence.'\" Unanimously, the Court held that \"considerable doubt\" that the psychiatric report \"even if erroneous, had a 'substantial and injurious effect'\" on the verdict, meant not overturning the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection of Penry's Fifth Amendment claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54928:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54930:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54930:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEastern Associated Coal Corp. and the United Mine Workers of America are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement with arbitration provisions. Under the agreement, in order for Eastern to discharge an employee, it must prove it has \"just cause,\" or the arbitrator will order the employee reinstated. The arbitrator's decision is final. With this framework in place, James Smith worked for Eastern as a truck driver subject to Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring random drug testing of workers engaged in \"safety-sensitive\" tasks. After Smith tested positive for marijuana use twice, Eastern sought to discharge him. Each time the union went to arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that Smith's positive drug test did not amount to \"just cause\" for discharge and reinstated him conditionally. After the second occurrence, Eastern filed suit to vacate the arbitrator's award. The District Court ordered the award's enforcement, holding that Smith's conditional reinstatement did not violate the strong regulation-based public policy against drug use by workers who perform safety-sensitive functions. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54930:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54930:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54930:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that under Eastern and the United Mine Workers of America collective bargaining agreement, the arbitration award, which required Smith's reinstatement, was not contrary to explicit, well defined, dominant public policy. The public-policy exception to enforcing an arbitrator's award is narrow; thus, the public policy must be \"explicit, well-defined, and dominant,\" explained Justice Breyer, and must be ascertained \"by reference to positive law and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.\" Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54930:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54931:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54931:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSemtek International filed a complaint against Lockheed Martin Corporation in California state court, alleging breach of contract and various business torts. Based on diversity of citizenship, Lockheed Martin moved the case to the District Court. In the District Court, Lockheed Martin successfully moved to dismiss Semtek's claims, as they were barred by California's 2-year statute of limitations. The dismissal was upheld on appeal. Semtek then filed suit in the State Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, alleging the same causes of action. The suit was not time barred under Maryland's 3-year statute of limitations. The court dismissed the case under res judicata. In affirming, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the California federal court's dismissal barred the Maryland complaint because the res judicata effect of federal diversity judgments is prescribed by federal law, under which the earlier dismissal was on the merits and claim-preclusive.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54931:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54931:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54931:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that \"[b]ecause the claim-preclusive effect of a federal court's dismissal 'upon the merits' of a diversity action on state statute-of-limitations grounds is governed by a federal rule, which in turn (in diversity cases) incorporates the claim-preclusion law that would be applied by state courts in the State in which the federal court sits, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the California federal court's dismissal 'upon the merits' necessarily precluded the Maryland state-court action.\" Thus, the District Court's dismissal on the merits of claims as untimely under California law did not preclude Semtek from asserting its claims in a different state court forum.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54931:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54932:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54932:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., a corporate promoter of boxing matches, sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of a rival corporation, alleging that King had conducted his corporation's affairs in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO makes it \"unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise...to conduct or participate...in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.\" The District Court dismissed the complaint. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that RICO applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a \"person\" and a distinct \"enterprise,\" the affairs of which that \"person\" improperly conducts. The court concluded that King was part of the corporation, not a \"person,\" distinct from the \"enterprise,\" who allegedly improperly conducted the \"enterprise's affairs.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54932:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54932:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54932:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that \"the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision...applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner -- whether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority.\" \"The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity,\" wrote Justice Breyer. \"A corporate employee who conducts the corporation's affairs through an unlawful RICO 'pattern...of activity,' uses that corporation as a 'vehicle' whether he is, or is not, its sole owner.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54932:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54933:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54933:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1969, Tuan Ahn Nguyen was born in Saigon, Vietnam to Joseph Boulais and a Vietnamese citizen. At age six, Nguyen became a lawful permanent United States resident. At age 22, Nguyen pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on a child. Subsequently, the Immigration and and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings against Nguyen. After the Immigration Judge ordered Nguyen, Boulais obtained an order of parentage from a state court. Dismissing Nguyen's appeal, the Board of Immigration of Appeals rejected Nguyen's citizenship claim because he had not complied with 8 USC section 1409(a)'s requirements for one born out of wedlock and abroad to a citizen father and a noncitizen mother. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected Nguyen and Boulais argument that section 1409(a) violates equal protection by providing different rules for attainment of citizenship by children born abroad and out of wedlock depending upon whether the one parent with American citizenship is the mother or the father.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54933:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54933:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54933:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Section 1409(a) comports with the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. \"For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established 'at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives,'\" wrote Justice Kennedy. Although the law imposes different requirements on unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers, it does so on the basis of the difference between their relationships to the potential citizen at the time of birth and is justified by two important governmental interests. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, with whom Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined, dissented, noted that \"[n]o one should mistake the majority's analysis for a careful application of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence concerning sex-based classifications.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54933:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54934:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54934:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChristopher Garris' mother filed a complaint in Federal District Court alleging that her son died as the result of injuries he sustained while sandblasting aboard the USNS Maj. Stephen W. Pless. Because the vessel was berthed in the navigable waters of the United States, Garris invoked federal admiralty jurisdiction and sought damages under general maritime law. Garris asserted that the injuries were caused by the negligence of Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corporation. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a federal claim. The court stated that no cause of action exists, under general maritime law, for death resulting from negligence. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that although the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet recognized a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the action was made appropriate by principles contained in precedent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54934:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54934:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54934:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the general maritime cause of action for death caused by violation of maritime duties is available for the negligent breach of a maritime duty of care. \"The general maritime law has recognized the tort of negligence for more than a century, and it has been clear since [Moragne v. States Marine Lines Inc.] that breaches of a maritime duty are actionable when they cause death, as when they cause injury,\" wrote Justice Scalia for the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part, which was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54934:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54935:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54935:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was \"quintessentially religious\", and the activities \"fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'\" Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54935:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54935:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54935:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that \"Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation.\" \"When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,\" wrote Justice Thomas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54935:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54936:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54936:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers to accompany her to her trailer, where she lived with her husband, Charles McArthur, so that they could keep the peace while she removed her belongings. While at the trailer, Tera alerted the officers, Assistant Chief John Love and Officer Richard Skidis, that her husband had marijuana hidden under the couch. Love then asked Charles for permission to search the trailer. Permission was denied and Love sent Officer Skidis with Tera to get a search warrant. Love told Charles he could not reenter his trailer, unless a police officer accompanied him. Afterwards, Love stood just inside the door to observe Charles when he went into the trailer. About two hours later, a search warrant was obtained. Subsequently, a search of the trailer transpired and officers found drug paraphernalia and marijuana. Charles McArthur was arrested. At trial, McArthur moved to suppress the drug paraphernalia and marijuana on the ground that they were the \"fruit\" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter the trailer unaccompanied, which would have permitted him, he said, to \"have destroyed the marijuana.\" The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court denied the state's petition for leave to appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54936:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54936:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54936:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that given the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interest at stake, the brief seizure of the premises was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. \"We have found no case in which this Court has held unlawful a temporary seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period of time,\" wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens noted he would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54936:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54937:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54937:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1991, P. D. W. & A., Inc., an insolvent corporation taxed under Subchapter S, excluded its entire discharge of indebtedness amount from its gross income. David Gitlitz and other shareholders were assessed tax deficiencies because they used the untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their basis in S corporation stock and to deduct suspended losses. Ultimately, the Tax Court held that Gitlitz and others could not use an S corporation's untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their basis in corporate stock. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the discharge of indebtedness amount first had to be used to reduce certain tax attributes of the S corporation and that only the leftover amount could be used to increase their basis. In so holding, the court assumed that the excluded discharge of indebtedness is an item of income subject to passthrough to shareholders.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54937:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54937:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54937:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that excluded discharged debt is an \"item of income,\" which passes through to shareholders and increases their bases in an S corporation's stock and that pass-through is performed before the reduction of an S corporation's tax attributes. Justice Thomas wrote that the Code \"simply does not say that discharge of indebtedness ceases to be an item of income when the S corporation is insolvent. Instead it provides only that discharge of indebtedness ceases to be included in gross income.\" \"In order to determine the 'tax imposed,' an S corporation shareholder must adjust his basis in his corporate stock and pass through all items of income and loss. Consequently, the attribute reduction must be made after the basis adjustment and pass-through,\" continued Justice Thomas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54937:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54938:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54938:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Texas law, it is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver to fail to secure any small child riding in front. In 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her truck in Lago Vista. Neither of Atwater's children, who were sitting in the front seat, was wearing seatbelts. Lago Vista policeman Bart Turek observed the violations and pulled Atwater over. Ultimately, Atwater was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released on bond. Atwater then filed suit alleging that Turek's actions had violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In granting the city summary judgment, the District Court ruled the claim meritless. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes because no one disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and there was no evidence the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Atwater's privacy interests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54938:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54938:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54938:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. \"If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender,\" wrote Justice Souter for the Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissenting opinion argued that the Court's decision \"neglects the Fourth Amendment's express command in the name of administrative ease\" and thus \"cloaks the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle of reasonableness.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54938:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54939:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54939:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1873, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe agreed to relinquish all claims to its aboriginal lands outside the bounds of a more substantial reservation that U.S. negotiators agreed to set apart for the tribe's exclusive use. The reservation included part of the St. Joe River and virtually all of the Lake Coeur d'Alene. President Grant set the land aside in an 1873 Executive Order. In 1891, Congress ratified agreements in which the Tribe agreed to cede its rights to all land except that within the Executive Order reservation, and the Government promised to compensate the Tribe and agreed to hold the land forever as Indian land and the Tribe agreed to cede the reservation's northern portion, including two-thirds of the lake, for compensation. The United States initiated an action against Idaho to quiet title in the United States, in trust for the Tribe, to the submerged lands within the current reservation. The District Court quieted title in the United States as trustee, and the Tribe as beneficiary, to the bed and banks of the lake and the river within the reservation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54939:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54939:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54939:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the National Government holds title, in trust for the Tribe, to lands underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that \"Congress recognized the full extent of the Executive Order reservation lying within the stated boundaries it ultimately confirmed, and intended to bar passage to Idaho of title to the submerged lands at issue here.\" Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, with whom Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas joined, dissented. \"Congress' desire to divest an entering State of its sovereign interest in submerged lands must be 'definitely declared or otherwise made very plain,'\" argued Chief Justice Rehnquist, \"That standard has not been met here.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54939:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54940:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54940:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1982, when Congress extended Medicare to federal employees, then-sitting federal judges began to have Medicare taxes withheld from their salaries. In 1983, Congress then required federal judges to participate in Social Security, except for those who contributed to a \"covered\" retirement program. A \"covered\" program was defined to include any retirement system to which an employee had to contribute, which did not encompass the noncontributory pension system for federal judges, whose financial obligations and payroll deductions therefore had to increase. A group of federal judges, who were appointed before 1983, filed suit arguing that the 1983 law violated the Constitution's Compensation Clause, which guarantees federal judges a \"Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.\" Ultimately, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that a 1984 judicial salary increase cured any violation. In reversing, the Federal Circuit held that the Compensation Clause prevented the government from collecting Medicare and Social Security taxes from the judges and that the violation was not cured by the 1984 pay increase.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54940:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54940:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54940:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Compensation Clause prevents the government from collecting Social Security taxes from federal judges who held office before Congress extended those taxes to federal employees and that the Compensation Clause violation was not cured by the 1984 pay increase for federal judges. In a 5-2 split, the Court held that the Government could collect Medicare taxes from the same class of judges. On the Medicare question, Justice Breyer, wrote that \"this Court has held that the Legislature cannot directly reduce judicial salaries even as part of an equitable effort to reduce all Government salaries. But a tax law, unlike a law mandating a salary reduction, affects compensation indirectly, not directly. And those prophylactic considerations that may justify an absolute rule forbidding direct salary reductions are absent here, where indirect taxation is at issue.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54940:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54941:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54941:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn unidentified person intercepted and recorded a phone call between the chief union negotiator and the union president (the petitioners) during collective-bargaining negotiations involving a teachers' union and the local school board. After a teacher-favorable proposal was accepted, a radio commentator played a tape of the intercepted conversation. Petitioners filed suit under both federal and state wiretapping laws, alleging that an unknown person using an electronic device had surreptitiously intercepted their telephone conversation. Rejecting a First Amendment protection defense, the District Court concluded, in part, that the statutes were content-neutral laws of general applicability containing \"no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech.\" Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the statutes invalid because they deterred significantly more speech than necessary to protect the private interests at stake.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54941:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54941:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54941:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications by parties who did not participate in the illegal interception. \"In this case, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance,\" wrote Justice Stevens. \"[A] stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.\" Noting that the negotiations were a matter of public interest, Justice Stevens wrote that the \"debate may be more mundane than the Communist rhetoric that inspired Justice Brandeis' classic opinion in Whitney v. California, but it is no less worthy of constitutional protection.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54941:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54944:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54944:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Indian Regulatory Gaming Act provides that Internal Revenue Code provisions \"(including sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and chapter 35() concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes\" with respect to gambling operations shall apply to Indian tribes in the same way as they apply to States. Chapter 35 imposes taxes from which it exempts certain state-controlled gambling activities, but says nothing about tax reporting or withholding. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, in a lawsuit, claimed that the Gaming Act subsection's explicit parenthetical reference exempts them from paying those chapter 35 taxes from which the States are exempt. Rejecting that claim, the Court of Appeals ultimately held that the subsection applies only to Code provisions concerning tax withholding and reporting.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54944:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54944:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54944:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Indian Regulatory Gaming Act does not create such an exemption. The Court reasoned that despite its parenthetical reference, the language outside the parenthetical was unambiguous and the subsection applied only to Internal Revenue Code provisions that concerned the reporting and withholding of taxes. The language inside the parenthetical was meant simply to be illustrative. Moreover, the Court noted that when Congress enacts a tax exemption, it ordinarily does so explicitly. \"We can find no comparable instance in which Congress legislated an exemption through an inexplicit numerical cross-reference -- especially a cross-reference that might easily escape notice,\" wrote Justice Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54944:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54946:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54946:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAkos Swierkiewicz, a 53-year-old native of Hungary, began working for Sorema N. A., a reinsurance company principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation, in 1989. Six years later, the Chief Executive Officer, a French national, demoted Swierkiewicz from the position of senior vice president and chief underwriting officer to a marketing and services position with fewer responsibilities. A younger French national was promoted to Swierkiewicz's old position. Swierkiewicz filed suit, alleging that he had been fired on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,and on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In dismissing the case, the District Court found that Swierkiewicz had not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he had not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent requiring an employment discrimination complaint to allege facts constituting a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54946:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54946:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54946:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an employment discrimination complaint need not include specific facts establishing a prima facie case under the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and instead must contain only \"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,\" pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Thomas noted that the prima facie case operates as a flexible evidentiary standard and not a pleading requirement for discrimination cases. \"Under the Second Circuit's heightened pleading standard, a plaintiff without direct evidence of discrimination at the time of his complaint must plead a prima facie case of discrimination, even though discovery might uncover such direct evidence,\" wrote Justice Thomas. \"It thus seems incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is discovered.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54946:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54947:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54947:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. terminated Ella Williams, citing her poor attendance record. Subsequently, claiming to be disabled from performing her automobile assembly line job by carpal tunnel syndrome and related impairments, Williams sued Toyota for failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Granting Toyota summary judgment, the District Court held that Williams's impairment did not qualify as a disability under the ADA because it had not substantially limited any major life activity and that there was no evidence that Williams had had a record of a substantially limiting impairment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the impairments substantially limited Williams in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. Because her ailments prevented her from doing the tasks associated with certain types of manual jobs that require the gripping of tools and repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time, the appellate court concluded that Williams demonstrated that her manual disability involved a class of manual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54947:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54947:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54947:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not apply the proper standard in making its determination because it analyzed only a limited class of manual tasks and failed to ask whether Williams's impairments prevented or restricted her from performing tasks that are of central importance to most people's daily lives. The Court also reasoned that for the purposes of the ADA, an impairment's impact must also be permanent or long-term. \"Given large potential differences in the severity and duration of the effects of carpal tunnel syndrome, an individual's carpal tunnel syndrome diagnosis, on its own, does not indicate whether the individual has a disability within the meaning of the ADA,\" wrote Justice O'Connor for the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54947:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54948:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54948:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1990, Robert Barnett injured his back while working in a cargo-handling position at US Airways. Invoking his seniority rights, Barnett transferred to a less physically demanding position in the mailroom. Subsequently, Barnett's new position became open to seniority-based employee bidding under US Airways' seniority system and, ultimately, he lost his job. Barnett then filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against \"an individual with a disability\" who with \"reasonable accommodation\" can perform a job's essential functions unless the employer \"can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business.\" In granting US Airways summary judgment, the District Court found that altering a seniority system would result in an \"undue hardship\" to both US Airways and its nondisabled employees. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the seniority system was merely a factor in the undue hardship analysis and that a case-by-case, fact intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular assignment would constitute an undue hardship.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54948:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54948:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54948:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the ADA did not require the employer to assign the employee to the mailroom position in violation of the established seniority system. The Court reasoned that an employer's showing that a requested accommodation conflicts with seniority rules is ordinarily sufficient to show that an accommodation is not reasonable. However, the Court added, an employee remains free to present evidence of special circumstances that makes a seniority rule exception reasonable in the particular case. Justice Antonin Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, argued that the accommodation provision of the ADA requires the suspension, within reason, of employment rules and practices that an employee's disability prevents him from observing. Also dissenting, Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that US Airways failed to establish any burden brought on by accommodating Barnett.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54948:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54949:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54949:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, an explosion on board Mallard Bay Drilling Rig 52, a oil and gas exploration barge, killed or injured several workers while the barge was drilling a well in Louisiana's territorial waters. The Coast Guard's subsequent investigation did not accuse Mallard of anything, but did note that the barge was not an \"inspected vessel\" subject to comprehensive Coast Guard regulation. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) then cited Mallard for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act) of 1970. Mallard challenged OSHA's jurisdiction to issue the citations on the grounds that Rig 52 was not a \"workplace\" under section 4(a) of the Act and that section 4(b)(1) of the Act pre-empted OSHA jurisdiction because the Coast Guard had exclusive authority to prescribe and enforce occupational safety and health standards on vessels such as Rig 52. Rejecting both arguments, an Administrative Law Judge found that Rig 52 was a \"workplace\" under the Act and held that the Coast Guard had not pre-empted OSHA's jurisdiction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Coast Guard's exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of seamen's working conditions aboard vessels such as Rig 52 precluded OSHA's regulation under section 4(b)(1), and that this pre-emption encompassed both inspected and uninspected vessels.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54949:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54949:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54949:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that OSHA had jurisdiction under the Act to issue the citations. The Court reasoned that section 4(b)(1) did not pre-empt, in favor of Coast Guard jurisdiction, OSHA jurisdiction over the barge, as the Coast Guard had not exercised its authority over the barge because the Guard has neither affirmatively regulated the working conditions at issue, nor asserted comprehensive regulatory jurisdiction over working conditions on uninspected vessels. \"Mere possession by another federal agency of unexercised authority to regulate certain working conditions is insufficient to displace OSHA's jurisdiction,\" wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Antonin Scalia took no part in the decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54949:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54950:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54950:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) exempts \"compounded drugs,\" or drugs in which a pharmacist or doctor has combined, mixed, or altered ingredients to create a medication tailored to an individual patient's needs, from the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) standard drug approval requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), so long as the providers of the compounded drugs abide by several restrictions. The restrictions included that the prescription be unsolicited and that the providers not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug. A group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs sought to enjoin enforcement of the advertising and solicitation provisions, arguing that they violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Agreeing, the District Court held that the provisions constituted unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government had not demonstrated that the restrictions would directly advance its interests or that alternatives less restrictive of speech were unavailable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54950:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54950:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54950:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the FDAMA's provisions amounted to unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Among other findings, the Court reasoned that, although the speech restrictions allegedly served governmental interests in permitting drug compounding while guaranteeing that compounding was not conducted on such a scale as to undermine the drug approval process, it had not been demonstrated that the speech restrictions were not more extensive than necessary to serve such interests. Justice Thomas Clarence filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, filed a dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54950:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54951:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54951:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile Larry Dean Dusenbery was in prison on federal drug charges, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began an administrative process to forfeit cash that officers seized when they executed a search warrant for the residence where he was arrested. The FBI sought to notify Dusenbery by sending certified mail addressed to him care of the federal correctional institution where he was incarcerated; to the address of the residence where he was arrested; and to an address in the town where his mother lived. The FBI received no response in the time allotted and turned over the cash to the United States Marshals Service. When Dusenbery moved for the return of all the property and funds seized in his criminal case, the District Court denied the motion. On remand, the District Court ruled that the Government's sending of notice by certified mail to Dusenbery's place of incarceration satisfied his due process rights as to the cash. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54951:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54951:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54951:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the FBI's notice of the cash forfeiture satisfied due process. The Court reasoned that the means employed to provide notice to the prisoner were reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the prisoner of the forfeiture. The prisoner did not actually have to receive the notice, noted Chief Justice Rehnquist. \"The Government could, for example, have allowed [Dusenbery] to make an escorted visit to the post office himself in order to sign for his letter. But the Due Process Clause does not require such heroic efforts by the Government; it requires only that the Government's effort be 'reasonably calculated' to apprise a party of the pendency of the action.\" Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the Court was condoning a procedure that was too lax to reliably insure that a prisoner would receive a legal notice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54951:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54952:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54952:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Florida Power Corporation (FPC) operated as a publicly-regulated electric utility monopoly until 1992, when Congress opened the industry to competition through the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Between 1992 and 1996, FPR terminated Wanda Adams and others during a series of reorganizations the company stated were necessary to maintain its competitiveness. Members of the Adams class sued FPC, claiming that FPC discriminated against them because of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In 1996, the District Court conditionally certified a class of former FPC employees claiming age discrimination. In 1999, the court decertified the class and ruled as a matter of law that a disparate impact theory of liability is not available to plaintiffs bringing suit under the ADEA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54952:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54952:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54952:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court did not answer the question. In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54952:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54953:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54953:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOhio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. In the 1999-2000 school year 82 percent of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation and 96 percent of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54953:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54953:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54953:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the program does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that, because Ohio's program is part of Ohio's general undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children, government aid reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients and the incidental advancement of a religious mission, or any perceived endorsement, is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the government. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the \"Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a program of true private choice.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54953:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54954:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54954:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBeginning in 1972, Mario Echazabal worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. When Echazabal applied for a job directly with Chevron, the company's physical examination revealed he had a liver condition, the cause identified as Hepatitis C. Chevron's doctors said that the condition would be exacerbated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. In response to Chevron's request that the refinery reassign Echazabal to a job without exposure to toxins or remove him, the contractor employing him laid him off. Echazabal filed suit, claiming that Chevron's action violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Under an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation that permits the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health, Chevron defended its action. The District Court granted Chevron summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the regulation exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54954:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54954:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54954:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the ADA did not preclude the EEOC's regulation allowing the harm-to-self defense. The Court reasoned that deference applied to the regulation because it made sense of the statutory defense for qualification standards that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. The Court also found that the risk of violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) was enough to show that the regulation was permissible. \"Although there may be an open question whether an employer would actually be liable under OSHA for hiring an individual who knowingly consented to the particular dangers the job would pose to him, there is no denying that the employer would be asking for trouble: his decision to hire would put Congress's policy in the ADA, a disabled individual's right to operate on equal terms within the workplace, at loggerheads with the competing policy of OSHA, to ensure the safety of 'each and 'every worker,\" wrote Justice Souter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54954:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54957:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54957:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, provides that each \"public housing agency shall utilize leases...providing that...any drug-related criminal activity on or off [federally assisted low-income housing] premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.\" Paragraph 9(m) of the leases of the tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) obligates them to \"assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not engage in?any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises.\" After the relations of four tenants were linked to drug activity, OHA instituted state-court eviction proceedings against respondents, alleging violations of lease paragraph 9(m) by a member of each tenant's household or a guest. The tenants filed an action, arguing that the Act does not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of the \"innocent\" tenants. The District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction against OHA was affirmed by an en banc Court of Appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54957:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54957:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54957:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, \"Congress' decision not to impose any qualification in the statute, combined with its use of the term 'any' to modify 'drug-related criminal activity,' precludes any knowledge requirement.\" The Chief Justice also noted that it was reasonable for Congress to permit no-fault evictions in order to provide public housing that was decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54957:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54958:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54958:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn filing suit against a group of unions, BE&K Construction Company alleged that the unions had engaged in lobbying, litigation, and other concerted activities in order to delay a project it had been hired for because it employed nonunion workers. After BE&K lost on or withdrew each of its claims, the National Labor Relations Board issued an administrative complaint, alleging that BE&K, by filing and maintaining its lawsuit, had violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibits employers from restraining, coercing, or interfering with employees' exercise of rights related to self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities. Finding that the lawsuit was filed to retaliate against the unions, whose conduct was protected under the NLRA, the Board ordered BE&K to cease and desist from prosecuting such suits. In granting the Board's enforcement petition, the Court of Appeals held that because the Judiciary had already found BE&K's claims against the unions unmeritorious or dismissed, evidence of a simple retaliatory motive sufficed to adjudge BE&K of committing an unfair labor practice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54958:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54958:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54958:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Board lacked authority to assess liability under the standard of prosecuting an unsuccessful suit with a retaliatory motive. The Court reasoned that the Board's definition of a retaliatory suit as one brought with a motive to interfere with the exercise of protected NLRA rights covers a substantial amount of genuine petitioning. \"Because there is nothing in the statutory text indicating that [the NLRA] must be read to reach all reasonably based but unsuccessful suits filed with a retaliatory purpose, we decline to do so. Because the Board's standard for imposing liability under the NLRA allows it to penalize such suits, its standard is thus invalid,\" wrote Justice O'Connor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54958:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54959:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54959:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1987, Charles Zandford, a securities broker, persuaded William Wood to open a joint investment account for himself and his mentally retarded daughter. The Woods gave Zandford discretion to manage the account and a general power of attorney to engage in securities transactions without their prior approval. After Wood died, all of the money that he had invested was gone. Subsequently, Zandford was indicted on federal wire fraud charges for selling securities in the Woods' account and making personal use of the proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also filed a civil complaint, alleging that Zandford had violated section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rule 10b-5 by engaging in a scheme to defraud the Woods and misappropriating their securities without their knowledge or consent. After Zandford's conviction in the criminal case, the District Court granted the SEC summary judgment in the civil case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint, holding that neither the criminal conviction nor the allegations in the complaint established that Zandford's fraud was in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54959:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54959:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54959:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that assuming that the complaint's allegations were true, the securities broker's conduct was in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Noting that Zandford's practices were not independent events, the Court found that each sale was made to further his fraudulent scheme and that each was deceptive because it was neither authorized by, nor disclosed to, the Woods. Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded, the stockbroker's breaches of fiduciary duty were in connection with the securities sales, within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, because the securities transactions and breaches of fiduciary duty coincided.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54959:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54960:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54960:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJennifer Harbury, a United States citizen, is the widow of Efrain Bamaca- Velasquez, a Guatemalan rebel leader. Harbury alleged that Government officials intentionally deceived her in concealing information that her husband had been executed by Guatemalan army officers paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Harbury also alleged that this deception denied her access to the courts by leaving her without information, or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit that might have saved her husband's life. Harbury filed suit, listing 28 causes of action, for the violation of her constitutional right of access to courts. With respect to the access-to-courts counts, the District Court held that Harbury had not stated a valid cause of action. Given that she had not filed a prior suit, the court reasoned that she could only guess how the alleged cover-up might have prejudiced her rights to bring a separate action and that the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed only the dismissal of one of Harbury's claims for denial of access to courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54960:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54960:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54960:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Harbury had not stated a claim for denial of judicial access. The Court reasoned that Harbury's complaint failed to identify the underlying cause of action for relief that she would have raised had it not been for the alleged deception. Moreover, the Court noted that Harbury's informal amendment accepted by the Court of Appeals failed to seek any relief presently available for denial of access to courts that would be unavailable otherwise. \"It is true that [Harbury] cannot obtain in any present tort action the order she would have sought before her husband's death, the order that might have saved her husband's life. But neither can she obtain any such order on her access claim, which therefore cannot recompense Harbury for the unique loss she claims as a consequence of her inability to bring an intentional-infliction action earlier,\" wrote Justice Souter. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54960:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54961:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54961:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder 42 USC section 406(b), an attorney who successfully represents a Social Security benefits claimant in court may be awarded a reasonable fee not in excess of 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimant, payable out of the amount of the past-due benefits. After three individuals prevailed on their claims for Social Security disability benefits and successfully sought attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, their attorneys were to collect 25 percent of all past-due benefits recovered from each claimant, pursuant to contingent-fee agreements. In each case, the District Court declined to give effect to the attorney-client fee agreement, instead employing a \"lodestar\" method, under which the number of hours reasonably devoted to each case was multiplied by the reasonable hourly fee. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54961:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54961:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54961:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, section 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements. The Court reasoned that, because section 406(b) was enacted at a time when contingent fee agreements were prevalent in Social Security cases and before the lodestar method of calculating fees was developed, section 406 was intended to prohibit only unreasonable contingent fee agreements and reasonable agreements remained enforceable. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54961:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54962:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54962:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. Two Tecumseh High School students and their parents brought suit, alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted the School District summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem, which the School District had failed to demonstrate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54962:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54962:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54962:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, because the policy reasonably serves the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students, it is constitutional. The Court reasoned that the Board of Education's general regulation of extracurricular activities diminished the expectation of privacy among students and that the Board's method of obtaining urine samples and maintaining test results was minimally intrusive on the students' limited privacy interest. \"Within the limits of the Fourth Amendment, local school boards must assess the desirability of drug testing schoolchildren. In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no opinion as to its wisdom. Rather, we hold only that Tecumseh's Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren,\" wrote Justice Thomas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54962:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54963:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54963:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe spousal impoverishment provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA) permit a spouse living at home to reserve certain income and assets to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs he or she will have when the other spouse is institutionalized, usually in a nursing home, and becomes eligible for Medicaid. The MCCA's resource allocation rules provide that, in determining the institutionalized spouse's Medicaid eligibility, a portion of the couple's resources, called the \"community spouse resource allowance\" (CSRA), shall be reserved for the benefit of the community spouse. The MCCA allows an increase in the standard allowance if either spouse shows, at a state-administered hearing, that the community spouse will not be able to maintain the statutorily defined minimum level of income on which to live after the institutionalized spouse gains Medicaid eligibility. In 1996, after entering a Wisconsin nursing home, Irene Blumer applied for Medicaid through her husband Burnett and ultimately sought a higher CSRA. Under the \"income-first\" method for determining whether the community spouse is entitled to a higher CSRA, which Wisconsin uses, the State considers first whether potential income transfers from the institutionalized spouse will suffice to enable the community spouse to meet monthly needs once the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid. Subsequently, an examiner denied Blumer's request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State's income-first statute conflicted with the MCCA, which, the appeals court held, unambiguously mandates the resources-first method.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54963:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54963:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54963:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the income-first method qualified as a permissible interpretation of the MCCA. The Court reasoned that neither the text not the structure of the MCCA barred Wisconsin's use of the income-first method. Among the Court's findings were that that income-first method did not render meaningless the MCCA's key prohibition against deeming income of the community spouse available to the institutionalized spouse and that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who possessed the authority to prescribe standards relevant to the issue at hand, had declared in a proposed rule that the Federal Government ought to leave to states the decision whether to use the income-first method or the resources-first method. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54963:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54964:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54964:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter convicting William Kelly for murder, a South Carolina jury was asked to determine whether any aggravating factors had been shown and, if so, to recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment. During sentencing, the prosecutor presented testimony that Kelly had taken part in an escape attempt with plans to hold a female guard hostage; provided evidence of Kelly's sadism and his desires to kill anyone who irritated him; and spoke of Kelly as a \"butcher,\" \"bloody,\" and \"dangerous.\" Relying on the holding of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, that when \"a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death...is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant 'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility,'\" Kelly's counsel requested a jury instruction stating that Kelly would be ineligible for parole if he received a life sentence. In refusing, the trial court said that the State's evidence went to Kelly's character and characteristics, not to future dangerousness. The jury recommended a death sentence. In affirming the sentence, the State Supreme Court held Simmons inapposite because state law provided the jury with a third sentencing alternative and future dangerousness was not at issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54964:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54964:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54964:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Kelly was entitled to a jury instruction that he would be ineligible for parole under a life sentence. The Court reasoned that the Simons rule was applicable because under South Carolina's sentencing scheme, although a defendant charged with murder carrying the possibility of a death sentence could receive a sentence less than life imprisonment, a jury's only alternatives were to recommend death or life without parole, if the jury found the existence of an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, the Court found that the assertion that the defendant's future dangerousness was not at issue was unsupportable on the record.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54964:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54966:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54966:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, \"that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period.\" The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54966:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54966:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54966:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held, according to Argersinger, that a suspended sentence that may \"end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty\" may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded \"the guiding hand of counsel\" in the prosecution for the crime charged. The Court reasoned that, because the invocation of the suspended incarceration would constitute a prison term imposed for the assault offense of which defendant was convicted without the assistance of counsel, the Constitution required the provision of counsel. Justice Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that the Court's prior decisions emphasized actual imprisonment as the touchstone of entitlement to appointed counsel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54966:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54967:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54967:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA few years before his release, prison officials ordered Robert Lile, who was convicted of rape, to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an \"Admission of Responsibility\" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from SATP participants is not privileged. By refusing to participate, a prisoner's privileges are reduced. Lile refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The District Court granted Lile summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the compelled self-incrimination can be established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. The appellate court concluded that the SATP could treat inmate admissions as privileged.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54967:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54967:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54967:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the SATP serves a vital penological purpose, and that offering inmates minimal incentives to participate does not amount to compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Filing an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, while noting that the Court was divided over the standard for evaluating compulsion for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a prison setting, agreed that Lile's argument was unpersuasive. Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Fifth Amendment's text does not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person's refusal to incriminate himself; it prohibits only the compulsion of such testimony. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined, arguing that the Court's decision \"characterized a threatened harm as 'a minimal incentive.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54967:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54968:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54968:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSouth Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (Maritime Services), asked the South Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) five times for permission to berth a cruise ship, the M/V Tropic Sea, at the SCSPA's port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina. Some cruises offered by Maritime Services would allow passengers to participate in gambling activities while on board. The SCSPA repeatedly denied Maritime Services' requests, contending that it had an established policy of denying berths in the Port of Charleston to vessels whose primary purpose was gambling. Maritime Services file a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), arguing that SCSPA violated the Shipping Act by its denials. The complaint was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found that the SCSPA, as an arm of the State of South Carolina, was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus dismissed the complaint. Reversing on its own motion, the FMC concluded that state sovereign immunity covers proceedings before judicial tribunals, not Executive Branch agencies. In reversing, Court of Appeals fund that the proceedings were an adjudication and thus subject to state sovereign immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54968:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54968:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54968:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that state sovereign immunity bars the FMC from adjudicating a private party's complaint against a nonconsenting State. Historically, the Court noted, states were not subject to private suits in administrative adjudications when the Constitution was adopted, and states were thus presumptively immune from such actions. Moreover, the Court pointed to the similarities between the FMC's proceedings and civil litigation to conclude that there was no basis for distinguishing between the actions for purposes of sovereign immunity. \"Although the Framers likely did not envision the intrusion on state sovereignty at issue in today's case, we are nonetheless confident that it is contrary to their constitutional design,\" wrote Justice Thomas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54968:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54969:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54969:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Virginia jury convicted Walter Mickens, Jr., of the premeditated murder of Timothy Hall during or following the commission of an attempted forcible sodomy and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mickens filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest at trial - his lead attorney, Bryan Saunders, had represented Hall on criminal charges at the time of the murder. Saunders had not disclosed to the court, his co-counsel, or Mickens that he had represented Hall. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals rejected MIckens's argument that the juvenile court judge's failure to inquire into a potential conflict either mandated automatic reversal of his conviction or relieved him of the burden of showing that a conflict of interest adversely affected his representation. Subsequently, the appellate court concluded that Mickens had not demonstrated adverse effect.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54969:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54969:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54969:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation in such a situation, a defendant must establish that a conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance. The Court rejected Mickens's argument that where the trial judge neglects a duty to inquire into a potential conflict the defendant, to obtain reversal, need only show that his lawyer was subject to a conflict of interest, not that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. In doing so, the Court noted that a defendant alleging ineffective assistance generally must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54969:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54971:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54971:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRush Prudential HMO, Inc., a health maintenance organization that provides medical services for employee welfare benefits plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), denied Debra Moran's request to have surgery by an unaffiliated specialist. Under the Illinois HMO Act (Act), which provides that \"in the event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary,\" the HMO \"shall provide\" the service, Moran made a written demand for an independent medical review of her claim. After Rush refused her demand, Moran sued in state court to compel compliance with the Act. The court ordered the review, which found the treatment necessary. While the suit was pending, Moran had the surgery and amended her complaint to seek reimbursement. Rush removed the case to federal court, arguing that the amended complaint stated a claim for ERISA benefits. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found Moran's reimbursement claim preempted by ERISA so as to place the case in federal court, but it concluded that the Act was not preempted as a state law that \"relates to\" an employee benefit plan because it also \"regulates insurance\" under ERISA's saving clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54971:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54971:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54971:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that ERISA does not preempt the Illinois HMO Act. Under its common-sense view of the matter, the Court reasoned that, because HMOs are risk-bearing organizations subject to state insurance regulation and almost universally regulated as insurers under state law, \"the Illinois HMO Act is a law 'directed toward' the insurance industry and an 'insurance regulation'\" and is, thus, saved from preemption under ERISA's saving clause. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that ERISA's civil enforcement provision provides the exclusive means for actions asserting a claim for benefits under health plans governed by ERISA and therefore state laws that create additional remedies are preempted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54971:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54972:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54972:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Chicago Park District is responsible for operating public parks and other public property in Chicago. Pursuant to its authority, the Park District adopted an ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events in public parks. The ordinance provides that the Park District may deny a permit on any of 13 specified grounds, must process applications within 28 days, and must explain its reasons for a denial. An unsuccessful applicant may appeal, first, to the Park District's general superintendent and then to state court. The Windy City Hemp Development Board applied on several occasions for permits to hold rallies advocating the legalization of marijuana. Some permits were granted and others were denied. Ultimately, the Board filed suit, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. The District Court granted the Park District summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54972:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54972:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54972:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the First Amendment free speech guarantee does not require the Park District to initiate litigation every time the agency denied a permit for an event or specify a deadline for judicial review of a challenge to the denial of a permit. The Court reasoned that the licensing scheme was not based on subject-matter censorship, but rather content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of the use of a public forum thus making the ordinance constitutional. \"On balance, we think the permissive nature of the ordinance furthers, rather than constricts, free speech,\" wrote Justice Scalia for the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54972:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54975:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54975:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, held that strict scrutiny governs whether race-based classifications violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (Adarand I). The Court then remanded the case for a determination whether the race-based components of the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program could withstand this standard of review. Ultimately, the Court remanded Adarand for a second time for a determination on the merits consistent with Adarand I. When the Court of Appeals held, that by virtue of a new regulatory framework under which the DOT's state and local DBE program now operated, that program passed constitutional muster, the Court again certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard announced in Adarand I.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54975:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54975:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54975:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. After Adarand asserted that it was only challenging the rules pertaining to the direct procurement of DOT funds for highway construction on federal lands rather than any part of the DOT's DBE program as it pertained to state and local procurement, the Court concluded that the posture of the case had changed. The Court reasoned that such a shift required dismissal as it had not been addressed whether the various race-based programs applicable to such direct procurement could satisfy strict scrutiny and that reaching the merits of such a challenge would require a threshold examination whether the company had standing to challenge such direct-procurement provisions, which was not in the writ of certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54975:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54976:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54976:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWaffle House, Inc.'s employees must each sign an agreement requiring employment disputes to be settled by binding arbitration. After he suffered a seizure and was fired by Waffle House, Eric Baker filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that his discharge violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The EEOC then filed suit, alleging that Baker?s discharge violated the ADA, and sought injunctive relief and specific relief for Baker, including backpay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages, and punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Waffle House petitioned to stay the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration. The District Court did not stay the action. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House did not foreclose the enforcement action because the EEOC was not a party to the contract, but had independent statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court where venue was proper. The appellate court also held that the EEOC was limited to injunctive relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54976:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54976:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54976:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the arbitration agreement did not bar the EEOC from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief in an ADA enforcement action. The Court reasoned that the EECO's statutory enforcement powers unambiguously authorized the EEOC to obtain the relief that it sought in its complaint, if it could prove its case against the employer. The Court further noted that no language existed to suggest that an arbitration agreement between private parties materially changed the EEOC's statutory function or the remedies otherwise available. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54976:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54978:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54978:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1992, a car accident rendered Janette Knudson a quadriplegic. At that time, Knudson was covered by the Health and Welfare Plan for Employees and Dependents of Earth Systems, Inc. (the Plan), which covered $411,157.11 of her medical expenses, most of which were paid by Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. The Plan contains a reimbursement provision, which gives it the right to recover from a beneficiary any payment for benefits paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third party. After Knudson filed a state-court tort action to recover from the manufacturer of her car and others, she negotiated a settlement that earmarked $13,828.70 to satisfy Great-West's reimbursement claim. Great-West then filed an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to enforce the Plan's reimbursement provision by requiring Knudson to pay the Plan $411,157.11 of any proceeds recovered from third parties. The District Court granted Knudson summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that that judicially decreed reimbursement for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third party is not equitable relief authorized by ERISA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54978:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54978:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54978:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that because Great-West is seeking legal relief - the imposition of personal liability on Knudson for a contractual obligation to pay money - ERISA does not authorize this action. The Court reasoned that the suit, which sought relief under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, was not authorized under ERISA's catch-all provision authorizing equitable relief because the claim was for a legal remedy, or monetary damages. Justice Scalia wrote that \"an injunction to compel the payment of money past due under a contract, or specific performance of a past due monetary obligation, was not typically available in equity.\" Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed dissents. Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer joined in Justice Ginsburg's dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54978:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54979:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54979:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to file his petition within one year after his state conviction becomes final, but excludes from that period the time during which an application for state collateral review is pending. In 1990, Tony Saffold was convicted and sentenced in California state court for murder, assault with a firearm, and robbery. Saffold filed a state habeas petition in California seven days before the federal deadline. Five days after the state trial court denied his petition, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Court of Appeal. Four and one-half months after that petition was denied, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Supreme Court, which denied the petition on the merits and for lack of diligence. The Federal District Court dismissed Saffold's subsequent federal habeas petition as untimely, finding that the federal statute of limitations was not tolled during the intervals between the denial of one state petition and the filing of the next because no application was pending during that time. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Saffold's petition was timely because the State Supreme Court based its decision not only on lack of diligence, but also on the merits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54979:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54979:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54979:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that, as used in AEDPA, \"pending\" covers the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court. The Court also held that the same rule applies to California's unique collateral review system, a system that does not involve a notice of appeal, but rather the filing within a reasonable time of a further original state habeas petition in a higher court. The Court reasoned that to rule otherwise would encourage state prisoners to file federal habeas petitions before the state completed collateral review. In remanding the question of whether Saffold's petition was pending, the Court concluded that the California Supreme Court's inclusion of the words \"on the merits\" could not by themselves indicate that the petition was timely. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy authored a dissent, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54979:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54980:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54980:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1999, Ronald Nussle, an inmate at the Cheshire Correctional Institution in Connecticut, filed a federal action under 42 USC section 1983, charging that certain correction officers had subjected him to a sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation and had singled him out for a severe beating in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, Nussle did not file a grievance under the applicable Connecticut Department of Correction procedures. Based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that PLRA directs that \"No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983...or any other Federal law, by a prisoner...until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for a claim of the kind Nussle asserted. Citing legislative history, the appellate court found that the phrase \"prisons conditions\" covers only conditions affecting prisoners generally, not single incidents that immediately affect only particular prisoners.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54980:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54980:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54980:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. The Court rejected Nussle's argument that Congress added the words \"prison conditions\" to exempt excessive force claims. Justice Ginsburg wrote that the Court's precedents and the act's \"dominant concern to promote administrative redress, filter out groundless claims, and foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court\" persuade the Court \"strongly away from classifying suits about prison guards' use of excessive force, one or many times, as anything other than actions 'with respect to prison conditions.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54980:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54981:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54981:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, while at a doctor's office in California, Adelaide Andrews filled out a form listing her name, Social Security number, and other basic information. An office receptionist named Andrea Andrews copied the data and later moved to Las Vegas, where she attempted to open credit accounts using Adelaide's Social Security number and her own last name and address. Thereafter, TRW Inc. furnished copies of Adelaide's credit report to companies from which Andrea sought credit. In 1996, Adelaide filed suit, alleging that TRW had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to verify predisclosure of her credit report to third parties. TRW moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the FCRA's statute of limitations had expired on Adelaide's claims stemming from TRW's first two disclosures because both occurred more than two years before she brought suit. Adelaide countered that the limitations period on those claims did not commence until she discovered the disclosures. The District Court held the two claims time-barred. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied what it considered to be a general federal rule that a statute of limitations starts running when a party knows or has reason to know she was injured, unless Congress expressly legislates otherwise.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54981:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54981:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54981:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a discovery rule does not govern section 1681p of FCRA, as that section explicitly delineated the exceptional case in which discovery triggered the two-year limitation and Adelaide's case does not fall within the exceptional category. The Court reasoned that it was not at liberty to make Congress' explicit exception the general rule. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54981:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54982:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54982:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Social Security Act authorizes payment of Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income to individuals who have an \"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable...impairment...which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.\" After developing a serious mental illness, Cleveland Walton lost his job as a teacher in October 1994. Eleven moths later, Walton was working as a cashier. When Walton applied for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income, the Social Security Administration denied him benefits, reasoning that his \"inability\" to engage in substantial gainful activity lasted only 11 months. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the 12-month duration requirement modifies \"impairment\" not \"inability,\" that no similar duration requirement relates to an \"inability,\" and that, therefore, Walton was entitled to benefits despite regulations restricting them to those unable to work for 12 months. Further, the appellate court concluded that Walton qualified for benefits since, prior to his return to work, his \"inability\" would have been \"expected\" to last 12 months.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54982:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54982:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54982:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Social Security Administration's interpretations of the statute fell within its lawful interpretative authority. Justice Breyer noted that the Administration has determined in both its formal regulations and its interpretation of those regulations that an \"inability\" must last the same amount of time as an \"impairment,\" or last or be expected to last not less than 12 months. \"The statute's complexity, the vast number of claims that it engenders, and the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative experience lead us to read the statute as delegating to the Agency considerable authority to fill in, through interpretation, matters of detail related to its administration,\" concluded Justice Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54982:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54983:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54983:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt Timothy Ring's trial for murder, the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing and only if the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Because the jury had convicted Ring of felony murder, not premeditated murder, Ring would be eligible for the death penalty only if he was the victim's actual killer. Citing accomplice testimony at the sentencing hearing, the judge found that Ring was the killer. The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of them being that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, as well as one mitigating factor, Ring's minimal criminal record, and ruled that the latter did not call for leniency.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54983:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54983:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54983:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operates as \"the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,\" the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be \"exposed...to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone,\" the Court overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, insofar it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. \"The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54983:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54985:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54985:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. hired Jose Castro on the basis of documents appearing to verify his authorization to work in the United States. After Castro engaged in union-organizing activities, Hoffman laid him off. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the layoff violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and ordered backpay for Castro. At a compliance hearing, Castor testified before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that he was born in Mexico, that he had never been legally admitted to, or authorized to work in, this country, and that he gained employment with Hoffman only after tendering a birth certificate that was not his. The ALJ found that Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which makes it unlawful for employers knowingly to hire undocumented workers or for employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility, precluded Castro's award. In reversing, the Board noted that the most effective way to further the immigration policies embodied in IRCA is to provide the NLRA's protections and remedies to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54985:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54985:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54985:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that such relief is foreclosed by federal immigration policy, as expressed by Congress in the IRCA. The Court reasoned that allowing the Board to award backpay to illegal aliens ran counter to explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy and that however broad the Board's discretion to fashion remedies when dealing only with the NLRA was, it was not so unbounded as to authorize the award. \"Congress has expressly made it criminally punishable for an alien to obtain employment with false documents. There is no reason to think that Congress nonetheless intended to permit backpay where but for an employer's unfair labor practices, an alien-employee would have remained in the United States illegally, and continued to work illegally, all the while successfully evading apprehension by immigration authorities,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54985:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54986:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54986:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 restructured the system for providing private health care benefits to coal industry retirees by merging two previous benefits plans into the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund. The fund is financed by annual premiums assessed against signatory coal operators, or those who signed any agreement requiring contributions to the plans that were merged into the Fund. If the signatory is no longer in business, the Act assigns liability for beneficiaries to a defined group of \"related persons\" based on the Commissioner of Social Security assignments. Shortly after Jericol Mining Co. was formed in 1973 as Irdell Mining, Inc., Irdell purchased the coal mining operating assets of Shackleford Coal Co., which was a signatory to a coal wage agreement while it was in business. Between 1993 and 1997, the Commissioner assigned responsibility for 86 retired miners to Jericol, determining that as a successor in interest to Shackleford, Jericol qualified as a related person. All of these retirees had worked for Shackleford, but none of them had actually worked for Jericol. Jericol filed suit against the Commissioner. The District Court granted Jericol summary judgment, concluding that the Act's classification regime does not provide for the liability of successors of defunct signatory operators. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that Jericol was not a related person to Shackleford and thus could not be held responsible for Shackleford's miners.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54986:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54986:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54986:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Act did not permit the Commissioner to assign retired miners to the successors in interest of out-of-business signatory operators, since the companies were not related to such operators under the Act's statutory definitions. Justice Thomas reasoned that, because the Act is explicit as to who may be assigned liability for beneficiaries and neither the related persons provision nor any other provision states that successors in interest to these signatory operators may be assigned liability, the Act's plain language necessarily precluded the Commissioner from assigning the disputed miners to Jericol. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen G. Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54986:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54987:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54987:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., is a manufacturer of patented fans and heaters. In 1992, Vornado sued Duracraft Corp., claiming that Duracraft's use of a spiral grill design in its fans infringed Vornado's trade dress. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that Vornado had no protectible trade-dress rights in the grill design. Later, Vornado filed a complaint with the U.S. International Trade Commission, claiming that Holmes Group, Inc.'s sale of fans and heaters with a spiral grill design infringed Vornado's trade dress. Subsequently, Holmes filed a federal-court action, seeking a declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe Vornado's trade dress and an injunction restraining Vornado from accusing it of such infringement. In response, Vornado asserted a compulsory patent-infringement counterclaim. The District Court ruled in Holmes's favor. Vornado appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, notwithstanding Holmes's challenge to its jurisdiction, vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54987:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54987:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54987:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the appellate could not assert jurisdiction over such a case. Noting that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is fixed and turns on whether an action is one arising under federal patent law, the Court reasoned that because the complaint asserted no claim arising under patent law, the court erred in asserting jurisdiction over the appeal. \"By limiting the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to cases in which district courts would have jurisdiction...Congress referred to a well-established body of law that requires courts to consider whether a patent-law claim appears on the face of the plaintiff's...complaint. Because [Holmes's] complaint did not include any claim based on patent law, we vacate the judgment of the Federal Circuit,\" wrote Justice Scalia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54987:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54988:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54988:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. In doing so, the Court characterized a dangerous sexual offender's confinement as civil rather than criminal and held that the confinement criterion embodied in the statute's words -- \"mental abnormality or personality disorder\" -- satisfied substantive due process. When the state of Kansas filed a petition in a Kansas district court to have Michael T. Crane, a previously convicted sexual offender, committed, the Kansas District Court ordered his civil commitment. In reversing, the State Supreme Court concluded that Hendricks requires a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior even if, as provided by Kansas law, problems of emotional, and not volitional, capacity prove the source of behavior warranting commitment. The trial court had made no such finding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54988:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54988:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54988:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Hendricks set forth no requirement of total or complete lack of control, but that the Constitution does not permit commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination. Such required proof, the Court continued, had to be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjected the offender to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case. The Court concluded that an absolute finding of lack of control since this approach would risk barring the civil commitment of some highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54988:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54989:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54989:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFesto Corporation owns two patents for an improved magnetic rodless cylinder, a piston-driven device that relies on magnets to move objects in a conveying system. When the patent examiner rejected the initial application for the first patent because of defects in description, the application was amended to add the new limitations that the device would contain a pair of one-way sealing rings and that its outer sleeve would be made of a magnetizable material. The second patent was also amended during a reexamination proceeding to add the sealing rings limitation. After Festo began selling its device, SMC entered the market with a similar device that uses one two-way sealing ring and a nonmagnetizable sleeve. Festo filed suit, claiming that SMC's device is so similar that it infringes Festo's patents under the doctrine of equivalents. Rejecting SMC's argument that the prosecution history, or the public record of the patent proceedings, estopped Festo from saying that SMC's device was similar, the District Court ruled in Festo's favor. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the prosecution history estoppel applied, ruling that estoppel arises from any amendment that narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act. The Court of Appeals also held that, when estoppel applies, it bars any claim of equivalence for the element that was amended.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54989:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54989:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54989:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that prosecution history estoppel may apply to any claim amendment made to satisfy the Patent Act's requirements, not just to amendments made to avoid the prior art, but that estoppel need not bar suit against every equivalent to the amended claim element. Noting that by amending an application the inventor is deemed to concede that the patent does not extend as far as the original claim, the Court reasoned that the patentee should bear the burden of showing that the amendment does not surrender the equivalent in question. Justice Kennedy wrote that, in cases where an equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the application, the patentee could rebut the presumption that prosecution history estoppel barred a finding of equivalence by showing that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54989:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54990:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54990:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEmployers must pay Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes, calculated as a percentage of the wages, including tips, that their employees receive. In 1991 and 1992, Fior D'Italia restaurant paid FICA taxes based on the tip amount its employees reported, but the reports also showed that the tips listed on customers' credit card slips far exceeded the reported amount. The IRS made a compliance check and assessed additional FICA taxes using an \"aggregate estimation\" method, under which it examined the credit card slips; found the average percentage tip paid by those customers; assumed that cash-paying customers paid at same rate; calculated total tips by multiplying the tip rates by Fior D'Italia's total receipts; subtracted the tips already reported; applied the FICA tax rate to the remainder; and assessed additional taxes owed. Fior D'Italia filed a refund suit, claiming that the tax statutes did not authorize the IRS to use the aggregate estimation method. The District Court ruled for Fior D'Italia, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54990:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54990:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54990:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the law authorizes the IRS to use the aggregate estimation method. The Court reasoned that the law, by granting the IRS assessment authority, necessarily granted it the power to decide how to make that assessment within certain limits. In rejecting Fior D'Italia's reasonability arguments, the Court said the law does not require the IRS to determine total tip income by estimating each individual employee's tip income separately, then adding individual estimates together to create a total. Justice David H. Souter, with whom Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas joined, dissented. The IRS's method \"raises anomaly after anomaly, to the point that one has to suspect that the Government's practice is wrong,\" argued Justice Souter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54990:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54991:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54991:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTraffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd. is a corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands (BVI), an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom. In 1998, Chase Manhattan Bank, now JPMorgan Chase Bank, agreed to finance certain Traffic Stream ventures, with the contract to be governed by New York law and with Traffic Stream agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of federal courts in Manhattan. Subsequently, Chase sued Traffic Stream for defaulting on its obligations. The District Court found subject-matter jurisdiction under the alienage diversity statute, 28 USC section 1332(a)(2), which gives district courts jurisdiction over civil actions where the controversy is \"between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state,\" and granted Chase summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because Traffic Stream was a citizen of an Overseas Territory and not an independent foreign state, jurisdiction was lacking.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54991:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54991:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54991:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a corporation organized under the laws of the BVI is a \"citizen or subject of a foreign state\" for the purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that, because of the United Kingdom's retention and exercise of authority over the BVI, statutes permitting incorporation in the BVI are enacted in the exercise of the United Kingdom's political authority. \"It is enough to hold that the United Kingdom's retention and exercise of authority over the BVI renders BVI citizens, both natural and juridic, 'citizens or subjects' of the United Kingdom,\" wrote Justice Souter. Thus, Traffic Stream was a citizen or subject of a foreign state for the purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54991:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54992:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54992:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1998, Ralph Arvizu was stopped by Border Patrol Agent Clinton Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A number of factors prompted Stoddard to stop Arvizu, including his slowing down, his failure to acknowledge the agent, the raised position of the children's knees, and their odd waving. After receiving permission to search the vehicle, Stoddard found more than 100 pounds of marijuana. Arvizu was charged with possession with intent to distribute. Arvizu moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing among other things that Stoddard did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as required by the Fourth Amendment. Denying the motion, the District Court cited a number of facts that gave Stoddard reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, including its location. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court relied on factors that carried little or no weight in reasonable-suspicion calculus and that the remaining factors were not enough to render the stop permissible. In the appellate court's view, fact-specific weighing of circumstances or other multifactor tests introduced uncertainty and unpredictability into the Fourth Amendment analysis, making it necessary to clearly delimit the factors that an officer may consider in making stops such as this one.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54992:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54992:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54992:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Court of Appeals' methodology was contrary to its prior decisions and that it reached the wrong result in this case. The Court concluded that Stoddard had reasonable suspicion to believe that Arvizu was engaged in illegal activity, having considered the totality of the circumstances and given due weight to the factual inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer and District Court Judge. The Court reasoned that, although each factor alone could have appeared innocent, when taken together they sufficed to form a particularized and objective basis for Stoddard's stopping the vehicle, making the stop reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54992:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54993:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54993:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed two moratoria from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983 and from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., filed suits, claiming that TRPA's actions constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The District Court found that TRPA had not effected a partial taking; however, it concluded that the moratoria did constitute a categorical taking because TRPA temporarily deprived real estate owners of all economically viable use of their land. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had only a temporary impact, no categorical taking had occurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54993:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54993:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54993:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that that the mere enactment of the regulations implementing the moratoria did not constitute a per se taking of the landowners' property. The Court reasoned that whether a taking occurred depended upon the considerations of landowners' expectations, actual impact, public interest, and reasons for the moratoria. Moreover, the Court concluded that the adoption of a categorical rule that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constituted a compensable taking would impose unreasonable financial obligations upon governments for the normal delays involved in processing land use applications. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54993:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54994:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54994:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only \"material that is harmful to minors.\" Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply \"contemporary community standards\" in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54994:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54994:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54994:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that COPA's reliance on community standards to identify what material is harmful to minors does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for First Amendment purposes. The Court expressed no view as to whether COPA was overbroad for other reasons or was unconstitutionally vague and did not vacate the preliminary injunction because it could not do so without addressing matters yet to be considered. \"In its original form, the community standard provided a shield for communications that are offensive only to the least tolerant members of society,\" argued Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissent. \"In the context of the Internet, however, community standards become a sword, rather than a shield. If a prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village, it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide Web.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54994:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54996:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54996:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff shall file an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 days after an alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. Abner Morgan filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC against National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), alleging that he had been subjected to discrete discriminatory and retaliatory acts and had experienced a racially hostile work environment throughout his employment. The EEOC issued a \"Notice of Right to Sue.\" While some of the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred within 300 days of the time that Morgan filed his EEOC charge, many took place prior to that period. The District Court granted Amtrak summary judgment in part, holding that the company could not be liable for conduct occurring outside of the 300-day filing period. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff may sue on claims that would ordinarily be time-barred so long as they either are sufficiently related to incidents that fall within the statutory period or are part of a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that took place, at least in part, within the period.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54996:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54996:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54996:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the statutory time period. The Court also held that consideration of the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim, including behavior alleged outside the statutory time period, is permissible for the purposes of assessing liability, so long as any act contributing to that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time period. Justice Thomas wrote that the Court's holding does not leave employers defenseless when a plaintiff unreasonably delays filing a charge, noting that the application of equitable doctrines may either limit or toll the time period within which an employee must file a charge.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54996:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54998:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54998:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDaryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally disabled (or \"mentally retarded\" in the vernacular of the day). The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54998:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54998:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54998:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals are \"cruel and unusual punishments\" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Since it last confronted the issue, the Court reasoned that a significant number of States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. Moreover, the Court concluded that there was serious concern whether either justification underpinning the death penalty - retribution and deterrence of capital crimes - applies to mentally retarded offenders, due to their lessened culpability. \"Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender,\" wrote Justice Stevens. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia filed dissenting opinions. Justice Clarence Thomas joined both. \"This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the others in turning the process of capital trial into a game,\" argued Justice Scalia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54998:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54999:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "54999:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, John E. Malesko was assigned to a bedroom on the fifth floor of the Le Marquis Community Correctional Center, a facility that houses federal inmates run by the Correctional Services Corporation (CSC) under contract with the Bureau of Prisons. After CSC instituted a policy requiring inmates residing below the sixth floor to use the stairs rather than the elevator, Malesko, who was afflicted with a heart condition limiting his ability to climb stairs, was exempted form the policy. When a CSC employee did not let Malesko use the elevator, he climbed the stairs, suffered a heart attack, and fell. Subsequently, Malesko filed a suit, alleging that CSC was negligence in refusing him the use of the elevator. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, in which the U.S. Supreme Court recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights, the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that such an action may only be maintained against individuals. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reasoned that such private entities should be held liable under Bivens to accomplish Bivens' goal of providing a remedy for constitutional violations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "54999:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "54999:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "54999:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Bivens' limited holding may not be extended to confer a right of action for damages against private entities acting under color of federal law. The Court reasoned that the threat of suit against an individual's employer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by the Bivens decision. The Court also noted that the purpose of the Bivens decision was to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations. \"In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice, to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer's unconstitutional conduct. Where such circumstances are not present, we have consistently rejected invitations to extend Bivens,\"wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "54999:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55000:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55000:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKristja J. Falvo asked the Owasso Independent School District to ban peer grading, or the practice of allowing students to score each other's tests, papers, and assignments as the teachers explain the correct answers to the entire class, because it embarrassed her children. When the school district declined, Falvo filed an action against the school district, claming that such peer grading violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). FERPA authorizes federal funds to be withheld from school districts that permit students' \"education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein)\" to be released without their parents' written consent and defines education records as \"records, files, documents, and other materials\" containing information directly related to a student, which \"are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution.\" Disagreeing with Falvo, the District Court held that grades put on papers by another student are not \"education records.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that grades marked by students on each other's work are \"education records,\" such that the very act of grading is an impermissible release of information to the student grader.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55000:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55000:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55000:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Peer grading does not violate FERPA. The Court reasoned that peer-graded items did not constitute education records protected by FERPA until a teacher collected the grades on the students' papers or other items and recorded the grades in the teacher's grade book. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that peer-graded items were not \"maintained\" within in the meaning of FERPA, as the student graders only handled the items for a few moments. Moreover, the Court stated that each student grader, by grading assignments, did not constitute a person acting for an educational institution within FERPA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55000:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55001:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55001:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA California court sentenced Mark James Knights to probation for a drug offense. The probation order included the following condition: that Knights would \"submit his...person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer.\" In the aftermath of arson at the site of a Pacific Gas and Electric (PGE) power transformer, a sheriff's detective, with reasonable suspicion, searched Knights's apartment. Based in part on items recovered, including a PGE padlock, a federal grand jury indicted Knights for conspiracy to commit arson, for possession of an unregistered destructive device, and for being a felon in possession of ammunition. In granting Knights's motion to suppress, the District Court held that, although the detective had reasonable suspicion to believe that Knights was involved with incendiary materials, the search was for \"investigatory\" rather than \"probationary\" purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55001:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55001:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55001:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the warrantless search of Knights, which was supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation, was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Noting that nothing in Knight's probation condition limits searches to those with a \"probationary\" purpose, the Court examined whether the Fourth Amendment imposed such a limitation. The Court then concluded that, based on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis, reasonable suspicion is constitutionally sufficient to render a warrant requirement unnecessary. Justice David H. Souter filed a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55001:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55002:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55002:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) guarantees qualifying employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave each year and encourages businesses to adopt more generous policies. In 1996, Wolverine World Wide, Inc. granted Tracy Ragsdale 30 weeks of medical leave after she was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. Wolverine did not notify Ragsdale that 12 weeks of the absence would count as her FMLA leave. After Ragsdale sought another 30-day extension, Wolverine refused her request and terminated her when she did not return to work. Ragsdale filed suit, alleging under Labor Department regulation 29 CFR section 825.700(a), which provides that if an employee takes medical leave \"and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement,\" that Wolverine was required to grant her 12 additional weeks of leave. The District Court granted Wolverine summary judgment, finding that the regulation was in conflict with the statute and invalid because it required Wolverine to grant Ragsdale more than 12 weeks of FMLA-compliant leave in one year. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55002:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55002:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55002:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the regulation is contrary to the FMLA and beyond the Secretary of Labor's authority. Among other findings, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the regulation amended the FMLA's most fundamental substantive guarantee, the 12-week leave entitlement, and thus undermined Congress's balance of the needs of families and the interests of employers. Arguing that the regulation was incompatible with the regulation, Justice Kennedy wrote that, it \"imposes a high price for a good-faith but erroneous characterization of an absence as non-FMLA leave, and employers like Wolverine might well conclude that the simpler, less generous route is the preferable one.\" Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55002:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55003:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55003:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1935, when the Federal Power Act (FPA) became law, most electric utilities operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation and their sales were bundled, meaning that consumers paid a single charge for both the cost of the electricity and the cost of its delivery. Section 201(b) of the FPA provides the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with jurisdiction over \"the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce\" and section 205 prohibits unreasonable rates and undue discrimination \"with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the [Commission's] jurisdiction.\" Currently, public utilities still retain ownership of the transmission lines that their competitors must use to deliver electricity to wholesale and retail customers and thus can refuse to deliver their competitors' energy or deliver that power on terms and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions. In Order No. 888, FERC found such practices discriminatory under section 205. FERC then ordered the unbundling of wholesale generation and transmission services, which means that each utility must state separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services; imposed a similar open access requirement on unbundled retail transmissions in interstate commerce; and declined to extend the open access requirement to the transmission component of bundled retail sales. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld the order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55003:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55003:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55003:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that FERC properly construed its statutory authority. The Court's 9-0 decision affirmed that FERC had the jurisdiction to require nondiscriminatory access to electrical transmission by utilities, which unbundled their costs, regardless of state regulation of retail sales, and, by a 6-3 vote, was not required to impose requirements on bundled retail sales. \"Because the FPA authorizes FERC's jurisdiction over interstate transmissions, without regard to whether the transmissions are sold to a reseller or directly to a consumer, FERC's exercise of this power is valid,\" wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55003:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55004:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55004:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) prohibits \"any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture\" that \"is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,\" and any sexually explicit image that is \"advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression\" it depicts \"a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.\" The Free Speech Coalition, an adult-entertainment trade association, and others filed suit, alleging that the \"appears to be\" and \"conveys the impression\" provisions are overbroad and vague and, thus, restrain works otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held the CPPA invalid on its face, finding it to be substantially overbroad because it bans materials that are neither obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, nor produced by the exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55004:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55004:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55004:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the two prohibitions described above are overbroad and unconstitutional. The Court found the CPPA to be inconsistent with Miller insofar as the CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity, because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the obscenity definition. Moreover, the Court found the CPPA to have no support in Ferber since the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Provisions of the CPPA cover \"materials beyond the categories recognized in Ferber and Miller, and the reasons the Government offers in support of limiting the freedom of speech have no justification in our precedents or in the law of the First Amendment\" and abridge \"the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech,\" wrote Justice Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55004:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55005:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55005:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Pole Attachments Act requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to set reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for certain attachments to telephone and electric poles. A pole attachment includes \"any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a [utility's] pole, conduit, or right-of-way.\" After the FCC issued an order that interpreted the Act to cover pole attachments for commingled high-speed Internet and traditional cable television services and attachments by wireless telecommunications providers, pole-owning utilities challenged the order. Reversing both of the FCC's positions, the Court of Appeals held that commingled services are not covered by either of the Act's two specific rate formulas and, thus, were not covered by the Act. Additionally, the appellate court held that the Act does not give the FCC authority to regulate wireless communications.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55005:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55005:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55005:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held 6-2 that the Act covers attachments that provide high-speed Internet access at the same time as cable television and 8-0 that the Act applies to wireless attachments by providers of wireless telecommunications services. The Court reasoned that the FCC's assertion of jurisdiction under the Act to regulate rates charged for attachments that provided commingled cable television and high-speed Internet access and for attachments by wireless telecommunications providers was reasonable and, therefore, entitled to deference. Joined by Justice David H. Souter, Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that the FCC had failed to clearly explain the specific statutory basis on which the FCC was regulating rates for attachments that provided commingled cable television service and high-speed Internet access. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55005:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55006:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55006:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChristopher Drayton and Clifton Brown were traveling on a Greyhound bus. In Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded the bus as part of a routine interdiction effort. One of the officers worked his way from back to front, speaking with individual passengers as he went. The officer did not inform the passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate. As the officer approached Drayton and Brown, he identified himself, declared that the police were looking for drugs and weapons, and asked if the two had any bags. Subsequently, the officer asked Brown whether he minded if he checked his person. Brown agreed and a pat-down revealed hard objects similar to drug packages in both thigh areas. When Drayton agreed, a pat-down revealed similar objects. Both were arrested. A further search revealed that Drayton and Brown had taped cocaine to their legs. Charged with federal drug crimes, Drayton and Brown moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that their consent to the pat-down searches was invalid. In denying the motions, the District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and Drayton and Brown's consent to the search was voluntary. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard officers' requests to search absent some positive indication that consent may be refused.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55006:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55006:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55006:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to searches. The Court reasoned that, although the officer did not inform the defendants of their right to refuse the search, he did request permission to search and gave no indication consent was required. Moreover, the Court noted, the totality of the circumstances indicated that the consent was voluntary. Justice David H. Souter, with whom Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, dissented. \"The issue we took to review is whether the police's examination of the bus passengers ... amounted to a suspicionless seizure under the Fourth Amendment. If it did, any consent to search was plainly invalid as a product of the illegal seizure,\" argued Justice Souter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55006:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55007:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55007:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Telecommunications Act of 1996 entitles new companies seeking to enter local telephone service markets to lease elements of the incumbent carriers' local exchange networks and directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prescribe methods for state utility commissions to use in setting rates for the sharing of those elements. The FCC provided for the rates to be set based upon the forward-looking economic cost of an element as the sum of the total element long-run incremental cost of the element (TELRIC) and a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs incurred in providing a group of elements that cannot be attributed directly to individual elements and specified that the TELRIC should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration. FCC regulations also contain combination rules, requiring an incumbent to perform the functions necessary to combine network elements for an entrant, unless the combination is not technically feasible. In five separate cases, a range of parties challenged the FCC regulations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the use of the TELRIC methodology was foreclosed because the Act plainly required rates based on the actual cost of providing the network element and invalidated certain combination rules.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55007:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55007:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55007:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the FCC can require state commissions to set the rates charged by incumbents for leased elements on a forward-looking basis untied to the incumbents' investment and that the FCC can require incumbents to combine elements of their networks at the request of entrants. Because the incumbents did not meet their burden of showing unreasonableness to defeat the deference due the FCC, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals's ruling insofar as it invalidated TELRIC. \"The job of judges is to ask whether the Commission made choices reasonably within the pale of statutory possibility in deciding what and how items must be leased and the way to set rates for leasing them. The FCC's pricing and additional combination rules survive that scrutiny,\" wrote Justice Souter, rejecting arguments that the FCC did not chose the best way to set rates. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor did not participate in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55007:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55008:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55008:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBased on its 1977 study concluding that concentrations of adult entertainment establishments are associated with higher crime rates in surrounding communities, the city of Los Angeles enacted Municipal Code section 12.70(C), which prohibited such enterprises within 1,000 feet of each other. The city later amended the ordinance to prohibit more than one adult entertainment business in the same building. Alameda Books, Inc. and Highland Books, Inc., two adult establishments that openly operate combined bookstores/video arcades, sued, alleging that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Finding that the ordinance was not a content-neutral regulation of speech, the District Court reasoned that the 1977 study did not support a reasonable belief that multiple-use adult establishments produce the secondary effects the city asserted as content-neutral justifications for its prohibition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that, even if the ordinance were content neutral, the city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments was designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55008:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55008:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55008:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the city of Los Angeles may reasonably rely on a study it conducted some years before enacting the present version of section 12.70(C) to demonstrate that its ban on multiple-use adult establishments serves its interest in reducing crime. Three other Justices joined in this holding. Concurring, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concluded that Los Angeles may impose its regulation in the exercise of the zoning authority, and that the city is not, at least, to be foreclosed by summary judgment. Justice David H. Souter, with whom Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined, dissented. Justice Souter argued that the 1977 study, while pursuing a policy of dispersing adult establishments, evolved to a policy of breaking-up combined bookstores/video arcades, for which the study's evidence was insufficient.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55008:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55009:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55009:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPursuant to 49 USC section 14501(c)(2)(A), federal preemption prescriptions relating to motor carriers \"shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.\" Columbus, Ohio, extensively regulates the operation of tow trucks seeking to pick up vehicles within city limits. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., a tow-truck operator and a trade association of such operators, sought to enjoin enforcement of the City's tow-truck regulations on the ground that they were preempted. The District Court granted Ours Garage summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent that section 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule explicitly applies to \"a State [or] political subdivision of a State,\" while the exception for safety regulations, section 14501(c)(2)(A), refers only to the \"authority of a State.\" The appellate court also noted that precedent determined that the contrast in statutory language indicated that Congress meant to limit the safety exception to States alone.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55009:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55009:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55009:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 14501(c) does not bar a State from delegating to municipalities and other local units the State's authority to establish safety regulations governing motor carriers of property, including tow trucks. \"A locality, as section 14501(c) recognizes, is a 'political subdivision' of the State,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg. \"Ordinarily, a political subdivision may exercise whatever portion of state power the State...chooses to delegate to the subdivision. Absent a clear statement to the contrary, Congress' reference to the 'regulatory authority of a State' should be read to preserve, not preempt, the traditional prerogative of the States to delegate their authority to their constituent parts.\" Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55009:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55010:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55010:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. holds 17 utility patents issued under 35 USC section 101 that cover the manufacture, use, sale, and offer for sale of its hybrid corn seed products. Pioneer sells its patented hybrid seeds under a limited label license that allows only the production of grain and/or forage. J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., bought patented seeds from Pioneer in bags bearing the license agreement and then resold the bags. Subsequently, Pioneer filed a patent infringement suit. In response, Farm Advantage filed a patent invalidity counterclaim, arguing that sexually reproducing plants, such as Pioneer's corn plants, are not patentable subject matter within section 101. Farm Advantage maintained that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set forth the exclusive statutory means for protecting plant life. The District Court granted Pioneer summary judgment. The court held that section 101 clearly covers plant life and that in enacting the PPA and the PVPA, Congress neither expressly nor implicitly removed plants from section 101's subject matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55010:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55010:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55010:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that utility patents may be issued for plants. The Court reasoned that the PPA and the PVPA were not the exclusive means of obtaining a federal statutory right to exclude others from reproducing, selling, or using plants or plant varieties, as nothing in the controlling PPA and PVPA's texts indicated that the PPA's protection for asexually-reproduced plants was intended to be exclusive. \"Denying patent protection under section 101 simply because such coverage was thought technologically infeasible in 1930, however, would be inconsistent with the forward-looking perspective of the utility patent statute,\" wrote Justice Thomas. Joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55010:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55013:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55013:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Village of Stratton promulgated an ordinance that prohibits canvassers from entering private residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office. The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from fraud and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55013:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55013:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55013:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the ordinance's provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violate the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills. The Court reasoned that the village's interest in preventing fraud could not support the ordinance's application to the religious organizations, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. Dissenting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the Court decision deprived Stratton residents of the degree of accountability and safety that the permit requirement provides.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55013:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55014:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55014:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn conducting the 2000 census, the Census Bureau used \"hot-deck imputation\" to fill in certain gaps in its information and resolved certain conflicts in the data. Under this methodology, the Bureau imputes the relevant information by inferring that the address or unit about which it is uncertain has the same population characteristics as those of its geographically closest neighbor of the same type. Hot-deck Imputation increased North Carolina's population by 0.4% while increasing Utah's population by only 0.2% such that North Carolina will receive one more Representative and Utah one less than if the Bureau had simply filled relevant informational gaps by counting the related number of individuals as zero. Utah brought suit against the officials charged with conducting the census, claiming that the Bureau's use of hot-deck imputation violates 13 USC section 195, which prohibits use of \"the statistical method known as 'sampling,'\" and is inconsistent with Article 1, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution, which states that an \"actual Enumeration be made.\" Utah sought an injunction compelling a change of the official census results. The District Court found for the Bureau.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55014:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55014:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55014:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the use of hot-deck imputation violates neither the statute nor the Constitution. The Court reasoned that, whereas sampling seeks to extrapolate the features of a large population from a small one, the Bureau's imputation process simply sought to fill in missing data as part of an effort to count individuals one by one and that these differences placed imputation outside the scope of the prohibitive statute. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that Article 1's wording that the \"actual Enumeration\" shall take place \"in such Manner as\" Congress itself \"shall by Law direct,\" suggested a breadth of congressional methodological authority, rather than a limitation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55014:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55015:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55015:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPaul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, filed a state-court lawsuit against the system?s board of regents and other university officials, alleging that the officials had violated state tort law and 42 USC section 1983 when they placed sexual harassment allegations in his personnel files. The defendants removed the case to Federal District Court and then sought a dismissal. Conceding that a state statute had waived Georgia's sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, the State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal court. The District Court held that Georgia had waived such immunity when it removed the case to federal court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because state law was unclear as to whether the state attorney general had the legal authority to waive Georgia's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State retained the legal right to assert immunity, even after the removal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55015:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55015:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55015:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court. The Court concluded that that the university officials' voluntary removal of the action expressly invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts and thus constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to state law claims for which immunity was waived in state court. Under the general principle that a State's voluntary appearance in federal court amounts to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court reasoned that Georgia was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in state court, but it then voluntarily removed the case to federal court, thus voluntarily invoking that court's jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55015:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55016:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55016:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA student at Gonzaga University planned to become a public elementary school teacher in Washington, which required all new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral character from their graduating colleges. Gonzaga's teacher certification specialist overheard one student tell another that the student had engaged in sexual misconduct, contacted the state agency responsible for teacher certification, and discussed the allegations, identifying the student by name. Ultimately, the student was told that he would not receive his certification affidavit. The student sued Gonzaga in state court, alleging a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), which prohibits the federal funding of schools that have a policy or practice of permitting the release of students' education records without their parents' written consent. A jury awarded the student compensatory and punitive damages. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court acknowledged that FERPA does not give rise to a private cause of action, but reasoned that the nondisclosure provision creates a federal right that is enforceable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55016:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55016:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55016:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that such an action is foreclosed because the relevant provisions of FERPA create no personal rights to enforce. The Court reasoned that the creation of individual rights required clear and unambiguous terms, which FERPA's confidentiality provisions did not contain. \"FERPA's nondisclosure provisions contain no rights-creating language, they have an aggregate, not individual, focus, and they serve primarily to direct the Secretary of Education's distribution of public funds to educational institutions,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the Court's opinion \"may be read as accepting the proposition that FERPA does indeed create both parental rights of access to student records and student rights of privacy in such records, but that those federal rights are of a lesser value because Congress did not intend them to be enforceable by their owners.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55016:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55017:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55017:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Don Craft failed to pay federal income tax liabilities for the failure to file federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1986, a federal tax lien attached to \"all [of his] property and rights to property,\" pursuant to 26 USC section 6321. After the notice of the lien was filed, Dan and his wife Sandra L. Craft jointly executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer to her his interest in a piece of real property in Michigan that they owned as tenants by the entirety. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agreed to release the lien and allow the Crafts to sell the property with half the net proceeds to be held in escrow pending determination of the Government's interest in the property. After Sandra brought an action to quiet title to the escrowed proceeds, the Government claimed that its lien had attached to the husband's interest in the tenancy by the entirety. The District Court granted the Government summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, however, held that no lien attached because the husband had no separate interest in the entireties property under Michigan law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55017:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55017:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55017:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that each tenant possesses individual rights in the estate sufficient to constitute \"property\" or \"rights to property\" for the purposes of the lien. By determining that Michigan law granted the husband the right to use the property, the right to receive income produced by it, the right to exclude others from it, the non-unilateral right to alienate the property, and the right of survivorship, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the rights Michigan law granted to the husband as a tenant by the entirety qualified as \"property\" or \"rights to property\" under section 6321 and, therefore, the federal tax lien could attach to the husband's property. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Scalia and John Paul Stevens joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55017:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55018:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55018:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her a \"fast track\" plea bargain in which she would waive indictment, trial, and an appeal in exchange for a reduced sentence recommendation. The prosecutors' offer requires that the defendant waive the right to receive impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses, as well as information supporting any affirmative defense she raises if the case goes to trial. When Ruiz rejected the waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their offer, indicted her for unlawful drug possession, and she pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same reduced sentence that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the plea bargain. The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it. In vacating the sentence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Constitution prohibits defendants from waiving their right to certain impeachment information.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55018:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55018:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55018:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant. Although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide that defendants have the right to receive exculpatory impeachment material from prosecutors, the Court reasoned that a criminal defendant's guilty plea under the plea agreement, with its accompanying waiver of constitutional rights, could have been accepted as knowing and voluntary despite any misapprehension by Ruiz concerning the specific extent or nature of the impeachment evidence. Furthermore, Justice Breyer noted that requiring disclosure of the evidence would improperly force the Government to engage in substantial trial preparation prior to plea bargaining.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55018:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55019:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55019:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that incumbent local-exchange carriers (LECs) provide interconnection with their existing networks; that the carriers then establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transporting and terminating the calls of each others' customers; and that their interconnection agreements be approved by a state utility commission. Verizon Maryland Inc., the incumbent LEC in Maryland, negotiated an interconnection agreement with MCI WorldCom, Inc. After the Maryland Public Service Commission approved the agreement, Verizon informed WorldCom that it would no longer pay reciprocal compensation for calls made by Verizon's customers to the local access numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) because ISP traffic was not local traffic subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement. WorldCom filed a complaint with the Commission, which ordered Verizon to make the payments for past and future ISP-bound calls. Verizon then filed an action in federal district court, seeking an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, alleging that the determination that Verizon must pay reciprocal compensation for ISP traffic violated the Act. The District Court dismissed the action. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Commission had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the Act did not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Verizon's claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55019:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55019:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55019:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the district court had jurisdiction, so as to review the Commission's order for compliance with federal law, to entertain the suit because resolution of the LEC's claim turned on whether the Act, or an FCC ruling issued thereunder, precluded the state commission from ordering payment of reciprocal compensation. Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Court also reasoned that Verizon's request for injunctive relief to restrain state officials from enforcing an order allegedly in contravention of controlling federal law avoided an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55019:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55020:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55020:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCornelius and Suzanne Young failed to include payment with their 1992 income tax return, which was due and filed on October 15, 1993. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed a tax liability against them. After filing a Chapter 13 petition, the Youngs ultimately filed a Chapter 7 petition and were granted a discharge, meaning that Youngs had no assets available to satisfy unsecured creditors, including the IRS. If the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a claim for certain taxes for which the return was due within three years before the individual taxpayer files a bankruptcy petition, its claim enjoys eighth priority under 11 USC section 507(a)(8)(A)(i), and is nondischargeable in bankruptcy under section 523(a)(1)(A). When the IRS subsequently demanded that they pay the tax debt, the Youngs asked the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the Chapter 7 case and declare the debt discharged under section 523(a)(1)(A), claiming that it fell outside section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)'s \"three-year lookback period\" because it pertained to a tax return due more than three years before their Chapter 7 filing. The District Court held that the \"lookback period\" is tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition and concluded that the 1992 debt had not been discharged when the Youngs were granted a discharge under Chapter 7. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55020:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55020:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55020:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)'s lookback period is tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition. The Court reasoned that the three-year lookback period is a limitations period subject to traditional principles of equitable tolling and that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code precluded the equitable tolling of the lookback period. The Court reject the Youngs' argument that the Bankruptcy Code permitted the filing of a Chapter 13 petition and the subsequent filing of a Chapter 7 petition after the lookback period has expired. Under such a loophole, certain unpaid taxes would be dischargeable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55020:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55022:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55022:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJeffrey Gorman is a paraplegic. After being arrested, he was transported to a Kansas City police station in a van that was not equipped to accommodate the disabled. Gorman was removed from his wheelchair and seatbelted to a bench in the van. During the ride, Gorman fell to the floor, suffering serious injuries that left him unable to work full time. Gorman sued certain Kansas police officials for discriminating against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, by failing to maintain appropriate policies for the arrest and transportation of persons with spinal cord injuries. A jury awarded him compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court vacated as to punitive damages, holding that they are unavailable in private suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found punitive damages available under a general rule that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55022:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55022:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55022:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that, because punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it follows that they may not be awarded in suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The Court noted that the remedies of the sections of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act Gorman sued under are coextensive with those available in a private action under Title VI. Under a contract-law analogy, the Court reasoned because Title VI- funding recipients did not, merely by accepting funds, implicitly consent to liability for punitive damages, it followed that they could not be awarded in suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55022:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55023:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55023:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Devlin, a retired worker represented by the Transportation Communications International Union, participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan) administered by the Union. In 1991, the Plan was amended to add a cost of living increase (COLA). In 1997, the Plan's trustees eliminated the COLA because the Plan could not support such a large benefits increase. The trustees also filed a class action in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1997 elimination was binding on all Plan members or that the 1991 COLA was void. After the District Court conditionally certified a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and the trustees asked the court to approve their settlement with the class representatives, Devlin moved to intervene. The court denied his motion as untimely. The court then heard objections to the settlement, including those advanced by Devlin, and approved the settlement. In affirming the District Court's denial of Devlins's intervention, the Court of Appeals held that, because Devlin was not a named class representative and because he had been properly denied the right to intervene, he lacked standing to challenge the settlement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55023:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55023:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55023:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that nonnamed class members like Devlin, who have objected in a timely manner to approval of the settlement at the fairness hearing, have the power to bring an appeal without first intervening. The Court reasoned that the District Court's approval of the settlement, which bound the nonnamed class member as a member of the class, amounted to a final decision of the nonnamed class member's right or claim sufficient to trigger his right to appeal. Moreover, the Court concluded, appealing the approval of the settlement was the nonnamed class member's only means of protecting himself from being bound by a disposition of his rights he found unacceptable, given that the nonnamed class member had no ability to opt out of the settlement. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissent, in which Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55023:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55025:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55025:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMaria Gregory worked for the United States Postal Service as a letter technician with responsibility for overseeing letter carriers on five mail routes and serving as a replacement carrier on those routes. In 1997, while three disciplinary actions that the Postal Service took against Gregory were pending in grievance proceedings pursuant to the Postal Service's collective bargaining agreement with her union, the Postal Service terminated Gregory's employment after a fourth violation. Gregory then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, where an agency must prove its charge by a preponderance of the evidence, proving not only that the misconduct occurred, but also that the penalty assessed is reasonable in relation to it. Analyzing her three prior disciplinary actions independently, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that Gregory's termination was reasonable in light of her four violations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing proceedings may not be used to support a penalty's reasonableness.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55025:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55025:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55025:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that that the Federal Circuit's ruling was vacated because the Board has broad discretion in determining how to review prior disciplinary actions and need not adopt the Federal Circuit's rule. The Court reasoned that the Board had broad discretion under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of 5 USC section 7703(c) to review prior disciplinary actions and that the role of the judiciary was only to ascertain whether the Board had met this minimum standard. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55025:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55026:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55026:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGary Cone was tried in a Tennessee court for a 2-day crime spree that ended with the killing of an elderly couple. In response to the overwhelming evidence that he perpetrated the crimes, Cone's defense asserted that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury found him guilty. During the sentencing hearing, Cone's counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses, but called no witnesses. After the prosecutor closed, the defense counsel waived final argument. Ultimately, Cone was sentenced to death. The State Criminal Court denied Cone's petition for post-conviction relief, rejecting his contention that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase by failing to present mitigating evidence and waiving final argument. Subsequently, the Federal District Court denied Cone's federal habeas petition, ruling that he did not meet 28 USC section 2254(d)(1)'s requirement that a state decision be \"contrary to\" or involve \"an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Cone suffered a Sixth Amendment violation for which prejudice should be presumed because his counsel, by not asking for mercy after the prosecutor's final argument, did not subject the State's death penalty call to meaningful adversarial testing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55026:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55026:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55026:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals's decision neither was \"contrary to\" nor involved \"an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law\" under the provisions of 28 USC section 2254(d)(1). The Court noted that the defense counsel was defending a client who had committed a brutal and senseless crime against two elderly persons. Rather than closing, defense counsel prevented the lead prosecutor from arguing by waiving his own summation and relying on his opening plea for life. \"Neither option, it seems to us, so clearly outweighs the other that it was objectively unreasonable for the Tennessee Court of Appeals to deem counsel's choice to waive argument a tactical decision about which competent lawyers might disagree,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55026:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55027:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55027:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that a charge of employment discrimination be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) \"within [a specified number of] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.\" An EEOC regulation permits an otherwise timely filer to verify a charge after the time for filing has expired. In November 1997, Leonard Edelman faxed a letter to the EEOC, claiming that Lynchburg College had subjected him to gender-based, national origin, and religious discrimination after it denied him tenure. The EEOC informed Edelman of the 300-day time limit and sent him a Form 5 Charge of Discrimination, which he returned 313 days after he was denied tenure. The District Court dismissed the Title VII complaint, finding that the letter was not a charge under Title VII because neither Edelman nor the EEOC treated it as one. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that because a charge requires verification and must be filed within the limitations period, it follows that a charge must be verified within that period.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55027:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55027:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55027:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the EEOC's relation-back regulation was an unassailable interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court noted that where a statute or supplemental rule required an oath, which the charge in question did, courts had shown a high degree of consistency in accepting later verification as reaching back to an earlier, unverified filing. Moreover, by amending the law without repudiating the regulation, the Court reasoned that Congress had suggested its consent to the EEOC's practice. \"This background law not only persuades by its regularity over time but points to tacit congressional approval of the EEOC's position, Congress being presumed to have known of this settled judicial treatment of oath requirements when it enacted and later amended Title VII,\" wrote Justice Souter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55027:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55028:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55028:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1996, Lance Raygor and James Goodchild filed complaints in Federal District Court against the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, stemming from an alleged incident in which the university attempted to compel them to accept early retirement. They refused. Subsequently, their jobs were reclassified to reduce their salaries. The complaints alleged a federal cause of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and a state law discrimination action under the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, which purports to toll the limitations period for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed. The District Court ultimately dismissed their cases on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Before the dismissal, Raygor and Goodrich refilled their state law claims in state court. The university contended that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute did not toll the limitations period on those claims because the Federal District Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the ADEA claims. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court held the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute unconstitutional when applied to claims against nonconsenting state defendants, such as the university.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55028:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55028:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55028:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota never consented to suit in federal court on Raygor and Goodrich's state law claims and that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute does not toll the period of limitations for state law claims asserted against nonconsenting state defendants that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Therefore, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute did not operate to toll the period of limitations for Raygor and Goodrich's claims. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Joined by Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer, Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55028:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55029:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55029:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile on trial for first-degree murder, Remon Lee planned an alibi defense. His mother, stepfather, and sister were to voluntarily testify that he was in California at the time of the murder. The day the defense was to begin its case, the three could not be found. Lee's counsel moved for an overnight continuance to gain time to find the witnesses. The trial judge denied the motion. Subsequently, no alibi witnesses testified, the jury found Lee guilty, and he was sentenced to prison for life without possibility of parole. The Missouri Court of Appeals eventually disposed of the case on state procedural grounds. The appeals court held that the denial of the continuance motion was proper because Lee's counsel had failed to comply with Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.09, which requires that such motions be in writing and accompanied by an affidavit, and with Rule 24.10, which sets out the showings a movant must make to gain a continuance grounded on witnesses' absence. Ultimately, the Federal Court of Appeals ruled that federal review of Lee's claim, that the refusal to grant his continuance motion deprived him of his federal due process right to a defense, was unavailable because the state court's rejection of that claim rested on state-law grounds, independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55029:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55029:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55029:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the Missouri Rules, as injected into this case by the state appellate court, did not constitute a state ground adequate to bar federal habeas review. The Court reasoned that the dispositive issue was that the accused's asserted due process right to defend ought not to depend on a formal ritual that would further no perceivable state interest. \"Caught in the midst of a murder trial and unalerted to any procedural defect in his presentation, defense counsel could hardly be expected to divert his attention from the proceedings rapidly unfolding in the courtroom and train, instead, on preparation of a written motion and affidavit,\" wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that the decision had committed the Court to a problematic course concerning the adequacy of state procedural grounds to bar subsequent federal review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55029:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55030:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55030:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, from a Los Angeles-area golf course. At the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. The court, reasoning that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55030:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55030:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55030:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 plurality decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court, relying heavily on its decision in Rummel v. Estelle (1980), concluded that Ewing's long history of legal offenses justified his conviction. In Rummel, the Court had ruled that a sentence of life with the possibility of parole was valid for three convictions of fraud, check forgery, and theft. In that case, the Court gave great deference to legislatures in mandating sentences for repeat offenders. Justice O'Connor writes that, as in Rummel, Ewing's conviction reflects \"rational legislative judgment\" and \"is justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55030:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55031:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55031:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlthough investigators concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contested liability and took the case to trial. State Farm assured the Campbells that they would represent their interests. After losing in court, the Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the first part of the trial, the jury found State Farm's decision not to settle unreasonable. In the second part, the trial court denied State Farm's renewed motion to exclude dissimilar out-of-state conduct evidence, ruling such evidence was admissible to determine whether State Farm's conduct in the Campbell case was indeed intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages. The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively. The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55031:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55031:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55031:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the punitive award of $145 million was neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was thus an irrational, arbitrary, and unconstitutional deprivation of the property of the insurer. The Court reasoned that evidence of dissimilar out-of-state misconduct was an improper basis for punishing the insurer for the limited harm and noted, \"few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.\" Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. Justices Scalia and Thomas argued that the Due Process Clause provides no substantive protections against excessive or unreasonable awards of punitive damages. Justice Ginsburg noted that the decision overstepped states' traditional territory to regulate punitive damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55031:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55032:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55032:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral Louisiana cotton gins sued Entergy, an electric utility company, because it had over-billed them for electricity between 1988 and 1994. The gins claimed that Entergy had failed to notify them of a lower rate that would have saved them more than $2 million over the six-year period. Louisiana law requires that utility companies notify customers when they are eligible for a lower rate. Furthermore, the gins claimed that Entergy had discriminated against them by notifying several other gins in the state of the lower rate. Deferring to the decision of the Louisiana Public Service Commission, the state's utility regulatory agency, a state district court ruled against Entergy. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the decision on appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55032:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55032:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55032:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the LPSC's order was preempted by the filed rate doctrine articulated in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, and Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354. Applying Nantahala and MP&L;, the Court reasoned that the LPSC's order impermissibly \"traps\" costs that have been allocated in a FERC tariff. The Court noted that it did not matter whether the FERC has spoken to the precise classification of ERS units, but only whether the FERC tariff dictates how and by whom that classification should be made. \"The amended system agreement clearly does so, and therefore the LPSC's second-guessing of the classification of ERS units is pre-empted,\" wrote Justice Thomas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55032:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55034:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55034:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC section 1226(c), the Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who is removable from this country because he has been convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, including an aggravated felony. After Hyung Joon Kim, a lawful permanent resident alien, was convicted in state court of first-degree burglary and petty theft with priors, the Immigration and Naturalization Service charged him with being deportable and detained him pending his removal hearing. Kim filed a habeas corpus action challenging section 1226(c) on the ground that his detention violated due process because the INS had made no determination that he posed either a danger to society or a flight risk. The District Court granted Kim's petition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the INS had not provided a justification for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a permanent resident alien's liberty interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55034:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55034:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55034:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held, 6-3, that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to aliens challenging their detention under section 1226(c) and, 5-4, that detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that Congress, concerned that deportable criminal aliens may fail to appear for their removal hearings, has the authority to require that persons be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, dissented from the first holding, reasoning that the Act deprives federal courts of jurisdiction in such a case. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented from the Court's second holding. The minority argued against the Court's approval of lengthy mandatory detention.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55034:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55035:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55035:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBeginning in 1996, a number of allegations arose that Nike was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities. Nike responded to the charges in numerous ways, such as by issuing press releases. In 1998, Marc Kasky, a California resident, sued Nike for unfair and deceptive practices under California's Unfair Competition Law. Kasky alleged that Nike made \"false statements and/or material omissions of fact\" concerning the working conditions under which its products are manufactured. Nike filed a demurrer, contending that Kasky's suit was absolutely barred by the First Amendment. The trial court dismissed the case and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. In reversing, the California Supreme Court found that Nike's messages were commercial speech, but that the suit was at such a preliminary stage that the issue whether any false representations had been made had yet to be resolved.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55035:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55035:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55035:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court did not answer the question dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy dissented. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, dissented. Justice Breyer argued that no jurisdictional rule prevented the Court from decided the case and that \"delay itself may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of free speech without making the issue significantly easier to decide later on.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55035:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55036:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55036:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Hazard Elimination Program provides state governments with funding to improve the most dangerous sections of their roads. To be eligible for funding, a state must undertake a thorough evaluation of its public roads. This led to concerns that the absence of confidentiality would increase the liability risk for accidents that took place at hazardous locations before improvements could be made. Ultimately, Congress provided that materials \"compiled or collected\" for purposes of the program \"shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding.\" In 1996, Ignacio Guillen's wife died in an automobile accident in a Pierce County, Washington intersection. While Washington had previously been denied funding for the intersection where the accident occurred, its second request was granted after the accident. Guillen first sought information on the intersection and then asserted that the state had been negligent in failing to install proper traffic controls. Washington sought to protect itself under the Program. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Program exceeded Congress's power under the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55036:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55036:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55036:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Clarence Thomas, the Court held that both the original program and its subsequent amendments fall within Congress's Commerce Clause power to \"'regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce'\" and \"'to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.'\" The Court concluded that, because Congress could reasonably believe that adopting a measure eliminating an unforeseen side effect of the Program's information-gathering requirement would result in greater safety on the nation's roads, the legislation was aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protections for the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55036:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55037:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55037:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPhilip Breuer sued in state court to resolve an overtime dispute under the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal removal statute. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have the case moved to federal court \"unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress.\" Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits under the FLSA to be heard in state court and that the case should therefore be returned to state court; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district court refused to send the case back to state court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55037:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55037:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55037:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered David H. Souter, the Court held that the FLSA does not bar removal of a suit from state to federal court, thus Breuer's case was properly removed under section 1441. The Court reasoned that nothing on the face of the FLSA looked like an express prohibition of removal, there being no mention of removal, let alone of prohibition, given that word \"maintain\" and its bearing on removal was ambiguous at best. Rejecting all of Breuer's arguments, the Court noted that numerous other statutes provided indisputable prohibitions of removal, which demonstrated Congress's intent to give plaintiffs an absolute choice of forum in unmistakable terms.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55037:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55038:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55038:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nErick Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in federal District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on November 23, 1998, the court's mandate issued on December 15, 1998, and Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. One year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate, and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expired, Clay filed a motion for postconviction relief under 28 USC section 2255. Section 2255 provides that such motions are subject to a one-year time limitation that runs from \"the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.\" The District Court stated that when a federal prisoner does not seek certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for section 2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals's mandate. Because Clay filed his motion more than one year after that date, the court denied it as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55038:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55038:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55038:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, for the purpose of starting the clock on section 2255's one-year limitation period, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction. Under this rule, Clay's section 2255 motion was timely filed. After comparing the understanding of finality for collateral review purposes to the meaning of the phrase \"becomes final\" in 28 USC section 2255, the Court rejected the standard that the issuance of the appellate court mandate is the triggering date.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55038:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55039:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55039:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBefore 1994, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) allowed States to charge interstate motor carriers annual registration fees of up to $10 per vehicle. Under this system, some States discounted or waived registration fees for carriers from other States in exchange for reciprocal treatment. Under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), the ICC implemented a new registration system. ISTEA also capped state registration fees by establishing a fee system that \"will result in a fee for each participating State that is equal to the fee?that such State collected or charged as of?1991.\" In 1991, the Michigan Public Service Commission did not levy a fee for Yellow Transportation, Inc.'s trucks pursuant to a reciprocal agreement. However, in 1992, the commission changed how it computed fees and, ultimately, levied a fee of $10 per vehicle on Yellow Transportation's entire fleet. Yellow Transportation sued, alleging that, because Michigan had not collected or charged a 1991 registration fee for those trucks, ISTEA's fee-cap provision prohibits Michigan from levying a fee for them. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that reciprocity agreements are not relevant in determining what fee a State charged or collected as of 1991. The court reasoned that the new fee system is not based on the fees collected from one company, but at the generic fee Michigan charged or collected from carriers as of 1991.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55039:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55039:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55039:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that, because the ICC's interpretation of ISTEA's fee-cap provision that States may not renounce or modify a reciprocity agreement so as to alter any fee charged or collected as of that date was permissible reading, the Michigan Supreme Court erred in declining to enforce it. \"Under the ICC's rule, where a State waives its registration fee, its 'fee?collected or charged' is zero and must remain zero,\" wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice O'Connor concluded,\" to allow States to disavow their reciprocity agreements so as to alter any fee charged or collected as of November 15, 1991, would potentially permit States to increase their revenues substantially under the new system, a result that the ICC quite reasonably believed Congress did not intend.\" Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55039:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55040:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55040:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe University of Michigan’s Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) considers a number of factors in its evaluative process, such as high school grades, standardized test scores, curriculum strength, alumni relationships, geography, and leadership. The OUA also considers race and admits virtually every qualified applicant from certain groups determined to be “underrepresented minorities.” Beginning in 1998, the OUA used a point system in which students were awarded an additional 20 points for being a member of an underrepresented minority, and beginning in 1999, the University established an Admissions Review Committee to provide an additional level of consideration.\nIn 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admission to the University of Michigan’ College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as residents of the state of Michigan. Both are of Caucasian descent. Both were denied admission and told that, although they were qualified, they were not competitive enough applicants to be admitted on first review. In October 1997, Gratz and Hamacher filed a class action suit against the University, the LSA, Lee Bollinger, and James Duderstadt. They argued that the admission procedure discriminated against certain racial and ethnic groups in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the respondents had shown that a racially and ethnically diverse student body produced significant academic benefits but that the admission policies of 1995-1998 were problematic because they amounted to “holding seats” for certain minority groups. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the petitioners with respect to the admissions policies for 1995-1998 and for the respondents with respect to the policy that began in 1999. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard this case the same day as Grutter v. Bollinger, a similar case, and upheld the University’s admission policies in that case. The petitioners in this case then asked the Court to grant certiorari, despite the lack of opinion from the lower court, to resolve the issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55040:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55040:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55040:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the OUA’s policies were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the strict scrutiny standard. Because the policy did not provide individual consideration, but rather resulted in the admission of nearly every applicant of “underrepresented minority” status, it was not narrowly tailored in the manner required by previous jurisprudence on the issue.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote that the record showed that the only individualized consideration in the admissions process came through the Admissions Review Committee. Because the Committee played only a small part in the overall admissions process, it was not sufficient to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he argued that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits any racial discrimination for the purposes of higher education admission. The admission policy in question failed because it did not allow for sufficient consideration of non-racial factors in determining the admissibility of a candidate from an underrepresented minority group. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that, in cases dealing with the Equal Protection Clause, the Court should distinguish between policies of inclusion and policies of exclusion because the former are much more likely to prove consistent with the intent of the Clause.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, because neither of the petitioners could receive any benefit from the relief being requested, precedent required that the case be dismissed. While they are entitled to relief for past wrongs, they cannot seek injunctive relief to prevent future harms to other parties. Justice David Souter joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Souter wrote that, by making race only one of a number of factors to be considered, the admissions policy meets the requirements established by previous Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Because the point system and the Admissions Review Committee operate in conjunction with each other, there cannot be the “holding of seats” phenomenon that the majority opinion fears. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which she argued that, because there is no evidence that the OUA policies attempt to limit or decrease enrollment by any particular racial or ethnic group and there is no evidence of saving seats, the policies do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Racial information about an applicant can be useful in admission considerations because it often serves to show what a student has accomplished and why the student is worthy of admission. Justice Souter joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55040:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55042:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55042:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1991, Leonard and Arlene Warner sold the Warner Manufacturing Company to Elliott and Carol Archer. Subsequently, the Archers sued the Warners for fraud connected with the sale. In settling the lawsuit, the Archers executed releases except for obligations under a $100,000 promissory note and then voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. After the Warners failed to make the first payment on the promissory note, the Archers sued in state court. The Warners filed for bankruptcy, and the Bankruptcy Court ordered liquidation under Chapter 7. The Archers then brought a claim asking the Bankruptcy Court to find the $100,000 debt nondischargeable and to order the Warners to pay the sum. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy \"to the extent\" it is \"for money...obtained by...false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.\" The Bankruptcy Court denied the Archers' claim. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55042:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55042:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55042:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a debt for money promised in a settlement agreement accompanied by the release of underlying tort claims can amount to a debt for money obtained by fraud, within the nondischargeability statute's terms. \"We conclude that the Archers' settlement agreement and releases may have worked a kind of novation, but that fact does not bar the Archers from showing that the settlement debt arose out of 'false pretences, a false representation, or actual fraud,' and consequently is nondischargeable,\" wrote Justice Breyer. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Justice John Paul Stevens joined, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55042:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55043:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55043:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctioned off certain broadband personal communications services licenses to NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., Nextwave filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and suspended payments to all creditors, including the FCC. The FCC asserted that NextWave's licenses had been canceled automatically when the company missed its first payment-deadline and announced that NextWave's licenses were available for auction. Ultimately, when the FCC denied NextWave's petition for reconsideration of the license cancellation, the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit held that the cancellation violated 11 USC section 525(a), which provides that a \"governmental unit may not...revoke...a license...to...a debtor...solely because such...debtor...has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case.\" (Together with No. 01-657, Arctic Slope Regional Corp. et al. v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc. et al.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55043:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55043:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55043:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the FCC's cancellations of the licenses violated section 525(a) as revocations of government licenses solely for nonpayment of the debtors' dischargeable debts. The Court rejected the FCC's argument that it did not revoke NextWave's licenses solely because of nonpayment and noted that the fact that the FCC had a valid regulatory motive for its action was irrelevant. Justice Scalia reasoned that, because the statute refers to failure to pay a debt as the sole cause of cancellation, it cannot reasonably be understood to include the governmental unit's motive in effecting the cancellation, since such a reading would deprive section 525 of force. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Stephen G. Breyer authored a dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55043:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55044:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55044:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter attending a gun show in Texas, Thomas Bean drove to Mexico. When Mexican officials stopped his vehicle at the border, they found ammunition, and Bean was subsequently convicted in a Mexican court of importing ammunition. Because of his felony conviction, 18 USC section 922(g)(1) prohibited Bean from possessing, distributing, or receiving firearms or ammunition. Bean applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for relief from his firearms disabilities, but the ATF returned the application unprocessed, explaining that its annual appropriations law forbade it from expending any funds to investigate or act upon applications such as Bean's. Bean then filed suit, asking the District Court to conduct its own inquiry into his fitness to possess a gun and grant relief from his inability to possess, distribute, or receive firearms or ammunition. The court granted the requested relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55044:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55044:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55044:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the absence of an actual denial of Bean's petition by ATF precludes judicial review. Because Bean's application for relief from the firearms disabilities was not considered due to appropriation provisions, Justice Thomas reasoned that the court could not grant relief since the statute only permitted judicial review of an affirmative denial of an application. \"The text of [section 925(c)] and the procedure it lays out for seeking relief make clear that an actual decision by ATF on an application is a prerequisite for judicial review, and that mere inaction by ATF does not invest a district court with independent jurisdiction to act on an application,\" wrote Justice Thomas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55044:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55045:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55045:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral H&R Block customers, who took out loans from Beneficial National Bank in anticipation of their tax refunds, sued the bank in state court. The customers alleged that the bank charged excessive interest in violation of Alabama law. The bank asked that the case be heard in federal, rather than state, court, because the issues were covered under the National Bank Act (NBA), a federal law. The district court ruled in favor of the bank; the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NBA did not completely preempt state laws governing lending rates and that the case could therefore be heard in state court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55045:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55045:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55045:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the National Bank Act preempted the state-law claim and provided the exclusive cause of action for usury claims against national banks. Thus, the claim arose under federal law. The Court reasoned that the provisions of the Act create a federal remedy for overcharges that is exclusive, even when a state complainant relies entirely on state law. \"Because [sections of the Act] provide the exclusive cause of action for such claims, there is, in short, no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national bank,\" wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55045:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55046:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55046:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA), a political subdivision of Virginia, owns and operates Whitcomb Court, a low-income housing development. In 1997, the Richmond City Council conveyed Whitcomb Court's streets to the RRHA. Subsequently, the RRHA enacted a policy authorizing the Richmond police to serve notice on any person lacking \"a legitimate business or social purpose\" for being on the premises and to arrest for trespassing any person who remains or returns after having been notified. After the RRHA gave Kevin Hicks, a nonresident, written notice barring him from Whitcomb Court, he trespassed there and was arrested and convicted. At trial, Hicks claimed that RRHA's policy was unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. The Virginia en banc Court of Appeals vacated his conviction. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found the policy unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55046:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55046:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55046:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the RRHA's trespass policy is not facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine. Noting that he was not in Whitcomb Court to engage in constitutionally protected speech, the Court reasoned that Hicks had not shown that the RRHA policy prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications. Justice Scalia wrote, \"both the notice-barment rule and the 'legitimate business or social purpose' rule apply to all persons who enter the streets of Whitcomb Court, not just to those who seek to engage in expression.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55046:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55048:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55048:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbids racial discrimination in respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. The Holleys, an interracial couple, alleged that a Triad real-estate corporation sales representative prevented them from buying a Triad-listed house for racially discriminatory reasons. The Holleys filed suit against the sales representative and David Meyer, Triad's president, sole shareholder, and licensed \"officer/broker,\" claiming that he was vicariously liable for the sales representative's unlawful actions. The District Court dismissed the claims, stating that the FHA did not impose personal vicarious liability upon a corporate officer or a \"designated officer/broker.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the FHA imposes strict liability principles beyond those traditionally associated with agent/principal or employee/employer relationships.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55048:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55048:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55048:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the FHA imposes liability without fault upon the employer in accordance with traditional agency principles. In other words, the FHA normally imposes vicarious liability upon the corporation, but not upon its officers or owners. In the absence of a clear indication of congressional intent to abrogate the common law principles of vicarious liability, the Court reasoned that neither the right of the officer to control the salesperson nor the overriding societal priority of the FHA's objectives warranted extending tort-related vicarious liability rules to include the officer. The Court also reasoned that nothing in the FHA supported imposing a non-delegable duty upon the officer to ensure that its salesperson did not discriminate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55048:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55049:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55049:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDeborah Wells worked for Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. from 1986 until 1997. Wells filed suit, alleging that Clackamas Gastroenterology violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) when it terminated her employment. Clackamas moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not covered by the Act because it did not have 15 or more employees for the 20 weeks required by the ADA. This argument depended on the four physician-shareholders, who own the professional corporation and constitute its board of directors, not being counted as employees. In granting the motion, the District Court concluded that the physicians were more analogous to partners in a partnership than to shareholders in a corporation and therefore were not employees under the ADA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found no reasoned to permit the professional corporation to argue it was a partnership so as to avoid employment discrimination liability.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55049:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55049:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55049:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the common-law element of control is the principal guidepost to be followed in deciding whether the four director-shareholder physicians in this case should be counted as employees and listed six factors that are relevant to such a decision. \"Because the District Court's findings appear to weigh in favor of concluding that the four physicians are not clinic employees, but evidence in the record may contradict those findings or support a contrary conclusion,\" the Court remanded the case for a determination under the new standard. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the physician-shareholders function in several respects as common-law employees in their capacity as doctors performing everyday functions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55049:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55050:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55050:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKentucky's two \"Any Willing Provider\" (AWP) statutes prohibit \"[a] health insurer [from] discriminating against any provider who is...willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the?insurer,\" and require a \"health benefit plan that includes chiropractic benefits [to]...permit any licensed chiropractor who agrees to abide by the terms [and] conditions?of the?plan to serve as a participating primary chiropractic provider.\" Certain health maintenance organizations (HMOs) filed suit asserting that Kentucky's AWP laws are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which preempts all state laws \"insofar as they?relate to any employee benefit plan,\" but saves from preemption state \"laws...which regulate insurance.\" The District Court concluded that although both AWP statutes \"relate to\" employee benefit plans each law \"regulates insurance\" and is therefore saved from preemption. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55050:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55050:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55050:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Kentucky's AWP statutes are \"laws...which regulate insurance\" under ERISA. The Court reasoned that the statutes were specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance, regardless of the fact that the statutes also had the effect of prohibiting providers from entering into limited network contracts with the HMOs. Moreover, the Court concluded that, by expanding the number of providers from whom an insured may receive health services, AWP laws alter the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds thus affecting the type of risk pooling arrangements that the HMOs could offer, thereby constituting regulation of the business of insurance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55050:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55051:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55051:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOliverio Martinez was stopped while riding his bicycle home from work by police investigating narcotics violations. When police attempted to handcuff him, a struggle ensued, but it is unclear who started it. During the struggle, Martinez was shot, resulting in permanent paralysis and loss of vision. A year later he sued the officers, saying the search and use of deadly force were unconstitutional. The officers introduced as evidence in their defense a taped confession obtained while Martinez was receiving medical treatment in the hospital, in which he admitted to grabbing the gun of one of the officers during the struggle. Martinez claimed that the tape could not be used as evidence because he had not been read his Miranda rights. The district court ruled with Martinez that the tape was inadmissible. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55051:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55051:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55051:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo; the Court remanded the substantive due process portion of the question. In a 6-3 judgment delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Chavez did not deprive Martinez of his Fifth Amendment rights. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, joined Justice Thomas. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, reasoned that Martinez's claim that his questioning alone was a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments could be recognized if a \"core guarantee\" would be placed at risk; however, Martinez could not make the showing necessary to expand protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. Regarding substantive due process, Justice Souter delivered a 5-4 holding concluding that the issue whether Martinez may pursue a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation should be addressed on remand.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55051:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55053:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55053:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) established rules governing disputes arising out of certain federal government contracts. After Congress enacted the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, which established a comprehensive concession management program for national parks, the National Park Service (NPS) issued 36 CFR section 51.3, which purported to render the CDA inapplicable to concession contracts. The National Park Hospitality Association challenged 51.3's validity. Upholding the regulation, the District Court concluded that the CDA is ambiguous as to whether it applies to concession contracts and found the NPS's interpretation reasonable. In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the NPS's reading of the CDA consistent with both the CDA and the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55053:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55053:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55053:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court did not answer the question. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the controversy was not yet ripe for judicial resolution. The Court reasoned that, because the NPS has no delegated rulemaking authority under the CDA, 51.3 is nothing more than a general policy statement designed to inform the public of NPS's views on the CDA's proper application and thus the National Park Hospitality Association's challenge was a facial one. Given the absence of a concrete dispute, the Court asked the parties provide supplemental briefing on whether the case was ripe for judicial action. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55053:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55054:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55054:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Dallas County prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 10 of the 11 African-Americans eligible to serve on the jury at Thomas Miller-El's capital murder trial, he moved to strike the jury on the ground that the exclusions violated equal protection. The trial judge denied relief, finding no evidence indicating a systematic exclusion of African-Americans. Subsequently, the jury found Miller-El guilty, and he was sentenced to death. After Miller-El's direct appeal and state habeas corpus petitions were denied, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The Federal District Court denied Miller-El's application for a certificate of appealability (COA) in deference to the state courts' acceptance of the prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking the potential jurors. The Court of Appeals also denied the COA, finding that Miller-El failed to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55054:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55054:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55054:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Court of Appeals should have issued a COA to review the District Court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The Court reasoned, \"when a habeas applicant seeks permission to initiate appellate review of the dismissal of his petition, the court of appeals should limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of his claims.\" Thus, a prisoner seeking a COA need only demonstrate \"a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right\" and satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to proceed further. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55054:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55055:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55055:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a \"compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body.\" The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's \"critical mass\" was the functional equivalent of a quota.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55055:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55055:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55055:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, \"in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55055:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55056:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55056:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1987, Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman was convicted of first-degree murder and related charges. In state post-conviction proceedings, Abdur'Rahman presented claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Presenting all of his claims to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Abdur'Rahman was denied leave to appeal, and then he only presented some of his claims, on which he ultimately lost, to the federal District Court. While Abdur'Rahman's certiorari petition was pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted Rule 39, which expressly states that Tennessee litigants do not need to seek discretionary review from the court in order to exhaust their claims. Abdur'Rahman then filed a federal motion for relief of judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, re-presenting claims that the district court had previously determined to be unexhausted and procedurally barred. The District Court construed the Rule 60(b) motion as a second, or successive, habeas corpus petition and denied relief. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals denied all of Abdur'Rahman's motions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55056:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55056:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55056:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. Justice Stevens argued that the Court of Appeals plainly erred when it characterized Abdur'Rahman's Rule 60(b) motion as an application for a second or successive habeas petition and denied relief for that reason.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55056:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55058:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55058:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress passed the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in 2000, requiring public libraries to install internet filtering software on their computers in order to qualify for federal funding. The American Library Association and others challenged the law, claiming that it improperly required them to restrict the First Amendment rights of their patrons. As stipulated by the law, a three judge panel heard the case, and ruled unanimously that the CIPA violated the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55058:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55058:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55058:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 judgment delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that, because public libraries' use of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons' First Amendment rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution and is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Both noted that CIPA imposed a comparatively small burden on library Internet users that was not disproportionate to any potential speech-related harm, especially in light of the libraries' ability to unblock sites. Justices John Paul Stevens and David H. Souter dissented. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55058:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55059:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55059:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1984 Dow Chemical Co. negotiated a settlement in a class action lawsuit filed by Vietnam War veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange and subsequently developed various injuries and illnesses. The settlement created a fund that would pay those who developed illnesses up until 1994. Daniel Stephenson, a Vietnam veteran, developed cancer in 1998 and could therefore not collect money from the fund. He sued, saying that he was not adequately represented in the original settlement, which made no provision for injuries that developed after 1994. Therefore, he claimed, he had the right to file a suit of his own. The district court ruled for Dow Chemical; the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, ruling for Stephenson.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55059:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55059:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55059:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAn equally divided Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. In a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the judgment of Court of Appeals with respect to Stephenson and vacated and remanded the judgment of Court of Appeals with respect to Isaacson for further consideration in light of Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002). Justice John Paul Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55059:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55060:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55060:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKhanh Phuong Nguyen and Tuyet Mai Thi Phan were tried, convicted, and sentenced on federal narcotics charges in the District Court of Guam, a territorial court with subject-matter jurisdiction over both federal-law and local-law causes. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit panel that convened to hear their appeals included two judges from that court, both of whom are life-tenured Article III judges, and the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, an Article IV territorial-court judge appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a 10-year term. Neither Nguyen nor Phan objected to the panel's composition before the cases were submitted for decision and neither sought rehearing to challenge the panel's authority to decide their appeals immediately after it affirmed their convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55060:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55060:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55060:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals panel did not have the authority to decide Nguyen and Phan's appeals. The Court reasoned that the territorial judge was precluded from designation to the panel and thus the defendants' appeals required reconsideration by a properly constituted panel. The Court found that the statutory and constitutional provisions governing the creation and tenure of territorial judges were distinct from those for district court judges and that the territorial district court was not constituted pursuant to the chapter required to meet the definition of a district court. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that neither Nguyen nor Phan showed that the error seriously affected the judicial proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55060:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55061:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55061:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, Angelo Tsakopoulos purchased the Borden Ranch, an 8348-acre ranch in California. Tsakopoulos planned to subdivide the land into parcels for cultivation as vineyards and orchards. Because a dense layer of material prevented water from reaching the depths necessary to cultivate vineyards or orchards, Tsakopoulos intended to \"deep rip\" the soil. Deep ripping has a dramatic effect on the character of a wetland area. The Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency informed Tsakopoulos that he was not to deep rip protected waters without a permit. Ultimately, the District Court found that Tsakopoulos had violated the Clean Water Act multiple times and imposed a substantial fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55061:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55061:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55061:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the judgment of the appeals court by an equally divided vote. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55061:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55062:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55062:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEvery state uses interest on lawyers' trust accounts (IOLTA) to pay for legal services for the needy. Among it rules, Washington's program requires that funds that cannot earn net interest for the client be deposited in an IOLTA account. The Supreme Court of Washington extended its IOLTA rules to cover Limited Practice Officers (LPOs), nonlawyers who are licensed to act as escrowees in real estate closings. Allen Brown and Greg Hayes alleged that they regularly purchase and sell real estate, in the course of such transactions they deliver funds to LPOs who are required to deposit them in IOLTA accounts, and the taking of the interest earned on their funds in IOLTA accounts violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court found, among other things, that Brown and Hayes had lost nothing. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reasoned that there was no taking because Brown and Hayes had suffered neither an actual loss nor an interference with any investment-backed expectations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55062:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55062:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55062:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that state law that requires client funds that could not otherwise generate net earnings for the client to be deposited in an IOLTA account is not a regulatory taking. Moreover, the Court reasoned that, because compensation is measured by the owner's pecuniary loss, which is zero whenever the Washington law is obeyed, there is no violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court's decision created an exception to its general rule that the just compensation owed to former owners of confiscated property is the fair market value of the property taken. Justice Kennedy also filed a separate dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55062:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55063:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55063:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nV Secret Catalogue, Inc., the affiliated corporations that own the Victoria's Secret trademarks, filed suit, alleging that the name Victor's Little Secret contributed to \"the dilution of famous marks\" under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). The law defines \"dilution\" as \"the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.\" The District Court granted V Secret summary judgment on the FTDA claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that V Secret's mark was distinctive and that the evidence established dilution even though no actual harm had been proved.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55063:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55063:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55063:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to parts I, II, and IV of the opinion, which held that the FTDA requires proof of actual dilution. The Court reasoned this standard, as opposed to a presumption of harm arising from a subjective \"likelihood of dilution\" standard, controlled. \"There is a complete absence of evidence of any lessening of the capacity of the Victoria's Secret mark to identify and distinguish goods or services sold in Victoria's Secret stores or advertised in its catalogs,\" wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Antonin Scalia did not join the portion of the Court's opinion that discussed legislative intent. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy filed a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55063:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55064:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55064:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDoubleday published the WWII book, Crusade in Europe, registered the work's copyright, and granted exclusive television rights to Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. In 1975, Doubleday renewed the book's copyright, but Fox never renewed the copyright on the television series, leaving the series in the public domain. In 1988, Fox reacquired the television rights. In 1995, Dastar Corporation released a video set, World War II Campaigns in Europe, which it made from tapes of the original version of the Crusade television series. Fox filed suit, alleged that Dastar's sale of Campaigns without proper credit to the Crusade television series constituted \"reverse passing off\" in violation of the Lanham Act. The District Court granted Fox summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, because Dastar copied substantially the Crusade series, labeled it with a different name, and marketed it without attribution to Fox, Dastar had committed a \"bodily appropriation\" of Fox's series, which was sufficient to establish reverse passing off.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55064:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55064:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55064:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo; the Court did not answer the question. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not prevent the unaccredited copying of an uncopyrighted work. Under the Lanham Act, the Court reasoned that no false designation of origin was shown since the phrase \"origin of goods,\" as used in the Act, did not connote the person or entity that originated the ideas contained in the video, but instead referred only to the producer's tangible video product. Thus, Dastar was the \"origin\" of the products it sold as its own, without acknowledging the series, because it marketed a video that copied a public domain television series. Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55064:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55065:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55065:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCalifornia regulates the minimum price paid to dairy farmers producing raw milk by establishing price minimums and requiring contributions to a price equalization pool. After it became profitable for some California processors to buy raw milk from out-of-state producers, the California Department of Food and Agriculture amended its regulations to require contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases. Four dairy farms in Nevada filed suit, alleging that the amendment unconstitutionally discriminated against them. Without reaching the merits, the District Court dismissed both cases. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 immunized California's milk pricing and pooling laws from Commerce Clause challenge. The appellate court also held that the individual petitioners' Privileges and Immunities Clause claims failed because the amendment did not create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55065:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55065:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55065:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held, 8-1, that, because the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 did not clearly express an intent to insulate California's pricing and pooling laws from a Commerce Clause challenge, the Court of Appeals erred in relying on it to dismiss the case. The Court also held, 9-0, that the appellate court erred in rejecting the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim on the ground that the California laws did not, on their face, create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship. The Court reasoned that the absence of an express statement identifying out-of-state citizenship as a basis for disparate treatment was not a sufficient basis for rejecting the claim. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55065:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55066:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55066:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the False Claims Act (FCA), \"any person\" who \"knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval\" is liable to the federal government. A private person may bring a qui tam action \"in the name of the Government\" under the FCA. After the National Institute of Drug Abuse gave Cook County Hospital a $5 million research grant, Janet Chandler, who ran the study for a nonprofit research institute affiliated with the hospital, filed a qui tam action, claiming that Cook County and the institute had submitted false statements to obtain grant funds. Based on precedent, which held that States are not \"persons\" subject to FCA qui tam actions, the District Court granted the County's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55066:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55066:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55066:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the term \"person\" includes local governments. The Court noted that the County, as a recipient of federal funding, was clearly able to abuse federal spending and was thus subject to the FCA remedy that applied to prevent such abuse. Rejecting the Country's argument that is was not subject to punitive damages, the Court responded that the federal government amended the FCA to make it a more effective tool against fraud. \"It is simply not plausible that Congress intended to repeal municipal liability sub silentio by the very Act it passed to strengthen the Government's hand in fighting false claims,\" wrote Justice Souter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55066:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55067:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55067:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 authorizes magistrate judges to conduct \"any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case\" with \"the consent of the parties.\" When Jon Withrow, a state prisoner, brought suit against members of the prison's medical staff, he gave written consent for the magistrate judge to preside over the entire case. Only one of the three staff members gave written consent. The other two members voluntarily participated. When the medical staff won, Withrow appealed and the Court of Appeals sua sponte remanded the case to determine whether the parties had consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. Ultimately, the magistrate judge reported that she had lacked jurisdiction because such consent had to be expressly given. The District Court adopted the report and recommendation. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that consent must be express and that the staffs' postjudgment consent was inadequate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55067:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55067:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55067:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that consent to a magistrate judge's designation can be inferred from a party's conduct during litigation. Distinguishing between full and part-time magistrate judges, the Court reasoned that the \"unadorned references\" regarding the consent of the parties and full-time magistrate judges provided for jurisdiction as long as the parties voluntarily consented. \"[The two staff members'] general appearances before the Magistrate Judge, after they had been told of their right to be tried by a district judge, supply the consent necessary for the Magistrate Judge's 'civil jurisdiction,'\" wrote Justice Souter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55067:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55068:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55068:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, the Commissioner of Social Security \"shall, before October 1, 1993,\" assign each coal industry retiree eligible for benefits under the Act to a company, which shall then be responsible for funding the beneficiary's benefits. After October 1, 1993, the Commissioner assigned 600 hundred beneficiaries to various coal companies. The companies challenged the assignments, claiming that the statutory date sets a time limit on the Commissioner's power to assign such that a beneficiary not assigned on October 1, 1993 must be left unassigned for life. Under the companies' argument, the challenged assignments are void and the corresponding benefits must be financed by other pension plans and funds. The companies obtained summary judgments, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55068:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55068:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55068:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Commissioner's initial assignments made after October 1, 1993, are valid despite their untimeliness. The Court reasoned that a statute directing official action needed more than a mandatory \"shall\" before the grant of power would be read to expire when the job was supposed to be completed. Moreover, Justice Souter noted that the Act was designed to assign the greatest number of beneficiaries and read the statutory date as a spur to prompt action. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissenting opinion. Both read the Act has establishing a clear deadline for the expiration of the Commissioner's authority.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55068:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55069:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55069:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1971, Congress enacted tax provisions providing special tax treatment for export sales made by an American manufacturer through a subsidiary that qualified as a \"domestic international sales corporation\" (DISC). Regarding research and development (R&D) expenses, Treasury Regulation 26 CFR section 1.861-8(e)(3) provides what must be treated as a cost when calculating combined taxable income (CTI), and how those costs should be allocated among different products and apportioned between the DISC and its parent. Under this regulation, the Internal Revenue Service reallocated Boeing's company sponsored R&D costs for 1979 to 1987, thereby decreasing the untaxed profits of its export subsidiaries and increasing its taxable profits on export sales. Subsequently, Boeing filed suit, arguing that it had an unqualified right to allocate its company sponsored R&D expenses to specific products and to exclude any allocated R&D from being treated as a cost of another product. In granting Boeing summary judgment, the District Court found section 1.861-8(e)(3) invalid due to a specific DISC regulation giving the taxpayer the right to group and allocate income and costs by product or product line. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55069:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55069:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55069:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that section 1.861-8(e)(3) is a proper exercise of the Secretary of the Treasury's rulemaking authority. The Court reasoned that the general regulation classifying all R&D as an indirect cost attributable to all export sales was not arbitrary as it provided consistent treatment for costs items used in computing domestic taxable income and combined taxable income. Justice Stevens wrote that the rule's \"allocation of R&D expenditures to all products in a category even when specifically intended to improve only one or a few of those products is no more tenuous than the allocation of a chief executive officer's salary to every product that a company sells even when he devotes virtually all of his time to the development of an Edsel.\" Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Antonin Scalia joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55069:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55072:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55072:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1971 Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, banning direct corporate donations to federal election campaigns. In 2000, Christine Beaumont and the North Carolina Right to Life (NCRL), an anti-abortion advocacy group, challenged the act, saying it violated their right to free speech. The group is an incorporated non-profit that lobbies and backs political candidates friendly to its cause, but under the act it cannot make political donations. The district court ruled in favor of NCRL. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55072:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55072:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55072:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that applying the direct contribution prohibition to nonprofit advocacy corporations is consistent with the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that it could not hold for NCRL \"without recasting our understanding of the risks of harm posed by corporate political contributions, of the expressive significance of contributions, and of the consequent deference owed to legislative judgments on what to do about them.\" Justice Anthony M. Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissented, arguing that section 441b should have been subject to strict scrutiny and, under this standard, it could not stand.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55072:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55073:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55073:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, California enacted a new criminal statute of limitations permitting prosecution for sex-related child abuse where the prior limitations period has expired if the prosecution is begun within one year of a victim's report to police. In 1998, Marion Stogner was indicted for sex-related child abuse committed between 1955 and 1973. Without the new statute allowing revival of the State's cause of action, California could not have prosecuted Stogner. Stogner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids revival of a previously time-barred prosecution. The trial court agreed, but the California Court of Appeal reversed. The trial court denied Stogner's subsequent dismissal motion, in which he argued that his prosecution violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. The Court of Appeal affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55073:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55073:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55073:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution. The Court reasoned that the features of the law produce the kind of retroactivity that the Constitution forbids by inflicting punishment where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment. \"After...the original statute of limitations had expired,...Stogner was not 'liable to any punishment,'\" wrote Justice Breyer. \"California's new statute therefore 'aggravated' Stogner's alleged crime, or made it 'greater than it was, when committed,' in the sense that...it 'inflicted punishment' for past criminal conduct that...did not trigger any such liability.\" In his dissent, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy argued, \"A law which does not alter the definition of the crime but only revives prosecution does not make the crime 'greater than it was, when committed.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55073:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55074:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55074:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of racetracks that earn revenue from gambling sued the state of Iowa, claiming that the state's practice of taxing racetrack gambling at a higher rate than riverboat gambling violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The group asserted that gambling at racetracks and riverboat casinos is is not substantially different, and that the state should therefore charge the same tax rate for both activities. A state district court sided with the state, ruling that important differences did exist between riverboat and racetrack gambling; the Iowa Supreme Court reversed in a 4-3 decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55074:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55074:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55074:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Iowa's differential tax rate, which distinguishes between adjusted revenues from slot machines at racetracks and revenues from riverboat slot machines, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the facts did not preclude an inference that the reason for the different tax rates was to help the riverboat industry or the river communities. Thus, the Court reasoned there was a rational basis for the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55074:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55075:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55075:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring Duyonn Vincent's trial, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder. Subsequently, when the prosecution made a statement on first-degree murder, defense counsel objected, arguing that the court had granted its directed verdict motion and that further prosecution on first-degree murder would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judge responded that he had granted the motion but had not directed a verdict. The judge then submitted the first-degree murder charge to the jury, which convicted Vincent on that charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. In reversing, the State Supreme Court determined that the trial judge's comments were not sufficiently final to terminate jeopardy. Subsequently, the Federal District Court granted Vincent's federal habeas corpus petition after concluding that continued prosecution for first-degree murder had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55075:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55075:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55075:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the defendant did not meet the requirements for habeas relief. The Court stated that Vincent was entitled to relief only if he can demonstrate that the state court's adjudication of his claim was \"contrary to\" or an \"unreasonable application of\" the Court's clearly established precedents. Finding that the state court's adjudication of his claim was not, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals because \"Even if we agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Double Jeopardy Clause should be read to prevent continued prosecution of a defendant under these circumstances, it was at least reasonable for the state court to conclude otherwise.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55075:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55076:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55076:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a class action alleging that certain individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through \"a pattern of racketeering activity\" that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against the abortion opponents. Upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals held, in part, that the things abortion supporters claimed were extorted from them, such as women's right to seek medical services from the clinics and the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, constituted \"property\" that was \"obtained\" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. (Together with No. 01-1119, Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55076:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55076:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55076:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an 8-1 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that abortion opponents did not commit extortion because they did not \"obtain\" property from the abortion supporters as required by the Hobbs Act. The Court further held that is first holding renders insufficient the other bases or predicate acts of racketeering supporting the jury's conclusion that the abortion opponents violated RICO. While the opponents' conduct constituted the separate offense of coercion, reasoned Chief Justice Rehnquist, the opponents neither pursued nor received something of value from the supporters that the opponents could exercise, transfer, or sell, and thus did not commit extortion. Without an underlying RICO violation, the Court vacated the District Court's injunction and did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55076:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55077:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55077:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Public Law 86-392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common-law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported a money damages claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55077:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55077:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55077:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Public Law 86-392 gives rise to Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over the Tribe's suit. The Court reasoned that, although the statute providing for the land to be held in trust imposed no duties on the United States to maintain the land, the occupation of such land by the United States raised a duty to preserve trust assets and that it naturally followed that the United States was liable in damages for the breach of such duties. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that the majority's opinion \"radically alters the relevant inquiry from one focused on the actual fiduciary duties created by statute or regulation to one divining fiduciary duties out of the use of the word 'trust' and notions of factual control.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55077:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55078:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55078:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIf a federal court with jurisdiction over a civil action declines to exercise supplement jurisdiction over other related claims, the claims will be dismissed and must be refiled in state court. To prevent the limitations period on those claims from expiring, 28 USC section 1367(d) requires state courts to toll the period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court. In 1994, Susan Jinks filed a federal-court action against Richland County, South Carolina. The District Court granted the county summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jinks's state-law claims. Jinks then filed the supplemental claims in state court and won. In reversing, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found the state-law claims time-barred. Although they would not have been barred under section 1367(d)'s tolling rule, the court held section 1367(d) unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court against a State's political subdivisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55078:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55078:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55078:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that section 1367(d)'s application to claims brought against a State's political subdivisions is constitutional. The Court reasoned that section 1367(d) is necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress's power \"to constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\" under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, as it provides a straightforward tolling rule, which promotes fair and efficient operation of the federal courts and is therefore conducive to the administration of justice. The Court also reiterated that, while Congress lacks Article I authority to override a State's immunity from suit in its own courts, it may subject a municipality to suit in state court if that is done pursuant to a valid exercise of its enumerated powers. Justice David H. Souter filed a concurring opinion, noting that he did not shift from his dissent in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55078:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55081:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55081:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, Article 1, section 8, \"Congress shall have Power...to promote the Progress of Science...by securing [to Authors] for limited Times...the exclusive Right to their...Writings.\" In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years, making copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have entered the public domain, argued that the CTEA violates both the Copyright Clause's \"limited Times\" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. They claimed Congress cannot extend the copyright term for published works with existing copyrights. The District Court and the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55081:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55081:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55081:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutional limitations in placing existing and future copyrights in parity in the CTEA. Disagreeing with the argument that a copyright once set is fixed, the majority found that the CTEA \"continues the unbroken congressional practice of treating future and existing copyrights in parity for term extension purposes,\" and is a permissible exercise of Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. Moreover, the Court held that the CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights does not violate the First Amendment. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the CTEA amounted to a grant of perpetual copyright that undermined public interests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55081:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55085:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55085:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1999 the California legislature enacted the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) in an attempt to facilitate Holocaust-era insurance claims by California residents. The Act required all insurance companies doing business in California that sold policies to people in Europe between 1920 and 1945 to make public all of those policies, including the names of policy owners and the status of the policies. A group of insurance companies and a trade organization sued, saying that only the federal government, with its jurisdiction over commerce and foreign affairs, had the right to enact such legislation. They also said the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution because the companies, if they failed to comply, could lose their insurance licenses. The District Court ruled for the insurance companies; the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55085:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55085:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55085:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that California's HVIRA interferes with the president's ability to conduct the nation's foreign policy and is therefore preempted. The Court reasoned that an exercise of state power that concerns foreign relations must yield to the Federal Government's policy or that generally there is executive authority to decide what policy should be implemented. Based on an account of related international negotiations, the Court found sufficiently clear conflict between HVIRA and the President's foreign policy. \"The basic fact is that California seeks to use an iron fist where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves,\" wrote Justice Souter. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that no executive agreement or other formal expression of foreign policy expressly disapproved of state disclosure laws like California's HVIRA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55085:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55087:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55087:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLeandro Andrade was found guilty of two felony counts of petty theft with a prior conviction after he stole approximately $150 worth of videotapes. Under California's three strikes regime, a judge sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life. In affirming, the California Court of Appeal rejected his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. After the Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review, Andrade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The District Court denied his petition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals granted Andrade a certificate of appealability as to his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55087:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55087:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55087:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the California Court of Appeal's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Court's clearly established law within the meaning of 28 USC section 2254(d)(1). The Court reasoned that, because the \"precise contours\" of the proportionality principle were unclear, it was not objectively unreasonable for the state appellate court to conclude that the \"contours\" permitted an affirmance of the sentence. The gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case, wrote Justice O'Connor. \"This is the rare sentence of demonstrable gross disproportionality,\" argued Justice David H. Souter in his dissent, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55087:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55088:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55088:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of physicians filed suit against a number of managed-health-care organizations, alleging they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by failing to reimburse them for health-care services that they had provided to patients covered by the organizations' plans. The District Court refused to compel arbitration of the RICO claims on the ground that the arbitration clauses in the parties' agreements prohibited awards of punitive damages. Subsequently, the court found the arbitration agreements unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55088:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55088:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55088:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the proper course in this case was to compel arbitration. The Court reasoned that since it did not know how the arbitrator would construe the remedial limitations, given the Court's prior decisions, the questions whether they render the parties' agreement unenforceable was unusually abstract and thus it would be premature for the Court to address them. Justice Clarence Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55088:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55089:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55089:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGilbert Hyatt filed a part-year resident income-tax return in California for 1991, which represented that he had become a Nevada resident in October 1991, shortly before he received substantial licensing fees. The California Franchise Tax Board (CFTB) determined that Hyatt was a California resident until April 1992 and issued notices of proposed assessments and imposed substantial civil fraud penalties. Hyatt filed suit against CFTB in a Nevada state court, alleging that CFTB had committed negligence and intentional torts during the course of its audit. CFTB argued that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because full faith and credit required that the court apply California law immunizing CFTB from suit. Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court allowed the intentional tort claims to proceed to trial. The court held that affording CFTB statutory immunity with respect to intentional torts would contravene Nevada's interest in protecting its citizens from injurious intentional torts and bad faith acts committed by sister States' government employees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55089:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55089:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55089:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Nevada to give full faith and credit to California's statutes providing its tax agency with immunity from suit. Noting that Nevada did not grant immunity to its agencies for intentional torts, the Court reasoned that Nevada's interest in redressing intentional tortious conduct was sufficient to decline to accord full faith and credit to California's immunity of its tax agency to bar intentional tort claims. Accordingly, the Court refused to adopt a new rule mandating that a state court extend full faith and credit to a sister State's statutorily recaptured sovereign immunity from suit when a refusal to do so would interfere with the State's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55089:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55090:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55090:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKevin Wiggins was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1988 murder. He appealed, claiming that his attorney's decision not to tell jurors about Wiggins' troubled childhood amounted to ineffective counsel because it resulted in a harsher sentence. Prosecutors countered that the attorney's decision had been carefully considered, and that a different decision would not necessarily have resulted in a different outcome. Therefore, they said, it was not ineffective counsel. A Maryland district court sided with Wiggins; the Maryland Supreme Court reversed, siding with the state. On appeal to federal court, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling for Maryland.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55090:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55090:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55090:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the performance of Wiggins's attorneys at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court reasoned that Wiggins's counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation because, among other things, standard practice in Maryland in 1989 included the preparation of a social history report, which his attorneys did not commission even though the necessary funds were available. The Court concluded that Wiggins's counsels' failures prejudiced his defense. \"Had the jury been able to place [Wiggins's] excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance,\" wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55090:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55092:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55092:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) allows Indian tribes, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to lease the mining rights on their tribal lands to private companies. In 1964, Navajo Nation (tribe) entered into a lease with the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company, allowing Peabody to mine on the tribe's land in return for a royalty of 37.5 cents for every ton of coal mined. The agreement was subject to renegotiation after 20 years. By 1984, the tribe's royalty was only worth 2% of Peabody's gross proceeds. In 1977 Congress had required a minimum of 12.5%. The tribe requested that the Secretary set a new rate, and the Director of Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area, as the Secretary's representative, made a preliminary decision to set the rate at 20%. Peabody's representatives urged the Secretary to reverse or delay the decision. The Secretary agreed, and urged the parties to resume negotiations. The tribe and Peabody agreed on a rate of 12.5%. In 1993, however, the tribe sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of trust and claiming $600 million in damages. The court ruled for the government, explaining that though the government may have betrayed the tribe's trust by acting in Peabody's interest rather than the tribe's, it had not violated any specific statutory or regulatory obligation. The tribe was therefore not entitled to monetary relief. On appeal, the tribe argued that the entirety of the IMLA imposes on the government a broad obligation to look after the wellbeing of the tribe. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court, finding that \"the Secretary must act in the best interests of the Indian tribes.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55092:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55092:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55092:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that an Indian Tribe must \"identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties.\" The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the IMLA could not be interpreted to require the Secretary to exercise broad authority to manage the tribe's resources for the tribe's benefit. Instead, the tribe itself controls negotiations and the Secretary has a more limited role in approving the agreements. The Court concluded that no provision of the IMLA entitled the tribe to monetary damages as a result of the government's role in the negotiations. Justice Souter, joined by justices Stevens and O'Connor, wrote a dissent arguing that the Secretary's approval power must be exercised for the tribe's benefit, and monetary damages may be awarded if the power is misused.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55092:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55094:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55094:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWith the recommendation of his doctor, Kenneth Nord filed for disability benefits with his employer of 25 years, Kwikset Corp., a company owned by Black & Decker Corp. After the company denied his claim, Nord asked for a review of the denial. A doctor hired by the company determined that Nord could in fact perform the duties required by his job and was therefore ineligible for benefits, despite determinations to the contrary by Nord's physician, his orthopedic surgeon and a Black & Decker human resource representative. Nord sued to have the decision reversed, claiming that the company's preference of its doctor's opinion over the opinions of the other physicians violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The district court ruled in favor of Black & Decker Corp. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55094:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55094:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55094:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that plan administrators are not obliged to accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians. The Court reasoned that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied a \"treating physician rule\" because nothing in ERISA gave rise to such a rule. Justice Ginsburg wrote, \"courts have no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant's physician; nor may courts impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of explanation when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician's evaluation.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55094:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55095:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55095:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJoseph Massaro was indicted on federal racketeering charges, including murder in aid of racketeering. Though prosecutors found a bullet before the trial began and did not inform the defense until the trial was underway, defense counsel declined more than once the trial court's offer of a continuance so the bullet could be examined. Subsequently, Massaro was convicted. On direct appeal, Massaro but did not raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Massaro later moved to vacate his conviction, under 28 USC section 2255, based on an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. The District Court found his claim procedurally defaulted because he could have raised it on direct appeal. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that, when the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the ineffective-assistance claim is based solely on the trial record, the claim must be raised on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55095:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55095:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55095:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a collateral proceeding under section 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal. The Court reasoned that requiring a criminal defendant to bring ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal would create a risk that defendants would feel compelled to raise the issue before there has been an opportunity fully to develop it. Moreover, the Court noted its new rule would provide for ineffective-assistance claims to be litigated in the District Court, the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation during an entire trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55095:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55096:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55096:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRex Sprietsma's wife was killed in a boating accident when she was struck by the propeller of a motor made by Mercury Marine. Sprietsma sued Mercury Marine under Illinois common law, alleging that his wife's injuries were caused by an unreasonably dangerous motor. The trial court, the intermediate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court all dismissed the complaint, finding the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) preempted such state common-law claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55096:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55096:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55096:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held 8-0 that neither the text nor the intent of the FBSA preempts Sprietsma's common law claims, either explicitly or implicitly. Justice Stevens wrote, \"Absent a contrary decision by the Coast Guard\" - the agency in charge of propeller-safety regulations - \"the concern with uniformity does not justify the displacement of state common-law remedies that compensate accident victims...\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55096:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55097:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55097:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVietNow National Headquarters, a charitable nonprofit corporation, retained for-profit fundraising telemarketing corporations to solicit donations to aid Vietnam veterans. The contracts provided that the telemarketers would retain 85 percent of the gross receipts from Illinois donors. The Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint in state court, alleging that the telemarketers represented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be paid over to VietNow for charitable endeavors and that such representations were knowingly deceptive and materially false and constituted a fraud. The trial court granted the telemarketers' motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Courts relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that held that certain regulations of charitable solicitation barring fees in excess of a prescribed level effectively imposed prior restraints on fundraising and were therefore incompatible with the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55097:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55097:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55097:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, consistent with the Court's precedent and the First Amendment, States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used. The Court reasoned that, while bare failure to disclose that information directly to potential donors does not suffice to establish fraud, when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the listener, the First Amendment does not preclude a fraud claim. Because the state's action was on misrepresentations that were not protected by freedom of speech, rather than the high percentage of donations retained, the Court concluded that the allegations against the telemarketers therefore state a claim for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55097:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55098:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55098:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen David Sattazahn's penalty-phase jury reported to the trial judge that it was hopelessly deadlocked 9-to-3 for life imprisonment, the court discharged the jury and entered a life sentence, as required under Pennsylvania law. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed Sattazahn's first-degree murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. At the second trial, Pennsylvania again sought the death penalty and the jury again convicted Sattazahn, but this time the jury imposed a death sentence. In affirming, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty at the retrial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55098:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55098:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55098:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that there was neither a Double Jeopardy Clause nor a Due Process Clause bar to Pennsylvania's seeking the death penalty on retrial. The Court reasoned that the death sentence on retrial did not implicate a double jeopardy bar because the life sentence at issue did not amount to an acquittal based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence or that the government failed to prove one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also refused to hold that the Due Process Clause provides greater double-jeopardy protection than does the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55098:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55099:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55099:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSix employees of the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company contracted asbestosis, a disease caused by exposure to asbestos. The employees brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), including a damages request for pain and suffering caused by a fear of cancer (which they had not yet contracted). The district court ruled for the plaintiffs. The court of appeals denied discretionary review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55099:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55099:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55099:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. The court ruled that an employee who has developed asbestosis as a result of the actions or negligence of his employer has a reasonable fear of cancer and may collect damages for the emotional distress caused by this fear. Furthermore, under FELA the railroad is liable for damage caused \"in whole or in part\" by its negligence. It is the responsibility of the railroad to seek contribution from other parties involved in causing the damage.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55099:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55100:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55100:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing the 2000 Census, the Democratic-controlled Georgia legislature passed a redistricting plan that was backed by many black leaders because it would have spread black voters and influence across several districts rather than concentrating them in a select few. Georgia's Republican governor objected to the plan because he said it violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which discourages the dilution of minority voting strength. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the legislature's plan.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55100:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55100:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55100:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that the District Court failed to consider all the relevant factors when it examined whether Georgia's Senate plan resulted in a retrogression of black voters' effective exercise of the electoral franchise. The Court reasoned that Georgia likely met its burden of showing nonretrogression under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because the District Court focused too narrowly on certain districts without examining the increases in the black voting age population that occurred in many of the other districts and improperly rejected evidence that the legislators representing the benchmark majority-minority districts support the plan. In his dissent, Justice David H. Souter argued that Georgia had failed to carry its burden.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55100:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55102:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55102:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nConnecticut's \"Megan's Law\" requires persons convicted of sexual offenses to register with the Department of Public Safety and requires the Department to post a sex offender registry containing registrants' names, addresses, photographs, and descriptions on the Internet. John Doe, a convicted sex offender who is subject to the law, filed suit, claiming that the law violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District Court enjoined the law's public disclosure provisions. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that such disclosure violated the Due Process Clause because officials did not afford registrants a predeprivation hearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55102:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55102:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55102:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme. The Court reasoned that, because the law was not based on an offender's dangerousness, but rather only on convictions, disclosing an offender on the registry without a hearing did not violate due process. The Court did not answer whether the law violated the substantive component of due process. Justices Antonin Scalia and David H. Souter filed concurring opinions. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55102:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55103:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55103:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, the U.S. Supreme Court held that amendments to the criminal code made by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) do not apply to cases pending in federal court on the AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996. Robert Garceau was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After his petition for state postconviction relief was denied, Garceau moved for the appointment of federal habeas counsel and a stay of execution in Federal District Court on May 12, 1995. He filed a federal habeas application on July 2, 1996. The District Court concluded that Garceau's habeas application was not subject to AEDPA because his motions for counsel and a stay were filed prior to that date. The Court of Appeals agreed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55103:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55103:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55103:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held, for purposes of Lindh, that a case does not become \"pending\" until an actual application for habeas corpus relief is filed in federal court. The Court reasoned that, because Garceau's federal habeas application was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date, it was subject to AEDPA's amendments. \"If, on [the effective date of the AEDPA], the state prisoner had before a federal court an application for habeas relief seeking an adjudication on the merits of the petitioner's claims, then [the AEDPA] does not apply. Otherwise, an application filed after AEDPA's effective date should be reviewed under AEDPA, even if other filings by that same applicant...were presented to a federal court prior to AEDPA's effective date.\" Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55103:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55104:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55104:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a \"serious health condition\" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action \"against any employer\" that \"interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of\" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55104:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55104:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55104:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. The Court reasoned that Congress both clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the FMLA and acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting prophylactic, rather than substantively redefining, legislation. \"In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [section] 5 legislation,\" wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy, who was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia, filed dissents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55104:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55105:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55105:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCatharina Costa was fired from her job as a heavy equipment operator at Desert Palace Casino. She filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit, charging that the firing was the culmination of discrimination that had occurred during her employment. Jurors during the trial were instructed by the judge to rule for Costa if they determined that sex was a motivating factor in the firing, even if other (legal) factors were present as well. The jury ruled for Costa. Desert Palace appealed, saying that the instructions incorrectly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in the case. A three judge panel from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling for the casino, but a subsequent review of the case by all 11 judges of the 11th Circuit reversed the panel's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55105:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55105:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55105:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that direct evidence is not required. Given that Title VII, on its face, does not mention that a plaintiff must make a heightened showing through direct evidence, the Court reasoned that in order to obtain an instruction a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that \"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.\" \"Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury,\" wrote Justice Thomas. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55105:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55106:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55106:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe State of Washington, through its Department of Social and Health Services, provides foster care to certain children. It also receives and manages Social Security benefits, which it uses to cover its costs, for many of those children. Such beneficiary children filed suit, alleging that the Department's use of their benefits to reimburse itself for the foster care costs violated the \"anti-attachment\" provision of Title II of the Social Security Act, which protects certain benefits from \"execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.\" The trial court enjoined the Department from continuing to charge its foster care costs against Social Security benefits and ordered restitution of previous reimbursement transfers. The Washington Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's holding that the Department's practices violated the anti-attachment provision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55106:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55106:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55106:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the state's use of the Social Security benefits to reimburse itself does not violate the Social Security Act's anti-attachment provision. The Court reasoned that the Department's effort to become a representative payee and its use of Social Security benefits did not amount to employing an \"execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process\" within the meaning of the provision. The Court also noted that a ruing adverse to the state could disadvantage children in foster care.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55106:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55107:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55107:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn order to achieve savings on Medicaid purchases above federal cost-saving measures, the \"Maine Rx\" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. Under the program, Maine attempts negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers. If a company does not enter into a rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales are subjected to a prior authorization procedure that requires state agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for reimbursement. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre-empted by the Medicaid Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without resolving any factual issues, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the statute's implementation, concluding that any obstacle to the federal program's administration is sufficient to establish pre-emption. The Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55107:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55107:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55107:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held, 9-0, that the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America had not carried its burden of showing a probability of success on the merits of its Commerce Clause claims and, 6-3, that their showing was insufficient to support a finding that the Medicaid Act pre-empts Maine's Rx Program insofar as it threatens to coerce manufacturers into reducing their prices on non- Medicaid sales. The Court's decision upheld the Court of Appeal's reversal of the District Court's injunction. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented from the plurality's opinion. \"By imposing prior authorization on Maine's Medicaid population to achieve wholly non-Medicaid related goals, Maine Rx 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives' of the federal Medicaid Act,\" argued Justice O'Connor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55107:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55108:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55108:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring an investigation of welfare fraud, the Inyo County Sheriff's office requested personnel files from a casino owned by the Paiute-Shoshone Indian tribe. When the request was denied, the Sheriff's office obtained a warrant to search for the records at the casino. After the search, the tribe sued, claiming that it was a violation of their sovereign immunity. The district court ruled for Inyo County; a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, ruling for the Paiute-Shoshone tribe.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55108:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55108:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55108:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo; the Court did not answer the second question. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, in the situation presented, the Tribe does not qualify as a \"person\" who may sue under section 1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. The Court reasoned that section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, not to advance a sovereign's prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. Regarding the second question, the Court concluded that whether the Tribe's suit qualifies for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than section 1983 was an issue that required additional addressing and remanded the question. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55108:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55109:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55109:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn an attempt to solve a contract dispute, Lynn and Burt Bazzle filed suit against Green Tree Financial Corporation. After they filed the suit, the Bazzles learned that other Green Tree customers were dealing with the same sort of dispute. As a result, they asked for and received permission to file a class action suit. However, Green Tree contracts had a clause requiring that any contract disputes be settled by an arbitrator. Green Tree asked the court to revoke the class certification because the Federal Arbitration Act, it argued, did not permit class-wide arbitration. Instead, the arbitration would have to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that, unless specifically banned in the contract, class-wide arbitration could be permitted by the courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55109:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55109:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55109:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, delivered an opinion concluding that an arbitrator must determine whether the contracts forbid class arbitration. Justice Breyer reasoned that, because the question of what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to did not concern a state statute or judicial procedure, was well suited to be answered by an arbitrators, and was situated in sweeping language, the matter of contract interpretation should be for an arbitrator, not the courts, to decide. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part in order to establish a controlling judgment. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55109:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55110:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55110:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nResponding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55110:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55110:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55110:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. \"Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government,\" wrote Justice Kennedy. \"The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual,\" continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55110:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55111:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55111:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, a group of farm workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama, who alleged injury from chemical exposure, filed a state-court action against Dole Food Company and others. Subsequently, Dole impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Co. and Bromine Compounds, Ltd., or the Dead Sea Companies. Dole successfully removed the action to federal court, arguing that the federal common law of foreign relations provided federal-question jurisdiction. The District Court rejected the argument that the Dead Sea Companies were instrumentalities of a foreign state, Israel, as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) and thus entitled to removal. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Dole could not base removal on the federal common law of foreign relations and that the Dead Sea Companies were not instrumentalities of Israel because they did not meet the FSIA's instrumentality definition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55111:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55111:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55111:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held, 7-2, that a foreign state must itself own a majority of the shares of a corporation if the corporation is to be deemed an instrumentality of the state under the provisions of the FSIA and, 9-0, that instrumentality status is determined at the time of the filing of the complaint. The Court reasoned that, as indirect subsidiaries of Israel, the Dead Sea Companies cannot come within the statutory language granting instrumentality status and that only direct ownership satisfies the statutory requirement. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, argued that the language \"other ownership interest...owned by a foreign state,\" covers a foreign state's legal interest in a corporate subsidiary, where that interest consists of the foreign state's ownership of a corporate parent that owns the shares of the subsidiary. As Dole did not seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision, the writ of certiorari in 01-593 was dismissed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55111:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55113:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55113:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and sale of a chlordimeform-based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in a similar action, Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., in federal district court, the Louisiana court stayed his state court claim. Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that his state-court action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson to proceed. Syngenta then removed the action to the federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state-court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating the dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly support removal of the state-court action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55113:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55113:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55113:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the All Writs Act does not provide removal jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that, because the general removal statute requires that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be removed from a state court, the All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that requirement. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55113:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55114:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55114:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAccording to Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s standard client agreement, Karen Howsam chose to arbitrate her dispute with the company before the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure section 10304 states that no dispute \"shall be eligible for submission...where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute.\" Dean Witter filed suit, asking the Federal District Court to declare the dispute ineligible for arbitration because it was more than six years old. The court dismissed the action, stating that the NASD arbitrator should interpret and apply the NASD rule. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the rule's application presented a question of the underlying dispute's arbitrability and the presumption is that a court will ordinarily decide an arbitrability question.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55114:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55114:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55114:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the applicability of the NASD time-limit rule is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator. Justice Breyer reasoned that the issue did not raise a substantive question of arbitrability requiring judicial resolution. The NASD's time-limit rule \"falls within the class of gateway procedural disputes that do not present what our cases have called 'questions of arbitrability.' And the strong pro-court presumption as to the parties' likely intent does not apply,\" concluded Justice Breyer. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55114:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55115:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55115:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Ford Motor Company and Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. canceled a credit card rebate program that enabled cardholders to accrue and redeem rebates towards the purchase of a new Ford, cardholders filed multiple state-based class actions. Ford and Citibank removed the cases to federal court. The cardholder plaintiffs consolidated their actions, seeking reinstitution of the program. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that each class member was asserting a separate and distinct claim and that the individual claims did not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. The appellate court also concluded that premising jurisdiction on the cost of complying with an injunction in favor of a single plaintiff would conflict with the principle of the amount-in-controversy requirement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55115:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55115:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55115:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55115:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55116:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55116:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, any sex offender or child kidnaper incarcerated in Alaska must register with the Department of Public Safety, which maintains a central registry of sex offenders. While some of the data is kept confidential, some, such as the offender's name, photograph, and physical description, is published on the Internet. The Act's requirements are retroactive. John Doe I and John Doe II were convicted of aggravated sex offenses before the Act's passage are thus covered by it. Both brought suit, seeking to declare the Act void as applied to them under the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I Section 10 of the United States Constitution. The District Court ruled against them and the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that, because its effects were punitive, the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55116:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55116:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55116:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act's retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the act is nonpunitive. The Court reasoned that the act was clearly intended as a civil, non-punitive means of identifying previous offenders for the protection of the public. The Court also found that the stigma, which could result from registration, did not render the act effectively punitive, since the dissemination of the registration information did not constitute the imposition of any significant affirmative disability or restraint. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the act could only cover those convicted of offenses committed after the effective date of the act without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the act was \"ambiguous in intent and punitive in effect\" and that its retroactive application was incompatible with the Ex Post Facto Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55116:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55117:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55117:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, after the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) banned visits to inmates by little brothers and sisters, nieces, nephews and other minors, a group of prisoners sued. They claimed that the ban violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and that it restricted their First Amendment right to association. The district court agreed, ruling against the ban. On appeal, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55117:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55117:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55117:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the MDOC's regulations were valid. The Court reasoned that the fact that the regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests suffices to sustain them regardless of whether the prisoners have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. The Court also concluded that the visitation restriction for inmates with two substance-abuse violations is not a cruel and unusual confinement condition violating the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that withdrawing visitation privileges for a limited period is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for confinement conditions. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55117:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55118:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55118:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the City Council of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio passed an ordinance authorizing construction of a low-income housing complex by the Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, a group of citizens filed a formal petition requesting that the ordinance be repealed or submitted to a popular vote. The voters passed the referendum repealing the ordinance. The Foundation filed suit, claiming that by submitting the site plan to voters, the City violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. After the Ohio Supreme Court declared the referendum invalid under Ohio's Constitution, the District Court granted the City summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the Foundation had stated a valid Fair Housing Act claim and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City had engaged in arbitrary and irrational government conduct in violation of substantive due process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55118:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55118:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55118:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals with regard to the Foundation's equal protection and substantive due process claims and vacated the appellate court's Fair Housing Act holding. Noting that the Foundation claimed injury from the referendum petitioning process and not from the referendum itself, the Court reasoned that statements made by private individuals during a citizen-driven petition drive do not, in and of themselves, constitute state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55118:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55122:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55122:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLarry Hiibel was arrested and convicted in Nevada state court for failing to identify himself to a police officer who was investigating an assault. Nevada, and many other states, has a law that requires a person to tell an officer his name if asked. Hiibel challenged the conviction, claiming it violated his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The state intermediate court and Supreme Court rejected his argument in affirming the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55122:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55122:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55122:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was based on reasonable suspicion (the police officer was investigating the assault, and Hiibel was nearby) and involved only a minimally intrusive question (his name). It also did not violate the Fifth Amendment because Hiibel never argued that telling the officer his name would actually incriminate him of any crime. Justice Kennedy wrote, \"While we recognize petitioner's strong belief that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature's judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55122:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55123:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55123:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice stopped Robert Lidster at a checkpoint set up to find information about a recent hit-and-run accident. Lidster was arrested, and later convicted, for drunk driving. Lidster successfully appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court. It relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) holding that a checkpoint is unconstitutional if its only purpose is to uncover \"ordinary criminal wrongdoing.\" The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55123:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55123:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55123:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held 6-3 that the Illinois checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and was constitutional. It ruled that the checkpoint was reasonable because it advanced a \"grave\" public interest - \"investigating a crime that had resulted in a human death\" - and interfered minimally with Fourth Amendment liberty. The Court distinguished Illinois's \"information-seeking\" checkpoint from the \"crime control\" checkpoint struck down in Edmond. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg - while agreeing that Edmond does not invalidate the Illinois checkpoint - dissented from the majority's decision granting constitutional approval to the checkpoint. They argued that the case should have been remanded to the Illinois courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55123:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55124:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55124:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDelma Banks, Jr. was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Texas state court in 1980. Sixteen years later Banks learned that one of the witnesses against him, Robert Farr, was a paid informant (a fact not stated during the trial). Charles Cook, another witness against Banks, claimed that he had made up much of his testimony in order to get other criminal charges against him dropped as part of a plea agreement.\nIn Brady v. Maryland the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process is violated if prosecutors suppress evidence favorable to a defendant that relates to guilt or punishment. Pointing to Brady and evidence the prosecution suppressed information on its ties to the two witnesses, Banks sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to overturn his conviction and get a new trial. The district court granted habeas relief with respect to Banks' death sentence based on the state's failure to disclose Farr's informant status. However the district court refused to reverse the guilt verdict, rejecting Banks' Brady claim relating to Cook's testimony and Banks' argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) allowed the claim to be treated as if it were raised earlier.\nThe Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision to grant Banks relief as to his death sentence based on his Brady claim relating to Farr's testimony. The Court held that Banks first had to press his claims in state court. The Court upheld the district court's rejection of Banks' claim relating to Cook's testimony, holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55124:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55124:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55124:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held 7-2 that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to dismiss Banks' claim under Brady relating to Farr's testimony and 9-0 that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to deny Banks' appeal based on Cook's testimony. Banks could make his Brady claim relating to Farr's testimony in federal court without have made the claim in state court because he demonstrated both cause for failing to present evidence in state court and evidence that that failure prejudiced the proceedings against him. The Court held that both the district court and the Fifth Circuit wrongly denied Banks' appeal with regard to his Brady claim on Cook's testimony. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) does apply in this case and requires courts to treat Banks' claim relating to Cook's testimony as if it were raised in earlier proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55124:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55125:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55125:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBureau of Indian Affairs officials arrested Billy Jo Lara on the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation for public intoxication (though Lara is not a member of the reservation). During the arrest Lara attacked an officer.\nA tribal court convicted Lara of assault. The federal government then indicted Lara for assaulting a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the federal charges violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeapordy (being charged twice for the same crime). The district court denied Lara's motion. Lara then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his Fifth Amendment motion.\nA panel of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling. However, the Eight Circuit reversed when it reviewed the case en banc (with the full court), ruling that Lara's federal charges violated the double jeapordy clause. The court reasoned that the only source of authority for Spirit Lake Nation to prosecute a nonmember (like Lara) came from the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). Because the federal government delegated this prosecutorial authority to Indian Tribes, charging Lara for the same crime in tribal and federal courts was essentially trying Lara twice under federal authority.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55125:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55125:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55125:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion written by Justice Stephen G. Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and three other Justices, the Court found that the right to prosecute nonmember Indians is inherent in the sovereignty of Native American tribes. Congress may constitutionally choose to restrict this right, but its choice not to (or its choice to relax earlier-imposed restrictions) is different from a delegation of federal prosecutorial power. Prosecuting a crime under both federal and tribal law, therefore, does not violate the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55125:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55126:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55126:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMaria Altmann learned that the valuable artwork owned by her uncle had been either seized by the Nazi's or taken by Austria after World War II. She sued in American federal court to recover six paintings from the Austrian Gallery. She filed the suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which allows suits against foreign nations in cases involving \"rights to property taken in violation of international law.\" Austria, however, claimed that the FSIA did not apply in this case because the paintings were taken in the 1940s, when the United States embraced a different - and more extensive - idea of immunity that would have barred the suit. Because the Act did not explicitly state that it applied retroactively (that is, to actions taken before it was passed) Austria claimed that it was entitled to this broader definition of immunity.\nThe district court sided with Altmann, holding that the FSIA applied retroactively. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55126:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55126:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55126:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that, while the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 does not explicitly state that it should be applied to actions that took place before its passage, there are strong indications in the text of the statute that Congress intended it to apply retroactively. Justice Stevens wrote that, under the Act, immunity \"claims are 'henceforth' to be decided by the courts. ... [T]his language suggests Congress intended courts to resolve all such claims 'in conformity with the principles set forth' in the Act, regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55126:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55127:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55127:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter a heart attack left her unable to continue working as a housekeeper in the late 1980s, Pauline Thomas took a job as an elevator operator. By the mid- 1990s, however, Thomas's job and others like it were eliminated as elevators became automated. Thomas applied for Social Security disability benefits because she could not do other work. The Social Security Administration (SSA), however, rejected her claim because, it said, she was still able to perform the duties of her former position. The fact that it was nearly impossible to find such a position, the SSA held, did not entitle her to benefits under disability law. An administrative judge and a federal district court both upheld the SSA's position, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that \"a claimant's previous work must be substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55127:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55127:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55127:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the SSA's decision had been a reasonable interpretation of the statute and was therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837. Justice Scalia wrote, \"The proper Chevron inquiry is not whether an agency construction can give rise to undesirable results... but whether... the agency construction is reasonable. Here, the SSA's authoritative decision satisfies that test.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55127:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55128:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55128:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2001, President Bush announced that he planned to lift a temporary ban on Mexican trucking companies in the United States once new regulations were prepared by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to regulate safety inspections and applications to transport materials. Congress specified certain standards that those regulations would have to meet before it would appropriate money to register the new carriers.\nWhen the FMCSA formulated its regulations, it performed an Environmental Assessment (EA) to examine their effects on the environment. Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), federal agencies must perform an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) of policies that are likely to have significant environmental effects. If an agency feels that its policies will not have significant effects, however, it may perform a more limited Environmental Assessment (EA) - which is what FMCSA chose to do. Public Citizen, a watchdog group that monitors government actions, challenged this decision in federal court. It argued that, because FMCSA knew that a large number of Mexican trucks would be admitted into the United States once it issued its regulations, it should have considered the environmental impact of the increased number of trucks in addition to the more limited impact of the safety inspections. The impact of the trucks would have been significant enough to warrant an EIS, so Public Citizen argued that FMCSA had violated NEPA by not conducting the more stringent study. The district court side with the FMCSA, holding that, while the passage of the regulations was necessary before the trucks could be admitted, the FMCSA nevertheless did not have control of those trucks and therefore did not have to account for them in its Environmental Assessment; a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55128:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55128:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55128:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the FMCSA had no control of the trucks once the regulations were passed, and would therefore be unable to act on the findings of an EIS even if it did conduct one. Further, the Court found that the passage of the regulations was not sufficiently responsible for the increased pollution caused by the trucks to warrant an EIS.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55128:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55129:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55129:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn January 2001, President Bush created an advisory committee on energy policy headed by Vice President Dick Cheney. After the group issued its recommendations five months later, Judicial Watch, a non-profit government watchdog group, filed suit in federal district court. The Sierra Club, an environmentalist organization, later filed a nearly identical suit that was joined with the Judicial Watch suit. The two organizations alleged that the advisory committee had violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) by not making public all the documents that it had generated. While FACA exempts committees composed entirely of federal officials, Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club argued that the exemption did not apply because private lobbyists had participated in the energy committee's meetings.\nCheney and the advisory group asked the court to dismiss the case, claiming that it violated the Constitutional separation of powers by requiring judicial oversight of internal executive branch deliberations. The district court refused.\nThe government then sought summary judgment of the case (without the discovery process) based on a few administrative documents that it claimed showed that only federal officials had worked on the group. The district court denied this request as well, and the government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The appeals court refused to grant summary judgment, arguing that it could not yet rule on the separation of powers argument. The government then appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55129:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55129:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55129:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court sent the case back to the D.C. Court of Appeals, arguing that the appellate court should have considered separation-of-powers claims and was wrong to conclude it lacked authority to order District Court discovery to stop. Such an order (mandamus) to stop discovery proceedings should be considered because those proceedings, \"by virtue of their overbreadth,\" could interfere with presidential activity. Further, the appellate court misinterpreted U.S. v. Nixon to mean that the government needed to assert executive privilege for separation-of-powers objections to be considered.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55129:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55131:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55131:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAdvanced Micro Devices (AMD) filed a complaint against Intel with the European Commission, alleging that Intel was using its size to unfairly dominate the computer microprocessor market. Complaints filed with the European Commission are first reviewed by the commission's directorate general, which does fact-finding to decide whether or not to pursue the complaint. AMD asked the directorate to review documents containing some of Intel's trade secrets from a separate American court case involving Intel. The directorate declined.\nBecause European law did not provide a way for AMD to gain access to the documents, AMD filed suit against Intel in United States federal district court seeking access to the documents so that it could use them to support its complaint. The suit was filed under Title 28, Section 1782 of U.S. Code, which allows (but does not require) federal district courts to give \"interested persons\" access to material for proceedings before \"foreign or international tribunal(s).\" AMD argued that, though the directorate was only a fact-finding body, the case could eventually be appealed to a trial court and was therefore covered under section 1782. Further, it argued that the directorate's unwillingness to demand the documents was irrelevant. Intel, on the other hand, argued that the directorate was not a \"foreign or international tribunal\" and that the federal district court therefore did not have the authority to compel Intel to release the documents. It also argued that the directorate's unwillingness to compel production of the documents should preclude U.S. action.\nThe district court sided with Intel, ruling that the directorate's investigation was not a foreign tribunal and that the court therefore could not give AMD access to the documents. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed the decision. After the case was accepted for review by the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Commission filed a brief in the case supporting Intel's position that the directorate was not a foreign tribunal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55131:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55131:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55131:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and Yes. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court ruled that just because a foreign tribunal was unwilling to demand certain documents did not mean that it would be unwilling to accept them if provided to them by other means. By permitting, but not forcing, American judges to allow discovery of certain documents, Congress allowed judges to exercise their discretion to decide whether a foreign tribunal would be receptive to the the documents at question. The Court also ruled that it would be impractical to limit the fact-finding to only the actual trial before a foreign tribunal because, in cases like this one, the foreign tribunal does not gather evidence itself but instead relies on the evidence presented to the investigatory commission (in this case the directorate general). In order to make the evidence available for the tribunal, therefore, it would be necessary to present it first to the commission.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55131:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55132:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55132:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Tennard was convicted of murder. During the sentencing phase, he presented evidence that he had an IQ of 67. The instructions given to the jury by the judge when it was considering whether to apply the death penalty, however, did not account for this - they instructed they jury to determine whether the crime was committed deliberately and whether Tennard posed a future risk. Under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, those instructions are not enough to allow the jury to weigh a defendant's mental retardation in his favor. After he was sentenced to death, Tennard filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, claiming that the sentence, given the shortcomings of the jury instructions, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The district court rejected the petition. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Tennard had no shown that his mental retardation was constitutionally relevant. To be constitutionally relevant, Tennard's retardation would have had to be responsible for his crime, and Tennard had not shown that this was the case.\nAfter the Supreme Court decided, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, that executing the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered its holding. It affirmed the decision on the grounds that execution was only unconstitutional if the defendant could show that his mental retardation had actually caused the crime; being mentally retarded in and of itself did not exempt someone from the death penalty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55132:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55132:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55132:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a fairly narrow ruling 6-to-3 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Tennard's mental retardation could reasonably be understood as relevant to his crime. Especially given the fact that the prosecutor emphasized Tennard's retardation when discussing the likelihood that he would be dangerous in the future, the Court found that the jury instructions did not sufficiently permit the jury to weigh Tennard's mental retardation in his favor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55132:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55133:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55133:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Newdow's daughter attended public school in the Elk Grove Unified School District in California. Elk Grove teachers began school days by leading students in a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words \"under God\" added by a 1954 Congressional act. Newdow sued in federal district court in California, arguing that making students listen - even if they choose not to participate - to the words \"under God\" violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.\nThe district court dismissed Newdow's complaint for lack of standing, because he and the mother of his daughter are divorced and he does not have custody. The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Newdow did have standing \"to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter.\" The Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress's 1954 act adding the words \"under God\" to the Pledge and the school district policy requiring it be recited both violated the First Amendment's establishment clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55133:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55133:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55133:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court found that Newdow did not have standing to bring suit because he did not have sufficient custody over his daughter. \"When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law,\" Justice Stevens wrote. Because it found that Newdow did not have standing, the Court failed to reach the constitutional question. Chief Justice Renquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas all wrote seperate concurrences, saying that requiring teachers to lead the Pledge is constitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55133:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55134:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55134:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1996, Linda Frew and other citizens settled a class-action lawsuit in federal district court against the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. Settlement was reached through a consent decree, in which the parties make an agreement that is subject to court supervision. As part of this consent decree, Texas was supposed to improve health care for poor children to comply with a federally mandated program called Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment. Two years later, Frew and others remained unsatisfied that Texas was complying with the federal requirements, and asked the court to force Texas to create a plan for how it would improve health care. Texas refused, however, claiming that it was immune from the court order under the 11th Amendment, which provides for state sovereignty. Texas argued that because no federal rights had been violated, suit could not be brought in federal court. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Texas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55134:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55134:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55134:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that enforcement of the consent decree does not violate the 11th Amendment. The Court rejected the argument that a federal court cannot enforce a consent decree unless it finds a violation of federal law. \"The decree here is a federal court order that springs from a federal dispute and furthers the objectives of federal law,\" Justice Kennedy wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55134:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55135:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55135:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThomas Heinz worked as a construction worker for 20 years, then retired. Upon retirement, he began to receive pension payments from the Central Laborers' Pension Plan. He continued to receive the pension after he took another job as a supervisor in the construction industry. The pension plan had a list of occupations that a recipient could not work in while receiving pension payments, but construction supervisors were not included. After two years, however, Central Laborers' Pension amended the list of prohibited professions to include construction supervisors. As a result, Heinz stopped receiving his pension payment. He and Richard Schmitt, a friend who was in the same situation, filed suit in federal district court. They claimed that the amendment, because it was passed after they had already started receiving the benefits, violated the \"anti-cutback\" provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. ERISA states that amendments to a pension plan may not decrease the \"accrued benefit of a participant.\" Because the amendment barred them from receiving payments that they were otherwise eligible for, Heinz and Schmitt claimed that it had reduced their \"accrued benefit.\" Central Laborers' Pension, however, argued that the men were still eligible to receive the same pension, they just could not receive it while working as construction supervisors. Because the value of the plan itself had not been changed, only the stipulations for receiving it, the pension plan managers argued that the amendment did not violate ERISA.\nThe federal district court sided with the pension plan. A divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel, however, reversed the decision, writing that \"an amendment placing materially greater restrictions on the receipt of the benefit 'reduces' the benefit just as surely as a decrease in the size of the monthly benefit payment.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55135:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55135:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55135:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court unanimously held that the amendment to the plan had narrowed Heinz's rights to the benefits promised him at the time he retired, and that such a narrowing violated ERISA. Justice David H. Souter, in the Opinion of the Court, wrote, \"'[A] participant's benefits cannot be understood without reference to the conditions imposed on receiving those benefits.' ... We simply do not see how, in any practical sense, this change of terms could not be viewed as shrinking the value of Heinz's pension rights and reducing his promised benefits.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55135:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55136:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55136:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 Congress created a list of people that corporations could pay while going through Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy attorney for the corporation was not included in that list. John Lamie, a bankruptcy attorney, challenged the law, arguing that the omission of bankruptcy attorneys from the list was accidental. The bankruptcy court that heard the case ruled that the omission was not inadvertent. Nevertheless, it awarded Lamie the fees in question because money intended to pay them had been set aside in a retainer before the corporation entered Chapter 7 proceedings. A Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision to pay Lamie, holding that the retainer was not separate from the corporation's other funds. On the issue of whether the omission of the bankruptcy attorney from the list of acceptable payees, the panel affirmed the lower court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55136:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55136:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55136:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld the Fourth Circuit, ruling that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 did not authorize the payment of bankruptcy attorneys by corporations going through Chapter 7 bankruptcy. According to Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinion for the Court: \"The statute is awkward, and even ungrammatical; but that does not make it ambiguous on the point at issue.\" The Court ruled that though the Act's deletion of the words \"or to the debtor's attorney\" from the Bankruptcy Code had rendered a sentence grammatically incorrect, the Act should still be interpreted according to the plain meaning of its text, however awkward. The Court found the legislative history of the Act inconclusive, and concluded that \"we must determine intent from the statute before us.\" The text of the statute, erroneously or not, omitted bankruptcy attorneys from the list of people bankrupt corporations could pay. r", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55136:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55137:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55137:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLittleton required adult businesses to apply for a permit to operate from the city. If the city denied the license, the business could appeal to a state district court under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Z.J. Gifts, an adult bookstore, wanted to operate in a place not zoned for adult businesses. Rather than apply for a license, they challenged the licensing law itself as unconstitutional, claiming that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provide merely for prompt judicial review of city denial, not for a prompt judicial decision. Because stores denied a license cannot operate until the court has made its decision, they could potentially be forced to wait indefinitely for a license based solely on the content of the material they intend to sell. This, Z.J. argued, violated the Supreme Court's holding in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, that censorship laws must provide for \"prompt judicial determination.\"\nThe federal district court sided with Littleton. A Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55137:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55137:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55137:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Colorado did not have to explicitly provide for a \"prompt judicial determination\" to make the law constitutional. As long as Colorado courts did not unnecessarily delay such claims, the normal judicial review process could be expected to provide a decision quickly enough to satisfy the constitutional demands. If the courts failed to make a prompt decision in a specific case, the business in that particular case could sue, but the absence of explicit \"prompt judicial determination\" language in the statute did not make it unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55137:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55139:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55139:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Washington State Promise Scholarship, created by the state legislature in 1999, gives college scholarship money to talented students. However, this money cannot be used to obtain a degree in theology if the program is taught to cause belief. Washington's constitution prohibits funding religious instruction. The 1969 state code applied this ban to college financial aid.\nJoshua Davey forfeited his Promise Scholarship money in order to major in pastoral ministries at a private Christian college. Davey filed suit in U.S. district court, claiming the state constitution's ban on funding religious instruction violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion (in the U.S. Constitution). The district court rejected Davey's claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Davey's free exercise rights were violated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55139:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55139:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55139:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court ruled that a state does not violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause when it funds secular college majors but excludes devotional theology majors. The Court rejected Davey's argument that the state scholarship program is unconstitutional because it is not neutral toward religion. \"The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction,\" the Court wrote. Similarly the Washington Constitution - which explicitly prohibits state money from going to religious instruction - does not violate the free exercise clause. Unlike laws and programs the Court has struck down under the free exercise clause, nothing in either the scholarship program or the state constitution \"suggests animus towards religion.\" States have a \"historic and substantial interest\" in excluding religious activity from public funding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55139:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55140:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55140:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNancy Drew Suders quit her job as a dispatcher for the Pennsylvania State Police in August 1998. She claimed that she had been sexually harassed by her supervisors since she got the job in March of that year, and that she had finally decided to quit after she was accused of theft, handcuffed, photographed and questioned. Two days before quitting, she had contacted the state police equal opportunity officer about the harassment, but did not file a report because, Suders claimed, the woman was unhelpful and unsympathetic.\nSuders then filed suit in federal district court, charging that the harassment had forced her to quit. The district court judge, however, granted summary judgment to the state police before the case went to trial. He found that Suders had failed to use the internal procedures set up by the state police to deal with sexual harassment, and that she therefore could not bring suit unless the police had taken a \"tangible employment action\" that substantially changed her employment status. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel overturned the district judge's decision, ruling that the harassment had been so bad that Suders had no choice but to quit. While the police had not fired Suders, they had been directly responsible for her resignation and therefore could not use her failure to file a report as a defense.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55140:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55140:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55140:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-to-1 decision written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that an employee faced with a situation in which a \"reasonable person ... would have felt compelled to resign\" could bring suit even if she had not filed a report with the employer before resigning. Her employer, however, could use her failure to file a report, along with evidence of the safeguards it had in place to prevent harassment, in its defense. If it could prove that she had not attempted to prevent the harassment, and that the safeguards in place would have prevented it if she had, the employer would not be liable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55140:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55143:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55143:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGeorge Lane and Beverly Jones were disabled and could not access upper floors in Tennessee state courthouses. Lane, Jones, and several others sued Tennessee in federal district court, alleging that by denying them public services based on their disabilities, Tennessee was in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990). According to Title II, no person may be denied access to \"services, programs, or activities\" on the basis of his disability. The act allows alleged victims of discrimination to sue states for damages.\nTennessee asked that the case be dismissed, claiming that it was barred by the 11th Amendment's prohibition of suits against states in federal courts (the sovereign immunity doctrine). The state cited Alabama v. Garrett (2001), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress had acted unconstitutionally in granting citizens the right to sue states for disability discrimination (such as the denial of employment) under the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. In that case the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress did not have enough evidence of disability discrimination by states to justify the waiver of sovereign immunity.\nThe district court rejected the state's argument and denied the motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The courts reasoned that because Title II of the ADA dealt with the Due process Clause of the 14th Amendment, not the equal protection clause, the ruling in Garrett did not apply. The court found that while Congress may not have had enough evidence of disability discrimination to waive sovereign immunity for equal protection claims, it did have enough evidence of Due Process violations (such as non-handicap-accessible courthouses) to waive the sovereign immunity doctrine for Due Process claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55143:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55143:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55143:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Congress had sufficiently demonstrated the problems faced by disabled persons who sought to exercise fundamental rights protected by the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (such as access to a court). The Court also emphasized that the remedies required from the states were not unreasonable - they just had to make reasonable accommodations to allow disabled persons to exercise their fundamental rights. Because Title II was a \"reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end,\" and because Congress had the authority under the 14th Amendment to regulate the actions of the states to accomplish that end, the law was constitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55143:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55144:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55144:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard Ford filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court five days before the one-year statute of limitations for his appeal ended under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). He represented himself, and his petition contained some claims that had been decided on by state courts and others that had not. The judge informed him that he could not hear the claims that had not been heard by state courts, and that Ford had several options: the judge could dismiss all the claims, allowing Ford to re-file them after he had presented the unheard claims to a state court, or he could dismiss the unheard claims, but delay proceedings on the other ones so that Ford could re-add the unheard ones after they had been heard. Ford chose the first option, but when he tried to re-file the claims after they were rejected by a state court, the judge refused to let him file them because the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations had ended. Ford appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision, finding that the judge could have heard the claims if Ford had chosen the second option and that he should have warned Ford that the statute of limitations would likely end before he could re-file the claims under the first option.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55144:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55144:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55144:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that a judge is not required to warn a habeas corpus petitioner who is representing himself of the consequences of his legal decision. Justice Thomas wrote, \"District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.\" Five justices joined Thomas' opinion, while two others concurred in his judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55144:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55145:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55145:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Manuel Flores-Montano approached the U.S.-Mexico border, U.S. Customs inspectors noticed his hand shaking; an inspector tapped Flores-Montano's gas tank with a screwdriver and noticed that the tank sounded solid; a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the vehicle. After a mechanic began disassembling the car's fuel tank, inspectors found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks in the tank.\nFlores-Montano was charged in federal district court in California for importing and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. Flores-Montano moved to suppress the marijuana finding on Fourth Amendment grounds. He argued that the search that yielded the marijuana finding was intrusive and non-routine and therefore required reasonable suspicion (which, he argued, was not present in his case).\nRelying on U.S. v. Molina-Tarazon, a case decided by the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2002 (with similar circumstances), the district court agreed that the search was non-routine and thus required reasonable suspicion. The government, the court held, failed to prove that reasonable suspicion prompted its search. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55145:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55145:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55145:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that the government had authority to inspect a vehicle's fuel tank at the border without suspicion. Though the Fourth Amendment \"'protects property as well as privacy,'\" interference with a vehicle owner's gas tank \"is justified by the Government's paramount interest in protecting the border.\" The Court rejected the argument that the requirement of suspicion for highly intrusive searches of people be carried over to cars (especially at the border): \"Complex balancing tests...have no place in border searches of vehicles.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55145:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55146:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55146:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJeff Groh, a special agent for the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, applied for a search warrant to search the Ramirez ranch for illegal weapons. On the warrant, Groh mistakenly omitted the exact items sought (though he correctly listed the items on the application itself). A federal magistrate issued the warrant.\nThe Ramirezes later sued Groh and the law enforcement officers involved in the search in federal court for violating their Fourth Amendment rights. They argued that the incorrectly completed warrant violated the Fourth Amendment requirement that any items searched for be described in the warrant.\nThe district court ruled that no constitutional violation took place. The officers, the court held, retained \"qualified immunity\" - meaning they are legally immune while doing their jobs unless they violate a \"clearly established\" constitutional right.\nA Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed. The court held that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and that Groh is not immune to lawsuit because he was personally responsible for using the warrant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55146:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55146:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55146:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 5-4 opinion holding that the search was \"unreasonable\" under the Fourth Amendment. Groh's warrant was invalid because it did not meet the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant particularly describe the persons or things to be seized. True, the magistrate judge approved a complete warrant - but what matters is that the Ramirezes did not know what the search was after. Because the particularity requirement is stated in the Fourth Amendment's text, \"no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that did not comply with that requirement was valid.\" Groh therefore did not have \"qualified immunity\" from suit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55146:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55147:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55147:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1991, Joel Hernandez tested positive for cocaine use in a drug test administered by his employer. As a result of the incident, he was forced to resign. In 1994, he reapplied for a job from the company. His application was rejected. Hernandez claimed that the company was discriminating against him because of his drug and alcohol addiction (though at the time he reapplied he had been sober for two years) in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The district court sided with the company, dismissing the case before it ever went to trial. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed, however, holding that Raytheon's decision not to rehire Hernandez because of an incident related to his past addiction could constitute discrimination under the act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55147:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55147:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55147:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court unanimously held that an employer may refuse to rehire an employee who was terminated in connection with drug or alcohol-related incidents as long as the refusal is based on a policy of not rehiring employees who previously violated workplace rules rather than on the worker's addiction. That is, an employer may refuse to hire someone who was terminated for coming to work under the influence, but may not refuse to hire someone whose previous addiction did not result in any workplace rule infractions. Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer took no part in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55147:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55148:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55148:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1982, George Banks was sentenced to death in Pennsylvania for the murder of 13 people. After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the conviction, Banks unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Reversing the district court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found Banks's death sentence unconstitutional. The court held that jury instructions during sentencing led jurors to believe they could not vote against the death penalty unless they all agreed on mitigating evidence (that is, evidence that would have inclined them to vote against the death penalty). This, the court reasoned, violated the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Mills v. Maryland (1988). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision (in part) and remanded it. Pointing to its opinion in Teague v. Lane (1989) and the fact that Mills was decided after Banks's conviction, the Court reasoned that the appeals court did not consider whether Mills could be \"retroactively\" applied. The Third Circuit Court - reviewing its ruling - did not change its original opinion. It found that \"Mills did not announce a new rule of constitutional law for retroactivity purposes\" and that Banks's death sentence was unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55148:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55148:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55148:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nRuling yes on the first question, the Court did not need to reach the second question. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court found that the rule announced in Mills - that sentencing schemes could not prevent jurors from considering mitigating evidence that had not been accepted unanimously when deciding whether to apply the death penalty - was a new rule, because it was not compelled by previous Court decisions. As a new rule, it could only be applied retroactively if it was a \"watershed rule[] of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.\" Finding that it was not a watershed rule, the Court found that it could not be applied retroactively and that Beards' conviction was therefore constitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55148:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55149:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55149:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPamela Hood had an outstanding debt to the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, a loan-granting institution established by the state, when she filed for bankruptcy. The state objected to her request that the debt be forgiven (\"discharged\" in the terms of bankruptcy law) by the federal bankruptcy court, arguing that to discharge the debt would violate the state's sovereign immunity (that is, its right not to be sued). Hood countered that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure allow student loan debts to be discharged if the bankruptcy filer can demonstrate that they will suffer \"undue hardship\" if the debt is not forgiven, and that this congressional permission is a constitutional waiver of state sovereign immunity because it falls under the power granted to Congress by the Bankruptcy Clause (Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution).\nThe bankruptcy court sided with Hood, finding that Congress had acted constitutionally in waiving the states' sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, as did a normal panel of the Sixth Circuit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55149:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55149:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55149:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court declined to reach the question of whether the Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress the power to waive a state's sovereign immunity. Instead, the Court ruled that discharging a debt owed to a state in a bankruptcy procedure is different from a suit and therefore not barred by sovereign immunity. \"A bankruptcy court is able to provide the debtor a fresh start in this manner ... because the court's jurisdiction is premised on the debtor and his estate, and not on the creditors,\" wrote the Court. That is, the discharge of debt by a bankruptcy court is not a personal suit against a state (which would violate sovereign immunity) but instead merely a modification of a debtor's estate that incidentally affects a state. As such, it is permissible even without Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55149:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55151:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55151:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLee Till owed $4,000 in payments on his truck when he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 13 debtor must promise each creditor future payments \"not less than the [claim's] allowed amount.\" When a repayment plan includes a series of payments (installments), as Till's did, the installments must equal the \"total present value\" of the amount owed. Till proposed that he make monthly payments on the truck to SCS Credit with a 9.5 percent yearly interest rate, which was slightly higher than the average loan rate to make up for the increased risk that Till would fail to make a payment (because he had already declared bankruptcy once). SCS, however, argued that it was entitled to 21 percent interest because that was how much it would have made if it had foreclosed on the loan, taken the truck, sold it, and reinvested the proceeds. SCS argued that this 21 percent plan was necessary to ensure that the payments were equal to the \"total present value\" or \"not less than the [claim's] allowed amount.\" The bankruptcy court ruled for Till. The district court reversed, imposing SCS's 21 percent rate. A divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel modified that approach slightly, ruling that the 21 percent rate was probably correct but that the parties could introduce evidence that a higher or lower rate should apply.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55151:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55151:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55151:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a decision that had no majority opinion, four justices held that the proper rate was the 9.5 percent one arrived at by modifying the average national loan rate to make up for the increased risk of non-payment. While this would not give the creditors the same amount of money that they might have gotten had they seized the collateral for the loan, it nevertheless met the statutory requirement that the repayments equal the \"total present value.\" Justice Clarence Thomas, in a separate opinion that provided the fifth vote needed for judgment, found that the 9.5 percent rate was acceptable, but that it could be even lower because the Bankruptcy Code did not require the judge to accommodate for the risk of non-payment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55151:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55152:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55152:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn November of 1996, Edith Jones and several other African Americans filed a class action lawsuit in federal district court against R.R. Donnelley and Sons, a commercial printing company. They claimed they had suffered racial discrimination in violation of section 1981 of United States Code (U.S.C.), which had no specified statute of limitations. Donnelley and Sons, however, argued that the section was bound by a two-year statute of limitations established by Illinois for all personal injury claims. The suit fell outside that statute of limitations, and the company argued that it should therefore be dismissed.\nJones, however, argued that a separate section of U.S.C. extended the statute of limitations to four years for any civil suit brought under an act of Congress passed after 1990. Because the 1991 Civil Rights Act had broadened the definition of section 1981, she argued, the four-year statute of limitations should apply to that section and the suit should therefore not be thrown out. Donnelley and Sons countered that the 1991 Civil Rights Act had merely amended the section, not created a new law, and that the four-year statute of limitations therefore did not apply.\nA federal district court sided with Jones. A Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55152:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55152:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55152:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIt also applies to amendments of previously existing laws. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens stated \"[a]n amendment to an existing statute is no less an 'Act of Congress' than a new, stand-alone statute.\" The four-year statute of limitations therefore applies to any act or amendment to an act passed by Congress after 1990.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55152:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55153:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55153:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCurtis Trinko was an AT&T customer but received service on lines owned by Verizon, which AT&T was permitted to use for a fee under the anti-monopoly 1996 Telecommunications Act. Trinko claimed that Verizon discriminated against AT&T customers by providing them worse service than it provided to its own customers. He claimed that this violated both the Telecommunications Act and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, which prohibits monopolies from aggressively defending their monopoly position in the market. A federal district court ruled that Trinko had no grounds to sue because he was not a direct customer of Verizon. A 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals panel, however, reinstated the charges leveled under the Sherman Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55153:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55153:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55153:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the complaint alleging breach of Verizon's Telecommunication Act duties to share its network with competitors did not state a claim under the Sherman Act. The Court reasoned that the 1996 act did not alter antitrust law or add new claims and that Verizon did not violate preexisting antitrust standards. The justices declined to add a new claim by making an exception to the rule that businesses need not aid competitors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55153:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55155:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55155:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was detained by the United States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an \"enemy combatant,\" and was held in Guantanamo Bay. Upon learning he was an American citizen, he was transferred to a military prison in Virginia. Hamdi’s father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus naming himself as Hamdi’s “next friend,” in an attempt to have Hamdi’s detention declared unconstitutional. The district court granted Hamdi’s petition, and appointed the Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia, Frank Dunham, Jr., as counsel for the petitioners. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The government countered that the Executive Branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people who fight against the United States \"enemy combatants\" and thus restrict their access to the court system.\nThe district court refused to answer the question of whether the declaration of \"enemy combatant\" was sufficient to justify his detention without review of materials and criteria used in making the determination. It ordered the government to produce these materials for a review by the court. Not wanting to produce these materials, the government appealed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because \"the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not.\" The panel therefore found that it should defer to the Executive Branch's \"enemy combatant\" determination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55155:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55155:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55155:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In an opinion backed by a four-justice plurality and partly joined by two additional justices, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred with the plurality that Hamdi had the right to challenge in court his status as an enemy combatant. Souter and Ginsburg, however, disagreed with the plurality's view that Congress authorized Hamdi's detention. Justice Antonin Scalia issued a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented separately.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55155:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55156:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55156:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles Edwards founded a company that sold pay telephones and then leased them back from the purchasers for a fixed monthly fee. After Edwards filed for bankruptcy, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued him for selling securities (considering the telephones to be investments on the part of the purchasers and therefore securities) in violation of the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.\nA federal district court froze Edwards' assets in a preliminary injunction. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court's injunction for lack of jurisdiction. The SEC, the court reasoned, failed to show that Edwards' selling pay telephones was an \"investment contract\" under federal securities laws. In defining \"investment contract,\" the court used the Supreme Court's ruling in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. (1946), that a financial interest is an \"investment contract\" if it involves (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of others. The 11th Circuit ruled that the SEC could not meet the test's third part because the purchasers received a fixed fee that was guaranteed by contract and therefore not dependant on Edwards' success.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55156:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55156:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55156:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that an investment scheme promising a fixed rate of return can be an \"investment contract\" and thus a \"security\" subject to federal securities laws. The test the Court uses for determining whether a scheme is an \"investment contract\" is \"whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.\" Because the test does not distinguish between promises of fixed returns and promises of variable returns, the scheme at issue here can be defined as an \"investment contract.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55156:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55157:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55157:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJuan Davila sued his HMO in state court because it had refused to provide certain procedures, and the refusal led to certain injuries. He brought the suit under a Texas law that requires HMOs \"to exercise ordinary care\" for their patients. The HMO asked that the case be moved to federal court, arguing that the case should be governed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) rather than the Texas law, because ERISA is a federal law the takes precedence over any state laws dealing with the same subject matter. Davila objected, arguing that the case did not fall under ERISA and should be heard in state court. The federal district court sided with the HMO, finding that ERISA prohibits individuals from filing state suits against HMOs when they refuse to pay for a particular treatment. A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55157:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55157:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55157:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Congress intended ERISA to provide a uniform system for regulating retirement schemes and benefits. If a state law conflicts with ERISA, therefore, ERISA must be used in its place. Justice Thomas wrote, \"[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55157:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55158:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55158:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA state trial court sentenced Reese to 33 years in prison. An appellate court lowered the sentence to 24 years. In another appeal to a state appellate court, Reese argued his federal Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated at trial and on appeal. The appellate court refused to reverse Reese's sentence. Reese appealed to the state supreme court and failed.\nReese appealed to a U.S. District Court. Ruling against Reese, the Court held that Reese did clearly say to the state supreme court his claims were federal. Federal law requires state prisoners to \"fairly present\" federal constitutional claims in each state court before appealing to federal courts. A federal appellate court reversed, ruling that the state supreme court had had the opportunity to read the state appellate court decision - had the court done this, it would have understood Reese's claims were federal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55158:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55158:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55158:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Reese did not \"fairly present\" his Sixth Amendment ineffective counsel claim to state courts. Federal law thus barred Reese from turning to federal courts. The state court could have understood Reese's claims were federal if the court had read the lower court opinion. However, a state prisoner does not \"fairly present\" a federal claim to a state court if that court must read beyond what the prisoner files. There is no federal requirement that courts read lower court opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55158:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55160:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55160:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the Everglades sued the South Florida Water Management District under the Clean Water Act (CWA) in federal district court. The suit alleged that the water district violated the Clean Water Act by releasing pollutants from a pump system without a discharge elimination system permit. The Clean Water Act prohibits the \"addition of any pollutant... from any point source\" without a specific permit. The water district defended its action by claiming that it was not actually adding pollutants to the water, but merely transporting polluted water from one body of water to another, less polluted, body.\nThe district court ruled against the water district and found that it had violated the CWA by using the pump. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on this point, \"conclud[ing] that the release of water caused by the... pump station's operation constitutes an addition of pollutants from a point source.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55160:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55160:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55160:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court sent the case back to the district court to consider whether the water conservation area and the canal used to transport the water are distinct. If the district court decides the two are not distinct, then the water district will not need a permit under the Clean Water Act. The Court rejected the water district's argument that the act covers a point source only when pollutants originate from that source, not when pollutants originating elsewhere pass through the point source. A point source need only convey the pollutant to navigable waters. The Court was unanimous in sending the case back to district court. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented from part of the Court's reasoning.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55160:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55161:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55161:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), the Sherman Act (which regulates monopolies and attempts to unfairly raise prices) does not apply to foreign commerce unless that commerce significantly harms domestic commerce, American imports, or American exporters. In this case, several companies that purchase and resell vitamins sued several vitamin manufacturers for illegal attempts to raise prices, both within the United States and in foreign countries. The manufacturers asked the district judge to dismiss several of the vitamin purchasers from the case because they only did business in other countries and, the manufacturers argued, could therefore not bring claims under the Sherman Act. The purchasers countered that the foreign price-fixing attempts were linked to the domestic attempts and could therefore be heard under the exception to the FTAIA. The district court sided with the manufacturers. On appeal, a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the price fixing schemes were independent of each other but that Congress' intent had been to prevent price-fixing both at home and abroad, and that even the foreign claims could therefore be brought under the exception to the FTAIA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55161:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55161:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55161:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court unanimously ruled that Congress' intent in passing the FTAIA was to prevent American courts from interfering in foreign commerce. Congress made an exception for foreign commerce that affected domestic commerce, but the exception should not be read as a general prohibition against price-fixing in all parts of the world. In the majority opinion (Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia filed a separate opinion concurring in judgment), Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote, \"Why should American law supplant, for example, Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own determination about how best to protect (their own) customers from anticompetitive conduct engaged in\" by their own companies?", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55161:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55162:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55162:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAbid Hanson was allergic to second-hand smoke. On an Olympic Airways flight, he and his wife, Rubina Husain, sat in non-smoking seats. However, because the seats were close to the smoking section, Mrs. Husain requested she and her husband be moved. Her request was denied twice, even after the smoke began bothering Hanson. Hanson died during the flight. Husain filed suit in California federal district court. She sought damages under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which allows damages recovery for international air travelers for accidents on airplanes. The district court agreed that Hanson's death was an \"accident\" as defined by the convention and awarded Husain $1.4 million. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55162:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55162:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55162:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the Court's 6-2 opinion that the events on the airplane were an \"accident\" under the Warsaw Convention's Article 17. The Court cited its 1985 decision in Air France v. Saks, in which it decided any \"injury is the product of a chain of causes\" and that an accident occurs when \"some link in the chain was an unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger.\" The Court rejected Olympic Airways' argument that only the cigarette smoke was relevant and that no \"accident\" took place because the flight attended simply did not act. The flight attendant's refusal three times to reseat Husain was a \"link in the chain\" of causes leading to his death and the attendant's rejection of an explicit request for assistance was an \"event.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55162:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55163:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55163:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice interviewed Michael Alvarado, 17, without his parents at a police station about his involvement in a crime. Police neither arrested nor Mirandized Alvarado. During the interview, Alvarado confessed involvement. Based, in part, on these statements, Alvarado was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted robbery. After failed appeals in the California courts, Alvarado unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court in California. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Recognizing the \"in custody\" standard to be whether a reasonable person would feel free to end interrogation, the appeals court held that a juvenile is more likely to feel he is in custody. Because Alvarado was \"in custody,\" the Fifth Amendment required that his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) be read to him.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55163:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55163:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55163:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the purpose of the Court's Miranda decision was to provide an objective rule readily understandable by police officers: when interrogating a suspect who is \"in custody,\" an officer must first read the suspect his Miranda rights. Determining whether a suspect is actually in custody has always been based on objective criterion like whether he had been brought to the police station by police or had come of his own accord. Requiring officers to consider individual characteristics of a suspect when determining whether he is \"in custody,\" such as the suspect's age or previous history with law enforcement, would make the test a subjective one that would be more difficult for officers to understand and abide by. Justice Kennedy wrote that the Miranda decision \"states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect's individual characteristics - including his age - could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55163:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55164:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55164:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) designated 2.5 million acres of land in Utah as \"Wilderness Study Areas\" under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Under the Act, the BLM is required to manage this land \"so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness.\"\nThe Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) and several other environmentalist groups brought suit in federal district court under section 706 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows federal courts to compel government action when an agency has failed to meet its legal duties. SUWA claimed that the BLM had failed to take a \"hard look,\" as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, at the effects of off-road vehicles on the Wilderness Study Areas. It also claimed that the permitted off-road vehicle use was in fact damaging the study areas in violation of the agency's FLPMA obligations.\nThe district court dismissed the case, holding that SUWA's charge that the bureau had failed to adequately protect the study areas was not specific enough for the court to hear under the Administrative Procedure Act. On appeal, a divided panel of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held that the bureau's discretion was limited to deciding how to implement the act, not if to implement it, and that SUWA could therefore bring suit to force it at least to take a \"hard look\" at the effects of the off-road vehicle policy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55164:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55164:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55164:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, but only to a limited extent. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the APA only allows courts to examine government agencies' failures to meet specific statutory requirements. A general complaint based on policy differences - like SUWA's view that the off- road vehicles made the Wilderness Study Areas unsuitable for preservation as wilderness - could not be heard under the APA. Justice Scalia wrote, \"If courts were empowered to enter general orders compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates ... it would ultimately become the task of the supervising court, rather than the agency, to work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate, injecting the judge into day-to-day agency management.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55164:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55165:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55165:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJose Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested in Chicago's O'Hare International Airport after returning from Pakistan in 2002. He was initially detained as a material witness in the government's investigation of the al Qaeda terrorist network, but was later declared an \"enemy combatant\" by the Department of Defense, meaning that he could be held in prison indefinitely without access to an attorney or to the courts. The FBI claimed that he was returning to the United States to carry out acts of terrorism.\nDonna Newman, who had represented him while he was being held as a material witness, filed a petition for habeas corpus on his behalf. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that Newman had standing to file the petition despite the fact that Padilla had been moved to a military brig in South Carolina. However, the court also found that the Department of Defense, under the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief and the statutory authorization provided by Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force, had the power to detain Padilla as an enemy combatant. The district judge rejected Newman's argument that the detention was prohibited by the federal Non-Detention Act, which states that no \"citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.\"\nOn appeal, a divided Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the district court's \"enemy combatant\" ruling. The panel found that the Authorization for Use of Military force did not meet the requirement of the Non-Detention Act and that the President could not, therefore, declare American citizens captured outside a combat zone as enemy combatants.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55165:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55165:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55165:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court did not reach a decision on the merits in this case. Instead, in 5-to-4 opinion written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the case had been improperly filed. Under federal law, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus can only be filed against the person directly responsible for a prisoner's confinement or, put another way, the person with the power to bring the prisoner to court. In most cases this person is the warden of the petitioner's prison; in this case, it was the commander of the military brig in which Padilla was held. Because Padilla's attorney had listed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as the defendent, instead of the brig commander, and because the suit was filed in New York instead of in South Carolina, where the commander lived and worked, the Court found that the case would have to be re-filed in a federal district court in South Carolina.\nJustices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer dissented, finding that an exception should be made to the jurisdictional rule because the government had moved Padilla to South Carolina without giving his attorney notice to file the habeas writ.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55165:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55166:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55166:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPatrice Seibert was convicted of second degree murder for the death of 17 -year-old Donald Rector, who died in a fire set in the mobile home where he lived with Seibert. Several days after the fire, Seibert was interrogated by a police officer. The officer initially withheld her Miranda warnings, hoping to get a confession from her first. Once she had confessed, the officer took a short break from questioning, then read her her Miranda rights and resumed questioning her after she waived those rights. He prompted her to restate the confession that she had made earlier. Based on this second, Mirandized confession, Seibert was convicted.\nShe appealed, charging that the officer's intentional use of an un-Mirandized interrogation to get the initial confession made the later confession, though it occurred after she had waived her Miranda rights, inadmissable. The prosecution cited Oregon v. Elstad to argue that an initial, un-Mirandized confession did not make a defendant incapable of voluntarily waiving her Miranda rights and confessing later.\nThe Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with Seibert, overturning the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55166:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55166:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55166:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a decision with no majority, a four-justice plurality found that the post-Miranda confession is only admissible - even if the two-stage interview was unintentional, as it was in Elstad - if the Miranda warning and accompanying break are sufficient to give the suspect the reasonable belief that she has the right not to speak with the police. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a concurring opinion that provided the fifth vote, found that evaluating the warning and accompanying break was only necessary if the police used the two-stage interrogation intentionally. Justice Kennedy wrote, \"The admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to be governed by Elstad's principles unless the deliberate two-step strategy is employed. Then, the postwarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before they were made.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55166:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55167:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55167:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRandall Scarborough won a case against the Department of Veterans Affairs. He then applied for attorney's fees to the U.S. Veterans' Court under the federal Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Under the EAJA, the government must pay attorney's fees to anyone who wins against the federal government in litigation unless the government can show that its position was \"substantially justified.\" However, Scarborough's attorney submitted an incomplete application, neglecting to assert that the government's position was not substantially justified. Though he amended and resubmitted it, he did so after the 30-day filing deadline. The Veterans' Court dismissed the application for \"lack of subject matter jurisdiction\" - that is, because it was not filed in its complete form within the 30-day deadline. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55167:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55167:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55167:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the statement on the application that the government's position had not been \"substantially justified\" was merely procedural. There was no need to prove the assertion - the applicant merely had to make the claim to shift the burden of proof to the government. Because the government was not harmed by the initial omission of the statement - filing the claim made it obvious that the applicant thought the government's position was not substantially justified, even without the specific statement - Scarborough should be able to amend his application even after the 30-day filing period had passed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55167:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55168:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55168:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAtlas Global Group was a limited partnership company created under Texas law. They filed a suit in federal court against Grupo Dataflux, a Mexican corporation. The suit dealt with a state law, but Atlas filed the case in federal court because, it claimed, the court had \"diversity jurisdiction\" (when a case involves citizens of two different states, or an American citizen and a foreign citizen, it is heard in federal court). However, at the time the case was filed, two of Atlas's partners were Mexican citizens (they left the partnership before the trial began). After the case was decided, but before the judgment was announced, Grupo Dataflux filed a motion to dismiss the case because the court did not have diversity jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion, finding that Atlas was a Mexican \"citizen\" at the time of filing because of the citizenship of its partners, and that the federal courts therefore did not have jurisdiction. On appeal, Atlas argued that even if the necessary diversity had not been present at the time of filing, it was present before the trial began and the court should therefore ignore the error under an exception for cases that have already been decided. A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel agreed, reversing the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55168:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55168:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55168:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that allowing diversity jurisdiction to change after a case is filed would create uncertainty and expensive litigation that dealt with jurisdiction rather than the merits of the case. \"Uncertainty regarding the question of jurisdiction is particularly undesirable, and collateral litigation on the point particularly wasteful,\" wrote Justice Scalia. \"The stability provided by our time tested rule (of requiring diversity at the time of filing) weighs heavily against the approval of any new deviation.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55168:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55169:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55169:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPrison officials sentenced Muhammad, a state prisoner, to seven days of special detention and 30 days of restricted privileges for insolence toward Close, a prison guard. Muhammad filed suit with a magistrate judge under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, seeking $10,000 in damages. Muhammad alleged Close had charged him with threatening behavior in retaliation for other proceedings against Close. Muhammad did not challenge his insolence conviction or punishment. The magistrate judge ruled that Muhammad lacked evidence proving Close acted in retaliation. The U.S. District Court agreed.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling for a different reason, citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision Heck v. Humphrey (1994). In Heck the Court held that when a prisoner seeks damages in a case that questions his sentence, the prisoner must first have successfully challenged the sentence itself or the conviction itself. The Court of Appeals held that because Muhammad's damages case questioned his sentence, he must first successfully appeal the sentence itself. Going further the Court of Appeals held that Heck applies to all challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55169:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55169:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55169:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that prisoners - whose suits do not question their sentences - do not need to successfully challenge those sentences before challenging prison disciplinary proceedings. The Court rejected the argument that Heck necessarily requires successful sentence appeals before any challenges can be made to prison disciplinary proceedings. Muhammad's suit sought damages for prison disciplinary proceedings but in no way challenged his sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55169:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55170:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55170:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo Australians and 12 Kuwaitis were captured by the American military in Pakistan or Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The captives were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains \"ultimate sovereignty\").\nThe district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55170:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55170:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55170:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the degree of control exercised by the United States over the Guantanamo Bay base was sufficient to trigger the application of habeas corpus rights. Stevens, using a list of precedents stretching back to mid-17th Century English Common Law cases, found that the right to habeas corpus can be exercised in \"all ... dominions under the sovereign's control.\" Because the United States exercised \"complete jurisdiction and control\" over the base, the fact that ultimate sovereignty remained with Cuba was irrelevant. Further, Stevens wrote that the right to habeas corpus is not dependent on citizenship status. The detainees were therefore free to bring suit challenging their detention as unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55170:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55171:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55171:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAndrew Kontrick filed for bankruptcy after he and his partner, Robert Ryan, dissolved their plastic surgery practice. Ryan notified the court that Kontrick owed him money before the 60-day filing deadline set by Bankruptcy Rule 4004. More than three months later (after the deadline for filing had passed) Ryan filed an amended complaint charging that Kontrick was diverting paychecks into his wife's account so that he wouldn't have to pay Ryan. Ryan's attorneys claimed that they were not making a new claim - the diversion had been alluded to in other court documents - but that they were merely refocusing the judge's attention. Furthermore, they argued that the deadline for filing could be - and had been - waived by the judge. Kontrick's attorneys, on the other hand, argued that the amended complaint was a new filing and that the deadlines for filing could not be waived. The bankruptcy court ruled for Ryan. The district court and a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel both affirmed, holding that the deadline was subject to waiver.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55171:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55171:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55171:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Kontrick lost the right to invoke Rule 4004's time limitation because he did so after the bankruptcy court reached the merits of Ryan's objection. The Court rejected Kontrick's claim that Rule 4004 is \"jurisdictional\" and that it trumps other considerations whenever raised in proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55171:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55172:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55172:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55172:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55172:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55172:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court ruled that because the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle, the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that \"a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55172:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55173:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55173:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a \"strong likelihood\" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show \"strong likelihood\" that the challenges were race- based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder.\nJohnson appealed and argued that the \"strong likelihood\" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference\" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55173:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55173:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55173:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court ruled it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55173:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55174:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55174:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Clean Air Act, state agencies must determine the best way to prevent air pollution in areas that have met national clean air standards. In part, they must require that polluting companies use the \"best available control technology\" to limit pollution whenever they construct new facilities. In 1998, Teck Cominco Alaska, a mining company, requested a permit to build an additional generator at one of its mines. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) issued the permit, which called for Cominco to use \"Low NOx\" technology on all its generators, not just the new one. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, stepped in, arguing that a better technology was available. ADEC appealed the EPA's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the EPA did not have the right to interfere with the state agency's decision. The Ninth Circuit sided with the EPA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55174:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55174:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55174:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the Clean Air Act authorized the EPA to bar the construction of the polluting facility in Alaska. Though Alaska determined the facility's use of \"Low NOx\" met the act's requirement that facilities use \"best available control technology,\" the EPA was reasonable to reject this claim. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered a dissent joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice William Rehnquist.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55174:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55175:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55175:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) sued the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) - established under the California Health and Safety Code - in federal district court. The EMA alleged that the Clean Air Act (CAA) preempted SCAQMD's \"fleet rules\" - rules that required new commercial vehicles to meet specific emissions standards - and that the rules were therefore illegal. The EMA pointed to section 209 of the act, which prohibits states from enforcing \"any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles.\" Reasoning that the regulations affected the standards at which engines could be sold, not the standards to which they must be manufactured, and finding that Congress's purpose was to protect manufactures from \"having to build engines in compliance with a multiplicity of standards,\" the district court ruled that the CAA did not preempt California's fleet rules. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55175:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55175:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55175:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nProbably. In an 8-to-1 opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that distinguishing between rules governing the standards to which engines must be made and the standards at which they may be sold was unreasonable. Justice Scalia wrote, \"A command ... that certain purchasers may buy only vehicles with particular emission characteristics is as much an 'attempt to enforce' a 'standard' as a command ... that a certain percentage of a manufacturer's sales volume must consist of such vehicles.\" Justice Scalia reserved judgment on the specific regulations at issue in the case, however, sending the case back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the holding that regulating the standards engines must meet to be sold is no different from regulating the standards at which they must be manufactured.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55175:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55176:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55176:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral Arizona residents challenged in federal district court an Arizona statute that allows tax credits for money spent toward parochial schools. They alleged that the statute violates the religious establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.\nThe district court dismissed the case and ruled that it lacked jurisdiction for two reasons: First, the federal Tax Injunction Act (TIA) prohibits federal district courts from ruling on the \"assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such state.\" And second, the court pointed to the comity doctrine - that is, the deference that federal courts should generally give to state tax laws. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that neither the TIA nor comity place the case outside federal jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the TIA was inapplicable because invalidating a tax credit would not harm Arizona's ability to raise revenue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55176:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55176:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55176:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the intention of the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) was to prevent taxpayers from trying to avoid their state taxes through federal litigation. TIA was not intended, however, to prevent all federal interference with state taxation. Justice Ginsburg wrote, \"Third-party suits not seeking to stop the collection of a tax imposed on plaintiffs were outside Congress' purview. ... Nowhere does the [legislative] history announce a sweeping congressional direction to prevent federal-court interference with all aspects of state tax administration.\" (emphasis original) Establishment clause challenges to state tax exemptions for religious eduction could therefore be challenged without violating TIA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55176:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55177:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55177:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSharon Pfennig went over her $2000 credit limit. The company that issued Pfennig her credit card, Household Credit Services, Inc., charged her a fee of $29 for each month that her balance remained over $2000. This fee was listed in the \"Purchases\" category on her monthly statement rather than as a \"finance charge.\" Under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), any charges \"incident to the extension of credit\" must be listed separately as \"finance charges.\"\nHousehold Credit Services chose not to list the over-limit fee as a \"finance charge,\" however, based on the Federal Reserve Board's definition of the term, which explicitly excludes \"charges ... for exceeding a credit limit.\" Pfenning countered that the Board's definition was an unreasonable interpretation of TILA's plain language and should therefore be disregarded.\nThe district court sided with Household Credit Services, finding that the the Federal Reserve Board had properly exercised its authority under TILA to define the term, that the definition was a reasonable interpretation of TILA, and that the credit company was therefore justified in relying on its definition. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55177:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55177:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55177:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court found that the Board's definition of \"finance charge\" was reasonable under the language of TILA. Because neither side challenged the authority of the Board to interpret the act (Pfennig just challenged its end result as unreasonable), under Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, the Court would have to find that the Board's regulation was clearly contrary to the unambiguous intent of Congress in order to overturn it. Finding that Congress's intent with respect to over-limit fees was ambiguous, Justice Thomas wrote that the regulation was entitled to deference and the credit company's reliance on it could therefore not be punished.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55177:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55178:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55178:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAbel Galletti and his wife, along with another couple, the Briguglios, formed a business partnership. The partnership underpaid its federal employment taxes, and the IRS assessed the unpaid taxes against the partnership (meaning the partnership would be forced to pay the taxes). According to the Internal Revenue Code, if a tax debt is assessed within three years after the return was filed, the government has 10 additional years to collected the money.\nMore than three years later, the Gallettis and the Briguglios separately filed for bankruptcy. The IRS made a claim in bankruptcy court against the two couples for the taxes assessed against the partnership. The couples objected, arguing that because the partners themselves had not been separately assessed, the statute of limitations had not been extended to the partners.\nThe bankruptcy court ruled against the IRS, holding that the IRS must assess tax claims against individual partners, not just the partnership, in order to later collect on those claims from the individuals. The district court and a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel both affirmed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55178:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55178:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55178:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the IRS' assessment against the partnership was sufficient to extend the statute of limitations by 10 years to collect the money from the partners themselves. The Internal Revenue Code does not require the government to make separate assessments of a single debt against people or entities secondarily liable in order to extend the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations extension is attached to the debt - without reference to the entities who owe the debt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55178:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55179:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55179:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn July 15, 1998 police officers, with a warrant, knocked on the door of suspected drug dealer Lashawn Banks. They waited between 15 and 20 seconds, and when Banks did not come to the door they smashed it open with a battering ram. Banks was arrested but, before his trial, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his apartment because, he claimed, the forced entry had been unlawful. When the request was denied, he pled guilty, but eventually attempted to retract his guilty plea on the advice of a new attorney. The new attorney, Randall Roske, argued that the search was unconstitutional because officers did not wait long enough before breaking down the door, and had no evidence that waiting longer would have had negative consequences. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling the search unconstitutional and suppressing the evidence found during it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55179:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55179:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55179:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court unanimously held that 15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable period for police to wait before entering by force when they were investigating drug charges because waiting any longer was likely to result in the destruction of evidence. Justice David Souter, writing for the court, stated that \"while we agree... that this call is a close one, we think that after 15 to 20 seconds without a response, police could fairly suspect that cocaine would be gone if they were reticent any longer.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55179:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55181:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55181:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVincent Foster, a high-ranking White House lawyer involved in the investigation of possible fraud by the Clinton family in the Whitewater real estate venture, was found dead in a Virginia park. Two government investigations subsequently found that the death had been a suicide. Allan Favish questioned the findings of the government investigations, claiming that they were part of a government cover-up of murder. Under the Freedom of Information Act, Favish requested access to 150 photos of Foster's body in the park and during the autopsy. He later reduced his request to 129 photos.\nThe government initially denied him access to all the photos, but eventually gave him access to 118 of them. It withheld the rest, arguing that the privacy interest of Foster's family members in relation to Foster's death trumped the public interest served by providing Favish access to the photos. The government stated that the photos were very graphic and that releasing them would upset the family. Favish countered by arguing that the family did not have a relevant privacy interest; the only person whose privacy interests would be violated by the release of the photos was Foster, Favish argued, and Foster's death had rendered him incapable of exercising that interest.\nAfter a series of appeals in which a Ninth Circuit panel held that the Foster family's right to privacy was relevant to the case but that the district court must look at the specific photos in order to weigh the privacy rights against Favish's right to access government information, the Ninth Circuit eventually decided that Favish should be given access to all but four of the photos. The government, joined by the Foster family, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55181:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55181:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55181:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Foster family's interest in privacy outweighed the public interest in seeing pictures from Vincent Foster's death scene. The public interest could only trump privacy interests if Favish could present evidence that the government might have acted improperly. Favish failed to do so. The Court acknowledged that citizens seeking access to documents under the Freedom of Information Act normally need not explain why they seek the information. The act, however, exempts from disclosure records that would present an unwarranted invasion of privacy. In ruling that the act protected the privacy of the Foster family, the Court rejected Favish's argument that the act only protected Vincent Foster's privacy (an interest that Favish argued died with Foster).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55181:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55182:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55182:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarcus Thornton was stopped after getting out of his vehicle by a police officer who had noticed that the license plate on Thornton's Lincoln Town Car belonged to a Chevy two-door car. During his conversation with Thornton, the officer asked if he could search him. During the search he found two bags of drugs. The officer arrested Thornton, then searched his vehicle (which Thornton had already exited by the time the police officer spoke with him, though the officer had seen him exit it). In the vehicle the officer found a gun.\nThornton was convicted of drug and firearms offenses. On appeal, he moved to have the gun dismissed as evidence because, he claimed, it had been found as the result of an unconstitutional search. He argued that the officer had contacted him after he had left the vehicle and that the search therefore did not fall within the \"search incident to arrest\" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (the exception allows police to search the person being arrested and the area \"within his immediate control\").\nA Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel rejected his argument, holding that requiring officers to signal their intent to arrest a person before he exited his vehicle would be dangerous because it would give him a chance to get any weapons in the vehicle or to use the vehicle to get away or run over the officers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55182:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55182:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55182:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court ruled that forcing officers to decide whether a suspect had noticed them before exiting the car (with the understanding that only if he had could the car be searched) would be too subjective and leave officers uncertain of whether they could perform searches. Further, it found that weapons or contraband inside a vehicle could still be easily accessed by someone who had just exited it, providing the same reason for searching the vehicle that was present in cases where suspects were arrested while still inside it (that is, the possibility that illegal material would be destroyed or officers attacked with concealed weapons). Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion, wrote, \"Once an officer determines there is probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55182:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55183:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55183:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the 2000 census reduced the size of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation by two members, the Republican-controlled state legislature passed a redistricting plan that clearly benefitted Republican candidates. Several members of the Democratic party sued in federal court, claiming that the plan was unconstitutional because it violated the one-person, one-vote principle of Article I, Section 2 of Constitution, the Equal Protection clause, the Privileges and Immunities clause, and the freedom of association.\nThe district court dismissed all but the Article I, Section 2 claim. It held that the voters bringing the suit had not proved that they would be denied representation, only that they would be represented by Republican officials. Because the plaintiffs (those bringing the suit) were not denied the right to vote, to be placed on the ballot box, to associate as a party, or to express their political opinions, their political discrimination claims failed.\nHowever, the court found the act unconstitutional because it created districts with different numbers of voters, thereby violating the one-person, one-vote principle. Because the plaintiffs had shown that it was possible to create districts with smaller differences, and because the defendants had failed to justify the disparities resulting under their plan, it was therefore unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55183:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55183:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55183:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a split decision that had no majority opinion, the Court decided not to intervene in this case because no appropriate judicial solution could be found. Justice Antonin Scalia, for a four-member plurality, wrote that the Court should declare all claims related to political (but not racial) gerrymandering nonjusticiable, meaning that courts could not hear them. Because no court had been able to find an appropriate remedy to political gerrymandering claims in the 18 years since the Court decided Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, which had held that such a remedy had not been found yet but might exist, Scalia wrote that it was time to recognize that the solution simply did not exist.\nJustice Anthony Kennedy, however, wrote in his concurring opinion (which provided the deciding fifth vote for the judgment) that the Court should rule narrowly in this case that no appropriate judicial solution could be found, but not give up on finding one eventually.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55183:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55184:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55184:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBedRoc Ltd. and Western Elite, Inc., own property in Nevada patented under the federal Pittman Act (1919). (The act was repealed in 1964.) The act authorized the issuance of patents to desert lands in Nevada to individuals who successfully developed underground water resources. However, the act specified that patents reserve to the United States \"all the coal and other valuable minerals\" in the patented lands. When the previous owner of BedRoc and Western Elite's land extracted and sold commercially valuable sand and gravel from the lands without a federal mineral contract, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) gave notification that the mining was illegal under federal law. The owner lost an appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). Once BedRoc and Western Elite owned the land, they filed suit in U.S. district court, arguing that the Pittman Act's \"valuable minerals\" provision did not include valuable sand and gravel. The district court rejected the companies' argument and sided with the United States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55184:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55184:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55184:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an plurality opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and joined by three other Justices, the Court ruled that because sand and gravel were not commercially valuable in 1919 when the Pittman Act was passed, they were not \"valuable minerals\" covered under the Act. Although the Court had interpreted \"minerals\" expansively in the past, the Court held that the adjective \"valuable\" limited the term sufficiently to exclude sand and gravel. The Court emphasized that since the plain text of the statute was clear, there was no need to delve into the legislative history of the Act. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he agreed that sand and gravel were not \"valuable minerals\" under the Act, but disputed the plurality's reliance on the word \"valuable.\" Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented. The dissent argued that the legislative history of the Pittman Act indicated that \"valuable minerals\" should be interpreted broadly to include sand and gravel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55184:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55185:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55185:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBlakely pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his estranged wife and the facts admitted in his plea supported a maximum sentence of 53 months. Washington state law allows a judge to impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds \"substantial and compelling reasons\" for doing so that were not computed into the standard range sentence. The judge in this case imposed an \"exceptional\" sentence of 90 months after determining Blakely had acted with \"deliberate cruelty.\"\nBlakely appealed, arguing that this sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. A state appellate court affirmed the sentence and the state supreme court denied review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55185:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55185:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55185:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that an exceptional sentence increase based on the judge's determination that Blakely had acted with \"deliberate cruelty\" violated Blakely's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Citing its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court ruled that facts increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Dissents by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy and Justice Stephen Breyer argued the ruling will diminish legislatures' ability to set uniform sentencing guidelines.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55185:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55186:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55186:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Telecommunications Act of 1996 allowed federal preemption of state and local regulations \"prohibiting the ability of any entity\" to provide telecommunications services. Based on this act, a group of local governments in Missouri (the Missouri Municipal League) asked the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to nullify a state law that prevented municipalities from providing telecommunications services. Missouri argued that municipal governments were not separate entities but merely subsections of the state government and that the state could therefore restrict their authority. The FCC agreed with the state, refusing to nullify the law.\nThe Municipal League appealed, and an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision. The panel held the words \"any entity\" were intentionally broad and that a proper understanding of them would include municipal governments. The state could therefore not regulate attempts by municipalities to provide telecommunications services. The FCC, along with the state of Missouri and Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55186:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55186:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55186:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that the act allows states to prevent municipalities from providing telecommunications services. The act only allows federal preemption of state and local efforts to prevent \"any private entity\" from providing telecommunications services. The Court concluded it would be \"unlikely\" and \"strange\" if Congress intended to free municipal governments from state regulations because municipal governments rely on state governments for authority to regulate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55186:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55188:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55188:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFelipe E. Tovar was charged with drunk-driving in Iowa three times in four years. Tovar pleaded guilty both times and waived his right to an attorney the first time. The third time, because Iowa law increases sentencing for successive drunk-driving, Tovar faced up to five years in prison. Tovar argued that his first conviction was an invalid waiver of his 6th Amendment right to counsel and should not increase his third sentence. The waiver was invalid, Tovar argued, because the judge did not warn him of the consequences of entering a guilty plea without an attorney. The Iowa district court rejected Tovar's argument and sentenced him to 30 days in jail. The court of appeals affirmed. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55188:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55188:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55188:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Tovar's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated. In a case like Tovar's, the Sixth Amendment requires the judge to inform the accused of the charges against him, of his right to counsel regarding his plea, and of the range of punishments he faces if he pleads guilty. The Court decided Tovar's trial court judge satisfied these requirements and that Tovar's waiver of his right to counsel was \"knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55188:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55189:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55189:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) to prevent minors from accessing pornography online. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and online publishers sued in federal court to prevent enforcement of the act, arguing that it violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court agreed. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed, holding that because the act used \"community standards\" to decide which material was harmful to minors, it would prohibit material that was felt offensive in the most \"puritanical\" communities from being displayed in more \"tolerant\" ones.\nOn appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the \"community standards\" provision alone did not make the act unconstitutional and sent the case back to the Third Circuit for further evaluation.\nThe Third Circuit again prohibited implementation of the act, holding that it was likely to fail the \"strict scrutiny\" test because it was not narrowly tailored - that is, it prevented online publishers from publishing some material that adults had a right to access - and because it did not use the least restrictive means possible to protect children (the court found that blocking software installed on home computers by parents would do as good a job without preventing free speech). For similar reasons, the panel found that the act was unconstitutionally \"overbroad\" - that is, it applied to too much protected material.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55189:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55189:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55189:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an interesting 5-to-4 vote, with Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg on one side and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Breyer and O'Connor on the other, the Court found that Congress had not yet met its burden to show that the COPA requirements were more effective than other methods of preventing minors. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in the majority opinion, wrote that the district court's injunction \"was not an abuse of discretion, because on this record there are a number of plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute.\" The majority also emphasized that barring the statute's enforcement during the trial would be less harmful than allowing it, because allowing it would be likely to prevent online publishers from publishing certain material.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55189:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55190:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55190:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGeneral Dynamics Land Systems renegotiated its union contract to provide full health care benefits only to retirees who were more than 50 years old by a July 1, 1997, deadline. Union member Dennis Cline fell two years short of 50 at the time of the deadline and was excluded permanently from receiving health benefits.\nCline - along with 196 other 40-to 49-year-old employees - filed suit against General Dynamics under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). ADEA protects workers over 40 from age discrimination. Since the contract excluded workers between the ages of 40 and 49, Cline alleged that providing benefits only to retirees 50 and up was illegal age discrimination.\nA U.S. district court in Ohio rejected Cline's claims. The court ruled that the ADEA does not recognize claims for \"reverse discrimination\" or preferential treatment for older people within the same over-40 class. Cline appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The court ruled that General Dynamics was guilty of plain age discrimination, since the ADEA protects all persons over 40 from age discrimination by their employers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55190:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55190:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55190:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice David H. Souter delivered the Court's 6-3 opinion that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's \"text, structure, purpose, history, and relationship to other federal statutes show that the statute does not mean to stop an employer from favoring an older employee over a younger one.\" The Court cited a long-held understanding of the \"ADEA as a remedy for unfair preference based on relative youth, leaving complaints of the relatively young outside the statutory concern.\" The Court also noted the findings section of the act included no evidence of younger workers being discriminated against in favor of older workers. Further \"[i]f Congress had been worrying about protection the younger against the older, it would not likely have ignored everyone under 40.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55190:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55191:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55191:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHaley was convicted in Texas state courts of a felony theft and sentenced as a habitual felony offender (extending his sentence). After a failed appeal to the Texas appellate court, Haley filed a state habeas application in the trial court, arguing that his past crimes did not qualify him as a habitual offender and that his attorney had provided ineffective counsel when he failed to object to the extended sentence. The court dismissed his claims on procedural grounds, because he had not raised the issue during his trial and therefore could not raise it in the habeas petition. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his habeas application based on the trial court's findings.\nHaley then filed for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. Pointing to the procedural-default doctrine, Texas argued that Haley's claim was procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Under the procedural-default doctrine, federal courts cannot grant habeas relief if the last state court rejected the appeal for procedural violations of state law; the only exception is if the petitioner is actually innocent.\nThe district court held that Haley showed he was \"actually innocent\" of earlier violations on which his sentence enhancement was based. The court ruled that Haley's sentence was therefore improperly extended. It never reached his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, having already found grounds for overturning the extended sentence. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Texas's argument that the actual-innocence exception applies only to cases involving capital offenses.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55191:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55191:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55191:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court declined to answer the question presented, ruling instead that the district court should have first considered the ineffective assistance of counsel claim before reaching the question of whether the \"actual innocence\" exception applies to non-capital cases. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for a seven-member majority, wrote that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim would accomplish the same thing - the reduction of the sentence - without burdening the state with the need to prove the existence of all prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55191:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55193:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55193:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCarlos Dominguez Benitez confessed to selling drugs to an informant. He made a plea agreement with the government in which he would plead guilty to conspiracy to sell drugs, which normally carried a 10-year minimum sentence. However, the government agreed to ask the judge to reduce the sentence below that minimum. The plea agreement also said that, if the judge did not agree to the government's request to lower the sentence, Dominguez could not withdraw his guilty plea. During discussions of the plea, the judge failed to mention the fact that it prohibited him from withdrawing his plea (the written statement, which did contain the fact, was read to him at another time). When the judge ruled that he could not lower the sentence, Dominguez appealed. He argued that the judge's failure to tell him that he would be unable to withdraw his appeal was a \"plain error\" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 and therefore required reversal. The prosecutors countered that, in order to show that the judge had made a \"plain error\" Dominguez would need to show not just that he had made a mistake but also that it was reasonably likely that, without the error, Dominguez would not have pled guilty. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, siding with Dominguez to reverse the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55193:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55193:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55193:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled that the judge's error most likely had no effect on Dominguez's decision to plead guilty, because he had already confessed to the crime and had little chance of winning at trial. Under Rule 52, a plain error is an \"error that affects substantial rights.\" Because the error did not harm Dominguez - he would likely have pled guilty anyway - it was not a reversible plain error. Justice David H. Souter, writing for 8 members of the Court (Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment), wrote, \"The point of the question is not to second-guess a defendant's actual decision... The point, rather, is to enquire whether the omitted warning would have made the difference required by the standard of reasonable probability; it is hard to see here how the warning could have had an effect on Dominguez's assessment of his strategic position.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55193:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55194:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55194:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid Nelson was sentenced to death for murder and scheduled for execution in 1997. A series of appeals and habeas petitions in federal court delayed the execution until 2002, when an 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously rejected a claim dealing with the alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. After the final appeal was rejected, Nelson was rescheduled for execution on October 9, 2003.\nNelson filed petition in federal district court alleging that the method of execution proposed by Alabama violated his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Alabama had notified Nelson that, because of damage done to his veins by previous intravenous drug abuse, the execution procedure might require corrections officers to cut through muscles and fat in his arm to get access to a vein that could carry the toxins. He claimed that this was an inhumane method of execution and should therefore be barred. Further, he argued that the petition was not an appeal of his conviction or sentence (appeals of both were prohibited by U.S. Code Title 28, Section 2254, a federal law designed to limit the number of habeas corpus appeals by death row inmates) but rather a freestanding lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the proposed execution procedure. Alabama countered that Nelson's appeal was intended only to prolong his life through procedural delays, exactly what the federal law was designed to prevent, and should therefore be thrown out.\nThe federal district court agreed with Alabama, holding that Nelson's appeal dealt not just with the procedure but with the sentence itself. It was therefore functionally equivalent to a habeas corpus petition, which was barred by Section 2254. A divided 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the decision. After the 11th Circuit declined to rehear the case as a whole (en banc), the U.S. Supreme Court issued a stay of execution and then accepted the case for appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55194:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55194:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55194:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled unanimously that Nelson's suit dealt only with the proposed method of execution, not with his conviction or sentence, and was therefore different from a habeas corpus appeal. Nelson had a right to challenge the necessity of the procedure for his execution using the same legal approach he would have used to challenge the conditions of his prison. However, the Court declined to rule on whether the execution would be constitutional if the district court found that cutting through was indeed necessary, leaving that question for a case in which necessity had already been determined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55194:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55197:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55197:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen the U.S. Postal Service ended its mail-sack contract with Flamingo Industries, Flamingo sued in U.S. district court. Flamingo claimed the Postal Service declared a \"fake emergency in the supply of mail sacks\" so it could give no-bid contracts to cheaper foreign manufacturers without allowing U.S. companies to compete for them. Flamingo claimed this violated federal antitrust laws (among other charges). The district court dismissed the antitrust claim reasoning that the federal government is protected by sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the antitrust immunity count. It ruled that the 1970 Postal Reorganization Act waived the Postal Service's sovereign immunity and that it could be sued under federal antitrust laws as a \"person.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55197:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55197:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55197:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the U.S. Postal Service cannot be sued under antitrust laws. The Court acknowledged the Postal Reorganization Act may waive the Postal Service's immunity from suit. However, federal antitrust laws (the Sherman Act, for example) do not allow the federal government - of which the Postal Service is a part - to be sued.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55197:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55198:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55198:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWarren Summerlin killed a loan collector with a hatchet in 1982 and was subsequently convicted of murder. He was sentenced to death by a state trial judge because of the heinous nature of the crime and his previous criminal history. He appealed the sentence, arguing that his attorney's romantic relationship with the prosecutor and the trial judge's proven use of marijuana had prevented him from receiving a fair trial, but the Arizona state courts rejected his appeals.\nIn June 2002, however, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring v. Arizona. The decision found that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial meant that only juries, not judges, could sentence someone to death. The Ring decision gave Summerlin new hope. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the decision changed the substance of the law rather than just the procedure used to apply it, and that it should therefore be applied retroactively. The state countered that the change dealt only with who did the actual sentencing, not with the burden of proof, and was therefore only procedural. Because procedural changes are not applied retroactively under the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Teague v. Lane, the state argued that Summerlin's sentence should be upheld. A divided Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, siding instead with Summerlin and ordering the state to reopen his trial for re-sentencing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55198:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55198:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55198:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the changed announced in Ring v. Arizona was merely procedural and therefore not retroactively applicable. Justice Scalia wrote, \"[W]e give retroactive effect to only a small set of 'watershed rules of criminal procedure implementing the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.' That a new procedural rule is 'fundamental' in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one 'without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.\" (Italics Scalia's, citation omitted). Because the Court could not confidently say that fact-finding by a judge rather than a jury seriously diminished accuracy, it could not apply its Ring ruling retroactively.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55198:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55199:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55199:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) special agent was kidnapped and murdered by a Mexican drug cartel in 1985. After an investigation, the DEA concluded that Humberto Alvarez-Machain had participated in the murder. A warrant for his arrest was issued by a federal district court. The DEA, however, was unable to convince Mexico to extradite Alvarez-Machain, so they hired several Mexican nationals to capture him and bring him back to the United States. His subsequent trial went all the way to the Supreme Court, which found that the government could try a person who had been forcibly abducted, but that the abduction itself might violate international and provide grounds for a civil suit. When the case went back to the district court for trial, Alvarez-Machain was found not guilty for lack of evidence.\nAlvarez-Machain then filed a group of civil suits in federal court against the United States and the Mexican nationals who had captured him under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which allows the federal government to be sued on tort claims, and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which permits suits against foreign citizens in American courts. The government argued that the FTCA applied only to claims arising from actions that took place in the United States and therefore did not cover Alvarez-Machain's case because the arrest took place in Mexico. Further, the government and the Mexican nationals argued that the ATS gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear tort claims against foreign citizens, but did not allow private individuals to bring those suits.\nThe federal district court disagreed with the government's contention that the FCTA claim did not apply, finding that plan to capture Alvarez-Machain was developed on U.S. soil and therefore covered. However, the court then ruled that the DEA had acted lawfully when they arrested Alvarez-Machain and was therefore not liable. On the ATS claims, the court rejected the argument that private individuals could not bring suit under the Act. The court found that Jose Francisco Sosa, one of the Mexican nationals who kidnapped Alvarez- Machain, had violated international law and was therefore liable under the ATS.\nOn appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court's FTCA decision, ruling that the DEA could not authorize a citizen's arrest of Alvarez-Machain in another country and was therefore liable. The appeals court did, however, affirm the lower court's finding on the ATS claim, upholding the judgment against Sosa.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55199:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55199:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55199:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and No. On the Alien Tort Statute claim, the Court unanimously ruled that the ATS did not create a separate ground of suit for violations of the law of nations. Instead, it was intended only to give courts jurisdiction over traditional law of nations cases - those involving ambassadors, for example, or piracy. Because Alvarez-Machain's claim did not fall into one of these traditional categories, it was not permitted by the ATS. On the FTCA claim, the Court ruled that the arrest had taken place outside the United States and therefore was exempted from the Act. It rejected Alvarez-Machain's argument that the exemption should not apply because the arrest had been planned in the United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55199:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55200:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55200:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeven coal miners sued the Department of Labor, claiming that the department had violated the federal Privacy Act and the right to privacy found in the federal Constitution by releasing their social security numbers (SSNs). The Privacy Act stated that any \"person entitled to recovery\" in a suit against the government for a violation of privacy would be awarded \"actual damages sustained by the individual... but in no case... [would the damages awarded be] less than the sum of $1000\" and attorney fees.\nThe miners argued that all they needed to prove in order to receive the $1000 minimum award was that the government had violated their privacy by releasing their SSNs; they did not need to prove that they had suffered actual damages. They maintained that the inclusion of \"actual damages\" in the act was only intended to limit the size of judgments awarded against the government, not to require proof of actual damage. The government argued that the act required the miners to prove that they had been harmed by the government's violation of their privacy.\nThe district court ruled in favor of the government. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55200:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55200:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55200:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice David Hackett Souter delivered the Court's 6-3 opinion that the Privacy Act requires plaintiffs prove actual damages to qualify for the minimum statutory award of $1000. The Court reasoned that \"a straightforward textual analysis\" of the Privacy Act shows that the statute guarantees the $1000 minimum for victims of willful Privacy Act violations only in relation to \"actual damages sustained.\" Individuals subjected to an adverse effect - like the miners in this case - have \"injury enough to open the courthouse door, but without more\" have \"no cause of action for damages under the Privacy Act.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55200:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55201:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55201:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRaymond Yates owned a corporation with a profit sharing/pension plan. Yates borrowed money from the plan at a set interest. After he had repaid the loan to his profit sharing/pension plan, Yates' creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against him. They asked the bankruptcy court to set aside the repayment (interest included) and give it to the creditors.\nYates argued that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the interest from the profit sharing/pension plan could not be seized (except for loans to participants). The bankruptcy court disagreed and granted Yates' creditors' requests. The court reasoned that as the sole owner of the business, Yates was an employer under ERISA, not a \"participant.\" The plan's prohibition on interest seizure therefore did not apply. A federal district court and a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel both affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55201:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55201:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55201:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the Court's unanimous opinion holding that a business owner, such as Yates, qualifies as a \"participant\" in an ERISA pension plan. The Court reasoned that this was the intent of Congress and that the act's text verifies this. In a business in which an ERISA plan covers employees, the employer can essentially qualify as an employee and receive the plan's protections. In light of this, the Court sent Yates' bankruptcy issues to a lower court for resolution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55201:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55202:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55202:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHernan O'Ryan Castro was sentenced to 20 years in prison for drug related offenses. After the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, Castro alleged that he had discovered evidence that a government witness had testified falsely. Based on this evidence, he requested a new trial without legal representation. The district court, because Castro had no legal representation, attempted to help him by re-characterizing his request for a new trial as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The judge's re-characterization of Castro's appeal was intended to help him, but two years later, in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress limited the number of petitions for writ of habeas corpus that a prisoner could file to one. When Castro attempted to petition for what he thought was his first write of habeas corpus in 1998, he was denied because of the earlier reclassification of his request for a new trial. When he appealed, the 11th Circuit Court of appeals initially sided with Castro, ruling that the reclassification should not count against him. Four months later, however, the 11th Circuit reconsidered, siding with the government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55202:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55202:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55202:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that a federal court can recharacterize a motion as a first habeas corpus petition only if the court: (1) informs the litigant of the court's intent to recharacterize; (2) warns the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent habeas corpus petition will be treated as a second petition; (3) gives the litigant an opportunity to withdraw or amend the motion. The Court held that because the district court failed to give these prescribed warnings, Castro's 1994 motion could not be considered a first habeas corpus petition and his 1997 motion therefore could not be considered a second petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55202:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55203:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55203:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Beef Promotion and Research Act (1985) required cattle producers to pay a fee for generic beef advertisements done on behalf of the cattle industry. Some cattle producers disagreed with the advertisements. The Livestock Marketing Association sued the Department of Agriculture (USDA) in federal district court and alleged a government-required fee for advertising with which some cattle producers disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The USDA argued the advertising was government speech immune from First Amendment challenge. Another group of cattle producers, the Nebraska Cattlemen, sided with the USDA and sued the Livestock Marketing Association. The two cases were consolidated. The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the program violated the First Amendment and that the advertising was compelled and not government speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55203:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55203:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55203:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the fund was for government speech and that therefore the government could not be sued under the First Amendment. The Court pointed to the rule that while compelled funding of private speech raises First Amendment concerns, compelled funding of government speech generally does not.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55203:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55204:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55204:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohnnie Cochran sued his former client Ulysses Tory in a California court for making defaming statements. Tory had tried to force Cochran to pay him money in exchange for desisting, Cochran argued. A judge agreed and ordered Tory to never talk about Cochran again. Tory appealed unsuccessfully in state court, arguing the order violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Cochran died one week after oral argument.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55204:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55204:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55204:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Cochran's death diminished the grounds for the judge's order and that the order therefore amounted to an overly broad prior restraint on speech. Tory could no longer try to force Cochran to pay him in exchange for desisting, the Court reasoned, ending the order's underlying justification.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55204:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55205:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55205:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws \"respecting an establishment of religion.\" The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55205:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55205:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55205:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, \"simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55205:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55206:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55206:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1998 a Georgia court reversed all of Johnson's seven prior convictions. One of these had been the basis for the enhanced federal sentence Johnson had received in 1994. In light of the reversals, Johnson filed a motion to vacate his enhanced federal sentence. Federal law, however, set out a one-year statute of limitations on motions by prisoners seeking to modify their sentences. That one-year period ran from the latest of four dates, the last of which was \"the date on which the facts supporting the claim...could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.\" Johnson argued his motion was timely because the reversals constituted previously undiscoverable \"facts supporting the claim\" and thus triggered a renewed limitation period. The district court and the 11th Circuit denied Johnson's motion as untimely.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55206:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55206:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55206:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court that the vacating of a state sentence that underlay a federal sentence enhancement was a \"fact\" within the meaning of the law, but that fact had to have been discovered with due diligence: that is, the prisoner must have promptly sought to have the state judgment vacated. The Court held that by waiting until more than three years after his federal sentence, Johnson failed to show due diligence in seeking to have his original state convictions vacated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55206:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55207:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55207:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Florida court convicted Vietnam citizen Duan Le for driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged in federal immigration court that Le should be deported. The INS argued Le committed a crime of violence that was an aggravated felony under federal immigration laws - a deportable crime. The immigration court and an appellate immigration court ruled Le could be deported. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55207:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55207:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55207:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice William Rhenquist, the Court held that state DUI offenses, except when involving purposeful intent, are accidental and not crimes of violence under federal law. Le therefore did not commit an aggravated felony for which he could be deported.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55207:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55208:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55208:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTexas prodded Aviall Services to clean up contaminated property bought from Cooper Industries. Aviall sued in federal district court to force Cooper to pay some of the clean up costs. Aviall claimed it could sue Cooper under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Cooper admitted to being a potentially responsible party (PRP), but claimed it was not liable because Aviall was never sued to clean up the land and had no federal requirement to do so. The district court and a panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Aviall. The entire appellate court reversed and ruled CERCLA does not require a PRP to first be sued before seeking clean up funds from other PRPs.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55208:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55208:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55208:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a private party, who, like Aviall, had not been sued under CERCLA could not obtain cleanup contributions from other liable parties. The Court reasoned that CERCLA's language made clear that parties could seek cleanup contribution only during or following a civil action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55208:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55209:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55209:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWillard Stewart was injured while working on a dredge (a machine for underwater digging) for Dutra, a dredging company. Stewart alleged Dutra was negligent and sued the company in federal district court under the Jones Act. The district court ruled a dredge is not a \"vessel in navigation\" as defined by the Jones Act and therefore Stewart could not sue under the act. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55209:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55209:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55209:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Revised Statutes of 1873 specified that in any act passed after 1871, \"vessel\" included any watercraft capable of transportation. The requirement that a worker be on a vessel \"in navigation,\" required by the LHWCA, simply meant that the vessel be capable of transportation. This included dredges which, both then and now, transported equipment and a crew over water.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55209:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55210:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55210:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986 John Pace was convicted for murder in a Pennsylvania court. His post-conviction appeal was rejected by the state courts as untimely. In 1999 he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. While federal law provides a one-year statute of limitations on filing habeas petitions, that period is tolled while \"a properly filed\" state appeal is pending. The district court found Pace entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling, effectively discounting the period of time when Pace pursued appeals in state courts. Pennsylvania appealed and argued the court had no basis for the extension. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled Pace could not file a federal habeas petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55210:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55210:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55210:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the federal statute of limitations barred Pace's petition, as it was filed beyond the deadline. Pace was not entitled to statutory tolling because a petition filed after a time limit, which does meet any exceptions to that limit, was no more \"properly filed\" than a petition filed after a time limit permitting no exception. Moreover, because Pace did not pursue claims in a \"diligent\" and timely fashion, he was not entitled equitable tolling for any of the time period during which he pursued his state appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55210:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55211:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55211:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMelvin T. Smith was tried in for illegal possession of a firearm, among other offenses. During the trial the judge ruled Smith was not guilty because the state failed to introduce direct evidence of the gun's length - therefore not proving the gun Smith possessed met the statutory definition of a firearm. The state later pointed to the state supreme court's ruling that testimony that a gun was a pistol or revolver was sufficient evidence to allow a firearm charge to go to the jury. Because a witness had testified that Smith's gun was a pistol, the judge reversed and sent the possession charge to the jury.\nSmith appealed and argued the judge's reversal of the not guilty ruling on the possession charge violated the Fifth Amendment's doubly jeopardy clause, which prohibited successive prosecutions. The state court of appeals rejected Smith's argument and ruled no Fifth Amendment violation occurred because the judge's reversal did not require a second proceeding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55211:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55211:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55211:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause barred the judge from reconsidering the acquittal on the firearm charge later in the trial. Smith was subjected to successive prosecutions because, according to Court precedent, the midtrial ruling was an acquittal and the submission of the count to the jury was a further proceeding dealing with guilt or innocence. While the double jeopardy clause did allow states to create a procedure for reconsidering a midtrial determination of insufficiency of proof, Massachusetts had no such procedure at the time of Smith's trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55211:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55212:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55212:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAzel Smith and group of other police department employees over the age of 40 sued Jackson, Mississippi, and the city police department in federal district court. The group alleged the department salary plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which banned employers from engaging in age discrimination. The department plan gave officers with five or fewer years of tenure with the department larger raises than those with more than five years of tenure. The group made a \"disparate impact\" claim under the ADEA, arguing the department and city unintentionally engaged in age discrimination. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled disparate impact claims could not be made under the ADEA. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55212:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55212:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55212:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that ADEA authorized recovery in disparate-impact cases, but that in this case petitioners failed to set forth a valid claim. The Court relied on its 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power, where the Court first authorized disparate-impact claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court reasoned that the ADEA authorized disparate-impact claims in cases similar to Griggs, because the language of Title VII and ADEA was virtually identical. However, ADEA was narrower than Title VII and allowed an otherwise prohibited action where the discrimination was based on reasonable factors other than age. The employees in this case failed to identify any specific practice within the pay plan that had an adverse impact on older workers. Further, the city's plan was based on reasonable factors other than age.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55212:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55213:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55213:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA California state court sentenced Felix to life in prison for murder. Felix's conviction became final on August 12, 1997. Federal habeas law gave Felix one year to file a habeas petition in federal court. On May 8, 1998, Felix filed a habeas petition and asserted a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission into his trial of videotaped prosecution witness testimony. On January 28, 1999, more than five months after the one-year habeas time limit, Felix filed an amended petition arguing that the admission into his trial of pretrial statements had violated the Fifth Amendment. Felix argued that the one-year limit did not bar this amended petition, citing the rule under federal habeas law that amended petitions relate back to the filing date of the original petition if both arise out of the original's \"conduct, transaction or occurrence.\" Because his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims challenged the same criminal conviction, Felix argued, they arose out of the same \"conduct, transaction, or occurrence.\" The district court disagreed and ruled the amended petition time barred; the court rejected the Sixth Amendment claim on its merits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Sixth Amendment ruling, but agreed with Felix that his amended petition was not time barred because they both arose out of the same trial and conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55213:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55213:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55213:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court rejected the argument that the trial itself was the \"transaction\" or \"occurrence\" under federal habeas law. The Court said that such a definition would have allowed virtually any new claim introduced in an amended petition to relate back, gutting the one-year time limit on petitions. Felix's amended habeas petition thus did not relate back because the issue of his pretrial statements differed in time and type from the videotaped witness testimony.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55213:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55215:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55215:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHalbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and told Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court. Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea to apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial court twice to appoint counsel to help him with his application. The trial court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal, which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55215:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55215:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55215:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses required Michigan to provide counsel for defendants who wanted to appeal to the state appellate court. The Court reasoned that if indigent defendants convicted on their pleas did not have counsel to guide them through Michigan's complex appellate process, their right to appeal would not be meaningful.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55215:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55216:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55216:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo subsidiaries of ExxonMobil formed joint ventures with Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. When a dispute arose over the royalties SABIC had charged, SABIC sued the two subsidiaries in a Delaware state court, seeking a ruling that the royalties were proper. ExxonMobil countersued in federal district court, alleging SABIC had overcharged. Before the state-court trial, the district court denied SABIC's motion to dismiss the federal suit. As SABIC appealed, the Delaware court ruled for ExxonMobil. The Third Circuit held that as a result of of the state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the suit. That doctrine was an offshoot of the federal law giving the U.S. Supreme Court sole authority to modify and prohibiting a federal district court from exercising appellate jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55216:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55216:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55216:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the the Third Circuit \"misperceived the narrow ground occupied by Rooker-Feldman.\" That doctrine was confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of state-court judgments made before the federal district court proceedings began and inviting district court rejection of those judgments. In this case, ExxonMobil's federal suit was filed before any state-court judgment and had not sought the review of any such judgment. Rather, the company had sought to protect itself in the event it lost in state court on grounds that might not have precluded relief in federal court. Moreover, in cases of parallel state and federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman was not triggered simply by the entry of a state court judgment. Properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction did not vanish if a state court reached judgment on the same or a related question while the case remained before a federal district court. Rooker-Feldman did not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or add to the circumscribed doctrines allowing federal courts to dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55216:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55218:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55218:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCalifornia prisoner Garrison Johnson alleged in federal district court that the California Department of Corrections used race to assign temporary cell mates for new prisoners. Johnson alleged this violated the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause. The district court and a federal appellate court ruled against Johnson. The appellate court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Turner v. Safley, which said a relaxed standard - as opposed to a \"strict scrutiny\" standard - should be used to determine whether prison regulations are constitutional. The prison's policies were \"reasonably related to the administrators' concern for racial violence and thus must be upheld,\" the appellate court wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55218:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55218:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55218:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that prison racial-segregation policies are subject to strict scrutiny. The Court rejected the claim that because the policy was \"neutral\" - because all prisoners were \"equally\" segregated - the policy was not subject to strict scrutiny. Racial classifications must receive strict scrutiny even when they may be said to affect the races equally. The Court remanded the case so that the Ninth Circuit could use strict scrutiny to review the policy. Justices John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas, and Antonin Scalia dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55218:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55219:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55219:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, \"unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55219:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55219:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55219:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 7-2 opinion that Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Constitution did not require police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drug-detection dog on a car during a legal traffic stop. No legitimate privacy was at risk, the Court argued, because the dog only alerted to an illegal drug.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55219:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55223:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55223:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $567,000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state-court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court (the rule of \"issue preclusion\"). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55223:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55223:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55223:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 judgment delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court refused to create an exception to the full faith and credit statute in order to provide a federal forum for litigants seeking to advance federal takings claims. The Court rejected the argument that whenever plaintiffs reserved their federal takings claims in state court, federal courts should review the reserved federal claims, regardless of the issues decided by the state court. Moreover, federal courts were not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can sue in federal court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55223:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55225:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55225:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCosmetics company Lasting Impression trademarked the term \"micro colors.\" Lasting Impression sued K.P. Permanent Make-Up in federal district court for using the term. K.P. used the \"classic fair use defense\" and argued it used the term only to describe K.P. products. The district court sided with K.P. Lasting appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Unlike other federal appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit required companies that used the fair use defense to prove there was no likelihood of confusion in use of the term. The Ninth Circuit ruled there was likelihood of confusion and reversed the district court's ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55225:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55225:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55225:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a party raising the classic defense of fair use did not need to negate any likelihood that the practice under question would confuse consumers about the origin of the goods. The Court interpreted federal trademark law as placing the burden of showing likelihood of confusion on the party charging infringement. Moreover, Congress \"said nothing about likelihood of confusion in setting out the elements of the fair use defense.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55225:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55227:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55227:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe IRS seized property owned by Grable and gave Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to Darue. Grable sued in state court, claiming Darue's title was invalid because federal law required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to federal disctrict court, arguing that the case presented a federal question because Grable's claim depended on an interpretation of federal tax law. The district court agreed and ruled for Darue. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55227:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55227:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55227:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that the case involved a federal question and could thus be removed to federal court. Federal-questions jurisdiction, the Court reasoned, lay over some state-law claims that implicated significant federal issues. In this case, the national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation warranted moving the case to federal court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55227:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55228:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55228:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBradley Nigh bought a car from Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Nigh later sued the dealership for intentionally charging him for a car feature for which he did not agree to pay. Nigh sued under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). A federal district court awarded Nigh about $24,000. Koons Buick appealed and argued the district court ignored TILA's cap on damages to $1,000. A Fourth Circuit held that a 1995 amendment to the act removed the $1,000 cap on recoveries involving loans secured by personal property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55228:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55228:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55228:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 judgment delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a 1995 TILA amendment did not change the original limit on violations involving personal-property loans. Congress intended the amendment to raise the minimum and maximum recoveries for closed-end loans secured by real property. Congress had not sought to remove the $1,000 cap on loans secured by personal property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55228:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55229:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55229:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn Blakely v. Washington (2004) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range.\nFollowing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge.\nIn another case, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188-235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55229:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55229:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55229:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines, where they allow judges to enhance sentences using facts not reviewed by juries, violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The sentences of Booker and Fanfan, based partly on facts determined only by judges, were therefore unconstitutional. In a separate 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court said the guidelines would now be advisory and invalidated the provisions that made them mandatory.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55229:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55230:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55230:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Westlands Water District received water from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under a 1963 contract. In 1993 Westlands sued the district for reducing their water supply. California farmers who had bought water from Westlands also sued the bureau, intervening as plaintiffs. After negotiations Westlands agreed to dismiss their suit. But the farmers refused to drop theirs, accusing the bureau of breach of contract. The farmers claimed that as third-party beneficiaries they could enforce the contract and that the United States had waived its sovereing immunity from such suits in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. That act allowed parties \"to join the United States as a necessary party defendant in any suit\" over rights under a federal reclamation contract. The district court held that the farmers were not contracting parties or third-party beneficiaries and thus could not invoke the waiver. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55230:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55230:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55230:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn this case, no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the act merely permitted parties to join the United States in an action between other parties when the action required interpretation of a contract and joining the U.S. was necessary. The farmers suit was not an attempt to join the U.S. as a necessary party defendant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55230:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55231:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55231:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJane and John Doe said they performed espionage activities abroad for the United States. The Does sued the CIA in federal district court for not paying financial support allegedly promised to the Does and for allegedly violating the Does' due process rights. The CIA argued the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Totten v. U.S. (1875) prohibited the district court from hearing the case. In Totten the Court dismissed a spy's claim against the government for damages for breach of contract. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Totten did not prevent the district court from hearing the Does' case. The courts reasoned that the Does' case, unlike Totten's, was mainly about the denial of due process rights. The Ninth Circuit said the CIA could prohibit the district court from hearing the Does' case only if the CIA could show that state secrets would be in jeopardy were the case to proceed. The Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the district court for that court to determine the CIA's potential state secrets claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55231:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55231:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55231:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 9-0 decision delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Totten barred the Does' suit. Totten, the Court ruled, prohibited judicial review in any case where success depended on the existence of a secret espionage relationship with the government. To risk revealing that relationship would endanger the essence of a spy's contract with the government - secrecy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55231:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55232:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55232:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court.\nThe medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not \"substantially affect\" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55232:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55232:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55232:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the commerce clause gave Congress authority to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary. Stevens argued that the Court's precedent \"firmly established\" Congress' commerce clause power to regulate purely local activities that are part of a \"class of activities\" with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority argued that Congress could ban local marijuana use because it was part of such a \"class of activities\": the national marijuana market. Local use affected supply and demand in the national marijuana market, making the regulation of intrastate use \"essential\" to regulating the drug's national market. The majority distinguished the case from Lopez and Morrison. In those cases, statutes regulated non-economic activity and fell entirely outside Congress' commerce power; in this case, the Court was asked to strike down a particular application of a valid statutory scheme.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55232:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55233:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55233:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Ohio's highest security prison first opened, no official policy governed placement there, resulting in haphazard and erroneous placements. Ohio ultimately issued the \"New Policy,\" which required formal procedures for evaluating whether prisoners classified for placement into the facility. The New Policy also required a three-tier review process after a recommendation for Supermax placement was made. For instance, the state had to explain a placement recommendation to an inmate and that inmate had to have an opportunity for rebuttal at a hearing. Prisoners in the facility sued in federal district court, alleging the prison placement policy violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The court agreed that the New Policy violated due process and ordered elaborate and far-reaching modifications to the policy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but set aside the substantive modifications on the ground they exceeded the court's authority.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55233:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55233:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55233:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the procedures by which the New Policy classified prisoners for placement at the facility provided sufficient protection to comply with the due process clause. The Court reasoned that procedural protections afforded to prisoners were necessarily limited, and that the New Policy sufficiently minimized risk of erroneous placement. The Court also cited Ohio's interests in prison security against gangs and in preserving scarce resources.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55233:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55234:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55234:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Tennessee trial court sentenced Thompson to death for murder. Thompson made unsuccesful appeals in state court based on the claim that his counsel had failed to adequately investigate his mental health. A federal district court also rejected Thompson's petition based on that claim. However, Thompson's habeas counsel had failed to include in the record the deposition and report of a psychologist who argued Thompson had suffered from serious mental illness. The counsel included the documents when Thompson appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which nevertheless dismissed Thompson's claim. Thompson then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate until the Court decided whether to hear the case. The Court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate again, pending the Supreme Court's decision on Thompson's petition for rehearing, which the Court denied. The Sixth Circuit still did not issue its mandate. Five months later, Tennessee had set Thompson's execution date. The Sixth Circuit suddenly issued an amended opinion on Thompson's habeas petition, overturning the district court's dismissal of his ineffective counsel claim and ordering hearings based on that claim. The Sixth Circuit included in the appeal record the initially ommitted psychologist deposition. The circuit court argued its authority to issue an amended opinion five months after the Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition was based on its inherent power to reconsider an opinion before issuance of the the mandate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55234:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55234:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55234:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit abused its discretion by withholding its mandate and not releasing its amended opinion for more than five months after the Supreme Court's final say in the case. The Sixth Circuit cost the state and the parties significant time and resources by not providing notification that it was reconsidering its decision. Further, the Sixth Circuit had the opportunity at the rehearing stage to consider the same mental health arguments it later adopted. Moreover, the evidence and its ommission did not warrant the court's \"extraordinary departure from standard procedures.\" By withholding its mandate for months, the Court said, the Sixth Circuit failed to give the \"appropriate level of respect\" to Tennessee's judgment that Thompson deserved death. Notably, the Court declined to consider the scope of the appellate courts' Federal Appellate Procedure 41 authority to stay a mandate following a denial of certioarari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55234:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55235:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55235:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRancho Palos Verdes, a city in California, gave Mark Abrams a permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. But when the city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes, the city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. Abrams applied and the city refused to give him the permit. Abrams then sued in federal district court, alleging the city violated his rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Abrams sought damages under a federal liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rights violations.\nThe district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to give Abrams the permit. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. The court said Congress intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act to include only remedies specifically found in that act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a \"comprehensive remedial scheme,\" Abrams could seek damages under other federal laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55235:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55235:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55235:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Abrams could not enforce the limitations of the Telecommunications Act on local authorities through federal liability law, because the act provides its own judicial remedy. Congress could not have meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by the Telecommunications Act to co-exist with an alternative remedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55235:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55237:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55237:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOklahoma's election laws created a primary system in which a party could invite only its own members and Independents to vote in its primary. The Libertarian Party and voters registered in other parties argued the laws violated the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association by preventing the Libertarian Party from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections. The district court ruled for Oklahoma. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled Oklahoma's election laws violated the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55237:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55237:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55237:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system did not violate the right to freedom of association and that any burden it imposed was minor and justified by legitimate state interests. The Court noted that not every electoral law burdening associational rights was subject to strict scrutiny. Requiring voters to register with a party before participating in its primary minimally burdened voters' associational rights. Moreover, Oklahoma's primary advanced a number of state interests, including the preservation of parties as viable and identifiable interest groups.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55237:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55238:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55238:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the Missouri Supreme Court set aside Carman Deck's death sentence, Deck was presented at his new sentence hearing shackled with leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain. Deck was again sentenced to death. The state supreme court rejected Deck's claim that his shackling violated the U.S. Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55238:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55238:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55238:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the Court's 7-2 holding that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during both a capital trial's guilt and penalty phases, unless such shackling is justified by an essential state interest specific to the defendant on trial (such as courtroom security). The majority argued that the law has long forbidden use of visible shackles during a capital trial's guilt phase, and that the reasons underlying this prohibition (like the possibility shackles will bias the jury) extend this rule to the penalty phase.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55238:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55239:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55239:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGrokster and other companies distributed free software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files directly between their computers, without the use of a central server. Users employed the software primarily to download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution companies were not liable for copyright violations stemming from their software, which could have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55239:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55239:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55239:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that companies that distributed software, and promoted that software to infringe copyrights, were liable for the resulting acts of infringement. The Court argued that although the Copyright Act did not expressly make anyone liable for another's infringement, secondary liability doctrines applied here. The software in this case was used so widely to infringe copyrights that it would have been immensely difficult to deal with each individual infringer. The \"only practical alternative\" was to go against the software distributor for secondary liability. Here the software companies were liable for encouraging and profiting from direct infringement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55239:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55240:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55240:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state's largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling gas prices. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is \"a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.\" The Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55240:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55240:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55240:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous opinion that the Court needed to \"correct course\" and make clear that the \"substantially advances\" formula put forth in Agins was inappropriate for determining whether a regulation amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking. Takings clause challenges to regulations had to be based on the severity of the burden that the regulation imposed upon property rights, not the effectivness of the regulation in furthering the governmental interest. The Court insisted that its ruling did not \"disturb any of its prior holdings.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55240:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55241:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55241:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government or an individual on the government's behalf to sue any person for \"making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States.\" A 1986 amendment to the FCA allows individuas to sue their employer if the employer retaliates against them in any way for assisting in an investigation of such false claims. In 2001, Karen Wilson, a secretary for Graham County Water District, sued her employer for various false claims it allegedly made concerning a federal disaster relief program. She also brought a retaliation suit against her employer, alleging that after she had provided information on the false claims to federal officials in December 1995, she had been repeatedly harassed by Graham County District officials until she resigned in March 1997. The District Court dismissed Wilson's suit as untimely. The court accepted Graham County District's argument that the six-year statute of limitations in the 1986 amendment to the FCA was not intended to apply to retaliation suits. Therefore, the court held, the most closely analogous state limitation applies instead. The north Carolina limit for retaliation suits was three years, so Wilson's suit was brought too late. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the six-year limitation to all retaliation suits under the FCA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55241:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55241:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55241:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that the six-year statute of limitations did not apply to suits for retaliation. The majority opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas found the statute of limitations \"ambiguous.\" The ambiguity arose from the fact that the six-year limitation in the FCA starts from the time the false claim was made. Yet in a retaliation suit, no actual false claim needs to be alleged. The plaintiff only has to allege that her employer retaliated against her in connection with a federal investigation. The Court found that the ambiguity could be resolved by interpreting the statute of limitations to apply only to suits for false claims, not to retaliation suits. The Court left to the lower courts the question of which state statute of limitations should apply in place of the six-year limitation. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. The dissent characterized the statute of limitations as \"unusual\" but \"reasonably clear,\" and argued that it should be read to apply to retaliation actions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55241:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55243:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55243:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn Artuz v. Bennett (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court held that state petitions for postconviction relief could toll the federal statute of limitations even if those petitions were ultimately dismissed as procedurally barred. Gonzalez, whose federal habeas petition had been dismissed as time barred, filed a new petition (a Rule 60[b] petition) in light of the Artuz ruling. The district court denied Gonzalez's new motion. The 11th Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that Gonzalez's latest motion amounted to a second or succcessive habeas petition which could not be filed without precertification by the court of appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55243:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55243:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55243:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Gonzalez's Rule 60(b) motion challenged only the district court's previous ruling on the federal statute of limitations. That motion was therefore not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition and could be ruled on by the district court without the 11th Circuit's precertification.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55243:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55244:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55244:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of peanut farmers in Texas threatened to sue Dow Agrosciences in state court for damages caused by one of Dow's herbicides. The farmers alleged Dow violated Texas labeling requirements. Dow asked a federal district court to rule the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted and therefore prohibited the farmers' state law claims. The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled FIFRA expressly prohibited additional state labeling requirements such as Texas'.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55244:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55244:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55244:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the peanut farmers could sue Dow in state court. The Court reasoned that FIFRA preempts only state-law \"requirements for labeling or packaging.\" The peanut farmers' defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of warranty claims were based on common-law and did not necessarily require that Dow label or package products in a particular way. The farmers' fraud and negligent-failure to warn claims, by contrast, were based on common-law rules that qualified as \"requirements for labeling or packaging.\" However, FIFRA preempted only state-law labeling requirements\" that were \"in addition to or different from\" FIFRA's labeling standards. The Court sent back to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals the question whether Texas law governing fraud and failure-to-warn claims was parallel to FIFRA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55244:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55245:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55245:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder federal law, the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges to hear certain cases and to make recommendations to the Tax Court. The Tax Court judge, under Tax Rule 183(b), had to presume the special judge's fact findings to be correct, but could make the ultimate decision in the case. The special trail judge reports were made public and included in the record on appeal. Only after a rule revision in 1983 did the Tax Court stop making such reports public and exclude them from the appellate record. Whether the final Tax Court's decision deviated from the special judge's recommendations was kept secret. Tax Court Judge Howard Dawson ruled that Kanter was guilty of tax fraud and of illegally diverting money to Claude Ballard, a business associate. In his opinion, Dawson claimed to have adopted the opinion of the special trial judge. Ballard and Kanter separately appealed, objecting to the absence of the special trial judge's report from the appellate record. Two federal appellate courts ruled against Kanter and Ballard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55245:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55245:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55245:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that no statute authorized, and Rule 183's text did not warrant, the concealment of the special report. Rule 183 did not allow the \"novel practice\" of treating the trial judge's opinion as an \"in-house draft to be worked over collaboratively by the regular Tax Court judge and the special trial judge.\" The rules allowed only one trial judge opinion to be issued and before a separate Tax Court ruling, Ginsburg wrote. It would be impossible for a Tax Court judge to give deference to an opinion he himself collaborated in producing. Moreover, the Tax Court's refusal to disclose the trial judge's original report did not allow fully informed appellate review of the court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55245:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55246:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55246:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, Dodd was convicted under federal law for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On April 4, 2001 he filed a motion that the conviction should be set aside because it was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1999 in Richardson v. U.S. In that case, the Court held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The district court rejected Dodd's motion, because it was filed more than a year after the Court decided Richardson. Under federal law, the one-year limitation period in which a prisoner may file a motion to change his sentence, begins \"on the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.\" The 11th Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55246:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55246:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55246:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the text of the federal law \"unequivocally\" stated that the one-year limitation period begins to run on the date on which the Court \"initially recongized\" the right, not the date on which that right was made retroactive. O'Connor wrote that Dodd's reliance on the statute's second clause was misplaced, because that clause merely limited the subsection's applicability to cases where applicants assert rights both \"newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made applicable to cases on collateral reviiew.\" Thus, the date the right was asserted does not apply at all unless the second clause's conditions are met. The Court noted that this would make it difficult for applicants filing second or successive motions to obtain relief, since the Court rarely announces a new rule and makes it retroactive within a year.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55246:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55247:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55247:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAs Enron's financial difficulties became public in 2001, Arthur Andersen instructed its employees to destroy Enron-related documents. This was consistent with Andersen's document retention policy. The government later charged Andersen for violating federal law, which made it a crime to \"knowingly...corruptly persuade another person\" to \"withold\" or \"alter\" documents in an \"offical proceeding.\" The federal jury found Andersen guilty. The company appealed, arguing the jury instructions failed to convey the elements of a \"corrupt persuasion\" conviction - specifically, that a \"consciousness of wrongdoing\" was required. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55247:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55247:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55247:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the jury instructions failed to convey that the federal document law required a \"consciousness of wrongdoing\" for conviction. There was nothing inherently corrupt in ordering employees to destroy documents, even if the aim was to keep the documents from the government. Thus, contrary to what the jurors had been told, Andersen could be convicted only if the persuaders were shown to be conscious that they were behaving corruptly.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55247:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55248:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55248:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the late 18th century, Congress set aside most of the tribal land of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York as a reservation. The tribe later sold off much of the reservation. In the 1990s members of the tribe began to buy back pieces of the land. The tribe said the reacquired land was part of a reservation and therefore exempt from state and municipal taxes. The City of Sherrill - which encompassed some of the tribe's property - argued the land was not tax-exempt. The Oneidas sued Sherrill in federal district court and alleged the land was recognized by the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua as part of their historic reservation. The Oneidas also pointed to the 1790 Non- Intercourse Act that required federal consent for Indian land to lose its reservation status. Sherrill argued the land lost its reservation status after leaving the Oneidas' ownership originally. The district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for the Oneidas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55248:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55248:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55248:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that standards of federal Indian law and federal equity precluded the Tribe from unilaterally reviving its ancient sovereignty over the land at issue. The Court pointed to the \"longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of central New York and its inhabitants\"and the fact that regulatory authority over the land had been exercised by state and local government for 200 years. By giving up the land in the early 19th century, the Oneidas had \"relinquished governmental reins and could not regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55248:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55249:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55249:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoderick Jackson, a high school basketball coach, claimed he was fired for complaining that the girls' basketball team he coached was denied equal treatment by the school. Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education in federal court, claiming his firing violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX bans sex discrimination in federally-funded schools. Jackson claimed Title IX gave him the right to sue - a \"private right of action\" - because he suffered for reporting sex discrimination against others, despite the fact the he did not suffer from sex discrimination. The federal district court and appellate court ruled against Jackson.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55249:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55249:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55249:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Title IX allowed suits alleging retaliation for reporting sex discrimination. Such retaliation, the majority reasoned, constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. Jackson therefore had the right under Title IX to pursue his claim in court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55249:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55250:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55250:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Susette Kelo and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically, the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55250:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55250:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55250:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the majority held that the city's taking of private property to sell for private development qualified as a \"public use\" within the meaning of the takings clause. The city was not taking the land simply to benefit a certain group of private individuals, but was following an economic development plan. Such justifications for land takings, the majority argued, should be given deference. The takings here qualified as \"public use\" despite the fact that the land was not going to be used by the public. The Fifth Amendment did not require \"literal\" public use, the majority said, but the \"broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55250:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55251:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55251:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames Kirby hired International Cargo Control (ICC) as a shipping intermediary to arrange a shipment of goods from Australia to Alabama. ICC issued Kirby a bill of lading (a contract that set shipping terms). The bill invoked liability limitations provided by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). The bill also included a Himalaya Clause, which extended ICC's limitations of liability to companies ICC hired. ICC hired Hamburg Sud to transport the goods. Hamburg Sud issued ICC a bill of lading that also invoked COGSA protections and included a Himalaya Clause. Hamburg Sud carried the goods on a ship to Georgia and subcontracted Norfolk Southern Railroad to transport the goods inland to Alabama.\nThe train derailed and Kirby sued Norfolk Southern to recover the $1.5 million in damages he claimed the derailment caused his goods. The district court ruled Norfolk Southern could limit its liability to Kirby on the basis of the Himalaya clause in the Hamburg Sud contract. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Hamburg Sud bill did not limit Norfolk Southern's liability to Kirby because Kirby was not bound by its terms.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55251:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55251:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55251:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that federal law controlled the interpretation of both bills, because they were maritime contracts and the dispute was not inherently local. The Court also held that the 11th Circuit misinterpreted the bills as not protecting Norfolk.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55251:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55252:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55252:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against her estranged husband. A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits. A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children. Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back. During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him. Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order. The Due Process Clause states: \"No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...\" The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order. On appeal, however, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim. A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a \"protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order,\" which the police had violated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55252:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55252:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55252:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that Gonzales had no constitutionally-protected property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order, and therefore could not claim that the police had violated her right to due process. In order to have a \"property interest\" in a benefit as abstract as enforcement of a restraining order, the Court ruled, Gonzales would have needed a \"legitimate claim of entitlement\" to the benefit. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia found that state law did not entitle the holder of a restraining order to any specific mandatory action by the police. Instead, restraining orders only provide grounds for arresting the subject of the order. The specific action to be taken is up to the discretion of the police. The Court stated that \"This is not the sort of 'entitlement' out of which a property interest is created.\" The Court concluded that since \"Colorado has not created such an entitlement,\" Gonzales had no property interest and the Due Process Clause was therefore inapplicable. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55252:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55253:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55253:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSigitas Banaitis and John Banks separately argued to the U.S. Tax Court that contingency fees paid to lawyers could be deducted from taxable gross income. The court disagreed and ruled for the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS said Banaitis and Banks owed taxes on contingency fees. Banaitis appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that under Oregon law contingency fees could not be taxed as income. Banks appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled contingency fees were never taxable income. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated Banaitis' and Banks' cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55253:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55253:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55253:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous, 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that if a litigant's recovery constituted income, the litigant's income included the contingency fee paid to his or her lawyer. The Court held that an economic gain assigned in advance to another party - as in a contingency-fee agreement - could not be excluded from gross income.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55253:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55254:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55254:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In separate cases groups sued the states and argued the laws violated the U.S. Constitution's \"dormant\" commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause prohibited states from passing laws affecting interstate commerce, particularly laws favoring in-state business over out-of-state business. The states argued the laws were valid exercises of state power under the 21st Amendment, which ended federal Prohibition and allowed states to regulate alcohol importation. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Michigan law violated the dormant commerce clause and did not advance the core concerns of the 21st Amendment (such as temperance). A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the 21st Amendment allowed New York's law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55254:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55254:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55254:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that both states' laws violated the commerce clause by favoring in-state wineries at the expense of out-of-state wineries and did so without the authorization of the 21st Amendment. State authority to engage in such economic discrimination was not the purpose the 21st Amendment. Moreover, in modern cases, that amendment did not save state laws violating other provisions of the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55254:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55255:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55255:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNonJay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a \"strong likelihood\" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show \"strong likelihood\" that the challenges were race-based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder.\nJohnson appealed and argued that the \"strong likelihood\" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference\" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same. The U.S. Supreme Court at first dismissed Johnson's appeal because the case was not finalized (see Johnson v. California 2004, No. 03-6539). After another round of appeals, however, the Court agreed to decide the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55255:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55255:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55255:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the California Supreme Court and ruled that California's standard for objections to peremptory challenges was incompatible with the standard set forth in Batson. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens explained that the Court had not intended that the objector would have to prove that a peremptory challenge was \"more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.\" The Court ruled that in the first step of the Batson procedure, the objector only needs to \"produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.\" The objector ultimately has to prove that the peremptory challenge was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination, but not until the third step of the Batson procedure, after the State has offered \"permissible race-neutral justifications\" for the challenges. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that California's standard was within the procedural leeway provided to States by Batson.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55255:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55256:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55256:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA South Dakota court convicted Charles Rhines of murder. Rhines filed a habeas corpus petition with a federal district court, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights in the trial and conviction. The district court ruled Rhines failed to exhaust all of his claims in state court. The court stayed Rhines' habeas petition so that Rhines could finish his claims in state court. The stay prevented the one-year statute of limitations in the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act from barring Rhines from appealing to a federal court once he exhausted state remedies. The state penitentiary warden appealed. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Lundy (1982) required the dismissal of a habeas petition that included unexhausted claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55256:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55256:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55256:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that a district court could stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present unexhausted claims in state court and then return to federal court. The Court recognized that its decision in Rose, combined with the one-year statute of limitations required by the AEDPA (enacted 14 years after Rose) could have permanently deprived petitioners like Rhines of the opportunity to seek federal review for unexhausted claims. As a result, federal district courts could grant a stay on a mixed petition if (1) there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims in state court, (2) the unexhausted claims had merit, and (3) the petitioner was not engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55256:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55257:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55257:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice detained Mena and others in handcuffs while they searched the house they occupied. During the detention they asked Mena about her immigration status. The police had a search warrant to search the premises for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued the officers in federal district court for violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for Mena. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that using handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status also violated the Fourth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55257:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55257:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55257:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 9-0 judgment delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Mena's detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Officers with a search warrant for contraband had authority to detain occupants of the premisses during the search, in order to minimize any risk to officers. Handcuffing Mena while police searched for weapons and a wanted gang member was also justified by officer safety concerns and because officers had to deal with detaining multiple occupants. The Court further held that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status during her detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The officers did not need to have reasonable suspicion to question Mena. Moreover, the Court had held repeatedly that mere police questioning did not constitute a seizure.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55257:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55258:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55258:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichigan law required every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a flat $100 annual fee. Interstate trucking companies asked Michigan courts to invalidate the fee, claiming the flat fee discriminated against interstate carriers and imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate trade (in violation of the \"dormant\" commerce clause). They pointed to the fact that trucks carrying both interstate and intrastate loads engaged in intrastate business less than trucks that only haul within Michigan. State courts refused to invalidate the fee.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55258:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55258:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55258:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Michigan's fee did not violate the dormant commerce clause because the fee was imposed only on intrastate transactions and did not facially discriminate against interstate or out-of-state activities or enterprises. The dormant commerce clause did not, Breyer wrote, ban such a \"neutral\" and \"locally focused fee.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55258:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55259:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55259:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard and Betty Rousey filed bankruptcy and claimed their two Individual Retirement Accounts were exempt from the bankruptcy. Federal law exempted the following from bankruptcy: \"a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract.\" The exemption had to be \"on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonable necessary for the support of the debtor....\" The Rouseys said an IRA was a \"similar plan or contract.\" The bankruptcy court and a bankruptcy appellate panel ruled an IRA not a \"similar plan or contract.\" The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even if IRAs are \"similar plans or contracts,\" the Rouseys' account withdrawals would not be \"on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service.\" The Eighth Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other circuits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55259:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55259:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55259:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Rouseys could exempt IRA assets from their bankruptcy estate. IRAs met both federal requirements dealing with exemptions from bankruptcy: They were \"similar plans or contracts\" to the exemptions enumerated and they \"conferred a right to receive payment on account of age.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55259:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55260:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55260:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of disabled people who travelled on Norwegian Cruise Line ships sued the company in federal district court and alleged two of its ships did not conform with Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The company argued the ADA did not apply to the two ships because, though the ships sailed out of Texas, they sailed under the Bahamian flag. The district court dismissed the group's claims and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled foreign-flagged cruise ships are not subject to Title III of the ADA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55260:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55260:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55260:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held 6-3 that Title III applied to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S. waters. Justice Kennedy delivered the Court's controlling opinion, which held that Title III did not apply to foreign ships' internal affairs, because there was no \"clear congressional statement\" showing an intent to do so. A clear statement was necessary before a general law could interfere with a foreign-vessel's internal affairs. Title III's own limitations, however, prevented the statute from imposing requirements that would have threatened safety on the ship or conflicted with international obligations. If Title III were to impose certain requirements, such as major structural modifications, the clear statement rule could bar such an interference.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55260:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55261:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55261:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Broudo and a group of shareholders sued Dura Pharmaceuticals under the Securities and Exchange Act after the price of the company's stock dropped sharply. The shareholders alleged the company's misleading statements about its antibiotic sales and about the possibility of FDA approval of an asthma device caused the price drop. The district court ruled the investors failed to prove \"loss causation\" because they could not prove a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the drop in price. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the investors proved loss causation because they proved the stock price on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55261:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55261:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55261:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that an inflated purchase price did not by itself prove \"loss causation.\" At most, an inflated purchase price suggested that misrepresentation \"touched upon\" a later economic loss, but did not necessarily cause it. The Court reasoned that at the moment the transaction took place, the plaintiff had not suffered a loss because the inflated purchase price was offset by ownership of a share that possessed equivalent value at that instant. Further, the logical link between the inflated purchase price and any later economic loss was not invariably strong, because other factors may have affected the price.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55261:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55262:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55262:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1991 about 10,000 Exxon dealers sued Exxon Corporation in federal court, alleging that the corporation had engaged in an extensive scheme to overcharge them for fuel. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, but the District Court judge certified the case for review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction. Some of the multiple plaintiffs in the case had claims that did not meet the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy necessary to qualify for federal diversity jurisdiction. In 1990 Congress had enacted 28 U.S.C. Section 1367, overturning Finley v. United States, which had narrowly interpreted federal courts' power to confer supplementary jurisdiction on related claims. The question for the District Court was whether Section 1367 also overturned Zahn v. International Paper Co., which ruled that each plaintiff had to separately meet the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The District Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that Section 1367 gave federal courts power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs with related claims, even if some plaintiffs' claims did not meet the required amount. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling on supplemental jurisdiction. However, this ruling conflicted with the ruling of another Circuit, which had taken the opposite view of Section 1367's scope (see Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, No. 04-79). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55262:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55262:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55262:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that as long one plaintiff meets the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction, Section 1367 authorizes federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related claims even if they do not meet the requirement. The majority opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy held that courts only need to determine whether they have original jurisdiction over one of the claims in a case. If they do, courts can then decide to extend supplemental jurisdiction to the other related claims. The Justices ruled that to require each claim in a civil action to meet the requirement would be \"inconsistent with the whole notion of supplemental jurisdiction.\" The Court based its ruling on the \"unambiguous[]\" text of the statute, saying \"the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.\" Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court should have consulted the legislative history of Section 1367. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer, wrote a dissent arguing for a narrower interpretation of Section 1367 that would not overturn Zahn.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55262:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55263:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55263:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nReginald Shepard pled guilty to violating the federal statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a gun. The government argued Shepard's sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The act added at least a 15-year sentence for any felon with three or more \"violent felony\" convictions who then possessed a gun. The government argued at least five of the 11 breaking and entering convictions on Shepard's record were violent felonies. The ACCA listed \"burglary\" as a violent felony and in Taylor v. U.S.(1990) the U.S. Supreme Court said the act meant \"generic burglary\" of a \"building or other structure.\" However the Massachusetts burglary law Shepard pled guilty to breaking gave burglary a nongeneric definition - including entry into non-structures like cars. Shepard argued he had not pled guilty to generic robbery. The federal district court refused to sentence Shepard under the ACCA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and said the district court must consider evidence that showed it was obvious to Shepard that he pled guilty to generic robbery. The district court refused. The First Circuit reversed and sentenced Shepard under the ACCA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55263:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55263:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55263:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that while a guilty plea could qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA, courts may only look to the following when determining if that plea admitted to generic burglary: the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement, or a judicial record in which the defendant confirmed the factual basis for the plea (such as conversation between defendant and judge).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55263:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55264:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55264:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn Ohio state court proceedings, Stumpf pled guilty in to aggravated murder committed in an armed robbery. That robbery had left Mr. Stout wounded and Mrs. Stout dead. While Stumpf admitted to shooting Mr. Stout, he insisted his accomplice Wesley had shot Mrs. Stout. A three-judge panel ruled Stumpf the principal offender in Mrs. Stout's murder and sentenced him to death. Following this, in Wesley's trial, the state presented evidence that Wesley had admitted to shooting Mrs. Stout. After Wesley's trial, Stumpf moved to withdraw his plea or reverse his death sentence, arguing that the evidence presented by the prosecution in Wesley's trial was inconsistent with what it had presented in his own. This, Stumpf argued, cast doubt on his conviction and sentence. Stumpf's motion was unscucessful in Ohio courts. A federal district court denied Stumpf habeas relief, but the Sixth Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55264:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55264:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55264:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and possibly not. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Stumpf's plea was knowing and therefore valid, because his attorneys at the plea hearing had represented that they had explained the elements to Stumpf, who then confirmed this. The Court articulated the broad rule that constitutional requirements were satisfied when a defendant's competent counsel explained to him the charge's nature and the crime's elements. As for the prosecution's use of inconsistent theories in Stumpf's and Wesley's trials, the Court held that Stumpf's sentence may have been invalid, depending on the relationship between the prosecutor's conduct and Stumpf's death sentence.. The Court sent the question of that relationship back to the Sixth Circuit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55264:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55265:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55265:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFederal district courts convicted David Whitfield and Haywood Hall of conspiracy to commit money laundering. They appealed and argued the federal money laundering law required the jury to have found proof of an \"overt act\" furthering the conspiracy. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that the law lacked any language requiring proof of an overt act. Other federal appeals courts had ruled the law did require an overt act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55265:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55265:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55265:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous ruling that because the federal money laundering law's text did not expressly make committing an overt act an element of the conspiracy offense, the government did not need to prove such an act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55265:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55266:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55266:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChristopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally disabled. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally disabled (or \"mentally retarded\" in the vernacular of the day) violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case.\nUsing the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional.\nOn appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at \"evolving standards\" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55266:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55266:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55266:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing minors is \"cruel and unusual punishment\" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the Court pointed to \"overwhelming\" international opinion against the juvenile death penalty. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas all dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55266:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55267:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55267:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFederal law made gun possession illegal for any person \"convicted in any court\" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. A Japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a prison term longer than one year. Years later a U.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term \"convicted in any court\" did not include convictions in foreign courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Small.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55267:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55267:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55267:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the federal law's phrase, \"convicted in any court,\" encompassed only domestic, not foreign, convictions. The majority reasoned that in determining the scope of the phrase, it was appropriate to assume Congress had domestic concerns in mind. Moreover, the statute's overall language suggested no intent to reach beyond domestic convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55267:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55268:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55268:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTony Alford was driving when Washington state police, concerned Alford was impersonating a police officer, pulled him over. During a search of Alford's car, police found a tape recorder recording the traffic stop. The police arrested Alford and said he had made an illegal recording of a private conversation - a violation, they said, of the state's Privacy Act. A state court judge dismissed charges against Alford, ruling - as another state court already had - that the Privacy Act did not apply to public police work.\nAlford then sued the officers in federal district court, alleging his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for the officers.\nThe Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the officers violated Alford's Fourth Amendment rights. The facts and law were so clearly established that no reasonable officer could believe Alford violated the Privacy Act. Therefore the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest and were not protected by qualified immunity. The court rejected the officers' argument that the arrest was constitutional because there was probable cause Alford committed the crime of impersonating a police officer. That was not the reason police gave during the arrest. The Ninth Circuit said there was only one instance when an arrest for a reason the police did not articulate was constitutional: if that reason was closely related to the stated reason for the arrest. Impersonating a police officer was not closely related to violating the state Privacy Act. Other circuit courts disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's \"closely related offense doctrine.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55268:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55268:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55268:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that police had probable cause to arrest Alford for impersonating a police officer, despite the fact that this was not closely related to the offense police identified during the arrest. A warrantless arrest by a police officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if, given the facts known to the officer, there is probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed. The offense establishing probable cause need not be closely related to the offense the arresting officer identifies at the time of arrest. An arresting officer's state of mind, except for facts he knows, is irrelevant to probable cause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55268:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55269:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55269:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Florida court convicted Joe Elton Nixon of murder and sentenced him to death. During the trial Nixon's lawyer told the jury Nixon was guilty. Nixon appealed and argued he received ineffective counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Nixon said he did not agree to the lawyer's strategy. After several appeals the Florida Supreme Court granted Nixon a new trial. The court said Nixon's lawyer's comments were essentially a guilty plea and that because Nixon did not explicitly agree to the strategy, the lawyer was \"per se ineffective.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55269:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55269:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55269:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous 8-0 decision, the Court ruled that Nixon's lawyer's strategy - pursued without Nixon's express approval - did not automatically qualify the lawyer as ineffective. The Court reversed the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court, faulting that court for inappropriately applying presumptions of prejudice and deficient performance. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that \"When counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant's best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant's explicit consent.\" Nixon's lawyer would have needed Nixon's consent for a formal guilty plea, but the Court ruled that the tactic of effectively conceding guilt in order to concentrate on the sentencing phase of the trial was legitimate as long as the defendant was informed of the strategy. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55269:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55270:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55270:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws \"respecting an establishment of religion.\" The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55270:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55270:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55270:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the \"Foundations of American Law,\" an exhibit in which the county reached \"for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55270:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55271:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55271:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a \"compelling government interest.\" Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their \"nonmainstream\" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws \"respecting an establishment of religion\"). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55271:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55271:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55271:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, on its face, RLUIPA made an accommodation allowed by the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the law was an effort to alleviate the \"government-created burden\" on religious exercise that prisoners faced. Nor did section three discriminate between mainstream and non-mainstream religions. The Court did point out that constitutional problems could arise if RLUIPA were enforced improperly and religious prisoners received favored treatment, or if religious exercise and security concerns were not properly balanced.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55271:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55272:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55272:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a \"catch-all factor\" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55272:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55272:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55272:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the California Supreme Court was not unreasonable to decline to distinguish between pre-crime and postcrime mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court reasonably read the relevant precedent, Boyde v. California (1990), as establishing that the catch-all factor's text was broad enough to accommodate Payton's post-crime religious conversion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55272:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55273:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55273:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Pennsylvania court convicted Ronald Rompilla of murder. During the sentencing phase, the prosecution presented to the jury Rompilla's previous rape and assault conviction, as an aggravating factor to justify the death sentence. The jury sentenced Rompilla to death and the state supreme court affirmed. Rompilla's new lawyers filed an additional appeal, arguing that Rompilla's trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence about his various personal problems. The state courts found that Rompilla's counsel had sufficiently investigated mitigation possibilities. After Rompilla filed a federal habeas petition, a district court reversed the sentence and ruled the state supreme court had unreasonably applied the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington. Had the state court followed that case, the district court ruled, the court would have found Rompilla's trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate obvious signs of Rompilla's troubled childhood, mental illness and alcoholism. The Third Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55273:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55273:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55273:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Rompilla's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make reasonable efforts to examine the file on Rompilla's prior conviction for rape and assault. Moreover, counsel had known the prosecution would probably present the prior conviction to the jury during sentencing. In that file counsel would have found mitigating evidence about Rompilla's troubled childhood and mental health.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55273:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55274:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55274:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTitle II of the Communications Act of 1934, which was amended in 1996, subjected providers of \"telecommunications service\" to mandatory common- carrier regulation. The FCC concluded that this did not include broadband cable companies. The Ninth Circuit reversed and cited its own previous opinion that had held that cable modem service was a \"telecommunications service.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55274:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55274:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55274:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the FCC lawfully construed the Communications Act to not define cable broadband providers as \"telecommunications services.\" The Court held that the Ninth Circuit should have followed the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. That decision required federal courts to defer to an agency's construction of a statute, if that statute was within the agency's jurisdiction to administer and the agency's interpretation was reasonable, even if it differed from the court's own interpretation. In this case, the Court held that the FCC's construction was reasonable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55274:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55275:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55275:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) allows tribes to administer health care programs previously run by the federal government. Tribes can opt to do this by entering into contracts with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is obligated to fund tribe-run health services as if they were still federally run. The Secretary must also fund \"contract support costs\" associated with carrying out the contract. However, ISDA requires the federal government to fund contract support costs only to the extent money is available. ISDA also does not require the federal government to reduce funding for some tribe programs to make funds available for other tribes. In two separate cases tribes claimed the federal government under-funded contract support costs. The Secretary argued the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act made it clear the government lacked the funds to pay the full contract support costs. In one case a federal appellate court ruled that the federal government did not adequately fund contract support costs and that funds were available. In another case a federal appellate court ruled for the federal government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55275:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55275:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55275:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the government was legally bound to pay the contract support costs. Only in a \"special\" instance could the government break its promise to pay the costs. In this case, the government had access to sufficient unrestricted funds appropriated by Congress. Moreover, nothing in the act's language suggested it was non-binding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55275:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55276:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55276:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Michigan law imposed an annual $100 fee on each Michigan license-plated truck that operated entirely in interstate commerce. A group of interstate trucking companies sought unsuccesfully to have Michigan courts invalidate the law. The companies claimed that the federal law that had created the Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempted and prohibited such state fees. Under the federal law a trucking company could obtain a permit applicable in every state by registering once in a single state. While the initial state could demand a fee equal to the sum of its individual state fee, the law prohibited a state from imposing an additional \"state registration requirement.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55276:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55276:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55276:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that \"reference to text, historical context, and purpose\" proved that the words \"state registration requirement\" in the federal law applied only to state requirements concerning SSRS registration. The Michigan statute, the majority reasoned, had nothing to do with SSRS.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55276:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55277:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55277:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Minnesota state court convicted Somalian refugee Keyse Jama of assault. As a result the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued in immigration court that Jama should be deported to Somalia. The court agreed and an immigration appeals court also agreed. Jama then appealed to a federal district court and argued the part of the U.S. Code dealing with deporting an alien to his country of birth required that country to first accept the alien. Because Somalia lacked a functioning central government, this was impossible. The district court ruled for Jama. A federal appellate court reversed and said Jama and the district court misinterpreted the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55277:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55277:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55277:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Federal immigration law permitted an alien to be removed to a country without the advance consent of that country's government. Of the four removal options federal immigration law listed, an acceptance requirement appeared in only one clause: \"...he shall be removed to another country whose government will accept him.\" That clause only applied after the attorney general attempted the prior deportation option. The grammatical \"rule of the last antecedent,\" prevented \"another\" from applying to the earlier options. Nor did the law's structure impose an acceptance requirement. Moreover, contrary to Jama's argument, the acceptance requirement was hardly settled judicial interpretation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55277:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55278:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55278:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIntegra Lifesciences sued Merck for supplying an Integra patented compound to other drug companies for use in preclinical research. In response, Merck claimed its actions were allowed under the federal law that said it was not an act of patent infringement to use or import a patented invention into the United States, if the invention was used only in ways related to the development and submission of information under a federal drug law (such as the law governing submission of data to the FDA). The district court ruled against Merck and awarded Integra damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment but ordered a modification of damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55278:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55278:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55278:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the Court's unanimous opinion that federal law allowed the use of patented compounds in preclinical studies, as long as there was a reasonable basis to believe the compound could be the subject of an FDA submission. The Court reasoned that federal law provided \"a wide berth for the use of patented drugs in activities related to the federal regulatiory process\" and that \"this necessarily included preclinical studies.\" Because federal law required only a \"reasonable relation\" to FDA submission, information gathered on the patented invention (a compound in this case) did not necessarily need to be submitted to the FDA to be exempt from patent protection.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55278:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55279:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55279:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution said criminal defendants who pled guilty had no right to appeal and could appeal only with the permission of a state appellate court. Michigan then enacted a law that said in most cases judges could not appoint appellate lawyers for indigent defendants who pled guilty. Two criminal attorneys and three indigent defendants who were denied appointed appellate lawyers filed a single suit alleging the state law violated the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The district court ruled that the indigents had standing to sue and that the lawyers who sued with them had the right to sue as third-party representatives of the rights of indigents. A federal appellate court agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but based this only on the lawyers' claims. The court said the U.S. Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris required it to abstain from hearing the indigents' claims because the indigents were involved in related proceedings in state court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55279:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55279:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55279:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the attorneys lacked third-party standing to sue on behalf of the Michigan indigent defendants. The attorneys did not have close relationships with the indigent defendants, nor was there a hindrance to these defendants' ability to advance their own constitutional rights against the Michigan scheme. In addition, under Younger, the indigents should have only turned to the federal courts after pursuing their claims in state court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55279:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55280:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55280:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Mississippi court convicted Marlon Howell of capital murder - murder committed during a felony - and sentenced him to death. Howell appealed and argued the trial court was wrong to deny the jury the option of finding Howell guilty of the lesser offenses of non-capital murder or manslaughter, for which the death penalty would not have been an option. The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against Howell and said there was no evidence to support lesser charges.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55280:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55280:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55280:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the case because Howell had not first raised his federal constitutional claims in state court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55280:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55281:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55281:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe federal government deemed Daniel Benitez and Sergio Martinez inadmissible immigrants and detained them until they could be returned to Cuba.\nBenitez and Martinez argued that because deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, they could not be detained longer than the 90 days allowed by federal law. They pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis that said the government can detain beyond 90 days immigrants who were admitted to the United States, but only so long as necessary to deport them. Immigrants must be released if deportation is unforeseeable, the Court said.\nWhile separate district courts agreed deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, the Ninth Circuit and 11th Circuits disagreed over whether Zadvydas applied to inadmissible immigrants.\nThe U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the two cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55281:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55281:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55281:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court said the requirement that immigrants be detained no longer than reasonably necessary for deportation applied to both admissible and inadmissible immigrants. Because readmission to Cuba was unforeseeable, the detentions of Martinez and Benitez were unreasonable. The Court refused to give the same immigration statute different interpretations based on immigrants' characteristics.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55281:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55282:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55282:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlaska and the United States disputed ownership of two areas of submerged lands - enclaves under the Alexander Archipelago, which are more than three miles from the coast of Alaska or any island, and lands beneath the inland waters of Glacier Bay. Alaska claimed the archipelago waters under the Submerged Lands Act, which entitled states to submerged lands three miles seaward of their coastline and to land beneath inland navigable waters. The dispute over the submerged lands under Glacier Bay centered on the United States' claim that, at the time Alaska gained statehood, those lands were intended for a national monument. A Special Master appointed to deal with the conflict, recommended to the U.S. Supreme Court that the Court side with the United States with respect to both areas. Alaska appealed that decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55282:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55282:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55282:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court unanimously concluded that the Alexander Archipelago waters were not inland waters and thus belonged to the federal government. The Court reasoned that the archipelago waters were neither historic inland waters nor inland waters under the juridical bay theory (the theory would work only if the islands formed a peninsula from the mainland that divided the archipelago's waters in two). Kennedy also delivered the Court's 6-3 opinion holding that the underlying waters of Glacier Bay National Park belong to the federal government. The majority wrote that, at the time Alaska gained statehood, the government intended those lands to be part of a national monument.\nOn January 23, 2006, the Court issued its final decree. On the issues of Alexander Archipelago and Glacier Bay, the Court declared: \"judgment is granted to the United States, and the State of Alaska shall take nothing.\" Alaska's additional motion for judgment on the submerged lands within the Tongass National Forest was dismissed as moot (meaning \"previously settled\"), because the federal government had already disclaimed any interest in the lands. The newly appointed Chief Justice John Roberts took no part in the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55282:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55283:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55283:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMiller-El alleged the prosecution in his capital murder trial violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause by excluding 10 of 11 blacks from the jury. The jury convicted Miller-El and he was sentenced to death. State courts rejected Miller-El's appeals and ruled Miller-El failed to meet the requirements for proving jury-selection discrimination outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). Miller-El then appealed to a federal district court. The district court rejected Miller-El's appeal and ruled the court must defer to the state courts' acceptance of prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking potential jurors. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and ruled a federal court could only grant an appeal if the applicant made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.\nMiller-El appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and in Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) the Court ruled the Fifth Circuit should have accepted Miller- El's appeal to review the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court said an appeal should have been granted if the petitioner could demonstrate reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's decision. The Court said the district court did not give full consideration to the substantial evidence Miller-El presented. The Fifth Circuit reconsidered Miller-El's appeal and ruled Miller-El failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the state court was wrong to find no purposeful discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55283:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55283:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55283:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that Miller-El deserved to win his appeal because the jury selection in his case violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The Court began by noting that the prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 91 percent of the eligible black prospective jurors, \"a disparity unlikely to have been produced by happenstance.\" After comparing two eliminated black prospective jurors with similar white jurors who were not eliminated, the Court concluded that the \"selection process was replete with evidence that prosecutors were selecting and rejecting potential jurors because of race.\" The Court further concluded that Texas' jury selection manual, both in this case and generally, tended to allow prosecutors to read disparate questions to prospective jurors depending on whether they were black or white.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55283:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55284:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55284:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOhio state prisoners Rogerico Johnson and William Dwight Dotson separately alleged their parole proceedings violated due process. Each sued the Ohio prison system under a section of the U.S. Code - section 1983 - which allows prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement. The district courts dismissed the prisoners' claims. The courts ruled their claims challenging parole decisions actually challenged their sentences and that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) barred prisoners from using section 1983 to do this. The prisoners could make their claims only under the section of the U.S. Code that allows prisoners to petition for habeas corpus. A federal appellate court reversed the district courts' decisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55284:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55284:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55284:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and No. In an 8-1 decision, the Court affirmed the appellate court and ruled that prisoners could use Section 1983 to challenge a state's parole procedures. The majority opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that though prisoners cannot use Section 1983 to directly challenge their sentences, they can bring suit under the Section when a successful suit \"would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner.\" Though a successful constitutional challenge to Ohio's parole procedures might make it more likely that the prisoners would be released from prison sooner, the Court called the connection \"too tenuous\" for the prisoners' suit to be considered a challenge of the sentences themselves. The Court ruled that since the prisoners sought only new parole hearings, not reduced sentences, a favorable ruling would not necessarily imply the invalidity of their sentences. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a lone dissent arguing that challenges to parole proceedings can only be brought by a petition for habeas corpus.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55284:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55286:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55286:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSheila White was the only woman working in the Maintenance of Way Department of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad's Tennessee Yard. After she complained of harassment by her supervisor, White was moved from duties as a forklift operator to less desirable duties as a track laborer, though her job classification remained the same. She was also suspended for 37 days without pay, but was eventually reinstated and given full back pay.\nWhite filed suit in federal court, where a jury rejected her claims of sex discrimination but awarded her damages of $43,000 after finding that she had been retaliated against for her complaints, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On appeal, Burlington Northern argued that White had not suffered \"adverse employment action,\" and therefore could not bring the suit, because she had not been fired, demoted, denied a promotion, or denied wages. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the suspension without pay - even if back pay was eventually awarded - was an \"adverse employment action,\" as was the change of responsibilities within the same job category.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55286:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55286:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55286:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that White suffered retaliatory discrimination when she was reassigned to less desirable duties and suspended without pay. Though the duties were within the same classification and the pay was eventually reinstated, the action was nevertheless sufficiently harsh to constitute retaliatory discrimination. In a decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and six other justices, the Court held that in order to prevail on a claim of retaliatory discrimination, \"a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.\" (internal citations omitted) Justice Samuel Alito wrote separately, agreeing with the result but arguing that the test adopted by the other members of the Court would eventually prove problematic.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55286:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55288:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55288:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nS.D. Warren Company (Warren) operates several hydroelectric dams in Maine. Under Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act, companies must obtain state approval of \"any activity\" \"which may result in any discharge into the [Nation's] navigable waters.\" When Warren sought to renew the federal licenses for its dams, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) required that it first get approval from the Maine Board of Environmental Protection because, FERC ruled, the dams resulted in a \"discharge.\" Warren disagreed, arguing that the water which moved through the hydroelectric dams was not actually a \"discharge\" because it was water from the same river which had just been temporarily re-routed. After Warren's administrative appeals and state court suit (which went to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court) failed, it appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55288:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55288:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55288:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the term \"discharge\" in section 401 had historically been given a broad meaning by FERC, the Environmental Protection Agency, and even the Supreme Court. Justice David Souter, in the Opinion of the Court, wrote that \"[w]hen it applies to water, 'discharge' commonly means a 'flowing or issuing out.' ... In fact, this understanding of the word was accepted by all Members of the Court sitting in our only other case focused on Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.\" The discharge from hydroelectric dams fit this definition perfectly, and Section 401 therefore mandated state approval.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55288:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55289:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55289:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAs part of Ohio's economic development plan, DaimlerChrysler agreed to expand its operations in Toledo in exchange for tax exemptions and tax credits worth roughly $280 million. Charlotte Cuno and others challenged the deal, however, arguing that Ohio had violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by offering the tax incentives. A federal district court disagreed, ruling for DaimlerChrysler, but on appeal a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The panel found that the tax incentives coerced businesses to expand in Ohio at the expense of other states, and were therefore unconstitutional manipulations of interstate commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55289:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55289:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55289:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court did not reach the central question presented, finding instead that Cuno and the other plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the suit. Chief Justice John Roberts, for the unanimous Court, wrote that simply alleging standing based on their status as taxpayers in Ohio and Michigan did not give them a sufficiently strong interest in the case. The citizens from Ohio could not definitively show that the tax incentives had decreased the amount of money available to the state treasury (and thus increased their tax burden or decreased the services available to them) because the point of the incentive was to increase long-term tax revenue. The citizens from Michigan, meanwhile, could not show that any tax revenue increase in Michigan that could have resulted from DaimlerChrysler expanding there instead of in Ohio would have actually benefited them directly, because it might have been used for programs that they did not benefit from. Without any clear injury, they had no standing to sue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55289:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55292:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55292:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nClarence Hill was sentenced to death in Florida, which ordinarily uses a three-drug combination for executions. Hill claimed that this particular form of lethal injection was unnecessarily and gratuitously painful, and that it therefore violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. However, Hill had previously filed for a federal writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction, and the federal district court ruled that his new challenge was the practical equivalent of a second habeas corpus appeal. Successive habeas corpus appeals are not allowed under 28 U.S.C. 2244, and so the district court rejected Hill's petition. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55292:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55292:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55292:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that challenging the form of execution was fundamentally different from challenging the lawfulness of a conviction or sentence, the traditional purposes of a habeas corpus appeal. This finding was supported by the fact that Hill conceded other forms of execution would be constitutional, and that Florida state law does not require the particular form of execution at issue in this case. \"Under these circumstances,\" Justice Kennedy wrote, \"a grant of injunctive relief could not be seen as barring the execution of Hill's sentence.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55292:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55293:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55293:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn two separate cases, employees sued Barber Foods and IBP in federal district court. The employees alleged the companies violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by not paying them for time spent walking to the worksite after putting on required equipment. The district court and later the First Circuit ruled against the Barber employees. A separate district court ruled IBP must compensate its employees for the disputed time. The Ninth Circuit agreed. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55293:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55293:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55293:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens, for a unanimous Court, wrote that putting on required safety equipment qualified as a \"principal activity\" under the FLSA. The workday began when employees started that activity and therefore included the subsequent time spent walking to the worksite. The time spent waiting to put on safety equipment before that, however, was not included in the workday because it was a \"preliminary\" activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55293:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55294:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55294:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Cardegna signed a contract for a loan from Buckeye Check Cashing. The contract contained a clause in which Cardegna agreed to resolve any controversies over the loan through arbitration. Cardegna later sued Buckeye, claiming that the conditions for the loan stipulated by the contract were illegal. Buckeye filed a motion in Florida district court to have the case resolved by arbitration, as required by the contract. Cardegna countered that the contract as a whole was illegal and that the arbitration clause was therefore not enforceable. The court agreed and ruled for Cardegna.\nOn appeal, the state appeals court reversed, holding that the Federal Arbirtration Act, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, allows arbitration clauses to be enforced even if they are part of otherwise invalid contracts. The appeals court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court's use of Prima Paint, however, because the contract in that case had been merely voidable, while the contract in Cardegna's case was actually illegal. The Florida Supreme Court therefore reversed, ruling in favor of Cardegna.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55294:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55294:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55294:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The 7-1 majority (Justice Samuel Alito not participating) ruled that challenges to the legality of a contract as a whole must be argued before the arbitrator rather than a court. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia explained that \"unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.\" The Court held that the Florida Supreme Court had been wrong to rely on a distinction between void and merely voidable contracts, because the word \"contract\" in the Federal Arbitration Act includes contracts later found to be void. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented due to his long-held view that the FAA does not apply in state courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55294:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55295:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55295:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1998, Texaco and Shell Oil agreed to stop competing for the U.S. oil market. The two companies formed a joint venture, Equilon Enterprises, which would manage the refining and marketing of gasoline in the western United States. The joint venture was charged with setting prices for Texaco and Shell gasoline, which would be sold under the original brand names. When Equilon set the same price for both brands, Dagher and other service station owners sued under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that Equilon was engaging in illegal price-fixing. The dispute turned on whether Equilon's actions fell under the Sherman Act's per se rule against price-fixing, under which all such instances of price-fixing by joint ventures would be illegal without regard to the specific harm caused in any particular case. The District Court granted summary judgment for Texaco, holding that the per se rule did not apply to the price-setting engaged in by Equilon. The District Judge reasoned that all enterprises, including joint ventures, must eventually set prices for their products. Therefore Equilon was merely engaged in a normal business practice, not the type of unreasonable, anticompetitive price-fixing that would run afoul of the Supreme Court's non-literal interpretation of the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Equilon's actions constituted price-fixing under the Sherman Act's per se rule and therefore could not be legal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55295:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55295:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55295:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court ruled that the per se rule against price-fixing should not be applied to price-setting by joint ventures. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas held that \"though Equilon's pricing policy may be price fixing in a literal sense, it is not price fixing in the antitrust sense.\" The Court distinguished 'horizontal' price-fixing schemes between competitors, which are per se illegal, from the \"internal pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture,\" which are not.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55295:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55296:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55296:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nShadi Dabit, formerly a stockbroker at Merrill Lynch, brought a class action suit against his former employer alleging that the company had defrauded brokers by deceptively inflating stock prices, causing the brokers to hold onto stocks they would otherwise have sold. Dabit's class action was filed in the U.S. District Court based on federal diversity jurisdiction, but was based on Oklahoma state law.\nIn response to perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in securities litigation, Congress had passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which placed restrictions on federal securities fraud class actions. When plaintiffs began avoiding the law by bringing the suits in state courts instead of federal courts, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), which pre-empts federal class action securities fraud claims brought under state law that allege misrepresentation \"in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.\"\nMerrill Lynch argued that Dabit's suit was pre-empted by SLUSA and therefore could not be brought under state law. Dabit countered that the suit alleged misrepresentation concerning only the holding of stocks, and therefore was beyond the scope of SLUSA. The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Merrill Lynch, finding the language of SLUSA broad enough to include suits such as Dabit's. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that suits by holders of stocks are distinct from suits by sellers and purchasers and that SLUSA was meant to pre-empt only the latter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55296:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55296:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55296:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that \"holder\" class actions such as Dabit's are \"in connection with the purchase or sale\" of a security and therefore are pre-empted by SLUSA. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens reasoned that Congress must have been aware of the broad interpretation the Court had given that phrase when it passed SLUSA, and that a broad interpretation of SLUSA is more consistent with the law's stated purpose. \"For purposes of SLUSA pre-emption, that distinction [between sellers/purchasers and holders] is irrelevant,\" Justice Stevens wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55296:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55297:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55297:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nU.S. Customs Service agents investigating a child pornography website raided Susan and Richard Hallock's residence and seized several computers. The Hallocks were cleared of any guilt, but the computers were damaged beyond repair. Susan Hallock originally sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which waives the government's sovereign immunity in certain cases. The District Court dismissed that case for lack of jurisdiction, because the FTCA's waiver has an exception for claims arising from the detention of goods by customs. Hallock then sued Will and the other customs agents as individuals. The agents made a motion for dismissal under a provision of the FTCA that bars suits where a judgment on the claim has already been entered. The District Court denied the motion, accepting Hallock's argument that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction did not constitute a final judgment. Although the trial had not yet concluded, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the agents' appeal of the District Court's ruling on the motion and affirmed the District Court, ruling that since Hallock had not properly brought a claim in the original suit, no judgment had been entered. The Circuit Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the collateral order doctrine, under which some decisions of lower courts other than final judgments can be appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of the motion to dismiss, but instructed the parties to argue the question of the Circuit Court's authority to hear the appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55297:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55297:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55297:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered, and no. In a unanimous opinion, the Court ruled that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Writing for the Court, Justice David Souter stressed the narrow scope of the doctrine. The Court reiterated that only orders that cannot be \"effectively\" reviewed after a final judgment can be appealed before the close of the trial. Essential to this determination is the importance of the interest at stake. In this case, the Court ruled that the agents' interest in appealing the District Court's order had no \"greater importance than the typical defense of claim preclusion\" and it therefore warranted \"no immediate appeal of right as a collateral order.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55297:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55298:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55298:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSchmidt, a South Carolina citizen, sued Wachovia Bank in a South Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing him to participate in an illegal tax shelter. Wachovia is a national bank with its main office in North Carolina and branch offices in several other states, including South Carolina. Under federal diversity jurisdiction, federal courts can hear cases in which the parties are citizens of different states. Wachovia filed a petition in Federal District Court, seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute. After the petition was denied on the merits, Wachovia appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1348, national banks are \"deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.\" The Circuit Court interpreted \"located\" to mean any state where the bank has a branch location. Noting that the statute uses both \"located\" and \"established\" to refer to the presence of a bank, the Circuit Court determined that a national bank is \"established\" in the state where its main office is located, and \"located\" in every state where it has a branch office. Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, Wachovia was \"located\" in, and a citizen of, South Carolina (as well as several other states with branch offices). Since both parties, Schmidt and Wachovia, had South Carolina citizenship, the Circuit Court dismissed the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55298:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55298:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55298:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-0 decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that a national bank is \"located\" in, and therefore a \"citizen\" of, only the state in which its main office is located. Looking to the history of Congress's diversity jurisdiction statutes, the Court concluded that the word \"located\" need not be interpreted to mean any state where a bank has a physical presence. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Fourth Circuit had erred in drawing a distinction between the words \"located\" and \"established\": \"the Congress may well have comprehended the words 'located' and 'established,' as used in [Section] 1348, as synonymous terms.\" Justice Thomas took no part in the decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55298:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55299:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55299:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMercExchange patented a design for an online marketplace in which a single company provides the trustworthy framework within which buyers and sellers can negotiate for goods. After negotiations with eBay and Half.com to license the patent failed, MercExchange brought suit in federal district court alleging patent violation under the Patent Act. The jury sided with MercExchange, ruling that its patent had been violated, but the district court judge refused to issue a permanent injunction. The injunction would have forced eBay and Half.com to stop using the contested framework, but the judge applied the traditional four-part test to determine whether an injunction was necessary and found that it was not. That decision was reversed, however, by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which applied a \"general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringements absent exceptional circumstances.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55299:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55299:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55299:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the appeals court's general rule was an unwarranted departure from the traditional four-part test applied to determine whether an injunction is necessary. That test requires the plaintiff to prove (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that the law does not provide other adequate ways to compensate it; (3) that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, an injunction is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be harmed by a permanent injunction. The Court found no reason to make decisions on injunctions under the Patent Act different from other decisions on injunctions, and so the appeals court's general rule was rejected and the decision reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55299:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55300:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55300:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJennifer Arbaugh, a waitress at the Moonlight Cafe in Louisiana, sued her employer, the Y&H Corporation, for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The federal district court jury ruled for Arbaugh. Filing a motion to dismiss, Y&H claimed it did not qualify as an employer under Title VII, because it did not employ 15 or more employees for 20 or more calendar weeks during the relevant time period. The district court then reversed the jury judgment, holding that the number of employees determines a court's subject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII suit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55300:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55300:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55300:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the number-of-employees requirement is an element of the merits of a Title VII claim, not a jurisdictional limitation. The 8-0 opinion (Justice Alito not participating) by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reversed the Circuit Court, noting the \"unfair[ness]\" and \"waste of judicial resources\" that could result from a jurisdictional interpretation of the number-of-employees requirement as well as the lack of any specific jurisdictional language that would require such an interpretation. The Court relied on a \"readily administrable bright line\" rule that statutory limitations should be treated as non-jurisdictional unless specified as jurisdictional by Congress.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55300:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55302:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55302:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion protesters do not commit extortion in violation the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when they blockade abortion clinics, because they do not \"obtain\" property, as required by the Act. The Court concluded that \"Without an underlying RICO violation, the injunction [on the protesters] issued by the District Court must necessarily be vacated.\" The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to vacate the injunction, however, finding that the Court had only ruled on the 117 counts of extortion, and not on four additional counts of violence unrelated to extortion. The National Organization for Women (NOW) argued that acts of physical violence are sufficient to establish a violation of the Hobbs Act. Scheidler countered that the four counts of \"violence-only\" were irrelevant to the Hobbs Act, which he said requires that violence be used for robbery or extortion. Scheidler petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the Circuit Court had acted properly, and the Court granted certiorari. (Consolidated with No. 04-1352, Operation Rescue v. NOW.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55302:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55302:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55302:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court ruled that \"physical violence unrelated to robbery or extortion falls outside the scope of the Hobbs Act.\" Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Stephen Breyer cited statutory language, legislative history, and case law in support of the decision. He wrote, \"The language of the statute makes the more restrictive reading the more natural one.\" Although Congress had revised the Act in 1948, making it less clear, the Court ruled that Congress did not intend for the revisions to \"create a freestanding physical violence offense in the Hobbs Act.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55302:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55303:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55303:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBarbara Dolan tripped over mail left on her porch by a mailman, injuring herself. She sued the Postal Service under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), arguing that her injuries were due to the mailman's negligence. The government, claiming that its sovereign immunity had not been waived in this particular case, moved to have the case dismissed. The FTCA, while waiving federal sovereign immunity for most incidents that could arise under it, has an exception for the \"negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.\" Dolan argued that this exception referred only to mail that was lost or damaged by the Postal Service, not to people injured by the placement of the mail, but the district court disagreed. The case was dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55303:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55303:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55303:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-1 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy (Justice Alito not participating), the Court ruled that the \"negligent transmission\" exception was inapplicable to Dolan's case, and therefore sovereign immunity had been waived and her case could proceed. The Court accepted Dolan's argument that the exception was only meant to encompass cases of late, missing, or incorrectly delivered mail. To rule otherwise, the Court found, would be to ignore the context of the exception and risk subverting the main purpose of the statute. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent arguing that cases arising out of ambiguity in sovereign immunity waivers should be resolved in the Government's favor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55303:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55304:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55304:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKatz, the court-appointed liquidating supervisor of the bankrupt estate of a bookstore, filed a suit to collect debts owed to the bookstore by Central Virginia Community College and several other schools operated by the state of Virginia. Katz also petitioned to prevent the schools from filing claims to collect money from the bookstore because of its bankruptcy status. The colleges argued that they could not be sued by Katz because of state sovereign immunity (which holds that a state must consent in order to be sued). The bankruptcy court disagreed, however, finding that Congress's authority under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution (Article I Section 8) was sufficient to allow them to waive states' sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55304:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55304:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55304:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that states cannot invoke sovereign immunity as a defense in bankruptcy proceedings. Rather than ruling on the power of Congress under the Bankruptcy Clause to waive states' immunity, as the bankruptcy court did, the Court held that ratification of the Clause itself involved a subordination of state sovereign immunity. The Court relied on the history and intent of the Bankruptcy Clause, which indicated that \"the power to enact bankruptcy legislation was understood to carry with it the power to subordinate state sovereignty, albeit within a limited sphere.\" Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy and Chief Justice John Roberts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55304:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55305:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55305:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez hired Joseph Low, an attorney, to represent him in a federal criminal trial. The district court judge refused to allow Low to represent Gonzalez-Lopez, however, because the judge ruled that Low had violated a court rule in a previous case. Gonzalez-Lopez was subsequently convicted. On appeal, he argued that his Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his own choosing had been violated and that the conviction should therefore be overturned. The Eighth Circuit agreed, holding that the trial judge had misinterpreted the court rule and that Low's conduct had been acceptable under a proper understanding of the rule. The decision to not allow him to represent Gonzalez-Lopez was therefore wrong, and resulted in a violation of Gonzalez- Lopez's Sixth Amendment rights significant enough to warrant overturning the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55305:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55305:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55305:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court held that a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of one's own choosing is \"structural\" error. Unlike some other kinds of errors in which a defendant must also prove that the result would likely have been different had his rights not been violated, structural errors must result in automatic reversal of the conviction. \"[T]he erroneous denial of counsel bears directly on the 'framework within which the trial proceeds,'\" Justice Scalia wrote. \"It is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings. ... Harmless error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55305:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55306:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55306:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA police officer stopped and searched Samson on the street in San Bruno, California. The officer had no warrant and later admitted he had stopped Samson only because he knew him to be on parole. The officer found that Samson was in possession of methamphetamines. Samson was arrested and charged with drug possession in state court. At trial Samson argued the drugs were inadmissible as evidence, because the search had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion and the state supreme court declined to hear the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55306:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55306:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55306:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Samson \"did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.\" Parole allows convicted criminals out of prison before their sentence is completed. An inmate who chooses to complete his sentence outside of direct physical custody, however, remains in the Department of Correction's legal custody until the conclusion of his sentence, and therefore has significantly reduced privacy rights. In this case, Samson had also been required, as a condition of his parole, to sign an agreement that he would be \"subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer..., with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.\" This written consent to suspicionless searches, along with his already reduced privacy interests as a parolee, combined to make the search constitutional. Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer dissented, arguing that parolees have an expectation of privacy greater than that of prisoners, which was violated by the search at issue in this case.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55306:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55307:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55307:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSalim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's former chauffeur, was captured by Afghan forces and imprisoned by the U.S. military in Guantanamo Bay. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court to challenge his detention. Before the district court ruled on the petition, he received a hearing from a military tribunal, which designated him an enemy combatant.\nA few months later, the district court granted Hamdan's habeas petition, ruling that he must first be given a hearing to determine whether he was a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention before he could be tried by a military commission. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the decision, however, finding that the Geneva Convention could not be enforced in federal court and that the establishment of military tribunals had been authorized by Congress and was therefore not unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55307:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55307:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55307:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-3 decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, held that neither an act of Congress nor the inherent powers of the Executive laid out in the Constitution expressly authorized the sort of military commission at issue in this case. Absent that express authorization, the commission had to comply with the ordinary laws of the United States and the laws of war. The Geneva Convention, as a part of the ordinary laws of war, could therefore be enforced by the Supreme Court, along with the statutory Uniform Code of Military Justice. Hamdan's exclusion from certain parts of his trial deemed classified by the military commission violated both of these, and the trial was therefore illegal. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. Chief Justice John Roberts, who participated in the case while serving on the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, did not take part in the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55307:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55308:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55308:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen ConAgra, Swift-Eckrich's parent company, attempted to enforce its patent for a process for browning precooked meats, Unitherm claimed that the patent was invalid because Unitherm's president had invented the process six years before. Unitherm sued, alleging that ConAgra had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by attempting to enforce a patent obtained by fraud. Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ConAgra moved for judgment as a matter of law, asking the Disrict Court to dismiss the case based on insufficiency of evidence. The court denied the motion and sent the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for Unitherm. ConAgra appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, again arguing that the evidence was insufficent to prove an antitrust violation. However, ConAgra did not renew the motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict, pursuant to Rule 50(b), or move for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59. Normally, parties must file the Rule 50(b) motion after an unfavorable verdict in order to obtain judgment as a matter of law on appeal. Unitherm argued that since ConAgra had failed to renew its motion under Rule 50(b), the Court of Appeals could not consider the insufficiency-of-evidence claim. ConAgra took the position that renewal of the motion is optional. The Federal Circuit considered itself bound to apply the precedent of the relevant regional Circuit Court (the Tenth), under which Rule 50(b) is indeed optional, in contrast to the precedents of the other Circuit Courts. The Federal Circuit found the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict, so it reversed the District Court and ordered a new trial. Unitherm appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the procedural dispute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55308:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55308:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55308:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that a party must renew its motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) if the motion is to be the basis for an appeal. The District Court's denial of the initial Rule 50(a) motion could not itself form the basis of an appeal, because the denial was within the District Court's discretion. \"The only error here,\" Justice Thomas noted, \"was counsel's failure to file a postverdict motion pursuant to Rule 50(b).\" Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Kennedy, arguing that in exceptional cases courts of appeals can consider substantive issues even when procedural oversights by appellants would normally preclude them.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55308:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55310:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55310:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKeshia Dixon was arrested for illegally purchasing firearms. At her trial, Dixon raised a duress defense, claiming that her boyfriend abused her and that she feared he would harm or kill her or her daughters if she did not buy the firearms. Upon being convicted, Dixon appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that she should not bear the evidentiary burden of proving her duress claim. The Circuit Court rejected Dixon's argument, noting that the circuit's previous cases had clearly established that the duress defense requires the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of evidence. This ruling conflicted with a ruling on a similar case in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Dixon appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the narrow question of the burden of proof.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55310:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55310:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55310:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe burden of proof is on the defendant. In a 7-to-2 decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that the government meets its evidentiary burden when it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted \"knowingly\" and \"willfully.\" Dixon had argued that duress would make it impossible for a defendant to act \"willfully\" (and that the government therefore had to prove she did not act under duress in order to prove she acted willfully). The Court rejected that argument, however, because under Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, acting \"willfully\" means simply that a defendant \"acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55310:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55311:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55311:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA jury found Randy Lee Guzek guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court overturned the death sentence. Guzek was sentenced to death again, and the Oregon Supreme Court again threw out the death sentence. When Guzek was sentenced to death a third time, the Oregon Supreme Court again overturned his sentence and also considered his complaint that he had not been allowed to present testimony about his alibi at the sentencing phase of the trial. Oregon law requires that evidence of innocence, such as an alibi, be presented during the trial, not during the sentencing hearing. The Oregon Supreme Court accepted Guzek's argument that he had a constitutional right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to introduce the alibi testimony at his sentencing proceeding. Oregon appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that it was reasonable to restrict the introduction of evidence of innocence to the guilt phase of the trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55311:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55311:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55311:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the Court: \"We can find nothing in the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments that provides a capital defendant a right to introduce new evidence of this kind at sentencing.\" States are free \"to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted.\" This can include excluding the introduction of evidence of innocence from the sentencing phase.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55311:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55312:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55312:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2002 the U.S. began withholding a portion of Lockhart's Social Security payments to offset his debt on federally reinsured student loans that were more than 10 years overdue. Lockhart sued, arguing the offset was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations of the Debt Collection Act (1982). The district court dismissed Lockhart's suit, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55312:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55312:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55312:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Debt Collection Improvement Act made Social Security benefits subject to offset and that the Higher Education Technical Amendments removed the 10-year limit that would otherwise bar the offset.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55312:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55313:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55313:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, a sovereign Indian tribe, raises revenue with a tax on the gasoline sold at an on-reservation gas station. The Nation purchases the gas from non-Indian, off-reservation distributors. Kansas imposed a tax on distributors of motor fuels, which the distributors pass on to the gas stations they sell to. The Nation sued Wagnon, the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue, seeking to avoid the tax. The Nation argued that the state's tax interfered with the tribe's sovereignty, and therefore was not allowed by federal law. Wagnon claimed that since the tax was on off-reservation suppliers, the Nation's sovereignty was unaffected. The District Court accepted that argument and ruled for Wagnon. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, applying the interest-balancing test prescribed by White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker. The Circuit Court found that the tribe's interests in economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government out-weighed Kansas's interest in raising revenue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55313:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55313:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55313:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that the White Mountain Apache v. Bracker balancing test applies only where \"a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation.\" The Court ruled for Wagnon and upheld the tax, agreeing with the District Court that the balancing test should not apply to taxes on off-reservation distributors. Justice Thomas wrote that keeping the scope of the test narrow would maintain the traditional concept of tribal sovereignty, establish a \"bright-line standard\" in Indian tax-immunity, and still respect tribal authority over on-reservation activities. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justice Kennedy joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55313:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55314:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55314:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTerry Whitman works as an air traffic assistant for the Federal Aviation Administration (which is part of the Department of Transportation). Federal law requires that FAA employees who perform \"safety-sensitive functions\" submit to random drug tests. Whitman brought suit in federal district court, claiming that the FAA was testing him for substance abuse three times more often than other people holding similar positions. The disproportionate testing, he argued, violated his \"First Amendment right to privacy\" as well as his statutory rights, because the testing was not truly random.\nThe district court dismissed the suit, finding that the Civil Service Reform Act requires complaint's like Whitman's to be decided through the arbitration procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement between the FAA and the National Association of Government Employees. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55314:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55314:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55314:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an anonymous 8-0 opinion, the Court reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court explained that while the Civil Service Reform Act does not itself enable federal courts to hear civil suits, neither does it remove the jurisdiction over civil suits that federal courts have under other statutes. The Justices declined to rule on whether the District Court should have taken Whitman's case, because lower courts had not determined exactly \"where Whitman's claims fit within the statutory scheme.\" The Court sent the case back to the Court of Appeals with instructions to rule on this question. (Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55314:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55315:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55315:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997 Vermont passed a campaign finance law, Act 64, which imposed strict limits both on expenditures by candidates for office during the election cycle and on the contributions of individuals, political groups, and parties. Neil Randall, a state legislator, sued Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, arguing that the limits were unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedom of speech. In Randall's view, the Supreme Court had declared all expenditure limits unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, and Act 64's contribution limits were unconstitutionally low. Sorrell countered that Buckley was outmoded because that Court had not considered one of Vermont's justifications, namely that expenditure limits prevent candidates from spending too much time trying to raise money. Sorrell also argued that Vermont's interests in combating corruption and ensuring fair elections justified the contribution limits. The District Court struck down the expenditure limits, but upheld most of the contribution limits. Only the limits on contributions by political parties - under which national, state, and local parties together could give only $400 to a statewide candidate - were unconstitutionally low. Both parties appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court reversed, ruling that all of Vermont's contribution limits were constitutional. The Second Circuit also found that the expenditure limits would be constitutional as long as they were \"narrowly tailored\" to the state's interests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55315:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55315:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55315:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. The Court reversed the Circuit Court and invalidated Vermont's Act 64 by a 6-3 vote. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the Court should let stand the Buckley decision and its invalidation of expenditure limits. Vermont's argument that such limits prevent candidates from spending too much time fund-raising was deemed irrelevant because it was \"perfectly obvious\" and would not have changed the result in Buckley. The Court affirmed that some limits on political contributions are constitutional, but perceived \"danger signs\" indicating that Vermont's exceptionally low limits could prevent candidates from campaigning effectively. Applying a 5-part test, the Court held that Vermont's contribution limits were \"disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance.\" Justice Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, in which he argued that the contribution limits should be upheld and the expenditure limits should be referred to the lower courts for a determination of whether they were the \"least restrictive means\" of accomplishing Vermont's goals. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent arguing that Buckley should be overruled as it pertains to expenditure limits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55315:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55317:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55317:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder West Virginia law, employers are required to either participate in a state-run workers' compensation fund or demonstrate that they are financially capable of covering any workers' compensation claims that may arise. Howard Delivery service, a West Virginia freight carrier, chose to fulfill its obligation by purchasing insurance from Zurich American Insurance Company. In January of 2002, however, the company cancelled its policy (still owing thousands of dollars in unpaid premiums) and filed for bankruptcy.\nZurich filed for special status as a creditor, arguing that the money owed to them consisted of \"contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered,\" and that under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code they should therefore be given priority in recovering the premiums. The bankruptcy court rejected Zurich's claims, however, finding that the provision did not apply to the workers compensation insurance premiums because they were not wage-substitute-type benefits for which the company could bargain (because Howard was required by law to have some form of insurance). A federal district court affirmed the decision, but a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that contributions to an employee benefit plan did not need to be voluntary to meet the Chapter 11 definition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55317:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55317:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55317:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that the workers' compensation insurance was different from the sort of employee benefit programs for which creditors could be given priority under Chapter 11. The programs for which preferred status was authorized were those whose main beneficiaries were the employees, and which could be offered as an alternative to wage increases. The workers' compensation insurance mandated in this case, however, benefited the employer as much as the employees (because it protected them from liability) and were legally required, not given as part of employment negotiations. Justice Ginsburg wrote that, though the question was a close one, \"we are guided in reaching our decision by the equal distribution objective underlying the Bankruptcy Code, and the corollary principle that provisions allowing preferences must be tightly construed.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55317:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55318:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55318:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMr. and Mrs. Sereboff held a health insurance policy with Mid Atlantic Medical Services that was governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). If a beneficiary is injured, Mid Atlantic pays for all covered medical expenses. However, the plan also has a provision that requires the beneficiaries to reimburse Mid Atlantic when an injury has been caused by a third party and the beneficiary receives compensation from that third party. In this case, the Sereboffs were injured in an automobile accident caused by a third party. After they settled their suit against that third party, Mid Atlantic filed suit in federal district court under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA to recover the money it had spent on medical expenses. 502(a)(3) provides that a health insurer may bring suit \"to obtain ... appropriate equitable relief ... to enforce ... the terms of the plan.\" The Sereboff's objected, arguing that the sort of reimbursement provision at issue in this case was not \"equitable\" because the Sereboffs had not had the funds in their possession when they agreed to the plan. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, siding with Mid Atlantic.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55318:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55318:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55318:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John Roberts, for a unanimous Supreme Court, pointed to Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117 (1914), in deciding this case. In Barnes, an attorney's promise to pay two other attorneys a portion of the money he collected from a case that had yet to be decided was held legally binding. Roberts wrote that equity had once required a contract to specify an existing fund from which money would be paid (which could not have happened in this case), but that after Barnes this was no longer the case. Roberts wrote that \"the most (the Sereboffs) can muster ... are several state cases predating Barnes and a single decision that rests .. on the simple conclusion that a contractual provision purporting to secure an equitable lien did not properly do so..\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55318:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55319:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55319:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIdeal Steel Supply Corporation filed a civil suit against its competitor, National Steel Supply, Inc. in federal court. Ideal alleged that National had failed to charge sales tax for cash purchases, giving it a competitive (but fraudulent) advantage. Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, \"[a]ny person injured in his business or property\" by racketeering activity may bring a civil suit. Ideal argued that it had been injured through lost sales because of National's illegal lower prices, and therefore had standing to sue.\nThe federal district court disagreed, dismissing the suit because Ideal had not had any direct encounters with National or relied on their fraudulent tax records. A Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, however, finding that a company can sue under RICO when its competitor uses racketeering to gain an advantage.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55319:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55319:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55319:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Eight members of the Supreme Court agreed that Ideal did not have standing to bring the suit because the relationship between its injuries and the fraudulent conduct of National was too remote. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a seven-member majority, wrote that \"[w]hen a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries. In the instance case, the answer is no.\" Justice Stephen Breyer wrote separately to say that the decisive factor in this case was not just the indirectness of the injury but also the fact that legitimate business practices (the lowering of prices) had actually caused it, even though those practices were made possible by the fraud. The ninth member - Justice Clarence Thomas - wrote that while he disagreed with the other justices' concern about directness, he too would have ruled in National's favor because the case had nothing to do with organized crime, RICO's original target.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55319:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55320:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55320:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL) ran a series of television advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose judicial filibusters. WRTL anticipated that the ads would probably run afoul of BCRA and sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), seeking an order barring the FEC from enforcing BCRA against the ads. WRTL's suit alleged that BCRA is unconstitutional as it applies to the ads, which it claimed are \"grassroots lobbying advertisements\" unrelated to electoral campaigning. The FEC argued that the Supreme Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) had ruled out all \"as-applied\" challenges to BCRA. The U.S. District Court for D.C. agreed and denied WRTL's motion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55320:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55320:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55320:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The unanimous per curiam opinion reversed the District Court's judgment, allowing WRTL to proceed with its as-applied challenge. The opinion explained that the District Court had misinterpreted a footnote in McConnell that seemed to foreclose such challenges. The Justices instructed the lower court to consider the larger question of whether the BCRA is constitutional as applied to WRTL's ads.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55320:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55321:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55321:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of current and former employees of Mohawk Industries brought suit against Mohawk in federal district court under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). They claimed that Mohawk had conspired with third-party employment recruiters to bring illegal immigrants into Georgia to work for the company, and that the resulting competition for jobs hurt the legal workers. Mohawk asked the court to dismiss the case because, it argued, the plaintiffs had not shown that there were two distinct entities involved in the illegal activity as required under RICO. The only parties involved were the Mohawk corporation and the third-party recruiters, which were acting as its \"agents.\" Mohawk argued that, because the recruiters were working on behalf of the corporation rather than in cooperation with (but distinct from) it, they should not be considered separate entities. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling that the recruiters and the corporation were distinct and that RICO could therefore apply.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55321:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55321:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55321:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot answered. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted. They sent it back to the Eleventh Circuit to be considered in light of Anza v. Ideal Steel Corporation, another RICO case decided while Mohawk was pending before the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55321:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55322:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55322:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard Ceballos, an employee of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, found that a sheriff misrepresented facts in a search warrant affidavit. Ceballos notified the attorneys prosecuting the case stemming from that arrest and all agreed that the affidavit was questionable, but the D.A.'s office refused to dismiss the case. Ceballos then told the defense he believed the affidavit contained false statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed him to testify. Seeking damages in federal district court, Ceballos alleged that D.A.s in the office retaliated against him for his cooperation with the defense, which he argued was protected by the First Amendment. The district court ruled that the district attorneys were protected by qualified immunity, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled for Ceballos, holding that qualified immunity was not available to the defendants because Ceballos had been engaged in speech that addressed matters of public concern and was thus protected by the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55322:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55322:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55322:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that speech by a public official is only protected if it is engaged in as a private citizen, not if it is expressed as part of the official's public duties. Ceballos's employers were justified in taking action against him based on his testimony and cooperation with the defense, therefore, because it happened as part of his official duties. \"The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write,\" Justice Kennedy wrote, \"does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance.\" Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55322:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55324:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55324:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994 Oregon enacted the Death with Dignity Act, the first state law authorizing physicians to prescribe lethal doses of controlled substances to terminally ill patients. Attorney General John Ashcroft declared in 2001 that physician-assisted suicide violated the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA). Ashcroft threatened to revoke the medical licenses of physicians who took part in the practice. Oregon sued Ashcroft in federal district court. That court and, later the Ninth Circuit, held Ashcroft''s directive illegal. The courts held that the CSA did not authorize the attorney general to regulate physician-assisted suicide, which was the sort of medical matter historically entrusted to the states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55324:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55324:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55324:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Congress intended the CSA to prevent doctors only from engaging in illicit drug dealing, not to define general standards of state medical practice. Moreover, the CSA did not authorize Attorney General John Ashcroft to declare a medical practice authorized under state law to be illegitimate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55324:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55325:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55325:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe parents of Brian Schaffer, a disabled child, sued their public school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Schaffer's parents claimed the Individualized Education Program that the school system devised for their son, and which IDEA required for each disabled student, was inadequate. The district court ruled for the Schaffers, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court incorrectly assigned the burden of proof to the school system. Because IDEA was silent on whether the parents or the school system bear the burden of proof, the Fourth Circuit held, the general rule that the party initiating the suit bears that burden should be applied.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55325:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55325:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55325:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6 to 2 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the party bringing the suit bears the burden of proof, whether that party is the parents or the school system. In the majority opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that \"absent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise, ... we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55325:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55326:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55326:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Rapanos sought to fill in three wetland areas on his property in order to build a shopping center. Rapanos ignored warnings from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality that the area was protected wetlands under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into \"navigable waters,\" which the Act defines as \"the waters of the United States.\" Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. After Rapanos also ignored cease-and-desist orders from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the government brought a civil suit against him. Rapanos argued before the District Court that the CWA gives the government jurisdiction to regulate only traditionally navigable waters. The government countered that Rapanos's lands were covered by the CWA as \"adjacent wetlands\" under the Corps's interpretation of the Act; the sites drained into man-made drains which eventually emptied into navigable rivers and lakes. The District Court rejected Rapanos's argument and upheld the Corps's regulations including the wetlands as \"waters of the United States.\" The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the \"hydrological connection\" of the wetlands to the navigable waters qualifies them as \"waters of the United States\" under the Act.\nThe Carabells sought to fill in a wetland on their property in order to build a condominium, but were denied a permit because the wetland was protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into \"navigable waters,\" which the Act defines as \"the waters of the United States.\" Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. Carabell's site is separated from a nearby ditch by a 4-foot-wide berm (earthen barrier), but the Corps's regulations specify that the wetland is nevertheless adjacent to the waterway. The ditch empties into another ditch, which in turn empties into a creek and ultimately into Lake St. Clair, a navigable water. After exhausting administrative appeals, Carabell sued in District Court. Carabell argued that the government lacked jurisdiction under the CWA to regulate the relatively isolated wetland as part of the \"waters of the United States.\" The District Court disagreed, and upheld the Corps's expansive interpretation of the CWA. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also ruled for the Corps, holding that as long as wetlands are \"adjacent\" to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and share a \"significant nexus\" with such waters, the wetlands qualify as \"waters of the United States\" for purposes of the CWA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55326:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55326:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55326:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. The closely-divided Court split 4-1-4, with Justice Anthony Kennedy providing the crucial fifth vote to reject the Sixth Circuit's decision.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by three other Justices. The plurality rejected the argument that only actually-navigable waters can be regulated by the Clean Water Act, but also held that the word \"navigable\" in the Act cannot be divested of all meaning. The plurality held that the definitional term \"waters of the United States\" can only refer to \"relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water,\" not \"occasional,\" \"intermittent,\" or \"ephemeral\" flows. Furthermore, A mere \"hydrological connection\" is not sufficient to qualify a wetland as covered by the CWA; it must have a \"continuous surface connection\" with a \"water of the United States\" that makes it \"difficult to determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland' begins.\"\nJustice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, which disagreed with much of the plurality's reasoning. In Justice Kennedy's view, wetlands need not have a continuous surface connection to a continuously flowing body of water to be covered under the CWA, but mere adjacency to a tributary of a navigable water is not sufficient. Instead, Wetlands that are not adjacent to a traditionally navigable water must have a \"significant nexus\" with a one. This requirement is satisfied if the wetland has a significant effect on the water quality of navigable waters. Justice Kennedy suggested that Rapanos's wetlands may be covered under the CWA if more evidence of a significant nexus were presented.\nJustice Stevens wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent argued that the Corps's regulations should be upheld as a reasonable interpretation of the Act. The inclusion of all wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters was most consistent with the CWA's purpose of eliminating pollution in the nation's waters.\nThough the Court failed to obtain a majority on most of the legal issues presented by the case, the plurality and Justice Kennedy agreed to send the case back to the Sixth Circuit for a new decision based on a different analysis.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55326:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55327:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55327:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing his arrest for murder, Leeander Blake invoked his right to speak with a lawyer. Before Blake's attorney arrived, however, an officer and a detective approached Blake to give him a copy of the charges against him. The statement of the charges included \"DEATH\" as a possible penalty, although Blake was 17 years old and therefore too young to face the death penalty. The officer said to Blake \"I bet you want to talk now, huh!\" The detective then said \"No, he doesn't want to talk to us. He already asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him now.\" A half hour later Blake decided to speak to the police without his lawyer, and he proceeded to make incriminating statements about the murder. At trial, Blake argued that the incriminating statements were the product of an illegal interrogation, and therefore inadmissible. (Under Edwards v. Arizona, police must cease interrogating a suspect after he requests an attorney, unless the suspect waives his previous request.) A county circuit court agreed with Blake, and ruled the statement inadmissible. On appeal, Maryland argued that Blake's interaction with the officer and the detective did not constitute an interrogation, because the officer's statement was a mere rhetorical question, and in any case was quickly corrected by the detective. An intermediate state appeals court agreed and allowed the statement to be admitted as evidence. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the detective's correction did not reduce the severity of the officer's inappropriate statement. Since the officer's statement was ruled an illegal interrogation in violation of Blake's Miranda rights, the incriminating statement could not be used as evidence at trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55327:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55327:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55327:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. Shortly after oral argument, the Court dismissed the case. The anonymous Per Curiam opinion stated simply: \"The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55327:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55328:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55328:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Martins filed a class action lawsuit against the defendant companies in New Mexico state court in 1996, alleging illegal conduct with regard to auto financing and insurance contracts the parties had entered into. The defendants removed the case to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. The Martins did not object or seek remand until over a year later, when they argued that their claims did not meet the $50,000 amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, agreeing with defendants' arguments that the punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and monetary relief for the named plaintiffs at issue in the case each exceeded the $50,000 threshold. The Martins requested that the district court certify its order denying remand so that they could seek interlocutory review, and the court denied their motion. The plaintiffs next requested that the district court grant judgment against them so that they could appeal the decision regarding jurisdiction, and the court granted their request.\nThe plaintiffs then appealed to the 10th Circuit, and in a 2001 ruling, the appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling, rejecting the arguments that the amounts sought by the plaintiffs satisfied the diversity jurisdiction requirement. The court remanded the case with instructions to send it back to state court.\nBack in district court, the Martins moved for attorney's fees and expenses under § 1447(c), which provides for judicial discretion to make such an award in cases of improper removal. The district court denied this request on the grounds that the defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for removal at the time. The Martins again appealed to the 10th Circuit.\nThe appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling, explaining that the district court had applied the proper standard under 10th Circuit precedent, stating that even in cases where removal was later found to be improper, if it was deemed to be objectively reasonable at the time, the court had discretion to deny an award of attorney's fees and expenses under § 1447(c); other circuits had employed a different standard. The appellate court also agreed with the district court's conclusion that the removal had an objectively legitimate basis at the time it occurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55328:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55328:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55328:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court ruled that \"absent unusual circumstances, attorney's fees should not be awarded when the removing party has an objectively reasonable basis for removal.\" The Court admitted that Section 1447 is unclear on when attorney's fees should be added. The Court's reading of the statute detected no strong textual bias for or against awarding fees. Considering the likely motives of Congress, the Court ruled that attorney's fees should only be awarded when a party sought removal without an objectively reasonable basis. Since Franklin had such a basis, Martin was not entitled to any fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55328:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55329:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55329:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPaul House was sentenced to death for murder based on circumstantial evidence. House then submitted a habeas petition in federal court, claiming that he had new evidence demonstrating his innocence. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his petition, finding he had failed to show that it was \"more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence,\" the standard of review established for habeas petitions in Schlup v. Delo. Even though the evidence cast some doubt on the original evidence, it was not sufficient to warrant a habeas petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55329:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55329:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55329:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, and unanswered. In a 5-3 decision, the Court ruled that the Court of Appeals was wrong to deny House's habeas petition. The opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy held that though the standard in Schlup v. Delo was \"demanding,\" House's case was so extraordinary that it could be granted review despite his failure to present his new evidence in state court. This was because House's new evidence, while not necessarily proving his innocence, was sufficiently compelling that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court sent the case back to the lower courts with instructions to hear House's new claims.\nThe Justices declined to clarify the \"persuasive demonstration of actual innocence\" standard in Herrera v. Collins, except to note that since House's evidence just barely met the high standard in Schlup, it did not meet the \"extraordinarily high\" threshold in Herrera.\nChief Justice John Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. The dissent argued that under Schlup it was not enough for new evidence to cast doubt on House's conviction; the totality of the evidence had to prove \"that House was actually innocent.\" The dissenters also stressed that the Court should defer to the District Court and not simply take the new evidence \"at face value.\" Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55329:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55330:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55330:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPatrick Day was convicted of murder in state court. After a long delay, he filed a petition for federal review, arguing that his counsel was inadequate. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within a one-year time limit. Day's petition was late, but the state of Florida failed to notice the untimeliness of the petition and instead addressed only the merits of Day's argument. Later a Federal Magistrate Judge did notice Day's failure to meet the deadline, and recommended to the District Court that the petition be dismissed. Day argued that by responding to the petition without disputing the timeliness, the state had forfeited the statute-of-limitations defense. The District Court disagreed and dismissed the petition. Day appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that the District Court had acted unfairly when it ruled against him based on an argument that the state had not made. The Circuit Court rejected Day's argument and affirmed the District Court, ruling that the state's erroneous concession of the timeliness of the petition did not prevent the court from dismissing it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55330:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55330:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55330:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court and ruled that the District Court was within its discretion when it dismissed Day's petition. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that \"if a judge does detect a clear computation error, no Rule, statute, or constitutional provision commands the judge to suppress that knowledge.\" The majority held that federal courts are not obligated to dismiss petitions for untimeliness if the state does not raise the issue, but they may as long as they give the petitioner notice and an opportunity to dispute the timeliness. Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion but dissented from the judgment. Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55330:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55332:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55332:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Reginald Chavis was convicted of murder, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in California court. After the California Court of Appeal denied Chavis' petition, he waited more than three years before appealing the decision to the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition without explanation.\nHaving exhausted his state-court remedies, Chavis then sought to file a habeas petition in federal court. The district court, however, dismissed Chavis' petition. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act there is a one-year period in which a habeas petition must be filed. Chavis' three-year delay, the court ruled, had exceeded that period, and Chavis' petition was therefore untimely. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that Chavis' state-court petition had been \"pending\" for the entire three years. Because the one-year statute of limitations did not apply to time during which state court petitions were pending, Chavis' petition in federal district court was timely under the AEDPA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55332:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55332:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55332:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the California Supreme Court's summary denial was not necessarily an indication that the petition was timely under state law. The petition was in fact untimely because the three-year delay could not be considered a \"reasonable time,\" which is the timeliness standard for filing a petition under California law. If the state petition was untimely, it could not be considered \"pending\" between the time of the lower court's denial and the filing of the state habeas petition. Therefore, the Court held that the three-year filing delay did count towards the AEDPA's one-year limitation, meaning the federal habeas petition was also untimely.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55332:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55333:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55333:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, Gary Jones moved out of his house and into an apartment, while his wife continued to live in the house. Jones failed to notify the state of his new address, however, and after several years of unpaid property taxes the tax authority sent a letter by certified mail to the house notifying him that, if the taxes went unpaid, the house would be sold. The letter was returned as \"unclaimed\" (because Jones was not living at the house and no one was present to sign for its receipt) and the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands sold the property in a private sale to Linda Flowers.\nJones sued in state court, claiming that the sale violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because he was never actually notified of the sale. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, however, finding that under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dusenberg v. United States actual notice is not required as long as the state makes a reasonable effort to notify the party of his rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55333:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55333:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55333:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-3 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court overruled the Arkansas Supreme Court, ruling that \"additional reasonable steps\" are required after a mailed notice is returned undelivered. The Court noted that the Due Process Clause does not require that every property owner receive actual notice, but the government must make a sincere effort. In this case, the government knew that its first effort to notify Jones had failed. Therefore, the Court ruled that the government should have taken additional steps, such as remailing the notice or posting a notice on the house's door. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Alito took no part in the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55333:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55335:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55335:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the 1980s, research scientists at University Patents, Inc. (UPI) discovered that high levels of the amino acid homocysteine in the body are correlated with dangerously low levels of two B vitamins. UPI filed for a patent, seeking to license both the method of testing for the amino acid, and the correlation of the amino acid levels with B vitamin levels. UPI's successor licensed Metabolite Laboratories, which in 1992 sub-licensed the patent to Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (LabCorp). When in 1998 LabCorp started using another company's test and stopped paying Metabolite royalties, Metabolite sued. A jury found LabCorp guilty of patent infringement and breach of contract and awarded damages to Metabolite. In an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, LabCorp argued that the patent was invalid. Natural phenomena themselves are not patentable, but new applications of them normally are. LabCorp argued that Metabolite had impermissibly patented a relationship that already existed in nature. The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, however, ruling that Metabolite could patent its discovery of the correlation and that any association of homocysteine levels with B vitamin deficiency could constitute patent infringement. LabCorp appealed its case to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55335:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55335:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55335:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. By a vote of 5-3, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The decision of the Federal Circuit was left in place, as if the Supreme Court had never agreed to hear the case at all. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented from the order. The dissent argued that the Court should have taken the case in order to lend necessary clarity to an important issue in patent law. In the dissenters' view, a natural correlation between two substances in the body is a \"natural phenomenon\" that cannot be patented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55335:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55336:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55336:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn McDonald was the president and sole shareholder of JWM Investments. After Domino's terminated its contract with JWM, McDonald brought suit under a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. Section 1981). McDonald claimed that Domino's had ended its contract because he was black, and that he therefore had a right to sue under the Civil Rights Act, which gives all citizens, regardless of race, the right to make and enforce contracts. Domino's moved to dismiss the case, arguing that McDonald had not been a party to the contract (it had been between Domino's and JWM) and therefore did not have standing to sue. The district court sided with Domino's, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that McDonald had suffered injuries separate from those of JWM and therefore had standing to sue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55336:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55336:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55336:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled in a unanimous decision (Justice Alito not participating) that only an actual or would-be party to a contract may sue under Section 1981. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, explained that if Section 1981 were not limited to the party to the contract, it \"would become a strange remedial provision designed to fight racial animus in all of its noxious forms, but only if the animus and the hurt it produced were somehow connected to somebody's contract. We have never read the statute in this unbounded--or rather, peculiarly bounded--way.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55336:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55337:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55337:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Lee Marsh II was convicted of murdering a mother and her young daughter. During the sentencing phase of the trial, jurors found that the mitigating factors and aggravating factors were in equipoise (i.e., of equal weight). The Kansas capital punishment statute specifically provided for the imposition of the death penalty in that circumstance, so Marsh was sentenced to death. After Marsh's sentencing, however, the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Kleypas found fault with the concept of the death penalty as a \"tie-breaker.\" The ruled in Kleypas that \"fundamental fairness requires that a 'tie goes to the defendant' when life or death is at issue.\" The State argued that while the prosecution has the burden of proof during the trial, the burden can be shifted to the defendant during the sentencing phase, so that the defendant must show that he deserves less than a death sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed, and overturned Kansas's death penalty statute as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55337:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55337:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55337:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and Yes. By a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court and upheld the Kansas death penalty statute. The Court found that the Kansas Supreme Court's decision had necessarily rested on a federal constitutional issue, so the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The opinion by Justice Thomas drew a comparison with a similar death penalty statute in Arizona that was upheld in Walton v. Arizona. The Court decided to let the Walton precedent stand and uphold the Kansas statute as well. Even apart from the Walton precedent, however, the Court would have upheld the statute as \"consistent with Eighth Amendment requirements.\" As long as juries are allowed to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence, states are allowed to require the death penalty when aggravating and mitigating factors are equally balanced. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented from the Court's opinion. Justice Souter wrote that various death penalty precedents suggested that the statute could not stand up to \"reasoned moral judgment.\" He called the Kansas death penalty statute \"morally absurd,\" \"a moral irrationality,\" and \"obtuse by any moral or social measure.\" Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent arguing that the Court should never have agreed to hear the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55337:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55338:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55338:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEric Clark shot and killed a police officer during a traffic stop. At trial in Arizona state court, Clark, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic who believed his town had been taken over by aliens, introduced expert evidence about his mental state. He wanted to use this evidence not only to prove that he was insane (a claim on which he bore the burden of proof) but also to show that he could not form the criminal intent that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge, however, ruled that Arizona law confined the use of the expert evidence to his insanity claim and did not permit him to use it to show he could not form the necessary criminal intent. The court ruled that he had not sufficiently proved his insanity defense, and Clark was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55338:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55338:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55338:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision by Justice David Souter, the Supreme Court held that Arizona could constitutionally limit the use of expert evidence about a defendant's mental state to his insanity defense. A defendant is presumed sane until he proves otherwise, but Justice Souter argued that allowing a defendant to use evidence of insanity to show that he could not form the necessary criminal intent would enable him to get around that presumption. \"Clark presses no objection to Arizona's decision to require persuasion to a clear and convincing degree before the presumption of sanity and normal responsibility,\" Justice Souter wrote. \"But if a State is to have this authority in practice as well as in theory, it must be able to deny a defendant the opportunity to displace the presumption of sanity more easily when addressing a different issue in the course of the criminal trial.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55338:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55339:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55339:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Security Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) states that class action lawsuits involving more than 50 plaintiffs alleging untruth or manipulation \"in connection with the purchase or sale\" of certain securities may be moved from state court to federal district court. In this case, several class action suits, each involving more than 50 investors in covered securities, were brought in various state courts over the devaluation of the plaintiffs' investments by Putnam Funds Trust and other mutual funds. The mutual funds asked to have the cases heard in federal court, and the state courts agreed. The federal district court sent the cases back to the state courts, however, finding that SLUSA does not cover suits over devaluation, only those related to purchases or sales. When the mutual funds appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs objected to the appeal because 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) prohibits appeals court review of federal district court decisions to remand cases to state court for lack of jurisdiction. The appeals court, however, found that the district court's decision had been substantive, not jurisdictional, and was therefore not covered by 1447(d). The appeals court then ruled that the plaintiff's claims could not be brought under SLUSA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55339:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55339:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55339:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion by Justice David Souter, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the district court's decision had been jurisdictional and that the appeals court's review was therefore barred by 1447(d). Quoting Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, Justice Souter wrote that \"where the order is based on one of the [grounds enumerated in 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)], review is unavailable no matter how plain the legal error in ordering the remand.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55339:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55340:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55340:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames Ludwig's yacht was damaged when it collided with a drawbridge. Ludwig's insurance company, Northern, sued Chatham County to recover its costs. The county claimed that it was immune from civil suits due to its sovereign immunity under common law. The District Court agreed and ruled for the county. The court held that the county had sovereign immunity as a local government exercising power delegated by the state. Under Supreme Court precedent, sovereign immunity does not apply to local governments, but only to states and \"arms of the state.\" Although the county did not qualify as an arm of the state under those precedents, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. The Circuit Court held that common law nevertheless guaranteed the county a \"residual immunity.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55340:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55340:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55340:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled that Chatham County was not entitled to immunity from suit. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas held that since the county was not acting as an \"arm of the state,\" it could not claim 11th Amendment immunity. The Court also refused to recognize a less expansive form of \"residual\" immunity for counties under common law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55340:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55341:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55341:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBobby Lee Holmes was sentenced to death after he was convicted of murder and several other crimes. At trial, he was not permitted to introduce evidence suggesting that another person had committed the crimes.\nUnder South Carolina law, defendants \"seeking to present evidence of third-party guilt must [limit the evidence] to such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence.\" Evidence that merely casts a bare suspicion on another person is not admissible. Using this standard, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision not to allow the evidence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55341:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55341:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55341:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito - his first as a Supreme Court Justice - held that evidence of third-party guilt brought by the defense could not be excluded only on the basis of the strength of the prosecution's case. Although the Constitution is not violated by the exclusion of evidence based on \"certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury,\" the Court held that exclusion of a defendant's evidence based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence denies the defendant his constitutional right to \"'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55341:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55342:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55342:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny U.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military policy under the amendment, forcing the schools to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could not require them to forfeit a constitutional right in order to receive federal funds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55342:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55342:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55342:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutional. Including military recruiters in receptions and interviews does not necessarily indicate university endorsement of the recruiters, so requiring their inclusion does not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. This would be true even if Congress had decided to make the requirement direct, rather than making it indirect as a condition for receiving federal funds. Roberts wrote, \"Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55342:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55343:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55343:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHeidi Ahlborn was injured and permanently disabled in a car accident. She received Medicaid payments totaling $215,645 through the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) to pay for her medical treatment. In order to be eligible for the Medicaid payments, Arkansas law required Ahlborn to give the ADHS the \"right to any settlement, judgment, or award\" she might receive because of the accident, up to the amount Medicaid had paid for her treatment.\nSeveral years after the accident, Ahlborn received $550,000 in a settlement with the parties liable for her injuries. The sum covered her medical treatment as well as pain and suffering, lost earnings, and her lost earning potential in the future. Only $35,581 of the settlement was earmarked for her medical treatment, however. When the ADHS demanded that she repay the full $215,645, therefore, Ahlborn refused, and the issue went to a federal district court in Arkansas. The judge sided with the ADHS, ruling that it was not unreasonable for Arkansas to require Ahlborn to agree to repay them fully from any settlement she might receive in order to be eligible, even if the portion specifically allocated for medical treatment was less than the amount demanded by Medicaid.\nAn 8th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, however, finding that seizing money from her settlement that had not been earmarked for medical treatment would violate federal Medicaid regulations, which forbid state governments from seizing the property of Medicaid recipients in order to recover money spent on treatment. The panel therefore ordered that Ahlborn repay just $35,581 to the ADHS.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55343:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55343:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55343:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that federal Medicaid statutes only allow a state to recover the part of a third-party settlement earmarked for medical expenses. The Justices agreed with the Circuit Court that the statutes do not permit Arkansas to require Ahlborn to repay Medicare expenses from the non-medical portions of the settlement. The Court found Arkansas's arguments to the contrary unconvincing due to \"internal inconsistency with a conscious disregard for the statutory text.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55343:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55344:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55344:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn federal trial for possessing child pornography, Grubbs asked the judge to suppress evidence officers seized from his home. Grubbs said the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers showed him an \"anticipatory warrant,\" something valid only after triggering events take place, with no mention of the triggering conditions. The condition set on this warrant was that officers could search Grubbs' house only after he received a pornographic video in the mail. The judge denied Grubbs' motion because the trigger was set forth in an affidavit that the officers carried during the search and that the warrant referenced. The Ninth Circuit reversed and said officers had to show the triggering events for an anticipatory warrant to the person being searched.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55344:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55344:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55344:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the majority opinion, wrote that under the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement a warrant need not set out the conditions that trigger it, only the place to be searched and the persons or things to be searched for. The fact that the triggering conditions were included in the affidavit, even if they were never showed to Grubbs, was therefore sufficient.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55344:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55345:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55345:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nReeder, a Volvo truck dealership, sued Volvo for violating the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), which prohibits forms of discriminatory pricing that reduce competition. When retail customers take bids from dealers such as Reeder, the dealers ask manufacturers for price concessions, which dealers factor into their bids. Reeder accused Volvo of offering better price concessions to other Volvo dealers bidding for different customers. Reeder cited four instances in which it had received a comparatively low concession from Volvo, but it claimed that its losses due to discriminatory pricing went beyond those four instances. District Court allowed the case to go to a jury, and the jury awarded damages to Reeder. On appeal, Volvo argued that no competition was present, as would be required by the RPA, because Reeder was not actually bidding against the other Volvo dealers that allegedly got favorable concessions. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the Volvo dealers - though they did not bid against each other - \"competed at the same functional level.\" Volvo's price discrimination would therefore fall under the RPA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55345:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55345:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55345:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that for a manufacturer to be liable under the RPA, dealers must be in actual competition with each other. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that Volvo's pricing decisions did not fall under the Act, because \"in none of the discrete instances on which Reeder relied did Reeder compete with beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination for the same customer.\" In declining to interpret the RPA more expansively, the Court hoped to maintain the \"broader policies of the antitrust laws,\" which are designed to protect competition itself rather than individual competitors. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which Justice Thomas joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55345:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55346:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55346:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nScott Randolph was arrested for drug possession after police found cocaine in his home. The police did not have a warrant to search the home, but Randolph's wife consented to the search. Randolph was also present at the time of the search, however, and objected to the police request. At trial, his attorney argued that the search was unconstitutional because of Randolph's objection, while the prosecution argued that the consent of his wife was sufficient. The trial court ruled for the prosecution, but the appellate court and Georgia Supreme Court both sided with Randolph, finding that a search is unconstitutional if one resident objects, even if another resident consents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55346:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55346:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55346:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5 to 3 decision, the Supreme Court held that when two co-occupants are present and one consents to a search while the other refuses, the search is not constitutional. Justice David Souter, in the majority opinion, compared the reasonableness of such a search to a more casual interaction. Souter wrote, \"it is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence that one occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, 'stay out.' Without some very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions.\" A police search in such circumstances, Souter wrote, would therefore not meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55346:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55347:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55347:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, the Texas State Legislature passed a redistricting plan that replaced the one created by a federal judge following the 2000 census. Critics of the plan charged that it was unconstitutional and violated section 2 the Voting Rights Act because it diluted racial minority voting strength and was designed to maximize partisan advantage. A three-judge district court panel disagreed, finding that the plan was constitutional and that the legislature had the right to redistrict in 2003 using census data from 2000.\nThe case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but while it was pending the Court decided Vieth v. Jubelirer, another redistricting case from Pennsylvania. Justice Anthony Kennedy, the deciding vote in that case, wrote that the Court could hear claims of partisan discrimination in redistricting cases, but left open the question of the test those claims would be subjected to.\nThe three-district panel in this case then affirmed its earlier decision, finding that the Texas redistricting plan was not substantively unfair.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55347:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55347:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55347:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court held that the Texas Legislature's redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution, but that part of the plan violated the Voting Rights Act. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a majority of the justices, stated that District 23 had been redrawn in such a way as to deny Latino voters as a group the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choosing, thereby violating the Voting Rights Act. Justice Kennedy also wrote, however, that nothing in the Constitution prevented the state from redrawing its electoral boundaries as many times as it wanted, so long as it did so at least once every ten years.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55347:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55348:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55348:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUsing the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Joseph Murphy's parents brought legal action to require the Arlington Central School District to pay for their son's private school tuition. After they prevailed, they sought reimbursement from the school district for fees they had paid to an educational consultant during the proceedings. They relied on an IDEA provision that allows courts to \"award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs\" to prevailing parents. The school district argued that under Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, expert fees can only be reimbursed when there is explicit authorization in the statute. Because the statute made no specific mention of expert fees, the school district argued, the fees could not be reimbursed. The federal district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, however, finding that a Congressional Conference Committee Report and a footnote in Casey referencing it showed that IDEA was intended to authorize reimbursement of expert fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55348:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55348:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55348:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court held that IDEA did not authorize reimbursement of expert fees. \"While authorizing the award of reasonable attorney's fees, the Act contains detailed provisions that are designed to ensure that such awards are indeed reasonable,\" Justice Alito wrote. \"The absence of any comparable provisions relating to expert fees strongly suggests that recovery of expert fees is not authorized.\" Justice Alito went on to write that the case was made even simpler by the fact that, as an exercise of Congress's Spending Clause power, any provision requiring reimbursement of expert fees would have had to be \"unambiguous,\" which it clearly was not. Justice Ginsburg, who joined the majority in finding that expert fees were not covered, wrote separately to disagree with that portion of the opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55348:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55349:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55349:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter New Hampshire's state legislature approved the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act but before the act went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenged the law in federal district court. They claimed that the law, which requires that parents be notified before their minor daughter has an abortion, violated the \"undue burden\" test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 Supreme Court decision that reformulated the constitutional protections given to abortion in Roe v. Wade. Specifically, they argued that an exemption in the law for abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, but not for those abortions necessary to protect merely her health, was unconstitutionally narrow.\nThe federal district court agreed, rejecting the argument of New Hampshire's Attorney General that the judicial bypass procedure included in the law, in which a judge could approve an abortion without parental notification for a minor who showed she was mature enough to make the decision on her own, could be used to permit abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother. The judge also rejected New Hampshire's argument that the law could not be challenged until it had actually been implemented. A First Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously affirmed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55349:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55349:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55349:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a rare unanimous decision regarding abortion, the Supreme Court sidestepped the most contentious questions of the case and focused instead on the proper remedy when a portion of a statute is found unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the statute would be unconstitutional when applied to the very small percentage of minors for whom an emergency abortion would be necessary to avert serious damage to their health. The lower court's decision to invalidate the entire statute based on its unconstitutional results in this small percentage of cases, however, was unnecessary. Instead, O'Connor wrote, \"in this case the lower courts can issue a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting [only] the statute's unconstitutional application.\"\nO'Connor warned, however, that a court should be wary of upholding an act while strike down some of its applications when it was obvious that a legislature would prefer the entire act be declared unconstitutional. Because of some disagreement about which course the legislature would have preferred - wholesale nullification or narrower individual rulings - the Court remanded the case to lower court to determine legislative intent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55349:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55351:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55351:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nArturo Recuenco was convicted of second degree assault in Washington state court after the jury found that he had attacked his wife \"with a deadly weapon.\" The trial court then applied a 3-year enhancement to his sentence based on its own finding that a firearm had been involved, even though the jury never specifically found that a gun was used. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that the enhancement was unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, a 2004 U.S. Supreme Court decision that held that only those factors found by a jury, not a judge, may be considered for sentencing enhancements. The court disagreed with Washington state's argument that, while a Sixth Amendment violation under Blakely had indeed occurred, that violation could be found legally harmless.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55351:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55351:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55351:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Blakely violations do not \"necessarily render[] a criminal trial unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.\" (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1) As such, the defendant is not entitled to an automatic reversal and the prosecution may attempt to argue that the jury would have returned the same result if the error had not occurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55351:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55352:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55352:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVickie Lynn Marshall (a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith) was involved in a dispute in Texas Probate Court over the estate of her late husband, J. Howard Marshall. While the state-court proceedings were ongoing, Ms. Marshall filed for bankruptcy in federal court. E. Pierce Marshall, J. Howard's son, filed a claim alleging that Ms. Marshall had defamed him, and she filed a counterclaim alleging that E. Pierce had interfered with a gift she expected from her late husband's estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Ms. Marshall and awarded her a large monetary award. Later, the probate court found J. Howard's will valid and ruled for his son. Under the judicially-created \"probate exception\" to federal jurisdiction, federal courts do not interfere with state-court judgments concerning wills and estates. E. Pierce Marshall appealed the bankruptcy court decision (awarding Ms. Marshall a large monetary award) to federal district court, invoking the probate exception to argue that the court had no jurisdiction. The district court disagreed and ruled for Ms. Marshall, holding that since her claim did not require invalidating the will, the probate exception did not apply. The Ninth Circuit reversed, broadly interpreting the probate exception as covering any question that would normally be handled in probate court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55352:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55352:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55352:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the probate exception did not apply. The Court's opinion stressed the \"distinctly limited scope\" of the exception. The Justices explained that while the probate exception was intended to preserve state-court control over wills and estates, it does not remove from federal jurisdiction every suit arising out of probate matters. In Ms. Marshall's case, her claim did not directly involve the validation of J. Howard Marshall's will or the administration of his estate, so the exception did not apply and the federal courts had jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55352:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55353:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55353:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA California trial court sentenced Sanders to death for murder. The jury was told to consider four special aggravating circumstances during sentencing. On appeal, however, the state supreme court invalidated two of these circumstances, but still upheld Sanders's sentence. Sanders then filed a federal habeas petition, which was rejected by the district court but granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In overturning Sanders's sentence, it held that the sentence had been substantially affected by jury instructions to consider invalid aggravating circumstances. The Ninth Circuit faulted the state supreme court for its standard of review: The court should have determined whether the invalid circumstances were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in affecting the jury's sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55353:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55353:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55353:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court upheld the sentence in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia. The Court established a new rule: invalidated sentencing factors make a sentence unconstitutional if they added aggravating weight to the jury's weighing process, \" unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances.\" In Sanders's case, the two remaining valid special circumstances were sufficient to make him eligible for the death penalty. Furthermore, the two invalided circumstances did not add any improper aggravating weight, because another valid sentencing factor - an omnibus \"circumstances of the crime\" factor - gave aggravating weight to the same facts. Therefore, the Court ruled, \"the erroneous factor could not have 'skewed' the sentence, and no constitutional violation occurred.\" Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which Justice Souter joined. Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent, which Justice Ginsburg joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55353:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55354:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55354:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIndependent Ink manufactured printing ink that was compatible with the printheads manufactured by (and patented by) Trident, a company owned by Illinois Tool Works. Trident, however, required that anyone who used their printheads also use their ink, which was not patented. Independent Ink brought suit in federal district court under the Sherman Act, which forbids companies from tying a license to use one product (in this case Trident's printheads) to a customer's agreement to use another product (Trident's ink). The district court ruled in favor of Trident, finding that Independent Ink had failed to show that Trident's control of the printhead allowed them to raise prices above the competitive market rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, however, finding that when the product for which a license is granted is under patent, the ability to raise prices of that product above market rates must be assumed, and the burden is on the defendant to show that such power did not exist.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55354:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55354:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55354:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court unanimously decided that the burden was on the party claiming an anti-trust violation to show that the defendant had the power to raise prices above market rates. Justice John Paul Stevens, who wrote the opinion, rejected the rule used in International Salt Company v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, that the assumption should be made that such power existed. Stevens wrote, \"The question presented to us today is whether the presumption of market power in a patented product should survive as a matter of antitrust law despite its demise in patent law. We conclude that the mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support such a presumption.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55354:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55356:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55356:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPennsylvania houses \"incorrigible, recalcitrant\" prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU). Ronald Banks was one of about 40 prisoners in level 2 of the LTSU, which is reserved for the most dangerous, worst-behaved inmates. It is the policy of the LTSU to impose severe restrictions on the privileges of level 2 inmates. In particular, level 2 prisoners are the only ones denied newspapers, magazines, and photographs. Beard, the Secretary of the PA Department of Corrections, argued that this policy was necessary to promote rehabilitation and ensure prison safety. Banks brought a suit challenging the policy as a violation of the First Amendment. On the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court ruled in favor of Beard. On appeal, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Circuit Court found that the prison's policy failed to meet the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment rights of the prisoners took precedence, because the policy was unrelated to the goal of rehabilitation, and an ineffective method of increasing prison safety.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55356:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55356:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55356:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-2 decision, the Court reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the prison's policy. The plurality opinion by Justice Breyer held that Banks had failed to present sufficient evidence that the prison had acted unreasonably in denying newspapers, magazines, and photographs to its most troublesome inmates. The Court found that the policy met the four-part test established in Turner v. Safley : (1) it was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of motivating good behavior; (2) though prisoners had no alternate means of exercising their rights, they could potentially graduate to the less-restrictive level 1; (3) accommodating prisoners' rights could result in negative consequences (worse behavior); and (4) there was no alternate means of accomplishing the prison's goals without restricting the prisoners' rights. Justice Thomas concurred separately in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, arguing that \"This case reveals the shortcomings of the Turner framework.\" Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both wrote dissents. Justice Stevens called the policy \"perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control,\" while Justice Ginsburg criticized the high evidentiary burden the plurality placed on the prisoners. Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55356:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55357:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55357:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nResponding to a complaint about a loud party, police arrived at a house where they saw minors drinking alcohol outside and heard shouting inside. As they approached the house, they saw a fight through the window involving a juvenile and four adults, one of whom was punched hard enough to make him spit blood. The officers announced their presence, but the people fighting did not hear them so they entered the home. They arrested the men for contributing to the delinquency of a minor and other related offenses. The trial court judge, however, refused to allow the evidence collected after the police entered the home because it was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the government argued that the search was covered by the \"emergency aid doctrine\" because the officers were responding to seeing the man be punched. The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed, however, ruling that the doctrine only applies when there is an unconscious, semiconscious, or missing person who is feared injured or dead. The Court also gave weight to the fact that the officers acted exclusively in a law enforcement capacity, not to assist the injured man.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55357:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55357:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55357:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that police may enter a building without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an occupant is \"seriously injured or threatened with such injury.\" Quoting from Mincey v. Arizona, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that \"[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.\"\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55357:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55360:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55360:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Moore sued six postal inspectors in federal court, alleging that they had brought criminal charges against him in retaliation for lobbying efforts he undertook on behalf of his company. The inspectors claimed that they had qualified immunity (that is, because they filed the charges in their official capacity on good faith, they could not be sued) and also that the case should be dismissed because they had probable cause to charge Moore. The district court sided with Moore, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed, finding that, even with probable cause, they must show that that the prosecution was not motivated by a desire for retaliation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55360:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55360:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55360:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-2 decision, the Court ruled in favor of the postal inspectors, overruling the Court of Appeals. The opinion by Justice David Souter held that plaintiffs alleging retaliatory prosecution must prove that the law enforcement agents lacked probable cause. Probable cause, the Court ruled, is a crucial component of the \"chain of causation\" needed to evaluate retaliatory prosecution charges. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justice Breyer joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito took no part in the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55360:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55361:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55361:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nO Centro Espirita Benficiente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV), a religious organization, brought suit in federal court to prevent the government from interfering with UDV's use of hoasca, a substance used during religious ceremonies that contains a drug prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act. UDV argued that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prohibits substantial imposition on religious practices in the absence of a compelling government interest, established their right to use hoasca.\nThe district court sided with UDV and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the government had not sufficiently proved the alleged health risks posed by hoasca and could not show a substantial risk that the drug would be abuse recreationally. In response to the Attorney General's argument that prohibiting the drug was required by an international treaty, the court ruled that the government had failed to \"narrowly tailor\" its prohibition of the drug.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55361:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55361:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55361:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that the government had failed to prove a compelling interest in regulating the UDV's use of drugs for religious purposes. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the government's argument that the Controlled Substances Act could accommodate no exceptions. On the contrary, Justice Roberts wrote, the Court is required by the RFRA to examine individual religious freedom claims and grant exceptions to generally-applicable laws where no compelling government interest can be shown.\nThe Court also rejected the argument that an exception for UDV was precluded by international treaty. The government failed to submit \"evidence addressing the international consequences of granting an exemption for the UDV,\" instead citing \"the general importance of honoring international obligations and of maintaining the leadership position of the United States in the international war on drugs.\" The Court held that such general government interests were not sufficient to satisfy the compelling interest standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55361:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55362:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55362:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust any available administrative remedies for resolving disputes within the prison system before they can bring suit in federal court. Viet Mike Ngo filed a grievance with the California prison system, but it was dismissed because he had waited too long to file it. He then brought suit in federal district court. California objected, arguing that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and that the fact those remedies were no longer available to him because of his delay in filing was immaterial. The district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that all of Ngo's administrative remedies were \"exhausted\" because they were no longer available to him.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55362:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55362:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55362:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner must properly exhaust any available administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court. This understanding of the PLRA's exhaustion provision mirrors that of the traditional exhaustion provision in administrative law and is \"substantively similar\" to that of habeas corpus law. An alternative ruling, Justice Alito wrote, would allow prisoners to circumvent the obvious purpose of the act (channeling initial appeals through the administrative system rather than the courts) by simply waiting until their administrative appeals were no longer timely.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55362:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55363:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55363:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChristophe and Juanita Roche leased an apartment in Virginia managed by Lincoln Property Company. The Roches sued Lincoln, which they identified as a Texas company, and other defendants in state court, alleging a variety of problems that arose from their exposure to toxic mold in their apartment. Lincoln moved the litigation to a federal district court, citing diversity of citizenship, which arises when opposing parties are from different states. The Roches then asked that the case be sent back to state court because there was no diversity of citizenship. Rather, one of the partners in the Lincoln-owned subsidiary partnership resided in Virgina. The court denied the motion and held that Lincoln was a Texas citizen. The Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Lincoln failed to show complete diversity of citizenship, because it did not disprove the exsistence of an affiliated Virginia entity that was a real party in interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55363:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55363:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55363:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Lincoln did not need to negate the existence of a potential defendant whose presence in the action would destroy diversity. To remove the suit to federal court, Lincoln only needed to show complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named defendants.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55363:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55364:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55364:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the U.S. is a party, any person detained in a foreign country has the right to notify the consulate of his home country of his detention.\nMoises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national, was arrested for his role in a shootout with the police. He was given a Miranda warning, but not informed of his right under Article 36 to notify his consulate. After Sanchez-Llamas made incriminating statements to the police, he was charged with attempted murder. Sanchez-Llamas moved to dismiss the charge. He argued that he had a right under Article 36 which had been violated, and that his confession should consequently be inadmissible as evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court both affirmed, holding that the Vienna Convention does not create individual rights, but only rights of countries.\nMario Bustillo, a Honduran national, was arrested for murdering a man with a baseball bat. He was not informed that Article 36 would allow him to notify his consulate of his arrest. At trial, Bustillo's counsel brought witnesses testifying that another man had committed the crime. Nevertheless, Bustillo was convicted of first-degree murder, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. Bustillo then filed a petition for review in state habeas court. He argued for the first time that his conviction should be thrown out because his Article 36 right to notify his consulate had been violated. The state habeas court denied the petition. The court ruled that the petition was \"procedurally barred\" under state law because he had failed to raise the issue at trial. The Virginia Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55364:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55364:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55364:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered, and no. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Oregon Supreme Court and ruled that evidence obtained in violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention need not be excluded from trial. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts held that it would be \"startling\" if the Vienna Convention required suppression of evidence as a penalty for its violation, since the United States is the only country to have the \"exclusionary rule\" for illegaly-obtained evidence. Absent any language in the Convention requiring suppression, the Court could not impose it on states. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an Article 36 violation was not the type of evidence-related violation that normally requires the exclusionary rule. The Court declined to decide the larger issue of whether the Vienna Convention creates individual rights that are enforcable in court. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissenters would have decided that the Convention did create individual rights. Justice Breyer also thought that \"suppression may sometimes provide an appropriate remedy\" for Article 36 violations.\nWith respect to state law, the Court ruled that states are allowed to have procedural rules that require courts to deny Article 36 claims if they are not raised at the proper time. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts noted that the Convention provides that Article 36 \"shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.\" In an adversarial system like that of the United States, the Court ruled, this means that states must be allowed to decide when claims need to be raised. The Justices also ruled that rulings of the International Court of Justice are not binding on U.S. courts. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissent took exception to the absolute language of the majority opinion, arguing that \" sometimes state procedural default rules must yield\" to the Convention's requirement that domestic laws give it \"full effect.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55364:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55365:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55365:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBooker T. Hudson was convicted of drug and firearm possession in state court after police found cocaine and a gun in his home. The police had a search warrant, but failed to follow the Fourth Amendment \"knock and announce\" rule which requires police officers to wait 20-30 seconds after knocking and announcing their presence before they enter the home. The trial judge ruled that the evidence found in the home could therefore not be used, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed based on two Michigan Supreme Court cases that created an exception to the suppression of evidence when the evidence in question would have inevitably been found.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55365:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55365:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55365:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that evidence need not be excluded when police violate the \"knock-and-announce\" rule. The opinion by Justice Scalia reaffirmed the validity of both the knock-and-announce rule and the \"exclusionary rule\" for evidence obtained by police in most cases of Fourth Amendment violation. However, the majority held that the exclusionary rule could not be invoked for evidence obtained after a knock-and-announce violation, because the interests violated by the abrupt entry of the police \"have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence.\" Justice Scalia wrote that the knock-and-announce rule was meant to prevent violence, property-damage, and impositions on privacy, not to prevent police from conducting a search for which they have a valid warrant. The Court also found that the social costs of the exclusionary rule as applied to the knock-and-announce rule outweighed any possible \"deterrence benefits,\" and that alternative measures such as civil suits and internal police discipline could adequately deter violations. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissent noted the Court's long history of upholding the exclusionary rule and doubted that the majority's cited precedents supported its conclusion. The dissent also expressed doubt that knock-and-announce violations could be deterred without excluding the evidence obtained from the searches.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55365:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55366:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55366:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGoodman, a paraplegic held in a Georgia state prison, sued Georgia in federal court for maintaining prison conditions that allegedly discriminated against disabled people and violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Georgia claimed the 11th Amendment provided the state immunity from such suits. The district court ruled for Georgia, but the 11th Circuit reversed.\nBefore the 11th Circuit ruled in the case, the United States sued Georgia, arguing that the ADA's Title II abolished state sovereign immunity from monetary suits. Congress could do this, the U.S. argued, by exercising its 14th Amendment power to enforce equal protection.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55366:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55366:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55366:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that Title II abrogates sovereign immunity in cases where violations of the 8th Amendment are alleged. The 14th Amendment incorporates the 8th Amendment (that is, applies it to the states). Congress can enforce the 14th Amendment against the states \"by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations\" of its provisions, which can involve abrogating state sovereign immunity. However, the Court did not address the question of whether Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity when the 8th Amendment is not involved.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55366:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55367:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55367:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn accordance with the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA), the Office of Personnel Management has negotiated a health insurance plan for federal employees with the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association. The plan requires the administrator to make a reasonable effort to recoup amounts paid for medical care from beneficiaries if those beneficiaries receive recoveries from another source (for example, a law suit or settlement against a third party that caused injury). In New York State, the plan is administered by Empire Healthchoice Assurance (Empire).\nEmpire brought suit in federal district court against the estate of Joseph McVeigh, a former federal employee who was injured in an accident and eventually won a settlement with the third party allegedly responsible for his injuries. Empire sought reimbursement for the money spent on McVeigh's medical care. Denise McVeigh, the administrator of Joseph McVeigh's estate, argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case under FEHBA and that it should be heard instead by the state court. The district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55367:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55367:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55367:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that jurisdiction for this case lay in state court. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that while FEHBA stated that any claims against the United States would be heard in federal district court, it made no provisions for suits brought by insurers seeking to recoup medical expenses from private beneficiaries. Absent that specific provision, a significant conflict with an identifiable federal interest, or the need to resolve a substantial question of federal law in order to establish the insurer's right to recovery, there was no reason to depart from the ordinarily-governing state law. Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter and Alito dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55367:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55368:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55368:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHumberto Fernandez-Vargas entered the United States illegally and was deported in 1981. He illegally re-entered in 1982 and lived in the U.S. until 2001, when he married a U.S. citizen and applied to adjust his status to permanent resident. While applying, Fernandez-Vargas was arrested and eventually deported pursuant to Section 241(a)(5) (the \"reinstatement statute\") of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The reinstatement statute, which became effective in 1997, allows prior deportation orders to be reinstated against aliens who re-enter the country illegally, and denies those aliens any form of relief under the INA. Fernandez-Vargas petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review, arguing that Section 421(a)(5) was not intended to reinstate deportation orders that were issued prior to its enactment. The Circuit Court denied the petition. It held that Fernandez-Vargas' application for permanent resident status was a form of relief not allowd by the reinstatement statute. It also held that Congress did intend the reinstatement statute to apply to deportation orders, such as Fernandez-Vargas', that were issued before the statute went into effect. Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that this application of the law was not impermissibly retroactive, because Fernandez-Vargas had no \"protectable expectation of being able to adjust his status.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55368:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55368:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55368:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the reinstatement statute does apply to illegal aliens who re-entered the U.S. before the effective date of the statute, and that the application to such aliens was not impermissibly retroactive. The Court held that the purpose of Section 421(a)(5) was most consistent with a broad application, and \"Common principles of statutory interpretation fail to unsettle the apparent application [...] to any reentrant present in the country, whatever the date of return.\" The majority opinion affirmed the presumption against retroactive statutes, but found the reinstatement statute permissible under a test set out in Landgraf v. USI Film Products. The main weakness in Fernandez-Vargas's argument was that his offense was not a \"past act that he is helpless to undo,\" but rather the \"continuing violation\" of remaining in the country illegally.\nIn a lone dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens disagreed with both of the Court's conclusions. He wrote that Fernandez-Vargas \"legitimately complains that the Government has changed the rules midgame.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55368:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55370:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55370:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavis was arrested after Michelle McCottry called 911 and told the operator that he had beaten her with his fists and then left. At trial, McCottry did not testify, but the 911 call was offered as evidence of the connection between Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis objected, arguing that presenting the recording without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine McCottry violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the call was not \"testimonial\" and was therefore different from the statements at issue in Crawford.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55370:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55370:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55370:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 9-0 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, does not apply to \"non-testimonial\" statements not intended to be preserved as evidence at trial. Although McCottry identified her attacker to the 911 operator, she provided the information intending to help the police resolve an \"ongoing emergency,\" not to testify to a past crime. The Court reasoned that under the circumstances, McCottry was not acting as a \"witness,\" and the 911 transcript was not \"testimony.\" Therefore, the Sixth Amendment did not require her to appear at trial and be cross-examined. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that though McCottry's statements were not testimonial, the Court should not \"guess\" at the primary motive behind the statements. This case was decided with Hammon v. Indiana.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55370:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55373:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55373:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nInjured workers sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that federal mine inspectors' negligence helped cause a mine accident. The FTCA authorized private tort actions against the U.S. when the federal government, if a private person in similar circumstances, would be liable according to the law of the place where the incident occurred. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the allegations failed to show Arizona law would have imposed liability on a private person in like circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding federal mine inspections were a governmental function with no private analogue. In such cases, the Ninth Circuit held, the FTCA waived sovereign immunity if a state or municipal entity would be held liable under the law where the activity occurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55373:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55373:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55373:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the United States waived sovereign immunity only where local law would make a \"private person\" liable in tort, not where local law would make a \"state or municipal entity\" liable. Nothing in the FTCA's \"context, history, or objectives\" supported the Ninth Circuit's holding that the act waived sovereign immunity where the United States, if a state or municipal entity, would be liable. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit treated the act's requirement that there be \"like circumstances\" to require the \"same circumstances.\" Private analogies did, in fact, exist for the federal mine inspectors' conduct.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55373:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55374:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55374:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, a federal criminal trial must begin within 70 days of the defendant's arrest or first appearance in court. The Act includes a list of delays which do not count toward this 70-day period, and one of these acceptable delays occurs when a federal district court finds on the record that the \"ends of justice\" served by granting a delay outweigh the public's and defendant's interest in a speedy trial. In this case, Zedner was a defendant in a criminal trial and twice asked the district court to issue such an order. The third time he requested one, the district court judge suggested that he sign a waiver of his right to a speedy trial under the Act for all time. Zedner signed the form, and accordingly the next time he asked for a delay the judge did not make on-the-record findings exempting the 91-day delay. Four years later, Zedner filed a motion to dismiss based on the failure to comply with the Act's 70-day period that resulted from that 91-day delay. The district court rejected the motion because of the waiver, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Zedner appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the waiver he signed was invalid under the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55374:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55374:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55374:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes, and no. In an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a defendant may not simply waive his right to a speedy trial under the Act. The list of acceptable reasons for an \"ends-of-justice\" order by the judge includes specific mention of the defendant's need for time to obtain counsel and prepare his case. If the defendant could simply waive his rights under the Act in order to meet these needs, the judge would not need to give them special consideration.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55374:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55375:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55375:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt Collins' state-court drug trial, he alleged that the prosecutor had used a peremptory challenge to strike a juror on account of her race. The prosecutor gave several race-neutral explanations for the strike, which the trial court accepted. Upon being convicted, Collins appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which upheld the conviction. According to the Court of Appeal, the juror's youth and demeanor were both valid reasons for striking her. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Federal District Court denied Collins' habeas petition, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts must defer to a state-court finding of fact unless it is an \"unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.\" Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court's acceptance of the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations was an unreasonable determination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Ninth Circuit had acted correctly.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55375:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55375:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55375:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. The Court ruled that the state court did not act unreasonably when it determined that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations were credible. Although there might have been some evidence that could be interpreted as undermining the prosecutor's credibility, the trial court was in a better position to determine those facts. The Court faulted the Ninth Circuit for substituting \"its own debatable interpretation of the record\" for the trial courts findings, and for \"misapplying settled rules that limit [the Circuit Court's] role and authority.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55375:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55380:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55380:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter extraordinarily long deliberations, a jury convicted John Fry of two counts of first degree murder. Near the end of the trial, the defense attempted to bring a witness who would testify that her cousin rather than Fry had committed the murders. The trial judge refused to let the witness testify. After exhausting his state court appeals, Fry petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.\nThe District Court held that the trial judge had been wrong to exclude the witness, but it ruled that the decision was harmless error and upheld the conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the judge's decision met the test for harmless error in Brecht v. Abrahamson . Under the Brecht test, evidence is held to be harmless unless it has a \"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.\" Fry argued that the standard for harmless error in habeas cases should instead be the one defined in Chapman v. California . The Chapman test requires the state to prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55380:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55380:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55380:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held unanimously that a federal court \"must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the 'substantial and injurious effect' standard set forth in Brecht, [...] whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard set forth in Chapman.\" The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia ruled that neither the Court's previous precedents nor the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 required courts to use the more stringent Chapman standard in such cases. As the government conceded during the proceedings, the State would bear the burden of persuasion on the question of injurious influence. A 5-4 majority declined to decide the question of whether the exclusion of the witness in Fry's trial was harmless error under the Brecht standard. This question was deemed to be not included in the petitioner's question presented. The dissenting opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens would have held the exclusion prejudicial to the fairness of the trial and reversed the Ninth Circuit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55380:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55381:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55381:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJeffrey Landrigan was convicted of first degree murder. During sentencing, Landrigan's counsel attempted to call witnesses to testify to Landrigan's disadvantaged upbringing and good character. However, Landrigan opposed his lawyer's decision to present this mitigating evidence, and the witnesses were never called. Landrigan was sentenced to death. He appealed, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. Landrigan claimed that he had wanted the lawyer to present mitigating evidence showing Landrigan's genetic predisposition to violence.\nAfter state courts rejected the claim as frivolous, Landrigan filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court. The District Court ruled against Landrigan, but he finally prevailed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Despite the high degree of deference to state courts required by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court had been unreasonable to uphold Landrigan's death sentence. Landrigan's lawyer should have presented the mitigating evidence, the Court ruled, and the omission had rendered counsel ineffective.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55381:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55381:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55381:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled that the District Court was within its discretion when it upheld Landrigan's sentence without granting him a new evidentiary hearing. The Justices split 5-4 with Justice Clarence Thomas writing the opinion for the majority. The Court rejected the Ninth's Circuit's holding that the District Court took out of context statements Landrigan made during his trial. Instead, the Court held that those statements clearly indicated that Landrigan had been aware of the mitigating evidence that could have been presented, but had simply chosen not to have it presented. The District Court could have reasonably concluded that Landrigan would refuse all mitigating evidence, rendering Landrigan's counsel's investigation ineffectual no matter how thorough it might have been. The dissenters noted that Landrigan's counsel's investigation had been inadequate, and argued that Landrigan might have agreed to present the evidence if his lawyer had investigated his case more thoroughly.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55381:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55382:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55382:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLong Island Care at Home (Long Island) employed Evelyn Coke as a \"home healthcare attendant\" for the elderly. Coke sued her employer, claiming rights to overtime and minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The District Court ruled for Long Island, holding that Coke fell under the FLSA's exemption for employees engaged in \"companionship services.\" The court gave deference to the Department of Labor's regulation 29 CFR Section 552.109(a), which applies the exemption to employees in \"companionship services\" who are \"employed by an employer or agency other than the family or household using their services.\"\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It ruled that the regulation was a misinterpretation of the statute, and was therefore unenforceable. The Second Circuit declined to give the Department's regulation any of the judicial deference normally due to administrative regulations. No Chevron deference (\"strong deference\") was due, because the regulation was under a section titled \"Interpretations.\" Regulations that are interpretive rather than legislative are not entitled to Chevron deference. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the regulation was \"unpersuasive in the context of the entire statutory and regulatory scheme,\" and thus not entitled to Skidmore deference (\"weak deference\") either.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55382:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55382:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55382:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. A unanimous Court ruled that the Department of Labor's regulation was \"valid and binding\" and therefore entitled to all of the deference courts normally give to administrative regulations. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer considered the regulation a normal instance of an agency \"filling a statutory gap,\" and rejected each of the lower court's arguments that it was unlawful. The regulation was intended to be legally binding even though it was under a section titled \"Interpretations.\" This was evidenced by the importance of the regulation and the fact that the Department went through full public notice-and-comment procedures. The \"Interpretations\" heading may have simply referred to that section's more detailed focus, which interpreted the more general regulations of the previous section. Since the regulation was valid and proper, the Court held, the FLSA's \"companionship services\" exemption continues to apply to workers paid by third-party agencies.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55382:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55383:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55383:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Alphonso James was convicted of firearm possession after having been convicted of a felony, the government sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The ACCA allows for a minimum 15-year sentence if the convicted criminal has three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or violent felonies. A \"violent felony\" under the ACCA includes burglary and \"conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.\" James had previously been convicted once for attempted burglary and twice for drug trafficking, so the government argued that he had the necessary three \"countable\" convictions for the increased sentence. James argued that one of his drug-related convictions did not count as a serious drug offense, and that attempted burglary did not count as a violent felony. A federal District Court held that attempted burglary was a violent felony, but also that James's drug offense was not serious. Therefore, James had only two countable offenses and could not be sentenced under the ACCA.\nOn appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that James's drug-trafficking offense was serious. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that attempted burglary counted as a violent felony, a ruling that put it at odds with other Circuits. The Circuit Court ruled that attempted burglary is a violent felony because it presents as much risk of violence as a successful burglary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55383:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55383:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55383:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court ruled 5-3 that attempted burglary is a \"violent felony\" for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito held that attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, is included in the residual provision of the ACCA governing \"conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.\" The Court rejected James's argument that attempted burglary should be excluded because the example crimes listed before the residual provision included only completed - as opposed to attempted - crimes. Instead, the Court held that the common element in the list was that \"these offenses, while not technically crimes against the person, nevertheless create significant risks of bodily injury or confrontation that might result in bodily injury.\" Since the risk associated with attempted burglary was comparable to the risks caused by the listed crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives, attempted burglary was included in the definition of \"violent felony.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55383:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55384:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55384:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMalaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC) owned a vessel carrying steel coils for Sinochem International, a Chinese company. Sinochem brought an action in Chinese Admiralty Court, alleging that MISC had backdated documents pertaining to the loading of the cargo, and seeking to have the ship detained in China. MISC filed suit in a Pennsylvania district court, accusing Sinochem of fraudulent misrepresentation. Sinochem argued that the U.S. had no personal jurisdiction over the Chinese company, but the District Court declined to rule on the issue. Instead the court dismissed the suit on grounds of \"forum non conveniens,\" which means that the case could be more conveniently tried in another forum, in this case the Chinese Admiralty Court.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ruling that the lower court should have first ruled on the jurisdictional issue. The Third Circuit acknowledged the inconvenience of determining jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway, but nevertheless sent the case back to the District Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55384:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55384:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55384:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled 9-0 that \"a court need not resolve whether it has [...] personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that [...] a foreign tribunal is plainly the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case.\" The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that while the first step of a court is normally to determine whether it has jurisdiction, a court can dismiss a case for forum non conveniens without establishing subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. The Court held that determination of jurisdiction is only important when there is a chance that the court will rule on the merits of the case. When it is clear that the case would be more conveniently tried in a foreign court, a court should immediately dismiss for forum non conveniens rather than undergo a burdensome and unnecessary determination of jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55384:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55386:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55386:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Cunningham, a former police officer, was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of his young son. Under California's Determinate Sentencing Law, the trial judge can choose between three possible sentences for a given crime: a minimum, medium, and maximum sentence. Judges normally hand down the medium sentence unless there are special circumstances. In Cunningham's case, the judge found six aggravating factors, and sentenced him to the maximum 16-year sentence. However, in determining some of the aggravating factors the judge relied on evidence not considered by the jury.\nCunningham appealed his sentence, arguing that the judge's discretion was a violation of Cunningham's right to a trial by jury. In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court had ruled that for the right to a jury trial to be effective, any fact which increases a sentence \"beyond the prescribed statutory maximum\" must be proved before the jury. Cunningham argued that the judge can consider only factors determined by the jury when deciding which sentence to impose.\nA California Court of Appeal disagreed and upheld the sentence, ruling that the judge had merely handed down the maximum sentence prescribed by the statute. The California Supreme Court denied Cunningham's appeal, but the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55386:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55386:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55386:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court ruled 6-3 that California's Determinate Sentencing Law was inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that \"[...] under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence.\" Because the maximum sentence could not be given unless aggravating circumstances were found, and because the aggravating circumstances \"depend[ed] on facts found discretely and solely by the judge,\" the Court found that California's sentencing system circumvented the process of trial by jury. In his dissent, Justice Alito argued that the California system was similar to the advisory federal sentencing guidelines which were upheld in United States v. Booker.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55386:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55387:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55387:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Clean Water Act (CWA) instructs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to turn over pollution permitting authority to a state if the state's proposal meets nine listed criteria. When Arizona issued such a proposal, the EPA regional office raised the concern that the transfer might violate Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which prohibits agencies from taking actions that might jeopardize endangered species. In accordance with the ESA, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The FWS's opinion was that the ESA was inapplicable because the agency had no authority to consider any additional factors beyond the nine CWA criteria (none of which concerned endangered species). On the advice of the FWS, the EPA approved the transfer.\nThe Defenders of Wildlife challenged the transfer, arguing that the ESA imposed an authoritative, independent requirement on the EPA's decision to approve the transfer. The agency countered the ESA was not an independent source of authority. Rather, the ESA imposes requirements only on the discretionary decisions of federal agencies. Since its decision was non-discretionary under the CWA, the agency argued, the ESA did not apply. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Defenders of Wildlife and invalidated the transfer. The Ninth Circuit found the FWS opinion legally flawed and the EPA's reliance on it \"arbitrary and capricious.\" It noted that the EPA's decision was inconsistent with previous transfers of permitting authority, in which the impact on endangered species was considered.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55387:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55387:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55387:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo to all. By a 5-4 vote the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and sustained the FWS's determination that Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act applies only to discretionary actions of federal agencies. EPA's transfer of permitting authority was a nondiscretionary action, so the EPA needed only to consider the nine criteria in the Clean Water Act. The majority opinion held that Section 7(a)(2)'s provisions for protecting endangered species do not establish a \"tenth criterion\" for the EPA to consider before transferring permitting authority. By this interpretation the Court sought to \"harmonize[]\" the ESA with the CWA, in keeping with the Court's interpretive principle that a statute should generally not be interpreted to repeal an earlier statute unless the more recent statute has explicit language to that effect. Because the Court found that the decisions of the EPA and FWS consistently and reasonably interpreted both statutes, it deferred to the views of the administrative agencies. Justice Stevens's dissent argued that the ESA's requirements properly applied to all agency decisions both discretionary and non-discretionary, and that EPA's interpretation was not entitled to deference because \"[t]he Departments of the Interior and Commerce, not EPA, are charged with administering the ESA.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55387:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55388:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55388:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGary Lawrence was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Lawrence appealed his conviction, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. After exhausting his state-court appeals, Lawrence filed a petition for certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to review the decisions of the Florida courts. Later, Lawrence petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which would allow his appeal to be heard in federal court.\nThe federal District Court rejected Lawrence's habeas petition, because he had exceeded the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The AEDPA gives defendants one year to submit habeas petitions, but that does not include any time that the petitioner has a \"properly filed application\" pending for \"State post-conviction or other collateral review.\" In Lawrence's case, whether or not he had exceeded the one-year time limit depended on whether or not the time spent waiting for the Supreme Court to process his pending certiorari petition counted toward the time limit. Federal Circuit Courts have disagreed on this question.\nIn his appeal, Lawrence argued that time spent on Supreme Court certiorari petitions, like time spent on state-court appeals, was not countable toward the one-year statute of limitations. Lawrence also made an alternative argument that the incompetence of his state-appointed counsel, as well as the disagreement among federal courts on the statute of limitations question, constituted \"extraordinary circumstances.\" If the Court were to find that the delay was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond the defendant's control, it could set aside the time limit under the doctrine of \"equitable tolling.\"\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the District Court and rejected Lawrence's petition. The Circuit Court ruled that Lawrence had failed to demonstrate how his lawyer's actions or the confusion over the statute of limitations caused him to miss the deadline. The Circuit Court acknowledged that the statute of limitations had been in dispute, but it followed Circuit precedent that said time spent waiting for a pending Supreme Court certiorari petition did count toward the AEDPA's one-year time limit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55388:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55388:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55388:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no, and no. The Court ruled 5-4 that the time a habeas petition is pending before the Supreme Court counts toward the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Section 2244(d)(2) of the Act stops the clock on the time limit while the prisoner appeals in state courts, but the Court ruled that appeals to the Supreme Court are not part of the process referred to in the Act. Justice Clarence Thomas's opinion held that \"Read naturally, the text of the statute must mean that the statute of limitations is tolled only while state courts review the application.\" The Court noted that suspending the statute of limitations for certiorari petitions might cause prisoners to file petitions \"as a delay tactic.\" Finally, the Court rejected Lawrence's equitable tolling claims, holding that attorney miscalculation is not a credible reason for the Court to set aside a deadline.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55388:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55389:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55389:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider \"[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.\"\nAfter the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a \"reasonable likelihood\" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.\nAfter the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or \"unadorned\" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55389:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55389:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55389:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and unanswered. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the factor (k) instruction, allowing Belmontes's death sentence to go forward. The opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy held that \"The factor (k) instruction is consistent with the constitutional right to present mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings.\" Following the analysis in Boyde v. California, the Justices ruled that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury had misunderstood the instruction. The Court held that the jurors had interpreted factor (k) as a broad catch-all under which they could consider forward-looking mitigating factors such as the possibility of rehabilitation. Since the jury had considered all of Belmontes's mitigating evidence before his sentencing, the sentence was constitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55389:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55390:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55390:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMassachusetts and several other states petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asking EPA to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases that contribute to global warming from new motor vehicles. Massachusetts argued that EPA was required to regulate these \"greenhouse gases\" by the Clean Air Act - which states that Congress must regulate \"any air pollutant\" that can \"reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.\"\nEPA denied the petition, claiming that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Even if it did, EPA argued, the Agency had discretion to defer a decision until more research could be done on \"the causes, extent and significance of climate change and the potential options for addressing it.\" Massachusetts appealed the denial of the petition to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and a divided panel ruled in favor of EPA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55390:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55390:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55390:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. By a 5-4 vote the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and ruled in favor of Massachusetts. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens held that Massachusetts, due to its \"stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests\" as a state, had standing to sue the EPA over potential damage caused to its territory by global warming. The Court rejected the EPA's argument that the Clean Air Act was not meant to refer to carbon emissions in the section giving the EPA authority to regulate \"air pollution agent[s]\". The Act's definition of air pollutant was written with \"sweeping,\" \"capacious\" language so that it would not become obsolete. Finally, the majority ruled that the EPA was unjustified in delaying its decision on the basis of prudential and policy considerations. The Court held that if the EPA wishes to continue its inaction on carbon regulation, it is required by the Act to base the decision on a consideration of \"whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change.\" Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion argued that Massachusetts should not have had standing to sue, because the potential injuries from global warming were not concrete or particularized (individual and personal). Justice Scalia's dissent argued that the Clean Air Act was intended to combat conventional lower-atmosphere pollutants and not global climate change.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55390:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55391:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55391:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn some states, public sector labor unions are allowed to collect fees from non-union members. The Supreme Court has ruled that unions may use these fees for political purposes, but only if the non-union member does not object. Washington state also has a \"paycheck protection\" law, RCW 42.17.760, which requires unions to obtain specific permission from non-members before using their fees for political activity. Davenport, a non-union teacher, sued the Washington Education Association (WEA) teacher's union for violating the law.\nWEA appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, arguing that Washington's requirement that unions get prior permission was an unconstitutional burden on the unions' First Amendment right to associate for political purposes. Davenport countered that his own First Amendment rights were being violated when his fees went to political causes he did not agree with. The state Court of Appeals ruled in favor of WEA.\nOn appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the burden must lie on the nonmember to assert his rights and object to the political fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55391:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55391:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55391:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the First Amendment allows a state to require public-sector unions collecting \"agency-shop\" fees from non-union employees to obtain permission from the employees before using the money for political purposes. The Court's opinion held that \"[...] unions have no constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees.\" It would be constitutional for a state to eliminate agency-shop fees altogether, and it is likewise constitutional for a state to take the lesser step of requiring permission from non-union employees before their fees are used for political purposes. The Court faulted the Washington Supreme Court for misinterpreting the Court's precedents as requiring that the burden always be on the objecting employee. The Court concluded that the law was viewpoint-neutral and that it did not suppress any political ideas, since it involved a limitation on how unions can obtain money from non-members and not a limitation how they can choose spend it once they have it. Thus, the Court held that the union's First Amendment right was not abridged by the permission requirement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55391:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55393:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55393:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nShortly after taking office, President Bush created by executive order the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, a program aimed at allowing religious charitable organizations to compete alongside non-religious ones for federal funding. Another executive order instructed various executive departments to hold conferences promoting the Faith-Based Initiative. The Freedom from Religion Foundation sued, alleging that the conferences favored religious organizations over non-religious ones and thereby violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The government argued that there was no \"Case or Controversy\" as required by Article III of the Constitution. According to the government, the Foundation had no standing to sue, because the Foundation had not been harmed in any way by the conferences. The fact that an individual pays taxes to the federal government is not normally enough to give the individual standing to challenge a federal program, but the Foundation noted that exceptions have been made for Establishment Clause challenges (see Flast v. Cohen and Bowen v. Kendrick ).\nThe District Court ruled that the Foundation lacked standing to sue. The court held that the exceptions only covered challenges to specific congressional expenditures, not executive-branch actions funded by the general funds allotted to the executive departments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, ruling that any taxpayer has standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge against an executive-branch program, whether funded by a specific congressional grant or by a discretionary use of a general appropriation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55393:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55393:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55393:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. By a 5-4 vote, the Court ruled that citizens do not have standing as taxpayers to bring Establishment Clause challenges against Executive Branch programs that are funded by appropriations for general administrative expenses. Justice Samuel Alito's plurality opinion called Flast v. Cohen a \"narrow exception\" to the general rule that taxpayer status does not grant standing to sue the government, and held that Flast did not support the Seventh Circuit's broad interpretation. In order to have standing under Flast, a taxpayer must not only challenge a policy on the basis of the Establishment Clause, but also bring the challenge against a congressional expenditure. Since no specific congressional appropriation was implicated in the suit, the Court ruled that there was no \"Case or Controversy\" under the Flast exception. To extend Flast to executive actions, the Court said, would threaten the separation of powers by relaxing the doctrine of standing and turning federal courts into \"general complaint bureaus.\" In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia called the plurality's distinction \"utterly meaningless,\" and argued that Flast should be overruled. Justice Souter argued in dissent that \"When executive agencies spend identifiable sums of tax money for religious purposes, no less than when Congress authorizes the same thing, taxpayers suffer injury.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55393:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55394:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55394:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Weaver was convicted of the first degree murder of a prospective witness in a drug trial. During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor gave a closing statement arguing for a death sentence. In the course of the statement, the prosecutor said: \"You've got to think beyond William Weaver [...] This is society's worst nightmare\" and \"Sometimes killing is not only fair and justified; it's right. Sometimes it's your duty [...] it's right to kill him [Weaver] now.\" The jury sentenced Weaver to death. Weaver appealed in state court, arguing that the prosecutor's statements had inflamed and prejudiced the jury.\nThe Missouri state courts denied the appeal, but a federal District Court granted habeas corpus. The District Court overturned the sentence, ruling that the \"unfairly inflammatory\" closing statement had violated Weaver's right to due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the state cited the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which states that federal courts shall not grant a prisoner's habeas petition unless the state court's decision was \"contrary to [...] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.\" The Eighth Circuit had cited some Supreme Court cases pertaining to prejudicial closing statements in the guilt phase of the trial, but the state argued that the federal courts should not have granted habeas relief, because the Supreme Court had not specifically addressed the issue of closing statements in the penalty phase.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55394:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55394:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55394:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. By a 6-3 vote, the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted, citing elements of the case's \"unusual procedural history.\" Weaver had filed a habeas petition before AEDPA went into effect, but the district court had ruled that he must abandon his habeas petition if he wanted to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court made it clear in 2007 that the district court's decision had been incorrect (see Lawrence v. Florida ). After the Court denied his petition for certiorari, Weaver refiled the habeas petition - but by then AEDPA was in effect, with its stricter requirements for habeas petitions. Rather than risk allowing Weaver's fate to hinge on the district court's mistake, the majority decided to dismiss the case. The dissenters argued that these considerations should not prevent the Court from correcting the Eighth Circuit's mistreatment of AEDPA. Justice Scalia suggested in dissent that other Circuit Courts should \"do unto the Eighth Circuitís decision just what it did unto AEDPA: ignore it.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55394:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55396:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55396:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe state of California suffered an energy crisis in 2001. Citizens filed suit against energy company Reliant Energy Services et al (Reliant) for conspiring to fix energy price levels. Reliant filed cross-claims against multiple energy companies and regulatory agencies involved in the price fixing, including the Canadian company Powerex Corporation. PowerEx exported surplus Canadian hydropower on behalf of its owner, the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (BC Hydro). Since BC Hydro was a governmental corporation and Powerex was its subsidiary, both argued that they were entitled to sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA). FSIA defines a foreign sovereign as an \"organ of a foreign state\" (28 U.S.C. Section 1603(b)). Reliant claimed that the two companies were exempt from FSIA sovereign immunity because their commercial activity had a \"direct effect\" on California energy markets.\nA District Court ruled that BC Hydro was a foreign sovereign, but PowerEx was not. The District Court issued a remand order sending the case back to state court. Powerex appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that it operated for the \"public interest\" as an instrumentality of the government. The Ninth Circuit held that PowerEx was not a \"foreign sovereign\" because BC Hydro, not the Canadian government, owned PowerEx's shares.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55396:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55396:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55396:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered and no. In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled 7-2 that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review the District Court's remand order. The Court relied on 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), which precludes appellate review of remands based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The District Court remanded the case because it found itself lacking the power to adjudicate the dispute after it determined that Powerex was not a foreign sovereign and thus could not remove the case to federal court. Since \"the District Court relied upon a ground that is colorably characterized as subject-matter jurisdiction,\" the remand could not be reviewed on appeal. The Court ruled that Section 1447(d) clearly applied to FSIA sovereign immunity cases, and rejected the argument that Congress could not have intended to deny review of remand orders in such cases. The Court acknowledged that Section 1447(d) had \"undesirable consequences in the FSIA context,\" but it said a change of the law in the internationally sensitive area of sovereign immunity would have to be left to Congress. Justice Stephen G. Breyer's dissent argued that there is an implicit exception for FSIA in Section 1447(d).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55396:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55397:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55397:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFlorida state park officials prohibited T.A. Wyner and George Simon from forming a peace symbol from nude individuals at a public beach. Wyner and Simon petitioned a district court, which issued a preliminary injunction barring the officials' interference and awarded Wyner and Simon their attorney fees in accordance with 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. Later, the district court reversed the injunction because state laws prohibited nudity at the beach. The officials argued that Wyner and Simon did not qualify as a \"prevailing party,\" and therefore should not have their attorney fees refunded.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Wyner and Simon were the \"prevailing party\" because the district court had decided to issue the preliminary injunction based on merits of the case. The park officials responded that the preliminary injunction was based on a \"mistake of the law,\" because the case was dismissed upon further review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had previously ruled that a preliminary injunction is not a ruling based on the merits, and therefore does not determine the \"prevailing party.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55397:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55397:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55397:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's opinion for the unanimous Court held that a preliminary injunction that is later reversed or otherwise undone cannot be the basis for \"prevailing party\" status for purposes of awarding attorney's fees. Though Wyner had been able to perform the nude peace symbol display without interference after her victory at the preliminary hearing, her victory had been \"transient,\" \"fleeting,\" and \"ephemeral.\" Because she eventually lost on the merits of her claim that the government's interference was unconstitutional, she failed to gain the enduring \"chang[e] [in] the legal relationship\" of the parties that is required for prevailing party status. The Court left open the possibility that a preliminary injunction could be the basis for awarding attorney's fees if it were not later superseded as was Wyner's.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55397:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55399:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55399:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Marrama filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and agreed to turn over all of his non-exempt assets to a trustee for payment of his creditors. Trustees later accused Marrama of acting in bad faith by attempting to conceal two assets: a tax refund and some real estate. Marrama then moved to convert his bankruptcy petition from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, which would allow him to keep more of his assets. Citizens Bank, one of Marrama's creditors, opposed the conversion. Citizens Bank argued that Marrama should not be able to convert to Chapter 13 due to his initial bad faith Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy court agreed and denied the conversion.\nThe bankruptcy appeals panel affirmed the court's ruling. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Marrama argued that the plain language of Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code supported his right to convert to Chapter 13, regardless of the circumstances. Section 706(a) states, \"The debtor may convert a case under [Chapter 7] to a case under Chapter 11, 12 or 13 of this title at any time [...]\" Citizens Bank countered that the word \"may\" indicates a privilege rather than a right. It also argued that the bankruptcy system could be abused if debtors were able to convert to Chapter 13 after filing bad faith Chapter 7 petitions. The First Circuit upheld the panel's ruling, denying Marrama his conversion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55399:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55399:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55399:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that there is a \"bad faith\" exception to the right of conversion in Section 706(a). The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens held that although the vast majority of Chapter 7 debtors can convert to Chapter 13, a Chapter 7 debtor who engages in bad faith conduct does not qualify as a \"debtor\" under Chapter 13 and thus cannot convert his petition. The majority also wrote that courts have the inherent power to deny the motions of litigants who act in bad faith. The Court concluded that \"Nothing in the text of [...] 706 [...] limits the authority of the court to take appropriate action in response to fraudulent conduct by the atypical litigant who has demonstrated that he is not entitled to the relief available to the typical debtor.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55399:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55400:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55400:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVictor Rita received a thirty-three month sentence from a trial judge after a jury convicted him of perjury, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. Though the sentence fell within the range prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and under the statutory maximum, Rita appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. He argued that the judge should not have sentenced him without explicitly considering factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) that might justify imposing a lesser sentence. The government argued that the judge could presume the sentence reasonable if it fell within the guidelines, even without an explicit analysis of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The Supreme Court had previously ruled in U.S. v. Booker that sentencing judges could only treat the guidelines as advisory, not as mandatory. The Fourth Circuit accepted the government's arguments and ruled that a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences did not violate Booker.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55400:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55400:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55400:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. The Court ruled that courts of appeals may apply a nonbinding presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that when the sentencing judge and the guidelines established by the Sentencing Commission agree on the proper sentence in a case, the \"double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.\" The Court reasoned that since the presumption of reasonableness for within- Guidelines sentences does not forbid any judge from imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines, the presumption is consistent with Booker. This presumption of reasonableness does not imply that courts can apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences outside the Guidelines ranges. The Court also found that the District judge had acted reasonably in imposing Rita's within-Guidelines sentence. Though the judge had not undertaken an explicit extended analysis of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the Court found his analysis \"brief but legally sufficient.\" It was clear from the context that the judge had considered and rejected each factor that might have justified a lesser sentence, and the Court said, \"we cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting upon a full opinion in every case.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55400:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55401:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55401:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBrentwood Academy, a private school, was a voluntary member of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA). After Brentwood's football coach violated TSSAA recruiting rules by contacting some prospective players at other schools, the TSSAA imposed various penalties on Brentwood. Brentwood sued the TSSAA, claiming that its First Amendment and Due Process rights were being violated. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that because the TSSAA was composed primarily of public schools, it was a state actor subject to the limitations of the Constitution (see Brentwood Acad. v. TN Sec. School Ath. Assn. No. 99-901). Accordingly, the District Court faulted the TSSAA for violations of Brentwood's constitutional rights and threw out the TSSAA's penalties.\nOn appeal, the TSSAA argued that it had not exercised the \"police power\" of the State, but merely enforced a voluntary contractual agreement with Brentwood. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth circuit rejected this argument, characterizing the TSSAA's actions as those of a \"government regulator.\" The Sixth Circuit held that the state interest in regulating athletic competition was not substantial enough to counter-balance Brentwood's First Amendment rights, and it affirmed the lower court's ruling for Brentwood.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55401:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55401:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55401:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that \"[t]he anti-recruiting rule strikes nowhere near the heart of the First Amendment.\" Brentwood's speech rights do not extend to potentially coercive one-on-one communications between a coach and potential students, especially after the school voluntarily agreed to the anti-recruiting rule. The Court drew an analogy to the case of Ohralik v. State Bar Assn., in which the justices had ruled that a lawyer's in-person solicitation of clients was not protected speech. In that case as well as Brentwood's, activities with a potential for pressure, misrepresentation, or coercion were found to be outside the First Amendment's scope even though speech was involved. The Court also considered Brentwood's voluntary acceptance of the anti-recruiting rule to be significant. The TSSAA is allowed to impose limited conditions on the free speech of its members as long as these conditions are necessary for its purposes as an athletic league, and \"the First Amendment does not excuse Brentwood\" from abiding by them. In concurring opinions, a narrow majority of justices disagreed with Justice Stevens's invocation of Ohralik on the ground that it was not meant to extend beyond the attorney-client relationship. Justice Thomas recommended that the Court revisit and overrule its previous holding that TSSAA is a state actor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55401:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55402:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55402:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAtlantic Research Corp. (Atlantic) built rocket motors for the United States government at an Arkansas facility. When residue from burnt rocket fuel contaminated the site, Atlantic voluntarily cleaned up the contamination and later sought cost recovery from the government under Section 107(a) and Section 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Some Courts of Appeals had interpreted Section 107(a) as implicitly allowing a party responsible for contamination to compel other partly-responsible parties to contribute to the clean-up. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 added Section 113(f), which makes explicit the right to sue for contribution.\nWhile Atlantic was negotiating with the government, the Supreme Court ruled in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. that a party cannot bring a Section 113(f) claim for contribution unless it is already the subject of a Section 107(a) contamination action. Atlantic filed a new claim for contribution under Section 107(a), but a district court denied the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had previously ruled that a liable party must use Section 113(f), not Section 107(a), to file a contribution claim. Atlantic argued that failure to meet the requirements of Section 113(f) did not foreclose the implied Section 107(a) right to sue other partly-responsible parties for contribution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55402:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55402:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55402:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court ruled unanimously that Section 107(a) of CERCLA allows potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to sue other PRPs for cost recovery. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas affirmed the Eighth Circuit and ruled for Atlantic Research. The government had claimed that the phrase \"any other person\" in Section 107(a) was meant to include only non-PRPs, but the Court, relying on the plain language of the statute, held that \"the Governmentís interpretation makes little textual sense.\" Since almost any party likely to incur clean-up costs could be designated a PRP, the government's interpretation risked rendering Section 107(a) functionless. The Court explained that its interpretation would not result in improper overlap between Section 113(f) and Section 107(a). A party can sue another PRP for contribution under 113(f), but the party can only sue under Section 107(a) for reimbursement of its own clean-up costs. Therefore, parties cannot take advantage of Section 107(a)'s longer limitations period by bringing contribution claims under 107(a).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55402:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55404:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55404:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGenentech held the patent for \"Cabilly I\", a process for using cell cultures to manufacture human antibodies. MedImmune had a licensing agreement with Genentech under which MedImmune paid royalties to Genentech in return for the use of the patent. Later, Genentech also obtained the patent to \"Cabilly II,\" a continuation of the Cabilly I process. Under the licensing agreement, MedImmune became a licensee for Cabilly II as well. Genentech informed MedImmune that it would have to pay royalties on one of its most lucrative products, Synagis, which uses the Cabilly II process. MedImmune sued Genentech, claiming that the patent was invalid and unenforceable. However, MedImmune kept paying the royalties.\nA federal District Court dismissed the suit because it did not present a controversy. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to \"cases or controversies.\" This is implemented in the Declaratory Judgment Act, which requires that a suit involve an \"actual controversy.\" Genentech argued that since MedImmune was still paying royalties on the patent, there was no controversy. MedImmune countered that though it was indeed still paying royalties on the patent it claimed was invalid, it was paying \"under protest.\" It would be unreasonable, MedImmune argued, for the company to be required to break its contractual obligations by stopping royalty payments before suing. This might jeopardize MedImmune's legal rights to one of its best-selling products.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled for Genentech and upheld the District Court, holding that the suit presented no actual controversy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55404:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55404:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55404:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court reversed the Federal Circuit and ruled for MedImmune. The Court held that MedImmune was not required to break its contract before suing, because \"The rule that a plaintiff must [...] risk treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business[] before seeking a declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.\" The Declaratory Judgment Act only requires that disputes be non-hypothetical and non-abstract. The mere fact that royalties were still being paid, the Court ruled, was not sufficient to remove the courts' jurisdiction under Article III. In a lone dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the Court's expansive approach toward Article III jurisdiction would improperly allow parties to bring premature, theoretical suits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55404:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55405:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55405:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nStone sued his employer, nuclear weapons plant operator Rockwell International, under the False Claims Act (FCA). He took advantage of the FCA's \"qui tam\" provision, which allows an individual to sue on behalf of the government. Stone alleged that Rockwell had made false claims about the environmental safety of \"pondcrete,\" a mixture of cement and sludge used for nuclear waste storage. In a qui tam action under the FCA, the person bringing the suit must be the \"original source\" of the information on which his claim is based. Rockwell argued that Stone was not an original source because he did not have \"direct and independent knowledge\" of the information at issue in the suit, as required by the FCA.\nThe District Court ruled that Stone qualified as an original source, and a divided panel of the U.S. Circuit Court for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed to resolve the question of how much and what kind of knowledge an FCA qui tam plaintiff must have.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55405:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55405:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55405:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court ruled 6-2 that Stone did not qualify as an \"original source\" with \"direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based\" for purposes of the False Claims Act. Justice Antonin Scalia's opinion interpreted the word \"information\" as referring to information on which the relator's (in this case Stone's) claim is based and not to any information underlying publicly disclosed allegations. The Court further pinpointed the meaning of the ambiguous statute by holding that \"allegations\" means the allegations in the relator's amended complaint and not just those in the original complaint. The Court concluded that \"[j]udged according to the principles set forth above, Stone's knowledge falls short.\" The government's investigation did turn up Rockwell's deceptions concerning the production of defective pondcrete, but the information provided by Stone was not directly related to the government's discoveries. In order for Stone to bring a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, he would have had to be the original source of information that was actually used to prosecute Rockwell. Since the claims involving Stone's information were ultimately dropped in the amended complaint, he could not bring the suit. The government, the Court ruled, would have to continue the action without Stone as co-plaintiff.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55405:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55406:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55406:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLeegin Creative Leather Products, a manufacturer of women's accessories, entered into vertical minimum price agreements with its retailers. The agreements required the retailers to charge no less than certain minimum prices for Leegin products. According to Leegin, the price minimums were intended to encourage competition among retailers in customer service and product promotion. When one retailer, PSKS, discounted Leegin products below the minimum, Leegin dropped the retailer. PSKS sued, arguing that Leegin was violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act by engaging in anticompetitive price fixing. Under the Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., mandatory minimum price agreements are per se illegal under the Act - that is, they are automatically illegal regardless of the circumstances.\nLeegin argued that this rule was based on outdated economics. It contended that a better legal analysis would be the \"rule of reason,\" under which price minimums would be held illegal only in cases where they could be shown to be anticompetitive. Both the District Court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments. The courts felt compelled to follow the Supreme Court's rule in the Dr. Miles case, under which Leegin's practices were illegal regardless of the economic arguments put forward by the company.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55406:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55406:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55406:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled 5-4 that \" Dr. Miles should be overruled and that vertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason.\" Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion held that Dr. Miles had erred by treating vertical minimum price agreements between manufacturers and retailers as analogous to horizontal price-fixing agreements between sellers. The Court cited evidence from the economic literature that vertical minimum price agreements are rarely anticompetitive and can often function to increase interbrand competition. The Court acknowledged that in some cases vertical price minimums might facilitate manufacturer cartels, but it held that instances where the price agreements are abused for illegal anticompetitive purposes can be determined on a case-by-case basis under the rule of reason. The mere fact that vertical price minimums may lead to higher prices for goods cannot reflect negatively on its legality under the Sherman Act, because there are many legitimate business decisions that may ultimately result in higher prices. The majority also acknowledged that the principle of stare decisis would weigh against overruling the nearly 100-year-old precedent in Dr. Miles, but it held that the Sherman Act is to be treated as a \"common-law statute,\" which must be allowed to evolve in the courts as economic knowledge and circumstances change. The dissenters, in an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, saw no change in circumstances that would justify overruling Dr. Miles, and they argued that the reliance of the business community on that decision supported adherence to stare decisis.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55406:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55407:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55407:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter a police officer attempted to pull him over for speeding, Victor Harris fled in his vehicle, initiating a high-speed car chase. Attempting to end the chase, Deputy Timothy Scott rammed Harris's vehicle with his police cruiser. Harris crashed and was rendered a quadriplegic. Harris sued Scott in federal District Court, alleging that Scott had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. Scott claimed qualified immunity as a government official acting in his official capacity, but the District Court rejected the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.\nIn order to show that a government official is not entitled to qualified immunity, a plaintiff is required to prove that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Scott's actions constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because there was no imminent threat - Harris remained in control of his vehicle and the roads were relatively empty - Scott's use of deadly force was unconstitutional. Although no Appellate Court had ruled on the specific question of the use of deadly force in a high-speed chase, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the limits on deadly force were \"clearly established.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55407:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55407:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55407:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled 8-1 that Scott's actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia relied heavily on a videotape of the car chase, which it said contradicted the plaintiff's claim that he was driving responsibly even while being pursued by the police. The majority held that \"[...] it is clear from the videotape that [Harris] posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.\" The opinion weighed the need to prevent the harm Harris could have caused against the high probability that Harris himself would be harmed by Scott's use of force. It also took into account Harris's culpability for starting the chase in the first place. The Court concluded that it is reasonable for a police officer to use deadly force to prevent harm to innocent bystanders, even to the point of putting the fleeing motorist at serious risk of injury or death. Justice Stevens's lone dissent argued that the videotape was not as definitive as the majority made it out to be and that a jury should make the determination on the justifiability of deadly force.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55407:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55408:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55408:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nForeign countries can own buildings surrounding the United Nations in New York City tax-free if the buildings are used exclusively for diplomatic purposes. The City filed lawsuits against the Indian and Mongolian consulates in a District Court for failing to pay taxes on properties used for non-diplomatic purposes. The two consulates argued that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) granted them immunity from suit. The District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the FSIA's \"immovable property\" exception, which removes immunity from foreign countries when \"rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue.\" The two countries argued that \"rights\" denoted a narrow set of property laws and did not extend to tax matters. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55408:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55408:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55408:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and unanswered. The Court held 7-2 that the \"immovable property\" exception to sovereign immunity in the FSIA covers disputes over tax liens on the property as well as disputes over ownership and possession. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas ruled that a tax lien, by both its dictionary definition and its practical effect, is an interest or right in property. This broad interpretation of the exception was consistent with Congress's purpose in passing FSIA to adopt a much more restrictive theory of sovereign immunity than the previous, virtually absolute one. The Court found some of the evidence from contemporaneous international agreements to be ambiguous and equivocal, but it held that its interpretation was consistent with Congress's intention to codify the state of international law at the time of FSIA's enactment. Justice Stevens's dissent argued that \"[s]uch a broad exception to sovereign immunity threatens [...] to swallow the rule.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55408:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55409:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55409:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAT&T owned the patent for certain speech codecs (a type of software code) included in Microsoft's Windows operating system. When Microsoft sent master versions of the software overseas, copied them, and sold the copied software, AT&T sued for patent infringement. A company is guilty of infringement under the Patent Act if it \"supplies...from the United States...components of a patented invention...in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components.\" Microsoft argued that it was not liable because 1) software code is intangible and cannot not be considered a \"component\" of an invention and 2) no software had been \"supplied\" from the U.S. because the copies were made overseas.\nThe District Court rejected both of Microsoft's arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Federal Circuit ruled that software code could be a component, because the Patent Act was not limited to physical structures. The Circuit Court also held that each overseas copy made of the U.S.-originated software code was \"supplied\" from the United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55409:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55409:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55409:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. The Court ruled 7-1 that Microsoft was not liable for infringement of AT&T's patent. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that \"software code is an idea without physical embodiment\"; it cannot be a component of a patented invention. While leaving open the possibility that intangible things could be components in some cases, the opinion compared software code to a blueprint - something that can precisely describe the combination of the components, but is not itself a component. The majority held that Microsoft's Windows software does not become a component for purposes of AT&T's patent until it is converted into copies that can be read by a computer. The Court acknowledged that the copying from the master versions was an easy step, but it was nonetheless \"essential.\" Since the crucial step occurred outside the United States, the copies were \"supplied from the United States\" under the meaning of the Patent Act. Instead, each functional copy was produced overseas from the master version of the software code. Justice Stevens's lone dissent disagreed with the Court's comparison of software code to a blueprint. He compared the exported master disk to a \"warehouse of components.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55409:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55410:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55410:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nScott Louis Panetti was convicted of the murder of his wife's parents and sentenced to death. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, claiming mental illness. The Supreme Court had ruled in Ford v. Wainwright that execution of the mentally ill is barred by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. A psychiatric evaluation found that Panetti believed that the State was \"in league with the forces of evil\" and was executing him in order to \"prevent him from preaching the Gospel.\" However, doctors also found Panetti to be aware of his crime, of the fact that he was to be executed, and of the State's stated reason for executing him. The District Court concluded that he was sufficiently sane to be executed.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court. The Fifth Circuit rejected Panetti's argument that an inmate cannot be executed if he lacks a rational understanding of the State's motivation for the execution. The Court of Appeals instead relied on Justice Lewis Powell's concurrence in Ford, holding that an inmate need only have an awareness of the State's reason for execution, not necessarily a rational understanding of it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55410:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55410:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55410:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. In an opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy for a 5-4 majority, the Court held that the Fifth Circuit's analysis was too restrictive under Ford v. Wainwright, because it treated Panetti's mental condition as irrelevant as long as he had in some sense a factual awareness of the state's rationale. The Court rejected the state's arguments that the Court did not have jurisdiction and that the state court was entitled to deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In doing so, the Court held that a prisoner may sometimes bring a habeas petition claiming mental incompetency even if he did not raise the claim in his first petition and that state courts can be held to have unreasonably applied a legal principle even if the principle was addressed to somewhat different facts than those of the case at hand. The state court had unreasonably applied Ford by failing to give Panetti a fair hearing to fully present his psychiatric evidence. The Court also ruled that the Fifth Circuit \"rests on a flawed interpretation of Ford,\" because it failed to consider that Panetti's delusions may have prevented him from understanding the meaning of his punishment even though he professed to be aware of the facts. The Court did not undertake its own analysis of what kind of rational understanding the Eighth Amendment requires a death row inmate to have, saying, \"Although we reject the standard followed by the Court of Appeals, we do not attempt to set down a rule governing all competency determinations.\" The Court expressed the hope that expert psychiatric evidence would shed light on which delusions might distort an inmate's sense of reality so much as to render him incompetent to be executed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55410:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55411:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55411:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoss-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. (Ross-Simmons) sued Weyerhaeuser, a competing sawmill, for \"predatory buying\" in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, Weyerhaeuser was accused of buying more raw materials than it needed at unnecessarily high prices. Ross-Simmons alleged that Weyerhaeuser's business practices were aimed at monopolizing the market for purchasing unprocessed sawlogs and forcing its competitors out of business. At the jury trial, jurors were instructed to rule against Weyerhaeuser if Ross-Simmons could prove that Weyerhaeuser bought more sawlogs \"than it needed\" and paid more \"than necessary\" for them. Weyerhaeuser objected, arguing that the more stringent guidelines in the case of Brooke Group v. Williamson Tobacco Corp. required a ruling in its favor. In Brooke Group, the Court held that in order for a company to be liable for \"predatory pricing,\" a company must be shown to have been operating at a loss, and to have a \"dangerous probability\" of recouping its losses.\nThe District Court rejected Weyerhaeuser's motion, ruling that Brooke Group applies only to predatory pricing, where a company prices its products too low in order force competitors out of the market, and not to predatory buying. Under the less stringent guidelines, the jury found Weyerhaeuser to be in violation of the Sherman Act, and awarded Ross-Simmons $78.8 million in damages. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court, ruling that the higher standard of liability for predatory pricing compared to predatory buying is appropriate, because business practices that resemble predatory pricing may result in benefits such as efficiency incentives and lower prices for consumers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55411:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55411:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55411:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit decision and ruled that the Brooke Group standard applies to predatory bidding as well as predatory pricing. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas noted the economic similarity between the monopoly conditions created by predatory pricing and the monopsony or \"buyer's monopoly\" conditions created by predatory bidding. The Court held that the \"theoretical and practical similarities of predatory pricing and predatory bidding convince us that our two-pronged Brooke Group test should apply to predatory-bidding claims.\" Since Ross-Simmons had not met the Court's test, the jury's verdict against Weyerhaeuser was invalid.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55411:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55412:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55412:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a nonprofit political advocacy corporation, ran three advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose filibusters of judicial nominees. WRTL intended to keep running the ads through the 2004 election, but the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. WRTL sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), claiming that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements. In 2006, the Supreme Court let the \"as applied\" challenge proceed (see Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 04-1581). In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Court had upheld Congress's power to regulate \"express advocacy\" ads that support or oppose political candidates, but WRTL claimed that its ads were \"issue ads\" rather than express advocacy. WRTL also argued that the government lacked a compelling interest sufficient to override the corporation's First Amendment free speech interest. The FEC countered that WRTL's ads were \"sham issue ads,\" which refrain from explicitly endorsing or opposing a candidate but are intended to affect an election.\nA three-judge District Court agreed with WRTL's arguments and ruled the BCRA unconstitutional as applied to the ads. The court refused the FEC's request that it inquire into the intent and likely effect of the ads, because those determinations would be impractical and would have a chilling effect on protected speech. Analyzing only the explicit content of the ads, the court found them to be legitimate issue ads and not express advocacy or sham issue ads. The court also held that the government's justification for banning express advocacy ads by corporations - the need to reduce political corruption and public cynicism - did not apply to ads that do not endorse or oppose a candidate. Therefore, the court ruled that the government lacked a compelling interest to justify the burden on WRTL's First Amendment rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55412:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55412:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55412:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. By a 5-4 vote the Court ruled that BCRA's limitations on political advertising were unconstitutional as they applied to issue ads like WRTL's. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that the ads were genuine issue ads, not express political advocacy or its functional equivalent (which Congress can concededly regulate). The Court held that McConnell v. FEC did not establish the test that any ad intended to influence an election and having that effect is express advocacy. Such a test would be open-ended and burdensome, would lead to bizarre results, and would \"unquestionably chill a substantial amount of political speech.\" Instead, the Court adopted the test that \"an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.\" The Court further held that the compelling state interests invoked by the government to regulate advocacy did not apply with equal force to genuine issue ads. Neither the interest in preventing corruption nor the goal of limiting the distorting effects of corporate wealth was sufficient to override the right of a corporation to speak through ads on public issues. This conclusion, the Court held, was necessary in order to \"give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship.\" The dissent by Justice Souter called WRTL's ads indistinguishable from political advocacy ads and accused the majority of implicitly overruling McConnell v. FEC.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55412:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55413:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55413:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarvin Bockting was accused of sexually assaulting his six year old stepdaughter. The girl told a detective about Bockting's crimes against her, but at the trial she became very upset and refused to testify. The judge declared the witness unavailable and allowed the detective to give hearsay testimony on what Bockting's daughter had told him. Bockting was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without having had a chance to cross-examine the only witness against him.\nBockting's appeals in state court were denied. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court, claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser had been violated. During Bockting's appeals, the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington that hearsay testimony given outside the court by an unavailable witness is only admissible if the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness before trial.\nBockting appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Nith Circuit, arguing that Crawford should apply retroactively to his case. The Circuit Court ruled that Crawford had announced a \"new rule\" of criminal procedure; new rules are normally not applied to cases that were final before the rule was announced. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the rule on hearsay testimony was a \"watershed\" rule that was fundamental to a fair trial. Under an exception defined by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, watershed rules are applied retroactively.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55413:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55413:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55413:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled unanimously \"that Crawford announced a 'new rule' of criminal procedure and that this rule does not fall within the Teague exception for watershed rules.\" Justice Samuel Alito's opinion called the Crawford ruling \"flatly inconsistent\" with the prior precedents that it overruled. It was therefore a new rule of criminal procedure. However, the ruling failed to meet the Court's two criteria for a watershed rule. Although Crawford was aimed at increasing the accuracy of criminal convictions, it was not absolutely necessary to prevent an \"impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction,\" as was the archetypal watershed ruling Gideon v. Wainwright. The Court acknowledged that the Crawford's holding was \"important,\" but it was not as \"profound,\" \"sweeping,\" or \"central[]\" as the Gideon watershed rule, which had been \"essential to the fairness\" of the judicial system. Since the Crawford ruling did not meet the criteria for a watershed rule, the Court ruled that the decision's restrictions on hearsay testimony did not apply retroactively.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55413:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55414:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55414:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMathew Musladin was convicted of the murder of Tom Studer. At Musladin's trial, Studer's family wore buttons showing pictures of the victim. Musladin's defense attorney requested that the trial judge tell the family to take off the buttons because they were prejudicial to the defense, but the judge denied the motion. Musladin later appealed his conviction to a state appellate court, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court. The appellate court held that though the buttons were an \"impermissible factor\" and should be discouraged, they were not so prejudicial that he had been denied his Due Process right to a fair trial. Musladin filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, but it was denied. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed the appellate court, and sent the case back the District Court.\nUnder 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1), a provision of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court can grant habeas relief to a defendant convicted in state court only if the state court decision was \"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.\" The Ninth Circuit found that this standard had been met, because the state court decision had been \"objectively unreasonable.\" The Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court should have recognized the buttons as inherently prejudicial to the defense. In addition to Supreme Court precedents, the majority of the Circuit Court panel relied on one of the Circuit's own precedents that specifically dealt with buttons in the courtroom. The dissent argued that this reliance contradicted AEDPA's requirement that habeas courts consider the law \"as determined by the Supreme Court.\" The majority considered the use of the Circuit precedent appropriate because it applied general principles set down by the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55414:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55414:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55414:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of any clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Court did not explicitly say that Circuit Courts cannot cite their own Circuit precedents when granting habeas relief, but the Court only addressed the Supreme Court precedents cited by the Ninth Circuit. Those precedents only dealt with government-sponsored practices that may prejudice a jury, such as forcing a defendant to appear in court wearing prison clothing. The Court's opinion called the issue of spectator conduct, like the kind at issue in Musladin's trial, an \"open question in our jurisprudence.\" Since there was no clearly established federal law on the issue of spectator conduct, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit was wrong to grant habeas relief and overturn Musladin's conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55414:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55415:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55415:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBurton was convicted of burglary, robbery, and rape. Under the standard state sentencing guidelines, the burglary and robbery alone warranted the maximum sentence for a single criminal event. In order to make sure the rape was punished as well, the trial judge added a consecutive sentence for the rape to the standard sentence.\nBurton filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his sentence in federal court. He argued that under Blakely v. Washington, handed down after his conviction, the jury rather than the judge should have decided whether to add the extra sentence. The government argued that the holding in Blakely was a \"new rule.\" Under the Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively. Burton countered that the relevant rule was actually established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, a decision handed down before his conviction became final. Burton also argued that even if Blakely is a new rule, it is essential for a fair trial. New rules that are essential for the fundamental fairness of trials can apply retroactively.\nThe Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Burton. The Appeals Court held that Blakely was a new rule, so it could not be used by Burton in his appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55415:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55415:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55415:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. In a 9-0 per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that Burton's habeas petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Burton had earlier filed a habeas petition challenging his conviction. Four years later, when he filed the habeas petition challenging only his sentence, Burton neglected to obtain the court authorization necessary for a \"second or successive\" petition. The Ninth Circuit had excused Burton's oversight because his first petition was filed before his sentence became final, but the Court held that Burton's second petition was nevertheless a \"second or successive\" petition requiring authorization. Since Burton's petition was invalid, the Justices did not address either of the questions presented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55415:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55417:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55417:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Department of the Interior (DOI) leases the rights to the mining of natural resources on federal lands to private companies like BP America Production (BP) in return for royalty payments. BP obtained a lease for the mining of coalbed methane gas, a natural gas that requires removal of excess carbon dioxide from the gas in order to make in marketable. In 1996, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the DOI issued an administrative order clarifying that the companies themselves must bear the full cost of removing the carbon dioxide. BP had been deducting the removal cost from its royalty payments, so the MMS ordered BP to pay more than $4 million in past royalites. BP cited 28 U.S.C. Section 2415(a), which establishes a six-year statute of limitations for government actions for monetary damages. BP argued that the government could not claim past royalties from more than six years before the 1996 administrative order, because the six-year time limit had expired.\nThe DOI Assistant Secretary rejected BP's arguments and ruled for the government. A District Court affirmed the decision, ruling that an agency administrative order was not a government action for monetary damages, so the statute of limitations did not apply. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the lower court's ruling. The Circuit Court ruled that the government would have had to file a complaint in court in order for the statute of limitations to take effect; an agency administrative order did not activate the time limit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55417:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55417:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55417:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled 7-0 that \"the 6-year statute of limitations in 2415(a) applies only to court actions and not to the administrative proceedings involved in this case.\" The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito relied on the plain meaning of the language in Section 2415(a). The statute used the terms \"action\" and \"complaint\" when referring to the statute of limitations. The Court held that these terms, when used by themselves, refer only to judicial proceedings, not administrative ones. Additionally, the Court noted that statutes of limitations on government actions are normally construed in favor of the government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55417:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55418:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55418:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLuis Duenas-Alvarez, a Peruvian citizen living in California, was convicted of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows for the deportation of aliens who are convicted of an aggravated felony, which includes \"theft offenses.\" The Department of Homeland Security began deportation proceedings against Duenas-Alvarez. An immigration judge ruled in favor of the government and ordered Duenas-Alvarez deported to Peru, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.\nOn appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Duenas-Alvarez argued that he was not guilty of a theft offense for purposes of the INA because he had only aided and abetted the theft of the car. The California anti-theft law did not distinguish between auto-theft and merely aiding an auto-theft, but the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the INA \"theft offense\" includes only the person who actually stole and took possession of the car, and not necessarily anyone who aided in the theft. Accordingly, the Circuit Court ruled in favor of Duenas-Alvarez and reversed the lower courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55418:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55418:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55418:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court ruled unanimously that aiding and abetting a theft qualifies as a \"theft offense\" for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the common law had done away with all distinctions between \"principals\" and \"aiders and abettors\" of theft crimes. Duenas-Alvarez argued that California's theft law was unique in that it included offenses beyond the \"generic theft\" contemplated by the Immigration and Nationality Act. However, the Court's analysis of California case law led it to the conclusion that California's law, like those of other states, encompassed the generic definition of theft. Because Duenas-Alvarez had not raised the issue in the Questions Presented, the Court refused to consider whether the California theft law included the less severe theft crime of joyriding, which might not fall under \"generic theft\" for purposes of the INA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55418:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55419:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55419:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPat Osborn, an employee of a private contractor for the U.S. Forest Service, sued Barry Haley, an employee of the Forest Service, in state court. Osborn alleged that Haley had influenced her employer to fire her. Under the Westfall Act, federal employees are immune from such lawsuits if the employee acts \"within the scope of his employment.\" If the Attorney General certifies that the employee acted within his scope, the case can be transferred to federal court and the United States can be substituted for the employee as the defendant. The government conceded that if Osborn's version of events were correct, Haley would have been outside his scope. Nevertheless, the government certified that Haley was within his scope, because it denied that Haley had any role in Osborn's firing.\nThe government brought the case to federal District Court, but the court decided that it lacked the authority to settle the factual dispute at the root of the Attorney General's certification. Instead, the court assumed that Osborn's account was true, ruled that Haley had been outside the scope of his employment by influencing Haley's firing, and sent the case back to state court.\nThe government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the lower court. The Circuit Court ruled that the Westfall Act gives the courts power to settle factual disputes over the incident at issue in a lawsuit, even if the dispute is over whether or not the incident happened at all. The Sixth Circuit also ruled that the District Court should not have sent the case back to state court, because the Westfall Act gives the federal courts jurisdiction over the case even after the federal District Court finds that the Attorney General was wrong to certify the federal employee.\nOsborn appealed to the Supreme Court, which instructed the parties to submit briefs on the additional question of whether the Westfall Act gives a Court of Appeals the authority to review a District Court's order remanding a case back to state court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55419:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55419:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55419:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes to all. In a 7-2 decision, the Court upheld the Sixth Circuit and ruled that \"Westfall Act certification is proper when a federal officer charged with misconduct asserts, and the Attorney General concludes, that the incident or episode in suit never occurred.\" The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the Act would be ineffective at shielding federal employees from suit if the government were required to accept for immunity purposes the plaintiff's allegation that the event in question occurred. The Court also rejected Osborn's jurisdictional arguments. Relying on the Westfall Act's provision that certification from the Attorney General \"shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal,\" the Court held that after the Attorney General's certification federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, even if the federal court eventually finds the certification invalid. In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) removed the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to review the District Court's order sending the case back to state court. The majority held that 1447(d) did not apply to orders based on findings of invalid certification.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55419:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55421:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55421:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA 1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act created the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program (PSD), which requires power companies that want to make emissions-increasing modifications to their facilities to first apply for permits. Between 1988 and 2000, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) made twenty-nine extensive improvements to its power plants without obtaining PSD permits. When the government, along with Environmental Defense and several other environmental groups, sued Duke, the company pointed to a PSD regulation explicitly defining \"modification\" for purposes of PSD as any change that increases the hourly rate of emissions from a facility. Duke's improvements increased the number of hours the plants remained open, and therefore also increased the total annual emissions from the plants. But since the improvements left the hourly rate of emissions unchanged, Duke argued that it did not have to obtain PSD permits. The government countered by citing the Environmental Protection Agency's current interpretation of the PSD regulations, which holds that a power company making improvements that increase the hours of operation of its plants does need to obtain a permit in all cases where construction is involved.\nThe District Court ruled in favor of Duke. The judge refused to rely on the EPA's current interpretation, ruling that it was inconsistent with the wording of the PSD regulations. Environmental Defense appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's decision. The Fourth Circuit pointed out that the 1977 PSD amendment had taken its definition of \"modification\" directly from a 1975 Clean Air Act amendment concerning the New Source Performance Standards program (NSPS). In the 1975 amendment, the term \"modification\" explicitly excluded improvements that merely increase the hours of operation of a facility. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held, the EPA did not have statutory authority to interpret \"modification\" differently for the PSD program. Environmental Defense appealed to the Supreme Court, with the added argument that the Fourth Circuit never should have heard the case, because challenges to Clean Air Act regulations can only be brought in the D.C. Cricuit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55421:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55421:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55421:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered and No. In a unanimous opinion by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the EPA need not interpret \"modification\" in PSD regulations the same way the term is interpreted in NSPS regulations. The Court's opinion acknowledged that two occurrences of the same term - sharing the same definition - are normally given the same meaning. However, the word \"modification\" and its definition appear in the context of two broad, open-ended grants of regulatory authority to the EPA. The Court held that \"EPA's construction need do no more than fall within the limits of what is reasonable, as set by the Act's common definition.\" The Court concluded that differing circumstances involved in regulating under the PSD provisions as opposed to the NSPS provisions may well necessitate giving a different meaning to the term \"modification\" as it appears in each.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55421:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55422:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55422:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHarvey Robbins owned a private dude ranch which was intermingled with federal lands. The previous owner had granted the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) right-of-way across the private land, but after Robbins bought the ranch he refused to re-grant it. Robbins alleged that BLM officials harassed him with threats and meritless criminal charges, with the aim of forcing him to grant the government right-of-way. Robbins sued the BLM officials for extortion in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). He also brought a Bivens action (an action seeking monetary damages from a federal agent for a constitutional violation). Robbins argued that the Fifth Amendment protects a \"right to exclude\" government officials from one's property, and that the BLM agents had retaliated against him for his exercise of this right. The District Court dismissed both claims, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the government argued that the BLM officials, while acting on behalf of the government, had qualified immunity and therefore could not be sued for extortion under RICO. The government also claimed that no Bivens action could be brought, because review of the BLM's actions was already available under the Administrative Procedure Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55422:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55422:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55422:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, unanswered, and no. The Court ruled 7-2 that \"neither Bivens nor RICO gives Robbins a cause of action,\" so he could not sue the government for retaliation. In an opinion by Justice David Souter, the Court declined to extend the availability of Bivens actions to cases of retaliation for the exercise of the right to exclude the government from one's property. The Court noted that Robbins had other administrative and judicial remedies for the government's various violations, though it acknowledged that these amounted to a difficult-to-use \"patchwork.\" Because of the impossibly of devising a framework to separate constitutional violations from government actions that are merely borderline improper, the Court would not add a Bivens remedy to landowners' toolkit. The government can be expected to engage in some hardball tactics during land negotiations, the majority held, and inviting an \"onslaught of Bivens actions\" in an effort to counter the occasional overreach would be a \"cure [...] worse than the disease.\" Robbins's RICO claim failed as well, because extortion has not normally been understood to encompass the actions of government officials seeking to obtain property for the government rather than for themselves. The Court called the cases that Robbins cited in favor of his claim obscure and off-point.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55422:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55423:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55423:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPrior to declaring bankruptcy, Pacific Gas & Electric company (PG & E) purchased surety bonds from Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America (Travelers). These bonds obliged Travelers to settle debts PG & E couldn't repay. When PG & E went bankrupt, Travelers hired attorneys to protect its interests. State law mandated that PG & E cover all attorney fees incurred by Travelers during state bankruptcy proceedings. The litigation later moved to federal court. PG & E refused to pay for Travelers's expenditures in federal court, claiming responsibility only for fees incurred during state proceedings.\nThe Bankruptcy Court denied Travelers's request for reimbursement because the precedents of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that only federal laws could ensure payment for federal litigation. PG & E was only under contractual and legal obligation to pay for state-court attorney fees. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit denied Travelers's claim on the same grounds. Travelers appealed to the Supreme Court, citing inconsistent rulings among the Circuit Courts of Appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55423:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55423:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55423:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Samuel Alito issued the unanimous opinion, which found that the Bankruptcy Code did not expressly waive the contractual obligation to reimburse attorney fees even if incurred in federal litigation. Because the Bankruptcy Code \"says nothing about unsecured claims for contractual attorney's fees incurred while litigating issues of bankruptcy law,\" the Court could \"presume that claims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed.\" Since none of the nine exemptions waiving contractual obligation to reimburse attorney fees set forth in 11 U.S.C. Section 502(b) applied to Travelers, nothing undermined the debtor's contractual or state-law obligation to pay.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55423:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55424:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55424:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGovernor Camacho of Guam sought to borrow over $400 million through the issuance of bonds. Guam Attorney General Moylan argued that the bond issuance violated the Guam Organic Act, a federal law governing the Territory of Guam. The Organic Act sets the limit for government borrowing to 10% of the \"aggregate tax valuation of the property on Guam.\" The Governor asked the Supreme Court of Guam for a decision on the disputed text. The Guam legislature had interpreted the phrase \"aggregate tax valuation\" to mean the assessed value of property on Guam for purposes of taxation. However, the Guam Supreme Court declined to follow the legislature's interpretation and ruled that the \"aggregate tax valuation\" was equivalent to the full appraised value of property on Guam. Under that interpretation, the debt-limit would be about $1.1 billion.\nThe Attorney General appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While the case was pending, Congress passed a law allowing parties to appeal directly from the Guam Supreme Court to the U.S. Supreme Court. When the Ninth Circuit declined to hear the case, Moylan appealed to the Supreme Court. Normally parties must seek Supreme Court review within 90 days of a lower court's decision, but the case had been pending before the Ninth Circuit for two years. The Supreme Court directed the parties to argue the question of whether the time the case was pending before the Ninth Circuit counted toward the time limit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55424:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55424:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55424:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. The Court agreed unanimously that the time the case was pending in the Ninth Circuit did not count toward the 90-day time limit for Supreme Court appeals, though this ruling was limited to the \"unique procedural circumstances\" presented by the case. On question of the interpretation of \"tax valuation\" in the Organic Act of Guam, the Court split 5-4. The majority opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas held that, contrary to the Guam Supreme Court's interpretation, the phrase must mean the assessed value for tax purposes of property on Guam. \"The word 'tax' modifies 'valuation,' not 'property,'\" the Court reasoned, so \"tax valuation\" \"refers to the type of valuation to be conducted, not the object that is valued.\" The dissenting Justices argued that deciding the case on the basis of textual analysis and comparison to state debt limitations would amount to a \"coin toss.\" In the dissenters' view, Congress's purpose was to set a \"hard cap\" on debt, which would indicate that the debt limitation should be based on the full market (appraised) value of property on Guam rather than dependent on the changeable assessment rate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55424:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55425:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55425:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, Congress passed and the President signed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. The controversial concept of partial-birth abortion is defined in the Act as any abortion in which the death of the fetus occurs when \"the entire fetal head [...] or [...] any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother.\" Dr. Leroy Carhart and other physicians who perform late-term abortions sued to stop the Act from going into effect. The plaintiffs argued that the Act could apply to a more common abortion procedure known as \"D&E\" (\"dilation and evacuation\"), as well as to the less common \"intact D&E,\" sometimes called D&X (\"dilation and extraction\"). With this application the Act would ban most late-term abortions and thus be an unconstitutional \"undue burden\" on the right to an abortion, as defined by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The plaintiffs also argued that the Act's lack of an exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, regardless of Congress's finding in the Act that partial-birth abortions are never medically necessary.\nA federal District Court agreed and ruled the Act unconstitutional on both grounds. The government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The government argued that the Act only bans a narrow category of abortion procedures, and that a health exception is not required when Congress determines that a banned abortion procedure is never necessary for the health of the mother. The Eighth Circuit disagreed and upheld the District Court, ruling that a health exception is required for all bans on abortion procedures when \"substantial medical authority\" supports the necessity of the procedure. The Circuit Court ruled that the ongoing disagreement among medical experts over the necessity of intact D&E abortions was sufficient to establish that the Act was unconstitutional without a health exception. The Circuit Court did not reach the question of whether the Act was so broad as to qualify as an unconstitutional \"undue burden.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55425:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55425:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55425:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled by a 5-4 vote that Congress's ban on partial-birth abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and did not impose an undue burden on the right to an abortion. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority. The Court held that, under the most reasonable interpretation, the Act applies only to the intact D&E method (also known as \"partial-birth abortion\") and not to the more common D&E procedure. The Act's application was limited by provisions that restrict enforcement to cases where the physician intends to perform an intact D&E and delivers the still-living fetus past specific \"anatomical landmarks.\" Because the majority found that the Act applies only to a specific method of abortion, it held that the ban was not unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, or an undue burden on the decision to obtain an abortion. The Court also held that Congress, after finding intact D&E never to be medically necessary, could validly omit a health exception from the ban, even when \"some part of the medical community\" considers the procedure necessary. To require the exception whenever \"medical uncertainty\" exists would be \"too exacting a standard to impose on the legislative power [...] to regulate the medical profession.\" The Court left open the possibility that an as-applied challenge could be brought against the Act if it were ever applied in a situation in which an intact D&E was necessary to preserve a woman's health. Justice Ginsburg's dissent disputed the majority's claim that the opinion was consistent with the Casey and Stenberg precedents and said \"The Court's hostility to the right Roe and Casey secured is not concealed.\"\nLearn more about the Supreme Court and abortion law in Body Politic, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55425:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55426:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55426:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn No. 06-100, Edo, a consumer, sued GEICO General Insurance Company, alleging that GEICO had violated the requirement in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) that insurance companies give consumers notice before raising rates. Edo sought statutory and punitive damages, which the FCRA awards only when a company \"willfully\" violates the law. Similarly, in 06-84, several consumers sued Safeco for failing to notify them that better credit ratings would have entitled them to better premiums. It was GEICO's policy to notify new applicants only if their credit ratings were worse than a certain \"neutral\" (average) value, while Safeco as a matter of policy did not give \"adverse action\" notices to any new applicants. GEICO argued that it was unaware that the FCRA applied to the setting of premiums for new applicants such as Edo, and thus could not be considered to have acted willfully. The District Court ruled for GEICO and Safeco, holding that their actions did not qualify as willful.\nOn appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that that the concept of willfulness includes \"reckless disregard\" for the law as well as actual knowledge that the conduct was illegal. The ruling put the Ninth Circuit in conflict with most other circuit courts, but the court argued that its interpretation was more consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the purpose of the FCRA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55426:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55426:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55426:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that insurance companies can be liable for willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act if they show \"reckless disregard\" for the law. The justices held that the meaning of the term \"willful\" is contextually determined. Under the common law reckless violations are considered willful violations, and the term is given its common meaning unless Congress intended to change it. The Court called the evidence of such an intent \"shaky,\" and it pointed to another section of the statute which indicated that Congress was treating \"knowing\" and \"reckless\" violations as subcategories of \"willful\" violations. Though GEICO and Safeco lost on the issue of the meaning of \"willful,\" the Court held that neither company had acted with reckless disregard. GEICO's policy - giving adverse action notices to new applicants only where they were likely to make a difference - was a correct interpretation of the statute. Though Safeco was in violation, its error was neither reckless nor willful.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55426:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55427:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55427:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Department of Education certified that the state of New Mexico equalizes educational expenditures among school districts. The certification of equalization allowed New Mexico to offset its funding of districts located on Indian Reservations by a proportion of the federal Impact Aid payments made to those districts. Zuni Public School District objected to the certification, arguing that the Department had not followed the statutory formula for determining that a state's expenditures are equalized. Outlier school districts falling above the 95th or below the 5th percentile in per-pupil expenditures were excluded from consideration when the Department determined equalization. The Department calculated these percentiles based on the total student population, but Zuni argued that 20 U.S.C. Section 7709 had repealed that policy.\nAn administrative judge dismissed Zuni's complaint, and the Secretary of Education affirmed on the ground that the law was ambiguous. A divided panel of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the Secretary's decision as a valid interpretation of the statute. In a rehearing by the entire Circuit Court, the 12 judges split evenly, again upholding the ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55427:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55427:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55427:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court voted 5-4 in favor of the Department of Education, affirming the lower court. In his majority opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer agreed with the Secretary of Education's argument that 20 U.S.C. 7709 was ambiguous on the specific formula to be used. Since administrative agencies have wide latitude to interpret their governing statutes, the Court gave deference to the Secretary's formula for calculating the 5th and 95th percentiles for the purpose of determining expenditure equalization. The majority concluded that \"[...] the history of the statute strongly supports the Secretary.\" No member of Congress had expressed an opinion on the formula to be used, so the Department would have been free to calculate the percentiles using either formula. In response to Zuni's statutory-language based argument, the Court ruled that the statute's phrasing could encompass the Secretary's method of calculating excluded districts based on per-pupil expenditure percentiles of the total student population. The four dissenting Justices argued that the statute required the Secretary to calculate the percentiles based on a comparison of the per-pupil expenditures of the districts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55427:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55428:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55428:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contended that Elmer and Dorothy Cullers had established a trust for the purpose of evading taxes. The IRS filed tax liens against the trust, freezing the trustees' assets until the outstanding taxes were paid. The trustees disagreed with the IRS, but opened a bank account to settle the tax dispute. A month later, the IRS collected the outstanding taxes from the bank account. EC Term of Years Trust sued the IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7426, which entitles trustees to challenge wrongful IRS collections, and 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), which entitles taxpayers to recover erroneously collected taxes. A district court decided that only 26 U.S.C. 7426 allowed third-party tax recoveries, so the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), the general provision for tax recovery. The court dismissed the 26 U.S.C. 7426 claim because the nine-month filing time limit had expired. EC Trust claimed in a second suit that the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Williams meant that the possibility of a suit under 26 U.S.C. 7426 did not preclude suits under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1). The District Court rejected the argument, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55428:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55428:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55428:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision written by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that \"Resisting the force of the better-fitted statute [28 U.S.C. 7426] requires a good countervailing reason, and none appears here.\" The Court held that Section 7426 is the exclusive legal vehicle for challenging a wrongful tax levy, so after having missed the deadline EC Term of Years Trust could not bring its suit as a tax refund claim under 1346(a)(1). The Court acknowledged that in United States v. Williams it had allowed liens to be challenged under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), but the Court held that the principle in Williams was limited to cases in which there is no other remedy available. The Justices ruled that it would not make sense to allow claims under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), which has a 9-month limitations period, to be duplicated under 26 U.S.C. 7426, which has a time limit of four years.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55428:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55429:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55429:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOver her nineteen-year career at Goodyear Tire, Lilly Ledbetter was consistently given low rankings in annual performance-and-salary reviews and low raises relative to other employees. Ledbetter sued Goodyear for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the company had given her a low salary because of her gender. A jury found for Ledbetter and awarded her over $3.5 million, which the district judge later reduced to $360,000.\nGoodyear appealed, citing a Title VII provision that requires discrimination complaints to made within 180 days of the employer's discriminatory conduct. The jury had examined Ledbetter's entire career for evidence of discrimination, but Goodyear argued that the jury should only have considered the one annual salary review that had occurred within the 180-day limitations period before Ledbetter's complaint.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court, but without adopting Goodyear's position entirely. Instead the Circuit Court ruled that the jury could only examine Ledbetter's career for evidence of discrimination as far back as the last annual salary review before the start of the 180-day limitations period. The Circuit Court ruled that the fact that Ledbetter was getting a low salary during the 180 days did not justify the evaluation of Goodyear's decisions over Ledbetter's entire career. Instead, only those annual reviews that could have affected Ledbetter's payment during the 180 days could be evaluated. The Circuit Court found no evidence of discrimination in those reviews, so it reversed the District Court and dismissed Ledbetter's complaint.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55429:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55429:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55429:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. By a 5-4 vote the Court ruled that Ledbetter's claim was time-barred by Title VII's limitations period. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito held that \"current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination.\" For a timely claim, Ledbetter would have needed to file within 180 days of a discriminatory salary decision; the Court did not consider it significant that paychecks she received during the 180 days prior to her claim were affected by the past discrimination. Discriminatory intent is a crucial element of a Title VII disparate-treatment claim, the Court held, but each instance of Goodyear's discriminatory intent fell outside the limitations period. The majority noted that the short time limit was enacted to ensure quick resolution of pay discrimination disputes, which can become more difficult to defend against as time passes. To adopt Ledbetter's argument would be to allow even \"discriminatory pay decision[s] made 20 years ago\" to be the subject of Title VII claims. In dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg called the majority's ruling out of tune with the realities of wage discrimination and \"a cramped interpretation of Title VII, incompatible with the statute's broad remedial purpose.\" She suggested that \"the Legislature may act to correct this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55429:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55430:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55430:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress passed the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in 1995 in an effort to cut down on frivolous lawsuits by prisoners. Under the PLRA, before bringing a federal civil rights suit a prisoner must go through his prison's internal complaint process. Only after exhausting all of these \"administrative remedies\" can the prisoner bring the complaint to federal court.\nLorenzo Jones sustained serious injuries in a car accident while in custody. He sued prison officials in federal court, claiming that they were violating his Eighth Amendment rights by making him do arduous work despite his injuries. The officials moved to dismiss the suit, because Jones had not provided any evidence or description of the administrative remedies he claimed to have pursued. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the suit.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court ruled that in order for Jones to sue, he would have had to provide the court with copies of his grievance forms or at least describe the administrative processes he had exhausted. The Circuit Court further ruled that the PLRA requires \"total exhaustion,\" which means that if a prisoner's suit has multiple claims, administrative remedies must have been exhausted for each and every claim.\nThe Supreme Court accepted review in order to resolve the conflict between Circuit Courts over which side bears the burden of proving exhaustion of administrative remedies.\nIn Williams v. Overton, Timothy Williams suffered from a medical condition which caused tumor growth and disfigurement in his arm. He claimed that prison officials were violating his rights by ignoring his medical needs. Williams's complaint had two claims: he needed additional surgery on his arm and a single-occupancy, handicapped-accessible cell. Williams went through the administrative remedial process on both grievances and both claims were denied. Williams then sued in federal court.\nThe District Court dismissed the suit, because Williams had neglected to name any prison officials as defendants in his medical complaint. Therefore, the court ruled, the administrative remedies for that claim could not be considered to have been exhausted.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, ruling that \"The prisoner must demonstrate that he has exhausted the administrative remedies with respect to each individual he intends to sue.\" The Circuit Court also ruled that the PLRA requires \"total exhaustion,\" which meant that Williams's entire suit was dismissed because of his unexhausted medical claim, even though the administrative remedies for his request for a new cell had been exhausted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55430:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55430:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55430:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo to all. The Court ruled unanimously that the Sixth Circuit's rules for exhaustion of administrative remedies were not required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts held that prisoners bring civil rights lawsuits do not need to demonstrate that they have already exhausted all administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit had assumed that Congress had intended to put the burden on the plaintiff, but the Court ruled that an explicit statement by Congress would have been required. The Justices also held that when a court is presented with a suit with both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the court can let the exhausted claims proceed rather than dismissing the entire suit. The Court rejected the argument that the statute's use of the word \"action\" instead of \"claim\" indicated that the entire suit should be dismissed. The opinion explained that Congress was merely using \"boilerplate language.\" Finally, the Court ruled that the PLRA did not require a prisoner to name each defendant in his administrative grievance in order to name the defendant in his subsequent lawsuit. By imposing these extraneous rules, the Sixth Circuit had exceeded its legitimate authority over the management of its docket.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55430:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55432:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55432:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLaRoyce Smith was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. In 2004, the Supreme Court overturned his death sentence and sent the case back to state court because of a judge's improper jury instruction. (See Smith v. Texas , No. 04-5323.) Nevertheless, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals re-imposed the sentence, holding that the erroneous instruction had not done any \"egregious harm\" to the fairness of Smith's sentencing. The Texas court found that the jury had still been able to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, despite the unconstitutional instruction. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case a second time.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55432:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55432:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55432:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered and no. The Court ruled 5-4 that the jury instructions did not give meaningful effect to Smith's mitigating evidence, and that a subsequent corrective instruction was not sufficient to correct the error. The Texas court had ruled that because Smith had abandoned his objection to the instructions in the course of the proceedings, he must show that \"egregious harm\" had been done to his trial. The Court criticized the Fifth Circuit for misreading the record and the Court's instructions: \"The requirement that Smith show egregious harm was predicated, [...] on a misunderstanding of the federal right Smith asserts [...]\" Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55432:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55433:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55433:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed over $20,000 in interest fees for outstanding taxes against John and Pamela Hinck. The Hincks claimed that the interest accrued because of IRS delays and errors. Section 6404(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the abatement of interest fees that are caused by IRS delays. The IRS rejected the Hincks' interest abatement claim in 2000. In 2003, the United States Court of Federal Claims determined that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case because Section 6404(h) of the Internal Revenue Code granted the United States Tax Court jurisdiction over interest abatement disputes.\nThe Hincks appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Tucker Act granted subject matter jurisdiction to the Federal Claims Court. The Federal Circuit held that Section 6404(h) grants the Tax Court exclusive jurisdiction over interest abatement disputes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had previously ruled to the contrary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55433:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55433:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55433:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote for a unanimous court that Section 6404(e)(1) requires that claims challenging a refusal to abate (i.e. forgive) interest be brought exclusively in Tax Court. The Court reasoned that its ruling was consistent with the principle that when Congress enacts a detailed, specific judicial remedy (such as 6404(e)(1)) where there was no remedy before, the new remedy will be regarded as exclusive. The Court insisted on reading the statute as a unified whole, so that all of the procedures outlined by Congress for interest abatement claims applied exclusively to the forum (U.S. Tax Court) that Congress mentioned in the same statute. To do otherwise would be to \"disaggregat[e] a statute Congress plainly envisioned as a package deal.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55433:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55434:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55434:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSorrell, an employee of Norfolk Southern Railway, crashed his company truck while swerving to avoid another company truck. Sorrell suffered injuries and sued Norfolk Southern for damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). Both Sorrell and the railroad had been negligent in the incident to some extent. Norfolk Southern argued that under the FELA, the \"causation standard\" - the standard for assigning the blame for an incident - was the same for both the employee and the railroad. According to Norfolk Southern, any damages awarded to Sorrell for the railroad's negligence had to be reduced by the amount of the damages that was attributable to Sorrell's own negligence. (If Sorrell was 60% responsible for the accident, for example, the damages would be reduced by 60%.)\nThe trial ruled instead that the causation standards were different: the railroad was responsible for any negligence that contributed to the accident, but the employee was only responsible for negligence that directly caused damage. Under this more lenient standard for employee negligence, the trial court awarded Sorrell $1.5 million.\nThe Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The Missouri Supreme Court declined to hear the case, but the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55434:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55434:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55434:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled unanimously that the causation standard for employee negligence is the same as the standard for railroad negligence. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts held that \"the common law applied the same causation standard to defendant and plaintiff negligence, and FELA did not expressly depart from that approach.\" In the absence of any explicit indication from the text of FELA, the Court relied on common law principles of negligence. The Court held that Congress had most likely intended for juries to compare each party's contribution under the same standard - a simple \"apples to apples\" comparison. The Court ruled only that the causation standards were the same; it declined to rule on the question of what the standard of causation should be.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55434:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55435:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55435:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral plaintiffs brought a class action securities fraud lawsuit against Tellabs, Inc., a manufacturer of equipment for fiber optic cable networks. The plaintiffs alleged that Tellabs had misrepresented the strength of its products and earnings in order to conceal the declining value of the company's stock. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), plaintiffs bringing securities fraud complaints must allege specific facts that give rise to a \"strong inference\" that the defendant intended to deceive investors (scienter).\nThe District Court dismissed the complaints. The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were too vague to establish a \"strong inference\" of scienter on the part of Tellabs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed one of the lower court's dismissals. The Seventh Circuit ruled that a plaintiff need only allege \"acts from which, if true, a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent.\" The Court of Appeals decided to consider only the plausibility of the inference of a guilty mental state, and not any competing inferences of an innocent mental state. This decision was due in part to the court's concern that weighing competing inferences was more properly the task of a jury. The Seventh Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other Courts of Appeals, which required plaintiffs to show that the inference of scienter supported by the alleged facts was more plausible than any competing inference of innocent intent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55435:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55435:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55435:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court ruled by a vote of 8-1 that a securities fraud complaint must allege facts establishing an inference of guilty intent that is \"cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.\" Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that opinion for the Court, which held that the Seventh Circuit's more relaxed standard was not strong enough to comport with Congress's intent in PSLRA to limit securities fraud litigation. \"The strength of an inference cannot be decided in a vacuum. The inquiry is inherently comparative [...],\" the Court ruled. A court must consider each plausible inference of intent, both fraudulent and nonfraudulent, and then decide whether a reasonable person would consider the guilty inference \"at least as strong as any opposing inference.\" The lower court need not have worried about impinging on the jury's prerogatives, because it is the role of judges to decide whether there exists an issue for the jury to hear, and the role a the jury to evaluate the issue. Two concurring Justices, Antonin Scalia and Samuel A. Alito Jr., argued that the phrase \"strong inference\" required that the inference of fraudulent intent be stronger than the competing inferences, while Justice John Paul Stevens's lone dissent argued for a more plaintiff-friendly probable-cause standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55435:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55436:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55436:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBrad Hanson worked as State Office Manager for U.S. Senator Mark Dayton. Shortly after Hanson took medical leave for a heart problem, Dayton fired him. Hanson sued under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, claiming that Dayton had discriminated against him based on a perceived disability. Dayton filed a motion to have the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He argued that he was immunized from the suit by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution (\"for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.\") Dayton claimed that because Hanson's duties were directly related to Dayton's legislative functions, the decision to fire him could not be challenged. The District Court denied the motion.\nOverturning its own precedent, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the Speech or Debate Clause does not bar the suit. The clause can be invoked to exclude evidence that would involve legislative acts, but the D.C. Circuit ruled that it is not a blanket ban on suits involving legislative employees. The employee would simply have to make his case without questioning legislative acts or motivations for legislative acts. Senator Dayton appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Accountability Act requires the Court to hear the appeal. He also argued that Hanson's suit should be dismissed because the case had become moot after Dayton retired from the Senate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55436:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55436:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55436:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered, no, and unanswered. The Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear Senator Dayton's appeal and dismissed the case without reaching the merits. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion for the 8-0 Court. The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 only authorizes direct Supreme Court appeal of rulings \"upon the constitutionality\" of the statute. The Justices held that the decisions of the lower courts (holding that Hanson's suit should not be dismissed under the Speech or Debate Clause) did not qualify as rulings on the constitutional validity of the Act. They were better characterized as rulings on the Act's scope. Direct appeal was therefore not authorized by the Act, and the Court declined to grant certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55436:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55437:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55437:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt a school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the message \"Bong Hits 4 Jesus,\" a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days. She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Frederick sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the federal civil rights statute, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found no constitutional violation and ruled in favor of Morse. The court held that even if there were a violation, the principal had qualified immunity from lawsuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , which extended First Amendment protection to student speech except where the speech would cause a disturbance. Because Frederick was punished for his message rather than for any disturbance, the Circuit Court ruled, the punishment was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the principal had no qualified immunity, because any reasonable principal would have known that Morse's actions were unlawful.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55437:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55437:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55437:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and not reached. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by a 5-4 vote, ruling that school officials can prohibit students from displaying messages that promote illegal drug use. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that although students do have some right to political speech even while in school, this right does not extend to pro-drug messages that may undermine the school's important mission to discourage drug use. The majority held that Frederick's message, though \"cryptic,\" was reasonably interpreted as promoting marijuana use - equivalent to \"[Take] bong hits\" or \"bong hits [are a good thing].\" In ruling for Morse, the Court affirmed that the speech rights of public school students are not as extensive as those adults normally enjoy, and that the highly protective standard set by Tinker would not always be applied. In concurring opinions, Justice Thomas expressed his view that the right to free speech does not apply to students and his wish to see Tinker overturned altogether, while Justice Alito stressed that the decision applied only to pro-drug messages and not to broader political speech. The dissent conceded that the principal should have had immunity from the lawsuit, but argued that the majority opinion was \"[...] deaf to the constitutional imperative to permit unfettered debate, even among high-school students [...].\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55437:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55438:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55438:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, Congress passed and the President signed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. The controversial concept of partial-birth abortion is defined in the Act as any abortion in which the death of the fetus occurs when \"the entire fetal head [...] or [...] any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother.\"\nPlanned Parenthood sued the Attorney General of the United States, arguing that the Act was unconstitutional under the right to an abortion protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases. The District Court agreed and stopped the Act from going into effect.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Though the government claimed that the Act banned only a narrow, rare category of abortions, the Circuit Court ruled that the Act applied to the common abortion procedure known as \"D&E\" (\"dilation and evacuation\"), as well as to the far less common \"intact D&E,\" sometimes called \"D&X\" (\"dilation and extraction\"). This made the ban expansive enough to qualify as an unconstitutional \"undue burden\" on the right to abortion, as defined in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.\nThe Ninth Circuit also ruled that the Act's lack of an exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it unconstitutional. Congress had included in the Act a finding that partial-birth abortions were never medically necessary, but the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart required the health exception in all cases where medical opinion on the necessity an abortion procedure is divided.\nFinally, the Circuit Court ruled that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, because the inclusion of ambiguous statutory terms such as \"partial-birth abortion\" would prevent physicians from knowing which methods of abortion were covered. The Circuit Court determined that the proper course of action was to block enforcement of the entire Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55438:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55438:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55438:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled by a 5-4 vote that Congress's ban on partial-birth abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and did not impose an undue burden on the right to an abortion. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority. The Court held that, under the most reasonable interpretation, the Act applies only to the intact D&E method (also known as \"partial-birth abortion\") and not to the more common D&E procedure. The Act's application was limited by provisions that restrict enforcement to cases where the physician intends to perform an intact D&E and delivers the still-living fetus past specific \"anatomical landmarks.\" Because the majority found that the Act applies only to a specific method of abortion, it held that the ban was not unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, or an undue burden on the decision to obtain an abortion. The Court also held that Congress, after finding intact D&E never to be medically necessary, could validly omit a health exception from the ban, even when \"some part of the medical community\" considers the procedure necessary. To require the exception whenever \"medical uncertainty\" exists would be \"too exacting a standard to impose on the legislative power [...] to regulate the medical profession.\" The Court left open the possibility that an as-applied challenge could be brought against the Act if it were ever applied in a situation in which an intact D&E was necessary to preserve a woman's health. Justice Ginsburg's dissent disputed the majority's claim that the opinion was consistent with the Casey and Stenberg precedents and said \"The Court's hostility to the right Roe and Casey secured is not concealed.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55438:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55439:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55439:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress declared that payphone service providers (PSPs) must be compensated for every completed call using their payphones. Previously, PSPs were not compensated for coinless \"dial-around\" long-distance calls in which the caller pays a long distance carrier rather than the PSP. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted rules requiring the carriers to pay the PSPs on a per-call basis. Metrophones Telecommunications, a PSP, sued Global Crossing Telecommunications, a long-distance carrier, alleging that Global Crossing had failed to pay for calls placed from Metrophones's payphones.\nThe District Court dismissed Metrophones's first complaint because the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not create a private right of action to recover compensation from long-distance carriers. Metrophones then filed an amended complaint based on Section 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, which deals with \"unjust and unreasonable\" practices of carriers. Global Communications argued that Metrophones had no right to sue under this statute either, but the District Court disagreed and ruled for Metrophones.\nThe Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Circuit Court relied heavily on the FCC's interpretation of the statute, which was that failure to pay compensation to PSPs is an \"unjust and unreasonable\" practice in violation of Section 201(b) and that PSPs have a private right of action to sue carriers for such violations. The Circuit Court held that though the FCC rule on the subject was brief, it was entitled to deference from the courts in the absence of specific guidance from the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55439:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55439:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55439:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court ruled 7-2 that Section 201(b) allows PSPs to sue long distance carriers for \"unjust and unreasonable practices.\" The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the FCC's regulation on the subject was reasonable and therefore entitled to deference. Justice Breyer wrote that \"The [FCC's] determination easily fits within the language of the statutory phrase.\" \"[I]n ordinary English,\" a carrier's refusal to pay compensation for a benefit received from payphone service providers can be said to be an unreasonable practice, the Court ruled. The majority also emphasized the similarities between the FCC's payphone regulation and traditional regulations of transportation communications.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55439:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55440:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55440:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring Chapter 11 liquidation proceedings, Crown Vantage, Inc. (Crown) terminated its employee pension plan and purchased an annuity for the employee participants as a replacement. The participants advocated merging the current plan into a multiemployer PACE International Union (PACE) pension plan but Crown did not investigate the possibility. The participants alleged that Crown breached its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by not acting \"solely in the interests of the participants\" (Section 1104(a)(1)). A bankruptcy court ordered Crown to maintain the plan's funds until they were distributed to the participants.\nA District Court affirmed, finding that Crown failed to consider its employees' interest. Crown appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that it did not consider the PACE plan because Section 4041 of ERISA prevents termination by way of a merger into a multiemployer plan. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court, ruling that ERISA does allow termination by way of a merger into a multiemployer plan.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55440:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55440:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55440:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that \"merger is not a permissible method of terminating a single-employer defined-benefit pension plan.\" Therefore, PACE's argument that Crown was required by ERISA to consider merger as a method of terminating the pension plan was rejected. Since ERISA does not expressly list merger as a method of termination, the Court relied on the view of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) that merger is not covered under the statute's residual clause. This interpretation was supported by the structure of ERISA, which deals with mergers in a separate section.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55440:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55441:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55441:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Washington State jury sentenced Cal Brown to death for murder. Brown protested that unfair jury selection had guaranteed a \"verdict of death.\" One potential juror who expressed willingness to impose the death penalty only in \"severe situations\" was dismissed by the judge for cause. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the dismissal.\nBrown appealed first to a federal district court and then to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ruled that the dismissed juror was not \"substantially impaired\" in his ability to follow the law. Supreme Court precedent required that jurors only be dismissed if their personal views prevent them from performing their duties. The prosecution unsuccessfully petitioned for the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc on the ground that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act required appeals courts to give deference to trial judges' evaluations of jurors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55441:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55441:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55441:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled that appellate courts \"owe deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror.\" Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The substance of the potential juror's comments had indicated confusion over the proper application of Washington's death penalty law, so the trial court had acted reasonably when it found the juror substantially impaired and excused him. The Court held that the trial judge was especially entitled to deference because the trial judge, unlike appellate judges, has access to contextual information that is not reflected in the transcript of the jury selection questioning. The Court also considered it significant that, although the defense counsel vigorously objected to other juror dismissals, he originally made no objection to the dismissal of the juror at issue in the subsequent appeal. Justice John Paul Stevens argued in dissent that \"the Court has fundamentally redefined--or maybe just misunderstood--the meaning of 'substantially impaired,' and, in doing so, has gotten it horribly backwards.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55441:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55443:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55443:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJesse Williams died of lung cancer at age 67 after a life spent smoking three packs of Marlboro cigarettes per day. His widow sued Phillip Morris, the maker of Marlboro cigarettes, alleging that the company had engaged in a deliberate, wide-spread campaign of misinformation on the dangers of smoking. The jury found for Williams and awarded her $821,485.50 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages. However, the trial judge found the punitive damages excessive and reduced them to $32 million.\nUnder the Supreme Court's decision BMW v. Gore, punitive damages must be reasonably related to the harm done to the plaintiff, but larger punitive damage awards may be appropriate if the defendant displayed reprehensible conduct. Citing Gore, the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the $79.5 million award, holding that Phillip Morris's conduct was reprehensible enough to warrant the large amount.\nThe Oregon Supreme Court declined to take the case. However, the U.S. Supreme Court sent the case back for consideration in light of State Farm v. Campbell, which held that punitive damages can normally only be as much as nine times greater than compensatory damages. The Oregon Court of Appeals again affirmed the $79.5 million award, ruling that the reprehensibility of Phillip Morris's conduct justified the larger ratio. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the decision.\nPhillip Morris appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the court had unreasonably exceeded federal guidelines on punitive damages. Phillip Morris also argued that it was unfair to punish the company for its actions toward other smokers who were not parties to the suit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55443:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55443:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55443:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\n1) Unconsidered and 2) no. The Court ruled 5-4 that \"the Constitution's Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties.\" The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that it would be unfair to allow courts to award punitive damages for harm done to \"strangers to the litigation,\" because defendants cannot defend themselves against such limitless and arbitrary charges. The Court did note that \"risk of harm to the general public\" can be taken into account as a component of the reprehensibility of the defendant's actions. Highly reprehensible actions may warrant a larger award of punitive damages, but the award cannot be increased as a direct result of harms inflicted on non-parties. The Court decided not to rule on the question of whether the $79.5 million award was excessive.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55443:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55444:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55444:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBilling and other investors filed a class action lawsuit against Credit Suisse and other Wall Street investment firms. The lawsuit alleged that the firms had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring to drive up the cost of initial public offering (IPO) securities during the stock market boom of the 1990s. The firms allegedly entered into illegal contracts with IPO purchasers, requiring subsequent investors to pay artificially inflated prices for the secutities. Credit Suisse argued that the suit should be dismissed, because the firms had implied antitrust immunity. It claimed that the firms' conduct was normal business practice, and was closely regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. If plaintiffs were able to bring antitrust suits against investment firms for securities violations, Credit Suisse argued, the plaintiffs would be able to subvert the securities laws that Congress intended to govern such suits.\nThe federal District Court agreed with Credit Suisse and dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court and reinstated the suit. The Second Circuit held that there was no evidence that Congress had intended securities laws like the Securities Act of 1933 to foreclose antitrust suits challenging practices like those engaged in by Credit Suisse.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55444:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55444:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55444:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court reversed the Second Circuit and ruled that the applicable securities laws granted the defendant implied antitrust immunity. The 7-1 ruling by Justice Stephen G. Breyer noted four factors indicating that the Securities Act of 1933 foreclosed antitrust lawsuits in cases of alleged artificial inflation of aftermarket IPO share prices. First, the challenged conduct fell within \"an area of conduct squarely within the heartland of securities regulations.\" Second, securities laws gave the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) clear authority to regulate in this area. Third, the SEC in fact actively regulated the challenged conduct. Fourth, overlapping antitrust and securities-law regimes would risk producing \"conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of conduct.\" To allow the blunter instrument of antitrust law to govern the conduct at issue in the case would be to risk chilling legitimate business practices in an area that requires diligent regulation by the SEC to separate disapproved conduct from necessary, approved conduct. In a lone dissent Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the savings clause of the Securities Act - preserving \"[...] any and all other rights and remedies that may exist in law [...] - was broad enough that it preserved the right to sue under antitrust laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55444:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55445:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55445:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJuan Resendiz-Ponce, a Mexican national, was convicted of kidnapping and deported. When Resendiz-Ponce tried to reenter the U.S. using false identification, he was arrested and indicted for attempting to reenter the country after being deported. Resendiz-Ponce moved to dismiss his indictment because it failed to allege that he had \"committed an overt act that was a substantial step toward reentering\" - an essential element of the criminal offense. The trial judge denied the motion and the jury convicted Resendiz- Ponce.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge's decision to deny the motion. The Ninth Circuit ruled that because the indictment failed to explicitly mention that Resendiz-Ponce had physically crossed the border and presented false identification, it was insufficient and should be dismissed. The government argued that the omission was \"harmless error,\" a minor mistake that would not invalidate the indictment, but the Circuit Court ruled that the omission was instead a \"fatal flaw.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55445:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55445:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55445:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. The Court ruled that Resendiz-Ponce's indictment was not defective at all, and thus it did not reach the question of whether a failure to state each element of the charged crime can ever be harmless error. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the indictment's language stating that Resendiz-Ponce had \"attempted\" to illegally reenter the United States was sufficient, even without a more detailed description of his actions. The majority reasoned that \"the word 'attempt' [...] encompasses both the overt act and intent elements.\" Therefore, Resendiz-Ponce's indictment did not lack any essential element of the crime. In a lone dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the word \"attempt\" did not necessarily imply an action that would constitute a \"substantial step\" toward reentering. Justice Scalia would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit and dismissed the indictment as structurally flawed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55445:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55446:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55446:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJeff and Sandee Winkelman claimed that Parma City School District failed to give their disabled son Jacob a \"free appropriate public education\" as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Despite the Winkelmans' opposition, the school district planned to place Jacob in a public elementary school. After a preliminary school district hearing affirmed Jacob's placement, the Winkelmans placed Jacob in a private school at their own expense and petitioned a federal District Court for reimbursement.\nThe District Court ruled for the School District. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the suit because the Winkelmans lacked a lawyer. The Winkelmans argued that according to the IDEA, \"any party aggrieved by the findings\" of a preliminary school district hearing may appeal in a federal court. Also, because the IDEA demands active parental involvement in order to enforce proper child placement, the parent should be able to appear in court \"pro se\" - without a lawyer. The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments and held that the IDEA does not establish any right of a non-lawyer parent to represent his disabled child in federal court. Non-lawyer parents cannot represent themselves either, the Circuit Court ruled, because the IDEA protects the rights of the child, not the parents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55446:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55446:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55446:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit by a 7-2 vote, ruling that \"[p]arents enjoy rights under IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf.\" Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion held that since the IDEA gives parents enforceable rights in the administrative stage of disputes over \"free appropriate public education,\" it would be inconsistent if they could not exercise the same rights in federal court. An interpretation where some rights inhere and both parents and child while others inhere only in the child would be unnecessarily confusing and was not indicated by the text and structure of IDEA. Therefore the Court ruled that a parent can be a \"party aggrieved\" under the statute and that sections referring to the rights of the child need not be read to exclude the parent. The dissenters would have held that IDEA gives parents the right to represent themselves in court when they seek reimbursement or challenge violations of their own procedural rights, but not when they challenge the adequacy of their child's free appropriate public education. Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the child, as the one who is receiving the education, is the only one with a right to it, and he accused the majority of \"spraying statutory sections about like buckshot [to] create a substantive parental right to education where none exists.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55446:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55447:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55447:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOneida and Herkimer counties adopted a local \"flow control\" ordinance requiring locally-produced garbage to be delivered to local publicly-owned facilities. The United Haulers Association filed suit in federal district court, arguing that by prohibiting the export of waste and preventing waste haulers from using less expensive out-of-state facilities, the ordinance ran afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause forbids any state law that regulates interstate commerce. The District Court ruled against United Haulers and held that the ordinance was constitutional because it did not discriminate against out-of-state businesses.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the ordinance imposed a slight burden on interstate commerce, the effect was outweighed by the ordinance's local benefits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55447:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55447:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55447:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court voted 6-3 to affirm the Second Circuit and uphold the ordinance. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion distinguished the Oneida- Herkimer ordinance from previous ordinances that were struck down by the Court by emphasizing that the favored waste-disposal facilities were publicly operated. The majority found that \"[t]he flow control ordinances in this case benefit a clearly public facility, while treating all private companies exactly the same.\" After deeming the ordinance nondiscriminatory, the Court balanced its burden on commerce against its financial, health, and environmental benefits. The Court found that it imposed only an \"incidental burden.\" The majority declined to \"rigorously scrutinize\" the economic effects of the ordinance, preferring to leave the policy analysis to local government. The dissent by Justice Alito would have held that the ordinance discriminated against commerce and was thus unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55447:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55448:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55448:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKeith Bowles was convicted of murder. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, and was denied. Bowles did not receive timely notice of the District Court's ruling, so he missed the deadline for appeal. He filed a motion under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) to reopen the appeal period. The District Court granted Bowles's motion, and gave him until February 27, 2004 to file his appeal. However, Rule 4(a)(6) allows only a 14-day extension of the appeal period, which would put the deadline on February 24, 2004. Bowles filed his appeal on February 26 - on time according to the court's deadline, but untimely according to Rule 4(a)(6).\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at first declined to dismiss Bowles's appeal. Later, on its own motion, the Sixth Circuit \"correct[ed] [its] error\" and dismissed the appeal, saying Rule 4(a)(6) \"is not susceptible to extension through mistake, courtesy, or grace.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55448:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55448:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55448:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court ruled that, even though Bowles was relying on the mistaken order of the District Court, the Circuit Court was correct to dismiss his untimely appeal. Justice Clarence Thomas's opinion for the 5-4 majority held that statutory time limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional, and therefore the Circuit Court had no choice but to dismiss Bowles's appeal once it found that the appeal was filed too late. The Court ruled that it had no authority to create an exception for Bowles under the little-used doctrine of \"unique circumstances,\" and it overruled its precedents \"to the extent they purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule.\" The majority left it to Congress to change the rule if Congress thought it unfair. In dissent, Justice David Souter wrote: \"It is intolerable for the judicial system to treat people this way, and there is not even a technical justification for condoning this bait and switch.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55448:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55449:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55449:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Twombly and other consumers brought a class action lawsuit against Bell Atlantic Corp. and other telecommunications companies. Twombly alleged that the companies had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to end competition among themselves and to stifle new competition. In the suit, Twombly claimed that the companies had agreed not to branch out into and compete in one another's territories, even though the Telecommunications Act of 1996 might have made it relatively inexpensive to do so.\nThe District Court granted Bell Atlantic's motion to dismiss the suit, however, because Twombly had failed to \"allege sufficient facts from which a conspiracy can be inferred.\" In order to sufficiently claim a Section 1 violation, the court held, the plaintiffs needed to establish a \"plus factor\" - a piece of evidence showing that the defendants' behavior would be against their economic self-interest unless there was a conspiratorial agreement. Twombly had not established a plus factor, the court held, because the companies' defensive behavior could have been motivated by economic factors rather than conspiracy.\nTwombly appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the lower court. The Second Circuit ruled that Twombly needed only to allege a conspiracy and specific facts that would support a Section 1 violation. Since he had alleged that the companies had engaged in suspicious \"parallel conduct\" and conspired to preserve monopoly conditions, his claim was sufficient and the suit could proceed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55449:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55449:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55449:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled 7-2 that a plaintiff claiming a Section 1 violation must also allege facts that, if true, would suggest a conspiratorial agreement. The opinion by Justice David Souter held that \"Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy [...]\" and \"A statement of parallel conduct [...] needs some setting suggesting the [conspiratorial] agreement [...]\" The Court laid out a \"plausibility standard\" for the pleading stage of Section 1 suits. Claims are valid only if they allege facts that plausibly suggest a conspiracy. To allege facts that are merely consistent with a conspiracy is not sufficient. The suggestive facts need only be alleged; a suit can go forward even if the facts are unlikely to be proven by the plaintiff. The Court held that Twombly's claim should be dismissed, because he had failed to identify any facts that suggested illegal conspiracy over the alternative: a concurrent appraisal of the economic situation by several telecomm companies. The dissenting Justices accused the majority of acting on the basis of practical concerns over \"enormously expensive\" antitrust lawsuits with the potential to confuse juries.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55449:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55450:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55450:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTeleflex sued KSR International (KSR), alleging that KSR had infringed on its patent for an adjustable gas-pedal system composed of an adjustable accelerator pedal and an electronic throttle control. KSR countered that Teleflex's patent was obvious, and therefore unenforceable. Under 25 U.S.C. Section 103(a), obvious inventions cannot be patented. A federal District Court granted summary judgment for KSR, accepting KSR's argument that the invention was obvious because each of the invention's components existed in previous patents. Anyone with knowledge or experience in the industry, the District Court ruled, would have considered it obvious that the two components could be combined. Teleflex appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the District Court. The Circuit Court found the lower court's analysis incomplete, because the District Court had not applied a full \"teaching-suggestion-motivation test.\" Under this test, in order to label the patent obvious the District Court would have needed to identify the specific \"teaching, suggestion, or motivation\" that would have led a knowledgeable person to combine the two previously-existing components. KSR appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Circuit Court's test conflicted with Supreme Court precedent and that it would allow too many patents of obvious inventions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55450:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55450:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55450:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled unanimously that the Federal Circuit \"analyzed the issue in a narrow, rigid manner inconsistent with [Section 103(a)] and our precedents.\" Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, which ruled in favor of KSR and reversed the Court of Appeals. The opinion acknowledged that a patent is not necessarily obvious by virtue of being a combination of two previously existing components and that it can be helpful in such cases for a court to identify a reason that would have motivated a knowledgeable person to combine the components. However, the Court held that Federal Circuit's \"teaching-suggestion-motivation test\" was not to be applied as a mandatory rule. This test for determining obviousness was too narrow, because it only took into account teachings on the specific problem the patentee was attempting to solve. Teleflex's gas pedal patent was inspired by previous inventions aimed at different problems. Even though no one had combined the pre-existing adjustable gas pedal and electronic sensor technology in the precise way Teleflex's patent did, the Court held that the existence of the technology would have caused any person of ordinary skill to see the obvious benefit of combining the two. Consequently, Teleflex's patent was obvious and therefore invalid.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55450:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55451:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55451:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, Andre Wallace was arrested and charged with murder. Two years later he was convicted and sent to prison. Wallace appealed, arguing that the police had arrested him without probable cause and coerced him into confessing to the crime. In 1998, an appeals court agreed that Wallace had been arrested without probable cause and granted him a new trial. Finally, in 2002, the prosecution dropped its case against him. The next year Wallace sued the police officers and the city of Chicago for violating his Fourth Amendment rights through false arrest.\nThe District Court ruled against Wallace, because his suit was time-barred. In Illinois there is a two-year statute of limitations on false-arrest claims. Since Wallace had not brought suit within two years of either his arrest or the time the arrest was declared invalid, his time was up. Wallace appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the two-year limit did not begin until his conviction was finally set aside in 2002.\nThe Circuit Court upheld the District Court, ruling against Wallace. The Circuit Court panel acknowledged that other Circuits had failed to agree on the question of when the statute of limitations for a false arrest claim should begin. The Seventh Circuit opted for a clear rule - the two-year limit starts at the time of the arrest, and therefore Wallace's suit was too late", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55451:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55451:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55451:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nBy a 7-2 vote, the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia held that \"the statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged false imprisonment ends.\" Since false imprisonment is detention without legal process, the Court ruled, the false imprisonment ends when legal processes begin. At that point, the clock begins to run on the time limit for filing a false imprisonment claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55451:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55452:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55452:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLisa Watson filed a class action lawsuit against the tobacco company Philip Morris, claiming that the company had violated Arkansas law by misrepresenting the amount of tar and nicotine in cigarettes branded as \"light.\" Seeking to have the case removed to federal court, Philip Morris invoked 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), which allows removal when a party is sued for actions taken while \"acting under\" a federal officer. Philip Morris claimed that it was acting under the direct control of regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), so 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) applied. After the federal District Court denied Watson's motion to have the case sent back to state court, Watson appealed.\nThe dispute centered on the degree of control exercised by the FTC over Philip Morris. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of Philip Morris, allowing the case to continue in the federal court system. The Eighth Circuit held that the question of whether 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) applies \"depends on the detail and specificity of the federal direction of the defendant's activities and whether the government exercises control over the defendant.\" In the case of the tobacco industry, the Eighth Circuit found \"unprecedented\" government involvement, including detailed FTC regulations concerning the testing and disclosure of tar and nicotine levels. Therefore, Philip Morris was \"acting under a federal officer\" and consequently entitled to remove the case to federal court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55452:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55452:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55452:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court ruled that Philip Morris could not remove its case to federal court, because it was not \"acting under a federal officer\" in the sense of the statute. Justice Breyer wrote that \"broad language is not limitless. And a liberal construction nonetheless can find limits in a textís language, context, history, and purposes.\" The Court held that the phrase \"acting under\" connotes a subordinate acting to assist his superior. A company complying with a regulation, no matter how restrictive, was not in the type of relationship covered by the statute. Philip Morris analogized its situation to government contractors that have been held to fall under the statute, but the Court ruled that the contractor's contractual \"principal/agent\" relationship assisted the government in a way that Philip Morris's mere compliance with stringent regulations did not.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55452:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55453:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55453:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJose Lopez, a Mexican national living in South Dakota, was convicted of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine. The crime is a felony under South Dakota law, but only a misdemeanor under the federal Controlled Substances Act.\nThe Immigration and Naturalization Service began proceedings to remove Lopez from the country. Lopez applied for a cancellation of his removal, citing the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). The INA allows an alien to avoid removal if he meets certain qualifications and has no prior \"aggravated felony\" convictions. Lopez argued that he was eligible for cancellation of his removal because his drug offense was only a misdemeanor under federal law.\nAn Immigration Judge denied Lopez's request for cancellation, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, on the grounds that Lopez had committed an aggravated felony. Lopez then sued the Attorney General and brought his case to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Circuit Court affirmed the lower courts, ruling that a crime is an aggravated felony under the INA if it is a felony under either federal or state law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55453:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55453:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55453:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled 8-1 that a drug crime must be a felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in order to count as an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA. The opinion by Justice David Souter rejected as unnatural the government's interpretation of the term \"aggravated felony\" in the INA as encompassing any state-law felony punishable under the CSA, whether as a felony or not. Instead, the Court looked to the crimes classified as felonies in the CSA in order to define INA aggravated felonies. Illicit trafficking is a felony drug crime under the CSA, but the Court ruled that Lopez's drug-possession crime could not be considered \"trafficking.\" The Court's approach avoided state-by-state disparities in the types of crimes that can be used to justify deportation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55453:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55454:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55454:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a), states do not have regulatory powers over national banks. In 2001 the federal Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) issued federal regulation 12 C.F.R. 7.4006, which applied 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a) to state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks. Wachovia Mortgage was an operating subsidiary of the national bank Wachovia Bank, and was registered with the state of Michigan.\nWhen Michigan attempted to exercise its regulatory powers over Wachovia Mortgage, Wachovia Bank sued Watters, a Michigan official, seeking a judgment that Michigan's laws on operating subsidies of national banks were superceded by 12 U.S.C Section 484(a). Michigan argued that the OCC had exceeded the authority given it by Congress by extending the definition of \"national bank\" to cover state-registered operating subsidiaries. Michigan also argued that the extension of federal authority over state entities like Wachovia Mortgage violates the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to states all powers not delegated to the federal government.\nThe District Court rejected these arguments and ruled for Wachovia, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court found that the decision of the OCC to apply rules for national banks to their operating subsidiaries was a reasonable interpretation of Congress's intent, and therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The Sixth Circuit also held that Congress had the power to regulate operating subsidiaries of national banks under the Commerce Clause, so the Tenth Amendment did not reserve that power to the states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55454:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55454:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55454:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered and no. The Court ruled 5-3 that state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks are subject to regulation by the federal Office of the Comptroller of Currency and not by the states in which they are located. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that \"[...] the level of deference owed to the regulation is an academic question,\" because \"Section 7.4006 merely clarifies and confirms what the [National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a)] already conveys: A national bank has the power to engage in real estate lending through an operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the national bank itself; that power cannot be significantly impaired or impeded by state law.\" The Court interpreted the statute broadly, as a shield against burdensome state regulation of national banks and their subsidiaries, so the OCC's regulation preempting Michigan's regulatory laws was firmly grounded in the statute. The Court briefly and definitively disposed of Watters's Tenth Amendment argument, holding that the regulation of subsidiaries of national banks is a legitimate application of Congress's Commerce Power and therefore is not reserved to the states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55454:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55455:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55455:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJalil Abdul-Kabir was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. At his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir presented mitigating evidence of his destructive family background and neurological defects. The jury was instructed to give effect to all mitigating evidence by making yes-or-no determinations on Texas's two \"special issues\" for capital sentencing: the deliberateness of the crime and the future dangerousness of the criminal. After his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing that the special issues had not allowed the jury to give full consideration and effect to his mitigating evidence as required by the Supreme Court in Penry v. Johnson. The District Court denied Abdul-Kabir habeas relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.\nThe Fifth Circuit held that the mitigating evidence was not \"constitutionally relevant,\" and that in any case the jury could have given it consideration as part of the \"deliberateness\" and \"dangerousness\" determinations. After the Supreme Court rejected the \"constitutional relevance\" test, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision that Abdul-Kabir's mitigating evidence had been given full consideration and effect under the Texas special issues. The case was consolidated with Brewer v. Quarterman No. 05-11287.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55455:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55455:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55455:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court ruled 5-4 that the Texas jury instructions conflicted with Supreme Court precedents requiring that jurors be given the opportunity \"to give meaningful consideration and effect to all mitigating evidence that might provide a basis for refusing to impose the death penalty.\" The majority opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens found Texas's scheme of yes-or-no determinations of deliberateness and future dangerousness to be far too constraining. This was particularly true when the defense offers \"double edged\" evidence, which can be mitigating or aggravating depending on the jury's interpretation. The Court faulted the Fifth Circuit for not recognizing that Abdul-Kabir had presented mitigating evidence of his deprived childhood and his lack of self-control in order to show his relative lack of moral culpability - not to dispute either the deliberateness of his crime or his likely future dangerousness (which indeed might be aggravated by the evidence). Since the instruction did not allow the jury to consider the evidence as mitigating in the sense Abdul-Kabir intended, it was unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55455:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55456:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55456:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the District. Since certain schools often became oversubscribed when too many students chose them as their first choice, the District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted to the popular schools. The second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor intended to maintain racial diversity. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population (approximately 40% white and 60% non-white), the racial tiebreaker went into effect. At a particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal.\nA non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents), sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. A federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. On appeal, a three-judge panel the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.\nUnder the Supreme Court's precedents on racial classification in higher education, Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, race-based classifications must be directed toward a \"compelling government interest\" and must be \"narrowly tailored\" to that interest. Applying these precedents to K-12 education, the Circuit Court found that the tiebreaker scheme was not narrowly tailored. The District then petitioned for an \"en banc\" ruling by a panel of 11 Ninth Circuit judges. The en banc panel came to the opposite conclusion and upheld the tiebreaker. The majority ruled that the District had a compelling interest in maintaining racial diversity. Applying a test from Grutter, the Circuit Court also ruled that the tiebreaker plan was narrowly tailored, because 1) the District did not employ quotas, 2) the District had considered race-neutral alternatives, 3) the plan caused no undue harm to races, and 4) the plan had an ending point.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55456:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55456:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55456:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no, and yes. By a 5-4 vote, the Court applied a \"strict scrutiny\" framework and found the District's racial tiebreaker plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that \"The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.\" The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling government interest in university admissions, but it ruled that \"[t]he present cases are not governed by Grutter.\" Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education, the District's plan involved no individualized consideration of students, and it employed a very limited notion of diversity (\"white\" and \"non-white\"). The District's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race: \"Racial balancing is not transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity.'\" The plans also lacked the narrow tailoring that is necessary for race-conscious programs. The Court held that the District's tiebreaker plan was actually targeted toward demographic goals and not toward any demonstrable educational benefit from racial diversity. The District also failed to show that its objectives could not have been met with non-race-conscious means. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy agreed that the District's use of race was unconstitutional but stressed that public schools may sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55456:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55457:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55457:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice stopped Karen Simeroth's car for having expired registration tabs. Bruce Brendlin, who had a warrant out for his arrest, was riding in the passenger seat. Police found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia in the car and on Simeroth's person. In a California trial court, Brendlin filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the traffic stop, claiming that the stop was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court found that Brendlin had never been detained or \"seized\" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It denied the motion, and Brendlin pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine. A California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a traffic stop necessarily results in a Fourth Amendment seizure.\nThe California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled for California. The court held that the driver of the car is the only one detained in a traffic stop. The movement of any passengers is also stopped as a practical matter, but the court considered this merely a necessary byproduct of the detention of the driver. The court held that Brendlin had been free to leave the scene of the traffic stop or to simply ignore the police. Since he was never \"seized,\" however, he could not claim a violation of the Fourth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55457:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55457:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55457:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice David Souter, the Court held that when a vehicle is stopped at a traffic stop, the passenger as well as the driver is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The justices said, \"We resolve this question by asking whether a reasonable person in Brendlin's position when the car stopped would have believed himself free to 'terminate the encounter' between the police and himself.\" The Court held that Brendlin would have reasonably believed himself to be intentionally detained and subject to the authority of the police. Thus, he was justified in asserting his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizure. The Court noted that its ruling would not extend to more incidental restrictions on freedom of movement, such as when motorists are forced to slow down or stop because other vehicles are being detained. To accept the state's arguments, however, would be to \"invite police officers to stop cars with passengers regardless of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of anything illegal.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55457:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55458:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55458:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt Stephen Danforth's trial for sexual abuse of a six-year-old boy, the victim was found incompetent to testify in court, so his videotaped testimony was shown instead. Danforth was convicted and his appeals were unsuccessful. After Danforth's case became final, the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington that pre-recorded testimony without the possibility of cross-examination is unconstitutional. Danforth filed a second petition for postconviction relief, seeking to have the Crawford decision applied retroactively to his case. Supreme Court decisions announcing constitutional rules of criminal procedure are applied retroactively only in certain circumstances, which are specified in Teague v. Lane. The state court of appeals declined to retroactively apply Crawford.\nOn appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Danforth raised an alternative argument, claiming that the state court was free to apply a broader standard of retroactivity than the one in Teague. Under Minnesota state retroactivity principles, Danforth argued, the Crawford case met the criteria for retroactive application. In Danforth's interpretation, the Teague standard was mandatory for federal habeas corpus proceedings but not for state postconviction proceedings. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Danforth's arguments, ruling that only U.S. Supreme Court decisions determine the proper standard for retroactive application of constitutional criminal procedure. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Whorton v. Bockting that Crawford does not apply retroactively under Teague, but it agreed to consider Danforth's alternative argument.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55458:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55458:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55458:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-2 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the federal case law precedent, including Teague did not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than was required by the precedent. The precedent applied only to federal habeas corpus petitions and had no bearing on state post-conviction proceedings. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Anthony Kennedy joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55458:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55459:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55459:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPaul Holowecki and other employees of Federal Express sued the corporation for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A district court judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had met the time limits and filing requirements of the ADEA. The ADEA requires that a plaintiff file a \"charge\" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 60 days prior to filing suit. Upon receiving the charge of discrimination, the EEOC notifies the employer of the accusation, investigates the matter, and offers to mediate. THE EEOC has an \"Intake Questionnaire\" form and a \"Charge\" form, but the EEOC regulations state only that \"A charge shall be in writing and shall name the prospective respondent and shall generally allege the discriminatory act(s).\" One of the plaintiffs completed an intake questionnaire, but the EEOC did not take the steps it should have taken after the filing of a charge. Holowecki sued over 60 days later, but the judge ruled that the intake questionnaire did not qualify as a charge for purposes of the AEDA.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, allowing Holowecki's suit to go forward. The Second Circuit ruled that the minimal written information required for a charge was contained in the intake questionnaire. The questionnaire also met the ADEA's implicit requirement that the charge be intended to start the process of an ADEA suit. The Second Circuit did not consider it significant that the EEOC did not act on the questionnaire, apparently not believing it to count as a charge. To dismiss a complaint based on the EEOC's inaction would be to hold the plaintiff accountable for the failings of the agency.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55459:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55459:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55459:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court, in a 7-2 opinion, upheld the Second Circuit, stating that the procedure used to file the document was consistent with the design and purpose of the ADEA. In his majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy accepted the EEOC's position that a filing would be considered a \"charge\" if it could be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee's rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee. Kennedy felt that Holowecki's charge met these requirements. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia dissented from the Court's judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55459:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55460:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55460:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo Kentucky inmates challenged the state's four-drug lethal injection protocol. The lethal injection method calls for the administration of four drugs: Valium, which relaxes the convict, Sodium Pentathol, which knocks the convict unconscious, Pavulon, which stops his breathing, and potassium chloride, which essentially puts the convict into cardiac arrest and ultimately causes death. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the death penalty system did not amount to unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55460:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55460:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55460:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-2 decision with four concurrences and a dissent, the Court held that Kentucky's lethal injection scheme did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Noting that the inmates had conceded the \"humane nature\" of the procedure when performed correctly, the divided Court inmates had failed to prove that incorrect administration of the drugs would amount to cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Court also suggested that a state may violate the ban on cruel and unusual punishment if it continues to use a method without sufficient justification in the face of superior alternative procedures. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. announced the judgment and issued an opinion joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion supporting the judgment but for the first time stated his opposition to the death penalty. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a separate concurring opinion in support of the judgment. Justice Alito also issued a separate concurring opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice David Souter, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55460:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55461:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55461:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo workers involved in the manufacture of electrical supplies for the Navy's billion-dollar guided missile destroyers brought a whistleblower case alleging that subcontractors performed faulty work. The two charged that the companies employed unqualified workers, installed leaky gearboxes and used defective temperature gauges. After a five-week trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the companies, concluding that the False Claims Act under which the suits were brought requires that defendants \"present\" the fraudulent claims to the government. Because the subcontractors actually invoiced the general contractor and not the government, the court ruled that the presentment requirement had not been met. The appeals court reversed, holding that the Act should be liberally construed to discourage private companies from defrauding the government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55461:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55461:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55461:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Samuel A. Alito made clear that a plaintiff must prove more than that the false statement's use resulted in payment or approval or that Government money was used to pay the claim. Instead, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intended the false statement to be \"material\" to the Government's decision to pay or approve the false claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55461:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55462:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55462:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames LaRue participated in a 401(k) retirement savings plan administered by his employer, the management consulting firm DeWolff, Boberg & Associates. Employee benefit plans are regulated under a federal law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). LaRue sought to exercise his option to make certain changes in his investment plan, but DeWolff neglected to make the changes. LaRue claimed that DeWolff's omission had cost him $150,000, and he sued the firm for breach of fiduciary duty, seeking to recover the money. In response, DeWolff argued that ERISA does not provide for the type of individual monetary award sought by LaRue.\nSection 502(a)(2) allows plan participants to sue plan administrators for breach of fiduciary duty in order to \"make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach.\" DeWolff argued that LaRue's suit was not of the type contemplated by the text of ERISA because LaRue sued to recover losses caused to his own personal retirement plan rather than suing to vindicate the interests of the plan as a whole. LaRue also invoked Section 502(a)(3), which allows plan participants to sue to obtain \"other appropriate equitable relief.\"\nThe U.S. District Court held that LaRue was not entitled to relief under ERISA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Fourth Circuit ruled that Section 502(a)(2) was concerned with protecting entire plans from misuse of plan assets and not with providing recovery for losses suffered by individual accounts. The court also rejected LaRue's Section 502(a)(3) claim. It ruled that the phrase \"equitable relief\" rarely includes relief in the form of a monetary award and only when the money has been unjustly possessed by the defendant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55462:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55463:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55463:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael H. Boulware founded a coffee and bottled water company known as Hawaiian Isles Enterprises. As his company became profitable in 1987, he began transferring money – a total of $4.5 million – from his company to his mistress. Seven years later, in the midst of a divorce, his mistress refused to return the money when asked, contending that it was a gift. A Hawaii court eventually held that the woman had been holding the money in constructive trust for the company's benefit. Seven years after that, the federal government indicted Boulware for failing to pay taxes on the disputed funds as well as $6 million more that he had received from the company. Boulware argued that under the \"return of capital\" rule, holding that when unprofitable companies distribute money to shareholders, the money is considered a nontaxable return of capital up to the shareholder's basis in the stock, he owed no taxes. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55463:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55463:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55463:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA unanimous Court reversed Boulware's conviction for tax evasion. In an opinion written by Justice David Souter, the Court held that a defendant in a criminal tax case does not need to show a contemporaneous intent to treat diversions as returns of capital to demonstrate no taxes were owed. All that mattered, according to the Court, was whether the corporation had earnings or profits and the taxpayer's basis for his stock. Based on these considerations, the Court determined that there had been no improper action on Boulware's part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55463:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55465:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55465:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBefore his transfer to a new prison, prisoner Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali temporarily left his two bags of possessions with a police officer. When the bags arrived, Ali noticed that several items were missing. He filed an administrative tort claim with the Bureau of Prisons seeking to recover the items. After the claim was denied, he brought his case to U.S. District Court. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the government had immunity from the lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA establishes a general waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims against the government, but it also makes several exceptions to the waiver. One exception is for \"[a]ny claim arising in respect of [...] the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.\" Ali argued that in context the phrase \"other law enforcement officer\" referred only to officers working in customs and related activities, but the court applied the exception to any detention of goods by any law enforcement officer.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Ali's claim. It ruled that the phrase \"any other law enforcement officer\" in the FTCA was not merely a supplementary catch-all relating to the government's immunity in tax collection and customs situations. Rather, it was itself a broad grant of sovereign immunity covering any instance of detention of goods by law enforcement officers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55465:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55465:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55465:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court agreed with the 11th Circuit and, in a 5-4 majority opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, held that the use of the word \"any\" should be given its normal interpretation, encompassing all federal officers whether or not they were involved in enforcing customs or excise laws. Justices Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Samuel A. Alito, along with Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., joined in the opinion.\nJustice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented in the judgment, arguing that if Congress intended to include officials other than customs or excise officials it would have listed them in the law. Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent, jointed by Justice Stevens, suggesting that the context of the statute made clear that Congress intended it only to refer to federal officials likely to deal with property loss or damage, a group that, according to Breyer, did not include police officers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55465:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55466:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55466:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called \"Millennium Bomber,\" was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-U.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 U.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent.\nRessam argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to include such \"in relation to\" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55466:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55466:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55466:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court determined 8-1 that because Ressam was in possession of the explosives at the time he made the false statement to the customs agent he was therefore carrying them during the commission of that felony. Justice John Paul Stevens, in his majority opinion, refused to over-analyze the language of the statute and applied the word \"during\" in its most obvious sense. Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, reading the statute to mean that the explosives must have facilitated or aided the false statements and suggesting that merely possessing the weapons at the time of the statements would not suffice for a conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55466:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55467:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55467:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2005, Mohammad Munaf was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping by U.S. military officers acting as part of a multinational force in Iraq. Munaf's sister petitioned on his behalf for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia. Soon after the petition was filed, Munaf was informed that he would be tried in an Iraqi court and transferred to Iraqi custody if convicted. Munaf filed a temporary restraining order attempting to block custody transfer.\nAfter the Iraqi court sentenced him to death and the district court dismissed his case for lack of jurisdiction, Munaf appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit which granted an injunction against the transfer. However, the D.C. Circuit, like the district court, eventually concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over Munaf's claim, basing its decision largely on the Court's ruling in Hirota v. MacArthur 338 U.S. 197 (1948). That decision prohibited Japanese citizens held abroad by U.S. troops from filing habeas petitions to challenge sentences handed down by a military tribunal sitting in Japan but including U.S. military personnel. Petitioner urges the Court to set aside Hirota and its ruling and to base its reasoning on a string of cases reaching the opposite result. The case will be consolidated and heard along with another D.C. case, Geren v. Omar, 07-394, in which the D.C. Circuit allowed a habeas petition by a U.S. citizen held in Iraq because he had not yet been charged or convicted by an Iraqi court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55467:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55467:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55467:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes they do. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the habeas corpus statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command even if part of a larger multinational force. The Court pointed specifically to the statute's application to individuals held in custody \"under color of the authority of the United States\" to hold that actual Government custody is sufficient for jurisdiction in federal courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55467:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55468:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55468:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn an effort to address the problem of tobacco use by minors, the Maine legislature passed the Tobacco Delivery Law, which imposes requirements on air and motor carriers that transport tobacco products. One provision of the law requires tobacco retailers to only use carriers that verify the age of each tobacco purchaser, and another provision requires that carriers ensure that no tobacco is shipped to unlicensed retailers. The New Hampshire Motor Transport Association sued, arguing that the state law was preempted by a federal law, the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). The preemption provision of the FAAAA prohibits state from enacting laws \"related to\" the prices, routes, or services of air and motor carriers. The Association argued that the Tobacco Delivery Law placed such a burden on the delivery procedures of carriers that significantly affected their prices and services. The state countered that the FAAAA was only meant to preempt traditional economic regulation by states, and therefore laws enacted pursuant to the state's police power - the power of a state to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens - were permissible. The U.S. District Court ruled that the law was preempted by the FAAAA.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court. The First Circuit held that a police power exception to the general rule of preemption would be far too broad and was not intended by Congress. Maine could validly ban all unlicensed tobacco products within its borders, but the FAAAA prohibited the state from implementing this goal by imposing requirements on carriers that significantly alter their delivery procedures.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55468:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55468:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55468:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court affirmed both lower courts, holding that the FAAAA preempted the state laws. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court asserted that the state laws were directly connected with motor carrier services and therefore had a significant and adverse impact on the congressional goal of precluding state regulation in lieu of competitive market forces. The Court further stated that the FAAAA did not allow any exceptions for police powers or public health concerns of the State.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55468:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55469:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55469:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJack Davis, a wealthy Democratic candidate for Congress from New York's 26th Congressional District, brought this claim challenging the constitutionality of the so-called 'Millionaire's Amendment' to the 2002 campaign finance law. Davis argued in the district court that the law, which basically raises the contribution cap for individuals running against self-financed candidates, violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection principle implicit in the Fifth Amendment. The district court rejected both of these claims, stating first that the law did not implicate the First Amendment because it did not impede Davis' ability to spend money in support of his message, noting that it actually led to a higher level of speech in the race overall. The district court similarly rejected Davis' Fifth Amendment claim, reasoning that although Davis may have been held to higher reporting standards than his opponent, his disproportionate wealth meant that the two candidates were not similarly situated and, therefore, the Equal Protection Clause did not apply. The campaign finance law allows direct appeal to the Court, which will consider whether Davis has standing to bring the First Amendment claim before deciding the case on the merits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55469:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55469:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55469:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Although all nine Justices agreed that Davis had standing to argue his case before the Court, only a 5-4 majority held that the contribution limits violated the First Amendment. In his majority opinion, Justice Samuel Alito noted that the Court had never upheld the constitutionality of a law imposing different contribution limits for candidates competing against one another. Because the Court found the laws in violation of the First Amendment, it did not reach the question of whether the Fifth Amendment was also violated. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreeing with the majority that Davis had standing but citing the reasoning of the district court to argue that the contribution cap did not violate the First or Fifth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreeing with Justice Stevens's argument but basing it on slightly different grounds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55469:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55470:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55470:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWalter Rothgery was arrested in Texas as a felon in possession of a firearm. Rothgery was taken before a judge for processing and, upon learning that seeking legal assistance would delay the proceedings, waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. No prosecutor was present at this hearing. Rothgery posted bail and was released, but was rearrested after a grand jury indictment several months later hiked his bail to a sum he could not afford. Throughout this entire period Rothgery continued to pursue legal counsel and only obtained such counsel approximately one week after the grand jury indictment. Rothgery's attorney produced evidence that Rothgery was in fact not a felon and he was released from custody. Rothgery brought suit against Gillespie County, TX for violating his civil rights by not appointing counsel as required under the Sixth Amendment.\nBoth the district court and the Fifth Circuit rejected his claim, the Fifth Circuit stating that Rothgery's Sixth Amendment rights were not implicated because no prosecutor was present at the initial hearing. In his petition for certiorari, Rothgery argued that both federal and state case law indicate that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to any hearing where a defendant is advised of his rights and the charges against him, regardless of whether or not a prosecutor is present.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55470:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55470:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55470:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 ruling, the Court held that a criminal defendant's initial appearance before a judge marks the beginning of the proceedings against him and triggers the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel whether or not a prosecutor is aware of or involved in that appearance. This right to counsel applies whenever a defendant learns of the charges against him and has his liberty subject to restriction. The opinion was penned by Justice David Souter. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the only dissent, arguing that the phrase \"criminal prosecution\" as used in the Sixth Amendment should not include a defendant's initial appearance in the absence of a prosecutor. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, chose to write a concurring opinion pointing out the validity of Thomas' argument but reasoning that Court precedent required him to agree with the majority. Justice Samuel Alito also filed a concurring opinion, stating that Rothgery's right to counsel certainly arose at the time of his appearance but reserving judgment on whether the County's actions infringed on that right in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55470:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55471:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55471:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles Lickteig is a deputy sheriff in Kentucky. Because he is a hazardous duty worker, he is eligible to retire at age 55. Kentucky Retirement Systems offers a two-tier calculation of so-called \"disability retirement benefits.\" If hazardous duty workers like Lickteig opt to keep working and then become disabled, they receive only their scheduled retirement benefits. In contrast, workers who become disabled before reaching age 55 receive payments that reflect not only their actual years of service but the number of years remaining until they would have reached 55. In effect, if two workers were otherwise identical, the one who retired on disability before 55 would always get benefits equal to or greater than those of the post-55 retiree.\nLickteig decided against retirement at 55. Six years later, he became disabled because of \"a deteriorating vertebra, arthritis, nerve damage, and Parkinson's disease,\" and stopped working. When he applied for disability retirement benefits, he received word that he was eligible only for standard retirement.\nThe Equal Employment Opportunity Commission argued unsuccessfully in federal district court that the two-tier system violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court reheard the case en banc and reversed, holding that the simple act of treating younger disabled retirees better than older ones was sufficient to make out a prima facie ADEA violation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55471:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55471:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55471:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Writing for a slim 5-4 majority, Justice Stephen Breyer held that the Kentucky system does not discriminate against workers who become disabled after becoming eligible for retirement based on age. According to Breyer, the circumstances of the case indicated that differences in treatment were not \"actually motivated\" by age but rather by pension status. He also noted that the ADEA treats system-wide rules involving pensions more flexibly than individual employment decisions. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that age is in fact the deciding factor in determining disability benefits and that, therefore, the Kentucky plan violates the ADEA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55471:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55472:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55472:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen the New York-based federal research laboratory Knolls Atomic Power Lab instituted a downsizing program, it asked supervisors to rank employees based on three factors: performance, flexibility, and the criticality of their skills, and then to add points for years of service in order to determine who would be dismissed. Of the thirty-one employees who were let go, all but one were over the age of forty. Twenty-six of these dismissed employees filed suit against Knolls for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A jury found for the employees and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.\nHowever the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment, relying on its 2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson to hold that \"an employer is not liable under the ADEA so long as the challenged employment action, in relying on specific non-age factors, constitutes a reasonable means to the employer's legitimate goals.\" On remand, the Second Circuit vacated its previous decision and held that the employees had failed to carry their burden of proving the evaluation system unreasonable. In seeking Supreme Court review, the employees argued that it should be Knolls, not them, who must prove the reasonableness of an action that would otherwise be prohibited.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55472:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55472:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55472:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Writing for a 7-1 majority on the issue of burden of proof, Justice David Souter stated that the text and structure of the ADEA indicated that it is the employer, not the employee, who must bear both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion for the use of \"reasonable factors other than age\" in the decision to terminate employment. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in the judgment, suggesting that the Congress left the determination of these issues in the hands of the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part. In his brief dissent, Thomas noted his belief that \"disparate-impact claims\" such as this one, which allege a discriminatory result rather than discriminatory intent, should not be allowed under the ADEA. Justice Stephen Breyer took no part in the decision because he is a significant shareholder in Knolls' parent company.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55472:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55473:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55473:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Long family, members of the Sioux nation, owned a cattle company that had been doing business with the Plains Commerce Bank for seven years when the family patriarch died. Because Plains Commerce was reluctant to grant operating loans to younger generation family members, it struck a deal with the Longs agreeing to provide the operating loans if the Longs deeded their farmland and house to the bank. According to the Longs the bank never followed through on its promise to provide the operating loans, and after the bank attempted to foreclose on the land the Longs brought suit in a local tribal court seeking a temporary restraining order blocking the land transfer as well as charging the bank with tortuous discrimination. The tribal court returned an award of $700,000 for the Longs, after which Plains Commerce filed suit in federal district court claiming that the tribal court had improperly exercised jurisdiction over the case.\nThe district court decided that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. In seeking Supreme Court review, Plains Commerce argued that the tribal court should not have had jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit erred in deciding so, because the claim did not fit into one of the exceptions granting such jurisdiction set forth by the Supreme Court in _Montana v. U.S. _ On the other hand, the Longs argued that federal courts whose geographic reach encompasses tribal lands have repeatedly allowed tribal courts to adjudicate civil suits against non-members who voluntarily did business with members.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55473:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55473:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55473:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nGenerally yes, but not in cases such as this one where the conflict arises over the sale of a piece of land. On this issue, the Court held unanimously that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning non- Indian banks' sales of their own lands. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts stated that although tribal courts have jurisdiction to regulate conduct occurring on tribal lands, that jurisdiction is lost once title to the land passes into the hands of non-Indians. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer, wrote an opinion concurring and dissenting in part, agreeing that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction to disturb the bank's land sale but suggesting that certain damages for discrimination, awarded based on the bank's mistreatment of the Longs due to their Indian heritage, should not have been overturned.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55473:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55474:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55474:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.\nDerrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence \"ridiculous.\" Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55474:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55474:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55474:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the Court's 7-2 majority opinion reversing the Fourth Circuit and affirming the sentence handed down by the trial judge. Ginsburg noted that the drug trafficking statute still had some minimum sentencing requirements, and expressed the Court's confidence that district courts could maintain reasonably uniform approaches to cocaine sentencing. She also referred to the Court's assertion in Booker that, by making the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory, the Court was willing to accept some non-uniformity in sentencing. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito dissented in the opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55474:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55475:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55475:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring Charles Riegel's angioplasty, his surgeon used an Evergreen Balloon Catheter to dilate his coronary artery. The catheter burst, causing extreme complications. Riegel sued the manufacturer, Medtronic, for negligence in the design, manufacture, and labeling of the device. Medtronic argued that Riegel could not bring these state-law negligence claims because they were preempted by Section 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The MDA establishes a federal regulatory process for ensuring the safety of medical devices, and it provides that no state may set requirements that differ from or add to the federal ones. The District Court dismissed Riegel's claims as preempted by the MDA.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the suits based on medical devices like the Evergreen Balloon Catheter are preempted by the MDA. The catheter had been through the exceptionally rigorous \"premarket approval\" (PMA) process, by which federal regulators ensured that it met federal requirements. To allow state common-law suits for PMA-approved devices, the court ruled, would be to add a state requirement to the regulatory process despite the MDA's preemption clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55475:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55475:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55475:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court, in an 8-1 decision, affirmed the Second Circuit and granted summary judgment in favor of Medtronic. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, noted that the MDA pre-empted state common law claims for defective devices such as this one. Riegel's negligence and strict liability claims relating to the safety and effectiveness of the catheter were based on New York's requirements and were therefore \"different from, or in addition to\" the federal requirements. Only Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55475:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55477:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55477:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn capital murder trial of Allen Snyder, an African-American, the prosecution used peremptory (automatic) challenges to dismiss five African-American prospective jurors. This resulted in Snyder being tried by an all-white jury, which found him guilty and approved the death penalty. The defense argued that the prosecution's striking of the black jurors was racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, according to the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky. As part of its case for the prosecution's alleged discriminatory intent, the defense cited two of the prosecutor's statements comparing the case to the O.J. Simpson murder trial. After having indirectly referred to the Simpson trial before jury selection, the prosecutor had invoked the case again during the sentencing phase, comparing aspects of Snyder's case to Simpson's and noting that the latter defendant \"got away with it.\" The trial court applied the Batson framework and denied the defense's challenges.\nOn appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court, ruling that the trial judge had not acted unreasonably when he accepted the prosecution's race-neutral justifications for the dismissals of the black jurors. The court ruled that the O.J. Simpson references were harmless comparisons made in the course of a rebuttal, and it noted that the prosecution had not mentioned Simpson's or Snyder's race. When the Supreme Court instructed the state court to reconsider the case in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, which requires that courts consider the totality of the circumstances when evaluating discriminatory intent, the court affirmed the trial court a second time.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55477:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55477:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55477:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court reversed the Louisiana Supreme Court in a 7-2 majority opinion written by Justice Samuel A. Alito. Alito concluded that the trial judge had acted improperly in allowing the peremptory strikes of the black jurors, pointing out that the reasons given by the prosecution for striking the jurors applied equally well to the white jurors the prosecution chose to keep. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that Batson does not require the exacting scrutiny imposed on the trial judge by the majority.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55477:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55478:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55478:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMyrna Gómez-Pérez worked as a clerk for the United States Postal Service (USPS) in Puerto Rico. Gómez alleged that she was subject to retaliatory treatment after filing an age discrimination complaint against her supervisors under section 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A federal district court granted summary judgment to the USPS on the ground that the United States had not waived sovereign immunity as to retaliation claims under the ADEA.\nGómez appealed to the United States Court of Appeals in the First Circuit. It held that the USPS and Potter have waived sovereign immunity with respect to ADEA suits, but that Section 15 of the ADEA does not provide a cause of action for retaliation by federal employers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55478:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55478:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55478:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, the ADEA prohibits retaliation against federal employees. Writing for a six-Justice majority, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. relied on prior Court rulings holding that retaliation is covered by similar language in other antidiscrimination statutes. Noting the similarity between these statutes and the ADEA, Alito concluded that Congress had intended to include a retaliation prohibition in the ADEA. Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas filed dissenting opinions each joined in part by Justice Antonin Scalia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55478:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55479:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55479:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2004, New Mexico resident Larry Begay was arrested after brandishing and unsuccessfully shooting a rifle while begging his sister for money. Begay pleaded guilty to possessing the rifle. Prior to the firearm arrest, Begay had been convicted twelve times of driving while intoxicated. Under New Mexico law, each DWI conviction after the first three were considered felonies. The court concluded that the DWI convictions were violent felonies, triggering the federal career criminal law's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. A deeply divided court of appeals panel affirmed the decision to treat the DWIs as violent felonies.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55479:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55479:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55479:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-3 vote, the Court held that Begay's DWI convictions did not qualify as \"violent felonies\" because they were too different from the violent felony examples provided by Congress in the Armed Career Criminal Act (such as burglary, arson and extortion). Therefore, Begay should not have been subject to the mandatory sentencing hike. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the majority opinion with Justice Antonin Scalia concurring and Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and David Souter, dissenting", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55479:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55480:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55480:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWanda Glenn, a long-time employee of Sears and manager of its women's department, was covered by the company's long-term disability plan. In 2000, Glenn took medical leave from Sears based on an ailing heart condition and submitted a disability claim under her ERISA plan. Metlife, the insurance carrier, approved the claim and told Glenn to seek social security payments which could then be deducted from her Metlife payments. However, after an administrative law judge determined, based in part on information provided by Metlife, that Glenn was disabled and eligible for social security payments, Metlife revised its own opinion and decided Glenn was no longer eligible for disability benefits.\nGlenn brought suit against Metlife in district court, where Metlife's change of heart was vindicated, however the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. In making its decision, the Sixth Circuit took into account Metlife's dual role as both the entity determining when disability awards should be paid out as well as the entity actually funding those payments, noting the possible conflicts of interest that could arise based on this arrangement. In seeking Supreme Court review, Metlife drew attention to circuit splits on the issue of whether these conflicts should be taken into account in determining the validity of Metlife's decisions on disability. In addition to the conflict of interest argument, Glenn pointed out that Metlife's flip-flop did not take into account certain of Glenn's doctor evaluations and that Metlife's representations to the administrative judge were at odds with its own eventual determination that she was not disabled.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55480:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55480:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55480:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe. The Court, in a 7-2 opinion, relied on its prior ruling in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch to hold that a possible conflict of interest such as MetLife's should be taken into account in determining the legality of a claim denial. The significance and severity of the conflict must be determined by the facts of each individual case. Here, the Court found that the evidence was sufficient to prove that a strong conflict of interest existed. Based on the principle of deference to lower court decisions, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice John G. Roberts concurred in part and dissented in part, framing his dissent around his view that conflicts should be taken into account only where there is evidence that the benefits denial was motivated or affected by the administrator's conflict. Justice Anthony Kennedy also concurred in part and dissented in part, suggesting that the case should be remanded to the Sixth Circuit where it could apply the majority opinion to the facts of the case on its own. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, finding the mere fact that an entity both determines claims and funds those claims insufficient to prove a conflict of interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55480:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55481:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55481:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMeadWestvaco, an Ohio company, sold its lucrative Lexis/Nexis division for a $1 billion profit in 1994. Illinois attempted to claim a portion of that profit when collecting taxes from MeadWestvaco for doing business in the state. Illinois argued that Lexis/Nexis was an \"operational\" part of Mead's business and therefore subject to taxation outside Mead's home state. Mead countered that Lexis/Nexis was merely an \"investment,\" whose sale was immune from taxation from outside jurisdictions. The trial court found that the division was key to Mead's operations, and therefore taxable, and the Illinois Appellate Court agreed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55481:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55481:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55481:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court sent the case back to the state appellate court holding that the court had previously applied the wrong test in defining the relationship between Lexis/Nexis and Meadwestvaco. Writing for seven of his colleagues, Justice Samuel A. Alito said that the appellate court, rather than applying an \"operational function\" test, should have looked for the existence of \"functional integration, centralized management and economies of scale\" between the two companies to determine whether or not they were a unitary business for tax purposes. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion arguing that the Court should refuse jurisdiction over such state tax cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55481:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55482:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55482:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJose Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised a post-conviction challenge arguing that the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives any foreign national detained for a crime the right to contact his consulate. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court (see Medellin v. Dretke ), Medellin's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that the U.S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals (including Medellin) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also cited a memorandum from the President of the United States that instructed state courts to comply with the ICJ's rulings by rehearing the cases. Medellin argued that the Constitution gives the President broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the treatment of treaties in state court proceedings.\nThe Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez-Llamas as standing for the principle that rulings of the ICJ are not binding on state courts. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted by the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement in state court of an ICJ ruling, because that would imply a law-making power not allocated to him by the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55482:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55482:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55482:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court upheld the rulings of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a 6-3 opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts. The Court held that the signed Protocol of the Vienna Convention did not make the treaty self-executing and, therefore, the treaty is not binding upon state courts until it is enacted into law by Congress. Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts characterized the presidential memorandum as an attempt by the executive branch to enforce a non-self executing treaty without the necessary Congressional action, giving it no binding authority on state courts. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the opinion and Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, authored a dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55482:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55483:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55483:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of Michigan residents who were injured after taking Warner- Lambert's Rezulin diabetes drug sued the company in Michigan state court. The plaintiffs invoked a Michigan tort reform statue immunizing drug makers' liability for FDA-approved products unless the drug makers made misrepresentations to the agency. The federal district court that eventually heard the case dismissed it, ruling that the Michigan \"fraud on the FDA\" cause of action was preempted by a federal law that empowered the FDA itself to punish misrepresentations. The appeals court reversed, reasoning that the Michigan law did not provide retribution for misrepresentations themselves, but merely created a window for consumers to bring product liability claims where the product reached the market solely through the manufacturer's chicanery.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55483:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55483:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55483:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was affirmed by an equally divided Court without issuing a written opinion. Chief Justice John G. Roberts took no part in the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55483:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55485:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55485:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTrustee Michael J. Knight hired a firm to provide investment-management advice to the William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust. The Trust deducted all of the fees paid for the investment-advice service from its tax return, but the IRS rejected the deduction. A provision in 26 U.S.C. 67(e) allows trusts to fully deduct certain administrative costs, but the IRS maintained that fees for investment-advice services fall outside the statute's scope. The tax court agreed with the IRS and ruled the fees nondeductible. Federal Courts of Appeals had come to opposite conclusions on the question.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the tax court. The court cited Section 67(e)'s requirement that a trust's fees are only fully deductible when they \"would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust.\" The provision was meant to exempt special administrative expenses that are incurred by trusts. Therefore, the court ruled, costs that could possibly be incurred by individual taxpayers as well as trusts were never deductible in full. Since an individual could pay for investment-advice services, and since the individual's payment would not be fully deductable, Section 67(e) did not exempt a trust's payment for the same services.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55485:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55485:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55485:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling, holding that if an expense incurred by a trust is the type that would also be incurred by an individual taxpayer, the expense is subject to the same limits on deduction applied to individual expenses. Roberts reasoned that the tax statute at issue required a court to decide whether an individual customarily would spend money on the type of service at issue; if so, the expense would not be fully deductible by a trust. The case was remanded for further proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55485:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55486:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55486:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn his role as chairman of a settlement committee of the Board of Trade of the City of New York, Norman Eisler allegedly manipulated the daily settlement prices of commodities futures in order to conceal bad investments. During this period Eisler's company purchased futures contracts through its broker, the commodity futures merchant Klein & Co. Futures, Inc., but the alleged price manipulation distorted Klein's appraisal of Eisler's ability to pay. When the scheme unravelled, Eisler's company could not meet its obligations and Klein was forced to absorb the loss.\nKlein sued Eisler and the Board of Trade under Section 22 of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), claiming that the Board of Trade failed to enforce rules that would have prevented the manipulation. The CEA requires boards of trade to set rules governing the market, and Section 22 allows private parties to sue for failure to enforce the rules as long as the party was \"engaged in any transaction\" subject to the board's rules.\nThe U.S. District Court dismissed Klein's claim for lack of standing to sue, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit interpreted Section 22 as including buyers and sellers of futures contracts but excluding the commodity futures merchants who conduct the actual trades on behalf of their customers. The court ruled that Klein's financial loss was not sufficient to grant it standing, because the loss was suffered in the aftermath of the futures trading and not during the trading itself.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55486:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55486:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55486:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nDismissed pursuant to Rule 46 as a result of settlement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55486:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55487:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55487:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground in Alaska's Prince William Sound in 1989 while under the command of Joseph Hazelwood, a relapsed alcoholic. Exxon knew that Hazelwood had resumed drinking but did not relieve him of his post, and the ship eventually spilled 11 million gallons of oil into the ecologically sensitive sound. The jury calculated compensatory damages at $287 million, and then awarded $5 billion in punitive damages. The punitive award has been reviewed three times by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ultimately settled on a $2.5 billion figure. In a dissent from the full court's denial of rehearing in the third review of the award, Judge Alex Kozinski posited that any award, no matter its size, violated the maritime law rule that a ship owner need not pay for the reckless actions of an employee.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55487:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55487:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55487:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe and yes. With Justice Samuel Alito taking no part in the decision because he owns Exxon stock, the Court split evenly 4-4 on the issue of whether judges may award punitive damages against a company for employee misdeeds. Therefore, the Court left the Ninth Circuit's ruling that they can undisturbed, but noted that this affirmation could not be used as precedent because it merely reflected an even split in the Court. On the second issue, a 5-4 majority held that judges are free to create remedies in maritime cases where Congress has not legislated in the area. However, this freedom can be lost if Congress passes legislation restraining such judicial activism. Justice David Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing with the Court's application of punitive damages precedent but arguing that those prior holdings were in error. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, stating that Congress, not the courts, should be the sole body entrusted with determining the permissibility of punitive damages. Justice Stephen Breyer also concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the punitive damages in this case should have been reduced.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55487:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55488:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55488:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2005, the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring all voters who cast a ballot in person to present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana. Plaintiffs including the local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote. At trial, the plaintiffs did not produce any witnesses who claimed they would be unable to meet the law's requirements. The district court and the court of appeals both upheld the law. However, the three-judge appellate panel was deeply divided. Dissenting Judge Terrence Evans claimed that the law was a thinly-veiled attempt to dampen turnout by those likely to vote for Democratic candidates.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55488:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55488:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55488:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nBy a vote of 6 to 3, the Court upheld the law, concluding that the photo I.D. requirement was closely related to Indiana's legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud. The slight burden the law imposed on voters' rights did not outweigh these interests, which the Court characterized as \"neutral and nondiscriminatory.\" Although there was no majority opinion, the Court's decision included concurring opinions written by Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia. Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55488:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55489:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55489:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, Piccadilly Cafeterias filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition in federal court in Florida asking the bankruptcy court for permission to auction off its assets in order to fund a reorganization plan. Piccadilly sought a tax exemption under 11 U.S.C. 1146(c) which states that certain asset transfers \"under a [confirmed Chapter 11] plan may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.\" Florida vehemently opposed this exemption and sought to collect $32,000 in taxes from Piccadilly.\nThe bankruptcy court, the district court, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit all found in favor of Piccadilly, holding that 11 U.S.C. 1146(c) allowed courts to exempt from taxes pre-confirmation asset sales that were essential to the completion of a reorganization plan. In urging the Court to grant certiorari, Florida pointed to both Third and Fourth Circuit decisions holding that such pre-confirmation asset sales were subject to state taxation, while Piccadilly Cafeterias contended that these so-called \"circuit splits\" only involve a small handful of cases and require no resolution by the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55489:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55489:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55489:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held 7-2 that the plain meaning of the statute indicates that it only applies to confirmed asset sales, not \"pre-confirmation\" sales. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas noted Congress' use of the phrase \"plan confirmed\" in Sec. 1146(c), as well as the statute's placement in a sub-chapter titled \"Postconfirmation Matters,\" to hold that the tax exemption should only be applied after a plan has been confirmed. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented, interpreting this same language to mean that the tax break should apply to asset sales that are subsequently confirmed, even if they were not confirmed at the time the sales were made.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55489:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55490:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55490:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nProvisions of the District of Columbia Code made it illegal to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibited the registration of handguns, though the chief of police could issue one-year licenses for handguns. The Code also contained provisions that required owners of lawfully registered firearms to keep them unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or other similar device unless the firearms were located in a place of business or being used for legal recreational activities.\nDick Anthony Heller was a D.C. special police officer who was authorized to carry a handgun while on duty. He applied for a one-year license for a handgun he wished to keep at home, but his application was denied. Heller sued the District of Columbia. He sought an injunction against the enforcement of the relevant parts of the Code and argued that they violated his Second Amendment right to keep a functional firearm in his home without a license. The district court dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep firearms in the home for the purpose of self-defense, and the District of Columbia’s requirement that firearms kept in the home be nonfunctional violated that right.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55490:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55490:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55490:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe ban on registering handguns and the requirement to keep guns in the home disassembled or nonfunctional with a trigger lock mechanism violate the Second Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the first clause of the Second Amendment that references a “militia” is a prefatory clause that does not limit the operative clause of the Amendment. Additionally, the term “militia” should not be confined to those serving in the military, because at the time the term referred to all able-bodied men who were capable of being called to such service. To read the Amendment as limiting the right to bear arms only to those in a governed military force would be to create exactly the type of state-sponsored force against which the Amendment was meant to protect people. Because the text of the Amendment should be read in the manner that gives greatest effect to the plain meaning it would have had at the time it was written, the operative clause should be read to “guarantee an individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” This reading is also in line with legal writing of the time and subsequent scholarship. Therefore, banning handguns, an entire class of arms that is commonly used for protection purposes, and prohibiting firearms from being kept functional in the home, the area traditionally in need of protection, violates the Second Amendment.\nIn his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the Second Amendment does not create an unlimited right to possess guns for self-defense purposes. Instead, the most natural reading of the the Amendment is that it protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes but does not curtail the legislature’s power to regulate nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons. Justice Stevens argued that the Amendment states its purpose specifically in relation to state militias and does not address the right to use firearms in self-defense, which is particularly striking in light of similar state provisions from the same time that do so. Justice Stevens also notes that “the people” does not enlarge the protected group beyond the context of service in a state-regulated militia. This reading is in line with legal writing of the time that contextualizes the Amendment in relation to state militias and post-enactment legislative history. Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Second Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests, and it does not provide absolute protection from government intervention in these interests. Historical evidence from the time of ratification indicates that colonial laws regulated the storage and use of firearms in the home. Justice Breyer argued that the Court should adopt an interest-balancing test to determine when the government interests were sufficiently weighty to justify the proposed regulation. In this case, because the interest-balancing turns on the type of analysis that the legislature, not the court, is best positioned to make, the Court should defer to the legislature and uphold the restrictions. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55490:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55491:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55491:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSamson Dada, a Nigerian citizen, entered the United States in 1998 and overstayed his temporary visa. Dada married a U.S. citizen which made him eligible for permanent residence under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Dada's wife failed to provide the required documentation. In 2004 the government found Dada removable. An immigration judge granted Dada's request for voluntary departure. Before the window to leave the country closed, Dada filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In so doing, he asked that the voluntary departure order be withdrawn, to avoid the 10-year bar on future re-entry that accompanies a failure to leave the country within the allotted time. The Bureau of Immigration Affairs denied the request.\nDada appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It upheld the denial. Because Dada's voluntary departure period had expired, the appeals court found Dada subject to the 10-year bar on future re-entry.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55491:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55491:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55491:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by four other Justices, stated that an alien has two options in such a case: he may abide by the terms of the voluntary departure and leave the country on time, maintaining the re-entry perks, or withdraw the voluntary departure request and remain in the country to pursue the motion to reopen. If the alien chooses the second option, he may become subject to deportation proceedings. While the Court acknowledged that the opinion still leaves a difficult decision for aliens, it prevents them from reaping the benefits of the voluntary departure option while evading its terms to pursue continuing legal action against the government. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, arguing that once an alien agrees to depart voluntarily he should have no right to withdraw that agreement. Justice Samuel A. Alito also filed a separate dissent suggesting that it should be within the discretion of the Board of Immigration Appeals, not the Court, to permit or deny the withdrawal of an alien's voluntary departure agreement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55491:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55493:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55493:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring a company-wide reduction in force, Sprint fired fifty-one-year-old employee Ellen Mendelsohn. Mendelsohn sued, alleging that Sprint had discriminated against her on account of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. At the trial, Mendelsohn attempted to present evidence from other Sprint employees who alleged that they were also discriminated against by the company. This type of testimony by employees who are not parties to the case is sometimes called \"me, too\" testimony. The District Court judge refused to admit the testimony, citing the \"same supervisor\" rule. Since the other employees did not share a supervisor with Mendelsohn, their testimony was not relevant to the alleged discriminatory intent behind the decision to fire her.\nThe jury returned a verdict for Sprint, but on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial. The Tenth Circuit held that the \"same supervisor\" rule applies only to discriminatory disciplinary actions and not to suits alleging a company-wide policy of discrimination. The Tenth Circuit held that the \"me, too\" testimony was relevant because the other employees were similarly situated and fired around the same time, and it held that the testimony was important enough that its exclusion had denied Mendelsohn an opportunity to present her allegation of company-wide discrimination. The ruling conflicted with those of several other Circuit Courts which approved the exclusion of \"me, too\" testimony.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55493:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55493:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55493:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Tenth Circuit, according to the Court, acted incorrectly when it engaged in its own assessment of the relevance and prejudicial effect of the witness testimony. Instead, the Court said, because the district court's basis for ruling on the evidence was unclear, the Tenth Circuit should have remanded the case for clarification before finding that a per se rule of exclusion had been applied. The Court sent the case back to the Tenth Circuit and instructed it to follow this procedure.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55493:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55494:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55494:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe State of Washington reconstructed its primary election system according to Initiative 872, which was passed into law by a majority general vote in 2004. The initiative was endorsed by the Washington State Grange and created a new \"modified blanket primary\" system where each candidate on the ballot could affiliate with the party of his choosing regardless of whether the party approved of his candidacy. Political parties claimed that this system violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free association, arguing that control over which candidates to endorse constituted an essential function of association. The Grange argued that the primary was nonpartisan.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a District Court decision, ruling that since \"party designation is a powerful, partisan message that voters may rely upon in casting a vote,\" Initiative 872 \"constitutes a severe burden upon the parties' associational rights.\" (The case was consolidated with Washington v. Washington State Republican Party for argument before the Supreme Court.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55494:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55494:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55494:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-2 opinion, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and held the party affiliation provision constitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas explained that the state law never referred to the candidates as nominees of any particular party. Rather, the nominees were simply asserting which party they preferred to be associated with, and the Court found no convincing evidence that this association would lead voters to believe that the particular party actually endorsed the nominee. Chief Justice John G. Roberts concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55494:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55495:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55495:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2000, the IRS announced it was admitting the unconstitutionality of a 1978 coal export tax. In response, Clintwood Elkhorn Mining brought suit to recover funds paid, plus interest, under the unconstitutional tax scheme between the years 1994 and 1999. Clintwood sought recovery under the Export Clause of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C Section 1491, which applies a six-year statute of limitations to claims and makes no mention of interest payments. The government argued that such claims must be brought under the Tax Code, which allows interest but applies a three-year statute of limitations.\nBoth the Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit allowed the Tucker Act claims, but the circuit court overruled the federal claims court's decision denying interest payments. In urging the Court to review both conclusions, the government contended that the Federal Circuit's ruling was at odds with other circuit decisions prohibiting Tucker Act claims under similar circumstances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55495:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55495:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55495:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the Court refused to pay Clintwood refunds for the unconstitutionally levied taxes. The Court stated that the remedy for taxes imposed in violation of the Export Clause is the same as for any other unlawful tax: filing a timely administrative refund claim. Until taxpayers exhaust this avenue, they are prohibited from bringing a direct suit against the government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55495:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55496:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55496:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHomero Gonzalez was tried with a co-defendant on several drug-related charges. He pled not guilty and opted for a jury trial. When jury selection began, a magistrate judge who had presided over several pretrial matters announced that she would conduct voir dire, and sought consent from the parties. Attorneys for the government and for Gonzalez expressly agreed. Gonzalez, who was being assisted by a translator, was not directly asked to consent, nor did he affirmatively object. He argued on appeal that he had the right to a new trial because he did not give his personal consent for a magistrate to conduct the jury interviews.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55496:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55496:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55496:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held 8-1 that express consent by counsel suffices to permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial, stating that such \"scheduling matters\" are among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. Seven Justices formed the majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy with Justice Antonin Scalia concurring in the judgment and Justice Clarence Thomas dissenting.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55496:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55497:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55497:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Michael Greenlaw was convicted of several drug and firearm offenses in federal court, the prosecution argued that he should receive a mandatory minimum sentencing hike because he had been convicted of two counts under the federal gun law. The district judge, in a decision incorrect under the Supreme Court's holding in Deal v. United States, reasoned that the mandatory minimum should not apply because the second offense was not the result of a separate, pre-existing indictment.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit vacated the sentence and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to apply the mandatory minimum. In seeking certiorari, Greenlaw argued that the Eight Circuit had ignored substantial high court precedent holding that an appellate court may not order a higher criminal sentence without a government request to do so. Greenlaw further sought clarification of two related issues: whether the lack of a government appeal deprives the appellate court of authority as a matter of jurisdiction or merely as a custom of practice, and whether such appellate court discretion is allowable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which allows courts to consider plain errors even when the parties do not raise them. The Solicitor General, while agreeing with Greenlaw that the Eighth Circuit erred, urged the Court to grant certiorari and remand the case for further briefing in order to give the appellate court an opportunity to revisit its holding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55497:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55497:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55497:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision, the Court stated that the Eighth Circuit could not order the district court to increase Greenlaw's sentence without a request from the government to do so. The Court pointed to several of its precedents for the rule that a remedy in favor the appellee, in this case the government, can only be justified if the appellee brings a cross-appeal. Because the government did not cross-appeal in this case, the Eight Circuit overstepped its bounds by ordering the sentencing hike. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens and in part by Justice Stephen Breyer, dissented, arguing that the cross-appeal rule was merely a rule of practice for the appellate courts, not a limitation on their power. Although Breyer joined parts of the dissent, he ultimately sided with the majority in a concurring opinion, recognizing that the cross-appeal rule is merely one of practice but finding no grounds on which to make an exception to that rule in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55497:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55498:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55498:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2002 Lakhdar Boumediene and five other Algerian natives were seized by Bosnian police when U.S. intelligence officers suspected their involvement in a plot to attack the U.S. embassy there. The U.S. government classified the men as enemy combatants in the war on terror and detained them at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is located on land that the U.S. leases from Cuba. Boumediene filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging violations of the Constitution's Due Process Clause, various statutes and treaties, the common law, and international law. The District Court judge granted the government's motion to have all of the claims dismissed on the ground that Boumediene, as an alien detained at an overseas military base, had no right to a habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal but the Supreme Court reversed in Rasul v. Bush, which held that the habeas statute extends to non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo.\nIn 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The Act eliminates federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from detainees who have been designated (according to procedures established in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005) as enemy combatants. When the case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit for the second time, the detainees argued that the MCA did not apply to their petitions, and that if it did, it was unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause reads: \"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.\"\nThe D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the government on both points. It cited language in the MCA applying the law to \"all cases, without exception\" that pertain to aspects of detention. One of the purposes of the MCA, according to the Circuit Court, was to overrule the Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which had allowed petitions like Boumediene's to go forward. The D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause only protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789, and that the writ would not have been understood in 1789 to apply to an overseas military base leased from a foreign government. Constitutional rights do not apply to aliens outside of the United States, the court held, and the leased military base in Cuba does not qualify as inside the geographic borders of the U.S. In a rare reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after initially denying review three months earlier.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55498:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55498:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55498:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA five-justice majority answered yes to each of these questions. The opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, stated that if the MCA is considered valid its legislative history requires that the detainees' cases be dismissed. However, the Court went on to state that because the procedures laid out in the Detainee Treatment Act are not adequate substitutes for the habeas writ, the MCA operates as an unconstitutional suspension of that writ. The detainees were not barred from seeking habeas or invoking the Suspension Clause merely because they had been designated as enemy combatants or held at Guantanamo Bay. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's ruling and found in favor of the detainees. Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia filed separate dissenting opinions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55498:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55499:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55499:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Tax Injunction Act establishes a general rule that federal courts will not interfere with matters of state taxation, but the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act) provides an exception for railroads. In an effort to prevent state tax discrimination against railroads, Section 306 of the 4-R Act requires that the ratio of the assessed value to the true market value of railroad property not exceed by more than five percent the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction. This calculation requires that states determine the \"true market value\" of the railroads' property - a valuation that can be subjective. Using a new valuation methodology, the Georgia State Board of Equalization appraised the property of the railroad company CSX Transportation, Inc. at $8.2 billion. CSX filed a complaint under the 4-R Act, noting that the old appraisal methodology would have valued the property at only $6 billion. Despite CSX's argument that the 4-R Act allows railroads to challenge state valuation methods, the district court ruled that the only the state's methodology could be considered.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that in the absence of a clear statement in the 4-R Act, principles of federalism weighed against interpreting the Act to give railroads additional power to challenge the taxing authority of the states in federal court. The Circuit Court stood by the general principle that federal courts should not interfere with state taxation policies. Since the 4-R Act did not allow challenges to the state's choice of valuation method, CSX could not bring its arguments that Georgia's methodology was faulty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55499:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55499:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55499:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court reversed the 11th Circuit in a unanimous decision. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. stated that courts cannot blindly accept the states' market valuations without potentially endorsing the type of discriminatory tax practices that the 4-R Act was designed to thwart. The Court also rejected Georgia's state sovereignty argument, holding that tax valuation methods are technical tools utilized by state employees, not expressions of state policy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55499:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55500:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55500:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnup Engquist, a woman of Indian descent, brought this action against the Oregon Department of Agriculture alleging that a co-worker at the Department harassed her and eventually engineered her termination. Although Engquist asserted numerous claims, a jury in the federal district court only found in her favor on her equal protection, substantive due process, and intentional interference with employment claims.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck those jury verdicts. Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had previously dealt with such \"class of one\" equal protection claims eight years ago in a case, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, involving a village resident suing the village for unjustified zoning decisions, it refused to apply that short, two-page opinion to Engquist's claim. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Olech opinion may only apply when the government is in the role of regulator and did not clarify whether it would also apply in an employment context such as this one. In seeking Court review, Engquist noted the pervasive splits in the circuits regarding the proper allocation of the Court's decision in Olech, while Oregon claimed that Olech should be construed narrowly so as to avoid a deluge of petty cases against the government. Oregon also pointed out that even if the case were to be heard, Oregon would have qualified immunity and Engquist would necessarily lose.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55500:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55500:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55500:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, it does not. The Court ruled 6-3 that the \"class-of-one\" theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. The government enjoys significantly greater leeway in dealing with employees than it does with the public at large in its capacity as a regulator. Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote the majority opinion.Justice John Paul Stevens authored a dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55500:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55501:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55501:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the California legislature passed laws prohibiting the use of state funds to \"assist, promote, or deter union organizing,\" a group of California companies brought suit claiming the state laws were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 7. The Act provides that companies' anti-labor speech can only be considered evidence of unfair labor practice if it threatens or coerces workers. The California companies argued that the state laws infringe upon their \"safe harbor\" for anti-labor speech embodied in the Act.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after entering two panel decisions holding the California law preempted, issued a split en banc opinion holding that it was not. The Second Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion on similar facts. The Court's decision in this case will affect roughly a dozen other states currently considering adopting legislation substantially similar to the California law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55501:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55501:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55501:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held the California laws preempted by the National Labor Relations Act because the state laws regulated within \"a zone protected and reserved for market freedom.\" Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court, viewed the Act as showing a \"congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management.\" Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the California laws dealt with funding, not regulation, and did not impermissibly discourage labor-related speech. Employers are still free under the laws to spend their own money on such speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55501:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55504:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55504:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Louisiana court found Patrick Kennedy guilty of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter. Louisiana law allows the district attorney to seek the death penalty for defendants found guilty of raping children under the age of twelve. The prosecutor sought, and the jury awarded, such a sentence; Kennedy appealed.\nThe Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the death sentence, noting that although the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down capital punishment for rape of an adult woman in Coker v. Georgia, that ruling did not apply when the victim was a child. Rather the Louisiana high court applied a balancing test set out by the Court in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, first examining whether there is a national consensus on the punishment and then considering whether the court would find the punishment excessive. In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court felt that the adoption of similar laws in five other states, coupled with the unique vulnerability of children, justified imposing the death penalty.\nIn seeking certiorari, Kennedy argued that five states do not constitute a \"national consensus\" for the purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, that Coker v. Georgia should apply to all rapes regardless of the age of the victim, and that the law was unfair in its application, singling out black child rapists for death at a significantly higher rate than whites.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55504:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55504:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55504:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars states from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the child's death. Applying the death penalty in such a case would be an exercise of \"cruel and unusual punishment\" in violation of a national consensus on the issue. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, dissented. In his view, no national consensus existed prohibiting the death penalty in this case, and he vehemently opposed the majority's application of a \"blanket rule\" barring the death penalty in child rape cases regardless of the facts of the case, including the age of the child, the sadistic nature of the crime, and the number of times the child has been raped.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55504:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55505:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55505:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York trial court judges are appointed by way of a \"district convention system.\" Under this system, political party members elect delegates, who in turn vote for judicial candidates nominated at party conventions. Margarita Lopez Torres sought appointment to a New York Supreme Court but did not have a political party's endorsement. Lopez Torres claimed that the system unconstitutionally obstructed judicial appointments by making candidates reliant upon political parties. The New York Board of Elections defended the system, arguing that it did not bar voters from participating because they had the opportunity to elect delegates.\nA District Court found that the system unnecessarily and excessively restricted elections. It cited the absence of a \"single successful challenge to candidates backed by the party leaders.\" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that the system gave political party officials too much power and violated voters' and candidates' First Amendment rights to freedom of association.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55505:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55505:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55505:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court reversed the Second Circuit, finding that the election scheme did not implicate Lopez Torres' rights under the First Amendment. What constituted a \"fair shot\" at obtaining the nomination, according to the Court, was a reasonable enough question for legislative judgment, which the Court would accept so long as it did not too much infringe upon a party's associational rights. The Court maintained that the First Amendment did not compel any substantive change in New York's practice of electing judicial officials.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55505:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55506:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55506:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFour-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.\nA District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have \"had civil rights restored.\" The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55506:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55506:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55506:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, affirmed the Seventh Circuit and held that the ACCA amendment should be read literally and should apply only when civil rights had been rescinded and later restored. Although Ginsburg admitted the amendment might result in disparate treatment of criminals under the Act, she declined to offer a clarifying interpretation of the ACCA, stating that it was unclear what subset of criminals Congress intended to treat leniently by using the \"civil rights restored\" language.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55506:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55507:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55507:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Keith Burgess pleaded guilty to a drug distribution charge in 2003, the government requested that his statutory minimum sentence be increased from ten to twenty years. The government based this request on 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A), which requires such a sentencing hike for defendants with prior felony drug convictions. The statute defined \"felony drug offense\" as any felony under any provision of the statute or any other federal law. Burgess argued that this definition conflicts with 21 U.S.C. Section 802(13) which requires that a felony drug offense be punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. Therefore, any enhancement of his sentence must be barred unless both statutory definitions are fulfilled. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected Burgess' argument, the D.C. Circuit reached the opposite conclusion based on similar facts in 2004.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55507:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55507:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55507:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court upheld the sentencing hike, stating that the definition of a felony drug offense in 12 U.S.C. 841 as punishable by imprisonment for more than one year was controlling regardless of whether South Carolina classified the offense as a felony or a misdemeanor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that the definition of \"felony drug offense\" in the statute does not incorporate any other definition of \"felony\" under federal or state law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55507:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55508:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55508:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHumberto Fidel Regaldo Cuellar was apprehended in 2004 driving a Volkwagen Beetle crawling 30 miles below the speed limit on a main artery through Texas to Mexico. When police pulled Cuellar over, they discovered that he had logged about 1,000 miles in the past two days stopping in major cities along the way for just hours each time. When questioned, Cuellar acted nervously; he later turned over a large roll of cash that smelled like marijuana. When police examined the car, they found drill marks suggesting tampering with the gas tank, as well as mud splashings and animal hair typical of efforts to conceal the existence of contraband. Police found $83,000 in cash in a secret compartment beneath the floorboard. Cuellar was convicted of money laundering, but the appeals court overturned the conviction. The court ruled that the federal money laundering statute required the government to prove that Cuellar was attempting to portray the money he carried as legitimate wealth, rather than merely showing that he tried to hide it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55508:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55508:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55508:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNeither. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court answered this question by taking the middle ground, holding that the statute contains no \"legitimate wealth\" requirement but also holding that mere proof that the defendant was attempting to conceal the money is not enough to uphold a conviction. In reversing Cuellar's conviction, the Court relied on the language of the statute providing that the transportation's purpose must have been to conceal not just the money itself but its nature, location, source, ownership, or control. The Court found that prosecutors had failed to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55508:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55509:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55509:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Dwayne Giles was tried in state court for the murder of his ex-girlfriend, he claimed self-defense. Giles stated that he had heard her vow to hurt him and a friend, and that she had previously shot a man and threatened people with knives. The prosecution then introduced evidence of a conversation between Giles' ex-girlfriend and police in which she claimed that he had assaulted her and threatened to kill her. The district court eventually convicted Giles of murder.\nOn appeal, Giles argued that use of the police conversation violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, namely, his deceased ex-girlfriend. The California Supreme Court held that Giles had waived this right because he was the cause of his ex-girlfriend's absence. Although this exclusion was justified under common law rules of \"forfeiture by wrongdoing\", the Supreme Court had greatly constrained the admissibility of such evidence in its 2004 holding in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford essentially wiped out the admissibility of such out-of-court statements unless the testimony could be subject to cross-examination at trial, an option that would be impossible under these circumstances. This case gives the Court an opportunity to expand on its decision in Crawford and to apply it to a situation where the wrongdoing that kept the witness from appearing in court was not motivated by a desire to prevent the witness' testimony.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55509:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55509:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55509:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception only applies to situations where the defendant causes the witness' absence with the intention of preventing that witness from testifying at trial. Without this intention, any act by the defendant making the witness unavailable does not waive that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witness, and therefore any out-of-court statements made by the witness are inadmissible as evidence. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion stressing his belief that statements such as those made by the witness in this case should not implicate the Confrontation Clause at all because the police questioning was not a \"formalized dialogue.\" Justice Samuel Alito also wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that the witness' statements, in his view, did not fall within the Confrontation Clause but noting that neither party had made this argument before the Court. Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred in all parts of the majority opinion except one section denouncing the dissenting argument. Justice Souter stated that he did not find the dissent as wrongheaded as the majority suggested.\nThe dissent, written by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Anthony Kennedy, argued that a defendant loses his right to confrontation when he makes a witness unavailable due to his own wrongdoing, even if he did not act with the specific intention of preventing her from testifying at trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55509:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55510:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55510:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLG Electronics owned patents for a group of products, including microprocessor chips used in personal computers. It licensed the patents to Intel, but in a well-publicized separate agreement excluded from the license any Intel customer that integrated the chip with non-Intel components. One purchaser disregarded the agreement and used the chips in computers made for Dell, Hewlett-Packard and Gateway. LG Electronics sued those who passed the chips down the line of commerce to companies that had not purchased licenses.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55510:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55510:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55510:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court concluded unanimously that it could not. Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas relied on the theory of \"patent exhaustion,\" which provides that a patented item's initial authorized sale terminates all patent rights to that item, denying LGE royalties from companies down the line of commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55510:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55511:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55511:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Gino Rodriquez was released from prison on supervision, he promptly absconded and was later found with $900 cash, heroin and a gun. Prosecutors argued that Rodriquez was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which applies to those convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm if they have a total of three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Rodriquez had two California burglary convictions. Prosecutors argued that the third required conviction was supplied by Rodriquez's Washington drug offenses. Although none of the three drug convictions, on their own, was considered \"serious,\" the second and third were repeat offenses and therefore punishable by ten-year sentences sufficient to qualify as serious under the federal career criminal law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55511:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55511:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55511:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held 6-3 that although the elements of a particular crime may not be considered \"serious,\" a defendant's prior record will have a considerable bearing on making the determination. A crime's seriousness may be greatly enhanced when its maximum sentence is increased due to the defendant's prior convictions for similar or related crimes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55511:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55512:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55512:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile a student at the University of Iowa, Brian Gall was involved in a drug ring distributing ecstasy (methylenedioxymethamphetamine, MDMA). He voluntarily left the drug conspiracy and moved to Arizona where he started his own business and led a crime-free life. When federal agents tracked him down, he turned himself in and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. The government argued for a sentence of 30 months in prison, which was the minimum sentence in the range recommended for the offense by the federal sentencing guidelines. Taking into account the mitigating circumstances in Gall's case, the judge instead decided to depart from the guidelines and impose a sentence of 36 months of probation. (The Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the sentencing guidelines to be merely advisory, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.)\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit held that while the guidelines are not mandatory, sentences that fall outside of the recommended sentencing range must overcome a presumption of unreasonableness. Sentences varying from the guidelines must be justified based on the circumstances of the case, and larger variances from the guidelines require correspondingly more compelling justifications. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the district court had erred by using Gall's youth as a mitigating factor, by overweighing his rehabilitation, and by underweighing the seriousness of the crime. Since the \"extraordinary variance\" was not justified by a finding of extraordinary circumstances, the Eighth Circuit ordered a new sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55512:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55512:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55512:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court, in a 7-2 ruling, reversed the appellate court and held that, under Booker, federal courts have the authority to set any reasonable sentence as long as they explain their reasoning. The Court made clear that Booker had removed the Guidelines from their earlier status as the primary determinate of a defendant's punishment, reaffirming the Guidelines' advisory status. The opinion was penned by Justice Stevens, with Justices David Souter and Antonin Scalia filing opinions concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito were the sole dissenters.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55512:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55513:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55513:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen calculating gross income for tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Code exempts from taxation the interest earned on any state or local bond. However, Kentucky law requires that interest income earned on bonds issued by other states be taxed as part of an individual's adjusted gross income. George and Catherine Davis filed a class action complaint arguing that Kentucky's policy of taxing out-of-state bonds was in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause - the doctrine that the Commerce Clause forbids states from interfering with interstate commerce. The state trial court ruled in favor of the Kentucky Department of Revenue and declared the tax policy constitutional.\nOn appeal, the Davises stressed Kentucky's market discrimination against other states as a factor indicating that the policy was unconstitutional. In response, the Department of Revenue cited a similar policy that was upheld by state courts in Ohio. The Department also invoked the \"market participant doctrine,\" which stands for the idea that only the state's actions as a regulator are subject to the dormant Commerce Clause. Actions undertaken as a market participant, such as the issuance of bonds, are not. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and struck down the tax policy. The Court of Appeals held that the tax discrimination rather than the bond issuance was at issue, and the taxation was indisputably undertaken in the state's capacity as a regulator. The court concluded that the Commerce Clause was incompatible with such a discriminatory state policy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55513:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55513:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55513:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held 7-2 that Kentucky's differential tax scheme does not offend the Commerce Clause. No single opinion commanded a majority. Bond proceeds are a \"quintessentially public function,\" the Court noted, and are therefore likely motivated by legitimate state objectives other than simple economic protectionism. These objectives outweigh any negative effect the tax may have on interstate commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55513:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55514:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55514:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen British Petroleum (BP) wanted to build a natural gas transfer facility on the New Jersey side of the Delaware River, the State of Delaware objected that the pier construction would require the dredging of underwater lands it considered part of its coastal zone. Delaware denied BP a permit for the construction despite the fact that most of the construction would take place on the New Jersey side of the river. New Jersey granted the permit, arguing that a 1905 compact between the States settling a boundary dispute placed the construction site under New Jersey control. New Jersey filed a claim to settle the dispute and the case went directly to the Court under its original jurisdiction to hear disputes between two States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55514:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55514:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55514:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held 6-2 that the 1905 compact between the States did not give New Jersey exclusive control over the construction project. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the Court, stated that Delaware acted within its authority in denying unreasonable uses of the river and soil within the lands it controls under the compact. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in, and Justice Antonin Scalia dissented from, the majority's opinion.Justice Stephen G. Breyer recused himself.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55514:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55515:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55515:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVirginia police stopped David Lee Moore after receiving a radio call alerting them that he was driving on a suspended license. State law specified the procedure for punishing that infraction: issuance of a citation and summons to appear in court. The officers instead decided to arrest Moore. After reading Moore his Miranda rights, they asked for and received consent to search his hotel room. Once they arrived at the room, they decided to search his person and discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine. Moore was then charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.\nAt trial court, Moore's attorney sought to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court allowed the evidence to be presented and Moore was convicted. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the introduction of the cocaine evidence at trial was unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55515:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55515:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55515:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held unanimously that the search did not violate Moore's constitutional rights. Writing for an eight justice majority (with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurring), Justice Antonin Scalia stated that the existence of probable cause gives an arresting officer the right to perform a reasonable search of the accused to ensure the officer's safety and to safeguard evidence. States may impose stricter search and seizure requirements, Scalia wrote, but \"when states go above the Fourth Amendment minimum, the Constitution's protections concerning search and seizure remain the same.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55515:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55516:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55516:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHendrick Humphries, an African-American, was an associate manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant owned by CBOCS. After he was fired, Humphries filed a lawsuit claiming discrimination and retaliation under 42 USC Section 1981. Humphries alleged that retaliation took many forms of abuse by his superiors. Section 1981, which derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, states in part that \"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.\"\nHumphries lost his case in federal district court but on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Section 1981 protects against retaliation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55516:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55516:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55516:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. The 7-2 decision, written by Justice Stephen Breyer, relied heavily on the concept of stare decisis, or adherence to prior Court decisions, in reaching its conclusion. Justice Breyer maintained that the historical interpretation of Section 1981 by the Court, as well as the legislative history leading up to the enactment of the law, placed a heavy burden on anyone arguing against including retaliation claims within the scope of Section 1981, and the burden was not met in this case. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Antonin Scalia joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55516:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55517:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55517:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1987, the United States Attorney General precleared a local Alabama law providing for a special election to fill vacancies on the Mobile County Commission, an exception to the usual procedure of gubernatorial appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the election violated the Alabama Constitution, so in response the Alabama Legislature passed an act explicitly allowing local laws to establish such an election. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the new state law failed to revive the local law. The plaintiffs, a group of Alabama residents, brought this suit in federal court alleging that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required the State of Alabama to preclear the two decisions of the Supreme Court in an action against the Governor of Alabama.\nThe U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found for the plaintiffs, stating that because the local law was the most recent precleared practice put into effect with the 1987 special election, it was the baseline from which to determine if there was a change. Because the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered the local law invalid and the state law unenforceable, the two decisions represented changes that should have been precleared before being implemented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55517:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55517:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55517:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court characterized the Alabama law permitting the local elections as a \"temporary misapplication of state law\" and held that such a law was not in \"force or effect\" even if actually implemented by state election officials. Because the law never gained force or effect, it did not represent a change from the baseline and therefore Alabama's reinstatement of its prior practice did not require preclearance. The 7-2 opinion was written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg with a dissent by Justice John Paul Stevens in which Justice David Souter joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55517:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55518:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55518:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGreg Herrick, the owner of one of two F-45s, a rare 1930s vintage airplane, in existence filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking the plans and specifications for the craft from the Federal Aviation Administration. After the FAA refused to turn over the plans as \"protected trade secrets,\" Herrick filed suit against the FAA to recover the plans. The district court found for the FAA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Subsequently, roughly a month later, Brent Taylor, represented by Herrick's attorney, filed another FOIA request seeking the plans. When the request was again denied, Taylor also filed suit in federal court in the District of Columbia.\nThe district court determined that Taylor had been \"virtually represented\" by Herrick in the first suit and therefore could not pursue the second suit in federal court. This judgment was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In seeking Supreme Court review, Taylor argued the D.C. Circuit's finding that Taylor and Herrick enjoyed a close enough relationship for virtual representation to apply conflicted with several other circuits requiring a much closer nexus to block the second claim. Opposing certiorari, Fairchild Corp. (the airplane manufacturer) arguing on behalf of the FAA, claimed that Taylor had overstated the circuit splits. It also pointed out that, because Taylor and Herrick were collaborating on the plane restoration and were represented by the same attorney, the logical conclusion was that they were attempting to relitigate the same issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55518:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55518:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55518:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that such \"nonparty preclusion\" runs up against the \"deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.\" Virtual representation should only be applied rarely and under certain exceptions to the general rule, none of which the Court found applicable in this case. The D.C. Circuit's decision was vacated and the case sent back to the district court for a new trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55518:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55519:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55519:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nStoneridge Investment Partners alleged that the cable company Charter Communications had fraudulently inflated the price of its stock. The alleged scheme involved a \"sham transaction\" in which Charter gave its equipment vendor, Scientific-Atlanta, above-normal payments for T.V. set-top boxes and the vendor then gave back the extra payments as advertising fees. Charter then fraudulently accounted the returned payments as revenue. Stoneridge sued both Charter and Scientific-Atlanta under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but the district court threw out the claim against Scientific- Atlanta. The court ruled that Stoneridge's claim against the vendor was only a claim for aiding and abetting fraud.\nThe Supreme Court had ruled in Central Bank of Denver v. First International Bank of Denver that Section 10(b) punishes only deceptive conduct itself, not aiding and abetting such conduct. However, the Court that secondary actors such as banks, lawyers, and accountants can be considered violators of Section 10(b) if they engage in deceptive conduct along with the primary actor. On appeal, Stoneridge argued that Scientific-Atlanta qualified as a primary violator of Section 10(b). Scientific-Atlanta countered that it had not participated in Charter's fraudulent accounting practices, and, in contrast to Charter, it had made no false public statements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled for Scientific Atlanta. The Circuit Court held that the vendor could at most be accused of aiding and abetting Charter's deception, and such claims are not allowed under Section 10(b) according to the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55519:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55519:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55519:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that, under Central Bank and Section 10(b), securities fraud plaintiffs cannot sue \"aiders and abettors\" like Scientific-Atlanta. The Court noted Congress' subsequent failure to create a right of private action against aiders and abettors in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act for support of its position that no such right should be allowed in the present case. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, reading Central Bank as allowing the claim against Scientific-Atlanta because, in this case, it had actually undertaken plainly deceptive acts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55519:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55520:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55520:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2004, Richard Irizarry pleaded guilty to threatening his ex-wife. The district court sentenced Irizarry to five years, the maximum sentence allowed by law. The court imposed this sentence, which is six months longer than the sentence prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, because it felt Irizarry was likely to continue to threaten his ex-wife.\nIrizarry appealed, arguing that the district court violated Rule 32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by not giving advance notice that it was considering a ground for departure not identified in the presentence report or a prehearing government submission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected this claim, stating that the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in U.S. v. Booker had made the guidelines advisory as opposed to mandatory. In imposing a harsher sentence than that suggested by the federal guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, the district judge had merely varied the federal rules, not departed from them.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55520:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55520:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55520:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the five-justice majority, held that advance warning of a sentence departing from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is unnecessary after Booker, which made the guidelines advisory. If the guidelines were still mandatory, Stevens argued, advance warning might be required. Justice Stephen J. Breyer, joined by three other Justices, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55520:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55521:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55521:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nToy manufacturer Mattel was sued by its landlord Hall Street Associates in a dispute over a property lease. After the litigation went to federal court both parties agreed to resolve the case by arbitration according to the procedures outlined in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Atypically, the parties' arbitration agreement stipulated that the District Court could override the arbitrator's decision if \"the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous.\" This provision of the agreement granted the federal courts a much broader role in supervising the arbitration than is specifically granted in the FAA. The Act explicitly mentions only a narrow set of circumstances under which courts can override an arbitration award, such as corruption, partiality, or misbehavior on the part of the arbitrator.\nThe arbitrator heard the parties' arguments and handed down a decision in favor of Mattel. Hall sought review from the District Court, and that court found that the arbitrator's decision contained legally erroneous conclusions. Accordingly, the arbitrator ruled for Hall Street, and the District Court affirmed.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the original arbitration award favoring Mattel must stand. Even if the arbitrator did make legal errors, it was not the place of the courts to review the soundness of the arbitrator's decision. The Ninth Circuit viewed the FAA's list of circumstances meriting judicial review as an exclusive list. As far as the original arbitration agreement expanded the scope of judicial review of the arbitration, the agreement could not be enforced.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55521:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55521:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55521:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-3 opinion, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit ruling and held that the provisions of the FAA are exclusive and cannot be expanded through contractual agreement. Writing for the majority, Justice David Souter pointed to words such as \"must\" and \"unless\" in the FAA as evidence that its provisions were intended to be mandatory and incapable of modification by the parties. Therefore, the Court upheld the arbitrator's award in favor of Mattel.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the FAA's central purpose-ensuring the enforcement of arbitration agreements-made judicial review necessary in this case. Justice Stephen Breyer also filed a separate dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55521:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55522:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55522:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFor his role in running an illegal lottery or \"bolita,\" Efrain Santos was convicted on charges of illegal gambling and money laundering. Santos had used income from the lottery to pay both the winners and the couriers and collectors who worked for the gambling operation. The money laundering charges were based on 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), which criminalizes the use of the \"proceeds\" of an illegal activity to promote or conceal that activity. However, federal courts disagreed on the meaning of \"proceeds.\" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had ruled that the proceeds used in money laundering can be any of the gross income obtained from the illegal activity, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which had jurisdiction over Santos's case, had recently ruled that only net income (gross revenues minus expenses) used to promote or conceal illegal activities can be the basis of a money laundering conviction. Because Santos had only used gross revenues to promote his lottery, the District Court reversed the convictions.\nThe government argued on appeal that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation would put too great a burden on prosecutions, because the bookkeeping of criminal operations is often purposefully incomplete or misleading in order to obscure the distinction between gross and net income. The narrow interpretation would also restrict money laundering prosecutions to criminal enterprises that are actually profitable. Santos countered that the government's broad interpretation would result in overlapping convictions for a wide variety of offenders charged with both money laundering and the underlying crime. He argued that the government's interpretation strayed too far from the traditional understanding of money laundering, which focuses on the subsequent disguising of profits obtained from a criminal venture. The Seventh Circuit ruled for Santos and affirmed its original ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55522:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55522:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55522:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSplitting 5 to 4, the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, answering that \"proceeds\" refers to \"net income\" or profits and not to \"gross income.\" Because the statute nowhere defines the term \"proceeds\", the plurality applied the so-called rule of lenity which requires such ambiguous statutes to be interpreted in favor of defendants. Justice Antonin Scalia announced the judgment and wrote a plurality opinion for himself and three other justices. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55522:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55523:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55523:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi-automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who \"uses or carries\" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs \"uses\" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that \"use\" means \"active employment\" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use.\nOn appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of \"use.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55523:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55524:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55524:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nProperty owners in Cook County, Illinois neglected to pay their tax bills and the county acquired liens on their real estate. John Bridge and Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. mailed competing bids for the real estate liens when they were auctioned off by the county. Property liens are distributed proportionally to the parties seeking the lowest penalty from the original owner. After Bridge and Phoenix tied for the best bid, they were required to mail affidavits to the county stating that they were bidding in their own names and were not related to any other bidders. Subsequently, Phoenix filed suit against Bridge claiming the affidavits he sent were false and hid the fact that he was actually in collusion with other bidders, thereby obtaining more than his fair share of the liens. The district court held Phoenix lacked standing because Bridge had made the false statements to the county, not Phoenix.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that Phoenix had suffered injury in fact proximately caused by Bridge. In seeking certiorari, Bridge noted splits between the circuits on the issue of whether a plaintiff must plead and prove reliance on a false statement in a RICO claim. Although Phoenix suggested that proximate cause, not reliance or standing, was the ultimate issue in this case, the Court has decided to frame its review around the reliance issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55524:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55524:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55524:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, they may. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held in favor of Phoenix, stating that a plaintiff bringing a RICO claim based on mail fraud does not need to show that it actually relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. Plaintiffs do not lack standing merely because the false statements were made to a third party.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55524:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55525:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55525:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) guarantees students with disabilities a \"free appropriate public education.\" Tom Freston enrolled his son Gilbert in a private school for students with special needs, because the New York City school district was unable to establish an adequate \"individualized education program.\" The school district reimbursed Freston for the private school tuition. After two years the school district offered to place Gilbert in another public school, but Freston chose to keep his son in private school and again sought tuition reimbursement from the district.\nA U.S. district court ruled that the school district was not required by the IDEA to reimburse Freston, because Gilbert had never been enrolled in public school. The relevant section of the IDEA authorizes tuition reimbursement to the parents of a disabled child \"who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency,\" but it does not explicitly state that parents of children who have never received public education are not entitled to reimbursement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court. By comparing the disputed section of the IDEA with other sections of the statute, the Second Circuit reasoned that the IDEA was not meant to deny reimbursement to students who have never been enrolled in public school. To rule otherwise, the Circuit Court held, would be to require parents like Freston to enroll children in inadequate public schools in order to be eligible for tuition reimbursement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55525:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55525:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55525:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court's role in the case proved to be anticlimactic. Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part in consideration of the case, leaving the eight remaining Justices to split evenly 4-4, affirming the judgment of the Second Circuit. This result leaves open the issue of reimbursements for private school placements under the IDEA when parents reject a public school placement and the child has not received special education services in the public school.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55525:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55526:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55526:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2005, the former manager for Alex Ferrer, television's Judge Alex, sued him to recover alleged unpaid commissions. The management contract at issue specifically called for all such disputes to be arbitrated out of court. Judge Alex responded by filing a complaint with California's labor commissioner charging that the management contract was illegal because the manager had actually been serving as an unlicensed talent agent in violation of California law. The commissioner, who has exclusive jurisdiction over talent agency disputes, said that he lacked authority to stop the arbitration. When Judge Alex filed suit in state court, the court stopped the arbitration.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55526:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55526:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55526:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court disagreed with the California Labor Commissioner's assessment and allowed the arbitration to continue. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for an 8-1 majority, stated that the California law granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Commission was superseded by the Federal Arbitration Act because the parties to this case had agreed to arbitrate any contractual disputes. Therefore, it was the function of an arbitrator, not the Labor Commission, to determine the legality of the management contract. Justice Clarence Thomas issued the sole dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55526:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55527:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55527:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1996, the Federal Communications Commission moved to require long-distance carriers to compensate pay-phone companies for so-called coinless phone calls. Last year, the Supreme Court ruled in Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., that pay-phone operators could sue for greater compensation. This case arose when APCC Services brought such a suit against Sprint seeking compensation for coinless long-distance calls. Sprint argued that APCC had no stake in the outcome of the case because, under the terms of the assignment, any compensation from a favorable judgment or settlement would go directly to the pay-phone companies, not \"intermediary\" companies such as APCC.\nThe district court initially dismissed APCC's suit, but the court eventually reversed itself, concluding that it was sufficient that the assignment transferred legal title to the claim rather than merely transferring power of attorney. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed, concluding that, as a matter of law, the assignment of a legal right to bring a claim gives the assignee a personal stake in the litigation sufficient to confer standing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55527:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55527:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55527:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a close 5-4 ruling, the Court held that third-party companies like APCC have standing to pursue legal claims that have been assigned to them, even when they must then pass along any proceeds from the litigation to the pay-phone operators who hired them. The Court based its ruling on the \"history and precedent\" of assignees brining legal claims on behalf of others, and found that Sprint had not made any convincing arguments for departing from that history in this case. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, filed a dissenting opinion. Roberts referred to the historical precedent relied on by the majority as \"at best, equivocal.\" Because APCC was required to pass the proceeds from the lawsuit onto the pay-phone operators, it had \"nothing to gain\" from the suit. Roberts therefore argued that the case should be dismissed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55527:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55528:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55528:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAhmad Edwards was arrested in Indiana after stealing a pair of shoes and shooting an FBI agent, a store security guard, and a bystander. Edwards was initially found mentally incompetent but, after five years of psychiatric evaluation, was put on trial for attempted murder. After his first trial resulted in a hung jury, Edwards asked to represent himself at his retrial. This request was initially granted by the trial court but was overturned when the court found that, although Edwards was competent to stand trial, he was unable to conduct a coherent defense. This ruling was supported by Edwards' filing of rambling and irrelevant documents during the proceedings.\nAfter his conviction on all counts, Edwards appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation had been abrogated by the trial court. The Indiana high court noted that two Supreme Court decisions, Godinez v. Moran 509 U.S. 389 (1993), which held that a defendant is competent to defend himself if he is competent to stand trial, and Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which held that a defendant need only be \"literate, competent, and understanding\" to represent himself, argued in favor of Edwards' right to self-representation while another, Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California 528 U.S. 152 (2000), holding that the modern availability of lawyers undercuts the need for self-representation, argued against it. The Indiana Supreme Court eventually held that Godinez and Faretta required it to overturn the trial court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55528:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55528:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55528:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not forbid states from insisting upon representation for those competent to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. The Court noted that Faretta only affirmed the right to self representation when the individual \"voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so,\" and therefore does not apply when that individual's mental competency is called into question. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, stating that in his view the Constitution does not permit a state to substitute its own perception of fairness for the defendant's right to make his own case before the jury, even if the defendant does have questionable mental competence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55528:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55529:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55529:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Williams was convicted in federal district court of \"pandering\" (promoting) child pornography. The PROTECT Act proscribes the pandering of \"any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe\" that the material is illegal child pornography. The Act represents Congress's attempt to outlaw sexually explicit images of children - including both images of real children and computer-generated images of realistic virtual children. The Supreme Court struck down Congress's previous effort as overbroad in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Council, because the law as written could have outlawed artwork that was neither obscene nor child pornography. Williams argued that the PROTECT Act was similarly overbroad, but the district court held that the government can legitimately outlaw the pandering of material as child pornography, even if the material is not in fact child pornography.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court and struck down the PROTECT Act as unconstitutionally overbroad. The Eleventh Circuit was unmoved by the government's argument that prosecuting the promotion of virtual child pornography as real is necessary to combat the child porn market. The Circuit Court held that the Act's prohibition was broad enough to include any \"braggart, exaggerator, or outright liar\" who claims in a non-commercial context to have child pornography but actually does not. Thus, the Act's pandering provision prohibited protected speech as well as actual child pornography.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55529:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55529:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55529:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a seven-Justice majority, held that the statute was not overly broad as written. Justice Scalia noted specifically that offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection, and he characterized the speech of an individual claiming to be in possession of child pornography in this category of unprotected speech. He also stated that the law did not violate Due Process because its requirements were clear and could be understood by courts, juries and potential violators. Justice David Souter filed the only dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55529:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55531:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55531:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn R. Sand & Gravel Company had leased the rights to mine sand and gravel on a piece of Michigan property that also contained an old landfill. After thousands of drums of illegally-buried industrial waste were discovered in the landfill, the EPA started a clean-up operation. In 1994 the EPA erected a security fence around its operations. Although John R. Sand kept mining other parts of the property, the fence blocked certain mining sites. John R. Sand's ability to mine the area was still impeded after the EPA moved the fence in 1998. In 2002 John R. Sand brought suit against the government, arguing that the restrictions on its operations amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking of property. The Tucker Act waives the government's sovereign immunity for such suits, but the Act has a six-year statute of limitations. John R. Sand argued that the issue in its claim originated in 1998 when the EPA moved its fence and for the first time obtained an order granting it unrestrained access to the property. The government countered that the claim actually accrued back in 1994 when the fence first went up, which would make the suit untimely. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the suit was timely, but it also ruled that the government was not liable for a Fifth Amendment taking.\nIn John R. Sand's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the issue of the statute of limitations was raised again - not by either of the parties, but by a group of corporations who were not parties to the case. Citing its own precedents, the Federal Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was jurisdictional. Jurisdictional requirements determine whether courts can hear a case. They cannot be waived by the parties to the case, and courts can consider jurisdictional issues on the courts' own initiative. The Federal Circuit ruled that John R. Sand's claim accrued no later than 1994. Since the suit fell outside the time limit, the Federal Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction and it dismissed the case without considering the merits of the Fifth Amendment claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55531:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55531:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55531:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a seven-member majority opinion written by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court upheld the Federal Circuit ruling that the statute of limitations was \"jurisdictional,\" or a predicate for court authority. Breyer referred to roughly five decades of the Court's case law to determine that the doctrine of stare decisis required it to follow the time limit and dismiss John R. Sand's claim. Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed separate dissenting opinions, each essentially reading the case law in a different light and determining that it had established a more flexible standard for applying statutes of limitation to suits against the government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55531:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55532:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55532:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe California Legislature deregulated the power industry in 1996, establishing a so-called \"spot market\" in which utilities purchased electricity on the day it was needed. Four years later, during an exceptionally hot summer, wholesale electricity prices skyrocketed. In response, several utilities on the Western power grid determined that they could no longer afford the spot market, and instead negotiated less expensive but still inflated long-term contracts with power suppliers. Once the crisis passed, the utilities asked the government to let them change the contracts to reflect newly lowered electricity prices. The government refused, citing a longstanding Supreme Court doctrine presuming that utilities' contracts are reasonable. The Ninth Circuit ultimately ordered the government to permit the changes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55532:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55532:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55532:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nRenegotiation is allowed only if the contract poses \"serious harm to the public interest.\" In this case, the Court decided 5-2 (Justices John G. Roberts and Stephen Breyer took no part in the decision) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had failed to make sufficient factual findings in order to determine whether such serious harm could in fact occur. Therefore, the Court sent the case back down to the Ninth Circuit in order to provide an opportunity to revisit these factual findings. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion stating that she believed the Court should have waited to hear the case until all the facts had been uncovered. However, because the case was heard when it was, she felt obliged to agree with the majority's reasoning. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice David Souter, dissented, arguing that Congress, not the courts, should set the standards regarding the reasonableness of public contracts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55532:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55533:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55533:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe case arises from competing claims to more than $30 million, the rewards of an investment former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos made with Merrill Lynch and subsequently misappropriated. A Philippine agency charged with recovering the funds, several Marcos family creditors, and human rights victims who had already secured a judgment against Marcos' estate each laid claim to the money, prompting Merrill Lynch to file an interpleader action to settle all of the claims in one case. The Philippine government, acting in concert with the recovery agency, claimed that it had sovereign immunity from suit and, because it was an indispensable party to the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), justice required that the case be stayed and brought before a special Philippine court established to return such misappropriated funds to the public treasury. However, the district court continued to adjudicate the case, eventually awarding the assets to the creditors.\nThe Ninth Circuit upheld the award, noting that the government's claim was barred by the applicable Philippine statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit further held that the \"equity and good conscience\" requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) did not require the Philippine government's participation in the case. In its petition for certiorari, the Philippine government argued that the award of assets undermined the comity principles of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) by not including the government as an indispensable party.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55533:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55533:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55533:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes it did. The Court's opinion was unanimous in finding that the Philippine government was a required party to the case under Rule 19(b). Such a required party must be joined to the suit if it is \"feasible,\" and the Court ruled that the government's inclusion was feasible in this case. The Court sent the case back to the district court with instructions to dismiss the interpleader action. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter concurred in part and dissented in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55533:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55534:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55534:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichlin Security Service contracted with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide guards at Los Angeles International Airport. After discovering that the guards had been misclassified by the federal government and subsequently underpaid for a period of years, Richlin brought a successful suit to recover the lost wages. In seeking reimbursement for fees associated with the proceedings, Richlin sought to recover fees for paralegal services at market rates. Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 504, Richlin was entitled to \"fees and other expenses incurred in the proceedings.\" Based on this language, the Board of Review determined that paralegal fees should be billed as a calculable cost to the firm and, therefore, should not be recoverable at market rates.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this decision, noting that the lack of a cap for paralegal fees could entice legal professionals to shift much of the work to them in order to maximize profits. Petitioners note, in urging the Court to grant certiorari, that a previous Court decision, Missouri v. Jenkins 491 U.S. 274 (1989), as well as several Eleventh Circuit decisions have reached the opposite result and have awarded paralegal fees at market rates.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55534:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55534:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55534:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court held that such paralegal fees are recoverable at market rates. Justice Samuel A. Alito stated that because Richlin incurred fees for paralegal services in connection with its case, a straightforward reading of the statute demonstrates that Richlin was entitled to recover fees for the paralegal services it purchased at the market rate. The Court found the government's argument that only \"reasonable costs\" should be recovered unpersuasive.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55534:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55535:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55535:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of employees brought this action following a job transfer they believed to be based on age discrimination. The employees filed a grievance with their union, including the age discrimination issues but also asserting that the transfer violated their collective bargaining agreement. The union pursued the employees' collective bargaining claim through Penn Plaza's arbitration system; however, the employees themselves pursued their age discrimination claim in federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Penn Plaza argued that the arbitration clause included in the employment contract, stating that all age discrimination claims must be pursued through arbitration, prevented the employees from bringing the claim in federal court. The district court ruled in favor of the employees, holding the arbitration clause unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, relying on its previous decisions holding that arbitration clauses with respect to statutory claims, such as the ADEA, are unenforceable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55535:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55535:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55535:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that ,here, the arbitration provision was a \"bargained-for exchange\" in the collective bargaining agreement and thus should not be interfered with by the courts. The Court went on to state that because the ADEA itself did not mandate such interference, the arbitration provision should be enforced.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He noted that the majority opinion was a departure from Supreme Court precedent with respect to arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. He went on to state that it was it was Congress' responsibility to reassess the policy arguments favoring arbitration rather than for the Supreme Court to decide. Justice David H. Souter also wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer. He reemphasized that Supreme Court precedent did not preclude the pursuit of an ADEA claim because of an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement, as in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55535:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55536:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55536:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2002 and 2003, Fox Television Stations broadcast the Billboard Music Awards, an annual program honoring top-selling musicians. During the broadcasts, one musician used an explicative in his acceptance speech, and a presenter used two expletives. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), although it had previously taken the position that such fleeting and isolated expletives did not violate its indecency regime, issued notices of liability to Fox for broadcasting the profane language. The FCC argued that previous decisions referring to \"fleeting\" expletives were merely staff letters and dicta and did not accurately represent its position on the matter. Fox appealed the FCC sanctions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.\nThe Second Circuit held that the FCC's liability order was \"arbitrary and capricious\" under the governing Administrative Procedure Act because the FCC had completely reversed its position on fleeting expletives without giving a proper justification. The Second Circuit also failed to find any evidence that the expletives were harmful.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55536:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55536:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55536:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that the FCC's order was neither \"arbitrary\" nor \"capricious.\" Justice Antonin G. Scalia announced the judgment of the court in which Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito joined in part, reasoning that the FCC need not prove that its change in policy is \"better\" than its prior stance. Rather, the FCC need merely prove that its new policy is \"permissible\" and that there are good reasons for it, as in this case.\nJustice Thomas wrote separately, concurring. Justice Kennedy also wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that when the FCC changes policy, such that it reverses its own precedent, it should explain why. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that the FCC need explain why it changed its policy and disagreed that the word \"indecent\" allowed the FCC to punish the broadcast of \"any\" expletive that has a \"sexual or excretory origin.\" Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also dissented. She noted, that while the First Amendment issues surrounding the case were not addressed, they \"cast a shadow\", and the Court should be mindful that words \"unpalatable to some may be commonplace for others.\" Lastly, Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. He argued that the FCC failed to adequately explain why it changed its policy and thus its order with respect to the Fox Television Stations was \"arbitrary\" and \"capricious.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55536:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55537:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55537:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case stems from a search of Utah resident Afton Callahan's home by the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force. The Task Force, based on evidence that Callahan was a methamphetamine dealer, had sent an informant to his home to make a purchase. After receiving a signal from the informant that the sale had taken place, the Task Force entered the home and conducted a protective sweep of the house without a warrant but after getting Callahan's consent. At trial, Callahan was convicted of possessing and distributing methamphetamines based on evidence discovered during the search, however the Utah Court of Appeals held the evidence inadmissible and reversed Callahan's conviction.\nSubsequently, Callahan filed this action in federal court against the Task Force and individual officers alleging that the search violated his civil rights under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah dismissed his claim, holding in part that the \"consent once removed\" doctrine applied to the search. Under the doctrine, an undercover officer may summon backup officers into a home after that officer has been invited with consent. However the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that the doctrine does not apply when the officers are summoned by a police informant. Therefore, according to the Tenth Circuit, Callahan had established a violation of his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55537:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55537:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55537:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot addressed, no, and yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court held that it was not clearly established at the time of police entry that the consent once removed doctrine violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore that the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force was qualifiedly immune in its search of Mr. Callahan's home. The Court also overturned its prior decision in Saucier v. Katz, which prescribed a rigid two-part inquiry into government officials' qualified immunity claims: \"1) whether the facts alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right, and 2) if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct.\" Rather, the Court held that this inquiry should be utilized at the discretion of the lower courts. It reasoned that substantial judicial resources were often expended in determining difficult constitutional claims that ultimately had little to do with the outcome of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55537:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55538:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55538:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, plaintiffs sued the Republic of Iraq in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging they had been tortured and taken hostage during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The plaintiffs relied on 28 U.S.C. Section 1605(a)(7), an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allowed for lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism. Iraq moved to dismiss arguing that Section 1605(f) provides a limitations period of ten years for any action filed under Section 1605(a)(7). The district court agreed and dismissed the suit.\nAfter the plaintiffs' appeal, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which revised Section 1605(a)(7) granting the President authority to waive the exception to the FSIA with respect to Iraq, which he did. Iraq subsequently contended that because of the revision, the case should be dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court. It held that the district court had jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed on time and not barred by the President's waiver.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55538:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55539:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55539:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNatural Resources Defense Council along with other environmental groups object to the \"SOCAL\" exercises, scheduled to take place between February 2007 and January 2009. The groups felt the exercises would cause serious harm to various species of marine mammal present in the southern California waters. The groups sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Navy from carrying out the exercises. The district court granted the injunction, finding that the NRDC had demonstrated probable success on its claim that the Navy had violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) regarding the exercises. The district court also denied the efforts of the Council on Environmental Quality to provide \"alternative arrangements\" for the Navy to proceed without an EIS. The district court stated that such arrangements require \"emergency circumstances\" not applicable to the case\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court and upheld the decision granting the injunction. The court reviewed the findings under an \"abuse of discretion\" standard and determined that the district court had not abused its discretion in finding that the environmental groups raised substantial questions as to whether the exercises would have a significant impact on the environment and that these claims were likely to succeed on the merits. Furthermore, the district court had acted properly when it found that allowing long-planned, routine training exercises to meet the \"emergency circumstances\" exception would create an unacceptably broad definition of that phrase.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55539:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55539:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55539:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and not specifically determined. The Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice John G. Roberts that the standard for properly granting a preliminary injunction is not based on the \"possibility\" of irreparable harm to marine life, but rather that \"irreparable injury is likely\" in the absence of such an injunction. Regardless, the Court reasoned that in this case the public interest in conducting naval training exercises outweighed even certain irreparable harm to marine life. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and removed the preliminary injunction against the Navy's training exercises. It further instructed that if a district court finds the Navy must complete an Environmental Impact Statement, it need find alternative ways to persuade the Navy to comply, other than through an injunction.\nJustice Stepehen G. Breyer filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. While agreeing with much of the majority's reasoning, he advocated keeping in place the court of appeals' modified injunction against naval exercises, at least until Navy's publication of an acceptable Environmental Impact Statement. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg joined by Justice David H. Souter dissented finding that the District Court appropriately used its discretion to order a preliminary injunction against the Navy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55539:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55540:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55540:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, T.A., a former student in the Forest Grove School District, sought to be evaluated for suspected learning disabilities. In 2004, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the State of Oregon determined that T.A. was disabled and eligible for special education under the Individual with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As T.A. was no longer enrolled in the Forest Grove School District, but attending private school, the hearing officer ordered the school district to reimburse T.A. for the private school tuition ($5,200 per month), determining it had failed to offer him a free and appropriate public education.\nThe school district appealed the order in an Oregon federal district court arguing that reimbursement was not appropriate because T.A. unilaterally withdrew from school, never received special education services while enrolled, and withdrew for reasons unrelated to his learning disability. The district court invalidated the order. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the order. It reasoned that IDEA provided the courts broad discretion in order to achieve \"equitable relief\" for disabled students, including reimbursement for private school tuition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55540:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55540:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55540:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that IDEA authorizes reimbursement for private special-education services when a public school fails to provide free appropriate public education (FAPE) and the private school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special education services through the public school. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court relied on its decisions in Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass. and Florence County School Dist. 4 v. Carter to reach its conclusion. There, the Court had found that courts had the power to reimburse parents for private school tuition when a school district fails to provide FAPE and a private school placement is appropriate.\nJustice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia and Clarence Thomas. He argued that the 1997 Congressional amendments to IDEA limited reimbursement for private school tuition when the public school had provided FAPE and the student's withdrawal was unilateral, and then criticized the majority for not recognizing such limitations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55540:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55541:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55541:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1999, the city of Valdez, Alaska imposed a property tax on large vessels that used its port. Vessels subject to taxation elsewhere were held to an apportionment formula based on the number of days spent there. In response, Polar Tankers Inc. filed suit in an Alaska trial court arguing that the apportionment provision was unconstitutional. The trial court in part agreed, ruling that the apportionment method violated the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, but did not violate the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution.\nOn appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed in part. The court held that the tax apportionment formula used by the city of Alaska was fair and non-duplicative. Therefore, it did not violate the Due Process, Commerce, or Tonnage Clauses in the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55541:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55541:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55541:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot answered, not answered, yes. The Supreme Court held that the Valdez, Alaska property tax that fell exclusively on large vessels and that used an apportionment method for out of state vessels violated the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined in part by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reiterated that the Tonnage Clause need be interpreted in light of its purpose of restraining states from enacting taxes that injure the interests of other states. Here, the Court reasoned that the Valdez tax that targeted ships not residing in Alaska did just this, and therefore was unconstitutional. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the Tonnage Clause would not have applied to the City of Valdez had it imposed similar taxes upon other businesses. However, the Court found little evidence that Valdez did so, and therefore the tax was not excluded from the scope of the Tonnage Clause.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the City of Valdez's tax was unconstitutional, but disagreed with the majority that an unconstitutional tax could become permissible when bundled with other similar taxes on other businesses and properties. Justice Alito also wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice David H. Souter, dissented. He argued that the Tonnage Clause merely limits states from charging ships for \"the privilege of arriving and departing from a port.\" He reasoned that the City of Valdez tax did not do so and therefore the tax was not unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55541:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55543:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55543:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn October 1998, Hugh Caperton filed suit against A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (Massey) for tortious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. A state trial court in West Virginia rendered judgment against Massey and found it liable for $50 million in damages. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted review. However, prior to hearing, Mr. Caperton motioned for Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself. He argued that since Massey's C.E.O. had donated $3 million to Justice Benjamin's campaign to win a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice Benjamin's participation would present a \"constitutionally unacceptable appearance of impropriety.\" The motion was denied. In a 3-2 decision with Justice Benjamin voting in the majority, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered it to dismiss the case. After its decision, the court granted Mr. Caperton's motion for rehearing, but once again denied his motion for Justice Benjamin to recuse himself. On rehearing, the court maintained in a 3-2 decision that the trial court should be reversed and the case dismissed. It reasoned that a forum selection clause in a contract between the parties made the trial court in West Virginia an improper venue. It also concluded that because the parties had previously adjudicated the dispute in a Virginia state trial court, the doctrine of res judicata did not allow this case to be retried.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55543:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55543:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55543:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that due process required that Justice Brent Benjamin recuse himself from participation in the case in question. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court stated that it need not find that Justice Benjamin was actually biased in his decision making in order to find invalid the decision in which he took part. Rather, it need merely be shown that \"under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,\" Justice Benjamin's interest posed \"a risk of actual bias\" and thus he should have recused himself if his participation threatened the adequate implementation of due process. The Court stated that such a risk of bias exists where a judge has a \"direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest,\" as Justice Benjamin did. Therefore, the Court reasoned, he improperly failed to recuse himself.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts dissented and was joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito. He argued that the majority imprudently expanded the standard for which a judge need recuse himself by merely showing a \"probability of bias.\" He raised forty points of uncertainty that arise because of the majority's vague standard. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He argued that the majority performed its duties poorly as a clarifying body by making an area of the law vastly more uncertain.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55543:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55544:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55544:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case represents another chapter in the longstanding dispute between the two states concerning water rights to the Arkansas River. The states had created the Arkansas River Compact in 1943 in order to allocate portions of the river between them. In 1985, Kansas brought suit before the Court alleging that Colorado had breached the agreement. The Court appointed a \"Special Master\" to investigate the allegations and to make recommendations to the Court. The Special Master submitted his report in 1994, finding that Colorado had indeed violated the Compact.\nSince 1994, the Special Master has issued three more reports. These reports have been accompanied by several objections by both states. The Court has dismissed the majority of these objections. The question presently before the Court is whether or not to overrule two of Kansas' objections to the most recent report of the Special Master.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55544:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55544:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55544:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court overruled Kansas' objection holding that witness attendance fees that are available in actions brought under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be the same as those brought under actions in the federal district courts. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that there was no good reason not to have a uniform rule for the recovery of expert witness fees among the different levels of federal courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55544:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55545:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55545:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the aftermath of September 11th, the FBI arrested thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of its investigation into the attacks. One of these men, Javaid Iqbal, was classified as being a \"high interest\" detainee at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. Iqbal claims that during his detention he was segregated from the rest of the prison population and mistreated in several ways, including confinement to a cell for 23 hours a day where he had blinding light shone on him constantly and air conditioning pumped into the cell even during the winter months. After being released, Iqbal brought a suit against representatives of the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, and FBI alleging 21 violations of his statutory and constitutional rights based on his treatment while confined. These defendants argued that they should be protected from the suit in their official governmental roles through qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and rejected the qualified immunity defense.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on all counts but one for violation of the right to due process. The Second Circuit noted that the actions taken by the government occurred in the immediate aftermath of September 11th and therefore created a unique context in which Iqbal's claims had to be reviewed. Even with these circumstances, however, the court felt that the qualified immunity defense could protect the government only from the due process claim. The \"serious allegations of gross mistreatment\" were enough to sustain the remaining counts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55545:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55545:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55545:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot Answered and No. The Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit had jurisdiction to affirm the district court's order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss Mr. Iqbal's claim. However, the Court also held that Mr. Iqbal failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful discrimination. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Mr. Iqbal needed to plead sufficient facts to show that the defendants implemented their policies for the purpose of discrimination. Mr. Iqbal did not do this and thus his complaint was deficient. The Court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether Mr. Iqbal may amend his complaint.\nJustice David H. Souter wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer. He disagreed with the majority's opinion that Mr. Iqbal failed to state a claim. Rather, he argued that since the defendants admitted that they would be liable if they knew their subordinates' conduct was deliberately discriminatory, that Mr. Iqbal did plead sufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55545:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55546:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55546:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nManoj Nijhawan was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud. He was found responsible for having caused over $600 million in damages and sentenced to 41 months imprisonment. Subsequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that Mr. Nijhawan had committed an \"aggravated felony\" and was subject to deportation because his offense involved fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Mr. Nijhawan argued that 1) his offense did not involve fraud or deceit as those terms are used in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and 2) that his conviction did not establish that loss to his victims exceeded $10,000. The court of appeals affirmed the BIA's findings and refuted Mr. Nijhawan's arguments. It held that Mr. Nijhawan's offenses constituted fraud or deceit as understood by the INA and that his conviction did establish that the loss to his victims exceeded $10,000, even though the jury did not determine that amount.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55546:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55546:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55546:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the $10,000 threshold stated by the Immigration and Nationality Act refers merely to the particular circumstances in which an offense is committed, and does not require that the statute used to convict the potential deportee contain $10,000 in damages as an element of the crime. Here, the Court reasoned that the statute used to convict Mr. Nijhawan for conspiracy did not require that he cause a minimum of $10,000 in damages; but regardless, the jury's computation of damages at his sentencing was sufficient to meet the requirements of the INA to trigger his deportation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55546:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55547:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55547:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn September 2004, Johnnie Corley was convicted on counts of armed bank robbery and the use and carrying of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress his oral and written confessions. The federal district court dismissed the motion. After his conviction, Mr. Corley appealed arguing his motion was improperly dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.\nThe court recognized that federal statutes require federal officials to bring persons they arrest before judicial officers without unnecessary delay. Confessions received after such delays and before the arrested person is presented before a federal magistrate should be suppressed. Mr. Corley's confessions fell under these guidelines. However, the court reasoned that the voluntariness of a confession was an overriding factor in determining admissibility. Mr. Corley voluntarily confessed. Therefore, his confessions were admissible.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55547:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55547:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55547:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. With Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court held that its decisions in McNabb and Mallory were not supplanted by 18 U.S.C. Section 3501. Therefore, confessions made during periods of detention that violate the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure remain generally inadmissible -- even voluntary ones.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia and Clarence Thomas. He argued that 18 U.S.C. Section 3501 is unambiguous in stating, \"[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States...a confession...shall be admissible in evidence if it is given voluntarily.\" Therefore, Mr. Corley's voluntary confession should not be suppressed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55547:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55548:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55548:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIgnacio Flores-Figueroa was convicted on two counts of aggravated identity theft in a federal district court and sentenced to 75 months imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that his conviction was in error because the government did not prove he knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court's decision. It held the government need not prove Mr. Flores-Figueroa knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55548:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55548:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55548:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the government needs to prove that the defendant \"knew\" that the identification he possessed belonged to another person. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that ordinary grammar indicates that \"knowingly\" should be read to apply to all subsequently listed elements of the crime in the relevant statute.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion and concurred in the judgment. He was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Scalia argued that the Court should distinguish between those cases where it should infer a mens rea requirement when Congress has not addressed it within the statute, and those cases when Congress has intentionally limited the mens rea requirement to particular elements of the relevant crime. Justice Samuel A. Alito also wrote separately, concurring and concurring in the judgment. He noted his concern that the majority opinion may be read as a rigid rule of statutory construction where the mens rea requirement of a federal criminal statute will always apply to every element of the relevant crime.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55548:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55549:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55549:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn February 2001 Jacqueline Fitzgerald, a kindergarten student, told her parents that an older student on the school bus, on several occasions, bullied her into lifting up her skirt. Jacqueline's mother reported these allegations to the school but its immediate investigation into the matter, including interviewing the supposed perpetrator, the school bus driver, and many students on the bus, did not provide any further proof of the sexual harassment. After Jacqueline told her parents about further instances of mistreatment, the local police department began its own investigation but was unable to find sufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings against the alleged harasser. Jacqueline reported other incidents throughout the year, and each was addressed by the school's principal as it occurred. In April of 2002 the Fitzgeralds brought suit against the school district in federal court alleging violations of both Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 and 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983). Title IX prohibits discrimination by any educational entity receiving federal funding, while Section 1983 protects against the deprivation of any rights guaranteed by the Constitution and federal laws. The district court granted the school district's motion to dismiss both counts and the Fitzgeralds appealed.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of both claims. First, discussing the Title IX claim, the court stated that five conditions must be met for a plaintiff to succeed: the student must prove that (1) the institution is a recipient of federal funding, (2) severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment occurred, (3) the harassment denied the student of educational opportunities or benefits, (4) the institution had actual knowledge of the harassment, and (5) the institution's deliberate indifference caused the student to be subjected to the harassment. The First Circuit held that even if the first four factors were met in this case, the school's \"prompt\" and \"diligent\" investigation was not clearly unreasonable and therefore did not amount to deliberate indifference. Rather, the school looked into each allegation quickly and thoroughly. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Fitzgeralds' Section 1983 claim, applying the so-called \"remedial\" exception prohibiting such claims when the allegedly violated federal law is itself specific enough to demonstrate Congress' intention to allow only those remedies referred to in the statute itself. According to the First Circuit, Title IX is one of these remedial statutes and therefore any alleged violations of the statute cannot be litigated under Section 1983.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55549:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55549:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55549:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. It held that a claim filed under Title IX for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude the use of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to further constitutional claims. The Court reasoned that Title IX was not meant to be the exclusive tool for addressing gender discrimination in schools, or a substitute for actions filed under Section 1983 to enforce constitutional rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55549:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55550:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55550:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) granted permits to allow Coeur Alaska, Inc. to discharge processed wastewater from its gold mine into a lake in Alaska. The South East Alaska Conservation council sued to prevent the discharge. It argued that granting the permits exceeded the authority of the USACE. The federal district court in Alaska held that the permits were valid.\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to void the permits. The court held that the USACE improperly interpreted the Clean Water Act when granting the permits. It explained that the characteristics of the wastewater discharge did not come under the USACE's scope of authority, but were of a nature that was explicitly prohibited by the Clean Water Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55550:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55550:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55550:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) and not the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had authority to grant permits allowing Coeur Alaska Inc. to discharge processed wastewater into a lake in Alaska. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and joined in part by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, the Court stated that both the USACE and EPA agreed on a common definition of \"fill material,\" which described the discharge planned by Coeur at its mining site in Alaska. Further, since the USACE had exclusive rights to grant permits relating to the discharge of fill material, the Court reasoned that it was clear that USACE had authority to grant Coeur a permit to discharge its waste at its mining site.\nJustice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion, attempting to assuage concerns that the Court's decision will be seen as a loophole for polluters, so long as they dump enough pollutant into a lake for it to be considered \"fill material.\" Justice Scalia also wrote separately concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and David H. Souter. She argued that the relevant inquiry should have stopped at the determination that Coeur failed to meet EPA performance standards by discharging its wastewater in an Alaska lake.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55550:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55551:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55551:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFour employees sued their employer, AT&T, alleging that the company's policy for calculating employee pension and retirement benefits discriminated against women who had taken leave time due to pregnancy in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The AT&T policy considered temporary disability leave as service time for the purposes of calculating retirement benefits except when the leave was taken by pregnant women. The employees argued that the policy violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), which clarified that Title VII prohibits discrimination \"because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.\" The main issue in the case was one of timing: although the employees' pregnancy leave was taken before the PDA came into effect, AT&T's calculation of benefits took place after. The employees argued that under the Court's decision in Pallas the time of calculation should govern the applicability of the PDA. AT&T countered that another decision, Landgraf directly opposed Pallas and had created a \"sea change\" in retroactivity principles such that the PDA should not apply to pregnancy leave taken before it was enacted. The district court sided with the employees and granted summary judgment in their favor.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the lower court, agreeing with AT&T that Pallas gave impermissible retroactive effect to the PDA. On rehearing, the full court reversed and ruled in favor of the employees, avoiding the retroactivity problem by holding that the PDA applies to the actual calculation of pension and retirement benefits regardless of when the leave itself was taken. Because AT&T performed this calculation after the PDA had gone into effect, the denial of benefits violated Title VII.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55551:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55551:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55551:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that a company does not necessarily violate the PDA or Title VII when it denies retirement benefits to women who take a temporary disability leave while pregnant when the leave was taken before the PDA came into effect. With Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that since AT&T's seniority system was not discriminatory at its adoption, its limiting seniority credit for time taken during pregnancy did not constitute unlawful discrimination. Rather, the limitation of seniority credit for pregnant women could only violate the PDA or Title VII if AT&T's system had been unlawful at its adoption.\nJustice Stevens also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. She argued that AT&T violated the PDA and Title VII when it did not discontinue reliance upon a benefit calculation system which contained pregnancy-based seniority classifications.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55551:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55552:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55552:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the Maine State Employees Association (a union representing state workers) negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement for certain employees, nonmembers voiced their disapproval with the agreement's requirement that they pay a \"service fee\" to the union as its exclusive bargaining agent. The service fee included an affiliation fee paid to the Service Employees International Union through a general pooling arrangement, meaning that the nonmembers were contributing funds to an affiliate for litigation not specifically for their own benefit. The nonmembers filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine claiming that the service fee violated their First amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the union.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, applying the Court's decision in Lehnert to determine that the nonmember employees' First Amendment rights were not implicated by the service fee. Under the Lehnert test, chargeable activities must (1) \"be substantively related to bargaining and ultimately inure to the benefit of local union members, (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding free riders, and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of agency.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55552:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55552:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55552:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment permits a local union to charge nonmembers for national litigation expenses so long as 1) the subject matter is of a kind that would be chargeable if the litigation were local and 2) the charge is reciprocal in nature (the contributing local union reasonably expects other local unions to contribute similarly). The Court reasoned that the fees paid by nonmembers of the Maine State Employees Association that funded national litigation expenses met this test and therefore did not violate nonmembers' First Amendment rights.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito filed a separate concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts. Alito noted the Supreme Court did not reach the question of what \"reciprocity\" means, acknowledging it was not contested by either party.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55552:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55553:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55553:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1991, the Narragansett Indian Tribe purchased a 31-acre parcel of land in Charlestown, RI to build a housing complex for the elderly. The U.S. Department of the Interior, acting at the tribe's request, moved to take the land into federal trust, thereby placing it largely under federal and tribal control, in 1998. However, Rhode Island officials opposed the move, claiming that the Department of the Interior lacked the proper authority because the Narragansett tribe was not recognized until nearly 50 years after the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act took effect. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island upheld the action, stating that Rhode Island was taking an unnecessarily narrow view of the law.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district court's decision and approved of its reasoning. In seeking Supreme Court review to determine whether the time of tribal recognition should be dispositive on this issue, Rhode Island noted that \"the future allocation of civil and criminal jurisdiction between states and tribes over a potentially unlimited amount of land hangs in the balance.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55553:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55553:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55553:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit holding that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 did not apply to tribes not recognized at the time of the statute's creation. Therefore, the Indian Reorganization Act did not authorize the Secretary of the Interior to act on behalf of the Narrangansett Tribe as trustee. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the statute unambiguously referred only to those tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and therefore did not apply to the Narrangansett Tribe.\nJustice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion qualifying his assent to the majority opinion. In part, he argued that the statute was not \"unambiguous\", but through contextual analysis, the statute referred only to those tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He departed from the majority opinion by arguing that the case should have been remanded for the Narrangansett Tribe to pursue an alternative legal theory. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented arguing that the Narrangansett Tribe was an Indian Tribe under the meaning of the statute, though not specified by name, and therefore the Secretary of the Interior should be allowed to act on its behalf.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55553:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55554:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55554:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDwight Strickland, a commissioner in Pender County, NC, along with several other county commissioners, brought this suit against state officials alleging that their redistricting plan was in violation of the North Carolina Constitution. The state officials argued that the redistricting plan was required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), stating that the minority group in question, comprised of African-American North Carolina citizens, was sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority under the terms of the VRA. The North Carolina Superior Court agreed with the state officials and entered summary judgment in their favor.\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court reversed on appeal, holding that the minority group did not comprise a numerical majority of citizens and, therefore, redistricting was not required by the VRA. Because the redistricting plan did not meet the conditions of the VRA, the court said, it had to comply with certain terms of North Carolina's Constitution setting a minimum county population for redistricting. The court found that the county did not meet this requirement, and declared the plan unlawful.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55554:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55554:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55554:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court affirmed the North Carolina Supreme Court holding that the VRA does not require state officials to redraw election district lines to allow a racial minority group to feasibly join with crossover voters to elect the minority's candidate choice when the racial minority group would make up less than 50 percent of the voting population in the redrawn district. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the plurality and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court, relying on its decision in Gingles, stated that the VRA allows redistricting only when a geographically compact group of minority voters could form a majority in the redrawn election district. The Court reasoned that this requirement was not satisfied here as the minority group in the redrawn district comprised a mere 39 percent of the voting population.\nJustice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, concurred only in the judgment. He disagreed with the Gingles framework for analyzing vote dilution claims arguing it had no basis in the language of the VRA. Justice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer. He disagreed with the majority's holding, arguing that a district may be redrawn so long as a cohesive minority population is large enough to elect its chosen candidate when combined with crossover voters. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, encouraging Congress to remedy what she viewed as the Court's misinterpretation of the VRA. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, criticizing the plurality's reliance on a 50 percent threshold as too simplistic because it fails to account for the realities of how people actually vote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55554:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55555:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55555:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction and members of the Arizona state legislature moved for relief from judgments of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. In January 2000, the court had cited the state for civil contempt for failing to adequately fund English Language Learner programs, in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act and subsequently rejected proposed legislation as inadequate to resolve the programs' deficiencies. The superintendent and representatives argued that increases in state funding, changes in the management of the school district involved, and passage of the No Child Left Behind Act sufficiently altered the foundations of the district court's original ruling and therefore relief was warranted. The federal district court of Arizona denied the motion.\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that since Arizona never appealed or complied with the district court's original order that it was fair to require compliance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55555:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55555:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55555:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in their analysis under Rule 60(b)(5). With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, the Court criticized the lower courts for implementing a Rule 60(b)(5) standard that was too strict. It remanded the case for the federal district court to examine four factual and legal areas that may warrant relief for Arizona from its court orders: 1) the impact of a new ELL learning program, 2) the impact of No Child Left Behind, 3) the impact of structural and managerial changes in its school system, and 4) the impact of an increased state general education fund.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He disagreed with the Court's reasoning, arguing that the lower courts fairly considered every change in the circumstances that Arizona called to the courts' attention.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55555:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55556:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55556:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn January 2003, Donnie Ventris and his girlfriend entered the apartment of Ernest Hicks who was subsequently robbed and killed. Mr. Ventris was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated battery by the District Court of Montgomery County in Kansas. To rebut the testimony of Mr. Ventris at trial, the State relied on the testimony of his former cell mate, Johnnie Doser. The government recruited Mr. Doser to keep his \"ear open\" and listen for incriminating statements made by Mr. Ventris. Mr. Ventris appealed claiming this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The District Court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the Supreme Court of Kansas.\nThe court held that \"[w]ithout a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, the admission of the defendant's uncounseled statements to an undercover informant who is secretly acting as a State agent violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.\" It reasoned that the fact finding responsibilities of the trial court do not outweigh individuals' constitutional rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55556:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55556:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55556:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Mr. Ventris' statements, elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment, were admissible to impeach his inconsistent testimony at trial. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the interests protected by excluding \"tainted evidence\" are outweighed by the need to assure \"integrity of the trial process.\"\nJustice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He sharply criticized the majority for allowing the State to cut corners in criminal proceedings at the expense of criminal defendants' constitutional guarantees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55556:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55558:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55558:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDeondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had \"knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution\" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55558:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55558:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55558:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Ruther Bader Ginsburg held that the \"failure to report\" crime does not satisfy the Armed Career Criminals Act's (ACCA) \"crime of violence\" definition. The Court reasoned that the \"failure to report\" crime does not \"involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another\" as it is a crime of inaction and therefore should not be categorized as a \"crime of violence\".\nJustice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. While agreeing with the Court's analysis, Justice Alito highlighted the difficulty the courts have had in applying the ACCA. He encouraged Congress to amend the ACCA and include a specific list of crimes that appropriately enhance a sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55558:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55559:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55559:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 2005, Edgar Townsend was allegedly injured while working aboard the tug boat Thomas. His employer, Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. sought declaratory judgment in a federal district court to determine its obligations toward him. Mr. Townsend counterclaimed. In part, he alleged arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure for his injuries, and sought punitive damages. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. motioned to dismiss the request for punitive damages. The district court denied the motion, but allowed for interlocutory appeal.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed. The court held it was bound by its prior decision in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc. There, it concluded a seaman may recover punitive damages when an employer arbitrarily and willfully refuses to pay maintenance and cure for his injuries. It reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. did not apply. In that case, the Court held that recovery for \"non-pecuniary loss in the wrongful death of a seaman was not available under general maritime law\". The court of appeals reasoned that Miles was not \"clearly on point\" to the facts in Mr. Townsend's case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55559:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55559:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55559:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that punitive damages remain available for the willful and and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure obligation. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since punitive damages have long been accepted under general maritime law and neither Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. or the Jones Act altered this understanding, punitive damages remain available.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, and Anthony M. Kennedy. He argued that under Miles courts should be reluctant to award relief under general maritime law that is not available under a statutory claim. Thus, punitive damages should not be available to Mr. Townshend.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55559:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55560:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55560:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLuis Melendez-Diaz was arrested while making a cocaine sale in a parking lot in Massachusetts. At trial, bags of the cocaine alleged to have been distributed by Melendez-Diaz were introduced into evidence along with drug analysis certificates prepared by the lab technician who analyzed the drugs and identified them as cocaine. A jury convicted Melendez-Diaz of distributing and trafficking cocaine in violation of Massachusetts law. Melendez-Diaz appealed, arguing that the State's introduction of the drug analysis certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him under the Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford had held that so-called \"testimonial\" evidence cannot be introduced at trial unless the defendant has a chance to cross-examine the witness providing the evidence. Melendez-Diaz characterized the lab analysis as testimonial and argued that Crawford required the lab technician to testify on the results. The State argued that Massachusetts had previously held, in Commonwealth v. Verde, that lab reports were not testimonial.\nThe Massachusetts Court of Appeals rejected Melendez-Diaz's claims in an unpublished opinion, referring to them in a short footnote as \"without merit.\" The Massachusetts Supreme Court also denied his appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55560:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55560:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55560:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that a state forensic analyst's lab report that is prepared for use in a criminal prosecution is subject to the demands of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that the lab reports constitute affidavits which fall within the \"core class of testimonial statements\" covered by the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, when Mr. Melendez- Diaz was not allowed to confront the persons who created the lab reports used in testimony at his trial, his Sixth Amendment right was violated.\nJustice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion, emphasizing that he thought the Confrontation Clause was only implicated by statements made outside the courtroom when they are part of \"formalized testimonial materials.\" Justice Anthony M. Kennedy dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Samuel A. Alito. He criticized the majority for so cavalierly dispensing with the long held rule that scientific analysis could be introduced into evidence without testimony from the analyst who produced it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55560:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55561:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55561:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhite and Hispanic candidates for promotion in the New Haven, CT fire department sued various city officials in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut when the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) failed to certify two exams needed for the plaintiffs' promotion to Lieutenant and Captain. The CSB did not certify because the results of the test would have promoted a disproportionate number of white candidates in comparison to minority candidates. The plaintiffs argued that their rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, and the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause were violated. The federal district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that the CSB, by refusing to certify the results of the promotional exam, was trying to fulfill its obligations under the rules utilized by the plaintiffs in their argument and therefore was protected in its actions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55561:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55561:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55561:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe; fact dependent. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that by discarding the exams, the City of New Haven violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote the majority joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito. Before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the purpose of avoiding a \"disparate impact\" on a protected trait (race, color, religion, national origin), the employer must have a \"strong basis in evidence\" that it will be subject to \"disparate impact liability\" if it fails to take the discriminatory action. Here, the Court reasoned that New Haven failed to prove it had a \"strong basis in evidence\" that failing to discard the results of the exam would have subjected it to liability, as the exams were job-related, consistent with business necessity, and there was no evidence that an equally-valid, less-discriminatory alternative was available.\nJustice Scalia wrote separately, concurring. He noted that the Court avoided answering whether the \"disparate impact\" provision of Title VII was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Alito also wrote a concurring opinion and was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. He criticized the dissent for omitting key information in reaching its alternate conclusion.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer. She argued that the City of New Haven had good cause to believe it would be vulnerable to a Title VII lawsuit if it certified the exams. Moreover, she criticized the majority for ignoring \"substantial flaws\" in the exam.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55561:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55562:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55562:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn April 2004, Jack Gross sued FBL Financial Services, Inc. (FBL) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) alleging he was demoted because of his age. A federal district court in Iowa found in his favor and awarded him $46, 945.\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial. The court held that the jury instruction in Mr. Gross' case was improper. It reasoned that since Mr. Gross never submitted direct evidence that age was a motivating factor in his demotion, he was not entitled to a jury instruction that put the burden of persuasion upon FBL to show that it would have demoted him regardless of his age.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55562:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55562:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55562:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that in an ADEA discrimination claim the burden of persuasion does not shift to the defendant employer to prove that it would have taken the action regardless of the plaintiff's age, even when evidence is introduced showing that age was one motivating factor in its decision. Rather, the Court held that the plaintiff must prove by a \"preponderance of the evidence\" that age was the \"but-for\" cause of the defendant's action. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned from the ADEA's plain text and Congressional intent that the Title VII burden shifting framework did not apply to the ADEA.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that both the Court and Congress had previously rejected the \"but for\" standard of causation in ADEA claims and then criticized the majority for \"unnecessary lawmaking.\" Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg. He criticized the majority for adopting a standard that was inappropriate for determining mental processes like motive, a necessary element in a ADEA discrimination claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55562:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55563:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55563:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn September 2003, James Benjamin Puckett agreed to a plea bargain with the United States on counts of bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. In exchange for his guilty plea, the government agreed to recommend a reduced sentence. However at sentencing, the government reneged arguing that because Mr. Puckett admittedly aided a fellow inmate in another crime while awaiting sentencing, he was no longer eligible for the reduction. The district court agreed. On appeal, Mr. Puckett maintained that the government's breach of agreement disqualified his guilty plea.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Puckett's guilty plea was not disqualified. It recognized that the government breached its plea agreement at sentencing. However, it reasoned that Mr. Puckett failed to prove his substantial rights were affected when the district court was unlikely to have imposed a different sentence, even if the government had recommended a reduction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55563:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55563:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55563:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court held that the \"plain error standard\" governs claims that are forfeited because they were not raised at trial in determining whether they may be raised at the appellate level. The Court then reaffirmed the four-pronged \"plain-error\" standard of review: \"1) there must be an error or defect that the appellant has not affirmatively waived, 2) it must be clear and obvious, 3) it must have affected the appellant's substantial rights, 4) if the three other prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\" Here, the Court rejected Mr. Puckett's arguments that he should not be subject to the \"plain-error\" standard after he failed to raise his claims at the trial level. Moreover, it affirmed his conviction and sentencing, agreeing with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that Mr. Puckett's \"substantial rights\" had not been affected.\nJustice David H. Souter, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He agreed that the \"plain-error\" standard was appropriate in Mr. Puckett's case. However, he criticized the majority for interpreting the \"plain-error\" standard's third prong requirement of affecting the appellant's \"substantial rights\" to only include his \"length of incarceration.\" Rather, Justice Souter argued that Mr. Puckett's substantial rights were affected when he was convicted without trial and by a plea agreement that was not honored by the government. Therefore, Mr. Puckett was entitled to relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55563:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55564:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55564:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEdward Jerome Harbison was convicted in a Tennessee state court of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, and grand larceny, and was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully appealing his case through the Tennessee courts, a federal district court appointed Mr. Harbison a federal public defender to represent him in filing a federal habeas corpus petition. That petition was denied by the both the federal district court as well as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. As Tennessee law does not authorize the appointment of state public defenders as counsel in state clemency proceedings, Mr. Harbison's federal public defender requested to represent him in his state clemency proceedings. Both the district court and Sixth Circuit denied the request, holding that federal law does not authorize federal compensation for legal representation in state matters.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55564:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55564:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55564:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and Yes. First, the Supreme Court held that a certificate of appealability (COA) is not required to appeal an order denying a request for federally appointed counsel. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that a COA is only required to appeal final orders in habeas corpus petitions. Here, Mr. Harbison did not require a COA because he merely appealed an order denying his request to expand the authority of his federally appointed counsel. Second, the Supreme Court held that federally appointed counsel may represent their clients in state clemency proceedings and are entitled to compensation for such representation. The Court stated that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. Section 3599 authorized federally appointed counsel to represent their clients in those proceedings \"as may become available to the defendant\", reasoning that state clemency proceedings met this description.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas each wrote separately concurring in the judgment. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, joined by Justice Samuel A. Alito, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that a COA was not required to appeal an order denying the expansion of a federally appointed counsel's authority. However, he disagreed that 18 U.S.C. Section 3599 authorizes state prisoners' federally funded counsel to pursue state clemency on their clients' behalf.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55564:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55566:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55566:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNorthwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One (\"Northwest\") sought a declaratory judgment exempting it from Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and alternatively argued that Section 5 was unconstitutional. Section 5 prohibits \"covered jurisdictions\" – states and political subdivisions with histories of racial discrimination in voting – from changing their voting procedures without permission from either the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.\nThe district court held that Northwest was not eligible for exemption from Section 5 reasoning that it did not qualify as a \"political subdivision\" as defined in the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, the court rejected Northwest's argument that Congress' 2006 extension of Section 5 for another 25 years made the provision unconstitutional. Rather, the court held that given the documentation of contemporary racial discrimination in \"covered jurisdictions\", Congress acted rationally in extending the provision, rendering Section 5 constitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55566:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55566:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55566:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the VRA permits all political subdivisions, including the district, to seek to bailout from the preclearance requirements of the VRA. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and in part by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reasoned that the language of the VRA did not constrict the availability of a bailout for political subunits like Northwest Municipal. Moreover, the Court reasoned that considering that only 17 of 12,000 jurisdictions covered by the VRA had bailed out suggested that Congress had never intended for it to be so difficult to bailout.\nJustice Thomas wrote separately, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. He criticized the Court for not addressing the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA. He argued that he thought it did in fact exceed Congress' power to enforce the 15th Amendment, rendering it unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55566:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55567:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55567:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986, a federal bankruptcy court granted Travelers Indemnity Co.'s (Travelers) motion to settle with three separate classes of plaintiffs in asbestos related litigation (on behalf of its insuree Johns-Manville Corp.) and enjoin non-settling parties from future litigation with Travelers for alleged misconduct unrelated to the settlement. The orders were subsequently affirmed by a New York federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.\nOver ten years later, the Second Circuit vacated the orders, stating that state-law actions (\"Direct Actions\") against Travelers that alleged wrongdoing while it acted as Johns-Manville Corp.'s insurer were not barred by the 1986 order. The court held that the federal bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to prevent such lawsuits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55567:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55567:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55567:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit erred in holding that federal bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction to enter orders beyond matters directly related to the execution of a debtor's estate. With Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court recognized that the unambiguous terms of the 1986 orders barred Direct Actions against Travelers and the orders' finality stood in the way of challenging their enforceability. It reasoned that the federal bankruptcy court's 1986 orders had become final on direct review 20 years previously, and thus the Second Circuit improperly ruled on an issue that was not reviewable.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, joined by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He criticized the majority for improperly interpreting the meaning of the 1986 orders.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55567:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55569:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55569:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case examines the correct application of federal antidumping statutes to so-called \"separate work unit\" (SWU) contracts for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU). The case, brought by the federal government and the United States Enrichment Corporation, has been consolidated from two cases both alleging that Eurodif, a French corporation, imported LEU in violation of federal antidumping laws. Based on a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit holding that SWU contracts for the production of LEU are contracts for services rather than goods and are therefore immune from the antidumping laws, the U.S. Department of Commerce excluded all LEU entering the country from antidumping regulations if accompanied by a certificate that the uranium was imported under an SWU contract. The Court of International Trade sustained the Commerce Department decision.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the case, saying that it was \"unripe\" for judicial review. The court held that the issues raised by the government only concerned the application of the Department's decision regarding future importation of LEU; and, therefore, the court did not have a specific factual context in which to review the claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55569:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55569:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55569:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice David H. Souter, the Supreme Court held that the Commerce Department's view of imported low enriched uranium, as the sale of goods rather than services, was permissible. It reasoned that, since 19 U.S.C. Section 1673 did not specify whether it applied to the production of low enriched uranium, it was left to the reasonable interpretation of the Commerce Department to determine. Accordingly, the Court found the Commerce Department interpreted the statute reasonably.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55569:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55570:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55570:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDaniel Negusie, an Eritrean citizen, worked as a prison guard in Eritrea before seeking asylum in the United States. When Negusie tried to come into the country, however, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied his application for asylum and withholding of removal. The INS based its decision on evidence that Negusie assisted in the persecution of prison inmates on the basis of a protected ground, specifically, the prisoners' Protestant religious beliefs. Negusie appealed his case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that he did not voluntarily assist in the persecution but rather attempted to help the individuals who were being mistreated.\nThe BIA gave little weight to Negusie's argument that he was trying to help the prisoners, instead focusing on his more prominent involvement in the persecution as an armed guard who oversaw and was complicit in the acts. After the BIA upheld the INS' denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal, Negusie filed a petition to have his case reviewed before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Finding that the evidence from the BIA decision did not compel a conclusion that Negusie was uninvolved in the persecution of inmates, the Fifth Circuit denied his petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55570:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55570:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55570:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot answered. The Supreme Court held that the BIA and Fifth Circuit erred when they evaluated Mr. Negusie's asylum petition because they presumed it mandatory that an alien's coercion to persecute was immaterial when determining whether the \"persecutor bar\" applies. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court found that the BIA failed to exercise its discretion when interpreting ambiguous provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and therefore interpreted the INA from a mistaken legal premise. The Court ordered that the BIA interpret the ambiguous provisions of the INA and then review Mr. Negusie's case with respect to its interpretation.\nJustice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a separate concurring opinion noting that he would not have agreed to remand Mr. Negusie's case had the majority prevented the BIA from reaching the same conclusion once again. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and dissented in part. He criticized the majority for failing to establish a standard for when the \"persecutor bar\" applies to an alien's asylum petition. Justice Clarence Thomas also dissented, arguing that the INA unambiguously precludes any inquiry into whether the persecutor acted voluntarily or was coerced.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55570:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55571:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55571:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Kennedy designated his wife, Liv, as the sole beneficiary of his Dupont pension and retirement savings plans. The couple subsequently divorced, and as part of the settlement Liv agreed to give up any interests she may have in the plans. However, William never submitted this portion of the settlement prior to his death in 2001, so the pension and retirement savings benefits were paid out to Liv. William's daughter, Keri, the executor of his estate, brought suit against Dupont to recover the benefits. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment for the estate, awarding it the value of the benefits.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, explaining that because William had never submitted the portion of the settlement agreement denying the benefits to Liv, they were correctly paid out to her by Dupont.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55571:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55571:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55571:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision with Justice David Souter writing for the Court, the Supreme Court held that Liv's waiver of her former husband's pension benefits upon their divorce was not rendered void by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's anti-alienation provision. However, the Court held that Liv was appropriately granted the benefits of her ex-husband's estate because the plan administrator properly disregarded her waiver. It reasoned that the pension plan was clearly laid out and recognized Liv as the beneficiary. The plan had a mechanism in which Liv could have disclaimed her interest, but she did not.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55571:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55572:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55572:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEmployees of the city of New York filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging that it was unlawful for the city, as a condition of employment, to require non-resident employees to pay a fee equivalent to the income taxes paid by resident-employees. The district court dismissed the case for failing to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It reasoned that actions brought by private parties under the FCA must be appealed within 30 days of judgment and not 60 days as when the United States is a party to the lawsuit. Here, the employees of the city of New York appealed 54 days after judgment and thus their appeal was untimely.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55572:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55572:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55572:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWith Justice Clarence Thomas writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it held that the 30-day limit applies for filing a claim under the False Claims Act when the United States is not a party to the lawsuit. Therefore, the Court found that the private parties who brought suit against New York filed in an untimely manner and their suit should be dismissed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55572:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55574:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55574:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLemon Johnson was riding in the backseat of a car when it was pulled over by the state police in Sugar Hill, Arizona. The officers had scanned the license of the car and found that it had a \"mandatory insurance suspension.\" Although the stop was solely predicated on the suspended license, the officers began to question the car's occupants, including Johnson, about gang activity in the area. Based on certain circumstantial evidence, such as Johnson's possession of a police scanner, the officers asked Johnson to exit the car so that they could question him further. Although Johnson was free to stay in the car, he voluntarily exited and a subsequent search of his person by the officers revealed a handgun and a small amount of marijuana. Based on evidence obtained during this search, Johnson was convicted in Arizona state court of (1) the unlawful possession of a weapon as a prohibited possessor and (2) possession of marijuana. Johnson appealed, arguing that the evidence recovered from the search should have been suppressed because the officers did not have probable cause to search him at the time of his arrest and therefore did so in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.\nThe Court of Appeals of Arizona agreed with Johnson and reversed his conviction and sentence. The court found that the officers had no reason to believe that Johnson was involved in any criminal activity when he was searched. The officers requested that Johnson step out of the car to discuss gang activity, not because the officers feared that their safety was threatened, thus it was part of a consensual encounter between the officers and Johnson. Therefore, the court said, the officers' subsequent search of Johnson was illegal and unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55574:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55574:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55574:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court reversed the Arizona Court of Appeals. It held that Mr. Johnson's encounter with police officers was not consensual and therefore did not violate his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The Court reasoned that lawful traffic stops entail the \"temporary seizure of driver and passengers\" that continues for the duration of the stop. Officer inquiries into matters unrelated to the stop do not transform the event into a \"consensual\" encounter whereby the driver or passenger is free to go as he or she pleases. Therefore, the police officers who frisked Mr. Johnson were not constitutionally required to depart the scene without first ensuring that he was not armed and dangerous, so long as they reasonably suspected he was armed and dangerous.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55574:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55575:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55575:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), filed suit against the state of Hawaii to prevent the transfer of \"ceded\" lands for the purpose of private development. The OHA was established to manage the proceeds from lands ceded by the Kingdom of Hawaii following its overthrow by the United States. The lands were marked to provide for the benefit of native Hawaiians. The OHA argued that \"any transfer of ceded lands by the State to third parties would amount to a breach of trust\" and would be without consideration of the claims of native Hawaiians to those lands. However, the trial court held that the State did have the power to transfer the lands. The OHA appealed.\nThe Supreme Court of Hawaii overruled the trial court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue an injunction to prevent the transfer of ceded lands from the public trust. In its reasoning, it cited Ahuna to illustrate that the State as trustee of these lands was under an obligation to administer the trust 'solely in the interest of the beneficiary' (native Hawaiians). Further, it gave great weight to the Apology Resolution passed by the United States Congress in 1993 to mark the 100th Anniversary of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii. This resolution stated that \"native Hawaiians (1) 'never directly relinquished their claims to... their national lands to the United States,' and (2) 'are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territory.'\" Therefore, the court held, it was the responsibility of the State of Hawaii to preserve the ceded lands in the public trust, at least until such land claims were resolved.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55575:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55575:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55575:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. A unanimous Supreme Court held that the Apology Resolution did not restrict Hawaii's sovereign authority to transfer publicly held land for private development. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the Court, it reasoned that the language of the resolution did not indicate the creation of new substantive rights that could limit the actions of Hawaii.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55575:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55576:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55576:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, Carlos Jimenez pled guilty in Texas state court to burglary and violating his probation. Because Jimenez had a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, he was sentenced to 43 years in prison. Jimenez appealed and, in 1996, a state appeals court dismissed Jimenez's petition when a court-appointed lawyer stated that Jimenez had no grounds for appeal. Six years later the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals allowed leave for Jimenez to renew his appeal based on his lawyer's incompetence, however the court affirmed his conviction and sentence.\nIn 2005, Jimenez filed a habeas corpus petition in a Texas federal court arguing that he had not received adequate legal assistance during his proceedings in the state courts. The district judge dismissed the claim, holding that the one-year statute of limitations, which began running on the date of conviction, had expired. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also denied Jimenez's appeal. Jimenez, in his petition for certiorari, argued that the one-year statute of limitations should actually have begun in 2005, after his final appeal was denied in state court, rather than in 1995 when he was convicted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55576:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55576:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55576:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion with Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the Court, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It held that when a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file an out-of-time direct appeal and he does so, the conviction is not final. Therefore, the statute of limitations begins to run only after the out-of-time direct appeal is final. The Court remanded Mr. Jimenez's case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55576:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55577:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55577:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMayola Williams sued the tobacco giant, Philip Morris, in Oregon state court following her husband's death from lung cancer in 1997. Ms. Williams claimed that her husband had been convinced by Philip Morris' advertisements and representations that smoking did not pose any significant health risks and had refused to quit smoking despite his family's pleas. She alleged that Philip Morris' fraud and negligence in this regard had caused her husband's death.\nAt trial, a jury found in favor of Ms. Williams and awarded her $79.5 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $32 million. On appeal, Philip Morris argued that the trial court had committed an error when it failed to give a proposed jury instruction stating, in part, that the jury should not \"punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons.\" The case eventually wound up before the Oregon Supreme Court (\"OSC\"), which ruled that the proposed jury instruction incorrectly stated the federal requirements of due process of law, and the trial court was therefore correct to exclude it. The OSC found it unnecessary to rule, at that time, on whether the jury instruction was flawed for its description of state-law requirements. Philip Morris sought and was granted certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court reversed the OSC, stating that due process did not necessarily require exclusion of the instruction, and remanded the case so that the OSC could apply the correct standard.\nOn remand, the OSC stated that the U.S. Supreme Court's new constitutional standard was only triggered \"upon request,\" which obligated it to determine whether Philip Morris's request was valid under state law. The OSC held that the proposed instruction misstated Oregon's statutory punitive damages criteria and therefore was not \"clear and correct in all respects,\" as it must be to be considered error. The U.S. Supreme Court, which will now hear the case for the second time after granting Philip Morris' certiorari petition, must determine whether the OSC is permitted to insert these state law issues at such a late stage in the game.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55577:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55577:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55577:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55577:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55578:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55578:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1977, the Iranian Ministry of Defense entered into an agreement with an American defense contractor for the purchase of military equipment to be used by the Iranian Air Force. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the American company breached its contract with Iran and sold the equipment elsewhere. Iran requested arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and received $2.8 million in damages for breach of contract. Iran then reduced the award to a judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.\nDariush Elahi, brought a wrongful death claim against the Iranian government alleging that Iranian agents had assassinated his brother in Paris in 1990. Elahi was awarded over $300 million in damages by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. He attempted to satisfy this judgment in part by attaching the damages Iran had recovered from the previous contract dispute. Iran argued that the previous recovery was immune from attachment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California held that Iran had waived its immunity from attachment by submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICC and the district court in its prior contract dispute.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's ruling but on different grounds. The court held that Elahi could attach the Iranian judgment under Section 201(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, which allows creditors such as Elahi to attach \"the blocked assets of [a] terrorist party.\" Eschewing the jurisdiction argument relied on by the district court, the Ninth Circuit characterized Iran as a \"terrorist party\" and held that the contract judgment was a \"blocked asset\" subject to attachment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55578:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55578:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55578:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot answered. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court held that the assets in question in Mr. Elahi's case were not \"blocked\" under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 at the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision and therefore could not be attached to satisfy his judgment against Iran. The Court then declined to determine whether a 2005 Executive Order issued by the President blocked the assets, holding that Mr. Elahi had waived his rights to attach. The Court reasoned that when Mr. Elahi accepted payment under a federal statute that offered compensation for those \"holding terrorism related judgments against Iran\", he relinquished his right to attach those assets.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred in part and dissented in part, and was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He agreed that the assets in question were not \"blocked\" at the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision. However, he disagreed that Mr. Elahi had waived his right to attach those assets. He reasoned that the majority departed from the \"plain meaning\" and \"purpose\" of the federal statute that awarded compensation to Mr. Elahi when it inhibited his ability to collect the award granted him against Iran for the murder of his brother.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55578:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55579:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55579:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCesar Sarausad was arrested in Washington state for his involvement in a drive-by shooting near a school. After he was convicted of second-degree murder and two attempted second-degree murder charges in a jury trial, Sarausad filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court granted Sarausad's motion, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that certain confusing jury instructions related to accomplice liability unconstitutionally relieved the state of its burden of proof.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling on the insufficiency of evidence claim but affirmed on the jury instructions claim. The court stated that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a conviction under Jackson v. Virginia. However, the jury instructions were ambiguous on the question of whether Sarausad could be convicted of murder and attempted murder on a theory of accomplice liability without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew an accomplice intended to commit a murder. According to the Ninth Circuit, there was a reasonable chance the jury misapplied these instructions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55579:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55579:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55579:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot necessarily and yes. In a 6-3 decision with Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court held that a federal court may reject state court conclusions with respect to the appropriateness of a state court jury instruction, so long as the instructions were \"not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.\" Here, the standard was not met and the Ninth Circuit should have accepted the conclusions of the state courts. Further, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in finding Mr. Sarausad's jury instructions so ambiguous that his constitutional rights were violated and therefore he was not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief.\nJustice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Souter criticized the majority opinion for relying on the fact that the jury instructions in Mr. Sarausad's case incorporated part of a state statute as evidence enough that the instructions were unambiguous. Further, he noted that the jury asked three times for clarification in the instructions. Therefore, Justice Souter argued, it was likely the jury did not grasp what it needed to find in order to convict Mr. Sarausad for accomplice liability.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55579:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55581:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55581:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder West Virginia law, it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. In 1994, Randy Hayes pled guilty in West Virginia to a misdemeanor battery offense after striking his wife. Ten years later, in 2004, police responded to a domestic violence call at Hayes' home. While conducting a search of the premises the police uncovered a Winchester rifle. They arrested Hayes for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence based on the 1994 plea. Hayes argued that his prior conviction for misdemeanor battery did not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of violence under the statute. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected this argument and Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea to reserve his claim for appeal.\nHayes' strategy was a success, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that conviction of a misdemeanor battery does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence, noting that the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute indicated that the original offense must involve a \"domestic\" relationship between the victim and offender. Finding this requirement unfulfilled in the case, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes' conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55581:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55581:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55581:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit holding that the predicate offense statute need not include the existence of a \"domestic relationship\" as an element of the crime in order to qualify as a \"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence\" as specified by the Gun Control Act of 1968. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, and joined in part by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reasoned that the language of the Gun Control Act suggested that the predicate offense statute need only include \"the use of force\" as an element of the crime and need not include a \"domestic relationship\" as an additional element.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts dissented and was joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia. He criticized the majority opinion's use of grammatical rules by which it reached an unsound conclusion. He argued that the rule of lenity should apply as the Gun Control Act was ambiguous and therefore should be interpreted in the defendant's favor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55581:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55582:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55582:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSavana Redding, an eighth grader at Safford Middle School, was strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip by another student that Ms. Redding might have ibuprofen on her person in violation of school policy. Ms. Redding subsequently filed suit against the school district and the school officials responsible for the search in the District Court for the District of Arizona. She alleged her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, on rehearing before the entire court, the court of appeals held that Ms. Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related to the circumstances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55582:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55582:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55582:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSometimes, fact dependent. No. The Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers. With David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and in part by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reiterated that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be \"reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.\" Here, school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to her underwear. The Court also held that the implicated school administrators were not personally liable because \"clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.\" It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right.\nJustice Stevens wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and was joined by Justice Ginsburg. He agreed that the strip search was unconstitutional, but disagreed that the school administrators retained immunity. He stated that \"[i]t does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude.\" Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate concurring opinion, largely agreeing with Justice Stevens point of dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the school administrators were qualifiedly immune to prosecution. However, he argued that the judiciary should not meddle with decisions school administrators make that are in the interest of keeping their schools safe.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55582:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55583:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55583:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA federal district court convicted both Christopher Michael Dean and Ricardo Curtis Lopez in part for the discharge of a pistol during an armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), a sentencing enhancement statute. They appealed arguing that Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) only applies to the intentional discharge of a firearm.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) does not have an intent requirement. It explained, \"The mere discharge of a firearm during any crime of violence... even accidental, is subject to the sentencing enhancement\", requiring ten additional years imprisonment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55583:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55583:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55583:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) does not require proof of intent to discharge a firearm in order enhance a sentence. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the grammatical structure of the statute demonstrates that there is no intent requirement in order to enhance the convicted person's sentence.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that criminal liability should not attach in cases where an accident causes no harm, as in Mr. Dean's case. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also dissented. He argued that 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) was sufficiently ambiguous that it should be viewed in favor of Mr. Dean, such that the statute provides \"fair warning\" to criminal behavior.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55583:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55584:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55584:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSummum, a religious organization, sent a letter to the mayor of Pleasant Grove, Utah asking to place a monument in one of the city's parks. Although the park already housed a monument to the Ten Commandments, the mayor denied Summum's request because the monument did not \"directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove.\" Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing, among other things, a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah denied Summum's request for a preliminary injunction.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted Summum's injunction request. The Tenth Circuit held that the park was in fact a \"public\" forum, not a non-public forum as the district court had held. Furthermore, Summum demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were to be denied, and the interests of the city did not outweigh this potential harm. The injunction, according to the court, was also not against the public interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55584:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55584:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55584:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit holding that the placement of a monument in a public park is a form of government speech and therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since Pleasant Grove City had retained final authority over which monuments were displayed, the monuments represented an expression of the city's viewpoints and thus government speech.\nJustice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a separate concurring opinion that largely embraced the majority's reasoning. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Agreeing with the Court's reasoning, he also noted that there were likely no violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment on the part of Pleasant Grove City. He argued that displays of the Ten Commandments had been construed by the Court as \"having an undeniable historical meaning\" and thus did not attempt to establish a religion. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that \"government speech\" should be considered a rule of thumb and not a rigid category. He stated that sometimes the Court should ask \"whether a government's actions burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action's tendency to further a legitimate government objective.\" Justice Souter also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment, but warning that public monuments should not be considered government speech categorically.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55584:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55585:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55585:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile serving in the United States army in 1944, Woodrow Sanders had a bazooka explode near him, burning the right side of his face. Sanders also claimed that the explosion had damaged his right eye. However subsequent examinations by Veterans' Affairs (\"VA\") optometrists suggested that the cause of the condition was difficult to determine and was likely due to an infection. When Sanders appeared before the Board of Veterans' Appeals, arguing that the injury was service related and seeking cost-free treatment, the Board denied his claim, finding that the injury was not service related. On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Sanders argued that the VA failed to provide notice as to who was responsible for obtaining the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim, as required by the notice provision of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (\"VCAA\"). The Veterans Court affirmed the Board, basing its decision on the fact that Sanders did not suffer any \"specific prejudice\" due to the VA's failure to notify.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court, finding that the VCAA does not require any showing of prejudice. Any failure to notify as required by the Act creates a presumption of prejudice that need not be alleged or proved by the veteran seeking medical assistance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55585:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55585:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55585:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's framework for evaluating VA notice errors, conflicted with established law that the Veterans Court \"take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.\". With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the Federal Circuit's framework was too complex, rigid, and its presumption of prejudicial error imposed an unreasonable burden upon the VA. Rather, the Court stated the proper framework for the Veterans Court to apply is the \"harmless-error\" rule ordinarily applied in civil cases.\nJustice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He disagreed that a veteran claimant bore the burden of persuasion when mounting a claim against the VA. He reasoned prior practice indicated congressional favoritism of veterans and that statutory doubt should be resolved in the veteran's favor. Moreover, he disagreed with the majority in its finding that the Federal Circuit's framework was \"complex\" and \"rigid,\" rather viewing it as \"workable.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55585:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55586:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55586:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDiana Levine filed this personal injury action against Wyeth, the drug manufacturer, in state court in Vermont. Ms. Levine had intravenously injected Phenergan, a drug made by Wyeth and used to prevent allergies and motion sickness, into her arm, and complications arising from the injection eventually led to the amputation of her arm. Ms. Levine brought this claim asserting that Wyeth had failed to include a warning label describing the possible arterial injuries that could occur from negligent injection of the drug. Wyeth argued that because their warning label had been deemed acceptable by the FDA, a federal agency, any Vermont state regulations making the label insufficient were preempted by the federal approval. The Superior Court of Vermont found in favor of Ms. Levine and denied Wyeth's motion for a new trial.\nThe Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed this ruling on appeal, holding that the FDA requirements merely provide a floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation. Therefore, states are free to create more stringent labeling requirements than federal law provides.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55586:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55586:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55586:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Vermont holding that federal law did not preempt Ms. Levine's state-law claim that Wyeth's labeling of Phenergan failed to warn of the dangers of its intravenous administration. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court first rejected Wyeth's argument that by unilaterally changing its labeling of Phenergan, it would have violated federal labeling regulations. Rather, the Court asserted that the manufacturer bears ultimate responsibility for the content of its labels at all times. The Court then rejected Wyeth's argument that requiring it to comply with the state-law duty to provide a stronger warning would interfere with Congress' purpose of entrusting the FDA with drug labeling decisions. Rather, the Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to preempt state-law failure to warn actions when it created the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.\nJustice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion noting that the FDA may create regulations that preempt state law tort claims, but such a regulation was not at issue in Ms. Levine's case. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately, concurring only in the judgment. He criticized the majority opinion for implicitly endorsing a \"far-reaching implied pre-emption doctrine\" where the Court invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with federal statutes by extrapolating from evidence not found in the text of the statute itself. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin G. Scalia. He disagreed with the Court's holding that a jury, rather than the FDA is ultimately responsible for regulating warning labels for prescription drugs. He argued this is incompatible with the Court's precedent in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., which established the principles of conflict preemption.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55586:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55587:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55587:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRodney Gant was apprehended by Arizona state police on an outstanding warrant for driving with a suspended license. After the officers handcuffed Gant and placed him in their squad car, they went on to search his vehicle, discovering a handgun and a plastic bag of cocaine. At trial, Gant asked the judge to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The judge declined Gant's request, stating that the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The court convicted Gant on two counts of cocaine possession.\nThe Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding the search unconstitutional, and the Arizona Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court stated that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. Because Gant left his vehicle voluntarily, the court explained, the search was not directly linked to the arrest and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. In seeking certiorari, Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard argued that the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling conflicted with the Court's precedent, as well as precedents set forth in various federal and state courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55587:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55587:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55587:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court held that police may search the vehicle of its recent occupant after his arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that \"warrantless searches are per se unreasonable\" and subject only to a few, very narrow exceptions. Here, Mr. Gant was arrested for a suspended license and the narrow exceptions did not apply to his case.\nJustice Scalia wrote separately, concurring. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that the majority improperly overruled its precedent in New York v. Belton which held that \"when a policeman has made a lawful arrest... he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.\" Justice Stephen G. Breyer also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, where he lamented that the court could not create a new governing rule.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55587:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55588:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55588:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVicky Crawford, a government employee, took part in an internal investigation regarding sexual harassment claims against another employee. When the investigation concluded, Crawford was fired based on charges of embezzlement and drug use. When these charges were later proven untrue, Crawford filed suit against her employer in federal district court in Tennessee claiming retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act based on her participation in the investigation. The district court directed a verdict for her employer.\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. Once again finding for the employer, the court stated that Crawford's participation in the investigation did not constitute \"opposition\" and her activity in that regard was not \"protected\" as those terms are defined in Title VII, making the Civil Rights Act inapplicable to her claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55588:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55588:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55588:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision with Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. It held that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII extends to people who speak out, not just on their own initiative, but when prompted by an employer's internal investigation. The Court reasoned that the plain meaning of the statute includes people who \"oppose\" sexually obnoxious behavior by merely disclosing the violation and need not initiate the disclosure.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito filed a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Alito noted that, while not addressed in the majority opinion, the plain meaning of \"oppose\" should not include \"silent opposition.\" He argued it would open the door to plaintiffs who never expressed opposition to their employers, thus raising difficult factual determinations at trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55588:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55589:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55589:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCitizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president.\nIn an attempt to regulate \"big money\" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to \"electioneering communications.\" Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support.\nCitizens United argued that: 1) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances.\nThe United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors \"might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause,\" but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55589:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55589:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55589:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. No. Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and portions of McConnell v. FEC. (In the prior cases, the Court had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity.) By a 5-to-4 vote along ideological lines, the majority held that under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Samuel A. Alito, and Clarence Thomas. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. The majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. The majority also held that the BCRA's disclosure requirements as applied to The Movie were constitutional, reasoning that disclosure is justified by a \"governmental interest\" in providing the \"electorate with information\" about election-related spending resources. The Court also upheld the disclosure requirements for political advertising sponsors and it upheld the ban on direct contributions to candidates from corporations and unions.\nIn a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, emphasized the care with which the Court handles constitutional issues and its attempts to avoid constitutional issues when at all possible. Here, the Court had no narrower grounds upon which to rule, except to handle the First Amendment issues embodied within the case. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas in part, criticizing Justice Stevens' understanding of the Framer's view towards corporations. Justice Stevens argued that corporations are not members of society and that there are compelling governmental interests to curb corporations' ability to spend money during local and national elections.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55589:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55590:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55590:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of California's Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) cleaned a parcel of contaminated land at considerable expense. They sued the responsible parties for recovery. A federal district court held the responsible parties (Burlington Northern Rail Road, Santa Fe Railway Company, and Shell Oil Company) liable for only a minor portion of the cleanup costs. The EPA and DTSC jointly appealed.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its liability calculations. It reasoned that the recovery statute employed by the EPA and DTSC imposed strict liability on parties merely partly responsible for contamination. It explained that the statute's intention was to prevent taxpayers from bearing the burden of such cleanup costs.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55590:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55590:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55590:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and Yes. The Supreme Court held that Shell was not liable as an \"arranger\" for the contamination at issue in this case. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Shell did not \"intend\" that at least a portion of its product be disposed by proscribed methods and thus was not an \"arranger.\" The Court also held that the Ninth Circuit erred by reversing the district court's CERCLA liability calculations. Rather, it reasoned that the district court reasonably apportioned Burlington Railroad's share of liability at the contaminated site in question.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. She argued that Shell should qualify as an \"arranger\" because it \"arranged for disposal... of hazardous substances\" at the contaminated site. She also argued that the case should be remanded such that all liable parties could provide input as to the proper liability apportionment formula.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55590:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55591:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55591:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Wayne Carlisle and his partners (Carlisle) sold their construction equipment business, they hired multiple consultants in order to set up a tax shelter for the proceeds. The IRS later determined the tax shelter was illegal, but offered amnesty under certain conditions. Carlisle was never informed of these developments and was ultimately required to pay taxes and penalties that exceeded $25 million. Carlisle filed suit in a federal district court against nine parties alleging fraud, negligence, civil conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty.\nBefore trial, one of the defendants motioned to stay the proceedings pending arbitration with Carlisle per a written agreement with Carlisle. Stay was granted. The remaining defendants motioned seeking their own stay arguing that allowing one party to arbitrate with Carlisle and not allowing the rest would be contradictory. The district court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied it had jurisdiction to review the matter. The parties then appealed the denial of jurisdiction. They argued that Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies and makes available a stay of proceedings in order to arbitrate when there is a written agreement that directs litigated issues into arbitration. Section 16(a)(1) of the FAA then grants appellate jurisdiction over Section 3 motions.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Section 16(a)(1) did not confer jurisdiction in this case. The court recognized that the appellants were not signatories to the arbitration agreement with Carlisle. Thus, it reasoned there was no written agreement that could direct litigated issues into arbitration. Since the appellants' motion to stay was not rooted in Section 3, Section 16(a)(1) did not grant appellate jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55591:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55591:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55591:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and Yes. The Supreme Court held that a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction over an appeal from a motion to stay proceedings under Section 16(a)(1) of the Federal Arbitration Act, regardless of whether the petitioner is in fact eligible for a stay. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Section 16 clearly and unambiguously views the underlying merits of the claim irrelevant, but rather looks to the category of order appealed from. In this case, an appeal from a motion to stay proceedings automatically granted the Sixth Circuit jurisdiction. The Court also held that the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that Section 3 of the FAA categorically prevents a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement from pursuing a stay in proceedings. Rather, \"whenever the relevant state law would make a contract to arbitrate a particular dispute enforceable by a non-signatory,\" that person may pursue and obtain a stay under Section 3. Therefore, the Court remanded to the Sixth Circuit to determine whether relevant state law allows the non-signatories to enforce their agreement under state contract law and thus are allowed to pursue a stay in proceedings.\nJustice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice John Paul Stevens. He argued that \"longstanding congressional policy\" limits the ability of parties to obtain interlocutory appeals. Accordingly, appeals from a denial of a motion to stay proceedings should not be available to those parties who have not even signed the relevant arbitration agreement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55591:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55592:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55592:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDiscover Bank filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in order to compel arbitration on certain counterclaims brought by Betty Vaden, a card member, in a state court suit against her. Discover had originally brought the state suit to recover on Vaden's outstanding credit card balance, but Vaden counterclaimed that certain fees and interest rates had been charged in violation of state law. The district court held that Vaden's usury claims were preempted by federal law and that the agreement clearly contained a provision compelling arbitration in such cases\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that Discover was the \"real party in interest\" and that Vaden's claims were therefore preempted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Furthermore, Vaden had failed to overcome the presumption that she received the properly mailed arbitration agreement. Based on these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit granted Discover's motion to compel arbitration.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55592:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55592:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55592:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and No. The Supreme Court held that a federal court may \"look through\" a Section 4 petition to determine whether the claim establishes federal subject matter jurisdiction. However in this case, the Court recognized the dispute did not bring itself under federal subject matter jurisdiction. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reasoned that Discover's claim against Mr. Vaden did not \"arise under\" federal law nor did Mr. Vaden's \"preempted\" counterclaims create federal subject matter jurisdiction.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts concurred in part and dissented in part, and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito. He agreed with the majority in that a federal court asked to compel arbitration should \"look through\" the dispute to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. However, he disagreed that federal subject matter jurisdiction was not found in this case, as the controversy between the parties was controlled by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55592:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55593:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55593:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEarth Island Institute, along with several other environmental groups, filed suit against the United States Forest Service in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that certain Forest Service regulations violated the Forest Service Decision Making and Appeals Reform Act (ARA). The ARA requires the Forest Service to establish an administrative appeals process providing an opportunity for notice and comment. Earth Island brought this claim when, in 2003, the Forest Service issued new regulations greatly limiting notice, appeals and public comment on certain categorically excluded activities. The district court found for the plaintiffs and issued a nationwide injunction against the Forest Service.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that if Congress intended to allow the Forest Service to limit notice, appeals and comment for categorically excluded activities (as the regulations did) it would not have enacted the ARA in the first place. In seeking certiorari, the Forest Service argued that the Ninth Circuit had overstepped its bounds in invalidating the regulations and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit because the case was not yet ripe for judicial review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55593:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55593:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55593:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and not answered. The Supreme Court held that Earth Island lacked standing to challenge regulations of the U.S. Forest Service because Article III of the Constitution limits judicial power to extend only to cases and controversies that imminently threaten injury to persons caused by violation of law. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Earth Island identified no application of the challenged Forest Service regulations that threatened imminent and concrete harm to its members' interests. As testament to this, the Court noted that Earth Island had voluntarily settled a portion of the lawsuit pertaining to any alleged members' interests and that it failed to show any of its members planned to visit sites where the challenged regulations were being applied in a manner that would harm a particular member's interests. Therefore, Earth Island lacked standing to bring its suit in the first place.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, agreeing that a procedural injury must also \"impair a separate concrete interest\" in order to grant a party standing. Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He disagreed with the majority's findings that Earth Island failed to show it suffered \"concrete injury\" by the challenged Forest Service regulations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55593:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55594:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55594:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEdmund Boyle was convicted by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bank burglary, bank burglary conspiracy, and attempted bank burglary. He was sentenced to 151 months imprisonment. Mr. Boyle appealed arguing that the government's case against him was factually contradictory. In his trial, the government charged that the robbery was an act of the Boyle Crew enterprise. However, in a previous case it had charged that the robbery was an act of the New Springfield Boys enterprise. Boyle maintained that this contradiction violated his right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the government's case was not factually contradictory. It reasoned that \"[n]othing dictates that a single crime cannot be committed by two enterprises working together, each in furtherance of its own interests.\" Thus, the trial court did not violate Boyle's Fifth Amendment due process rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55594:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55594:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55594:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that, under RICO, the association between criminal enterprises must be shown to have a \"structure,\" but the relevant jury instructions need not spell out the precise elements which need be found. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that a jury need not be instructed to find an \"ascertainable structure\" in order to find the association of enterprises because such instructions would be redundant as the jury is already tasked with finding the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt from which it may infer a \"structure\" of criminal association.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that Congress merely intended RICO to apply to \"business-like entities,\" and thus the majority's ruling extended RICO liability far beyond Congress' intent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55594:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55595:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55595:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLinkLine, along with several other internet-service providers (ISPs), sued Pacific Bell, claiming that the company was selling digital subscriber line (DSL) access at \"a high wholesale price in relation to the price at which [it was] providing retail services.\" The ISPs condemned the scheme as price squeezing in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a piece of U.S. antitrust legislation designed to prevent the formation of monopolies. A price squeeze occurs when a company holding a monopoly on the production of certain goods sets its wholesale prices higher than the retail prices it charges directly to consumers, preventing the wholesale customers from competing with it at the retail level. The district court denied Pacific Bell's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a valid claim but granted its motion for an interlocutory appeal, allowing the appellate court to determine whether such price squeezing claims are permissible before delivering a final judgment at the trial level.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the ISPs had stated a legitimate price squeezing claim under Section 2. The Ninth Circuit argued that prior Supreme Court precedent had not eliminated the application of traditional antitrust laws to partially regulated industries. While noting that the wholesale market is governed by a separate document, the 1934 FCC Act, the court stated that the retail market remains unregulated and is therefore subject to the antitrust laws. As far as the retail market was concerned then, the ISPs had stated a valid price squeezing claim under Section 2.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55595:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55595:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55595:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding that a \"price squeezing\" claim cannot be brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act when the defendant is under no duty to sell inputs to the plaintiff in the first place. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court relying on its decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, reasoned that since there was no duty on the part of AT&T to deal with its competitors and no support under existing antitrust doctrine that AT&T's retail prices were \"too low\", the plaintiffs' claim was barred under Section 2.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He argued that the Court should remand the case to the district court and allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include a \"predatory pricing\" claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55595:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55596:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55596:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1992, Michael Bies was convicted of kidnapping, rape, and murder and sentenced to death by an Ohio court. In his appeals to the Ohio Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Ohio, Mr. Bies argued that he was mentally retarded and this fact should mitigate his sentence. Both courts affirmed his conviction and sentence, but agreed that he was mentally retarded. While Mr. Bies proceeded with his post-conviction appeals, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Atkins stating that \"death is not a suitable punishment for mentally retarded people.\" He subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in an Ohio federal district court relying on Atkins. In response, the state claimed that Mr. Bies was not mentally retarded. Mr. Bies argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the state from relitigating the fact of his mental retardation. The district court agreed and granted Mr. Bies' petition for habeas corpus relief and ordered that he be resentenced.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that the state was prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause from relitigating the Supreme Court of Ohio's determination that Mr. Bies was mentally retarded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55596:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55596:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55596:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it held that the Ohio courts were not precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause from conducting a rehearing with respect to Mr. Bies' mental retardation. The Court reasoned that Ohio did not twice put Mr. Bies in jeopardy of conviction because he was never acquitted at trial. Rather, the Court stated that the Ohio courts merely attempted to discern the nature of Mr. Bies mental capacities in order determine whether his death sentence should be mitigated when weighed against other factors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55596:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55597:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55597:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThomas Lee Goldstein was released on habeas corpus from a California prison in 2004 after serving twenty-four years of a murder sentence. Goldstein then brought suit against the prosecutor and chief deputy from his trial alleging that he had been wrongly convicted. Goldstein argued that he had been prejudiced by the testimony of a jailhouse informant claiming to have heard Goldstein confess to the murder. The informant had stated that he had never, either before or during the trial, received benefits for cooperating with the government; in fact, the informant had worked with the government in the past and was getting reduced sentences in exchange for his testimony. Goldstein's claim alleged that the prosecutor and deputy had failed to fulfill their obligation to ensure that information regarding jailhouse informants was adequately shared among prosecutors. In response, the prosecutors argued that their actions during the trial were immune from suit.\nThe district court held that the actions were administrative rather than prosecutorial and were therefore not subject to immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, finding that the prosecutor had failed to show the necessary close association with the judicial phase of the trial in order to invoke immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55597:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55597:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55597:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It reaffirmed its holding in Imbler that officers of the court are immune from liability \"for actions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.\" Acknowledging that immunity does not apply when officers of the court engage in administrative tasks, the Court reasoned that in Mr. Goldstein's case, the defendant prosecutors' failure to share information regarding the testimony of a jailhouse informant was predicated on a decision, requiring legal knowledge, made by those prosecutors about what information to share, and was thus not administrative. Rather, the decision not to share the information was intimately connected to their roles as officers of the court and therefore they were not subject to prosecution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55597:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55598:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55598:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThree consolidated cases center around whether or not the EPA surpassed its federal authority by weighing the pros and cons of systems to be used at water intake cooling structures rather than simply employing the most advanced technology available on the market. The claims, brought by environmental groups and corporations, allege that the EPA's cost/benefit analysis violated the Clean Water Act (CWA) by leading to the use of structures that were insufficient to protect aquatic organisms from being harmed or killed as required by the CWA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55598:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55598:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55598:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the EPA was permitted to use a cost-benefit analysis in setting national performance standards for cooling water intake structures. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that under 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), the EPA has discretion to determine the extent of adverse environmental impact that should be reduced in setting national performance standards for cooling water intake structures. With this discretion, comes the authority to use a cost-benefit analysis in setting national performance standards.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the majority that the EPA was authorized to use a cost-benefit analysis in making its determinations. However, he noted that the drafting and legislative history of 33 U.S.C. Section 1326(b) indicate it was intended to restrict the use of cost-benefit analysis and consequently he found the EPA's reasoning deficient in employing its cost-benefit analysis. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He argued that the plain language of the relevant statute indicates that the EPA was required to set a standard that cooling water intake systems use the \"best technology available\" and therefore impermissibly used a cost-benefit analysis in setting the new standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55598:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55599:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55599:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis is the third habeas corpus appeal of petitioner Gary Bradford Cone after his 1982 conviction in a Tennessee state court on several felony counts including first degree murder and robbery by use of deadly force. The jury found that Cone had bludgeoned two elderly people to death while hiding out after a robbery. Cone's initial appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court soon following his conviction fell on deaf ears: the court ruled that although errors had been committed during the trial, each of them had been \"harmless\" and did not warrant overturning Cone's conviction. He responded by twice filing habeas corpus petitions alleging violations of several constitutional rights, appealing both all the way up to the Court but both times having his case remanded with, in his view, several of his claims still unresolved.\nIn his third appearance before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Cone raised two main points of contention. First, he claimed that he was entitled to relief because the jury in his trial had weighed invalid aggravating factors during his sentencing hearing, thereby entitling him to a new hearing. This argument was rejected by the Sixth Circuit, which found that the Tennessee Supreme Court had conducted a satisfactory harmless error test on the issue. The court pointed out that habeas petitions should be granted only after finding that a state court ruling has \"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.\" Because Tennessee had not abridged any federal laws, the Sixth Circuit denied Cone relief on this first issue.\nCone also argued that the Sixth Circuit had erred when, in a previous appeal, it had held that his claims relating to the prosecutor's improper withholding of evidence had been procedurally defaulted. Cone argued that his case met the Court's \"exceptional circumstances\" test as set out in Westside Mothers v. Olszewski for overruling the procedural default rule and rehearing the issue. The Sixth Circuit once again disagreed, ruling that Cone had failed to show \"cause and prejudice\" on the part of the prosecutor. The Sixth Circuit denied Cone's habeas appeal on all counts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55599:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55599:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55599:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and No. The Supreme Court held that the Tennessee state courts' rejection of Mr. Cone's Brady claim, that the state had suppressed material evidence at his trial, was improperly denied review during post-conviction proceedings and had not been procedurally defaulted. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that Mr. Cone's Brady claim had in fact never been presented at the state court level and thus the Sixth Circuit erred in finding that Mr. Cone's claim had been defaulted for having been raised twice previously. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the documents withheld at Mr. Cone's trial were material to his sentencing and thus entitled him to federal habeas corpus review.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. Justice Samuel A. Alito also wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed that Mr. Cone's case was properly remanded for further review. However, he disagreed that Mr. Cone properly preserved and exhausted his Brady claim at the state court level because Mr. Cone never raised that claim at the state court level. Rather, he argued Mr. Cone's claim was either \"not exhausted\" or was \"procedurally defaulted\", appropriate for the Sixth Circuit to review, not the federal district court. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, dissented. He argued that Mr. Cone failed to prove that there was a \"reasonable probability\" that had the withheld evidence been disclosed at trial that his sentencing would have been different, and therefore his claim should not be granted federal habeas corpus review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55599:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55600:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55600:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn March 2005, Jesse Montejo was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Lewis Ferrari. At his trial, the prosecution submitted as evidence a letter of apology he wrote to the victim's wife. Montejo wrote the letter at the suggestion of a detective who accompanied him in a search for the murder weapon. Before the search, Mr. Montejo was read his Miranda rights and wrote an explanation for his participation in the search. However, no one in the search party knew, including Mr. Montejo, that he had been appointed an attorney the same morning. Mr. Montejo contended under these circumstances that the Sixth Amendment barred the introduction of this evidence since his attorney was not present when he wrote and submitted the letter of apology.\nThe Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the letter of apology Mr. Montejo wrote was valid evidence. It found that Mr. Montejo waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It explained that when counsel was appointed Mr. Montejo remained mute and did not acknowledge it. The court reasoned that something beyond \"mute acquiescence\" is required to trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55600:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55600:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55600:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot necessarily. The Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Michigan v. Jackson which held that evidence obtained through interrogation after the defendant has invoked his right to counsel was inadmissible. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the Jackson framework was unworkable in jurisdictions that appoint counsel regardless of a defendant's request. Instead, the Court stated that the protections afforded under Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick were sufficient to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights from police badgering that might elicit culpable evidence.\nJustice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, also filed a concurring opinion. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and in part by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that the majority correctly concluded that the Louisiana Supreme Court misapplied the Court's holding in Jackson, but disagreed that the Court should have overruled its precedent entirely. Rather, Justice Stevens criticized the Court for misinterpreting the rationale of Jackson and undervaluing the role of stare decisis in its decision making. Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion, highlighting the consistency of his reasoning with respect to stare decisis in several other cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55600:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55601:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55601:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Coffee County, Alabama Sheriff's Department apprehended Bennie Herring in July of 2004. Upon searching Herring's vehicle, officers discovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and a gun under the seat of his truck. However, the situation was complicated by the fact that the initial search had been made on a faulty arrest warrant. The warrant, still active in the neighboring Dale County Sheriff's Office, was supposed to have been recalled five months prior, however someone had accidentally failed to remove it from the computer system. Herring filed a motion to suppress the allegedly \"illegally obtained\" evidence, however the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Herring's motion and sentenced him to 27 months in prison.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that illegally obtained evidence should only be suppressed when doing so could \"result in appreciable deterrence\" of future police misconduct. In his petition for certiorari, Herring pointed to an Arkansas case with nearly identical facts that had come out the other way, noting that \"as policing becomes ever more reliant on computerized systems, the number of illegal arrests and searches based on negligent recordkeeping is poised to multiply.\" The Court granted certiorari on February 19, 2008.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55601:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55601:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55601:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision with Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., the Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. It held that a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when police mistakes that lead to unlawful searches are merely the result of isolated negligence and \"not systematic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements.\" Evidence obtained under these circumstances is admissible and not subject to the exclusionary rule.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer. Justice Ginsburg argued that an intact exclusionary rule provides a strong incentive for police compliance with respect to the Fourth Amendment and its erosion in this case was not warranted. Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Souter. He argued that the Court should move away from its reliance on analyzing the degree of police culpability when determining whether the exclusionary rule applies, but rather draw a bright line between errors made by record keepers and those made by police officers.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55601:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55602:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55602:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of cigarette smokers brought this claim against Altria, the cigarette manufacturer, in federal court in Maine. The smokers asserted that Altria's advertisement claiming that its product was \"light\" and had \"lowered tar and nicotine\" constituted misrepresentations under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment in favor of Altria on the claim.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, reversed the lower court and found in favor of the plaintiff smokers. The court held that the Maine Act was not preempted, either explicitly or implicitly, by a similar federal act, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and that Altria's assertions did in fact constitute misrepresentations under the Maine Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55602:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55602:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55602:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) did not expressly or impliedly preempt all claims related to \"smoking and health\" under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (MUTPA). Adopting the reasoning it used in Cipollone, the court found that claims based on a common law legal duty (\"predicate-duty\" approach), like a manufacturer's duty not to misrepresent its products, were not preempted simply because they related to cigarette manufacturers and the labeling of its products.\nJustice Clarence Thomas joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. dissented. Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority's adoption of the \"predicate-duty\" approach from Cipollone arguing it was confusing and unworkable. Rather, he argued that the Court should adopt a clear test that expressly pre-empts any state law claim that \"imposes an obligation...because of the effect of smoking upon health.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55602:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55603:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55603:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2007, a federal district court convicted Salman Khade Abuelhawa in part for unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally using a communications facility (a telephone) in committing, causing, and facilitating a felony (distribution of cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 843(b). Mr. Abuelhawa appealed arguing that Section 843(b) does not apply because he purchased cocaine for personal use, which is not a felony.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Mr. Abuelhawa's conviction. It reasoned that Mr. Abuelhawa's use of a cell phone facilitated cocaine distribution because his telephone call made the distribution of cocaine \"easier\" for his dealer, which is a felony, thus Section 843(b) properly applies.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55603:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55603:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55603:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. With Justice David H. Souter writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it held that using a telephone to make a misdemeanor drug purchase does not \"facilitate\" felony drug distribution. The Court concentrated on the \"plain meaning\" of the statute in order to reach its conclusion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55603:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55604:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55604:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn June 2004 after 3 years awaiting trial, Michael Brillon was convicted in a Vermont court for felony domestic assault. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him for lack of a speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Vermont agreed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to set aside Mr. Brillon's conviction and dismiss the charges against him.\nThe court held that Mr. Brillon was not prosecuted within a time frame that satisfied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. It reasoned that the state was not relieved of its duty to provide Mr. Brillon with a speedy trial merely because the public defenders assigned him were mostly responsible for the delay. Rather, it considered the office of the public defender an arm of the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55604:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55604:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55604:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and No. The Supreme Court held that the Vermont Supreme Court erred when it categorized assigned counsel as a state actor in the criminal justice system and that it was not justified in treating Mr. Brillon's speedy-trial claims differently than if he had retained private counsel. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that delay caused by a defendant's counsel is ordinarily charged against the defendant, as it should have been in this case.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented. He criticized the Court for granting certiorari here. However, as certiorari was granted, he would have affirmed the Vermont Supreme Court reasoning that it had authority to supervise the appointment of public defenders and therefore could determine when a defendant's delayed trial date should be properly attributed to them.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55604:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55605:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55605:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe plaintiffs in this case are comprised of labor organizations suing officials of the State of Idaho. The organizations claim that Idaho's Voluntary Contributions Act (VCA) violates their First Amendment free speech rights by restricting their ability to participate in any activities the VCA defines as \"political.\" The State officials conceded the unconstitutionality of many of the VCA's provisions, however they argued for the validity of prohibiting payroll deductions for \"political activities.\" The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho held the payroll deduction provisions constitutional as applied to the state government but unconstitutional when applied to private and local government employees. The State officials appealed, contending that the provisions should be equally applicable to both groups.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the payroll deduction provisions could not be applied to private and local government employees because the State had provided no \"compelling justification\" to do so. Furthermore, the court stated that the officials had failed to show that the case should be reviewed under the more relaxed standard for a \"non-public\" forum.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55605:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55605:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55605:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding that Idaho's Voluntary Contributions Act did not violate the free speech rights of local government employees. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in part, the Court reasoned that Idaho's law did not restrict political speech, but merely declined to promote speech by prohibiting public employees from directly contributing to partisan activities from their government issued paycheck. Using a rational-basis review, it recognized that the state had a reasonable interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety by banning the funding of partisan political activity from the state's payroll. Moreover, the Court held that this governmental interest applied equally to governments at the state and local level.\nJustice Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that rather than reverse the court of appeals, the case should have been remanded. Additionally, he argued that rather than apply a rational-basis review as the Court did here, he would utilize an \"intermediate scrutiny inquiry\" where the statute would be considered in light of whether it imposed a burden upon speech that was disproportionate to other interests the government sought to achieve. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented arguing that the Idaho statue was clearly intended to make it more difficult for government employees to finance speech and therefore was unconstitutional. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also dissented arguing that this case was a poor vehicle for refining the analysis of the First Amendment and therefore should have been denied review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55605:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55606:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55606:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEdward Bell was convicted and sentenced to death in a Virginia state court for murdering a police sergeant. After unsuccessfully appealing his case through direct review and state habeas proceedings, Bell filed a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Bell argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, suggesting that his lawyer failed to investigate and present evidence from five witnesses that may have reduced his death sentence to life in prison.\nThe Supreme Court, in Strickland, has previously stated that a petitioner must show (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice in order to succeed on a claim for ineffective assistance. Based on these principles, the district court dismissed Bell's claim and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Fourth Circuit found that the conclusions of the Virginia state courts were reasonable and that Bell had failed to show that he had suffered actual prejudice. According to the court, the aggravating testimony from the witnesses outweighed any mitigating effects the missing testimony may have had.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55606:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55606:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55606:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55606:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55607:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55607:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe purported inventors of an anti-cancer agent, Jong-Wan park and Yang-Sook Chun through HIF Bio Inc., sued Carlsbad Technology, Inc. in a California court for various claims regarding ownership of the invention. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. After dismissing the federal claim, it declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state claims and remanded the case back to state court.\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the remand order. It reasoned that when the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims in the case, it necessarily found that the claims lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55607:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55607:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55607:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that a district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim is not a dismissal for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction for which federal appellate review is barred. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that, in this case, the district court merely exercised its discretion to dismiss a state-law claim for which it had supplemental jurisdiction, and therefore its decision was not based upon lack of jurisdiction, which would have precluded federal appellate court review.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined by Justice David H. Souter, all wrote separate concurring opinions. Each highlighted the mess the Supreme Court's holdings have left this area of law and suggested statutory revision to clarify the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55607:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55608:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55608:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2005, the New York State Attorney General began investigating possible racial discrimination in the real estate lending practices of several national banks. The Attorney General requested that the implicated banks turn over certain non-public information to aid the investigation. The Clearing House Association (CHA), a consortium of national banks including several involved in the investigation, filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court to prevent the Attorney General from continuing his investigation. The CHA argued that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the federal agency charged with overseeing national banks, was appropriately responsible for regulating the banks' compliance with activities that fall under the National Bank Act (NBA) and therefore precluded state officials like the Attorney General from doing so. In response, the Attorney General argued that the Federal Housing Act (FHA) provided an exception to the OCC's sole stewardship of the NBA and therefore authorized his investigation. The district court granted the CHA's request for an injunction and stopped the Attorney General's investigation.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the injunction against the Attorney General's investigation, but used the decision in a separate case, filed by the OCC and utilizing different arguments, to do so. Here, the court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the FHA claim. It reasoned that since the Attorney General had not yet filed any lawsuits against the banks under investigation, the issue of whether the FHA provided an exception to the enforcement of the NBA was not ripe for adjudication.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55608:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55608:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55608:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that the OCC's interpretation of the NBA that precluded state officials from regulating and enforcing banking activities was not reasonable. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court distinguished between a state's \"visitorial powers\" – its supervisory powers – and its enforcement powers. The Court stated that the NBA only prevented a state from exercising its visitorial powers over banks. Therefore, the Court reasoned that a state was not precluded from exercising its ordinary powers to enforce state laws.\nJustice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part. He was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito. Justice Thomas argued that because the definition of \"visitorial powers\" was ambiguous, the courts should have deferred to the OCC's interpretation of the term in the NBA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55608:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55609:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55609:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1964 the Navajo Nation entered into a contract with Sentry Royalty Company for the mining of coal on its land. The contract called for royalty payments to the Navajo Nation not to exceed 37.5 cents per ton of coal mined. However, the contract allowed for the Secretary of the Interior to adjust the royalty rate to a \"reasonable\" level after twenty years. At the end of twenty years, the Navajo Nation was being paid the equivalent of 2 percent of the proceeds from the mining operation. As stipulated by the contract, the Navajo Nation entered into discussions with Peabody Coal Company (formerly Sentry Royalty Company) to adjust the royalty rate. After discussions failed, the Navajo Nation asked the Secretary of the Interior to resolve the dispute. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs reached an initial decision to set the royalty rate at 20 percent. This decision was delayed on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior. Unbeknownst to the Navajo Nation, the Secretary had been meeting with executives of the Peabody Coal Company who requested the delay. Facing dire economic circumstances, the Navajo Nation agreed to a royalty rate of 12.5 percent which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior.\nIn 1993, the Navajo Nation brought suit against the United States for violations of its statutory and fiduciary duties to the Nation. It sought damages of $600 million. This latest decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit represents the fifth chapter in the long running saga over the original dispute. Its decision comes in the wake of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims holding, on instructions from the Supreme Court, that the Navajo Nation did not provide sufficient evidence to seek damages from the United States.\nThe Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the Navajo Nation marshaled sufficient evidence to show that the United States \"controls the leasing of the [Navajo's] coal resources and that the government is responsible for the liabilities arising thereunder.\" It reasoned that the body of regulations and statutes that governed the Nation's resources were \"reasonably amenable\" to an interpretation that imposed liability on the part of the government for breach of its duties.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55609:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55609:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55609:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and No. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, the Court held that its decision in Navajo I had not definitively terminated the Nation's claim. In Navajo I it reasoned that the Nation's only avenue to sue the United States was by finding \"specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions.\" The Court reasoned that since only three statutes were analyzed, there might exist a relevant statute that could provide the Nation a basis for its lawsuit. However, the Supreme Court also held that none of the sources of law cited by the Nation provided such a basis and therefore its suit should be dismissed.\nJustice David H. Souter, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote a separate concurring opinion. He admitted regretting that his dissenting opinion in Navajo I was not controlling authority, but recognized the Court must abide its precedent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55609:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55610:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55610:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 2005, a jury in a federal district court acquitted F. Scott Yeager of conspiracy, wire fraud, and security fraud, but hung on 20 counts of insider trading and 99 counts of money laundering in relation to his involvement with Enron Broadband Services. The district court declared a mistrial on the counts the jury hung on. Thereafter, the United States again indicted Mr. Yeager on a portion of the mistried counts. On interlocutory appeal, Mr. Yeager argued that in acquitting him of securities fraud, the jury \"necessarily found that he did not have insider information\", and therefore collateral estopple prevents the government from retrying him for insider trading and money laundering.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that collateral estoppel does not bar retrial in Mr. Yeager's case. It recognized that Mr. Yeager had the burden of proving the jury necessarily found that he was not guilty of insider trading. He did not, as a jury that found him not guilty of insider trading and \"acting rationally\" would have acquitted him of insider trading and money laundering. The court reasoned that because it was unclear the jury's rationale for its decisions, Mr. Yeager's mistried counts did not prevent his retrial on those counts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55610:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55610:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55610:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that apparent inconsistencies between a jury's verdict of acquittal on some counts and its failure to return a verdict on other counts does not affect an acquittal's preclusive force. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, and in part by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court stated that in Mr. Yeager's case, \"if the possession of insider information was a critical issue of ultimate fact in all of the charges [against him], a jury that decided that issue in his favor protects him from prosecution for any charges for which that [fact] is an essential element.\"\nJustice Antonin G. Scalia dissented and was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito. He disagreed with the majority holding, arguing that it was a departure from not only the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but the Court's own precedent. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. While acknowledging his disagreement with the majority holding, he argued that in light of the decision, the courts should rigorously apply the doctrine of issue preclusion. Based on this, an acquittal on one charge only precludes indictment for a second charge if a \"rational jury\" could not have acquitted on the precedent charge without finding in the defendant's favor on the factual element necessary to convict on the second charge. Justice Kennedy also wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. While agreeing with much of the majority holding, he noted the validity of Justice Alito's concerns with the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55610:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55611:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55611:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlexandre Mirzayance was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court. He was subsequently denied post-conviction relief by the trial court and the California Court of Appeals. Mr. Mirzayance then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. He maintained that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel because at trial, his attorney advised him to abandon his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). The federal district court denied Mr. Mirzayance's petition, but was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ordered an evidentiary hearing limited to determining whether \"there were tactical reasons for abandoning the defense.\"\nAt the hearing, the Magistrate Judge found that Mr. Mirzayance's counsel had \"nothing to lose\" by going forward with the NGI plea and thus found his performance ineffective. The federal district court accepted this finding and granted Mr. Mirzayance's petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Mr. Mirzayance's attorney's advice to withdraw his NGI plea was unreasonable because there was \"reasonable probability\" the jury would find Mr. Mirzayance insane. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, and remanded the case for consideration in light of Carey v. Musladin. On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its decision stating that Mr. Mirzayance's attorney's failure to pursue the NGI defense constituted ineffective counsel because it \"secured no tactical advantage.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55611:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55611:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55611:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and not answered. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the California Court of Appeals' decision to deny Mr. Mirzayance's petition for habeas corpus relief was not \"an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.\" With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit reached an erroneous result because it applied an improper standard of review when it found Mr. Mirzayance's counsel ineffective for abandoning the NGI plea because there was \"nothing to lose\" in pursuing it. Rather, the Court stated that in order to find counsel ineffective, the defendant must show both \"deficient performance\" and \"prejudice.\" The Court reasoned that Mr. Mirzayance's counsel was not deficient when he abandoned an NGI plea that had \"almost no chance of success.\" Therefore, the California Court of Appeals was not \"unreasonable\" in denying Mr. Mirzayance's petition for habeas corpus relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55611:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55612:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55612:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKeith Haywood, while incarcerated at the Attica Correctional Facility in Attica, New York, was charged with several misbehavior reports in 2003 and 2004, including assaulting a corrections officer, failing a urinalysis test, and improperly soliciting mail. After being found guilty of these charges, Haywood commenced actions in state court against two of the corrections officers responsible for reviewing the claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983), a federal statute protecting civil rights. He asserted that the guilty verdicts had been handed down without sufficient evidence, that the officers had tampered with the urinalysis test, and that they had conspired to fabricate the facts set forth in the misbehavior reports. The defendants moved to dismiss Haywood's claims, basing their argument on a New York law prohibiting civil claims such as Haywood's brought against corrections officers in their official capacities. Haywood responded by arguing that when Congress created Section 1983 it intended the statute to supersede any state laws contradicting it. Because Section 1983 allowed these claims, Haywood argued, the New York law prohibiting them violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court of New York (the state's lowest-level court) agreed with the defendants and dismissed Haywood's claim based on the New York law.\nThe Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, finding that the Supremacy Clause permits states to deny enforcement of a federal right in a case where a state court lacks jurisdiction due to a neutral state rule regarding the courts' administration. Because Haywood's claim would be barred if brought under either Section 1983 or an applicable state law, the New York law barring the claim was valid and neutral and did not violate the Supremacy Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55612:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55612:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55612:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that New York's Correction Law Section 24, prohibiting civil claims brought against corrections officers in their official capacities, as applied in Mr. Haywood's case, violated the Supremacy Clause and thus was unconstitutional. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court noted that New York had passed Section 24 after determining most damages suits filed by prisoners against state corrections officers were frivolous. However, the Court reasoned that states may not relieve whole categories of federal claims from their courts merely to avoid congestion.\nJustice Clarence Thomas dissented and was joined in part by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, and Samuel A. Alito. He argued that neither the Constitution nor Supreme Court precedent requires that states open their courts to Section 1983 claims. Thus, New York's law was not unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55612:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55613:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55613:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1998, Michael Rivera was convicted in an Illinois court on two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to 85 years in prison. Before the trial, Mr. Rivera's attorney moved to dismiss a potential juror. The judge did not allow it deeming the motion discriminatory towards the juror. On appeal after his conviction, Mr. Rivera argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the pre-trial motion and thus his conviction should be reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to specify how the motion was discriminatory. After the trial court found that gender discrimination was at issue, the Illinois Supreme Court continued its review.\nIt held that Mr. Rivera was improperly denied his pre-trial motion to dismiss the juror. It reasoned that there was no evidence Mr. Rivera's attorney aimed to dismiss the juror because of her gender. However, it also found that this was harmless error. It explained that there was no evidence that indicated Mr. Rivera was tried before a biased jury because of the improperly dismissed motion. Thus, Mr. Rivera's conviction should stand.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55613:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55613:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55613:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. A unanimous Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require the automatic reversal of a conviction because of the trial court's good-faith error in denying the defendant's preemptory challenge to a juror, provided that all the jurors are qualified and unbiased. In her opinion for the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reasoned that since there is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges, the mistaken denial of a preemptory challenge does not on its own violate the Constitution. Rather, states are free to decide as a matter of law whether the mistaken denial of a preemptory challenge is reversible error. In this case, the Court agreed that the Illinois Supreme Court acted within its powers in determining the mistaken denial of Mr. Rivera's preemptory challenge was mere harmless error.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55613:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55614:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55614:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denied Jean Marc Nken's petition to reopen his case regarding his deportation. He appealed arguing that the Board abused its discretion in denying his motion and should have used its sua sponte power to reopen his proceedings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its discretion. It also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Mr. Nken's claim that the Board failed to use its sua sponte power in order to reopen his case. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted Mr. Nken's motion for a stay of his removal until further proceeding by the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55614:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55614:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55614:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court held that the traditional factors govern a court of appeals' authority to stay an alien's removal pending judicial review. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court elucidated the four factors that govern stays. First, there must be more than a mere possibility that relief will be granted. Second, irreparable injury must be more than a mere possibility. The third and fourth factors, which respectively determine whether the stay will injure the other party and where the public interest lies, merge when the Government is the opposing party, as in this case. Consequently, the Court vacated the order in Mr. Nken's case and remanded it to the Fourth Circuit for review in light of its decision.\nJustice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a separate concurring opinion. He emphasized that stays are an extraordinary remedy and should not be granted lightly. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. He argued that the majority decision nullified statutory provisions adopted by Congress in 1996 that stated immigration removal orders were \"self-executing\" and \"not dependent upon judicial enforcement.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55614:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55615:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55615:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThomas Eugene Ice was convicted in state court in Oregon on two counts of first-degree burglary with intent to commit sexual abuse, as well as two counts of first-degree sexual abuse committed during those burglaries. Over Ice's objection, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences based on its own findings of fact. Ice appealed, raising the question whether the Oregon or U.S. Constitutions require a jury, rather than a judge, to make the factual findings upon which a court decides to prescribe consecutive sentences.\nThe Oregon Court of Appeals held that the consecutive sentences were not in violation of the State's Constitution because none of the factual issues reviewed by the judge were an \"element\" of the crime. However, the sentences did violate the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because the factual findings were not made by a jury but were used to increase Ice's punishment to more than what the jury had imposed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55615:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55615:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55615:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not prevent states from assigning to judges rather than to juries fact finding responsibilities necessary to imposing consecutive sentences on criminal defendants. The Court drew its reasoning from the historical record. Since the nation's founding, judges have served in this capacity. Additionally, the Court reasoned that judges serving in this capacity do not infringe upon the traditional responsibilities of a jury in a criminal trial.\nJustice Antonin G. Scalia dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Scalia argued that in Mr. Ice's case, the Court's opinion in Apprendi should control. There, the Court was clear that any fact finding necessary to the enhancement of a criminal sentence must be done by the jury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55615:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55616:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55616:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 1998, a United States Navy court-martial tried Jacob Denedo on counts of conspiracy, larceny, and forgery. In exchange for his guilty plea, Mr. Denedo was offered a reduced sentence that included three months of confinement, a demotion, and a bad-conduct discharge. Eight years later, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services began proceedings to deport Mr. Denedo, a Nigerian immigrant and lawful permanent resident of the United States, based on his court-martial conviction. In light of these developments, Mr. Denedo filed a petition with the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief and requested review of his court-martial and a writ of error coram nobis in order to achieve his pre-conviction state. He argued that his counsel at the court-martial was ineffective because he had specifically stated during the proceeding that \"his primary concern and objective\" was \"to avoid the risk of deportation\" and was less concerned about the amount of time he spent in prison. At the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, the government motioned to dismiss Mr. Denedo's petition on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The court disagreed and found it had jurisdiction as provided by 28 U.S.C. Section 1651 - the All Writs Act. It then denied Mr. Denedo's petition. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces agreed that the Court of Criminal Appeals had jurisdiction to review the petition, but remanded the matter to the Court of Criminal Appeals for further fact finding in order to determine whether Mr. Denedo's counsel was deficient.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55616:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55616:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55616:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that Article I courts, like the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA), retain jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to consider coram nobis petitions that allege a prior judgment of conviction was fundamentally flawed. With Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since Mr. Denedo's coram nobis petition was simply a further step in his criminal appeal, the NMCCA retained jurisdiction to issue the writ, as the petition challenged the validity of the court's original ruling.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts dissented, oined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito. Roberts disagreed with the majority that Article I courts have jurisdiction to consider coram nobis petitions. Rather, he argued that military courts are severely restricted in their jurisdiction, which cannot extend beyond the precise limits granted them by Congress.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55616:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55618:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55618:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Pulido was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court for his involvement in the shooting of a gas station attendant during the course of a robbery. He claimed that he was only involved in the robbery after the shooting had taken place. On appeal, Mr. Pulido argued that the jury instructions were in error and allowed a jury to convict him as an accomplice in the robbery and murder, even if he only took part in the robbery. The California Supreme Court refused to overturn the conviction holding that the error was harmless because the jury had specifically found that Mr. Pulido aided the robbery during the murder.\nMr. Pulido sought and was granted habeas relief by a federal district court in California. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that instructing a jury on multiple theories of guilt, one of which was legally improper, was \"structural error\" entitling Mr. Pulido to automatic relief and exempted the instructions from \"harmless-error\" review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55618:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55618:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55618:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit inaccurately categorized the type of jury instructions in Mr. Pulido's case as \"structural error.\" It reasoned that one instructional error arising in the context of multiple theories of guilt does not necessarily spoil all the jury's findings, which would entitle the convicted individual to automatic relief. Rather, the Court found that the jury instructions in Mr. Pulido's case should be evaluated by whether they caused a \"substantial and injurious effect\" upon the jury reaching its verdict. The Court vacated Mr. Pulido's conviction and remanded the case to the court of appeals for proceedings consistent with the decision.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. They found the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit merely misused the term \"structural error\" in its opinion, while it actually utilized the analytical model advocated by the majority opinion. They reasoned that in the interests of efficiency, the Supreme Court should have affirmed the court of appeals rather than have it repeat largely the same analysis.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55618:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55619:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55619:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn March 1994, William Osborne was convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault in an Alaska state court. After his conviction, Mr. Osborne sought access to biological evidence that was used to convict him. He intended to use DNA testing that was not available at the time of the trial to prove he was not the source. The District Attorney's Office (D.A.O.) in Anchorage denied access. Mr. Osborne subsequently filed suit in a federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the D.A.O. alleging that his 14th Amendment due process rights had been violated when he was denied post-conviction access to potentially exculpatory evidence.\nThe district court granted the D.A.O.'s motion to dismiss and Mr. Osborne appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded the case. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Mr. Osborne. The D.A.O. appealed arguing that Mr. Osborne need show the disclosure of evidence would \"affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent\" in order to gain access. Further, it argued that an oral confession given by Mr. Osborne after his conviction precluded him from pursuing post-conviction relief.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court. It held that Mr. Osborne had a limited due process right of access to the biological evidence for purposes of DNA testing. The court dismissed the D.A.O.'s arguments. It reasoned that Mr. Osborne need merely show that favorable DNA results would afford a \"reasonable probability\" that he could prevail in an action for post-conviction relief. Further, it found that Mr. Osborne's oral confession did not foreclose his pursuit of post-conviction relief, as exculpating evidence would raise serious questions about the validity of his confession.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55619:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55619:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55619:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe and no. The Supreme Court held that even assuming that Mr. Osborne could pursue his claims using § 1983, he had no constitutional right to obtain post-conviction access to the state's DNA evidence used against him at trial. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, the Court deferred to the legislative branch in establishing rules by which convicts can obtain DNA evidence to pursue postconviction relief. It recognized that while the Alaska legislature had yet to establish such procedures, its court system was making progress. Moreover, the Court held that Mr. Osborne's due process rights were not violated, reasoning that Alaska's postconviction relief procedures were adequate.\nJustice Alito also wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Kennedy and in part by Justice Thomas. He agreed with the majority's opinion, but also stated that Mr. Osborne's claim failed for two other reasons. First, he argued that § 1983 was an inappropriate mechanism for pursuing a federal constitutional right claim when the claim had not been exhausted at the state court level. Second, he argued that Mr. Osborne's claim should be rejected because a defendant who chooses not to have DNA testing done at the trial level for tactical reasons should not have access to such testing in pursuing postconviction relief. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, and in part by Justice David H. Souter. He strongly disagreed with the majority holding that prevented Mr. Osborne from having access to evidence that could conclusively prove his guilt or innocence, and thus could ensure justice had been achieved. Justice Souter also dissented. He argued that Alaska had failed to provide sufficiently effective postconviction relief procedures to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Constitution and thus Mr. Osborne should have had access to the DNA evidence he sought.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55619:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55621:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55621:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1961, Florida enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act (\"BSPA\") to restore and maintain critically eroded beaches within the state. In 2003, under the BSPA, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection filed for an Application for a Joint Coastal Permit and Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands in order to dredge sand from a shoal to rebuild a beach. Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. (\"SBR\"), an association of homeowners, subsequently challenged the issuance of the permit and the constitutionality of the BSPA. The Florida court of appeals rescinded the permit, holding that issuance would have resulted in an unconstitutional taking.\nOn appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida first rephrased the certified question to determine whether the BSPA was \"on its face\" constitutional. Then, the court held that the BSPA was not unconstitutional, reasoning that it did not deprive land owners of littoral rights without just compensation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55621:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55621:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55621:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held 8-0 that the Florida Supreme Court did not take property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Antonin Scalia announced the judgment of the Court, and authored an opinion in which he maintained that there could be no taking unless property owners could show that they had rights to future exposed land and to contact with the water superior to Florida's right to fill in its submerged land. Here, there could be no showing. Scalia drew from Florida-law principles that (1) the state, as owner of submerged land adjacent to beachfront property, has the right to fill that land and (2) the exposure of land previously submerged belongs to the state even if it interrupts the beachfront property owners' contact with the water. Justice Scalia, with a plurality of the Court including Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito, also noted in Parts II and III of the decision that if a court declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property in violation of the Takings Clause.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court's holding, but disagreed that a plurality should reach the issue of whether or when a judicial decision determining property owners' rights can violate the Takings Clause. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court's holding, but, like Justice Kennedy, counseled that the Court should only address the issues before it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55621:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55622:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55622:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Florida state court convicted Albert Holland of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, attempted sexual battery, and armed robbery, and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Holland petitioned for federal habeas relief in a Florida federal district court. The district court denied the petition as untimely.\nOn appeal, Mr. Holland argued that his attorney failed to communicate with him about the status of his case, then failed to file a timely federal habeas corpus petition, despite repeated instructions by Mr. Holland to do so. Therefore, Mr. Holland contended that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that absent an allegation and proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, or mental impairment on the attorney's part, no mere negligence of the attorney's rises to the level of egregious misconduct that would entitle a habeas corpus petitioner to equitable tolling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55622:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55622:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55622:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that a state prisoner who has exhausted her state court appeals has one year within which to petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held that under certain \"extraordinary circumstances,\" a court may relax that deadline. Those circumstances may arise from an attorney's misconduct, even if the attorney did not act dishonestly or in bad faith.\nJustice Samuel J. Alito concurred in part and in the judgment, and Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, joined in part by Justice Clarence Thomas. In his dissent, Scalia criticized the court's statutory interpretation, stating that if Congress had intended for there to be equitable tolling in AEDPA, they would have explicitly stated so. He went on to criticize the court's application of the new standard", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55622:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55623:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55623:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCatherine Ratliff was the attorney for Ruby Kills Ree in her successful suit against the Social Security Administration for Social Security benefits. The district court also granted Kills Ree’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Before paying the fee award, the government discovered that Kills Ree owed the government a debt that predated the fee award and accordingly sought to offset the fee award against the debt. Ratliff then intervened in the case to challenge the offset and argued that the fee award belonged to her and therefore could not be used to offset Kills Ree’s debt. The district court held that the offset was proper because the fee award goes to the “prevailing party,” not directly to the attorney. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that precedent established that EAJA fee awards go to the attorney.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55623:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55623:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55623:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that “prevailing party” is a term of art referring to the prevailing litigant, and nothing in the text of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) supports a different reading of the term. The fact that the statute awards fees to the prevailing litigant in which her attorney has an interest or contractual right does not mean that the statute awards the fees directly to the attorney. The government’s practice of paying fees directly to the attorney occurred mostly in cases in which the litigant had already assigned her rights to the fees to the attorney and does not affect the reading of the statutory text. The Court held that the fees are awarded to the litigant, and therefore they can be offset if the litigant has outstanding debts to the government.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that, although the text of the EAJA indicates that the government pays the litigant rather than the attorney and the attorney’s right to the fees is controlled by contract, it is not clear whether Congress intended for the government to be able to offset the fees against outstanding debt. Because such offsets undercut the effectiveness of the EAJA in providing access to the courts, it is likely that Congress would have made a different choice had it considered this possibility. Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55623:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55624:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55624:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nConvicted sex offenders moved to dismiss petitions requesting their indefinite civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. A North Carolina federal district court dismissed the petitions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. It held that the Protection and Safety Act exceeded the scope of Congress' authority when it enacted a law that could confine a person solely because of \"sexual dangerousness,\" and the government need not even allege that this \"dangerousness\" violated any federal law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55624:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55624:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55624:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress authority sufficient to enact the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority, the Court pointed to five considerations that compelled its holding. (1) the Necessary and Proper Clause grants broad authority. (2) The Court recognized that Congress has long delivered mental health care to federal prisoners. (3) Congress had good reason to pass the statute as it has the power to protect nearby communities from the danger prisoners may pose. (4) The Tenth Amendment does not reserve a zone of authority to the states in this context. (5) The Court recognized that the statute was narrow in scope and did not confer on Congress a general police power, which is reserved to the states.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. He maintained that authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause is dependent upon the \"strength of the chain\" from Congressional action and its enumerated power, not on the number of \"links in the chain.\" Justice Samuel A. Alito also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. He cautioned that the majority opinion should not be construed as granting an unlimited ability by Congress to extend its power.\nJustice Clarence Thomas, joined in part by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress only to enact laws that carry into execution one or more enumerated powers. Here, he argued that the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act did not carry into execution an enumerated power.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55624:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55625:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55625:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Pennsylvania federal district court convicted Percy Dillon for conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 50 grams of cocaine base, use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to retroactively reduce the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses. Mr. Dillon then moved to have his sentence reduced in accordance with the new guidelines. The district court reduced Mr. Dillon's sentence by two levels, but held that it lacked the authority to reduce his sentence further. On appeal, Mr. Dillon argued that in light of United States v. Booker the district court had the authority to further reduce his sentence. Moreover, he argued that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score when determining his sentencing.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that Booker did not allow a district court, when reducing a previously imposed sentence, to treat the amended guidelines' range as advisory. Moreover, the court rejected Mr. Dillon's argument that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score, reasoning that the district court had no authority to reconsider its prior criminal history determination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55625:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55625:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55625:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit, holding that Booker is inapplicable to the present case and, thus, does not require that the amended guidelines' range be treated as advisory. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the sentencing guidelines implicated in this case are not governed by Booker because, unlike other sentencing guidelines, the implicated guidelines allow only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented. He disagreed with the majority for binding the hands of district courts and not allowing them the discretion to reduce sentences with respect to this one section of the sentencing guidelines. Justice Stevens thought such restrictions had been done away with by the Court's decision in Booker.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55625:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55626:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55626:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTaylor James Bloate was convicted in a Missouri federal district court on counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. In a pretrial motion, Mr. Bloate moved to dismiss arguing that there had been a Speedy Trial Act violation. It was denied. The Act requires that a defendant's trial begin within \"70 days after the indictment or the defendant's initial appearance, whichever is later.\" However, it excludes \"any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant.\" Following his conviction, Mr. Bloate appealed, arguing that his motion to dismiss was improperly denied as the court excluded too many days in its calculation.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Bloate's conviction. It recognized that six circuits hold that \"pretrial motion preparation may be excluded, if the court specifically grants time for that purpose\" and that two do not. Here, the Eighth Circuit sided with the majority in holding that the district court properly excluded days from the time of Mr. Bloate's indictment to his trial and therefore there was no violation to the Speedy Trial Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55626:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55626:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55626:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit holding that the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable from the 70-day limit under subsection (h)(1). Rather, with Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court stated that such time may be excluded only when a district court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under subsection (h)(7). The Court reasoned that the period of time sought to be excluded by the government preceded the first day upon which Congress specified that such delay may be automatically excluded. Thus, in this case, the pretrial preparation time was not automatically excludable.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion. She highlighted that nothing in the majority decision prevents the Eight Circuit upon remand from considering the government's argument that Mr. Bloate's indictment and conviction remain valid. Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. He argued that the neither the text nor legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act support the majority decision. Instead, he criticized the majority for creating a rule that would entitle Mr. Bloate to dismissal of his charge because his attorney persuaded a Magistrate Judge to give him more time to prepare pretrial motions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55626:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55627:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55627:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAmong the plaintiffs in this case are supporters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (\"KWP\") and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (\"LTTE\"). The KWP and LTTE engage in a variety of both lawful and unlawful activities. They sought an injunction to prevent the government from enforcing sections of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (\"AEDPA\"). Section 302 authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a group as a \"foreign terrorist organization.\" Section 303 makes it a crime for anyone to provide \"material support or resources\" to even the nonviolent activities of a designated organization. In previous cases, the courts have held that Section 303 was unconstitutionally vague. Congress then passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (\"IRTPA\") which amended the AEDPA. It added a state of mind requirement that individuals \"knowingly\" provide \"material support or resources\" in order to violate the Act. Congress also added terms to the Act that further clarified what constituted \"material support or resources.\" The government moved for summary judgment arguing that challenged provisions of the AEDPA were not unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted a partial motion for summary judgment, but held that some parts of the Act were unconstitutionally vague.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the terms \"service,\" \"training,\" or \"other specialized knowledge\" within the AEDPA, as applied to the plaintiffs, were unconstitutionally vague.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55627:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55627:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55627:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot as applied to the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that the material support provision of the AEDPA is constitutional as applied to the particular forms of support that the plaintiffs seek to provide to terrorist organizations. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that, as applied, the provision in question is not vague. Here, the statutory terms at issue -- \"training,\" \"expert advice or assistance,\" \"service,\" and \"personnel\" -- are not similar to terms like \"annoying\" and \"indecent\" that the Court has struck down as being too vague. The Court recognized that the statute may not be clear in every respect, but it is clear enough with respect to the plaintiffs in this case.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, dissented. He agreed that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. However, Justice Breyer disagreed that the Constitution permits the government to prosecute the plaintiffs criminally for engaging in coordinated teaching and advocacy furthering the designated organizations' lawful political objectives. He reasoned that the government had not met its burden to show that the speech prohibited by the statute served a compelling governmental interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55627:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55628:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55628:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nApplicants were denied a patent by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for claims pertaining to a process of managing risk in commodities trading. The PTO examiner deemed the invention not to be of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the decision.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The court relied on Supreme Court precedent stating that an invention is patentable if: \"1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.\" Reasoning from this, it held that the applicants' invention clearly failed this test (machine-or-transformation test) and therefore did not constitute patentable subject matter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55628:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55628:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55628:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit, holding that the applicants' claimed invention is not patent eligible. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the Federal Circuit did not err when it used the \"machine-or-transformation test\" to determine patentability. However, the Court noted, in contrast to the Federal Circuit, that the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for determining patent eligibility.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority to the extent it suggested that any series of steps that is not itself an abstract idea or law of nature may constitute a \"process\" within Section 101. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, also concurred in the judgment. He noted his agreement with Justice Stevens' concurrence and also highlighted the extent to which the Court agreed on many fundamental issues of patent law raised by this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55628:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55629:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55629:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNatives of Somalia filed suit against Mohamed Ali Samantar in a Virginia federal district court under the Torture Victim Protection Act (\"TVPA\") and the Alien Tort Statute (\"ATS\"). Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Samantar committed torture and other human rights violations while he commanded Somali government agents under the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre. The district court dismissed the case, holding that Mr. Samantar was immune to suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (\"FSIA\").\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the FSIA did not render Mr. Samantar immune to suit. The court reasoned that the FSIA does not apply to foreign government officials. The court further reasoned that even if the FSIA does apply to foreign government officials, it does not apply to former foreign government officials.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55629:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55629:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55629:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. No. The Supreme Court held that the FSIA does not govern Mr. Samantar's claim of immunity. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that there is nothing to suggest that \"foreign state\" within the FSIA should be read to include an official acting on behalf of that state. The Court further reasoned that the FSIA's legislative history did not indicate that Congress intended to codify official immunity within the FSIA.\nJustices Samuel A. Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Antonin G. Scalia, writing in separate opinions, noted that the legislative history of the FSIA should not have been evaluated in reaching the Court's conclusion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55629:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55630:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55630:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe plaintiffs, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad (UPR), filed claims through their union, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET), contesting their discharge or discipline imposed by the UPR. The National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the BLET failed to submit conclusive evidence that the aggrieved parties had held a conference with the UPR to attempt to resolve the disputes – a prerequisite to arbitration – though conferences were in fact held. The plaintiffs appealed to a federal district where the dismissal was affirmed.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the NRAB denied the plaintiffs due process by requiring evidence of conferencing on the record as a prerequisite to arbitration. The court reasoned that this requirement was not clearly established in the statutes, regulations, or collective bargaining agreement and therefore the NRAB had created a new requirement, which it imposed retroactively.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55630:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55630:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55630:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and No. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for a unanimous bench, the Court held that the Seventh Circuit effectively resolved the Union's core complaint, but erred in doing so under a \"constitutional, rather than statutory headline.\" The Court reasoned that there was no due process issue \"alive\" in the case. The Court further held that prearbitration settlement conferences are not a prerequisite for NRAB jurisdiction over a dispute. The Court reasoned that prearbitration conference requirements set out by the NRAB run independent of the collective bargaining process and do not bear on the merits of an actual grievance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55630:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55631:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55631:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1978, Curtis W. McGhee Jr. and Terry Harrington were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Iowa state court. In 2002, Mr. McGhee's and Mr. Harrington's convictions were reversed because the prosecutor at their trial improperly withheld evidence of an alternative suspect. Subsequently, Mr. McGhee and Mr. Harrington filed civil claims in an Iowa federal court against Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and the prosecutors and officers involved in their prosecution. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that they were absolutely immune to civil prosecution. The district court found some defendants immune to certain claims, but denied immunity to other defendants on the other claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the prosecutors were absolutely immune to civil prosecution.\nThe Eighth Circuit held that the prosecutors were not immune from claims that they violated Mr. McGhee's and Mr. Harrington's due process rights. The court reasoned that allegations that prosecutors obtained, manufactured, coerced, and fabricated evidence did not fall within \"a distinctly prosecutorial function\" and thus the prosecutors were not immune to the claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55631:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55631:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55631:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nDismissed pursuant to the Court's Rule 46.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55631:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55632:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55632:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case originates in the Supreme Court. South Carolina seeks an equitable apportionment of the Catawba River, which starts in North Carolina and flows into South Carolina. The Special Master recommends that the Supreme Court (1) permit the City of Charlotte, N.C., the Catawba River Water Supply Project, and Duke Energy Carolinas LLC to intervene as defendants, and (2) deny South Carolina's motion for clarification of the Special Master's order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55632:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55632:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55632:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. The Supreme Court held that the Catawba River Water Supply Project and Duke Energy met the standards for intervention, but Charlotte did not. \"Charlotte has not carried its burden of showing a sufficient interest for intervention in this action,\" Justice Samuel J. Alito wrote for the 5-4 majority. \"Its interest is solely as a user of North Carolina's share of the Catawba River's water.\"\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor. The dissent agreed with the majority's denial of Charlotte's motion and its rejection of the more permissive intervention standard adopted by the special master, but would not have permitted the Catawba Project and Duke Energy to intervene either.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55632:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55634:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55634:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGeertson Seed Farms (\"Geertson\") and Trask Family Seeds (\"Trask\") sought an injunction against Monsanto Company (\"Monsanto\") in a California federal district court. Geertson and Trask feared that the wide-scale sale of a new Monsanto alfalfa variety, resistant to one of the company's herbicides, would lead to cross-pollination with Geertson's and Trask's conventional alfalfa variety and thereby lead to its disappearance. The district court granted the injunction pending an Environmental Impact Statement (\"EIS\") about the effect of Monsanto's new alfalfa variety.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed holding that the injunction was appropriate and that an evidentiary hearing was not required before the issuance of the injunction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55634:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55634:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55634:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Yes. The Supreme Court first held that the plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief. However, the Court further held that the district court abused its discretion when it entered an injunction absent the completed EIS. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that no factor favoring the imposition of an injunction yet existed.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that the district court's findings of fact all supported the imposition of an injunction: (1) the new alfalfa variety could contaminate other plants, (2) contamination could take place even in a controlled setting, (3) the relevant regulator has limited ability to control or limit limitations on planting, and (4) genetic contamination could decimate farmers' livelihoods all supported.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55634:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55635:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55635:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA federal district court in New York approved an $18 million settlement in a class-action brought by freelance writers who had contracted with the defendant publishers to publish their works in print. Without authorization, the publishers reproduced the works for electronic distribution. Muchnick and others objected to the settlement.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit overturned the settlement on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over claims relating to unregistered works. The court stated that the Copyright Act grants the federal district courts jurisdiction only over those claims that arise from registered works. Since the vast majority of the claimants in the litigation based their claims on unregistered works, the federal district court did not have the power to certify a class in the litigation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55635:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55635:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55635:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas held that Section 411(a)'s registration requirement is a precondition to filing a copyright infringement claim. The Court further held that a copyright holder's failure to comply with the registration requirement does not restrict a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction over infringement claims involving unregistered works. The Court declined to address whether Section 411(a)'s registration requirement is a mandatory precondition to suit that district courts may or should enforce on their own initiative by dismissing copyright infringement claims involving unregistered works.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Ginsburg agreed that Section 411(a)'s registration requirement does not restrict a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. However, she noted that tension remained between the Court's prior holdings in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. and Bowles v. Russell. In an attempt to stave off confusion, she attempted to reconcile the two decisions by distinguishing the cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55635:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55636:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55636:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Terrence Graham was 16 years old he was convicted of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery. He served a 12 month sentence and was released. Six months later Mr. Graham was tried and convicted by a Florida state court of armed home robbery and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, he argued that the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a juvenile, on its face, violated the Eighth Amendment and moreover constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. The District Court of Appeal of Florida disagreed. It held that Mr. Graham's sentence neither was a facial violation of the Eighth Amendment nor constituted cruel and unusual punishment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55636:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55636:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55636:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the Eight Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a non-homicidal crime. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned that because this case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders (juveniles), the categorical analysis under Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy governs. Under this approach, the Court must: (1) consider objective indicia of society's standards and (2) determine whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution guided by the standards elaborated by controlling precedents. Here, the Court concluded that both (1) and (2) indicated that the punishment in question for the class in question was unconstitutional. The Court made a point to note that life sentences for juveniles for non-homicidal crimes has been \"rejected the world over.\"\nChief Justice John G. Roberts wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. He disagreed with the manner in which the majority reached its conclusion. Instead, he made his conclusion based on: (1) Supreme Court cases requiring \"narrow proportionality\" review of noncapital sentences and (2) the Supreme Court's conclusion in Roper that juvenile offenders are generally less culpable than adults who commit the same crimes. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, and in part by Justice Samuel A. Alito, dissented. Justice Thomas reprimanded the majority for replacing its own moral judgment for that of American citizens who up to this point had been charged with making the moral distinction as to whether this sentence could ever be imposed. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He departed from Justice Thomas's dissent to note that \"[n]othing in the Court's opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.\" He also would not have reached the issue as to whether Mr. Graham's sentence as-applied violated the Eighth Amendment. He would only have reached the question of whether such sentences categorically violate the Eighth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55636:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55637:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55637:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) was signed into law. In part, it added a new term to the Bankruptcy Code (\"Code\"), \"debt relief agency,\" and both restricted and proscribed actions by those groups falling under the definition. Subsequently, a Minnesota bankruptcy law firm sought a declaratory judgment against the United States, arguing that the BAPCPA did not apply to attorneys and law firms, and was unconstitutional as it applied to attorneys. The federal district court agreed and issued an order declaring that attorneys in the District of Minnesota were excluded from the Code's definition of \"debt relief agency\" and that the challenged provisions of the Code were unconstitutional as they applied to attorneys in the District of Minnesota.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit held that attorneys who provide \"bankruptcy assistance\" were included within the BAPCPA's definition of \"debt relief agency.\" However, it also held that BAPCPA provisions that prohibited a debt relief agency from advising clients to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy was overbroad, and thus unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55637:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55637:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55637:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. No. No. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that attorneys who provide bankruptcy assistance to assisted persons are debt relief agencies under the BAPCPA. The Court further held that § 526(a)(4) of the BAPCPA is not an overly broad, content based restriction on attorney-client communications. Rather, the Court reasoned that it merely prohibits a debt relief agency only from advising a debtor to incur more debt because the debtor is filing for bankruptcy. Lastly, the Court held that § 528's disclosure requirements are valid as applied to Mr. Milavetz. The Court reasoned that the disclosure requirements do not act as an affirmative limitation on speech and are reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing consumer deception.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority's use of the BAPCPA's legislative history arguing that \"legislative history is irrelevant when the statutory text is clear.\" Justice Clarence Thomas also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He noted his skepticism with Zauderer and its progeny, cases at the heart of the majority's reasoning. Justice Thomas wondered whether these precedents provide sufficient First Amendment protection against government-mandated disclosure requirements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55637:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55639:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55639:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAntonio Jackson filed a complaint in the Nevada federal district court alleging race discrimination and retaliation. The employer, Rent-A-Center West, Inc., moved to dismiss the proceedings and compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and compelled arbitration.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in part that the district court was required to determine in the first instance whether the coverage and discovery provisions of the arbitration agreement were unconscionable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55639:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55639:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55639:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that under the Federal Arbitration Act (\"FAA\"), where an agreement to arbitrate includes a provision that the arbitrator will determine the enforceability of the agreement, if a party challenges specifically the enforceability of that particular provision, the district court considers the challenge, but if a party challenges the enforceability of the agreement as a whole, the challenge is for the arbitrator. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that Mr. Jackson challenged the enforceability of the agreement as a whole, and thus, the determination is left to the arbitrator not the district court.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, dissented. He criticized the majority for adopting a position not proposed by either party during briefing or oral arguments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55639:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55640:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55640:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe union representing employees at a New Process Steel plant in Butler, Indiana failed to reach an agreement over a new contract with New Process Steel. The union subsequently filed unfair labor practices claims with the National Labor Relations Board (\"NLRB\") arguing that New Process Steel failed to honor its collective bargaining agreement to deal with the union as the exclusive representative of employees of the plant. A two-member panel of the NLRB agreed with the union. On appeal, New Process Steel argued that the NLRB's decision was invalid because 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) of the National Labor Relations Act requires that three members of the five member National Labor Relations Board shall \"at all times\" constitute a quorum.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the board. The court held that the NLRB had power to delegate its authority to a group of three of its members. In which case, two sitting members constituted a quorum. Therefore, the NLRB appropriately rendered its decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55640:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55640:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55640:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that the NLRBA requires that when the Board delegates its authority, the delegated group must maintain a membership of three in order to exercise the delegated authority of the Board. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the plain language of the statute – the Board may delegate its powers to a \"group of three or more members\" – required that the delegated group must have at least three members to exercise such authority.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotamayor, dissented. He criticized the majority for calling into question the more than 500 cases the NLRB address during the 26 months it carried out its responsibilities with only two members. He also disagreed with the manner in which the majority reached its conclusion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55640:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55641:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55641:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Maine Public Utilities Commission along with the attorneys general of Connecticut and Massachusetts filed for petitions of review of orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC approved a settlement and redesigned New England's \"capacity\" electricity market, which Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts were subject to, even though they were not parties to the settlement. FERC denied their request for rehearing.\nOn appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts argued that FERC erred in finding that \"transition payments\" under the settlement should be reviewed under the \"public interest\" standard as dictated by Mobile-Sierra rather than the \"just and reasonable\" standard. The District of Columbia Circuit agreed holding that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine should not apply to non-parties to the settlement agreement. It reasoned that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is premised on the existence of a \"voluntary contract\" between the parties. Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts never entered a voluntary agreement with FERC and therefore the standard was inappropriate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55641:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55641:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55641:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to the extent that it rejected the application of Mobile-Sierra to non-contracting parties. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, Samuel A. Alito, and Sonia Sotamayor, the Court held that Mobile-Sierra controls the FERC as well as challenges to contract rates brought by contracting and non-contracting parties. The Court reasoned that Mobile-Sierra is not an exception to the just-and-reasonable standard, but rather an application of that standard to the context of rates set by contract.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He argued in part that this case was clearly outside the context of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. He further argued that the majority's decision imposes \"a special burden\" on non-contracting parties attempting to exercise their rights to object to unreasonable rates. He reasoned that such a rule was a \"quantum leap\" from the origins of the Supreme Court's rate setting jurisprudence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55641:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55643:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55643:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn-state and out-of-state retail natural gas suppliers sued Ohio's Tax Commissioner in an Ohio federal district court alleging that Ohio's tax scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs argued that because four local natural gas distribution companies benefited from certain tax exemptions that did not benefit the plaintiffs, despite their similar circumstances, the tax scheme violated the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.\nThe Sixth Circuit held that federal comity concerns do not bar an action that challenges the tax benefits provided to just four specific entities, but not others similarly situated. The court recognized a circuit split over whether federal comity concerns prevent federal court jurisdiction over a matter. In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit sided with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits which have interpreted Hibbs v. Winn to mean that comity prevents federal court jurisdiction only when state taxpayers seek federal court orders allowing them to avoid paying state taxes. This was not at issue in this case, and the plaintiffs' success would not significantly intrude upon traditional matters of state taxation in Ohio; thus, the federal court had jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case in order for it to proceed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55643:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55643:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55643:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that under the comity doctrine, a taxpayer's complaint of allegedly discriminatory state taxation must proceed originally in state court. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that its decision in Hibbs did not narrow the comity doctrine. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the Ohio courts are better positioned to determine whether Ohio's taxation scheme is unconstitutional.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote separately, concurring. He noted that he joined the majority position with the understanding it did not expand the holding in Hibbs. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, concurred in the judgment. He also noted his skepticism of Hibbs. Moreover, Justice Thomas argued that this case should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55643:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55644:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55644:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis appeal is the consolidation of three separate cases that involved defendants' conviction for possession of cocaine in a Virginia state court. On appeal, the defendants argued that the admission into evidence of a certificate of analysis in the absence of testimony at trial from the person who performed the analysis and prepared the certificate, pursuant to Virginia Code Section 19.2-187, violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that the provisions of Section 19.2-187 did not violate a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. Moreover, the court held that the defendants in these cases knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their Sixth Amendment rights to confront the forensic analysts when they failed to call them as witnesses at trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55644:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55644:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55644:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a short per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia, remanding the case for further proceedings in light of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts decided the previous Term.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55644:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55645:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55645:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKevin D. Powell was convicted in a Florida state court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Mr. Powell appealed arguing that his Miranda warning was invalid because the written form used by the Tampa police at his arrest did not explicitly indicate that he had a right to an attorney at his questioning. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that informing a defendant that he has the right to \"talk with an attorney\" is not sufficient to inform him of his right to have counsel present.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55645:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55645:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55645:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. No. The Supreme Court held that it retained jurisdiction over the case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotamayor, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer as to Part II. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented joined in part by Justice Breyer. The majority recognized that the Florida Supreme Court relied in part on its own state Constitution in addition to Miranda in reaching its decision. However, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that when a state court decision fairly appears to rest on federal law, or is interwoven with federal law, and the adequacy and independence of the state-law ground is unclear from the opinion, as in this case, it is presumed that federal law controlled the state court's decision. Hence, the Supreme Court retained jurisdiction.\nThe Supreme Court also reversed the Florida Supreme Court, holding that while Miranda requires that a suspect \"be warned prior to any questioning\" and \"that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, \"it does not dictate the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. Rather, to determine whether police warnings are satisfactory, the inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably conveyed to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda. Here, Mr. Powell received warnings that satisfied this standard.\nIn his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Supreme Court's power to review the Florida Supreme Court's decision was at best doubtful and that the Florida court had a better view of the case on the merits. Justice Stevens counseled that the Supreme Court should limit applying the presumption that federal law controlled a state court's decision only in truly ambiguous cases. He reasoned that this was not such a case. Justice Stevens further argued that the warnings Mr. Powell received did not reasonably convey to him that he had the right to a lawyer during his interrogation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55645:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55646:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55646:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrancisco J. Espinosa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and proposed a plan that provided for the repayment of student loans to United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (\"Funds\"). After Funds was notified, it filed a proof of claim roughly $4,500 greater than that was included in the plan. The bankruptcy court approved the original plan and Funds was notified it would be paid the lower figure. Mr. Espinosa subsequently completed the plan and his loans were discharged by the court. Three years later, Funds began intercepting Mr. Espinosa's income tax refunds to satisfy the unpaid portion of his student loans (the $4,500 figure). Mr. Espinosa petitioned the bankruptcy court for an order holding Funds in contempt for violating the discharge injunction. In response, Funds argued that Mr. Espinosa's student loans were improperly discharged because student loans cannot be discharged unless the debtor can show \"undue hardship.\" This can only be shown in an adversary proceeding, which did not take place. Moreover, it argued the lack of an adversary proceeding denied Funds its Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. These arguments were rejected by the bankruptcy court, but, on appeal, were accepted by the Arizona federal district court.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that simply because Mr. Espinosa failed to comply with additional procedures required by the Bankruptcy Code to discharge student loan debt was not sufficient to set aside the discharge of his student loans, considering Funds had actually been notified of the Chapter 13 plan. It also held that Fund's due process rights were not violated because Fund's had received actual notice of Mr. Espinosa's Chapter 13 plan, even though he had not commenced the adversary proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55646:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55646:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55646:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. No. The Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation order is not void. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that because the Bankruptcy Court's order was final, it could only be rendered void if the order was premised on either a jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process. Here, there was neither a jurisdictional error nor a violation of due process. The Court further reasoned that the Bankruptcy Court's failure to find undue hardship was mere legal error and did not rise to the level of a jurisdictional or due process error that would render the order void.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55646:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55648:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55648:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2005, the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) and related state agencies settled a class action lawsuit with plaintiff foster children under the care of the DHR. However, the parties could not agree on the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees to be included in the settlement. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion in a Georgia federal district court for that court to make a fee determination and award. The plaintiffs argued that they were owed over $7 million for services rendered and also deserved a $7 million fee enhancement for a job well done. The district court largely agreed with the plaintiffs and awarded $10,522,405.08 in compensation, over $4 million of which was a fee enhancement. The district court reasoned that \"the superb quality of counsel's representation far exceeded what could reasonably be expected for the standard hourly rates used to calculate the fee\" and thus justified the enhancement.\nOn appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced the lodestar figure (hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) because of counsel's skill, commitment, dedication, and professionalism. The Court reasoned that the enhancement of the lodestar amount of attorney's fees may be allowed for superior representation coupled with the exceptional nature of results.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55648:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55648:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55648:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the calculation of an attorney's fee based on the lodestar may be increased due to superior performance, but only in extraordinary circumstances. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court rejected the contention that a fee determined by the lodestar method may not be enhanced in any situation. The Court then explained that there were circumstances where superior attorney performance is not adequately taken into account by the lodestar. However, the Court counseled that such enhancements should not be awarded without specific evidence that the lodestar fee would not have been \"adequate to attract competent counsel.\"\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote separately, concurring. He lauded the Court for rejecting that all enhancements under the lodestar method should be barred. Justice Clarence Thomas also wrote separately, concurring. He was careful to note that the majority opinion placed precise limitations on the availability of lodestar enhancements. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that lodestar enhancements may sometimes be permissible. However, he would have affirmed the Eleventh Circuit because the Supreme Court was too far removed from the fact intensive inquiry as to whether a fee enhancement in this case was warranted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55648:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55649:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55649:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1998 National Australia Bank (NAB), an Australian company, acquired Homeside Lending Inc. (Homeside), an American company. In 2001, NAB announced that it would incur a $450 million write-down for inaccurately calculating the fees Homeside would generate for servicing mortgages, which had been calculated as present assets. Its stock price then dropped 5 percent. Later that year, NAB announced a second write-down of $1.75 billion to amend for other inaccurate calculations that had been booked as present assets. NAB's stock price tumbled an additional 13 percent. Subsequently, four owners of NAB stock filed suit against NAB and Homeside in a New York federal district court alleging violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Three of the plaintiffs purported to represent a class of non-American purchasers of NAB stock because they bought their shares abroad. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the class of non-American purchasers.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that subject matter jurisdiction exists over claims only \"if the defendant's conduct in the United States was more than merely preparatory to fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act with the United States directly caused losses to foreign investors abroad.\" Here, the court noted that (1) the issuance of fraudulent statements from NAB's corporate headquarters in Australia were more central to the fraud than Homeside's manipulation of financial data on which NAB based its statements, (2) there was no effect on U.S. capital markets, and (3) the lengthy chain of causation from NAB receiving inaccurate information from Homeside before passing the information along to its investors suggested that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55649:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55649:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55649:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Not answered. The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit, but held that it erred when it raised the question of subject matter over the case. Instead, the Court held that the Securities and Exchange Act does not provide a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign stock exchanges. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that \"longstanding principle\" dictated that the legislation of Congress, unless expressly stated otherwise, only applies within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Here, the Court further reasoned that the section of the Securities and Exchange Act in question dealt with transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions which was not present in this case.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment. He agreed with Court's conclusion but disagreed that the Court employed a new test to determine the reach of the Securities and Exchange Act – only extending to \"transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions.\" He stated that the federal courts have been construing the Act's scope under a different test which did not warrant abandonment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55649:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55650:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55650:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGas station franchisees won a verdict against franchisor Motiva in the Massachusetts federal district court for violations of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. The franchisees argued that new leases that changed the way rent was calculated and which amounted to increased rents were made in bad faith and meant to drive them out of business. They claimed that the new lease terms amounted to \"constructive nonrenewal,\" prohibited by the PMPA, even though they signed the agreements. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the PMPA did not support a claim for constructive nonrenewal under the circumstances in the case. It reasoned that the PMPA requires franchisees faced with objectionable contract terms to refrain from ratifying those terms by executing the contract, as the franchisees did in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55650:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55650:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55650:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the court held that a franchisee cannot recover for constructive termination under the PMPA if the franchisor's allegedly wrongful conduct did not compel the franchisee to abandon its franchise. The Court further held that a franchisee who signs and operates a renewal agreement with a franchisor may not maintain a constructive nonrenewal claim under the PMPA. The Court reasoned when a franchisee signs a renewal agreement, there has been no \"failure to renew,\" and, thus no violation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55650:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55652:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55652:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral states belonging to the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact (\"Compact\") and the commission created by the compact (\"Commission\") filed suit against North Carolina. The plaintiffs allege that North Carolina was designated as a host state for a waste management facility, accepted $80 million to build the facility, but then declined to fund, license, build, and operate it. The plaintiffs seek to recover the $80 million, a $10 million sanction, and attorneys' fees.\nThe Supreme Court assigned the case to a Special Master who conducted proceedings and filed two reports. The Preliminary Report recommended denying North Carolina's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds; denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to Count I which sought enforcement of sanctions against North Carolina; granting North Carolina's motion to dismiss Count I; and denying North Carolina's motion to dismiss Counts II-V. The Special Master's Second Report recommended denying Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting North Carolina's motion for summary judgment on Count II; and denying North Carolina's motion for summary judgment on Counts III-V. The parties then filed a total of nine exceptions to the Special Master's Reports.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55652:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55652:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55652:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' seven exceptions are overruled. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the Compact does not authorize the Commission to impose monetary sanctions against North Carolina. Moreover, the Court reasoned that North Carolina did not breach its contractual obligation. The Court further held that North Carolina's two exceptions are overruled. The Court reasoned that the Special Master acted reasonably in denying North Carolina's motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts III-V.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Sonia Sotamayor, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He stated that, despite some reservations, the majority was correct to reject the plaintiffs' final exception to the Special Master's Reports. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that Arizona v. California, relied on heavily by the majority, was a case \"built on sand,\" and thus, not sufficient to support the majority's conclusions. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that North Carolina did breach the Compact when it suspended its efforts to build a waste disposal facility.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55652:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55654:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55654:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnimalFeeds International Corp. on behalf of a class of plaintiffs filed suit in a Pennsylvania federal district court against Stolt-Nielsen among others alleging defendants were engaged in a \"global conspiracy to restrain competition in the world market for parcel tanker transportation services.\" After the case was transferred to the Connecticut federal district court, Stolt-Nielsen filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was denied. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. During arbitration, AnimalFeeds filed a demand to proceed as a class. A panel was appointed to determine whether the language of the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class and answered in the affirmative. Stolt-Nielsen then petitioned the Connecticut federal district court to vacate the panel's determination, which was granted.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and reinstated the panel's decision. The court held that the arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law when reaching its conclusion that the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class, even though the Award was silent on whether proceeding as a class was permitted. The court reasoned that when parties agree to arbitrate, the question of whether an agreement permits class arbitration is generally left to the arbitrators, not the courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55654:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55654:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55654:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that imposing class arbitration on parties who have not agreed to authorize class arbitration is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (\"FAA\"). With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that in this case the arbitration panel exceeded its powers by imposing its own policy choice instead of identifying and applying a rule derived from the FAA or from maritime or New York law. The Court emphasized that the FAA adopts the basic principle that arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion. Here, there was no consent.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. She argued first that the petition for certiorari in this case was improvidently granted because the Court overturned the ruling of \"experienced arbitrators.\" Moreover, even by reaching the merits of the case, she would have affirmed the Second Circuit and adhered to the \"strict limitations\" the FAA places on judicial review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55654:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55655:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55655:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars built a wooden cross on top of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve (Preserve) as a memorial to those who died in World War I. The original cross no longer exists, but has been rebuilt several times. Frank Buono, a former Preserve employee, filed suit in a California federal district court seeking to prevent the permanent display of the cross. The genesis of his suit occurred in 1999 when a request to build a Buddhist shrine in the Preserve, near the cross, was denied. He argued that the cross' display on federal property violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court agreed and the cross was covered.\nWhile the case was pending, Congress designated Sunrise Rock a national memorial and barred its dismantling with the use of federal funds. One year later, by land swap, Congress made Sunrise Rock private property in exchange for another parcel of land. Mr. Buono moved to not only enforce the previous court order preventing the display of the cross, but also to prohibit the land swap. The district court granted both motions. The Secretary of the Interior appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court reasoned that the government failed to show that the district court's fact findings or legal standards were clearly erroneous, nor did it show that the district court made an error in judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55655:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55655:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55655:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the plurality, the Court held that Mr. Buono has standing to maintain this action. Justice Kennedy reasoned that when a party obtains a judgment in its favor, like Mr. Buono, it acquires a \"judicially cognizable\" interest in ensuring compliance with that judgment. The plurality also held that the district court erred in preventing the government from implementing the land-transfer statute in order to protect Mr. Buono's rights. A court may not order an injunction when it fails to consider all the circumstances bearing on the need for preventive relief. The district court failed to consider the context in which the land-transfer statute was enacted. Justice Kennedy concluded that upon remand the court should conduct a proper inquiry into the continued need for preventive relief in light of the statute.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. The district court should not reach the issue whether the implementation of the land-transfer statute would violate the district court's injunction or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. Mr. Buono lacked standing; and therefore, the Supreme Court should not have addressed the merits of his claim. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotamayor, dissented. The district court was correct in preventing the enforcement of Congress' land-transfer statute because the statute was designed to leave the cross in place thus violating the Establishment Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55655:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55656:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55656:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrank Spisak was convicted of murder in an Ohio state court and sentenced to death. Subsequently, he was granted partial habeas corpus relief by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court held that Mr. Spisak received ineffective counsel at sentencing and the jury instructions at this phase unconstitutionally required the jury to be unanimous when finding mitigating evidence to his sentence. The court ordered a new sentencing trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Musladin and Landrigan.\nOn remand, the Sixth Circuit reinstated its original holding. It reasoned that Musladin and Landrigan were readily distinguishable from Mr. Spisak's case and therefore he was still entitled to habeas corpus relief. Moreover, the court noted that although the Supreme Court had not ruled on a set of facts identical to those in Mr. Spisak's case, the court of appeals was not precluded from finding that the Ohio state court had unreasonably applied federal law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55656:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55656:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55656:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Yes. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Samuel A. Alito, and Sonia Sotamayor, and Justice John Paul Stevens in part, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that the jury instructions in Mr. Spisak's trial were not \"contrary to\" and did not \"involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.\" The Court further held that even though Mr. Spisak's counsel's closing argument was inadequate, it reasoned that there was no \"reasonable probability\" that a better closing argument would have made a significant difference in Mr. Spisak's sentence.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that the Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that errors occurred during Mr. Spisak's trial that violated clearly established federal law. However, Justice Stevens agreed that those errors did not entitle Mr. Spisak to relief as his own conduct \"alienated and ostracized the jury\" and \"his crimes were monstrous.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55656:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55657:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55657:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Kansas federal bankruptcy court denied objections to a Chapter 13 debtor's repayment plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the starting point for calculating a Chapter 13 debtor's \"projected disposable income\" is presumed to be the debtor's current monthly income. However, the court stated that the calculation is subject to a showing that there is a substantial change in circumstances. The court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the debtor had shown there was a substantial change in her circumstances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55657:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55657:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55657:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit, holding that a bankruptcy court may account for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are \"known or virtually certain\" at the time of confirmation when it calculates a debtor's projected disposable income. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the plain meaning of \"projected disposable income\" within the statute supports the Court's holding.\nJustice Antonin Scalia dissented. He disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the term \"projected.\" He maintained that the term did allow for a bankruptcy court to depart from the \"inflexible formula\" provided by the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55657:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55658:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55658:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJose Padilla was indicted by a Kentucky grand jury on counts of trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor/trailer without a weight and distance tax number. On advice from his lawyer, he entered a guilty plea with respect to the three drug charges in exchange for dismissal on the final charge. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief arguing that he was misadvised about the potential for deportation as a consequence of his guilty plea. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Padilla's conviction and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.\nOn appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v. Fuartado, reversed the court of appeals. It held that collateral consequences of advice by counsel is outside the scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. It reasoned that counsel's advice on the consequences of a plea with respect to immigration is not required and therefore cannot constitute ineffectiveness.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55658:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55658:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55658:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that counsel must inform a client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that counsel's advice with respect to deportation is not categorically removed from the scope of the Sixth Amendment. Here, Mr. Padilla's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because counsel could have easily determined that a guilty plea would make Mr. Padilla eligible for deportation. The Court did not address whether Mr. Padilla was prejudiced by his counsel's deficiency and entitled to relief. The Court then remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Kentucky for proceedings consistent with the opinion.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, wrote separately, concurring. He criticized the Court for adopting a halfway standard where defense counsel must advise a client on immigration law when it is \"succinct and straightforward\" but not necessarily in other situations. He predicted that this instruction would lead to confusion and needless litigation. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, also wrote separately, dissenting. He criticized the majority for expanding the text of the Sixth Amendment beyond merely providing the defendant counsel to providing him \"sound advice about the collateral consequences of conviction.\" He mused that the Constitution is not an \"all-purpose tool\" to create a perfect world.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55658:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55659:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55659:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPlaintiffs were investors in several mutual funds managed by Harris Associates. They filed suit in an Illinois federal district court arguing Harris' fees were too high and thus violated Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The district court dismissed the case.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Section 36(b) did not permit judicial regulation of mutual fund management fees. It acknowledged that management had a fiduciary duty to investors, but that did not imply judicial regulation of management's fees was appropriate. Rather, the court stated that market forces were best able to determine the appropriateness of fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55659:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55659:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55659:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Circuit erred by not applying the Court's standard enunciated in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.. There, the Court held that in determining whether a claim is cognizable under Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act requires a determination that the adviser charge a fee that is \"so disproportionately large it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered.\" With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for unanimous Court, it reasoned that the Gartenberg standard reflected the importance of determining whether a fee structure was the result of \"arm's length bargaining\" while also understanding that the Act provided other avenues to protect investors.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote separately, concurring. He disagreed that the Court was simply endorsing a Gartenberg standard. Rather, he noted that the Court did not endorse a \"free-ranging judicial fairness review of fees\" that Gartenberg, itself, might endorse.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55659:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55661:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55661:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo was admitted to the United States in 1993 and became a lawful permanent resident. In 2004, he pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana. One year later, he pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of Xanax, but was not tried as a recidivist. In 2006, Mr. Carachuri was notified that he was removable from the United States. He applied for removal cancellation, which was denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Mr. Carachuri was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court reasoned that because Mr. Carachuri's second drug conviction could have been punished as a felony under the Controlled Substances Abuse Act, had he been prosecuted in federal court, the conviction qualified as an \"aggravated felony\" making him ineligible for cancellation of removal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55661:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55661:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55661:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that a minor drug offense is not automatic grounds for deportation of a legal immigrant. Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens reasoned that \"although a federal immigration court may have the power to make a recidivist finding in the first instance, it cannot, ex post, enhance the state offense of record just because facts known to it would have authorized a greater penalty under either state or federal law.\" Justice Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas each filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55661:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55662:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55662:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJoseph Kindler was convicted of first degree murder in a Pennsylvania state court and sentenced to death. He subsequently filed motions for post-conviction relief, but while the motions were pending, he escaped from prison. Pennsylvania immediately moved to dismiss the motions arguing that Mr. Kindler had waived any right to have his post-conviction motions considered because he was a fugitive. The trial court agreed and dismissed them. After recapture, Mr. Kindler moved to reinstate his post-conviction motions, which was denied. Both the Pennsylvania Superior Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.\nIn 2000, Mr. Kindler filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief in a Pennsylvania federal district court. The State of Pennsylvania argued that habeas corpus relief was unavailable to Mr. Kindler because Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was an \"independent and adequate\" state ground that precluded federal habeas review. The district court disagreed and granted the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Relying on its decision in Doctor v. Walters, it held that Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was not an independent and adequate state ground that precluded federal habeas review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55662:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55662:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55662:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Third Circuit holding that a discretionary state procedural rule can serve as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas corpus review. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would pose an unnecessary dilemma for the states: \"States could preserve flexibility by granting courts discretion to excuse procedural rules, but only at the cost of undermining the finality of state court judgments. Or States could preserve the finality of their judgments by withholding such discretion, but only at the cost of precluding any flexibility in applying the rules.\"\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a separate concurring opinion. He noted that while the Court did not have the opportunity to address the matter, \"[i]n a proper case,\" \"[i]t seems most doubtful that this Court can or should require federal courts to disregard a state procedural ground that was not in all respects explicit before the case when it was first announced, absent a showing of a purpose or pattern to evade constitutional guarantees.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55662:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55663:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55663:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA New York federal district court convicted Glenn Marcus of violating sex trafficking and forced labor provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (\"TVPA\"). The TVPA was enacted after Mr. Marcus engaged in some of the behavior for which he was charged. Yet, the jury was not instructed as to the date when the TVPA was enacted in relation to Mr. Marcus' allegedly illegal behavior. On appeal, he argued that the TVPA was applied retroactively, and, thus, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. Applying a \"plain-error\" standard of review, the court held that Mr. Marcus was entitled to a new trial on Ex Post Facto grounds. The court reasoned that if it was possible for the jury, who had not been given instructions regarding the date of the TVPA's enactment, to convict exclusively on the defendant's pre-enactment conduct, then the conviction violates the Ex Post Facto clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55663:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55663:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55663:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Second Circuit's plain-error standard stands in conflict with the Court's own interpretation of the plain-error rule. Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen G. Breyer stated that an appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only when the appellant demonstrates that: (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear and obvious; (3) the error affected the appellant's substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Here, the Second Circuit's standard conflicted with the third and fourth of these criteria.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented. He noted that while the Second Circuit reached its decision in an unusual manner, he agreed with its conclusion. Justice Stevens thought the Second Circuit properly exercised its discretion to remedy an error by ordering a retrial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55663:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55664:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55664:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFour former executives of Hollinger International were convicted of mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 by an Illinois federal district court. In part, they had paid themselves $5.5 million in fees without the knowledge of the company's audit committee or board of directors. At trial, the jury was instructed that it could find the defendants guilty if it deemed they had schemed to deprive Hollinger and its shareholders \"of their intangible right to the honest services of the corporate officers, directors, or controlling shareholders of Hollinger,\" and if the objective of the scheme was \"private gain.\" On appeal, the defendants explained that while their objective was \"private gain,\" the compensation had been crafted in order to avoid paying taxes to the Canadian government. Therefore, they argued that because their \"private gain\" was intended to be purely at the expense of the Canadian government and not the company, their actions did not violate the intent of Section 1346.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court. It held that the deprivation of honest services owed to an employer is not mitigated simply because the inducement was a tax benefit obtained from a third party. The court reasoned that had the defendants disclosed to Hollinger's audit committee and board of directors that the compensation was meant to bring about tax benefits, the committee and board very well may have reduced the pay-out in light of the tax benefits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55664:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55664:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55664:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot answered. No. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that based on its decision in Skilling v. United States, Section 1346 criminalizes only schemes to defraud that involve bribes or kickbacks. Therefore, the \"honest services fraud\" instruction given in this case was incorrect. The Court further held that Mr. Black and his co-defendants secured their right to challenge the \"honest services fraud\" jury instructions on appeal because they properly objected to the instructions at trial. The Court noted that it expressed no opinion as to whether the jury instruction prejudiced the defendants and left it for the district court to determine.\nJustice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed that the Court used the Notes of the Advisory Committee in rendering its decision. He also viewed the \"honest services fraud\" jury instruction to be error because it was given at all. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He viewed Section 1346 as being unconstitutionally vague.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55664:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55665:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55665:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Alabama state court convicted Billy Joe Magwood of murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, an Alabama federal district court partially granted Mr. Magwood's petition for federal habeas corpus relief. The court upheld his conviction but instructed the state court to look at mitigating evidence when resentencing Mr. Magwood. Upon resentencing, the state court sentenced Mr. Magwood to death once again. Mr. Magwood filed a second petition for federal habeas corpus relief with the federal district court arguing that a judicial rule was retroactively applied in his case and that he lacked effective counsel at sentencing. The district court granted the petition and vacated Mr. Magwood's death sentence.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh circuit reversed, holding that prisoners may not raise challenges to an original sentence that could have been raised in an earlier petition. The court also held that Mr. Magwood's counsel was not ineffective because he failed to raise an argument that had already been decided by the state's highest court adverse to his client's position.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55665:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55665:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55665:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that because Mr. Magwood's habeas application challenges new judgments for the first time, it is not \"second or successive\" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (\"AEDPA\") With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court determined that the text of the AEDPA counseled in favor of the Court's conclusion.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He noted that the Court was not expanding its holding from Panetti v. Quarterman. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Samuel A. Alito, dissented. He argued that a straightforward application of Panetti, consistent with all of the courts of appeals to rule on the issue, would have dictated an opposite result from the Court's.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55665:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55666:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55666:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Stevens was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 48 in a Pennsylvania federal district court for \"knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain.\" His conviction stems from an investigation into the selling of videos related to illegal dog fighting. Mr. Stevens appealed his conviction arguing that 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, was unconstitutional because it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Mr. Stevens and reversed his conviction, holding unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. Section 48. The court reasoned that the dog fighting videos he sold were protected speech and that 18 U.S.C. Section 48 did not serve a compelling governmental interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55666:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55666:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55666:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 48 is substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that depictions of animal cruelty are not categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court further reasoned that because a \"substantial number\" of § 48's applications are unconstitutional, the law is overbroad and, thus, invalid.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito dissented. He disagreed with the majority opinion arguing that § 48 was not intended to suppress speech, but rather to \"prevent horrific acts of animal cruelty.\" He was concerned that the majority holding will practically legalize the sale of such videos and spur the resumption of their production.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55666:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55668:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55668:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Massachusetts federal district court convicted Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess of attempted robbery and related weapons crimes. One of the weapons used by the defendants was an AK-47 assault rifle. At a pre-trial conference, the district court ruled that the nature of the weapon (i.e. semi-automatic, automatic, etc.) was an element of the crime and, thus, a matter for the jury to decide. After sentencing, the government appealed, arguing that the nature of the weapon was a sentencing element, and, thus a matter for the judge to decide. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) the nature of the weapon is an element of the crime that must be decided by the jury \"beyond a reasonable doubt.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55668:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55668:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55668:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fact that a firearm was a machinegun is an element to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, not a sentencing factor to be proved to the judge at sentencing. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that Congress determines whether a fact is an element or a sentencing factor. But when Congress is not explicit, the courts look to a statute's provision and framework for guidance. Under this analysis, the Court determined that the fact a firearm was a machine gun is an element of the crime.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote separately, concurring. He argued that McMillan and Harris, two cases holding that \"sentencing factors\" need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, should be overruled. Justice Clarence Thomas also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. He agreed with the majority's conclusion, but argued that the better approach is to treat any sentencing facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence as an \"element of a separate, aggravated offense that is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55668:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55671:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55671:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Virginia federal district court remanded Bridget Hardt's claim for long-term disability benefits from Reliance Standard Life Insurance (\"Reliance\"). The court asked Reliance to reconsider its denial of Ms. Hardt's claim. Upon remand and after Ms. Hardt presented new evidence, Reliance changed its earlier stance and awarded Ms. Hardt full long-term disability benefits. Ms. Hardt then filed a motion for attorneys' fees based on her status as a prevailing party. The district court granted her motion and awarded her $39,149 in fees.\nOn appeal, Reliance argued that Ms. Hardt was not a \"prevailing party\" as understood by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and thus was not eligible for an award of attorneys' fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. The court held that the district court's decision to remand Ms. Hardt's claim to Reliance did not constitute an enforceable judgment that Ms. Hardt prevailed on her claim because Reliance could have decided to deny her coverage.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55671:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55671:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55671:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a fee claimant need not be a \"prevailing party\" to be eligible for an attorney's fees award. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that because Congress failed to include an express \"prevailing party\" requirement, to say otherwise would more closely resemble \"inventing a statute rather than interpreting one.\" The Supreme Court also held that a court may award fees and costs under the statute so long as the fee claimant has achieved \"some degree of success on the merits.\" Here, Ms. Hardt met this standard even though she failed to win summary judgment on her benefits claim. The Court reasoned that the district court found compelling evidence that she was totally disabled and obtained the remand of her case after which Reliance awarded her benefits.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He cautioned that in the future the Court should examine the text, structure, and history of any other federal statute authorizing an award of fees before concluding that Congress intended the same approach as in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55671:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55672:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55672:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2006, Norman Carpenter, a Shift Supervisor at a Mohawk Industry manufacturing facility, was fired after violating Mohawk's Code of Ethics. He subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination in a Georgia federal district court. He argued that he was fired, not for violating company protocols, but for reporting immigration violations to Mohawk's human resources department. Mr. Carpenter stated that after filing his report, a Mohawk company attorney met with him and attempted to persuade him to recant. The report would have been detrimental to Mohawk as it was then involved in a class action lawsuit which charged the company with conspiring to hire illegal immigrants.\nBefore trial and as part of discovery, Mr. Carpenter requested information from Mohawk related to his meeting with its attorney. Mohawk contended that the information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The federal district court ordered Mohawk to disclose the information, but permitted the company to appeal. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order for discovery. It reasoned that while the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. provided an exception to the finality requirement necessary for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over appeals, the appeal of a discovery order involving attorney-client privilege did not qualify for exception.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55672:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55672:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55672:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that disclosure orders that are adverse to the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that postjudgment appeals, \"together with other review mechanisms,\" suffice to protect the rights of litigants.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that the Eleventh Circuit should have been affirmed on the ground that any \"avenue for immediate appeal\" should be left to the \"rulemaking process.\" Instead, the Court \"subordinated what the appellate jurisdiction statute says to what the Court thinks is a good idea.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55672:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55673:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55673:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, Holly Wood was convicted in an Alabama state court of capital murder during a first-degree burglary and sentenced to death. Both the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Mr. Wood subsequently filed for post-conviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, arguing that he was mentally retarded and thus not eligible for a death sentence and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Rule 32 court disagreed and denied his petition. Mr. Wood then filed for federal habeas corpus relief in an Alabama federal district court. The district court granted relief, agreeing that Mr. Wood's counsel was ineffective at sentencing because they failed to present evidence of Mr. Wood's deficient intellectual deficiencies.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that Mr. Wood's counsel was not ineffective. The court reasoned that Mr. Wood's attorneys acted reasonably when they decided it was in Mr. Wood's best interest to leave out information that illustrated his mental deficiencies. Moreover, the court recognized that while Mr. Wood's counsel included an inexperienced attorney, he merely acted as an assistant to the two experienced attorneys chiefly responsible for the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55673:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55673:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55673:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the state court's conclusion that counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue or present evidence of Mr. Wood's mental deficiencies was not an unreasonable determination under the facts. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the state court's conclusion was not unreasonable merely because a federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion. Moreover, the evidence in the record indicated that counsel's failure to pursue or present evidence of the defendant's mental deficiencies was the result of a deliberate decision to focus on other defenses.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens noted that the majority failed to distinguish between a decision not to introduce evidence at the guilt phase of trial and a failure to investigate mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. He argued that, contrary to the majority's conclusion, the evidence indicated that the decision of Mr. Wood's counsel was the result of \"inattention and neglect,\" rather than strategy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55673:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55674:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55674:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Barber petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a federal district court. Mr. Barber argued that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inaccurately calculated his good time credit toward the service of his federal sentence. The good time credit statute provides that a prisoner \"may receive credit toward the service of his sentence... of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner's term.\" Mr. Barber argued that the BOP should calculate good time credit based on the sentence imposed rather than the time an inmate has actually served in prison. The district court denied his petition.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing its decision in Tablada v. Daniels as controlling. There, the court held upheld the BOP's method for calculating good time credit. The court had reasoned that the good time credit statute was ambiguous and the BOP's interpretation of the statute was reasonable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55674:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55674:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55674:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Not answered. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the BOP's method for calculating good time credit was lawful. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the statute's language and purpose supported the BOP's construction of the statute.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the statute, arguing that it would impose \"tens of thousands of years of additional prison time on federal prisoners according to a mathematical formula they will be unable to understand.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55674:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55675:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55675:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2007, Wanda Krupski booked a trip with Costa Cruise Lines. On February 21 while on the trip, Ms. Krupski allegedly tripped over a loose cable and broker her femur. She filed suit in a Florida federal district court against Costa Cruise Lines. One year and four days after her alleged injury, Costa Cruise Lines informed Ms. Krupski that it was merely the North American sales and booking agent for the carrier, Costa Crociere. The district court allowed Ms. Krupski to amend her complaint to include Costa Crociere and dismissed the action against Costa Cruise Lines. Costa Crociere then moved for summary judgment arguing the ticket sold to Ms. Krupski stipulated that suits must be filed against it within one year of the alleged injury. Therefore, Ms. Krupski was out of time. The district court agreed and granted Costa Crociere's motion for summary judgment.\nOn appeal, Ms. Krupski argued that her amended complaint against Costa Crociere related back to her original filing and thus should be considered timely filed against Costa Crociere. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court. The court held that her amended complaint did not relate back to her original complaint. The court reasoned that Ms. Krupski was aware that Costa Crociere was the carrier all along. Thus, to relate her amended complaint back to the original complaint was not the sort of mistaken identity correction contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure15(c)(1)(C).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55675:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55675:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55675:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, holding that relating back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the party to be added knew or should have known, not on the amending party's knowledge or timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the text of Rule 15 asks what the prospective defendant \"knew or should have known\", not what the plaintiff \"knew or should have known\" as determined by the Eleventh Circuit. Here, the Court further reasoned that Cost Crociere should have known that Ms. Krupski's failure to name it as a defendant was due to a mistake concerning the proper party's identity. Thus, Ms. Krupski should be allowed to add Costa Crociere in her complaint.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He noted that he did not support the majority's use of the Notes of the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in reaching its decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55675:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55676:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55676:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Joe Sullivan was 13 years old, he was convicted of sexual battery by a Florida state court and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Mr. Sullivan argued that his sentence was cruel and unusual and thus violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court of appeals affirmed Mr. Sullivan's sentence without comment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55676:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55676:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55676:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55676:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55677:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55677:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nShippers sued the ocean carrier and rail carrier it used to ship products from China to the United States in a California state court to recover for damages. During the transport of the shippers' products, a train derailed damaging the products. The case was removed to a California federal district court only to be dismissed. The district court held that the contracts between the parties did not cover claims for cargo damage.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its analysis. The court reasoned that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (\"COGSA\") does not govern the inland transport of goods, unless the parties opted out of coverage by the Carmack Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act. The Carmack Amendment governs damage claims against motor and rail carriers, and narrowly limits the venues in which such suits can be brought. Because the district court did not consider whether the parties opted out of the COGSA by the Carmack Amendment, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for that determination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55677:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55677:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55677:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that because the Carmack Amendment does not apply to a shipment originating overseas under a single through bill of lading, the parties' agreement to litigate these cases in Tokyo, Japan is binding. With Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that, as illustrated in Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, when a a bill of lading requires \"substantial carriage of goods by sea,\" like in this case, \"its purpose is to effectuate maritime commerce.\" Under such circumstances, applying state law undermines maritime law. Therefore, the Carmack Amendment is inapplicable to this case.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. She argued that the Carmack Amendment applies to circumstances like at issue in this case unless the parties have contracted around Carmack's requirements. Here, she viewed the Carmack Amendment as providing the default legal regime for rail transportation in the United States and, consequently, would have reached the issue as to whether Union Pacific, one of the paties, was free to opt out of Carmack.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55677:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55681:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55681:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe City of New York sued several out-of-state cigarette vendors under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for failing to report sales made to individuals over the Internet as required by the federal Jenkins Act. The State of New York and City of New York rely on this information to collect taxes imposed on cigarettes sold in the state and city. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the City of New York's suit, holding that its claim did not meet the \"causation\" requirements set forth under RICO. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the City of New York met the RICO \"causation\" requirements and thus maintained a cause of action. The court reasoned that the defendants' conduct prevented the City from collecting taxes and thus directly injured it. Moreover, the court reasoned that the loss of taxes injured the City's \"business or property.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55681:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55681:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55681:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit holding that because the City of New York cannot show that it lost revenue \"by reason of\" the alleged RICO violation, it cannot state a RICO claim. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in part, the Court reasoned that to establish that an injury came about \"by reason of\" a RICO violation, a plaintiff must show both, \"but for\" and \"proximate\" causation. Here, the Court concluded that the City's causal theory was even more remote than in cases where the Court had failed to find proximate cause.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. She criticized the City for attempting to bring a claim for fraud that arose under violations of the Jenkins Act, but failed to actually bring a claim for violations under the Jenkins Act. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Anthony M. Kennedy, wrote a separate dissenting opinion. In contrast to the majority, he argued that Hemi Group's failure to provide New York State with the names and addresses of its New York City cigarette customers proximately caused New York City to lose tobacco tax revenue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55681:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55682:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55682:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese cases involve malpractice suits against Public Health Service (\"PHS\") employees. The plaintiffs filed actions recognized by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in a California federal district court alleging violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The PHS sought a dismissal arguing that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) preempted Bivens claims. The district court rejected the argument and denied the motion to dismiss.\nOn appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that FTCA did not preempt Bivens claims. The court reasoned that the FTCA was enacted six months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens and, thus, could not have been intended as a substitute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55682:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55682:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55682:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the immunity provided by the FTCA precludes Bivens actions against individual PHS officers or employees for harms arising out of constitutional violations committed while acting within the scope of their offices or employment. Justice Sonia Sotamayor, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) plainly and clearly provides that the FTCA is the \"exclusive\" avenue for claims like those at issue in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55682:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55683:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55683:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nShady Grove Orthopedics Associates (Shady Grove), on behalf of a class of plaintiffs, sued Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) in part for Allstate's alleged failure to pay interest penalties on overdue insurance payments as prescribed by New York statute. Allstate moved to dismiss relying on New York's rules of civil procedure which instruct that class action lawsuits are inappropriate unless specifically prescribed by statute. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed that Shady Grove's class action claim was not authorized and thus dismissed its claim.\nOn appeal, Shady Grove argued that the New York rules of civil procedure conflict with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus were not applicable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with Shady Grove and affirmed the district court. The Second Circuit, reasoning from the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins, stated that the New York rules of civil procedure did not conflict with Rule 23 and thus Rule 23 did not control.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55683:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55683:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55683:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. No. The Supreme Court held that §901(b) of the New York rules of civil procedure does not preclude a federal court sitting in diversity from entertaining a class action under Rule 23 of the federal rules of civil procedure. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority as to Parts I and II-A, the Court stated that if Rule 23 answers the question in dispute, it governs, unless it exceeds its statutory authorization or Congress' rulemaking power. Here, the Court reasoned that Rule 23 answers the question in dispute – whether Shady Grove's suit may proceed as a class action – and is therefore controlling. With Justice Scalia writing for a plurality as to Parts II-B and II-D, he stated that the Rules Enabling Act, not Erie controls the validity of a federal rule of civil procedure, even if that results in opening the federal courts to class actions that cannot proceed in state court. With Justice Scalia writing for a distinct plurality as to Part II-C, he concluded that the concurrence's analysis conflicted with the Court's precedent in Sibbach – that the federal rules \"really regulate procedure.\"\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote separately, concurring. He agreed that Rule 23 applies in this case, but also recognized that in some cases federal courts should apply state procedural rules in diversity cases because they function as part of the state's definition of substantive rights and remedies. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, dissented. She criticized the majority opinion for using Rule 23 to override New York's statutory restriction on the availability of damages and consequently turning a $500 case into a $5,000,000 one. She cautioned that it is important to interpret the federal rules with sensitivity to state regulatory policies.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55683:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55684:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55684:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBrian Russell Dolan pleaded guilty to assault resulting in bodily harm in the New Mexico federal district court. He was sentenced to twenty-one months in prison and ordered to pay the victim $250 per month in restitution. Mr. Dolan appealed arguing that because the district court failed to award restitution within ninety days of Mr. Dolan's sentencing, the district court lacked the authority to do so.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court. The court held that the time limits established by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act are not jurisdictional and, thus, the district court's tardiness in entering the order does not relieve the defendant of his obligation to pay.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55684:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55684:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55684:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that a court, which has missed the 90-day deadline still has the power to order restitution, at least under certain circumstances. The majority held that the consequences of missing a statutory deadline where the statute is silent on the subject depends on the statutory language and the relevant context and what they reveal about the purpose of the deadline. Some deadlines are \"jurisdictional,\" so that their expiration deprives a court of the authority to take the action to which the deadline attaches. Others are \"claims-processing rules\" that regulate the timing of motions or claims brought before the court; these deadlines are waived unless the opposing party brings them to the court's attention. Still others simply seek speedy disposition of matters by \"creating a time-related directive that is legally enforceable but does not deprive a judge . . . of the power to take the action\" if the deadline is missed. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. dissented, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55684:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55685:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55685:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCurrent and former employees of Xerox Corp. sued the company in a New York federal district court under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (\"ERISA\"). Plaintiffs had left the employer, been paid a lump sum, and after rehire had alleged Xerox improperly calculated their benefits. Xerox argued that release forms signed by some of the plaintiffs barred their ERISA claims. The district court disagreed and then crafted a remedy to compensate the plaintiffs for their lost benefits.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court crafted an appropriate remedy, but erred in finding that the release forms signed by some plaintiffs were unenforceable. Rather, the court reasoned that the release forms were signed knowingly and voluntarily, making them enforceable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55685:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55685:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55685:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have applied a deferential standard of review to the Plan Administrator's interpretation of the pension plan. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that its decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch established that when a trust instrument, like the pension plan, gives the trustee the \"power to construe disputed or doubtful terms,\" the trustee's interpretation will not be disturbed \"if reasonable.\" Here, the Second Circuit carved out an exception to the rule holding that a court need not apply a deferential standard when the trustee's previous construction of the same terms was found to violate ERISA. The Second Circuit erred in doing so.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stephens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He noted several mistakes made by Xerox, the district court, and the majority of the Court. With respect to the majority opinion, Justice Breyer disagreed that trust law imposes no such inflexible requirement that a court give deference to a plan administrator, as the majority held in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55685:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55686:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55686:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, a storm hit parts of western North Carolina causing extensive flooding and erosion. Graham and Cherokee Counties applied for assistance under the Emergency Watershed Protection Program (\"EWPP\"). Under the program, the counties would perform or hire to perform the necessary cleanup and repair work, paying for 25% of the costs, while the United States Department of Agriculture paid for the rest. During the cleanup, Karen Wilson, a secretary for the Graham Conservation District, raised concerns that she had about the legality of the awarded contracts. She filed suit in a North Carolina federal district court against Graham and Cherokee Counties, among others, under the False Claims Act. She alleged a conspiracy that tainted the execution of the EWPP contracts and rendered the claims for reimbursement false within the meaning of the False Claims Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the information underlying Ms. Wilson's claim was public disclosure and thus barred the court jurisdiction over the case. The court agreed and dismissed.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. It held that the audit reports that underlied Ms. Wilson's claim was not public disclosure for the purpose of the False Claim Act, and thus the district court was not barred from hearing her case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55686:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55686:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55686:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that the reference to \"administrative\" reports, audits, and investigations within the FCA encompasses disclosures made in state and local sources as well as federal sources – like at issue in this case. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the FCA's plain language did not limit \"administrative\" to federal sources, nor did it preclude the inclusion of state sources. Moreover, the Court looked at the legislative history of the FCA and found it inconclusive.\nJustice Antonin G. Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He emphasized that the legislative history of a statute is not relevant in analyzing what a statute means. Justice Sonia Sotamayor joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer also wrote separately, dissenting. She disagreed with the majority opinion in that it did not give sufficient weight to contextual and historical evidence of Congress' purpose in enacting the FCA. Under her analysis, she would hold that \"administrative\" refers only to federal sources.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55686:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55690:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55690:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA victim who obtained a civil protection order (\"CPO\") against John Robertson moved to hold him in criminal contempt for violating the order. A District of Columbia Superior Court convicted Mr. Robertson on three counts of criminal contempt for violating the CPO. Mr. Robertson moved to vacate the convictions, which was denied. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Robertson's conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55690:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55690:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55690:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Sonia Sotamayor, dissented. He recognized the complexity of the issue raised before the Court. However, he argued the answer to it is \"no.\" He explained that \"[t]he terrifying force of the criminal justice system may only be brought to bear against an individual by society as a whole, through a prosecution brought on behalf of the government\" – not an individual.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55690:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55691:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55691:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn April 2005, Nadejda Reilly filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Pursuant to standard practice, she listed equipment related to her catering business as \"exempt\" from the bankruptcy proceedings and valued the equipment at over $10,000. Trustee William Schwab independently had Ms. Reilly's business equipment appraised at over $17,000. He then sought a motion for the Bankruptcy Court to sell Ms. Reilly's equipment and turn over the proceeds, less the value of her exemption. Ms. Reilly countered that the business equipment had become fully exempt when Mr. Schwab failed to timely object when she listed the equipment as exempt. The Bankruptcy Court agreed and denied Mr. Schwab's motion to sell off Ms. Reilly's equipment. A federal district court in Pennsylvania affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the court affirmed, holding that Mr. Schwab's failure to file a timely objection to Ms. Reilly's exemption barred him from moving to sell the property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55691:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55691:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55691:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. No. The Supreme Court held that a creditor is not required to object to a debtor's exemptions in order to preserve his right to claim any value in the item exceeding the value listed as exempt. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the bankruptcy code only requires a timely objection to an asset's categorization as exempt and does not apply to objections about the asset's value.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. She argued that the failure to object to the debtor's valuation of an exempt asset should prevent the creditor's later challenge to the valuation because the asset's valuation is critical in determining whether the debtor will be allowed to keep the property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55691:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55693:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55693:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nInvestors brought a securities fraud class action suit against Merck & Co. in a New Jersey federal district court. They alleged the company had misled investors about the drug Vioxx's safety and commercial viability. Merck moved to dismiss the claim arguing that the investors had been put on \"inquiry notice\" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitations had run. The federal district court agreed and dismissed the suit.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It recognized that under the \"inquiry notice\" standard, plaintiffs are put on notice for the purpose of the statute of limitations in federal securities fraud litigation at the \"possibility\" of wrongdoing. Moreover, the court held that the investors had not been put on \"inquiry notice\" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitation had not run.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55693:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55693:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55693:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit, holding that the statute of limitations begins to run once the plaintiff actually discovered or a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered the facts constituting the violation – whichever comes first. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority, the Court noted that \"inquiry notice\" is only useful to the extent it describes the circumstances when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have begun to investigate.\nJustice John Paul Stevens wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He stated that much of the discussion in Part II of the majority opinion was unnecessary. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority holding to the extent it adopted a reasonably diligent person standard for when the statute of limitations begins to run.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55693:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55694:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55694:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Chicago Police Department seized property belonging to the plaintiffs, using the power granted it by the Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (DAFPA). The plaintiffs filed suit in an Illinois federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 arguing that when property is seized under the DAFPA, due process requires a prompt, postseizure, probable cause hearing. The district court dismissed, but the plaintiffs asked for a rehearing in light of Mathews v. Eldridge, which prohibited the seizure of real property without a prior hearing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted review.\nOn appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the DAFPA did not provide adequate due process for an owner to contest the seizure of his property, reasoning the length of time between seizure and contest was too long (a maximum of 97 to 187 days). The court remanded the case and instructed the district court to devise a mechanism by which an owner can contest the validity of the retention of his property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55694:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55694:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55694:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen J. Breyer, the court dismissed the case as moot. At oral argument, the parties confirmed that there was no longer any dispute about the ownership or possession of the property in question. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part but opposed vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55694:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55697:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55697:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral suits were filed against Chicago and Oak Park in Illinois challenging their gun bans after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia handgun ban violated the Second Amendment. There, the Court reasoned that the law in question was enacted under the authority of the federal government and, thus, the Second Amendment was applicable. Here, plaintiffs argued that the Second Amendment should also apply to the states. The district court dismissed the suits. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55697:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55697:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55697:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense applicable to the states. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that rights that are \"fundamental to the Nation's scheme of ordered liberty\" or that are \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition\" are appropriately applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized in Heller that the right to self-defense was one such \"fundamental\" and \"deeply rooted\" right. The Court reasoned that because of its holding in Heller, the Second Amendment applied to the states. Here, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether Chicago's handgun ban violated an individual's right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.\nJustice Alito, writing in the plurality, specified that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller. He rejected Justice Clarence Thomas's separate claim that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment more appropriately incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. Alito stated that the Court's decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases -- rejecting the use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause for the purpose of incorporation -- was long since decided and the appropriate avenue for incorporating rights was through the Due Process Clause.\nJustice Antonin Scalia concurred. He agreed with the Court's opinion, but wrote separately to disagree with Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states, but disagreed that the Due Process Clause was the appropriate mechanism. Instead, Justice Thomas advocated that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the more appropriate avenue for rights incorporation. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He disagreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. He argued that owning a personal firearm was not a \"liberty\" interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, also dissented. He argued that there is nothing in the Second Amendment's \"text, history, or underlying rationale\" that characterizes it as a \"fundamental right\" warranting incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55697:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55698:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55698:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn August 2003, a detective from the Hagerstown, MD Police Department interviewed Michael Blain Shatzer Sr. regarding allegations that he had sexually abused his three-year old child. At the time, Mr. Shatzer was incarcerated on an unrelated offense involving sexual abuse of another child. After Mr. Shatzer invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, the interview was terminated. The investigation was subsequently closed, only to be reopened in January 2006 on the prompting of Mr. Shatzer's wife, when she recognized her child could make more specific allegations about Mr. Shatzer's alleged sexual abuse. Thereafter in March 2006, another detective from the Hagerstown Police Department, who was aware that Mr. Shatzer had been under investigation, but was not aware that Mr. Shatzer had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, interviewed him. At this interview, Mr. Shatzer was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, which he waived, and then confessed to specific instances of sexual abuse involving his child.\nPrior to trial, Mr. Shatzer moved to suppress the confessions he made in the March 2006 interview arguing that his 2003 invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights was still applicable. Under Edwards v. Arizona rendered the confession inadmissible. The motion was denied and a Maryland trial court convicted him of sexual child abuse. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the protections of Edwards applies for an inmate who has been continually incarcerated and had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, until either counsel is made available or the inmate initiates further conversation with police. Therefore, under the circumstances, Mr. Shatzer's confession was inadmissible.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55698:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55698:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55698:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals of Maryland, holding that because Mr. Shatzer experienced a break in Miranda custody lasting more than two weeks between the first and second attempts at interrogation, Edwards does not mandate suppression of his 2006 statements. Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority reasoned that when a suspect has been released from custody and returned to normal life before the police later attempt interrogation, there is little reason to believe that the suspect's change of heart was coerced. The Court then stated that the appropriate period of time for a person to be re-acclimated to normal life was 14 days. Here, even though Mr. Shatzer was released back into the general prison population, he entered back into his normal life and was free of the pressures of investigative custody; thus, the Edwards presumption was no longer warranted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55698:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55699:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55699:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGranite Rock Co. filed suit against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under the Labor Management Relations Act (\"LMRA\") in a California federal district court. Granite Rock argued that a Teamsters strike constituted a breach of a no-strike clause in their collective bargaining agreement (\"CBA\"). The district court dismissed the case, finding that Granite Rock failed to state a claim, and denied Granite Rock's request to compel arbitration in order to determine if the CBA had been ratified.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while Granite Rock's claim against the Teamsters was outside the scope of the LMRA, the dispute should be arbitrated. The court reasoned that both parties consented to arbitration when Teamsters asserted the arbitration clause in its filings and when Granite Rock sued under the contract which included the arbitration clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55699:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55699:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55699:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. No. The Supreme Court held that the parties' dispute over the CBA's ratification date was a matter for the district court, not the arbitrator, to resolve. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court noted that the presumption that a dispute is arbitrable should only be applied where it reflects and derives its legitimacy from, a judicial conclusion that arbitration is what the parties intended because their express agreement to arbitrate was validly formed, is legally enforceable, and is best construed to encompass the dispute. The Court reasoned that the question of when the CBA was formed is for judicial determination because it constitutes a \"judicial conclusion\" needed to employ the framework for even determining arbitrability. The Court further held that the Ninth Circuit was correct in not recognizing a cause of action under the LMRA. The Court recognized that because Granite Rock had not yet exhausted other avenues of redress under such theories as state-law tort claims, unfair labor practice claims, and federal common-law breach-of-contract claims.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed that the LMRA does not recognize a new common-law cause of action. However, she argued that the arbitration provision in the CBA did cover the dispute in question. She reasoned the correct approach was for the Court to simply determine (1) whether the parties had an agreement to arbitrate and (2) whether the agreement covered the dispute. Here, she answered both inquiries in the affirmative.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55699:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55700:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55700:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Michigan state court convicted Van Chester Thompkins of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and several firearms related charges. After exhausting his remedies in Michigan state court, Thompkins petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition.\nOn appeal, Thompkins argued that his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and that he was denied effective counsel at trial. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court's finding that Thompkins waived his Fifth Amendment right was unreasonable because Thompkins refused to sign an acknowledgement that he had been informed of his Miranda rights and rarely made eye contact with the officer throughout the three hour interview. The Sixth Circuit also held that the Michigan Supreme Court improperly determined that Thompkins was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction related to his separately tried co-defendant's testimony.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55700:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55700:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55700:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that the state court's decision to reject Mr. Thompkins' Miranda claim was correct. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that Mr. Thompkins failed to invoke his Miranda rights to remain silent and to counsel because he failed to do so \"unambiguously.\" Moreover, the Court reasoned that Mr. Thompkins waived his Miranda right to remain silent when he \"knowingly and voluntarily\" made a statement to the police. The Court further held that, even if Mr. Thompkins' counsel was ineffective, he cannot show he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance – a prerequisite to establishing that his Sixth Amendment right was violated.\nJustice Sonia Sotamayor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. She reprimanded the majority for retreating from the broad protections afforded by Miranda, stating that now a criminal suspect waives his rights simply by uttering a \"few one-word responses.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55700:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55701:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55701:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTimothy Abbott, a British citizen, and Jacquelyn Abbott, an American citizen, litigated their divorce in the Chilean courts. Mrs. Abbott was awarded custody of their son, while Mr. Abbott was awarded visitation rights. At Mrs. Abbott's request, the Chilean court entered an order prohibiting the child's removal from Chile by either the father or mother without express mutual consent. One year later, Mrs. Abbott moved the child from Chile without Mr. Abbott's consent. Upon location of the child in Texas, Mr. Abbott requested an order in a Texas federal district court that the child be returned to Chile pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court denied the order holding that the child's removal did not constitute a breach of the father's \"rights of custody\" as defined by the Hague convention.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Chilean court's order and Chilean statute that required father's consent before the child could leave Chile did not give a non-custodial father \"rights of custody\" within the meaning of the Hague Convention. The court stated that Mr. Abbott merely possessed the rights of \"access to the child.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55701:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55701:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55701:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that a parent has a right of custody under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction when the parent retains a ne exeat right (the right to restrain someone from leaving a country). Here, Mr. Abbott retained such a right. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court first recognized that the Convention applies because the child in question is under 16 and was a habitual resident of Chile. (Chile and the U.S. are signatories to the Convention.) The Court then reasoned that the Convention's text, the U.S. State Department's views, signatory states' court orders, and the Convention's purposes all suggest that Mr. Abbott retained a ne exeat right under Article 49 of the Convention. Because Mr. Abbott possessed direct and regular visitation rights with his child, his ne exeat followed. The Court noted that Mr. Abbott's ne exeat right gave him a right of custody to his child, so long as Ms. Abbott could not find an exception in the Convention precluding the exercise of Mr. Abbott's right to custody.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. He argued that Mr. Abbott merely possessed a limited veto power over Ms. Abbott's ability take their son from Chile, not a custody right. He went on to explain that using the Convention's powerful return remedy under these circumstances is contrary to the Convention's \"text and purpose.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55701:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55702:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55702:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAgron Kucana, a citizen of Albania, entered the United States in 1995 and did not leave when his visa expired. Mr. Kucana applied for asylum but failed to appear at his hearing, after which he was ordered removed from the United States. He filed a motion to reopen his case, which was denied. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. After failing to remove himself from the United States, Mr. Kucana once again moved to reopen his case, contending that conditions in Albania had deteriorated to the extent where his life would be in danger upon his return. His motion was denied.\nOn appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, he argued that the BIA \"abused its discretion\" in denying his claim when it failed to consider an affidavit testifying to the dangerous conditions existing in Albania. The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the matter. It found that the BIA's decision not to reopen Mr. Kucana's case was \"discretionary.\" 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that \"no court has jurisdiction to review\" any decision that is under the discretion of the BIA. Therefore, the court reasoned that Mr. Kucana's claim was not reviewable by a federal court of appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55702:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55702:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55702:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)'s proscription of judicial review applies only to determinations made discretionary by statute, not to determinations declared discretionary by the Attorney General himself through regulation. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotamayor, the Court reasoned that policy, the statute's language, and its history all indicate that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar judicial review for administrative decisions made discretionary by regulation. At the heart of the Court's concern was preserving the separation of powers and avoiding a scenario where an Executive Branch order could preclude Judicial Branch review over a matter.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito filed a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment. He agreed that the Seventh Circuit had jurisdiction to review the denial of Mr. Kucana's petition to reopen his removal proceeding. However, Justice Alito argued for a narrower holding. He stated that while some regulations issued by the Attorney General may be unreviewable, the regulation at issue in this case did not have that effect.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55702:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55703:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55703:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Free Enterprise Fund, a non-profit organization, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It alleged that the creation of the Public Company Oversight Board (the Board) by the Act violated the Appointments Clause because it deprived the President from exercising adequate control over the Board. However, the Board itself was under the direct supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), all of whose commissioners are appointed by and can be removed by the President.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board did not violate either the Appointments Clause or the separation of powers principle. It reasoned that the Board's members were inferior officers under the supervision of the SEC and thus were not obligated to be appointed by the President. Also, the court noted that the President's ability to remove members of the SEC, who in turn could remove members of the Board, preserved the Constitution's separation of powers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55703:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55703:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55703:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Yes. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the \"for-cause\" limitation on the removal of Board members is unconstitutional because it contravenes the Constitution's separation of powers. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for the majority, the Court reasoned because the Act protects Board members from removal except for good cause, but withdraws from the President any decision on whether good cause exists, the Act deprives the President the power to hold Board members accountable. Such an arrangement contradicts Article II's vesting of the executive power in the president. The Court further held that the unconstitutionality of the removal provision did not make unconstitutional the entire Board. The Court concluded that the Board may continue to function as before, but its members may be removed at will by the Commission. Lastly, the Court held that the Board's appointment is consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that Board members are inferior officers, and, thus, their appointment may permissibly be vested in the \"Head of the Department.\" Here, the Commission constitutes the \"Head of the Department.\"\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor, dissented. He agreed that the members of the Board are inferior officers. However, he disagreed that the Act unconstitutionally interferes with the President's executive power.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55703:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55704:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55704:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Michigan state court convicted Diapolis Smith of second degree murder and felony possession of a firearm and sentenced him to life in prison. After exhausting his remedies in the Michigan state courts, Smith petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, Smith argued that he was denied an impartial jury from a fair cross-section of the community in violation of the Sixth Amendment.\nThe Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law in concluding that county jury selection \"worked no systematic exclusion.\" The Court reasoned the state trial court's policy of excusing potential jurors for whom jury duty would constitute hardship based on child care concerns or transportation issues, when viewed together with another policy that assigned prospective jurors from the county's only large city, established a prima facie case of systematic under-representation of African- American jurors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55704:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55704:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55704:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit erred in ruling that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision \"involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.\" With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it reasoned that Duren v. Missouri did not establish that Mr. Smith was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. While the Duren defendant established an absolute disparity, comparative disparity, and standard deviation of underrepresentation of women, that case did not specify the method courts must use to measure underrepresentation. Here, Mr. Smith did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the trial court's policies had any significant effect on the underrepresentation of African-American jurors in the area.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote separately, concurring. He challenged the Court to reconsider that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to a jury that represents \"a fair cross section\" of the community. Instead, he proposed that the right stems more from an \"amalgamation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55704:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55705:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55705:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBruce Weyhrauch was charged in the Alaska federal district court in part with a \"scheme and artifice to defraud and deprive the State of Alaska of its intangible right to [his] honest services.\" Mr. Weyhrauch was a member of the Alaska House of Representatives and allegedly took actions favorable to an Alaska oil company, VECO Corp., in return for future employment. At trial, Mr. Weyhrauch moved to exclude evidence related to the honest services charge. The district court excluded the evidence because it would merely have shown that Alaska could have imposed a duty upon Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, and thus did not prove he had violated any duty imposed by state law.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 established a uniform standard for \"honest services\" that governs every public official and that the government did not need to prove an independent violation of state law to sustain an honest services fraud conviction. Therefore, the court reasoned that because the district court excluded the evidence needed to prove that state law imposed an affirmative duty on Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, the evidence was admissible.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55705:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55705:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55705:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot answered. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in light of Skilling v. United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55705:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55706:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55706:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfrican-American applicants for firefighter jobs in Chicago, IL sued the city under Title VII alleging the written test used for hiring had a disparate impact. After administering the test, the city graded the scores and placed applicants in three categories: \"well qualified,\" \"qualified,\" and \"not qualified.\" Because the city had only 600 positions to fill among 1,782 \"well qualified\" applicants, \"qualified\" applicants were unlikely to get job offers. The class of plaintiffs in this suit allege that the test disparately categorized them as \"qualified.\" An Illinois federal district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.\nOn appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs' suit was untimely and dismissed. The court stated that the 300 day limit for filing such a claim began when the plaintiffs learned that they had been placed in the \"qualified\" category and that the city would be hiring those in the \"well qualified\" category. The court reasoned that because there was no fresh act of discrimination, the time for filing a Title VII claim began when the discriminatory decision was made and not when it was executed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55706:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55706:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55706:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may file his Title VII disparate impact claim within 300 days after the employer executes the allegedly unlawful practice so long so as he alleges each of the elements of a disparate impact claim. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that the principle inquiry in this case is not when the firefighters' claims accrued, but whether the claims stated a Title VII violation. The Court concluded that the firefighters successfully stated a Title VII violation within the claim-filing period when they alleged that the city caused a disparate impact on African-Americans each time it used its hiring list.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55706:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55707:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55707:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Indiana federal district court convicted Thomas Carr of violating the Sex Offender and Registration and Notification Act. The Act imposes penalties on anyone who is a convicted sex offender, and traveling in interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly fails to register as a sex offender, unless he proves that \"uncontrollable circumstances\" prevented him from doing so. On appeal, Carr argued that he did not violate the act because he traveled before the Act was passed. The Seventh Circuit held that the Act does not require that the defendant's travel postdate its enactment, and, consequently, affirmed the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55707:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55707:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55707:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Not answered The Supreme Court held that the Sex Offender and Registration and Notification Act does not apply to sex offenders whose interstate travel occurred before the statute's effective date. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the plain language and legislative history of the statute suggest that it does not apply to conduct that predates its enactment.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He disagreed that the majority referred to the legislative history of the statute to reach its conclusion. Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He argued that the majority's reasoning is faulty and that its conclusion leads to anomaly – where the statute treats differently similarly situated sex offenders.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55707:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55708:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55708:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEmployees of the City of Ontario, California police department filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in a California federal district court against the police department, city, chief of police, and an internal affairs officer. They alleged Fourth Amendment violations in relation to the police department's review of text messages made by an employee on a city issued text-message pager. While the city did not have an official text-messaging privacy policy, it did have a general \"Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy.\" The policy in part stated that \"[t]he City of Ontario reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice,\" and that \"[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.\" Employees were told verbally that the text-messaging pagers were considered e-mail and subject to the general policy. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. The court held that city employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the text messages they sent on their city-issued pagers because there was no text message privacy policy in place. Moreover, the court noted that the police department's review of the text messages was unreasonable because it could have used \"less intrusive methods\" to determine whether employees' had properly used the text messaging service.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55708:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55708:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55708:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot answered. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the City of Ontario did not violate its employees' Fourth Amendment rights because the city's search of Mr. Quon's text messages was reasonable. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that even assuming that Mr. Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages, the city's search of them was reasonable because it was motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose and was not excessive in scope. In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's \"least intrusive\" means approach to the issue.\nJustice John Paul Stevens concurred. He observed that the majority had not settled on one of the three approaches enunciated in O'Connor v. Ortega for determining the parameters of a \"reasonable expectation of privacy.\" He reasoned that under any of the three approaches, Mr. Quon's expectations were not violated. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed that the Court tacitly reaffirmed the O'Connor framework for determining whether the Fourth Amendment applies to public employees, arguing that it was \"standardless\" and \"unsupported.\"\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55708:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55709:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55709:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn the second day of jury deliberations in Reginald Lett's murder trial in a Michigan state court, the trial judge declared a mistrial because a juror asked what would happen if the jury did not agree. Mr. Lett was subsequently retried and convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After exhausting his state court remedies, including an appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, Mr. Lett petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in a Michigan federal district court arguing that his retrial violated the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. The federal district court granted the petition.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court recognized that a \"court may not force a defendant to undergo retrial on a matter that concluded without a conviction or acquittal unless there was a 'manifest necessity' for declaring a mistrial.\" While the court further recognized that a jury deadlock is a manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial, a trial judge's decision may only be upheld if it was based on an exercise of \"sound discretion.\" Here, the court concluded that the Michigan Supreme Court erred in finding that the trial judge had exercised sound discretion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55709:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55709:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55709:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in this case was not unreasonable; thus, the Sixth Circuit erred in granting Mr. Lett's habeas petition. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that while the trial judge in this case should have been more thorough before declaring a mistrial, the trial judge did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Sonia Sotamayor and in part by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. Stevens argued that the trial judge's reasons for declaring a mistrial were insufficient and unreasonably complied with clearly established federal law. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit's decision should have been affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55709:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55710:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55710:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Texas federal district court convicted Jeffrey Skilling of conspiracy, securities fraud, making false representations to auditors, and insider trading. Mr. Skilling was the former C.E.O. of Enron Corp. On appeal, he argued that the government prosecuted him under an invalid legal theory and that the jury was biased.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated Mr. Skilling's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court first held that the government's theory under the \"Honest Services\" fraud statute was valid. It reasoned that it was immaterial whether Enron's board of directors knew or even tacitly approved of Mr. Skilling's fraudulent conduct when he withheld information that would lead a reasonable employer to change its conduct. Moreover, the court held that while Mr. Skilling proved that there was sufficient inflammatory and pervasive pretrial publicity to require a presumption that prejudice tainted the jury, the government met its burden to show that jury screening was adequate, and that the district court did not empanel any juror who was unconstitutionally prejudiced.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55710:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55710:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55710:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot answered, Not answered. The Supreme Court held that pretrial publicity and community prejudice did not prevent Mr. Skilling from obtaining a fair trial. He did not establish that a presumption of juror prejudice arose or that actual bias infected the jury that tried him. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Court noted substantial differences between Mr. Skilling's case and in those where a presumption of juror prejudice arose. Most notably, the Court recognized that Mr. Skilling's trial took place in Houston, the fourth most populous city in the United States, as opposed to a local hamlet where it would more difficult to weed out biased jurors. The Court also recognized that the jury that convicted Mr. Skilling acquitted him of nine other counts. The Court further held that Section 1346, which proscribes fraudulent deprivations of \"the intangible right of honest services,\" is properly confined to cover only bribery and kickback schemes. Here, Mr. Skilling's alleged misconduct entailed no bribe or kickback, and thus did not fall within Section 1346's coverage.\nJustice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Anthony M. Kennedy, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court's holding and reasoning as to Mr. Skilling's jury impartiality challenge. He also agreed that the Fifth Circuit's decision with respect to the \"honest services fraud\" claim warranted reversal, but on different grounds. He reasoned that Section 1346 is impermissibly vague and therefore violates the constitution. Justice Samuel A. Alito also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He clarified that his understanding of the \"impartial jury\" requirement dictated by the Sixth Amendment requires only that \"no biased juror is actually seated at trial.\" Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed with the Court's resolution of the \"honest services fraud\" claim. However, she disagreed that Mr. Skilling received a fair trial considering the hostility that emerged in Houston after the collapse of Enron.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55710:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55711:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55711:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCurtis Johnson was convicted in a Florida federal district court for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the district court determined that his three earlier convictions constituted \"violent felonies.\" Mr. Curtis appealed arguing that one of his prior convictions was for battery and the Florida Supreme Court had held the Florida battery law did not constitute a \"violent felony.\"\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Mr. Johnson's prior battery conviction under Florida law constituted a \"violent felony\" under the ACCA. The court reasoned that the force requirement of the definition for a \"violent felony\" was satisfied by the \"touching or striking\" element under the state battery law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55711:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55711:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55711:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. No. The Supreme Court held that while the meaning of \"physical force\" in the ACCA is a question of federal law, not state law, the Court was bound by the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements of a Florida statute. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia held that the Florida felony offense of battery by \"actually and intentionally touching\" another person does not have \"as an element the use . . . of physical force against the person of another.\" The Court reasoned that within the context of the ACCA \"physical force\" means violent force, which rises beyond mere actual and intentional touching. Consequently, the Florida offense of battery does not constitute a \"violent felony\" under the ACCA.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented. Justice Alito stated that the classic definition of the crime of battery is the \"intentional application of unlawful force against the person of another.\" He argued that under such a definition, battery falls squarely within the plain language of the ACCA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55711:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55712:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55712:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPlaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction in a Washington federal district court to prevent the state of Washington from making referendum petitions available under the state's Public Records Act (\"PRA\"). In response to a petition titled \"Preserve Marriage, Protect Children,\" plaintiffs attempted to prevent the release of the names and contact information of individuals who signed the petition. The plaintiffs argued that, as applied to referendum petitions, the PRA violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The district court granted the injunction.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the PRA does not violate the First Amendment when applied to require public disclosure of petitions calling for a referendum. The court reasoned that even assuming that signing a petition qualifies as expressive conduct, and that application of the PRA's public access provision has an incidental effect on a referendum signer's speech by deterring some would-be signers, the appropriate level of constitutional inquiry is intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the interests asserted by the state are sufficiently important to justify the law's incidental limitations of referendum petition signers' First Amendment freedoms.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55712:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55712:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55712:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the disclosure of referendum petitions does not as a general matter violate the First Amendment. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that an \"exacting scrutiny standard\" is the appropriate standard for determining First Amendment challenges in the electoral context. The standard requires a \"substantial relation\" between the disclosure requirement and a \"sufficiently important\" governmental interest. Here, the state met its burden in establishing that its disclosure requirement was constitutional.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito concurred. He noted that the Court's opinion did not bar \"as applied\" exemptions from the PRA's disclosure requirements. To obtain an exemption, a speaker must show \"a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.\" Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also concurred. She agreed that in this case, given the relative weight of the interests at stake and the traditionally public nature of the referendum process, the Court correctly rejected the constitutional challenge to the PRA. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He opined that this was \"not a hard case\" as it merely dealt with a neutral, nondiscriminatory policy of disclosing information already in the state's possession that might one day indirectly burden signatories. He did not view the burden imposed by the PRA as substantial. Justice Antonin Scalia also concurred in the judgment. He noted that a history indicates that the First Amendment does not prohibit public disclosure. He also doubted whether signing a petition fits within the definition of \"freedom of speech\" at all. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented. He argued that the PRA severely burdens the First Amendment right to free speech and \"chills participation in the referendum process.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55712:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55713:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55713:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAmerican Needle Inc. filed suit in an Illinois federal district court against the National Football League (\"NFL\") and Reebok International Ltd. alleging that the teams' exclusive licensing agreement with Reebok violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. American Needle argued that because individual NFL teams separately own their team logos and trademarks, their collective agreement to authorize NFL Properties to award the exclusive headwear license to Reebok, was in fact a conspiracy to restrict other vendors' ability to obtain licenses for the teams' intellectual property. The district court disagreed and dismissed the case.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held that NFL teams were a single entity for purposes of antitrust laws, and thus could not have conspired to restrict trade. Therefore, the court stated that the teams were free to license their intellectual property on an exclusive basis.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55713:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55713:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55713:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the National Football League's licensing of intellectual property in this case constitutes concerted action that is not categorically beyond Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act's coverage. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for a unanimous Court, it noted that each NFL team is a substantial, independently owned, and independently managed business, whose objectives are not common. The Court reasoned that while the actions of NFL Properties (\"NFLP\") are not as easily classified as concerted activity, the NFLP's decisions about licensing are a concerted activity and, thus, are covered by Section 1.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55713:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55714:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55714:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKaren L. Jerman filed suit in an Ohio federal district against the law firm Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (\"FDCPA\"). The law firm had sought foreclosure on a property owned by Ms. Jerman and erroneously informed her that the FDCPA stated that the debt in question would be considered valid unless she disputed it in writing. Only later did the law firm discover that Ms. Jerman owed no debt and consequently withdrew its complaint. Before trial, the law firm argued that while it violated the FDCPA, its error was a bona fide error, and thus a complete defense to its actions. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FDCPA error defense applies to mistakes of law. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative history behind the FDCPA did not indicate Congress intended it to apply solely to clerical errors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55714:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55714:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55714:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that the bona fide error defense in the FDCPA does not apply to a violation resulting from a debt collector's mistaken interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Court reasoned in part that \"ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally.\" Moreover, the Court did not find that Congress intended otherwise.\nJustice Antonin G. Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority opinion in that it traced the actions of Congress outside of the FDCPA context to determine that Congress did not intend the bona fide error defense to apply to legal errors. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Samuel A. Alito, dissented. He disagreed with the majority opinion rejecting the straightforward and reasonable interpretation of the FDCPA that the bona fide error defense applies to legal errors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55714:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55716:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55716:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPlaintiffs brought a class action suit against Hertz in a California state court. Hertz moved to remove the case to a California federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argued that there was no diversity jurisdiction as Hertz's principal place of business was California and not New Jersey. The federal district court agreed and remanded the case to the state court.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court. It held that the district court correctly applied the \"place of operations test\" to determine Hertz's principal place of business. Therefore, there was no diversity jurisdiction and the district court had no authority over the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55716:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55716:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55716:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. No. The Supreme Court held that it retained jurisdiction over the case. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) simply requires a court of appeals to reach a decision within a specified time and does not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction when a court of appeals fails to reach a decision within the prescribed amount of time. Here, 28 U.S.C. § 1254 still gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction over any case it grants certiorari while that case is in the court of appeals.\nThe Supreme Court also held that the term \"principal place of business\" refers to the place where a corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities -- in other words its \"nerve center.\" The Court stated that in practice, the nerve center is normally the corporation's headquarters -- provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination. The Court remanded the case to the district court in order to determine whether Hertz's headquarters in New Jersey was its nerve center.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55716:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55718:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55718:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of Law (CLS) filed suit against the university in a California federal district for violating its First Amendment rights. The Hastings College of Law failed to recognize the CLS as an official student organization because state law requires all registered student organizations to allow \"any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions, regardless of their status or beliefs.\" In contrast, CLS requires its members to attest in writing that \"I believe in: The Bible as the inspired word of God; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's son; The vicarious death of Jesus Christ for our sins; His bodily resurrection and His personal return; The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration; [and] Jesus Christ, God's son, is Lord of my life.\" The district court dismissed the case.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the school's conditions on recognizing student groups were viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Therefore, the school's conditions did not violate the CLS's First Amendment rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55718:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55718:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55718:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the college's all-comers policy is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student organization forum; and, therefore, did not transgress First Amendment limitations. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the same considerations that have led the Court to apply a less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited public forums, counseled the same result in this case. The Court further reasoned that, considering this constitutional inquiry occurs in the education context, Hasting's all-comers policy is reasonable and viewpoint neutral.\nJustice John Paul Stevens, wrote separately, concurring. He agreed with the Court's holding and answered an argument raised by CLS that Hasting's Nondiscrimination Policy would be \"plainly unconstitutional\" if addressed in this case. He disagreed with CLS noting that while the First Amendment may protect CLS' discriminatory practices off campus, it does not require a public university to validate or support such practices. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy also concurred. He noted that to be effective, a limited forum will exclude some speakers based on their affiliation, as occurred in this case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, dissented. He critiqued the majority for expounding the principle: \"no freedom for expression that offends prevailing standards of political correctness in our country's institutions of higher learning.\" He argued that the majority arms public institutions with a \"handy weapon\" for suppressing the speech of unpopular groups.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55718:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55719:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55719:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLocomotive engineer Robert McBride filed suit after contending that he injured his hand while adding and removing railroad cars for his employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, a rail carrier is liable for worker injuries that result from negligence by the carrier. A trial judge instructed the jury that CSX caused or contributed to McBride's injury if its negligence \"played a part, no matter how small, in bringing about the injury.\" The jury found for McBride and awarded him $184,250.\nCSX argued that McBride should have been required to prove that the company's alleged negligence was a cause of the injury. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed, affirming the verdict.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55719:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55719:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55719:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. \"The charge proper in FELA cases, we hold, simply tracks the language Congress employed, informing juries that a defendant railroad caused or contributed to a plaintiff employee's injury if the railroad's negligence played any part in bringing about the injury,\" Ginsburg wrote for the majority. Meanwhile, Chief Justice John Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and Samuel Alito. \"The Court is wrong to dispense with that familiar element of an action seeking recovery for negligence, an element 'generally thought to be a necessary limitation on liability,'\" Roberts wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55719:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55721:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55721:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo hours after Hannah Bruesewitz received her six-month diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccine in 1992, she started developing seizures and was hospitalized for weeks. Hannah has continued to suffer from residual seizure disorder that requires her to receive constant care, according to her parents. When their daughter was three-years-old, Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz filed a petition seeking compensation for her injuries. One month prior to the petition, new regulations eliminated Hannah's seizure disorder from the list of compensable injuries. The family's petition was denied. Three years later, in 1998, the drug company Wyeth withdrew the type of vaccine used in Hannah's inoculation from the market.\nThe Bruesewitzes filed a lawsuit against Wyeth in state court in Pennsylvania. They claimed the drug company failed to develop a safer vaccine and should be held accountable for preventable injuries caused by the vaccine's defective design. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act protected Wyeth from lawsuits over vaccine injury claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55721:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55721:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55721:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. The majority reasoned that Congress had set up a special vaccine court as a way to provide compensation to injured children without driving drug manufacturers from the vaccine market. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55721:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55722:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55722:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCarol Anne Bond was found guilty of trying to poison her husband's mistress, Myrlinda Haynes, with toxic chemicals at least 24 times over the course of several months. A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged Bond with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of a criminal statute implementing the treaty obligations of the United States under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The grand jury also charged Bond with two counts of mail theft. Bond's attorneys argue that the statute was intended to deal with rogue states and terrorists and that their client should have been prosecuted under state law instead. Bond, a laboratory technician, stole the chemical potassium dichromate from the company where she worked. Haynes was not injured. Bond's husband had a child with Haynes while married to Bond. Haynes had contacted police and postal authorities after finding the chemicals at her home. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Bond lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on the basis of the Tenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55722:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55722:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55722:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. \"Bond has standing to challenge the federal statute on grounds that the measure interferes with the powers reserved to States,\" Kennedy wrote. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer in which she argued: \"I join the Court's opinion and write separately to make the following observation. Bond, like any other defendant, has a personal right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55722:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55723:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55723:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Thompson sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, the District Attorney, Harry Connick, in his official and individual capacities, and several assistant district attorneys in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C § 1983 in a Louisiana federal district court. Mr. Thompson served fourteen years on death row for a crime he did not commit because prosecutors failed to turn over blood work in a related case. The jury awarded Mr. Thompson $14 million against Mr. Connick in his official capacity. On appeal, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a tie vote and; thus by rule, affirmed the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55723:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55723:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55723:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. A divided Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's office could not be held liable for the illegal conduct of one of its prosecutors when there has been only one violation resulting from that deficient training. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the majority opinion for the court. In a dissent read from the bench, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, argued that the \"what happened here, the Court's opinion obscures, was no momentary oversight, no single incident of a lone officer's misconduct.\" Instead, Ginsburg contended, evidence \"established persistent, deliberately indifferent conduct for which the District Attorney's Office bears responsibility under §1983.\"\nJustice Antonin Scalia joined the majority opinion but filed a separate concurrence, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, which responded to the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55723:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55724:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55724:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJason Pepper pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine in an Iowa federal district court. In the latest of a long-running series of appeals and remands, a newly assigned Iowa federal district court sentenced Mr. Pepper to 77 months imprisonment and 12 months supervised release – a 20% downward departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory range. Thereafter, the district court granted the government's motion to reduce Mr. Pepper's sentence further to 65 months imprisonment because of the assistance Mr. Pepper provided after he was initially sentenced. Mr. Pepper appealed arguing in part that the district court should consider evidence of his post-sentence rehabilitation to reduce his sentence further.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Pepper's sentence, holding in part that evidence of a defendant's post-sentence rehabilitation was not relevant at resentencing. The court reasoned that Eighth Circuit precedent was clear that such evidence was not relevant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55724:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55724:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55724:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded the case back to the lower court in a majority opinion written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The Court held that when the defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal, a district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant's rehabilitation after the initial sentences; and, that evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the sentencing guidelines.\nJustice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurrence in which he agreed with the majority that the \"law does not require a sentencing court to follow a Guideline policy statement that forbids taking account of post-sentencing rehabilitation.\" He went on, however, to suggest: \"this conclusion does not leave a sentencing court free to disregard the Guidelines at will.\" Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito filed a partial concurrence and partial dissent, contending that \"requiring judges to give significant weight to the Commission's policy decisions does not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment right that the mandatory Guidelines system was found to violate, i.e., the right to have a jury make certain factual findings that are relevant to sentencing.\" Justice Clarence Thomas dissented in full, writing that he would have affirmed the lower court's decision and upheld Pepper's sentence. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55724:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55725:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55725:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlejandra Tapia was convicted of bringing illegal aliens into the United States and of jumping bail after being charged with immigration crimes. Following the jury trial, a judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced Tapia to 51 months in prison, noting that one factor in giving her a longer sentence was to make sure she remained confined long enough to take part in a drug rehab program.\nTapia appealed the sentence, arguing that the district court committed plain error by basing her sentence on speculation about whether and when she could enter and complete the Bureau of Prison's 500-hour drug abuse treatment program. But in April 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55725:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55725:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55725:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court holding in a unanimous decision by Justice Elena Kagan. \"Section 3582(a) does not permit a sentencing court to impose or lengthen a prison term in order to foster a defendant's rehabilitation,\" Kagan wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Samuel Alito in which she wrote: \"I agree with the Court's conclusion that 18 U. S. C. §3582(a) 'precludes federal courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant's rehabilitation. ' I write separately to note my skepticism that the District Judge violated this proscription in this case.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55725:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55726:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55726:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDaniel Kirk served with the U.S. Army in Vietnam from 1969 to 1971. Beginning in 1978, he worked at Millar Elevator Industries, which was later absorbed by Schindler Elevator in 2002. Although he had been promoted within the company on past occasions, in 2003, he was demoted from a managerial position to a non-managerial slot. He then resigned. Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor in 2004 claiming his demotion was in violation of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act. After his claim was denied by the department, he filed suit in the Southern District of New York in 2005 under the False Claims Act. Kirk claimed the company was shirking its obligation to take affirmative steps to employ and promote veterans, invite eligible veterans to identify themselves to employers and file annual reports detailing the hiring and placement of veterans.\nUsing documentation supplied by FOIA requests submitted by his wife and his own knowledge of company operations, he claimed the company failed to file reports from 1998 until late 2004 and filed false reports in 2004, 2005 and 2006, alleging that each claim for payment on the hundreds of government contracts submitted by Schindler was a violation of the False Claims Act.\nThe U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint in March 2009 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In April 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the lower court order and remanded the case for further proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55726:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55726:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55726:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a decision by Justice Clarence Thomas. A written response to a FOIA request for records is a report within the meaning of the False Claims Act's disclosure bar, according to the majority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissent, which was joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Ginsburg wrote that she would \"affirm the Second Circuit's judgment as faithful to the text, context, purpose, and history of the FCA's public disclosure bar.\" Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55726:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55727:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55727:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRandy Moore pled no-contest to felony murder in an Oregon trial court and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. After exhausting his post-conviction state court remedies, Mr. Moore petitioned for habeas corpus relief in an Oregon federal district court. Mr. Moore argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that his taped confession was obtained unconstitutionally. The district court denied the petition.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted the petition. The court held that Mr. Moore's counsel's failure to suppress Mr. Moore's confession was both constitutionally deficient and prejudicial under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington. The court was careful to note that even the state conceded the means by which the state elicited Mr. Moore's confession were unconstitutional because Mr. Moore's request for counsel had been ignored by the police.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55727:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55727:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55727:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The court reversed the appeals court decision, holding that defense counsel was not ineffective and that Moore was not in any event prejudiced by his counsel's actions. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the opinion for the court with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filing a concurring opinion. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55727:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55728:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55728:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGladys Mensing took the drug metoclopramide for four years to help fight diabetic gastroparesis. She filed a lawsuit against the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors, contending that the drug gave her a severe neurological movement disorder, tardive dyskinesia, but none of the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors made any effort to include warnings on the label.\nMetoclopramide manufacturers Pliva Inc. and Actavis Elizabeth LLC asked for the lawsuit to be thrown out, arguing that government regulations require thp to have the same label on metoclopramide as is on its brand-name equivalent, Reglan. Reglan did not have a warning about tardive dyskinesia while Mensing was taking metoclopramide.\nA federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota agreed, saying the lawsuit was pre-ppted by the federal regulations requiring the two labels to match. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit overturned that ruling, holding that more should have been done to warn consumers about possible risks.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55728:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55728:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55728:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Kennedy joined the opinion in part. \"We defer to the FDA's interpretation of its CBE and generic labeling regulations,\" Justice Thomas wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan. \"We have traditionally held defendants claiming impossibility to a demanding standard: Until today, the mere possibility of impossibility had not been enough to establish pre-emption,\" Sotomayor wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55728:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55729:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55729:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nArizona taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of Arizona's tuition tax credit in an Arizona federal district court. They alleged the tax credit violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it funneled money to private religious schools. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the taxpayers had standing to bring their suit and had alleged a viable Establishment Clause claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55729:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55729:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55729:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court overturned the lower court in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. The majority held that the challengers to the tax credit in Arizona lack standing under Article III. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. \"State sponsorship of religion sometimes harms individuals only (but this 'only' is no small matter) in their capacity as contributing members of our national community,\" Kagan wrote for the dissenters.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55729:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55731:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55731:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA California state court convicted Charles Martin of robbery and murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, Mr. Martin filed a round of habeas petitions in state court – all of which were denied. He then raised several new claims in petitions for federal habeas relief in a California federal district court. The court denied to examine the claims because they were not yet exhausted in state court. After Mr. Martin exhausted these last claims in state court, he returned to federal court for federal habeas corpus relief. The district court again denied the petition relying on California's statute of limitations for filing state habeas corpus petitions.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that California's statute of limitations could not operate as an independent and adequate state ground to bar federal habeas corpus review. The court reasoned that California's statute of limitations was not sufficiently defined, nor consistently applied such that it could bar Mr. Martin's petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55731:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55731:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55731:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The Court held that the California rule requiring state habeas petitions to be filed \"as promptly as the circumstances allow\" constitutes an independent state ground that is adequate to bar habeas relief in federal court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55731:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55732:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55732:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe families of two North Carolina teenagers killed in a bus crash in France brought suit in North Carolina state court, alleging faulty tires. The tires were made in Turkey, and the plaintiffs sued Goodyear's Luxembourg affiliate and its branches in Turkey and France. A North Carolina appeals court held that the foreign defendants had sufficient contacts in the state to support general personal jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55732:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55732:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55732:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. \"A connection so limited between the forum and the foreign corporation, we hold, is an inadequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction,\" Ginsburg wrote. \"Such a connection does not establish the 'continuous and systematic' affiliation necessary to empower North Carolina courts to entertain claims unrelated to the foreign corporation's contacts with the State.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55732:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55734:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55734:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCraig and Wendy Humphries were accused of abuse by one of their children, arrested, and their children were taken away from them. They were charged with child abuse and felony torture, but the charges were dismissed once it became clear the allegations were not true. Despite the fact that the charges were dismissed, the Humphries were placed on California's Child Abuse Central Index (\"CACI\") – a database for known and suspected child abusers. The Humphries subsequently filed suit against Los Angeles County and various County officials in a California federal district court. The Humphries argued that California's maintenance of the CACI violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because identified individuals are not given fair opportunity to challenge the allegations against them. The district court dismissed their claims.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the erroneous listing of the Humphries on the CACI violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Humphries, as the prevailing party, then moved for attorneys' fees. The Ninth Circuit awarded the fees, reasoning that the limitations to liability established in Monell v. Department of Social Services do not apply to claims for declaratory relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55734:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55734:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55734:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit decision, holding that Los Angeles County does not have to pay attorneys' fees in the case. Justice Stephen Breyer, who wrote the 8-0 opinion for the court, reasoned that the court's ruling in Monell applies to claims against municipalities for prospective relief as well as to claims for damages. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the consideration and decision of the case because she worked on it while in the Solicitor General's office.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55734:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55735:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55735:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, the FBI arrested Abdullah al-Kidd as he was preparing to travel to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic and Islamic law. He was held for 16 days as a material witness in the terrorism trial of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Al-Kidd has since argued the government classified him as a material witness because it lacked enough evidence to hold him as a suspect. He filed a lawsuit against then-Attorney General John Ashcroft personally, claiming that he created and authorized a program that allegedly misused the material witness statute to detain suspected terrorists.\nThe lawsuit did not go to trial and in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Ashcroft's bid for absolute immunity, holding that it didn't apply because the government's motive for arresting Al-Kidd allegedly had nothing to do with the al-Hussayen prosecution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55735:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55735:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55735:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. \"Efficient and even-handed application of the law demands that we look to whether the arrest is objectively justified, rather than to the motive of the arresting officer,\" Scalia wrote.\nJustice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined as to Part I. Kennedy expressed concern that the court's \"holding is limited to the arguments presented by the parties and leaves unresolved whether the government's use of the Material Witness Statute in this case was lawful.\"\nGinsburg filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined. Ginsburg also addressed the Material Witness Statute and wrote that Al-Kidd's \"ordeal is a grim reminder of the need to install safeguards against disrespect for human dignity, constraints that will control officialdom even in perilous times.\"\nMeanwhile, Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. \"Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the pretextual use of a material witness warrant for preventive detention of an individual whom the Government has no intention of using at trial is, in my view, a closer question than the majority's opinion suggests,\" Sotomayor declared.\nJustice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55735:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55736:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55736:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThree members of the Williamson family were involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Delbert and Alexa wore lap/shoulder seatbelts and survived, while Thanh wore a lap-only seatbelt and died. Subsequently, they sued Mazda Motor of America for strict products liability, negligence, deceit, and wrongful death in a California state court. The court dismissed the claims, holding that federal law precluded a state court tort action \"to the extent the theory of liability [was rooted in] the lap-only seat belt.\" On appeal, a California appellate court affirmed, holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (\"NHTSA\") regulation allowing minivan rear seats to have either lap-only or lap/shoulder seat belts preempted state court wrongful death actions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55736:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55736:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55736:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer. The court held that the state tort lawsuit in this case is not preempted by federal auto safety standards. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, while Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55736:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55738:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55738:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn these consolidated cases, the defendants engaged in drug trafficking while using a firearm. Both defendants received an additional five-year sentence for using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)A), even though they received longer mandatory minimum sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act. On appeal, they argued that the sentencing enhancement provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)A) should run concurrently with their already longer minimum sentences. The Third and Fifth Circuits rejected the defendants' arguments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55738:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55738:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55738:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In its first opinion of the term, a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' opinions. \"A defendant is subject to the highest mandatory minimum specified for his conduct in §924(c), unless another provision of law directed to conduct proscribed by §924(c) imposes an even greater mandatory minimum,\" Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in an 8-0 opinion. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the decision because of her involvement in the case as the solicitor general.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55738:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55739:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55739:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVarious business and civil-rights organizations challenged the enforceability of The Legal Arizona Worker's Act (\"LAWA\") in an Arizona federal district court. They argued that federal law preempted LAWA, which requires Arizona employers to use the federal E-Verify employment verification system and revokes business licenses of those who hire unauthorized workers. The district court upheld the statute.\nOn appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA was not preempted explicitly or impliedly by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (\"IRCA\"). The court reasoned that IRCA although IRCA expressly preempts all state and local laws imposing sanctions for hiring or recruiting unauthorized aliens, it excepts licensing laws – like LAWA – from preemptive reach. The court also reasoned that mandating the use of E-Verify is not impliedly preempted by IRCA because Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid states form requiring E-Verify participation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55739:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55739:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55739:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court holding in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. \"Arizona's licensing law falls well within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the States and therefore is not expressly preempted.\" All five members of the majority did not join the chief justice's opinion in full. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. \"Congress did not intend its 'licensing' language to create so broad an exemption, for doing so would permit States to eviscerate the federal Act's preemption provision,\" Breyer wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a separate dissent in which she contended that she \"would also hold that federal law pre-empts the provision of the Arizona Act making mandatory the use of E-Verify, the federal electronic verification system.\" The Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55739:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55740:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55740:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCompTel, a trade association that represents some of AT&T's competitors, filed a FOIA request with the Federal Communications Commision in 2005, seeking documents related to an FCC probe into whether AT&T had overcharged the agency for work on a technology education project. AT&T fought the request, contending the production of the documents violated Exemption 7(c) of FOIA, which exempts document disclosures in law enforcement records that would constitute an invasion of \"personal privacy.\"\nThe FCC rejected AT&T's argument, but in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the phrase \"personal privacy\" applied to corporations because other sections of FOIA had defined \"person\" as a corporation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55740:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55740:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55740:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.. The court held that corporations do not have a right of personal privacy that would protect them from the disclosure of public records that have been handed over to federal agencies. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55740:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55741:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55741:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCSX Transportation, Inc. (\"CSX\") brought suit against the Alabama Department of Revenue in an Alabama federal district court seeking an injunction to prevent the imposition of the state's sales and use tax on diesel fuel. CSX argued that the tax discriminates against railroad companies in violate of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (\"RRRR\"). The district court had granted a preliminary injunction, but of its own accord, dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the case.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately dismissed the action. The court reasoned that because it had already ruled in favor of the Alabama Department of Revenue on an identical challenge to the tax in Norfolk S. R. v. AL Dep't of Rev., the district court was correct in dismissing CSX's suit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55741:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55741:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55741:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. The majority held that a railroad could invoke the RRRR statute to challenge sales and use taxes that apply to rail carriers but exempt their competitors in the transportation industry. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55741:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55745:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55745:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing a jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Jason Louis Tinklenberg was convicted of possessing firearms after having been convicted of a felony and possessing materials used to manufacture methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.\nBefore trial, the district court had denied Tinklenberg's motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the STA. On appeal following Tinklenberg's conviction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the trial court had indeed violated the act and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55745:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55745:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55745:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer. The Speedy Trial Act \"contains no requirement that the filing of a pretrial motion actually caused, or was expected to cause, delay of a trial,\" Breyer wrote for the unanimous court. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case. \" I agree with the judgment of the Court in Part II that a pretrial motion need not actually postpone a trial, or create an expectation of postponement, in order for its pendency to be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act.... But I think that conclusion is entirely clear from the text of the Speedy Trial Act, and see no need to look beyond the text,\" Scalia argued.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55745:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55746:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55746:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn December 1993, a Rhode Island jury convicted Khalil Kholi on 10 counts of first-degree sexual assault. The charges stemmed from the alleged molestation of his two step-daughters. A judge on the state superior court sentenced Kholi to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, and the state supreme court affirmed the conviction in February 1996. Kholi did not file a federal writ of habeas corpus at that time. Instead, he filed a motion seeking sentence reduction as a form of post-conviction relief, which was denied. Kholi exhausted his procedural options regarding sentence reduction in 2007, at which time he began his appeal for federal writ of habeas corpus, which was well beyond the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's standard one-year limitation on filing. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's judgment that a petition for leniency is different from an appeal to correct legal errors and therefore does not result in a tolling of the statute of limitations under AEDPA. A circuit split exists on the issue. The First Circuit's decision was in line with a Tenth Circuit ruling on the same issue, but the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have previously ruled that a petition for leniency does not toll the statute of limitations under AEDPA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55746:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55746:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55746:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito. \"Because the parties agree that a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law is not part of the direct review process, we hold that respondent's motion tolled the AEDPA limitation period and that his federal habeas petition was therefore timely,\" Alito wrote for the court.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment but disagreeing with \"Footnote 3 of the Court's opinion, which declines to decide whether a Rule 35 motion seeks direct review.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55746:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55747:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55747:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of Halliburton Co. shareholders, led by the Erica P. John Fund, filed a lawsuit that contends that from 1999 to 2001, the Houston-based company falsified earnings reports, played down estimated asbestos liability and overstated the benefits of a merger. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the investors' motion for class certification in the case, holding that they couldn't sue as a group because they hadn't established that they lost money as a result of the alleged fraud. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55747:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55747:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55747:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. \"Securities fraud plaintiffs need not prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification,\" the Chief Justice wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55747:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55748:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55748:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Virginia Office of Protection and Advocacy (\"VOPA\"), a state agency dedicated to advocating on behalf of persons with disabilities, sued several Virginia state officials in their official capacities in a Virginia federal district court. VOPA alleged that the officials violated two federal statutes when the officials refused VOPA access to state records which VOPA argued it was entitled. The officials moved to dismiss the case arguing that they were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment.\nOn appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the state officials were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The court reasoned that: (1) Congress did not abrogate state immunity under the statutes which VOPA sued under and (2) the mere receipt of federal funds by Virginia under the two statutes did not mean that the state had consented to suit. The court declined to extend the Eleventh Amendment exception established in Ex parte Young, where a private party may seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials, noting that VOPA was not a private party but rather a state agency.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55748:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55748:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55748:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. \" Ex parte Young allows a federal court to hear a lawsuit for prospective relief against state officials brought by another agency of the same state,\" Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the 6-2 majority. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Roberts wrote that he disagreed with the majority's \"substantial and novel expansion of what we have also called a 'narrow exception' to a State's sovereign immunity.\" Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55748:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55749:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55749:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2007, the Vermont legislature passed a law that banned the sale, transmission or use of prescriber-identifiable data (''PI data'') for marketing or promoting a prescription drug without the consent of the prescriber. The law also prohibited the sale, license or exchange for value of PI data for marketing or promoting a prescription drug.\nThree companies -- IMS Health, Verispan and Source Healthcare Analytics, a unit of Dutch publisher Wolters Kluwer -- that collect and sell such data and by a trade group for pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit struck down the measure, holding that it violated the First Amendment because it restricts the speech rights of data miners without directly advancing legitimate state interests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55749:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55749:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55749:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. \"Vermont's statute, which imposes content-and speaker-based burdens on protected expression, is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny,\" Kennedy wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan. \"The First Amendment does not require courts to apply a special 'heightened' standard of review when reviewing such an effort,\" Breyer wrote. \"And, in any event, the statute meets the First Amendment standard this Court has previously applied when the government seeks to regulate commercial speech.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55749:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55750:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55750:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Freeman was charged with one count of crack possession, among other charges, and entered a plea agreement that included a sentence of 106 months. After his agreement was accepted by the trial judge and his sentence was entered, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to reduce the disparity in the treatment of crack and powder cocaine, and made the amendment retroactive. Freeman sought to reduce his sentence accordingly.\nBut in December 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky refused to do so. In November 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55750:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55750:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55750:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a plurality opinion. \"The Justices who join this plurality opinion conclude that the categorical bar enacted by the Court of Appeals finds no support in §3582(c)(2), Rule11(c)(1)(C), or the relevant Guidelines policy statements,\" Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote. In the controlling opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted: \"In my view, the term of imprisonment imposed by a district court pursuant to an agreement authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) ((C) agreement) is 'based on' the agreement itself, not on the judge's calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines.\" Meanwhile, Chief Justice John Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. \"I agree with the concurrence that the sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is based on the agreement, not the Sentencing Guidelines,\" Roberts wrote. \"I would, however, adhere to that logic regardless whether the agreement could be said to 'use' or 'employ' a Guidelines range in arriving at the particular sentence specified in the agreement.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55750:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55751:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55751:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMore than 20 years ago, General Dynamics Corp. and McDonnell Douglas Corp. signed a contract to build eight A- 12 Avenger stealth fighters for the U.S. Navy at a total estimated cost of more than $4 billion. Three years later, the Navy and then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney declared the company in default and canceled the contract. The government has argued that the companies weren't able to produce the aircraft as designed on schedule and is seeking repayment of $1.35 billion, plus more than $2.5 billion in accumulated interest, arguing that the companies failed to meet the terms of the contract. Meanwhile, General Dynamics Corp. and Boeing Co., which inherited the litigation through its purchase of McDonnell Douglas, contend that the delay was caused by the government's refusal to share essential stealth technology.\nThe government has argued that the companies couldn't press that argument because litigating the issue would require the disclosure of military secrets and jeopardize national security. Two lower courts agreed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55751:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55751:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55751:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Antonin Scalia. The court held that neither the government nor the defense contractors could pursue the long-running dispute because of the possibility that state secrets might be revealed. \"Suit on the contract, or for performance rendered or funds paid under the contract, will not lie, and the parties will be left where they are,\" Scalia wrote. \"Both parties—the government no less than petitioners—must have assumed the risk that state secrets would prevent the adjudication of claims of inadequate performance.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55751:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55752:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55752:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA California trial court convicted Joshua Richter of burglary and murder. He exhausted his state court remedies and filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. Mr. Richter argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the petition and was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.\nHowever, upon rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the state court's determination that Mr. Richter was not denied effective assistance of counsel was unreasonable. The court reasoned that under Strickland v. Washington the defendant must show that \"counsel's performance was deficient.\" And, the defendant must show that \"the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.\" Here, the requirements of Strickland were met when Mr. Richter's counsel failed to conduct sufficient pre-trial investigation to determine what forensic evidence or experts would be useful to the defense's theory when it was foreseeable what evidence the state would introduce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55752:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55752:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55752:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Reversing the lower court order, the court held that the defense lawyer was not deficient in failing to consult blood evidence when planning strategy for trial. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the opinion, which was joined by eight of the justices with Justice Elena Kagan taking no part in the consideration of the case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55752:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55753:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55753:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), plan administrators must provide all plan participants with a \"summary plan description\" (SPD), as well as a \"summary of material modifications\" when material changes are made to the plan. After CIGNA converted its traditional defined benefit pension plan to a cash balance plan, it issued a summary plan description to plan participants. In 2001, Janice Amara, one of the participants, filed a class-action lawsuit, claiming that CIGNA failed to comply with ERISA's notice requirements and SPD provisions. The U.S. District Court for the District Connecticut found for Amara, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the SPD misrepresented the terms of the plan itself.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55753:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55753:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55753:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order, finding that while the district court did not have authority under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA to reform CIGNA's pension plan, it did have authority to do so under another provision, Section 502(a)(3). In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court noted that \"although §502(a)(1)(B) did not give the District Court authority to reform CIGNA's plan, relief is authorized by §502(a)(3), which allows a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary 'to obtain other appropriate equitable relief' to redress violations of ERISA 'or the [plan's] terms.'\" Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas concurred only in the judgment. Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not take part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55753:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55755:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55755:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA North Carolina boy identified as J.D.B. was 13-year-old special education student in 2005 when the police showed up at his school to question him about a string of neighborhood burglaries. The police had learned that the boy was in possession of a digital camera that had been reported stolen.The boy was escorted to a school conference room, where he was interrogated in the presence of school officials. J.D.B.'s parents were not contacted, and he was not given any warnings about his rights under the 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, such as the right to remain silent or to have access to a lawyer. J.D.B. confessed to the crimes, but later sought to have his confession suppressed on the basis that he was never read his Miranda rights. He argued that because he was effectively in police custody when he incriminated himself, he was entitled to Miranda protections. In December 2009, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it could not consider the boy's age or special education status in determining whether he was in custody, and because he was not in custody, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55755:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55755:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55755:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. A divided Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the state court to determine whether the youth was in custody when he was interrogated. (1966). \"It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis,\" Sotomayor wrote for the majority. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. \"The Court's decision in this case may seem on first consideration to be modest and sensible, but in truth it is neither, Alito writes. \"It is fundamentally inconsistent with one of the main justifications for the Miranda rule: the perceived need for a clear rule that can be easily applied in all cases. And today's holding is not needed to protect the constitutional rights of minors who are questioned by the police.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55755:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55756:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55756:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichelle Ortiz, a former inmate, filed suit against several state and prison officials in an Ohio federal district court for violating her civil rights. While Ms. Ortiz served her sentence, she was sexually abused by a corrections officer on two consecutive nights. Prior to the second incident, Ms. Ortiz complained to prison officials, but was told \"that the man was leaving,\" \"this was his nature,\" and he \"is just an old dirty man.\" The corrections officer assaulted her on the following night. At trial, the jury found in favor of Ms. Ortiz against two of the prison officials – Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the case. The court noted that while courts do not normally review the denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits, a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an exception to the general rule. The court reasoned that Ms. Jordan's conduct did not violate Ms. Ortiz's Eight Amendment right to humane conditions because Ms. Jordan was not \"deliberately indifferent\" to Ms. Ortiz's plight.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55756:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55756:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55756:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, which held that a party may not appeal a denial of summary judgment after a district court has conducted a full trial on the merits. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a special concurrence, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55756:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55757:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55757:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2005, Santa Clara County, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reports, alleging that pharmaceutical companies have systemically overcharged hospitals and clinics, making them pay millions of dollars more than necessary for prescription drugs. The Inspector General's report also argued that the government is ill-equipped to ensure that clinics are being charged correctly. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, but in March 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55757:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55757:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55757:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg that health care providers cannot sue drug makers for overcharging public hospitals for prescription drugs. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55757:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55758:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55758:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid Henderson filed a claim for monthly compensation with the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office based on his need for in-home care. The Regional Office denied the claim. Mr. Henderson appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Office. He then filed a notice of appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims fifteen days after the expiration of the 120-day appeal period set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). The court of appeals denied the claim. The court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction because Mr. Henderson's notice of appeal was out of time and was not subject to equitable tolling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55758:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55758:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55758:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. The majority held that the deadline for filing a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court does not have jurisdictional consequences. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55758:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55759:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55759:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBayer Corp. withdrew the cholesterol-lowering drug, Baycol, from the market in August 2001 because of its alleged role in serious side effects and the deaths of some patients using the drug. Keith Smith and Shirley Sperlazza filed a lawsuit in West Virginia state court in 2001, seeking class certification for Baycol users throughout the state. Meanwhile, a separate putative West Virginia class action, filed was removed to federal court and consolidated as part of a multidistrict litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. In August 2008, the court denied certification on grounds that plaintiffs could not litigate economic loss claims as a class.\nCounsel for Smith and Sperlazza later received a notice declaring that their case in West Virginia state court was bound by that ruling. They appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court order in January 2010.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55759:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55759:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55759:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's opinion in a unanimous decision by Justice Elena Kagan. \"In enjoining the state court from considering Smith's class certification request, the federal court exceeded its authority under the 'relitigation exception' to the Act,\" Kagan wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55759:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55760:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55760:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA class of Chase Bank (\"Chase\") credit card holders sued Chase in a California federal district alleging the bank violated the Truth in Lending Act (\"TILA\"). The investors argued that Chase violated the act when it increased interest rates retroactively after the credit account was closed as a result of a late payment to the bank. The district court dismissed the complaint.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding in part that Regulation Z of TILA required a creditor, like Chase, to provide contemporaneous notice of interest rate increases that occurred because of customer default. Here, Chase failed to provide such notice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55760:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55760:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55760:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor who held that at the time of the transactions at issue, Regulation Z did not require Chase to provide McCoy with a change-in-terms notice before implementing the agreement term allowing it to raise his interest rate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55760:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55761:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55761:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJason Ransom filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Nevada in 2006 and proposed a plan to make $500 monthly payments over a period of 60 months. The chapter 13 trustee and two creditors objected to confirmation of the plan, arguing that $500 per month was not Ransom's projected disposable income as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. They argued that Ransom improperly included a deduction against income for \"vehicle ownership expense\" of $471. The trustee and creditors claimed that the deduction should be disallowed and that the monthly payment should be increased. The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the trustee and refused to confirm the plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, agreeing to hear the appeal on this interlocutory issue, affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55761:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55761:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55761:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-to-1 decision, Justice Elena Kagan, in her first opinion for the Court, ruled that a debtor who does not make loan or lease payments could not take the car-ownership deduction. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55761:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55762:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55762:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe owner of a patent for a computer language, i4i Limited Partnership brought suit against Microsoft Corp., alleging that the custom XML editor in certain versions of Microsoft Word, Microsoft's word-processing software, infringed i4i's patent. The jury found Microsoft liable for willful infringement, rejecting the company's argument that the patent was invalid, and awarded $200 million in damages to i4i.\nThe U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied Microsoft's motions for a new trial. And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court order, finding that Microsoft needed to offer \"clear and convincing evidence\" to overcome the traditional presumption that patents approved by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are valid.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55762:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55762:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55762:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. \"Section 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence,\" Sotomayor wrote. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alito, in which he \"join[s] the Court's opinion in full\" but added that \"I write separately because, given the technical but important nature of the invalidity question, I believe it worth emphasizing that in this area of law as in others the evidentiary standard of proof applies to questions of fact and not to questions of law.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55762:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55764:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55764:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarcus Sykes pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana enhanced Sykes' sentence under the ACCA after determining that he had previously been found guilty of three violent felonies.\nIn March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that \"fleeing police in a vehicle in violation of Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(A) is sufficiently similar to ACCA's enumerated crimes in kind, as well as the degree of risk posed, and counts as a violent felony under ACCA.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55764:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55764:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55764:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. \"Felony vehicle flight, as proscribed by Indiana law, is a violent felony for purposes of ACCA,\" Kennedy wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he wrote: \"the majority errs by implying that the 'purposeful, violent, and aggressive' test may still apply to offenses 'akin to strict liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes.'\" Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which he chastises the majority for an \"ad hoc judgment that will sow further confusion.\" Justice Elena Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. \"Vehicular flight comes in different varieties, and so too the statutes that criminalize the conduct,\" Kagan wrote. \"Because petitioner Marcus Sykes was convicted only of simple vehicular flight, and not of any flight offense involving aggressive or dangerous activity, I would find that he did not commit a 'violent felony' under ACCA.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55764:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55765:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55765:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe case arose over a licensing dispute between Stanford University and pharmaceutical firm Roche Molecular System over the ownership of patents used in the company's HIV test kits. Stanford School of Medicine professor Mark Holodniy developed the technology behind the kits. As a researcher at the university, patents from his work would normally be automatically assigned to Stanford. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to retain the rights to research funded by federal grants. But Holodniy also signed a contract with Cetus Corp., a company that later sold its line of business to Roche, that give the company the patent to anything that resulted from their collaboration. In February 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the university lacked standing to maintain patent infringement claims against Roche.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55765:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55765:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55765:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a decision by Chief Justice John Roberts. \"The Bayh-Dole Act does not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such inventions,\" Roberts wrote for the majority. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, noting that while she agrees with them majority that \"the appropriate disposition is to affirm. Like the dissent, however, I understand the majority opinion to permit consideration of these arguments in a future case.\" Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He argued that the case should have been remanded to the Federal Circuit for further argument.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55765:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55766:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55766:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA California federal district court convicted Ruben Flores-Villar under the Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\") of being a deported alien found in the United States. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Flores-Villar argued that the relevant provisions of the INA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of age and gender. The provisions impose a five-year residency requirement, after age fourteen, on United States citizen fathers but not mothers, whose residency requirement is merely one year. The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's holding in Nguyen v. INS which did not deal precisely with the provisions before the court, but held that other more onerous residency requirements for fathers but not mothers in the INA did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that the provisions challenged by Mr. Flores-Villar also did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and affirmed the judgment of the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55766:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55766:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55766:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWithout answering the question, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an unsigned per curiam opinion. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55766:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55767:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55767:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2002, the Jicarilla Apache Nation of New Mexico sued the federal government for allegedly mismanaging financial interests and funds, which are held in trust for the tribe's benefit. The tribe is seeking access to attorney-client communications about the trust operation. The Court of Federal Claims denied a petition by the United States to vacate its orders requiring the government to produce the documents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55767:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55767:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55767:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. \"The fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege does not apply to the general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes,\" Alito wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the majority decision \"rests on false factual and legal premises and deprives the Nation and other Indian tribes of highly relevant evidence in scores of pending cases seeking relief for the Government's alleged mismanagement of their trust funds.\" Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55767:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55768:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55768:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJose Tolentino was pulled over for playing his music too loudly. The officer ran a check on Tolentino's DMV files and discovered that not only was his license suspended, but it had also been suspended at least 10 times prior. Tolentino was arrested and charged with first-degree aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. He pleaded guilty in exchange for five years' probation. He later appealed, claiming his driving record should have been suppressed, because the police stop and subsequent DMV record search were illegal. The Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court, disagreed and upheld his sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55768:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55768:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55768:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the case was dismissed as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55768:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55770:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55770:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrench-based SEB S.A. sells home cooking products in the United States through an indirect subsidiary, T-Fal Corp. SEB owns a patent for a type of deep fryer with an inexpensive plastic outer shell. The improvement of the patent was to separate the shell from the fryer pan to allow for the less expensive material. Hong Kong-based Pentalpha Enterprises, a subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances, a British Virgin Islands corporation, began selling its deep fryers to Sunbeam Products Inc. in 1997. The company developed the product after purchasing an SEB deep fryer and copying its features. Though Pentalpha solicited and received a \"right-to-use study\" from a U.S. attorney citing no infringement of any patent, the company had failed to notify the attorney of the copying. SEB filed a lawsuit against Sunbeam and the companies settled. Though Pentalpha was aware of that litigation, it subsequently sold the same deep fryers to Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co. In 1999, SEB sued Montgomery Ward, Global-Tech, and Pentalpha for infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which ruled against Pentalpha. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision and further held that \"deliberate indifference\" to potential patent rights satisfies the knowledge requirement for induced infringement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55770:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55770:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55770:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court holding in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. \"Induced infringement under §271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement,\" Alito wrote for the majority. Justice Anthony Kennedy dissented, contending that the majority is \"incorrect in the definition it now adopts; but even on its own terms the Court should remand to the Court of Appeals to consider in the first instance whether there is sufficient evidence of knowledge to support the jury's finding of inducement.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55770:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55771:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55771:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA 2004 Bush administration antiterrorism initiative extended background checks required for many government jobs to contract employees, including scientists and engineers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a research facility operated by the California Institute of Technology under a contract with NASA. Twenty-eight lab employees, who do not have security clearances and are not involved in classified or military activities, filed suit over what they considered to be overly intrusive background checks. A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered the background checks halted while the case continued. The divided court later declined an en banc review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55771:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55771:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55771:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The court reversed the lower court decision and upheld the background checks that NASA uses for employees of companies working under contract in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas also filed his own concurring opinion. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55771:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55772:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55772:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGlen Milner, a member of an organization dedicated to raising community awareness about the dangers of Navy training exercises near Puget Sound, sued the Department of the Navy in a Washington federal district court under the Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\") to obtain the release of Navy documents relating to the effects of explosions at several locations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that documents relating to the effects of explosions constituted internal personnel rules and regulations of the agency which are subject to exemption from disclosure by the FOIA. The court reasoned that such documents are \"predominantly\" for internal agency use that present a risk, that if disclosed, would circumvent agency regulation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55772:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55772:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55772:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in an 8-1 opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. The majority opinion held that \"because Exemption 2 encompasses only records relating to employee relations and human resources issues, the explosives maps and data requested here do not qualify for withholding under that exemption.\"\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which he agreed with the judgment but noted: \"I write separately to underscore the alternative argument that the Navy raised below, which rested on Exemption 7(F) and which will remain open on remand. \" Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, backing the decision of the appeals court and writing that in this case, \"I would let sleeping legal dogs lie.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55772:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55773:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55773:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWatchmaker Omega S.A. sued Costco Wholesale Corp. when it bought a shipment of the Swiss-made watches from another importer and sold them for below Omega's suggested retail price. Omega contends that Costco's sale infringes on their copyright of the Omega logo on the back face of the watch. Meanwhile, Costco argues that Omega is precluded from bringing a copyright action after a sale due to the Doctrine of Exhaustion, or \"first sale\" rule, under which certain rights are \"exhausted\" after a sale of the copyrighted good.\nA judge on the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California backed Costco, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the first-sale doctrine did not apply to imported goods manufactured abroad.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55773:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55773:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55773:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court deadlocked 4-4, which means that the appeals court ruling against Costco stays in place, though the case sets no new high court precedent because it ended in a tie. The tie was possible because Justice Elena Kagan recused herself in the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55773:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55774:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55774:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDonald Bullcoming of New Mexico was sentenced to two years in prison for a felony aggravated DWI/DUI. The State introduced a blood alcohol test (blood draw) that was taken from Bullcoming under a search warrant issued following his refusal of the breath alcohol test. Bullcoming argued that the laboratory report of his blood draw results was testimonial evidence subject to the Confrontation Clause.\nThe New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and upheld the trial court's ruling that the forensic report was a business record. The court ruled that a blood alcohol report is admissible as a public record and that it presented no issue under the Confrontation Clause because the report was non-testimonial. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted discretionary review, but while the case was pending, this U.S. Supreme Court issued its 2009 decision in Melendez-Diaz v.Massachusetts, clarifying that forensic laboratory reports are testimonial and therefore the Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits. In applying the Melendez-Diaz ruling, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the blood alcohol report was testimonial evidence, but it was admissible even though the forensic analyst who performed the test did not testify.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55774:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55774:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55774:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. \"The Confrontation Clause does not permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification, made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial, through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of the test reported in the certification,\" Ginsburg wrote, adding: \"The accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification.\" Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined all but Part 4 of the opinion; Justice Clarence Thomas joined all but Part 4 and Footnote 6. Sotomayor concurred in part, writing: \"I agree with the Court that the trial court erred by admitting the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) report. I write separately first to highlight why I view the report at issue to be testimonial—specifically because its 'primary purpose' is evidentiary—and second to emphasize the limited reach of the Court's opinion.\" Meanwhile, Anthony Kennedy dissented, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel Alito. \"Far from replacing live testimony with 'systematic' and 'extrajudicial' examinations, these procedures are fully consistent with the Confrontation Clause and with well-established principles for ensuring that criminal trials are conducted in full accord with requirements of fairness and reliability and with the confrontation guarantee.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55774:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55775:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55775:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSarah Greene filed a lawsuit against Bob Camreta, a caseworker with the Oregon Department of Human Services, and Deputy Sheriff James Alford, contending they interviewed her daughter without a warrant, probable cause or parental consent. The girl's father, Nimrod Greene, was arrested for allegedly molesting a 7-year-old boy. The boy's mother told police that Sarah Greene had complained that she \"doesn't like the way Nimrod makes (his daughters) sleep in his bed when he is intoxicated and she doesn't like the way he acts when they are sitting in his lap.\" After interviewing one of the girls, Camreta concluded that she had been sexually abused and had the girls removed from the home. Nimrod was charged with sexually assaulting the boy and one of his own daughters. After a mistrial, he accepted a plea bargain in which he maintained his innocence but admitted there was enough evidence to convict him. Greene insisted the allegations were lies, and the daughter who was interviewed later recanted her statements. District Court Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the lawsuit. In December 2009, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed, allowing Greene to pursue her Fourth Amendment claims against both defendants.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55775:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55775:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55775:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court declined to address the Fourth Amendment question in the case. \"We conclude that this Court generally may review a lower court's constitutional ruling at the behest of a government official granted immunity. But we may not do so in this case for reasons peculiar to it. The case has become moot because the child has grown up and moved across the country, and so will never again be subject to the Oregon in-school interviewing practices whose constitutionality is at issue,\" Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the majority. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion and Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. \"I agree with the Court's conclusion that this case is moot and that vacatur is the appropriate disposition; unlike the majority, however, I would go no further,\" Sotomayor wrote. \"The majority suggests that we must decide whether Camreta has a 'right to appeal' in order to vacate the judgment below. But that view does not accord with our past practice.\" Meanwhile, Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. \"The correct solution is not to override jurisdictional rules that are basic to the functioning of the Court and to the necessity of avoiding advisory opinions,\" Kennedy argued.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55775:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55776:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55776:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn April 2008, a federal court jury found Frantz DePierre guilty of distributing cocaine. He was also found guilty of distributing more than 50 grams of cocaine base, which carries a 10-year minimum sentence. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the sentence, citing its past precedent. The opinion also notes that the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits also interpret the statute the same way.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55776:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55776:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55776:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Cocaine base \"means not just 'crack cocaine,' but cocaine in its chemically basic form,\" Sotomayor wrote for the court. Justice Antonin Scalia declines to join Section III-A, which is the portion of the opinion that discusses legislative history.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55776:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55777:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55777:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice officers in Lexington, Ky., entered an apartment building in pursuit of a suspect who sold crack cocaine to an undercover informant. The officers lost sight of the suspect and mistakenly assumed he entered an apartment from which they could detect the odor of marijuana. After police knocked on the door and identified themselves, they heard movements, which they believed indicated evidence was about to be destroyed. Police forcibly entered the apartment and found Hollis King and others smoking marijuana. They also found cash, drugs and paraphernalia. King entered a conditional guilty plea; reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from what he argued was an illegal search.\nThe Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that exigent circumstances supporting the warrantless search were not of the police's making and that police did not engage in deliberate and intentional conduct to evade the warrant requirement. In January 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower court order, finding that the entry was improper. The court held that the police were not in pursuit of a fleeing suspect when they entered the apartment, since there was no evidence that the original suspect even knew he was being followed by police.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55777:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55777:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55777:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Samuel Alito. \"The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment,\" Alito wrote for the majority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, contending that \"the Court today arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in drug cases. \"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55777:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55778:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55778:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn accident severed four fingers off the right hand of Robert Nicastro who was operating a recycling machine used to cut metal. A British company manufactured the machine and sold it through its exclusive U.S. distributor. Nicastro sued J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., the British company, and its U.S. distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., in New Jersey state court for product liability. The state supreme court reversed a trial court's dismissal, finding that the foreign company had sufficient contacts with the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55778:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55778:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55778:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court in a plurality opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. \"Although the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an extensive opinion with careful attention to this Court's cases and to its own precedent, the 'stream of commerce' metaphor carried the decision far afield,\" Kennedy wrote. \"Due process protects the defendant's right not to be coerced except by lawful judicial power.\" Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, concurred in the judgment, writing: \"I do not doubt that there have been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by our precedents. But this case does not present any of those issues. So I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day consequences.\" Meanwhile, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. \"Inconceivable as it may have seemed yesterday, the splintered majority today 'turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors market it.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55778:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55779:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55779:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nClifton Terelle McNeill was sentenced to 300 months imprisonment after he was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and 240 months imprisonment for unlawful possession with intent to distribute approximately 3.1 grams of crack cocaine.\nThe U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina determined McNeill to be an armed career criminal and then departed upward from the United States Sentencing Guidelines to sentence McNeill to the maximum sentence applicable. McNeill contends that he is not eligible for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the drug-related convictions upon which the district court relied do not qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit affirmed the district court order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55779:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55779:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55779:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. \"A federal sentencing court must determine whether 'an offense under State law' is a 'serious drug offense' by consulting the 'maximum term of imprisonment' applicable to a defendant's prior state drug offense at the time of the defendant's conviction for that offense,\" Thomas wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55779:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55780:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55780:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nInvestors in Matrixx Inititiatives, Inc. (\"Matrixx\") filed suit against the company in an Arizona federal district court for violations of federal securities laws. The investors alleged that Matrixx failed to disclose that one of its products, Zicam nasal spray/gel, caused anosmia (the loss of the sense of smell) in numerous customers. The district court dismissed the case holding that the investors failed to alleged \"materiality\" in their claim because their evidence was not \"statistically significant.\"\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the investors had pled sufficient facts going to the issue of materiality in order to avoid dismissal. The court reasoned that whether facts are statistically significant, and thus, material, is a question of fact that should ordinarily be left to the trier of fact – usually the jury. Here, the district court erred when it took liberties in making that determination on its own.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55780:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55780:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55780:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The court ruled that the materiality of a pharmaceutical company's non-disclosure of adverse event reports in a securities fraud action does not depend upon whether there is a statistically significant health risk.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55780:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55781:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55781:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n1950, Montana, Wyoming and North Dakota signed the Yellowstone River Compact, which spelled out how the states would share water. In 2007, Montana sued Wyoming, alleging farmers and other water users along the Powder and Tongue rivers were being harmed by Wyoming's excessive water use. Attorneys for Wyoming argued that much of the water used by the state's residents and businesses was not covered by the 1950 agreement.\nSpecial Master Barton Thompson issued an interim report, finding that Montana had grounds to sue over Wyoming's expanded use of water since 1950. However, Thompson rejected Montana's claim that Wyoming should be held liable for increased water use due to irrigation improvements. Meanwhile, North Dakota, also a member of the Yellowstone compact, was named as a second defendant in the original lawsuit. But Montana officials have said its inclusion was a formality and that they have no disagreement with their eastern neighbor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55781:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55781:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55781:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court agreed with the Special Master who found that \"Montana's allegation fails to state a claim because more efficient irrigation systems are permissible under the compact so long as the conserved water is used to irrigate the same acreage watered in 1950.\" Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, arguing that the \"court's analysis substitutes its none-too-confident reading of the common law and the compact's definition of 'beneficial use.'\" Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55781:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55782:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55782:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn January 2005, Vinton, Louisiana Police Chief Billy Ray Vice, who was seeking re-election to his post, sent fellow candidate Ricky Fox an \"anonymous\" letter trying to blackmail him into dropping out of the race. A month later, someone accused Fox of uttering a racial slur and, at Vice's instigation, filed a false police report regarding Fox's alleged use of the term. Fox brought a civil rights suit against Vice and the town in state court in December 2005, asserting both state and federal claims, and the case was removed to federal court in January 2006. Separately, in April 2007, Vice was tried and found guilty of extortion in state criminal court for the anonymous letter. In 2007, in response to a motion filed by the defendants, Fox admitted that he had failed to properly present any federal cause of action, so the district court dismissed Fox's federal claims with prejudice and remanded the remaining state law claims to state court. The district court then granted the defendants' motion for attorneys' fees, finding that Fox's federal claims were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. Fox appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and in a split decision the appeals court affirmed the district court's order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55782:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55782:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55782:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. \"When a plaintiff's suit involves both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, a court may grant reasonable fees to the defendant, but only for costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims,\" Kagan wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55782:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55783:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55783:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEric Thompson and his fiancée-then-wife, Miriam Regalado, worked for North American Stainless, the owner and operator of a stainless steel manufacturing facility in Carroll County, KY. Regalado filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in September 2002, alleging that her supervisors discriminated against her based on her gender. On February 13, 2003, the EEOC notified North American Stainless of the charge. Slightly more than three weeks later, North American Stainless terminated Thompson's employment. Thompson filed a complaint, which alleged that he was fired in retaliation for Regalado's EEOC charge. Retaliating in that way, Thompson asserted, violated section 704(a) of Title VII, which forbids an employer to \"discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has... made a charge ... under this title.\" The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Thompson's complaint, holding that Title VII \"does not permit third party retaliation claims.\" A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court order. But the court of appeals granted the employer's petition for rehearing en banc. A splintered en banc court upheld the dismissal of Thompson's complaint.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55783:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55783:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55783:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, which held that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct, including Thompson's cause of action. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55783:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55784:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55784:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn December 11, 2006, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic terminated Kevin Kasten's employment. Mr. Kasten filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\") in a Wisconsin federal district court alleging that he was retaliated against for filing complaints about the legality of the location of Saint- Gobain's time clocks. Mr. Kasten alleges that the location of the time clocks prevented employees from being paid for time spent donning and doffing their required protective gear. Saint-Gobain motioned for summary judgment arguing that purely verbal complaints, like those made by Mr. Kasten, were not protected activity under the FLSA. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that unwritten, purely verbal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55784:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55784:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55784:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. The majority held that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to a complaint, whether oral or written. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. \"The retaliation provision contemplates an official grievance filed with a court or an agency, not oral complaints—or even formal, written complaints — from an employee to an employer,\" Scalia argued. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55784:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55785:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55785:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2006, the Tohono O'odham Nation of Southern Arizona filed a complaint against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the United States government handled $2.1 billion in transactions for the nation between 1972 and 1992 and \"has never fulfilled its duty to provide a true and adequate accounting' of the trust funds. The lawsuit also alleged \"gross mismanagement\" by the federal government. One day later, the tribe filed a similar complaint against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims seeking monetary damages for the earnings shortfall in its trust accounts. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the lawsuit because a similar claim was being heard by a different court in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1500. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the CFC's dismissal of the case, concluding, \"the Nation's complaint in the Court of Federal Claims seeks relief that is different from the relief sought in its earlier-filed district court action.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55785:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55785:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55785:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Anthony Kennedy. \"The Court of Appeals was wrong to allow its precedent to suppress the statute's aims,\" Kennedy wrote for the majority. \"The conclusion that two suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are based on substantially the same operative facts allows the statute to achieve its aim.\" Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which she argued: \"To avoid both duplication and the running of the statute of limitations, the CFC suit could be stayed while the companion District Court action proceeds.\" Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55785:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55787:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55787:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEight states, New York City and three land conservation groups filed suit against four electric power companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority, five entities that they claimed were the largest sources of greenhouse gases. The lawsuit alleged that the utility companies, which operate facilities in 21 states, are a public nuisance because their carbon-dioxide emissions contribute to global warming. American Electric Power Co. and the other utilities argued that the courts should not get involved in the issue. The companies contended that only the Environmental Protection Agency can set emissions standards. A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York initially threw out the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said it could continue.\nThe states in the lawsuit are: California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. The Open Space Institute, the Open Space Conservancy and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire also are plaintiffs. The other utilities are Cinergy Co., Southern Co. Inc. of Georgia, and Xcel Energy Inc. of Minnesota.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55787:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55787:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55787:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. \"The Clean Air Act and the EPA action the Act authorizes displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.\"\nJustice Samuel Alito concurred in part and in the judgment, writing: \"I agree with the Court's displacement analysis on the assumption (which I make for the sake of argument because no party contends otherwise) that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act adopted by the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA is correct.\" Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not take part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55787:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55788:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55788:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBetty Dukes, a Wal-Mart \"greeter\" at a Pittsburg, Calif., store, and five other women filed a class action lawsuit in which they alleged that the company's nationwide policies resulted in lower pay for women than men in comparable positions and longer wait for management promotions than men. The certified class, which in 2001 was estimated to comprise more than 1.5 million women, includes all women employed by Wal-Mart nationwide at any time after December 26, 1998, making this the largest class action lawsuit in U.S. history. Wal-Mart has argued that the court should require employees to file on an individual basis, contending that class actions of this size – formed under Rule 23(b) of the federal rules of civil procedure — are inherently unmanageable and unduly costly. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has three times upheld the class certification.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55788:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55788:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55788:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. \"Here, proof of commonality necessarily overlaps with respondents' merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination. The crux of a Title VII inquiry is 'the reason for a particular employment decision,' and respondents wish to sue for millions of employment decisions at once,\" Scalia wrote. \"Without some glue holding together the alleged reasons for those decisions, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members' claims will produce a common answer to the crucial discrimination question.\" Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. \"Whether the class the plaintiffs describe meets the specific requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) is not before the Court, and I would reserve that matter for consideration and decision on remand,\" Ginsburg wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55788:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55789:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55789:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn January 2007, Michael Turner appeared in Oconee County, S.C., Family Court because he was behind in his child support obligation. He did not have an attorney, and he was not asked whether he needed or wanted representation. He presented some evidence of his inability to work, but the court made no finding as to Turner's indigent status. The judge held him in contempt and sentenced him to one year in jail. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Turner's argument for court-appointed counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55789:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55789:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55789:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Stephen Breyer. \"We conclude that where as here the custodial parent (entitled to receive the support) is unrepresented by counsel, the State need not provide counsel to the noncustodial parent (required to provide the support), \" Breyer wrote for the 5-4 majority. \"But we attach an important caveat, namely, that the State must nonetheless have in place alternative procedures that assure a fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support order.\" Meanwhile, Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined in full by Justice Antonin Scalia and in part by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. \"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt proceedings.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55789:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55790:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55790:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAs a member of the U.S. Army Reserves, Vincent Staub was required to attend occasional weekend training as well as a two-week training program during the summer. Staub was also a lab technician at Proctor Hospital in Peoria, Ill. He was fired in 2004 and later filed a lawsuit claiming that his supervisor was out to get him as a result of disapproval of his military service. He won $57,640 in damages at trial. But a more senior executive, not the supervisor, ultimately decided to fire Staub. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the decision-maker shared the supervisor's anti-military bias.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55790:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55790:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55790:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous decision announced by Justice Antonin Scalia. \"If a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable,\" wrote Scalia. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in the judgment but wrote that he would hold employers liable if the person making the firing decision \"merely rubberstamps\" a biased supervisor's recommendation or when the decision-maker is \"put on notice that adverse information about an employee may be based on antimilitary animus but does not undertake an independent investigation of the matter.\"\nJustice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55790:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55792:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55792:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress sought to open up the local telephone markets to competition by requiring incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share their equipment and services with competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). Under early interpretations of the law, incumbent-constructed entrance facilities had to provide at-cost access to the competitors. In AT&T Inc. unit Michigan Bell Telephone Co.'s interpretation, the FCC's Triennial Review Remand Order in 2005 created a means to charge for the use of the facilities, and the company announced plans to do so.\nCompetitor carriers complained to the Michigan Public Service Commission, and it ruled that the entrance facilities should still be provided at cost. Michigan Bell sued in federal court and won. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55792:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55792:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55792:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the lower court in a decision by Justice Clarence Thomas. \"The FCC has advanced a reasonable interpretation of its regulations — i.e., that to satisfy its duty under §251(c)(2), an incumbent LEC must make its existing entrance facilities available to competitors at cost-based rates if the facilities are to be used for interconnection — and this Court defers to the FCC's views,\" Thomas wrote. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, noting: \"I would reach the same result even without benefit of the rule that we will defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations.\" Meanwhile, Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55792:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55793:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55793:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe saga continues in the long-running inheritance dispute over the estate of a deceased Texas billionare. J. Howard Marshall's will left nearly all his money to his son, E. Pierce Marshall, and nothing to (now deceased wife) Anna Nicole Smith, aka Vickie Lynn Marshall. The younger Marshall died in 2006 and Smith died of a drug overdose in 2007. Smith had previously fought the will, claiming that her husband promised to leave her more than $300 million. Howard K. Stern, Smith's former attorney and boyfriend, has continued the legal battle on behalf of Smith's estate. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Marshall was mentally fit and under no undue pressure when he wrote a will leaving nearly all of his $1.6 billion estate to his son and nothing to Smith.\nThe Supreme Court will revisit the estate battle four years after the justices sent the case back to lower courts for further review. In the earlier case, the court only addressed whether or not federal courts can rule on Smith's claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55793:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55793:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55793:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nConclusion: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. \"Although the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on Vickie's counterclaim, it lacked the constitutional authority to do so,\" the chief justice wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. The majority \"fails to follow the analysis that this Court more recently has held applicable to the evaluation of claims of a kind before us here, namely, claims that a congressional delegation of adjudicatory authority violates separation-of-powers principles derived from Article III,\" Breyer wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55793:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55795:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55795:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nArizona enacted a campaign finance law that provides matching funds to candidates who accept public financing. The law, passed in 1998, gives an initial sum to candidates for state office who accept public financing and then provides additional matching funds based on the amounts spent by privately financed opponents and by independent groups. In 2008, some Republican candidates and a political action committee, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, filed suit arguing that to avoid triggering matching funds for their opponents, they had to limit their spending and, in essence, their freedom of speech.\nThe U.S. District Court for District of Arizona found the matching-funds provision unconstitutional. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the case, saying it found \"minimal\" impact on freedom of speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55795:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55795:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55795:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a decision by Chief Justice John Roberts. \"Arizona's matching funds scheme substantially burdens political speech and is not sufficiently justified by a compelling interest to survive First Amendment scrutiny,\" the chief justice writing for the majority, noted that the holding does not contend that the First Amendment forbids all public financing. Meanwhile, Justice Elena Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. \"The First Amendment's core purpose is to foster a healthy, vibrant political system full of robust discussion and debate,\" Kagan argued, adding: \"Nothing in Arizona's anti-corruption statute, the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, violates this constitutional protection. To the contrary, the Act promotes the values underlying both the First Amendment and our entire Constitution by enhancing the 'opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55795:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55796:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55796:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2005, Duryea police chief Charles Guarnieri filed a discrimination lawsuit against the Pennsylvania borough, alleging that council members retaliated against him because he had successfully challenged a 2003 decision to fire him. Guarnieri had challenged his firing through arbitration and was reinstated to his position as chief in 2005. His suit alleged that council then issued 11 employment directives, which he claimed placed humiliating restrictions on him, to retaliate against him. He further alleged the borough improperly withheld overtime pay from him and had improperly delayed issuing health insurance benefits. A jury heard the case in April 2008 and awarded Guarnieri $45,358 in compensatory damages and $52,000 in punitive damages. The borough appealed, arguing the evidence did not support the verdict. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the overall verdict entered by a federal jury, but it overturned the panel's award of $52,000 in punitive damages. The ruling differs from decisions by all 10 other federal circuits and four state supreme courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55796:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55796:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55796:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. \"A government employer's allegedly retaliatory actions against an employee do not give rise to liability under the Petition Clause unless the employee's petition relates to a matter of public concern,\" Kennedy wrote. \"The Third Circuit's conclusion that the public concern test does not limit public employees' Petition Clause claims is incorrect.\" Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, writing: \"Even where a public employee petitions the government in its capacity as sovereign, I would balance the employee's right to petition the sovereign against the government's interest as an employer in the effective and efficient management of its internal affairs.\" Meanwhile, Justice Antonin Scalia dissented in part: \"I find the proposition that a lawsuit is a constitutionally protected 'Petition' quite doubtful.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55796:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55797:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55797:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAssociations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of \"violent video games\" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute \"obscenity\" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55797:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55797:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55797:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. \"Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.\" Justice Samuel Alito concurred in judgment, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts. Alito noted that he disagreed \"with the approach taken in the Court's opinion. In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We should make every effort to understand the new technology.\" Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer filed separate dissents. Adhering to his strict understanding of the Framers' intent with the Constitution, Thomas wrote: \"The Court's decision today does not comport with the original public understanding of the First Amendment.\" Breyer argued that the California statute met current constitutional standards.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55797:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55798:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55798:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Prison Law Office in Berkeley, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit in April 2001 on behalf of Marciano Plata and several other prisoners, alleging that California prisons were in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which bans \"cruel and unusual punishment.\" Following a lengthy trial, a special panel of three federal judges determined that serious overcrowding in California's 33 prisons was the \"primary cause\" for violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court ordered the release of enough prisoners so the inmate population would come within 137.5 percent of the prisons' total design capacity. That amounts to between 38,000 and 46,000 inmates being released.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55798:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55798:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55798:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of special panel in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. \"The court-mandated population limit is necessary to remedy the violation of prisoners' constitutional rights and is authorized by the PLRA,\" Kenney wrote for the 5-4 majority. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, in which he admonished the majority for affirming \"what is perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation's history: an order requiring California to release the staggering number of 46,000 convicted criminals.\" Justice Samuel Alito filed a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, in which he wrote that the \"Constitution does not give federal judges the authority to run state penal systems.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55798:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55800:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55800:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice arrested Willie Gene Davis after a traffic stop. He subsequently gave a false name to the officers. After discovering his real name, the officers arrested him, handcuffed him and put him in the police car for giving false information to a police officer. Then they searched the vehicle and found a gun in his jacket. He was charged and convicted for possession of an illegal weapon. Following a jury trial, Davis was convicted and sentenced to 220 months in prison. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that while the search was illegal the evidence found in the vehicle was still admissible.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55800:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55800:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55800:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. \"Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule,\" Alito wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the judgment only. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. \"The Court finds a new 'good faith' exception which prevents application of the normal remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation, namely, suppression of the illegally seized evidence,\" Breyer notes, adding: \"At this point I can no longer agree with the Court. A new 'good faith' exception and this Court's retroactivity decisions are incompatible.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55800:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55802:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55802:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Texas state court convicted Henry Skinner of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mr. Skinner brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the prosecuting attorney in a Texas federal district court alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated when the district attorney refused to allow him access to biological evidence for DNA testing. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that circuit precedent established that Mr. Skinner's claim was not cognizable as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, but instead must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55802:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55802:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55802:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in which the majority found that Skinner had \"properly invoked § 1983.\"\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel Alito. Thomas cautioned: \"Allowing such challenges under § 1983 would undermine Congress' strict limitations on federal review of state habeas decisions. If cognizable at all, Skinner's claim sounds in habeas corpus.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55802:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55804:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55804:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNevada law requires elected officials to disqualify themselves when they are asked to vote on matters that touch on ''commitments in a private capacity.'' In 2006, a member of the Sparks City, Nevada Council, Michael A. Carrigan, disclosed that his campaign manager was a consultant to a business seeking to develop a casino, before voting its way in a land-use matter. The Nevada Commission on Ethics later ruled that the vote was improper and censured Carrigan.\nThe Nevada Supreme Court reversed that decision, saying it violated the First Amendment and citing the Supreme Court's decision last year in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. ''Voting by an elected public officer on public issues is protected speech under the First Amendment, '' Justice Michael Douglas wrote for the majority.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55804:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55804:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55804:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. \"The Nevada Ethics in Government Law is not unconstitutionally overbroad,\" Scalia wrote for the unanimous court. Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which he noted: \"the opinion does not, and on this record should not, consider a free speech contention that would have presented issues of considerable import, were it to have been a proper part of the case.\" Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing: \"I concur in the judgment, but I do not agree with the opinion of the Court insofar as it suggests that restrictions upon legislators' voting are not restrictions upon legislators' speech.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55804:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55805:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55805:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles Andrew Fowler shot and killed Christopher Todd Horner for trying to interfere with his plan to rob a bank with four other men. Horner had approached Fowler's accomplices as they sat in a stolen Oldsmobile, decked out in black clothes and gloves. Fowler, who had stepped out of the car to use cocaine, snuck up behind Horner, grabbed his gun, forced him to get on his knees and shot him in the back of the head. One of Fowler's accomplices later implicated him in the murder, and a jury convicted Fowler of killing Horner with the intent to prevent him from communicating information about a federal offense. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus 10 years. Fowler claimed the government failed to prove that a federal investigation would have been likely, and that Horner would have transferred the information to a federal officer or judge. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55805:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55805:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55805:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Stephen Breyer. \"The Government must show that there was a reasonable likelihood that a relevant communication would have been made to a federal officer,\" Breyer wrote. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he wrote that \"although I agree the case should be remanded for the Eleventh Circuit to consider whether the objection to sufficiency of the evidence was preserved or whether the District Court committed plain error, I would hold that there was insufficient evidence to support Fowler's conviction.\" Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. The majority opinion \" veers off course when it goes on to hold that the prosecution was required to show that, if Officer Horner had not been killed, there was a 'reasonable likelihood' that his information would have reached a federal officer,\" Alito wrote.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55805:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55806:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55806:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHarvey Sossamon, a Texas inmate, sued the state of Texas and various state officials in their official and individual capacities in a Texas federal district court. In part, he argued that he was denied access to the prison's chapel and religious services in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (\"RLUIPA\"). The district court dismissed the claim.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Sossamon could not sue Texas officials in their individual capacities under the RLUIPA. The court reasoned that because the Act was passed pursuant to Congress' Spending Power and not its Fourteenth Amendment Power, it did not create a cause of action for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacities. As to official-capacity lawsuits, the Fifth Circuit held that regardless of whether RLUIPA creates such a cause of action, it is barred by Texas's sovereign immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55806:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55806:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55806:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. \"States, in accepting federal funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages under RLUIPA,\" Thomas wrote for the 6-2 majority. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Stephen J. Breyer. \"Our precedents make clear that the phrase 'appropriate relief' includes monetary relief,\" she argued. \"By adopting a contrary reading of the term, the majority severely undermines the 'broad protection of religious exercise' Congress intended the statute to provide.\" Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55806:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55807:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55807:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research (\"Mayo\") and the University of Minnesota (\"University\") sued the United States in a Minnesota federal district court seeking a refund for taxes paid under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (\"FICA\"). They argued that payments made to doctors in their residency qualify for FICA's student exemption. The district court agreed and awarded judgment in favor of Mayo and the University.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the residents in this case did not qualify for the FICA exemption. The court reasoned that Treasury Regulation 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10) excludes \"full-time employees\" from the FICA student exemption. Here, the resident doctors were full-time employees and, therefore, were excluded from the FICA exemption.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55807:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55807:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55807:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. writing for a unanimous Court, upheld the Treasury Department's rule that treats medical residents as full-time employees, and therefore not exempt from the payment of payroll taxes is a valid interpretation of federal law. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55807:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55808:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55808:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA California state court convicted Scott Lynn Pinholster of double murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, he petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial. The district court upheld Pinholster's conviction but granted habeas relief on his death sentence. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.\nDuring rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the District Court’s grant of habeas relief, holding that the denial of habeas relief during the guilt phase was appropriate, but not during the penalty phase. The court noted that Strickland v. Washington requires trial counsel to investigate mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Here, the court reasoned that Pinholster's counsel failed meet to meet his obligations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55808:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55808:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55808:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. Limiting \"review to the state-court record is consistent with our precedents,\" Thomas wrote for the 5-4 majority. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a partial dissent in which he contended that \"I do not join Part III, for I would send this case back to the Court of Appeals so that it can apply the legal standards that Part II announces to the complex facts of this case.\" Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan, dissented in full. \"Some habeas petitioners are unable to develop the factual basis of their claims in state court through no fault of their own,\" Sotomayor argued.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55808:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55809:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55809:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, \"Thank God for dead soldiers\" and \"Fag troops\" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, \"notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55809:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55809:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55809:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. The Court held that the First Amendment shields those who stage a protest at the funeral of a military service member from liability. Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which he wrote that while he agreed with the majority's conclusion in the case, \"I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point.\" Justice Samuel Alito filed a lone dissent, in which he argued: \"Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55809:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55810:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55810:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFirst Derivative Traders, individually, and on behalf of various Janus Capital Group (\"JCG\") shareholders sued JCG and its investment advisor subsidiary Janus Capital Management (\"JCM\") in the Colorado federal district court (subsequently transferred to the Maryland federal district court) alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. They argued that JCG and JCM unlawfully made misleading statements in prospectuses about various Janus funds, most notably that it did not permit \"market timing\" of the funds – the practice of rapidly trading in and out of a mutual fund to take advantage of inefficiencies in the way the funds are valued. The district court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that investors stated a claim against JCG and JCM by asserting that both were responsible for making misleading statements about the funds' prohibition of market timing. The court reasoned that JCG investors would have inferred that, even if JCM had not itself written the alleged misstatements about JCG's practice of market timing, JCM must have at least approved of the statements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55810:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55810:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55810:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. \"Because the false statements included in the prospectuses were made by Janus Investment Fund, not by JCM, JCM and JCG cannot be held liable in a private action under Rule 10b–5,\" Justice Thomas wrote. Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. \"The majority has incorrectly interpreted the Rule's word 'make,'\" Breyer argued. \"Both language and case law indicate that, depending upon the circumstances, a management company, a board of trustees, individual company officers, or others, separately or together, might 'make' statements contained in a firm's prospectus—even if a board of directors has ultimate content-related responsibility.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55810:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55811:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55811:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCustomers brought a class action lawsuit against AT&T Mobility LLC in a California federal district court. They alleged that the company's offer of a free phone to anyone who signed up for its service was fraudulent to the extent the company charged the new subscriber sales tax on the retail value of each free phone. AT&T moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause contained within its contract of service. The district court denied the motion.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that (1) the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act (\"FAA\") did not expressly or impliedly preempt California law governing unconcionability.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55811:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55811:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55811:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a decision by Justice Antonin Scalia. The 5-4 majority held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts \"state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives.\" Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. \"The Court is wrong to hold that the federal Act pre-empts the rule of state law,\" wrote Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55811:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55812:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55812:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Michigan trial court convicted Richard Perry Bryant of second degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. On appeal, Mr. Bryant challenged the admission of the victim's statements at trial for violating his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The victim stated that Mr. Bryant shot him, but died shortly thereafter. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements that the victim made to police before his death were testimonial and their admission violated Mr. Bryant's right to confrontation. The court reasoned that the victim's statements were made in the course of a police interrogation whose primary purpose was to establish or prove events that had already occurred, not to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency. Therefore, the lower court held that the statements were \"testimonial\" for the purposes of the enhanced confrontation protections set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington and should not have been admitted against Mr. Bryant at trial because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the victim prior to his death.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55812:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55812:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55812:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in a majority opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The court held that the identification and description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were \"not testimonial statements because they had a 'primary purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.' Therefore, their admission at Bryant's trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause.\" Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.\nIn a strongly-worded dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia criticized the majority opinion for distorting \"our confrontation clause jurisprudence and leav[ing] it in a shambles. Instead of clarifying the law, the court makes itself the obfuscator of last resort.\" The majority, he continued, \"creates an expansive exception to the confrontation clause for violent crimes.\" In a separate dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg agreed with Scalia, but observed a \"well-established exception to the confrontation requirement: The cloak protecting the accused against admission of out-of-court testimonial statements was removed for dying declarations.\"\nJustice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55812:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55813:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55813:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2006, pilot Stanmore Cooper disclosed that he was HIV-positive to Social Security officials in order to receive medical benefits but withheld his status from the Federal Aviation Administration. But the Social Security Administration then turned over his medical records to the FAA, which revoked his license. Cooper filed suit against the agency for emotional distress for mishandling his medical records. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the exchange of records was improper and that Cooper has standing to sue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55813:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55813:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55813:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-3 decision written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court held that the Privacy Act's \"actual damages\" provision only allowed Cooper to recover for proven pecuniary or economic harm. Justice Alito cited the Court's rule that legislatures must unequivocally express waivers of sovereign immunity, and that any ambiguities in the statutory text must be construed in favor of immunity. He investigated the use of the term \"actual damages\" in various federal statutes, determining that it does not have a consistent legal meaning. Justice Alito inferred that congress may have intended \"actual damages\" to refer to pecuniary damages; under this interpretation, Privacy Act victims would have to show pecuniary loss or be barred from recovery. He also noted that congress did not make a separate Privacy Act provision for \"general damages,\" often defined as non-pecuniary damages.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer. She rejected the majority's strict interpretation of the sovereign immunity canon and argued that the traditional tools of statutory interpretation provided a better explanation of congress' intent. Looking to the text, to prominent secondary source definitions, and to the historical context of the act, Justice Sotomayor determined that congress intended \"actual damages\" to be synonymous with compensatory damages, which are not limited to pecuniary damages; it used the term \"actual damages\" to limit recovery to damages proven by evidence on record.\nJustice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55813:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55814:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55814:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnthony Cooper was convicted of shooting a woman in the thigh and buttocks after missing a shot to her head. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the conviction after Cooper claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. His lawyer told him not to take a plea offer, thinking that there could not be a finding that Cooper intended to murder his victim. But Cooper was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other charges. The appeals court said the incorrect advice equals unconstitutional ineffective assistance and ordered Cooper released. But Michigan officials argue that Cooper got a fair trial and that the verdict should not be thrown out because of his lawyer's mistake.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55814:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55814:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55814:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the majority opinion, vacating the Sixth Circuit judgment and returning the case for reconsderation. The Court held that the Michigan court applied the wrong standard when it rejected Cooper's claim to ineffective assistance of counsel. The proper test under Strickland v Washington is whether, absent the ineffective counsel, a defendant would have accepted an offered plea that was less severe than his eventual sentence, and the trial court would have accepted the terms of that plea. The majority also held that the proper remedy is not specific performance of the original plea. On remand, the prosecution should re-offer the plea and, if the defendant accepts it, the trial court can decide how to amend the original sentence.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, stating that there is no right to habeas relief when counsel's advice caused a defendant to have a full and fair trial. A criminal defendant has no right to a plea bargain, so rejecting the plea did not deprive Cooper of any procedural right. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the Scalia dissent. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent except for Justice Scalia's assertions that the majority's decision elevates the plea bargain to a constitutional right. Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote a separate dissent criticizing the majority's \"opaque discussion of the remedy....\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55814:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55815:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55815:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2004, the Federal Communications Commission said that TV stations could be fined for indecency violations in cases when a vulgarity was broadcast during a live program. That happened on Fox in 2002 and 2003 when Cher and Nicole Richie cursed during award shows and were not bleeped.
 The FCC never actually fined Fox, but the network took issue with the regulatory agency setting the stage for future fines and challenged the fleeting-expletive rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC's rules were \"unconstitutionally vague\" and had a \"chilling effect.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55815:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55815:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55815:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for seven members of the court, vacated the lower judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that the FCC's standards, as applied to the broadcasts in this case, were vague. The FCC did not give proper notice to broadcasters that they would be fined for fleeting expletives, so the practice violated due process. However, Justice Kennedy carefully noted that the Court did not decide whether the practice violated the First Amendment or that the indecency policy itself was unconstitutional. Only the way the policy was applied in this case was unconstitutionally vague. The FCC is free to modify its policy in light of this decision.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, stating her belief that FCC v. Pacifica was wrong when it was decided. Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55815:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55816:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55816:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1975, the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (ISDA) became law. Among other things, the ISDA directs the Secretary of the Interior, at the request of any Indian tribe, to enter into contracts which permit tribal organization to administer federal programs that would otherwise be directly administered by the Secretary. The ISDA further requires the Secretary to pay the tribe's reasonable contract support costs, or the costs that the tribe would incur operating the program that the Secretary would not incur. The payment of these costs was made subject to the availability of appropriations, and Congress had imposed a statutory cap on the appropriations available to pay such costs.\nRamah Navajo Chapter entered into multiple ISDA contracts for the administration a number of federally funded programs. The Ramah Navajo Chapter originally filed suit against the Secretary in 1990 on behalf of all BIA tribal contractors under the ISDA to challenge the methodology that Interior's Office of the Inspector General used to set indirect cost rates. In 1999 the district court granted the plaintiffs leave to add a new claim for the alleged underpayment of contract support costs due to insufficient appropriations. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court eventually granted summary judgment for the government, rejecting tribal demands for contract support costs in excess of the express statutory caps on the funds available to pay such costs.\nThe tribes appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed. The appeals court held that the government could be required to pay all of the contract support costs requested by every tribal contractor, even in excess of the statutory cap, because Congress appropriated sufficient funds to satisfy the demands of any single contractor considered in isolation. The government appealed the appellate court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55816:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55816:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55816:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 majority opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor affirmed the Tenth Circuit decision. Despite the statutory cap within the ISDA, the government must pay each tribe's support costs in full. The Court stressed that the government's contractual obligation under the ISDA should be treated like any other contract. Even if a particular agency exhausts legally available funds that were originally appropriated to satisfy a particular contract, the government is still obligated to fulfill its entire financial obligation within the contract. The tribe was entitled to rely on the government's promise of payment, rather than run the risk that the ISDA lump-sum appropriation may not cover the full cost of all contracts.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. dissented, focusing on the current restrictions on governmental payment of support costs. Once the allocated funds were appropriated to the specific ISDA contracts, the money in the broader pool of funds became unavailable, relieving the government of any further contractual obligation. Since the situation in this case is hardly a typical government contracts case, it should not be resolved using typical contract principles. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55816:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55817:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55817:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 5, 2008, Joel Perez and Carlos Cruz drove to a Shell station in Arlington Heights, Illinois, with Cruz at the wheel. They met with Alejandro Diaz, who was working with Drug Enforcement Agency (\"DEA\") officials. Diaz instructed them to meet him at a different location to complete the deal. Instead, Perez walked to a nearby Denny's, where Alexander Vasquez waited for him in the driver's seat of a black Pontiac Bonneville. Perez got into the passenger seat of the Bonneville and called Cruz, telling him that he was not willing to follow Diaz. Cruz walked to the Denny's where he was introduced to Vasquez. Diaz called Cruz to ask why they were not following him. Cruz informed him that they wanted to complete the deal in the Denny's parking lot, telling him, \"We got the money here.\" Vasquez echoed this statement.\nDiaz contacted his DEA handler, Agent James Chupik. Law enforcement agents surrounded the parking lot in their vehicles; several officers approached the Bonneville to arrest Vasquez, Cruz, and Perez. Cruz, outside the car, raised his hands in surrender. Vasquez, however, immediately put the Bonneville into reverse, striking two squad cars. He then shifted gears and headed for an agent. Agent Chupik stepped in front of the Bonneville and commanded Vasquez to stop, but was forced to dive out of the way. The Bonneville headed west on the eastbound lanes of Algonquin Road.\nSeveral minutes later, police found the Bonneville abandoned in a Walmart parking lot. A bystander told the police that he saw two men run from the vehicle into a McDonald's. Vasquez and Perez ran into the McDonald's, through its kitchen, then split up. Arlington Heights police officers quickly apprehended them, however. They found a cell phone on Vasquez and several cell phones on the ground near Perez; records indicated several calls between Vasquez's cell phone and both phones apparently belonging to Perez. Police impounded the Bonneville, and later found $23,000 in cash hidden in a secret compartment.\nA federal grand jury indicted Vasquez with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and with attempting to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. At trial, Agent Chupik testified that he instructed Diaz to have Cruz and his \"customers\" meet Diaz at a gas station in Arlington Heights. In a transcript of the call between Cruz and Diaz, however, Cruz only referred to a single customer. Vasquez's counsel attempted to impeach Agent Chupik on this point, but the judge found the difference to be trivial, limiting Vasquez's right to cross-examination and to refresh Agent Chupik's memory with the transcript. The government introduced Vasquez's previous drug conviction into evidence to demonstrate Vasquez's intent; he was convicted for dealing drugs with Perez in 2002.\nVasquez called Perez's wife Marina as a witness to testify. Marina Perez testified that she called Vasquez before the events in question to ask him to pick up Joel Perez at the site of the failed drug deal, implying that Vasquez was there by coincidence. In response, the government introduced transcripts and audio recordings of conversations between Marina Perez and her husband as evidence of bias. These indicated that Marina Perez spoke to her husband about a possible plea deal; Marina Perez also mentioned that Vasquez's attorney had told her that, \"everybody is going to lose.\" The trial judge allowed these transcripts and recordings to be admitted to show Marina Perez's bias and for the truth of their contents.\nThe jury found Vasquez guilty on the charge of conspiracy but not guilty on the charge of attempting to possess cocaine.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55817:Facts:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "55817:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55817:Facts:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nbetweenMarinaPerezandherhusbandasevidenceofbias.TheseindicatedthatMarinaPerezspoketoherhusbandaboutapossiblepleadeal;MarinaPerezalsomentionedthatVasquez'sattorneyhadtoldherthat,\"everybodyisgoingtolose.\"ThetrialjudgeallowedthesetranscriptsandrecordingstobeadmittedtoshowMarinaPerez'sbiasandforthetruthoftheircontents.ThejuryfoundVasquezguiltyonthechargeofconspiracybutnotguiltyonthechargeofattemptingtopossesscocaine.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held that Vasquez's previous drug conviction was properly introduced into evidence. The court rejected Vasquez's claim that the police's search of the Bonneville violated his Fourth Amendment rights, noting that Vasquez abandoned the car, and that the police had probable cause to believe that the money for the drug transaction was in the Bonneville. The court also rejected Vasquez's claim that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to elicit testimony through the cross-examination of Agent Chupik. The trial court found the distinction between \"customers\" and \"customer\" to be trivial, and the court held this finding to be within the trial court's discretion.\nIn a split decision, the court turned to the testimony of Marina Perez, holding that the evidence of conversations between Marina Perez and Vasquez's counsel were properly admitted to show bias and inconsistency with prior statements. While noting that the judge improperly instructed the jury that the recordings could be considered as evidence of the truthfulness of their contents, it held this instruction to be a harmless error. It pointed to other overwhelming evidence of Vasquez's guilt, including his attempt to escape capture and his previous conviction for drug dealing. It held that the jury would have convicted Vasquez absent the introduction of the transcripts and recordings in question.\nJudge David Hamilton dissented on this point alone, describing the recordings as prejudicial and inadmissible. He reminded the majority that the error is only harmless if the court is convinced Vasquez would have been convicted absent the error. He used a different test than the majority, looking to whether or not the error contributed to the conviction. He noted that Vasquez was never directly recorded or mentioned by name in any of the recordings, and that government agents were not aware of his involvement until his arrest. Judge Hamilton argued that Marina Perez' testimony about Vasquez was thus plausible evidence of innocence without the recordings on record.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55817:Facts:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "55817:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55817:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. After argument, the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55817:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55818:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55818:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCheryl Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Mich., for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act when they fired her after she became sick in 2004. After several months on disability, Perich was diagnosed and treated for narcolepsy and was able to return to work without restrictions. But she said the school at that point urged her to resign and, when she refused, fired her.\nPerich filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in her favor and authorized a lawsuit against the school. Attorneys representing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School argued that the \"ministerial exception\" under the First Amendment should apply in their client's case. The exception gives religious institutions certain rights to control employment matters without interference from the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned that ruling and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial on the merits. The court held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in nature, and therefore the ministerial exception did not apply.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55818:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55818:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55818:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that Perich was a minister for the purposes of the Civil Rights Act's ministerial exception, dismissing Perich's suit and her claims for damages. Chief Justice Roberts described the history of the \"ministerial exception\", established by courts to prevent state interference with the governance of churches, a violation of the First Amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses. He rejected the EEOC and Perich's argument that these clauses of the First Amendment are irrelevant to Hosanna-Tabor's right to choose its ministers.\nChief Justice Roberts concluded that Perich indeed functioned as a minister in her role at Hosanna-Tabor, in part because Hosanna-Tabor held her out as a minister with a role distinct from that of its lay teachers. He also noted that Perich held herself to be a minister by accepting the formal call to religious service required for her position. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that Perich performed secular duties in her position and that lay teachers performed the same religious duties as Perich, but reasoned that Perich's status as a commissioned minister outweighed these secular aspects of her job. He also rejected the EEOC and Perich's suggestion that Hosanna-Tabor's religious reason for firing Perich was pretextual, explaining that the purpose of the ministerial exception is not limited to hiring and firing decisions made for religious reasons.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55818:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55819:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55819:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPanagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.\nVartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.\nVartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55819:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55819:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55819:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg--writing for a 6-3 majority--reversed the lower court, holding that a determination of Vartelas' ability to travel abroad falls under the laws in effect at the time of his conviction. The Court applied the principle against retroactivity. Under this principle, courts will refrain from applying a law retroactively unless Congress expressly provides for it. The Court held that applying the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) imposed a new disability on Vartelas by effectively banning travel abroad. Vartelas also likely relied on the laws at the time, which would allow him brief international trips, when he decided to plead guilty.\nJustice Antonin Scalia dissented, stating that the applicable activity for deciding retroactivity is not Vartelas' conviction, but the act of leaving and then attempting to return to the United States. Vertelas' trip to Greece and return to the U.S. took place after the IIRIRA took effect, so he is subject to the law. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55819:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55820:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55820:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Christopher and Frank Buchanan began working for GlaxoSmithKline LLC (\"Glaxo\") as pharmaceutical sales representatives (\"PSRs\") in 2003. Glaxo developed, produced, marketed and sold pharmaceutical products to distributors or retail pharmacies, which subsequently sell those products to consumers when authorized by doctors via prescription. The plaintiffs worked between ten and twenty hours outside of normal business hours each week. PSRs are compensated with a salary and additional incentive-based pay; they are not paid overtime for work done outside of standard business hours.\nThe Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\") was enacted in 1938 to protect the well-being of workers. It imposed a baseline overtime wage on employers for employees who work over forty hours a week. There was an exception to the rule for \"outside salesmen\", defined by the Secretary of Labor (\"Secretary\") as an employee whose primary duty is making sales or obtaining contracts and who is primarily and regularly engaged outside of the employer's office. Christopher and Buchanan filed suit in August of 2008, alleging that Glaxo's practice of requiring overtime work without additional pay violated the FLSA's overtime provisions. Both parties filed for summary judgment, and the district court found for Glaxo, agreeing that the plaintiffs fell within the FLSA's \"outside salesman\" exception.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The Secretary filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Christopher and Buchanan's position, arguing that when a PSR promotes pharmaceutical products but does not receive items of value in exchange for those products, he does not fall within the \"outside salesman\" exception to the FLSA. The court rejected the Secretary's argument, however, reasoning that this definition is a simple parroting of the Congressional statute; such definitions require less deference by courts because they are not interpretive. Instead, the court pointed to Christopher and Buchanan's training in sales --and their experience in sales as a qualification for employment by Glaxo-- as evidence of their status as \"outside salesmen.\" The court noted that the pharmaceutical industry self-regulated marketing to doctors much like other industries self-regulate direct-to-consumer marketing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55820:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55820:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55820:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that pharmaceutical sales representatives are \"outside salesmen\" under the FLSA. The Court did not defer to the Secretary's interpretation of the statute because it is directly contrary to the long held industry practice of treating PSRs as exempt. To follow the Secretary's interpretation now would unfairly burden the employers with liability for conduct that occurred long before the Secretary announced that interpretation. The text of the statute also supports the holding that PSRs are outside salesmen.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that PSRs do not actually sell anything because they merely obtain non-binding agreements from doctors to prescribe a certain drug when appropriate. If the PSRs do not make sales, then they cannot be outside salesmen under the FLSA. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55820:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55822:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55822:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPlaintiffs Stephen R. Chandler and Robert L. Pierce were the sole shareholders of Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc. In 1999, Pierce contemplated selling his share of the business and sought professional advice in an effort to minimize tax liability generated by the sale of his interest in Home Oil. Each of the taxpayers initiated short sales of United States Treasury Bonds for $7,472,405. They then transferred the proceeds from that sale to Home Concrete as capital contributions. Home Concrete then closed the short sales by purchasing and returning essentially identical Treasury Bonds on the open market for $7,359,043. This transaction created \"outside basis,\" or how much the partner's investment was worth according to tax rules, equal to the amount of the proceeds the taxpayers contributed.\nHome Oil then transferred its assets to Home Concrete as a capital contribution. The taxpayers (except Home Oil) then transferred percentages of their partnership interests in Home Concrete to Home Oil as capital contributions. Home Concrete then sold substantially all of its assets to a third party purchaser for $10,623,348. The taxpayers timely filed their tax returns for 1999 in April 2000. Home Concrete elected to step-up its inside basis, or the amount that the partnership tax records compute for each partner, to equal the taxpayers' outside basis. Home Concrete again adjusted its inside basis to $10,527,250.53, including the amount of short sale proceeds earlier contributed by the taxpayers. As a result Home Concrete reported a $69,125.08 gain from the sale of its assets.\nThe IRS did not investigate until June 2003. As a result of their investigation, the IRS determined that the partnership was formed \"solely for the purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners.\" On September 7, 2006 the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), in which they decreased to zero the taxpayers' reported outside bases in Home Concrete. This substantially increased the taxpayers' taxable income. Plaintiff taxpayers brought action against Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeking to recover the increase.\nAs a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that the taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the taxpayer's return. During the trial the Treasury Department passed a regulation stating that the six-year period for assessing tax remains open for \"all taxable years... that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent jurisdiction... in which a decision had not become final.\" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found in favor of the plaintiffs.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55822:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55822:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55822:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for a four-justice plurality, affirmed the Fourth Circuit decision. The Supreme Court held that Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner decides this case. It interpreted language almost identical to the statute in question. Also, the statutory history shows that Congress intended to exclude overstatements of basis from the extended statute of limitations period. A treasury regulation cannot change Colony's the interpretation of the statute.\nJustice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that Colony decides the case, but argued that the court should not have ruled on whether to give treasury regulations deference.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy dissented, arguing that the Treasury regulation only interpreted a statute that had no established meaning. He argued that courts should be open to new interpretations through regulations when Congress amends a statute. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55822:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55824:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55824:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMenachem Binyamin Zivotofsky is a United States citizen born on October 17, 2002 in Jerusalem. In December 2002, Zivotofsky's mother filed an application for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and a United States passport for petitioner, listing his place of birth as \"Jerusalem, Israel.\" United States diplomatic officials informed petitioner's mother that State Department policy required them to record \"Jerusalem\" as petitioner's place of birth, which is how petitioner's place of birth appears in the documents he received.\nOn his behalf, Zivotofsky's parents filed this suit against the Secretary of State seeking an order compelling the State Department to identify petitioner's place of birth as \"Jerusalem, Israel\" in the official documents. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the complaint after concluding that petitioner lacked standing, and that the complaint raised a nonjusticiable political question. United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that petitioner had standing and that a more complete record was needed on the foreign policy implications of recording \"Israel\" as Zivotofsky's place of birth.\nOn remand, the State Department explained, among other things, that in the present circumstances if \"Israel\" were to be recorded as the place of birth of a person born in Jerusalem, such \"unilateral action\" by the United States on one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians \"would critically compromise\" the United States' ability to help further the Middle East peace process. The district court again dismissed on political question grounds. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Zivotofsky's claim is foreclosed because it raises a nonjusticiable political question.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55824:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55824:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55824:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-to-1 decision, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the Court vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the trial court for further consideration on the merits. Roberts argued that Zivotofsky's claim did not involve a political question and is thus justiciable. Resolution of Zivotofsky's claim would require the Judiciary to vindicate Zivotofsky's statutory rights, a matter within its competence to resolve. Reaching a decision is not simple, however. A full airing on the merits will frame the issues for further review.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stephen Breyer joined Part I of Justice Sonia Sotomayor's opinion. She wrote separately to emphasize that the inquiry required by the political question doctrine was more demanding than the majority suggested with its opinion.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. filed a special concurrence. He noted that determining the constitutionality of an Act of Congress could present a political question, but he did not think that the narrow issue before the court fell into that category of cases.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion. He wrote that a decision would touch upon several very sensitive foreign policy matters and that adjudication of the petitioner's claim would require the courts to answer a political question as defined by the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55824:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55825:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55825:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChantell and Mike Sackett own a half-acre lot in a residential area near Priest Lake, Idaho. In April and May of 2007, the Sacketts filled in about one-half acre of that property with dirt and rock in preparation for building a house. On November 26, 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a compliance order against the Sacketts. The compliance order alleged that the parcel is a wetland subject to the Clean Water Act and that the Sacketts violated the CWA by filling in their property without first obtaining a permit. The order required the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the parcel to its original condition.\nThe Sacketts sought a hearing with the EPA to challenge the finding that the Parcel is subject to the CWA. The EPA did not grant the Sacketts a hearing and continued to assert CWA jurisdiction over the parcel. The Sacketts filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. They challenged the compliance order as (1) arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) issued without a hearing in violation of the Sacketts' procedural due process rights; and (3) issued on the basis of an \"any information available\" standard that is unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss, finding that the CWA precludes judicial review of compliance orders before EPA has started an enforcement action in federal court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55825:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55825:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55825:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 9-0 decision, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the majority opinion holding that the EPA's compliance order is a final agency action, and there is no other remedy for the Sackett's other than judicial review. Justice Scalia rejected each of the government's arguments that the Clean Water Act precluded judicial review of compliance orders. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurrence, noting that the Court ruled only on whether the Sackett's can seek review of the EPA's authority to regulate their land, not whether they can challenge the specific terms of the compliance order. Justice Samuel A. Alito also concurred, stating that judicial review of compliance is better than nothing, but the only real solution is a clarification by Congress of the ambiguities in the Clean Water Act .", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55825:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55826:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55826:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPacific Operations Offshore runs two offshore oil drilling platforms, the Hogan and the Houchin, both located more than three miles off the coast of California. Juan Valladolid worked for Pacific Operations as a roustabout, stationed primarily on the Hogan. He was killed, however, on the grounds of Pacific Operations's onshore oil-processing facility when he was crushed by a forklift. Following his death, his widow, Luisa, sought workers' compensation benefits under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (\"OCSLA\") and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (\"LHWCA\"). An administrative law judge denied Mrs. Valladolid's OCSLA claim on the grounds that her husband's injury had occurred outside the geographic site of the outer continental shelf. The judge denied the LHWCA claim on two grounds: (1) Valladolid was not engaged in maritime employment, and (2) he was not injured on a maritime situs. The Benefits Review Board upheld the judge's denial of the OCSLA benefits under the \"situs-of-injury\" test, and affirmed the denial of LHWCA benefits on the maritime situs ground.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, ruling that the OCSLA does not have a situs-of-injury requirement. The court of appeals held that Section 1333(b) extends Longshore Act coverage to workers injured on land where there is \"a substantial nexus between the injury and extractive operations on the shelf.\" Two other circuits that have addressed the question have reached conflicting results.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55826:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55826:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55826:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 decision, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court and remanding for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the \"substantial nexus\" test best represents the text of the OCSLA. The Court noted that persons injured on the Outer Continental Shelf would almost always satisfy this test. The outcome for persons injured in other locals, like Mr. Valladolid, would depend on the individual circumstances of the case. On remand the Valladolid's must show a significant causal link between Mr. Valladolid's death and Pacific's Outer Continental Shelf activities.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a special concurrence, stating that \"substantial nexus\" is just legalese with no established meaning. He felt this test would be impossible to apply. He would apply a proximate cause test, which has been defined by tort law. Justice Samuel Alito joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55826:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55827:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55827:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC., owned the Radisson Hotel at the Los Angeles International Airport as well as an adjacent parking structure. In November of 2007, RadLax sought to expand the Radisson Hotel. It therefore obtained a $142 million construction loan from the Longview Ultra Construction Loan Investment Fund, for which Amalgamated Bank served as trustee and administrative agent.\nAfter taking out the loan, RadLAX was eventually forced to file voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Soon after, RadLax embarked on a campaign to sell the Radisson Hotel and adjacent parking structure.\nOn June 4, 2010, RadLAX filed a joint chapter 11 plan, which proposed the auction of substantially all of its assets and the distribution of proceeds to various creditors. The debtors specified that no secured creditor would be permitted to credit bid at the sale. Amalgamated Bank objected to the proposed bid procedures on the grounds that a sale of its collateral, free of liens, required the debtor to allow a lender to credit bid.\nThe Bankruptcy Court agreed with Amalgamated Bank and denied RadLax's proposal with regard to credit bids. The case was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. RadLAX subsequently appealed the appellate court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55827:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55827:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55827:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that RadLAX could not obtain confirmation of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that provided for the sale of its assets free from lien without permitting Amalgamated Bank to credit-bid at the sale. According to Justice Scalia, clause (ii) of § 1129(b)(2)(A) of the bankruptcy code specified that when property was sold free of lien, it was subject to Section 363(k) of the code. Section 363(k) in turn allowed the creditor to credit-bid at the sale, up to the amount of its claim.\nAlthough RadLAX proposed to repay Amalgamated Bank with the proceeds of the sale, its plan to preclude Amalgamated Bank from credit-bidding at the sale violated the clear language of the act. Justice Scalia rejected RadLAX argument that clause (iii) allowed RadLAX's plan because the plan guaranteed Amalgamated Bank the indubitable equivalent of its claim. He concluded that the general language of clause (iii) did not control the specific matter dealt with in clause (ii). Justice Scalia also rejected RadLAX's argument that clause (ii) was not more specific than clause (iii) because (ii) provided procedural protections but (iii) provided substantive protections.\nJustice Anthony Kennedy took no part in the consideration of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55827:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55828:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55828:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe United States Census Bureau conducted a national census in 2010. In May and June of 2011, the Texas Legislature created a new electoral map based on changes in the state's population. Texas Governor Rick Perry signed the new map into law in July of 2011.\nUnder Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, either the Justice Department or a special three-judge district court must approve new electoral maps before state officials may enact the map. Texas officials submitted its map to the three-judge court in Washington. The Washington court determined that state officials had used improper standards with respect to two districts. It further held that a three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas must designate an interim redistricting plan for the 2012 election cycle.\nThe district court redrew 36 electoral districts. Governor Perry and other state officials appealed the district court's redistricting to the Supreme Court and requested that the Supreme Court stop the enactment of the lower court's new map. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and stopped the enactment of the lower court's new map until the Supreme Court could issue a further order on the matter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55828:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55828:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55828:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe. In an unsigned, per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the interim maps and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that it was unclear whether the district court used the proper standards to create their interim plan. Portions of the district court's plan seemed to be based on State policy considerations, and portions had no relation to the outdated plan or the proposed plan. A district court may redraw districts, but it should look to the State's proposed plan and the policies surrounding it for guidance.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurrence, agreeing with the result, but stating that Section 5 is unconstitutional and should not be a prerequisite for approval of a redistricting plan. He would vacate the interim plans and remand only for consideration of the other issues.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55828:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55829:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55829:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, \"I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.\" In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.\nThe Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.\nAlvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55829:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55829:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55829:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the Court of Appeals. Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny and are almost always invalid, except in rare and extreme circumstances. While categories of speech, such as defamation and true threats, present a grave and imminent threat, false statements alone do not present such a threat. Congress drafted the Stolen Valor Act too broadly, attempting to limit speech that could cause no harm. Criminal punishment for such speech is improper.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer concurred, concluding that false statements of fact should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. However, as drafted, the Stolen Valor Act violates intermediate scrutiny because it applies to situations that are unlikely to cause harm. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito dissented. Congress could not draft the Stolen Valor Act more narrowly, while still preventing the substantial harm caused by false statements concerning military decoration. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55829:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55830:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55830:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2007, the Freemans and two other couples, each secured a mortgage from Quicken Loans, an online mortgage lender. At the closing of the mortgage, Quicken charged the Freemans a \"loan discount fee\", and charged the other couples similar fees including a \"loan origination fee\" and a \"loan processing fee\". The three couples contended these fees were unearned fees in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).\nIn 2008, each couple filed suit separately in state court. Quicken removed the cases to a federal district court where the three cases were consolidated. Quicken moved for summary judgment, claiming that the claims were not actionable under RESPA because the fees were not split with another party. The district court noted a circuit split on the issue of whether RESPA did not apply where fees were not spit with another party. Nonetheless, the district court granted Quicken's motion. The couples appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's opinion. The appealed the Appeals Court's opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55830:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55830:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55830:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that a charge for settlement services must be divided between two or more people in order to be actionable under RESPA. The language of the statute is unambiguous and cannot be understood to cover the fee in this case. Use of the words \"portion\", \"split\", and \"percentage\" all lead to an understanding that a fee must be divided between two or more parties.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55830:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55832:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55832:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJuan Smith was convicted on five counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Louisiana state trial court, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and state Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for review. Smith contends that the Louisiana state courts reached this result only by disregarding established precedents regarding the suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant and presentation of false or misleading evidence to a prosecutor in past Supreme Court cases, Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States and Napue v. Illinois.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55832:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55832:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55832:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and Yes. In an 8-1 decision Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion reversing Smith's conviction and remanding the case to the district court. The Supreme Court held that because the eyewitness testimony was the only evidence linking Smith to the murders, the witness' statements to the police were material to the jury's decision. The Court noted that contradictory statements will not always be material if there is enough other evidence to sustain confidence in the verdict. The Court found it unnecessary to consider other the undisclosed evidence Smith discovered.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent, stating that the Court should have considered the cumulative effect of all of the evidence. Justice Thomas felt that the undisclosed statements are not enough to establish a \"reasonable probability\" that the jury would change its verdict.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55832:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55833:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55833:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn April of 2001, the City of Indianapolis (\"the city\") sent a letter to property owners in the Northern Estates neighborhood informing them that their properties were part of the Brisbane/Manning Barrett Law Sanitary Sewers Project (\"the project\"). The project was designed to connect properties to the city sewer system, reducing or eliminating the use of septic tanks.\nIn July of 2004, the Indianapolis Board of Public Works (\"the board\") levied an assessment of $9,278 against each property subject to the project. Indianapolis offered each property owner the option of paying the assessment in its entirety or of paying in monthly installments, subject to an annual interest rate. The petitioners, Christine Armour and 30 other property owners (\"property owners\"), chose to pay the assessment in its entirety.\nIn 2005, the city abandoned the Barrett Law method of assessing owners' contributions in favor of the Septic Tank Elimination Program (\"STEP\"). As part of the transition to STEP, the board passed a measure forgiving all outstanding Barrett Law assessment balances owed as of November 1, 2005, including those assessed for the project. As a result, owners who chose to pay their assessment in monthly installments were forgiven from future payment. Owners who chose to pay their assessments in their entirety were given no reimbursement. The property owners requested compensation from the board in February of 2006 and were denied.\nThe property owners filed complaint against the city in July of 2007, alleging violation of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. All parties filed for summary judgment; the trial court granted the property owners' motion, and entered judgment against the city. On appeal, the property owners abandoned their due process claim, arguing that the city violated equal protection. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the city did not have a rational basis for only forgiving the debt of owners who chose to pay in installments. The Indiana Supreme Court granted the city's motion to transfer the case, vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nJustice Frank Sullivan, writing for a unanimous court, held that the city's tax policy survives rational basis review and does not violate equal protection. The city legitimately believed that 1) owners who fully paid their assessments were in a better financial position than those making monthly installments, 2) the benefits of simplifying funding for the sewer system outweighed the effort of continuing the previous taxation system and 3) the new taxation system would preserve city resources. He rejected the property owners' argument that they were a \"class of one\" --requiring heightened scrutiny of the city's action-- because the property owners were not singled out for discriminatory treatment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55833:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55833:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55833:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the Indiana court. The Supreme Court held that the distinction between homeowners who had paid the full amount and homeowners who had their balance forgiven had a rational relationship to the legitimate interest of reducing administrative costs. The Court used rational basis review because the classification between homeowners was not suspect and did not involve a fundamental right.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. dissented, writing that the extreme disparity in tax burdens between homeowners violated the equal protection clause under rational basis review. While administrative costs can play a role, they do not justify charging some taxpayers 30 times what other similarly situated taxpayers paid. Indianapolis even provided detailed records of how much each homeowner overpaid, so the only administrative cost would be cutting checks and mailing them to the homeowners. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55833:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55834:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55834:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1999, shortly after Robert and Karen Capato were married in New Jersey, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer, and was advised that chemotherapy might render him sterile. Before beginning treatment, Robert deposited semen at the Northwest Center for Infertility and Reproductive Endocrinology so the couple could conceive a child in the future. Karen Capato conceived a child naturally, however, giving birth to a son in August of 2001. The Capatos wanted their son to have a sibling, but Robert's health deteriorated quickly, and he died in Florida in March of 2002. He was insured by social security when he died. His will named only his son and two children from a previous marriage as beneficiaries.\nShortly after Robert's death, Karen began treatment for in vitro fertilization using her husband's frozen semen. She gave birth to twins on September 23, 2003, eighteen months after her husband's death. In October 2003, Karen applied for benefits from the Social Security Administration on behalf of her twins. § 416(e) of the Social Security Act (\"SSA\") defined \"child\" as \"the child or legally adopted child of an individual\". In addition, the child must be dependent on an insured individual at the time of the qualified individual's death. § 416(h) provided an alternate method of determining a child's qualification, directing the Commissioner of Social Security to look to the intestate property laws of the domiciliary of the deceased insured individual.\nThe Social Security Administration denied her claim, and Karen requested a hearing in front of an administrative court. While noting that granting benefits would be consistent with the purpose of social security, the court held that the twins were not Robert's \"child(ren)\" for the purposes of the SSA. The district court affirmed, echoing the ALJ's interpretation of \"child(ren)\". The court also held that because Robert died while domiciled in Florida, Florida's law of intestacy applies. The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, held that the twins were clearly children under § 416(e) of the SSA because they were the biological children of a married couple. It rejected the district court's argument that Florida state intestacy law should apply before § 416(e), holding § 416(h) to be an alternate definition only used when a child's status is in doubt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55834:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55834:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55834:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the Social Security Administration's denial of benefits to the Capato twins was a permissible interpretation of the Social Security Act. Justice Ginsburg rejected the Third Circuit's conclusion that § 416(h) was only relevant for determining the status of an applicant if that applicant was not clearly a child or legally adopted child of an insured individual under § 416(e). She argued that the sparse definition in § 416(e) was not enough to show that congress only intended \"child\" to mean the child of married parents. Capato's offered dictionary definitions were broader than this definition, and other contemporary statutes specifically differentiated between \"children\" and children who were specifically the biological offspring of married parents.\nJustice Ginsburg also pointed out that there was no such thing as a scientifically proven biological relationship when the act was passed in 1939, that a biological parent was not necessarily a child's legal parent, and that marriage does not necessarily make the legal status of a child certain. Further, it was not absolutely clear that the Capato twins fell under Capato's interpretation of § 416(e) because under Florida law a marriage ended upon the death of a spouse.\nJustice Ginsburg also noted that § 416(h) instructed the Commissioner to look to state intestacy law in determining the status of a child for the purposes of Title II; placing similar language in § 416(e) would be redundant. She also pointed out that the core purpose of the legislation was not to help needy people but to provide members of a wage earner's family with protection against the hardship caused by the loss of that wage earner's earnings. State intestacy law specified which children were likely dependant on those earnings.\nJustice Ginsburg also rejected Capato's argument that the SSA's interpretation was a violation of the fourteen amendment's due process clause. Here, the SSA's interpretation was only subject to rational-basis review because the Capato twins did not share any of the characteristics that prompted the Court's skepticism towards other classifications involving the children of unwed parents. Justice Ginsburg finally concluded that the SSA's interpretation was reasonable, overruling the Third Circuit's holding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55834:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55835:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55835:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA jury found Randall Fields guilty of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old child. Fields was in jail on a disorderly charge when Lenawee County, Michigan deputies questioned him about allegations of sex with a minor. The sex case was unrelated to the one Fields was in jail for at the time.\nFields filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals claiming that his statements were inadmissible because he had not been given his Miranda warnings before questioning. The state court reasoned that because Fields was free to return to the jail and was questioned on a matter unrelated to his incarceration, there was no obligation to provide him warnings under Miranda.\nFields then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated, and the U.S. District Court agreed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55835:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55835:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55835:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the Court reversing the lower court's decision. The Court stated that there was not yet any clearly established rule regarding what constituted Miranda custody. Mere imprisonment and private questioning about events in the outside world were not sufficient to create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes. Furthermore, the prisoner in this case was not in custody under Miranda because he was told at the outset of the interrogation that he could leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted and because he was not physically restrained.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Ginsburg agreed that what constituted custody was not clearly established in Fields' favor. However, the justice disagreed with the Court's determination that Fields was not in custody because Fields was subjected to incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere, was placed in an inherently stressful situation against his will, and had his freedom of action curtailed in a significant way.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55835:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55837:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55837:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAmid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay.\nThe ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees.\nShortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown.\nThe plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty.\nThe District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision.\nThe court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit.\nThe District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive.\nA panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55837:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55837:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55837:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo; Yes, under the Taxing and Spending Clause; Unanswered; Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., largely joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, authored the majority opinion. The Court reached the following conclusions:\nThe justices unanimously agreed that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. Congress did not intend that the payment for non-compliance with the Individual Mandate be a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.\nChief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that the Individual Mandate penalty is a tax for the purposes of the Constitution's Taxing and Spending Clause and is a valid exercise of Congressional authority. The payment is not so severe as to be coercive, is not limited to willful violations like fines for unlawful acts, and is collected by the Internal Revenue Service by normal means.\nAs part of a jointly written dissenting opinion, Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito disagreed, arguing that because Congress characterized the payment as a penalty, to instead characterize it as a tax would amount to rewriting the Act.\nChief Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, concluded that the Individual Mandate was not a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce. The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate existing commercial activity, but not to compel individuals to participate in commerce. This would open a new realm of Congressional authority.\nJustice Ginsburg, as part of an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan disagreed with this conclusion, arguing that the Chief Justice's distinction between economic \"activity\" and \"Inactivity\" is ill-defined and unsupported by either the Court's precedents or the text of the Constitution. Furthermore, even if the distinction were permissible, individuals who fail to purchase insurance nonetheless frequently participate in the healthcare marketplace, substantially impacting healthcare commerce, and may therefore be regulated by Congress.\nJustice Thomas, in a separate dissent, added that the \"substantial effects test\" has encouraged Congress to push the limits of its power.\nThe majority did not address the serverability question after concluding that the Individual Mandate was constitutional.\nJustices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito argued that the Individual Mandate and Medicaid expansion are inserverable, and that the entirety of the ACA is therefore unconstitutional. The provisions of the Act, they argue, are \"closely interrelated,\" with the two unconstitutional provisions serving as \"pillars.\"\nChief Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan, concluded that the Medicaid expansion provisions was unconstitutionally coercive as written. Congress does not have authority under the Spending Clause to threaten the states with complete loss of Federal funding of Medicaid, if the states refuse to comply with the expansion.\nJustices Ginsburg and Sotomayor disagreed, arguing, \"Congress' authority to condition the use of federal funds is not confined to spending programs as first launched. The legislature may, and often does, amend the law.\"\nChief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that the remainder of the Medicaid expansion provision, without the unconstitutional threat to completely withdraw Medicaid funding, could stand as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Spending Clause.\nJustices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito argued that the Court does not have the power to remedy the unconstitutional expansion as written. Such power should be vested exclusively in Congress.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55837:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55838:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55838:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, parents of Montana schoolchildren sued the owner of federally licensed hydroelectric dams on the Missouri, Madison and Clark Fork rivers within the state. The parents claimed that the owner, PPL, owed the state compensation because the riverbeds underlying its dams were part of Montana's \"school trust lands.\" The State of Montana joined the suit in 2004, asserting that PPL also owed the state compensation pursuant to Montana's Hydroelectric Resources Act.\nThe federal district court eventually dismissed the action for lack of diversity, and PPL filed suit in state court. The state countersued, arguing that it obtained title to the relevant streambeds at the time of statehood pursuant to the \"equal footing doctrine.\" The trial court dismissed PPL's affirmative defenses, held that the State obtained title to the riverbeds at issue because those rivers were navigable at the time of statehood and concluded that the state was entitled to retroactive lease payments under the HRA. Following a bench trial to determine damages, the court imposed approximately $40 million in back lease payments, as well as future lease payments imposed by the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55838:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55838:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55838:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the trial court must consider whether the relevant stretches of the Missouri, Madison, and Clark Fork rivers were navigable when the United States granted Missouri statehood, but it also determined that those stretches were not navigable at that time. While acknowledging that the equal footing doctrine grants a state title to navigable waters upon statehood, Justice Kennedy explained that navigability in fact is based on the \"natural and ordinary condition\" of the water.\nConsequently, Justice Kennedy held that the Montana Supreme Court erred in its treatment of the question of river segments and overland portage. He noted that the Court considers the navigability of rivers on a segment-by-segment basis, rejecting the Montana Supreme Court's ruling that this approach does not apply to short interruptions of navigability. He also pointed to the physical characteristics of some of the segments in question, noting that the Great Falls reach, a seventeen mile long stretch with distinct drops also included five waterfalls and continuous rapids in between. Justice Kennedy rejected the Montana Supreme Court's reliance on the evidence of present-day, primarily recreational use of the Madison River. Evidence that initial explorers successfully portaged between segments was also not persuasive.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55838:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55839:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55839:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAkio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement.\nImmigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55839:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55839:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55839:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, affirming the judgment of the appellate court. The Court held that filing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7206 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act when the Government's revenue loss exceeds $10,000. The Court rejected the argument that crimes under Section 7206 do not involve the fraud or deceit required by the Immigration and Nationality Act.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion which Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg wrote that the Court's construction of the statute was dubious because it characterized a tax crime as a crime of fraud or deceit, which would render the portion of the statute which directly addressed violations of tax law meaningless.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55839:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55841:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55841:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard Lee Pollard, an inmate at a federal prison run by the private company GEO Group, slipped on a cart left in a doorway and injured both elbows. As GEO employees were preparing to transport him to an outside orthopedic clinic, he said they made him wear a jumpsuit and a \"black box\" wrist restraint, despite his claim that both would cause him excruciating pain. Pollard sued GEO and its employees for allegedly violating his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.\nThe U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Pollard's suit. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action for injury caused by \"a federal agent acting under his authority.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55841:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55841:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55841:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court. Breyer rejected Pollard's arguments and held that a prisoner can not assert an Eighth Amendment claim for damages against private prison employees.\nJustice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. In his concurring opinion the justice emphasized that he believed that the case law in Bivens, creating a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment, should be limited.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion. She stated that she would not deny Pollard relief merely for the fact that he was placed in a privately operated prison rather than a federal or state operated facility.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55841:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55843:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55843:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band (\"the Band\") is a Potawatomi Indian tribe in Michigan. In 2001, the Band petitioned the Department of Interior to construct and operate a casino in Wayland Township, Michigan, a small farming community with about 3,000 residents. In May 2005, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior announced its plan to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township –known as the \"Bradley Tract\"-- into trust for the Band under the Indian Reorganization Act (\"IRA\").\nDavid Patchak, a resident of Wayland Township, filed suit against Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior on August 1, 2008, taking advantage of a stay of the Secretary's action granted due to a separate suit against the Secretary by a Michigan anti-gambling organization. Patchak alleged that the Band's gaming facility would destroy the peace and quiet of his community, create pollution, and increase crime. The Band intervened as a defendant. At trial, the Secretary argued that the Quiet Title Act (\"QTA\") precluded any person from seeking to divest the United States of title to Indian land trusts; hence, because the Bradley Tract was in trust while Patchak's suit was pending, the district court did not have jurisdiction. The court, however, dismissed Patchak's suit on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge Palazar's authority under the IRA, holding that Patchak's interests do not fall within the IRA's zone-of-interests.\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Patchak fulfilled the zone-of-interests test for standing. The court held that Patchak did not have to demonstrate that the statute was meant to benefit individuals in his situation, pointing to portions of the IRA tasking the Secretary with considering \"affected members of the public\" before using his trust authority. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the QTA barred Patchak's suit, reasoning that Congress intended the QTA to limit actions in which the plaintiff claims an interest in property contrary to the government's interest. In contrast, Patchak did not seek sole possession of title to the Bradley Track. Therefore, the court held that his suit fell within the general waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55843:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55843:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55843:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for an 8-1 majority, affirmed the lower court. The Court held that the US had waived its sovereign immunity and Patchak had proper standing to bring suit. While the government claimed that the QTA barred Patchak's relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\"), the Court held that the QTA only concerns individuals claiming a personal interest contrary to the government's interest in a property. Since Patchak's suit did not resemble a typical quiet title suit, the sovereign immunity waiver under the APA still applies. The Court further concluded that Patchak had standing to bring the suit because his claim falls within the zone-of-interests that the IRA regulates. The zone-of-interests standard is not intended to be particularly demanding, and merely requires a recognizable relation to the acquisition or use of territory for Indian tribes. Since Patchak's suit arguably concerns the acquisition and use of such territory, he has sufficient standing to proceed.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor was the sole dissenter. She expressed dissatisfaction with the majority's broad stroke limitation on sovereign immunity under the QTA. Under the majority's formulation, those with no personal interest in government owned property could bypass sovereign immunity to challenge the government's interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55843:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55844:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55844:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSandy Williams was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Illinois' appellate court affirmed Williams' conviction but reversed the trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the testimony of an Illinois State Police forensic analyst, who relied upon a DNA report prepared by a nontestifying third-party analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation. Alternatively, Williams argued that this testimony concerning the report was hearsay presented for the truth of the matter asserted and violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. The state's high court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Williams' Sixth Amendment rights weren't violated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55844:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55844:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55844:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., writing for a four-justice plurality, announced the judgment of the Court. The Court affirmed that the testimony of an expert witness that is based on a test the expert did not personally perform is admissible and does not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. The Court held that, because the evidence of the third-party test was not produced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to provide a basis for the conclusions that the expert reached, the prosecution had not infringed on the defendant's rights. The important issue was the conclusion that the expert reached, and that the expert was available to the defendant for cross-examination. Additionally, such a test does not fall within the bounds of the Confrontation Clause because the results were not directed to prove the guilt of the defendant. Williams was not even a suspect at the time the test was conducted.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer concurred and found that such DNA tests and their results fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause so long as the lab procedures are reliable, and the defendant still retains the right to call employees of the lab as witnesses. If the premise of a lab report's accuracy were shown to be untrue, then the testimony of the expert would fall under the Confrontation Clause. Justice Clarence Thomas also concurred on the basis that the evidence of the test was not \"testimonial,\" as it must to be governed by the Confrontation Clause.\nJustice Elena Kagan dissented and found this case to be in the same vein as others where the Court found that, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, the defendant must have the opportunity to cross-examine an analyst who performed the test. Without such an opportunity, an unreliable report is assumed to be true. Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55844:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55845:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55845:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe California Legislature approved a series of cutbacks in the payments to physicians, hospitals and pharmacies to address the state's budget deficit. In each case, the providers have sued in federal court and won rulings from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which blocked the cutbacks on the grounds that they conflicted with the Medicaid law. The providers argued that if the cutbacks were approved, the state would not provide the level of care required under Medicaid.\nThe Supreme Court agreed to hear three separate appeals from the state, all of which raise the same issue. The lead case is Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California. The other two cases are Maxwell-Jolly v. California Pharmacists Association and Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital. David Maxwell-Jolly served as the director of California's Department of Health Care Services.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55845:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55845:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55845:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe. In a 5-4 decision Justice Stephan G. Breyer wrote the majority opinion vacating the judgment and remanding to the Ninth Circuit. Since the court granted certiorari, the federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMMS) approved many of the cutbacks as consistent with federal law. California withdrew all cutbacks that were not approved. In light of this development, the majority argued that the healthcare providers may need to seek review of the CMMS decision under the Administrative Procedure Act instead of maintaining a supremacy clause action. The Court remanded the case so the parties could prepare new arguments based on the new circumstances.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote a dissent, stating that he would reverse because the health care providers no longer have a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55845:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55846:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55846:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBarion Perry is in prison for breaking into a car in 2008. Nubia Blandon told Nashua, N.H., police that she observed Perry from her apartment window taking things out of a parked car. She identified Perry at the scene but later could not pick him out of a photo lineup or describe him to police. A second witness identified Perry from the photo lineup. Perry filed a motion to suppress the photo identification because it was \"unnecessarily suggestive\" that he was a criminal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld his conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55846:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55846:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55846:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness' identification unless the identification was procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances, arranged by law enforcement. The Court further stated that the Constitution does not protect a defendant against a conviction based on questionable evidence by not prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but by allowing a defendant to persuade the jury that the evidence should not be believed. Therefore, Due Process will only prohibit the introduction of evidence when inclusion of the evidence is so extremely unfair that its inclusion would violate fundamental concepts of justice. The Court also rejected Perry's argument that eyewitnesses are uniquely unreliable, and emphasized that the fallibility of eyewitness identification does not warrant a due process ruling requiring a trial court to screen evidence for reliability, unless there was improper state conduct.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas wrote separately because he would not have extended Stovall v. Denno, and subsequent related case law, which premised substantive due process rights on notions of fundamental fairness. Instead he believed that the Due Process Clause is not a general guarantee against unfairness but rather only a guarantee of process before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. She stated that it is not merely the act of suggestion, which creates a due process problem, but rather the effect of an act of suggestion on the reliability of a resulting identification. She maintained that the court's ruling would draw a distinction between intentionally suggestive conduct and inadvertently suggestive conduct, either of which could lead to the same unfair result.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55846:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55847:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55847:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn September of 1995, Azzam Rahim, an American citizen, was tortured and murdered while in the custody of Palestinian Authority intelligence officers in Jericho. The respondents, Jibril Rajoub, Amin Al-Hindi, Twfik Tirawi, the Palestinian Authority, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, never disputed liability for the torture and murder. The petitioners, Azzam Rahim's widow and children, filed suit against the respondents under the Torture Victim Protection Act.\nThe district court dismissed the petitioners' action against the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization on the grounds that the Torture Victim Protection Act permits actions against natural persons only. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55847:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55847:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55847:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court affirming the decision of the United States Court of Appeals. The Court held that the word \"individual\" in the Torture Victim Protection Act means a natural person and does not impose any liability against organizations. The Court ruled that a word in a statute will be given its everyday meaning unless Congress gives some indication that it intends the word to have a broader meaning. The Court further determined that legislative history supported its interpretation. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote no opinion but did not join the Court regarding its analysis of the legislative history.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer filed a concurring opinion. He noted that the word \"individual\" is open to multiple interpretations and can mean natural persons, corporations, or other entities, making the word alone is insufficient to decide the case. Only the legislative history could make up for the interpretive inadequacies of considering language alone.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55847:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55848:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55848:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarcus Mims sued Arrow Financial Services, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit both held that they lacked jurisdiction over Mims' TCPA claim because, in their view, the TCPA creates exclusive state-court jurisdiction over private actions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55848:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55848:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55848:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg held that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over TCPA claims made by private individuals. Justice Ginsberg looked to the legislative history of the act, noting congress' concern about companies evading state law prohibitions on telemarketing through interstate operations. She also noted that, apart from the deletion of an amount-in-controversy requirement, the federal-question provision of §1331 has not changed since 1875. According to Justice Ginsburg, there is a deeply rooted presumption of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction rebuttable only by an explicit statutory directive, an implication from legislative history, or an incompatibility between state and federal court interests.\nJustice Ginsburg acknowledged that the TCPA's language is state-court oriented, but argued that it did not explicitly make state-court jurisdiction exclusive, citing other statutes where congress specifically excluded § 1331 claims. She contrasted the TCPA's language on claims made by private individuals with its directive on suits brought by state Attorneys General; these latter claims may be brought \"exclusively\" in federal district courts, but no such language appears in the statute's language on private actions. Justice Ginsburg explained that congress intended to remove any confusion about courts' concurrent jurisdiction over TCPA claims and to give states' flexibility over the venue for these claims.\nJustice Ginsburg rejected Arrow's concerns over defendants removing $500-per-violation TCPA claims to federal court to unfairly pressure plaintiffs to settle. She pointed out that the federal district court filing fee is $350 and that only sixty five such cases have been so removed, all class action suits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55848:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55850:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55850:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 16, 2006, Steven Howards saw Vice President Dick Cheney while strolling through Beaver Creek Mall. Howards decided to approach the Vice President to protest the President's polices regarding the Iraq War.\nOn that day, Gus Reichle and Dan Doyle were part of the Secret Service detail protecting the Vice President. Doyle heard Howards state into his cell phone \"I'm going to ask him how many kids he's killed today.\" Howards approached the Vice President and told the Vice President that he disapproved of his policies in Iraq. When the Vice President turned to leave, Howards made unsolicited physical contact with the Vice President by touching the Vice President's right shoulder with his open hand.\nAgent Reichle approached Howards, identified himself as a Secret Service agent, and asked to speak with Howards. After briefly questioning Howards, Reichle arrested him. Howards was initially charged with harassment under state law, but those charges were dismissed. No federal charges were filed.\nHowards sued agents Reichle and Doyle under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the agents had violated his Fourth Amendment right with an unlawful search and seizure and his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The agents moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds. The district court denied their motion, ruling that fact issues regarding the agents' immunity defense precluded summary judgment. The agents took an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they had probable cause to arrest Howards and also asserted that they were entitled to heightened immunity by virtue of their status as Secret Service agents protecting the Vice President. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel unanimously rejected Howards' Fourth Amendment claim on the grounds that the agents objectively had probable cause to arrest Howards. However, the panel held that probable cause was not a bar to Howards' First Amendment retaliation claim and that Howards could proceed with his First Amendment retaliation claim notwithstanding the fact that the agents had probable cause for his arrest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55850:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55850:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55850:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo answer and Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the 10th Circuit and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the agents have qualified immunity from Howards' First Amendment claim because there is no clearly established right to protection from retaliatory arrest when there is probable cause for that arrest. For a right to be clearly established, every reasonable officer must understand that he or she is violating that right. The Court has never acknowledged the proposed right in this case, and 10th Circuit precedent is unclear. The Court did not decide whether there is, in fact, a right to protection from retaliatory arrests where there is otherwise probable cause for the arrest.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred, writing that she would not grant qualified immunity if the agents had been ordinary law enforcement officers. She would apply a different standard for officers charged with protecting public officials because they must make quick and decisive decisions to protect the safety of those officials. The agents' actions in this case were rational and should not expose them to civil damages. Justice Stephen H. Breyer joined in the concurrence. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55850:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55852:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55852:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlbert Florence was searched twice in seven days after he was arrested on a warrant for a traffic violation he had already paid. Florence filed a lawsuit against officials at the two jails, contending the jailhouse searches were unreasonable because he was being held for failure to pay a fine, which is not a crime in New Jersey.\nU.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez ruled that the strip search of Florence violated the Constitution. However, officials representing both Burlington and Essex Counties appealed the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that it is reasonable to search everyone being jailed, even without suspicion that a person may be concealing a weapon or drugs.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55852:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55852:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55852:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the lower court, holding that the strip searches for inmates entering the general population of a prison do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court concluded that a prisoner's likelihood of possessing contraband based on the severity of the current offense or an arrestee's criminal history is too difficult to determine effectively. The Court pointed out instances, such as the arrest of Timothy McVeigh, in which an individual who commits a minor traffic offense is capable of extreme violence. Correctional facilities have a strong interest in keeping their employees and inmates safe. A general strip search policy adequately and effectively protects that interest. The Court did note that there may be an exception to this rule when the arrestees are not entering the general population and will not have substantial contact with other inmates. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined the majority in its entirety. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority except with respect to the potential exceptions to the rule.\nChief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion, emphasizing that the majority opinion leaves open the possibility of certain exceptions to the rule. Justice Alito also concurred, writing that the majority did not decide whether strip searches are always reasonable, only that the searches in this case were. Justice Alito wrote that strip-searching may not be reasonable for inmates held for minor offenses for a brief period of time.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, expressing that strip searches of individuals arrested for minor offenses that do not involve drugs or violence are unreasonable unless the prison official has a reasonable suspicion that that individual possesses drugs or contraband. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55852:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55854:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55854:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPatrick Wood filed pro se (on his own behalf) in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his convictions for felony murder and second degree murder violated the Sixth Amendment privilege against double jeopardy and challenging the validity of his jury trial waiver. The District Court denied relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit appointed Wood with an attorney and directed the parties to address the timeliness of Wood's petition. The appeals court found that Wood's habeas petition was untimely and affirmed the decision of the District Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55854:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55854:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55854:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a 9-0 majority, reversed the lower decision and remanded. The Supreme Court held that under Day v. McDonough appellate courts have the authority, though not the obligation, to raise a forfeited statute of limitations defense on its own. The prosecution in this case, however, expressly waived the statute of limitations through its repeated refusal to raise the defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit abused its discretion when it overrode the prosecution's express waiver of the statute of limitations.\nJustice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, arguing that Day v. McDonough was wrongly decided so district and appellate courts should not have the authority to raise the statute of limitations on their own. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55854:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55855:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55855:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFacts of the case: Kenneth Clair was sentenced to death in Orange County, Calif., in 1987 for the sexual assault, beating and strangulation of babysitter Linda Faye Rodgers. Clair filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court appointed the federal public defender as Clair's federal habeas counsel. The district court then stayed the federal proceedings to give Clair a chance to return to the California Supreme Court to \"exhaust\" his state remedies on some newly raised claims. Clair filed a second state habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied. Clair then returned to federal court. On June 16, 2005, Clair wrote a letter to the court, requesting that new counsel be appointed. The court was aware that Clair was having problems with his counsel; only three months earlier it had received from him a letter alleging a longstanding pattern of inattention to his case. In response to that letter, the district court made inquiry of Clair's counsel, who notified the court in April 2005 that they had spoken with Clair and that he was willing to have them continue to represent him for the time being.\nThe June 16th letter repeated allegations made in the previous letter, but also included a serious additional allegation: that a private investigator working on Clair's behalf had located important physical evidence from the crime scene that had never been tested, and that his counsel, despite having been informed of the evidence, had made no effort to obtain it, analyze it or present it to the court. Clair's private investigator sent the court a letter substantiating Clair's claims. The court received and opened the private investigator's letter, but returned it without filing it. Following receipt of Clair's June 16th letter, however, the district court made no inquiry into the truth of Clair's allegations or their potential impact on the case before it. The district judge without explanation denied the motion on the same day that he denied Clair's petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the district court abused its discretion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55855:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55855:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55855:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court reversing the lower appellate court's judgment. The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the prisoner's motion to replace court-appointed counsel. The Court further held that courts considering a motion to replace court-appointed counsel in capital cases should apply the same \"interest of justice\" standard applied in non-capital cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55855:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55857:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55857:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn February 24, 2002, Dana Roberts slipped on a patch of ice while working as a gatehouse dispatcher for Sea-Land Services Inc. As a result of his fall, Roberts suffered injuries to his shoulder and cervical spine. These injuries ultimately left Roberts permanently partially disabled and ended his longshore career. In accordance with the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Sea-Land's insurer paid Roberts compensation for temporary total disability for a period from 2002 to 2005. In May 2005, the insurer disputed Roberts' claim and stopped compensating him.\nOn October 12, 2006, an administrative law judge determined that Sea-Land continued to be liable under the Longshore Act for Roberts' on-the-job injuries after May of 2005. The Longshore Act required an employer to compensate a disabled worker at a rate based on the worker's average weekly wage at the time of injury. However, the act set an upper limit to compensation based on the average national weekly wage in the fiscal year that an individual was newly awarded compensation. The administrative judge determined that the applicable maximum rate for Roberts was $966.08 per week, based on fiscal year 2002, the year Roberts first became disabled. Roberts claimed that his maximum rate should be $1,114 per week, based on fiscal year 2007, the year the administrative law judge awarded Roberts compensation.\nRoberts filed a motion for reconsideration, which the administrative judge denied. Both Sea-Land and Roberts appealed to the Benefits Review Board, which adopted the rationale that the maximum compensation rate was based on the year in which the disability began rather than the year compensation was awarded. Roberts appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the Benefit Review Board's interpretation. Roberts appealed that decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55857:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55857:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55857:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe period is when an individual first becomes disabled. In an 8-to-1 decision, Justice Sonia Sotomayor writing for the majority held that the maximum compensation rate is set at the time that the worker becomes disabled no matter when a compensation order is entered. Given that most employers pay compensation voluntarily with no official award entered, the relevant section of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is meaningless as interpreted by the petitioner Roberts. The Court also held that this way of calculating maximum compensation gives employers more certainty in calculating liability, and eliminates disparate treatment of similarly situated employees. Setting the cap at the time of disability also prevents \"gamesmanship\" or unnecessary delays in the claims process.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in part and dissented in part. Ginsburg argued that the time of disability is not when the maximum compensation rate should be set. That rate should be set either when an employer voluntarily begins to pay compensation, or when a judge or other review board enters an order to pay.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55857:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55858:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55858:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSouthern Union Company is a diversified natural gas company with a storage facility in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. In September of 2004, vandals broke into the facility and found liquid mercury. The vandals spilled the liquid mercury in and around the facility and around a nearby apartment complex. Southern Union did not discover the spill for several weeks, and the apartment residents were displaced for two months during the subsequent cleanup.\nOn September 19, 2002, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Southern Union with illegally storing mercury without a permit. Southern Union was convicted by a jury, but the jury did not determine how many days Southern Union had illegally stored the mercury. At sentencing, the district court applied the penalty provision of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), which provided a maximum fine of $50,000 for each day of violation. The U.S. Office of Probation set the maximum fine for Southern Union's offense at $38.1 million dollars by multiplying $50,000 times 762, the full number of days referred to in the indictment.\nSouthern Union objected. The company argued that the number of days that Southern Union illegally stored mercury was a fact that should have been determined by a jury, because it increased the maximum criminal penalty. As such, Southern Union believed that the imposition of the $38.1 million dollar fine was a violation of its rights to criminal due process under the Fifth Amendment and to a trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment.\nThe district court requested briefs, but it ultimately concluded that a fact which increases a criminal penalty need not be tried by a jury if the penalty is a criminal fine. Southern Union appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected Southern Union's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55858:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55858:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55858:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded. The Court previously held that under the Sixth Amendment, the determination of any fact that increases a defendant's maximum potential sentence should be left to the jury. While the government challenged this rule's application to cases involving criminal fines, the Court maintained that the rule does extend to such cases. The government argued that fines are not serious criminal sentences like incarceration, and therefore do not require a jury determination. The Court disagreed, reasoning that if a fine were so insubstantial, then the right to a jury trial would not even be triggered.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, finding it sufficient for sentencing judges to determine sentencing facts. Since sentencing facts are not the same facts that determine the elements of a crime, they do not both need to be determined by a jury in all cases. Historically, judges have always determined the punishment for lesser crimes. While the Sixth Amendment allows the jury to determine sentencing for serious offenses, it does not extend so far as to require a jury determination of how much a defendant should be fined. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55858:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55859:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55859:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 23, 2010, the Arizona State Legislature passed S.B. 1070; Governor Jan Brewer signed the bill into law. On July 6, 2010, the United States sought to stop the enforcement of S.B. 1070 in federal district court before the law could take effect. The district court did not enjoin the entire act, but it did enjoin four provisions. The court enjoined provisions that (1) created a state-law crime for being unlawfully present in the United States, (2) created a state-law crime for working or seeking work while not authorized to do so, (3) required state and local officers to verify the citizenship or alien status of anyone who was lawfully arrested or detained, and (4) authorized warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the United States.\nArizona appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the United States had shown that federal law likely preempted: (a) the creation of a state-crime for violation of federal registration laws, (b) the creation of a state-crime for work by unauthorized aliens, (c) the requirement to verify citizenship of all detained persons, and (d) the authorization for police officers to effect warrantless arrests based on probable cause of removability from the United States. Arizona appealed the court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55859:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55859:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55859:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes for provisions 1, 2, and 4; No for provision 3. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-3 majority, reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Supreme Court held that provision 1 conflicts with the federal alien registration requirements and enforcement provisions already in place. Provision 2 is preempted because its method of enforcement interferes with the careful balance Congress struck with federal laws on unauthorized employment of aliens. Provision 4 is preempted because it usurps the federal government's authority to use discretion in the removal process. This creates an obstacle to carrying out the purposes and objectives of federal immigration laws.\nThe Court upheld provision 3 as constitutional on its face. This provision merely allows state law enforcement officials to communicate with the federal Immigrations and Customs Enforcement office during otherwise lawful arrests. The provision has three limitations that protect individual rights: a detainee is presumed not to be an illegal alien if he/she produces a valid Arizona drivers license; an officer may not consider race, color, or national origin during a check; and the check must be implemented in a manner consistent with federal law. Justice Kennedy noted that this decision did not foreclose any future constitutional challenges to the law on an as applied basis.\nJustice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part, writing that all four provisions are constitutional. He argued that the Arizona statute does not conflict with federal law, but enforces federal immigration restrictions more effectively. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with Justice Scalia that all four provisions are constitutional. He argued that there is no conflict between the ordinary meaning of the federal laws and the Arizona statute. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the majority on provisions 1 and 3, but disagreeing on 2 and 4. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision in the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55859:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55860:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55860:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGloria Gail Kurns and Freida E. Jung Corson brought suit on behalf of the decedent, George M. Corson, asserting a number of state law causes of action related to his alleged exposure to asbestos during his years employed by a railroad company. From 1947 to 1994, George M. Corson worked as a welder, machinist, and supervisor for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad. He was employed at different facilities in Montana and South Dakota. Much of his job involved removing insulation from locomotive boilers and putting brake shoes on the locomotives.\nKurns, the executor of his state, and Jung Corson, the widow, claim that throughout this time period, George Corson was repeatedly exposed to asbestos from the insulation and the brake shoes. After his retirement, he was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, the only known cause of which is exposure to asbestos. He passed away after the initiation of this litigation, and is represented by both Kurns and Jung Corson. Together they brought claims against multiple defendants including, the Railroad Friction Products Corp. over brake pads they manufactured containing asbestos.\nThe United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the claims, contending that they were barred by the Locomotive Inspection Act, which provides that a railroad carrier may only use a locomotive that is in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55860:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55860:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55860:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court affirming the lower court's decision. The Court held that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempted the state law design defect claims and the state law failure to warn claims. The Court emphasized that state law must yield to a Congressional Act, to the extent of any conflict with federal statute, even if there is no express preemption. The Court further determined that the Federal Railroad Safety Act did not change the scope of the Locomotive Inspection Act.\nJustice Elena Kagan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan agreed with the result, but emphasized that the notion, established in earlier case law, that Congress intended to occupy the entire field of locomotive equipment regulation was inaccurate.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor agreed with the Court's holding that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempted the claims for defective design. However, she did not think that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempted the claims for failure to warn because those claims were not based on any product's physical compensation, but on a failure to provide adequate instructions or warning.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55860:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55861:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55861:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCarlos Martinez Gutierrez, a native and citizen of Mexico, applied to an immigration judge for cancellation of his removal from the United States. The government appealed and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) sustained the government's appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Gutierrez's petition for review of the BIA's decision and remanded to the BIA to allow it to reconsider his case based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mercado Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). That case held that \"[f]or purposes of satisfying the five years of lawful permanent residence required under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(1), a parent's status as a lawful permanent resident is imputed to the unemancipated minor children residing with the parent.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55861:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55861:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55861:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded. The Court held that the BIA reasonably construed 8 U.S. C. 1229(a) to require each alien seeking cancellation of removal to fulfill the residency requirements on their own. An unemancipated minor cannot use his or her parent's years of residency to fulfill the requirements. The Court did not decide if another construction of the statute is possible because the BIA's construction was permissible.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55861:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55863:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55863:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 2003, Evan Miller, along with Colby Smith, killed Cole Cannon by beating Cannon with a baseball bat and burning Cannon's trailer while Cannon was inside. Miller was 14 years old at the time. In 2004, Miller was transferred from the Lawrence County Juvenile Court to Lawrence County Circuit Court to be tried as an adult for capital murder during the course of an arson. In 2006, a grand jury indicted Miller. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial court sentenced Miller to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.\nMiller filed a post trial motion for a new trial, arguing that sentencing a 14-year-old to life without the possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied Miller's petition for writ of certiorari.\nIn the companion case, petitioner Kuntrell Jackson, along with Derrick Shields and Travis Booker, robbed a local movie store in Blytheville, Arkansas in November, 1999. The three boys were 14 years old at the time. While walking to the store, Jackson discovered that Shields was hiding a shotgun in his coat. During the robbery, Shields shot the store clerk and the three boys fled the scene. Jackson was tried and convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery in July, 2003. The trial court sentenced Jackson to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.\nIn January 2008, Jackson filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court. He argued that his sentence was unusual and excessive, violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The circuit court dismissed the petition and Jackson appealed. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55863:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55863:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55863:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Elena Kagan reversed the Arkansas and Alabama Supreme Courts' decisions and remanded. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbids the mandatory sentencing of life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders. Children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes. While a mandatory life sentence for adults does not violate the Eighth Amendment, such a sentence would be an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment for children.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer filed a concurring opinion. He argued for an additional determination that the offender actually killed or intended to kill the robbery victim. Without such a determination, the State could not pursue a mandatory life sentence. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. filed a dissenting opinion. He reasoned that the Court's role is to apply the law, not to answer questions about morality and social policy. The majority did not sufficiently characterize the punishment as unusual, therefore the punishment did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55863:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55864:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55864:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office denies an application for a patent, the applicant may seek judicial review of the agency's final action by one of two means. The applicant may obtain direct review of the agency's determination in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Alternatively, the applicant may commence a civil action against the director of the PTO in federal district court. The court will decide whether a plaintiff in a civil (§ 145) action may introduce new evidence that could have been presented to the agency in the first instance. The court will also consider whether, when new evidence is introduced under § 145, the district court may decide the factual questions to which the evidence pertains, without giving deference to the prior decision of the PTO.\nGilbert P. Hyatt's patent application and subsequent claims were rejected. Hyatt appealed to the U.S. Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. The Board reversed most of the examiner's written description rejections, but upheld some. Hyatt filed a request for rehearing on the rejected claims, which the Board dismissed on the basis that it raised new issues that could have been raised to either the examiner or the Board. Hyatt responded by filing a civil action at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under §145. He submitted a declaration supporting his new and amended claims. The PTO objected to the declaration, arguing that the district court should not consider the new evidence because Hyatt did not introduce it to either the Board or the examiner. The district court agreed with the PTO, ruling that Hyatt's failure to present the evidence to the PTO constituted a negligent act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55864:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55864:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55864:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for a unanimous court affirming the lower court's decision. The Court held a patent applicant's ability to introduce new evidence in a civil action against the Patent and Trademark Office was only limited by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also held that a district court can decide a de novo factual question without giving deference to the prior decision and that it may take both new evidence and the administrative record into account.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion which Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's decision should not foreclose a district court's authority to exclude evidence that was deliberately suppressed or withheld in bad faith.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55864:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55865:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55865:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAll California state employees are required to pay a fee to the Service Employees International Union for its representation of them, and the union is required to tell employees how the money is spent and how to object. The union wanted to collect a special assessment for a \"Political Fight Back Fund\" in 2005. But some nonmembers wanted the union to give them a new notice and a new chance to object. They filed a class-action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and equitable restitution for violations of the nonmembers' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court agreed, siding with the nonmembers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55865:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55865:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55865:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. In his opinion for the 7-2 majority, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote that the structure by which nonmembers of a union have to pay chargeable expenses and must opt out of any others already strains the limits of the First Amendment. The actions of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) went beyond this allowable extension and infringed upon nonmembers' First Amendment rights. By failing to provide a new notice and a new chance to opt out, the union did not abide by the established procedure for handling nonmember payment. In order to respect the First Amendment rights of nonmembers, the special assessment should have come with a notice that allowed nonmembers to opt in. The Court held that, while it can be difficult to determine the yearly dues ahead of time, the union should err on the side of having nonmembers pay too little rather than too much and infringe on their constitutional rights.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in the judgment. She agreed that the union had not satisfied its constitutional obligation to provide nonmembers with notice of the purpose of the special assessment and a chance to opt out. However, she argued that the Court went beyond its authority by specifying that an opt-in system better fits the requirements of the First Amendment when there is no precedent to support such a statement. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the concurring opinion.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and argued that the basic system that the unions uses to charge dues is both constitutional and fair to members and nonmembers. The union uses each year's ratio of chargeable vs. nonchargeable to determine the next year's fees, so an objecting nonmember might overpay one year, but will underpay the next and ultimately come out even. In the year in question, even with the special assessment, the objecting nonmembers paid less than what the constitution considers their fair share. The First Amendment does not require the union to provide more than one opportunity for a nonmember to object to the yearly fee. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55865:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55866:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55866:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Section 514 of the act restored U.S. copyright protection to foreign parties whose works had entered the public domain. A group of artists, including musician Lawrence Golan, who made use of the works while they were in the public domain filed a lawsuit in Colorado's federal court to challenge the restoration of copyright, arguing that doing so violated their First Amendment rights.\nThe U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held that Section 514 of the URAA does not violate the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment. The district court also rejected Golan's First Amendment challenge, seeing \"no need to expand upon the settled rule that private censorship via copyright enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns.\" The United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed that Section 514 of the URAA does not exceed Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause, but it vacated the district court's First Amendment ruling and remanded for further proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55866:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55866:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55866:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 6-2 decision, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Court held that congress did have the power to enact Section 514 and the Uruguay Round Agreement. An exhaustive recount of the history of copyright law showed that the public domain is not untouchable, and congress may grant protection to previously unprotected works. The Court soundly rejected Golan's argument that taking works out of the public domain violated the constitutional \"limited times\" requirement, following the reasoning from Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Court also held that there were sufficient First Amendment protections built into the current copyright law in the form of the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.\nJustice Steven G. Breyer wrote a dissent, stating that the statutes in question violated the Constitution because they did not promote the production of new works. Justice Beyer also expressed concerns about the difficulty of finding authors of orphaned works in order to gain a copyright license.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55866:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55867:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55867:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 15, 2006, Rialto firefighter Nicholas B. Delia sustained injuries while working to control a toxic spill. As a result of his injuries, Delia began using sick leave. The City of Rialto suspected that Delia was taking sick leave inappropriately, using his sick days to work on personal home improvement projects. After obtaining video of Delia purchasing home improvement supplies on one of his sick days, the city launched a formal internal affairs investigation. The city retained attorney Steve A. Filarsky to assist with the internal investigation.\nOn September 18, 2006, the city ordered Delia to appear at an interview conducted by Filarsky. During the course of the interview, Delia stated that the home improvement supplies that he purchased were unused. Filarsky requested that Delia allow a warrantless search of his home in order to confirm that the supplies were unused. Delia refused, prompting Filarsky to order Delia to produce the supplies. Filarsky and some city officials subsequently followed Delia to his home, where Delia produced the supplies.\nOn May 21, 2008, Delia brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court against the City of Rialto, the City of Rialto Fire Department, and several city officials. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the grounds that Delia failed to establish municipal liability against the city and that the individuals were entitled to qualified immunity. Delia appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court opinion as to Filarsky only. Filarsky appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55867:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55867:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55867:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision as to Filarsky. Looking at the history of common law and case law on qualified immunity, the Court held that there is no reason to distinguish part time or temporary government workers from full time employees. There is a strong public policy interest in protecting all public employees while they are working on behalf of the government. Denying protection to temporary employees working alongside full time employees would leave the temporary employees \"holding the bag\" for conduct for which they are not fully responsible.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred, noting that qualified immunity is overcome when the government worker knew or should have known that his conduct violated a clearly established right. Justice Ginsburg instructed the lower court to consider this issue carefully on remand. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence, clarifying that not every private individual who temporarily works for the government is protected by qualified immunity in all circumstances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55867:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55869:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55869:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil production facilities in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, unlawfully detained, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that the respondents, including the Shell Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government's human rights abuses.\nThe petitioners filed a putative class action against the respondents, under the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court dismissed claims against the corporate defendants in part and certified its order for interlocutory appeal.\nBoth parties cross-appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach civil liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach to corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with the majority holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations. On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit denied the petitioners' request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition for rehearing en banc and a motion to recall the mandate, which the Second Circuit denied.\nFollowing oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument in the 2012 Term to address whether and when the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55869:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55869:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55869:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAs to the second question: no. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. delivered a unanimous opinion affirming the Second Circuit’s judgment. The Court held that under the Alien Tort Statute, there is a presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law. This presumption, derived from a traditional canon of interpretation, serves to protect against clashes between U.S. law and the law of other nations. The Court reasoned that nothing within the text, history, or purpose of the statute indicates that it was intended to apply extraterritorially. In order to rebut this presumption, the petitioners’ claim would have to touch and concern the territory of the United States with “sufficient force.” Since the statute is presumed not to apply, the Court did not address the question of whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the law of nations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55869:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55870:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55870:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJoel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.\nIn 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony \"crime of violence.\" The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a \"crime of violence\" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.\nA panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55870:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55870:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55870:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that the rule is invalid. While the judgments on administrative agencies are given deference, they must still have a rational reasoning behind them. The BIA posited several legitimate reasons for the comparable grounds rule, but gave no rational basis for them. The current application of discretionary relief in deportation cases is arbitrary and capricious. The case was reversed and remanded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55870:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55871:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55871:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 1, 2007, Lubbock police officers arrested Monroe Ace Setser after finding suspected narcotics during a traffic stop. At the time he was arrested, Setser was serving a five-year term of probation stemming from a previous state conviction. State authorities subsequently charged Setser with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in the state court arising from the activities of October 1, 2007. They also filed a motion to revoke his probation in the 2006 state case. Before the state cases could be resolved, the federal government stepped in and charged Setser for his October 2007. Setser pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment and in exchange the government agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts. At sentencing, the federal district court sentenced Setser to 151 months of imprisonment and ordered the sentence to run consecutive to whatever sentence might be imposed in the pending state case, and concurrent to whatever sentence might be imposed in the 2007 state case. Neither case had been resolved in state court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55871:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55871:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55871:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, affirming the lower court's decision. The Court determined that the federal judge had discretion to order a federal sentence to run consecutively or concurrently with an anticipated state sentence. The Court found nothing in the Sentencing Reform Act which foreclosed the federal judge's authority to make such a decision and noted that judges have traditionally had broad authority to determine whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined. Breyer argued that a federal judge does not have the power to order that a federal sentence run consecutively or concurrently with a state sentence that has yet to be imposed. Breyer noted that nothing in the Sentencing Reform Act explicitly granted federal judges that power. Furthermore, after discussing the history and purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act, Breyer concluded that the Court's decision was contrary to the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55871:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55872:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55872:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBilly Joe Reynolds pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly failing to register and update a registration, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of SORNA and the legality of the Interim Rule implementing that law. He also argued that his guilty plea should be invalidated because he is \"actually innocent\" of violating SORNA's registration requirements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected his arguments and affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55872:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55872:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55872:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that without an affirmative action by the Attorney General, pre-act offenders would not be obligated to register under SORNA. Hence, the Interim Rule must be valid for Reynolds to fall within SORNA's authority and there remains a justiciable question. Breyer looked to the relevant text of SORNA, which mandates that sex offenders register with the state and keep their registration current when moving to a different state. The act also stated, however, that the Attorney General has the authority to specify the applicability of SORNA with respect to sex offenders convicted prior to SORNA's enactment. He noted Congress' use of the word \"applicability\" as opposed to \"nonapplicability\", inferring that Congress wanted to give the Attorney General the discretion to apply SORNA to pre-act offenders, not the authority to make exceptions to SORNA. He reasoned, in part, that Congress wished to give the Justice Department some leeway with SORNA's applicability, given that the Justice Department is tasked with the act's enforcement. The Court therefore reversed the Third Circuit's decision and remanded the case to determine if the Attorney General's Interim Rule is a valid specification.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55872:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55874:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55874:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMissouri prosecutors offered Galin Edward Frye two deals while seeking his conviction for driving while his license was revoked, but his lawyer never told Frye about the offers. Frye pleaded guilty to a felony charge and was sentenced to three years in prison. He appealed, saying his lawyer should have told him about the previous deals. A Missouri appeals court agreed. Prosecutors contend that not knowing about the deals they offered doesn't mean that Frye didn't know what he was doing when he decided to plead guilty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55874:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55874:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55874:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to communicate formal plea offers from the prosecution. Justice Kennedy looked to Hill v. Lockhart and Padilla v. Kentucky ; in both cases, a prisoner claimed his guilty plea was invalid because counsel provided incorrect advice pertinent to the plea. While acknowledging that a defendant has no right to receive a plea offer, Justice Kennedy noted that the vast majority of both federal and state convictions are the result of guilty pleas. Justice Kennedy finally held that Frye must show a reasonable probability he would have accepted the initial plea and that neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented.\nJustice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that Frye was not denied his constitutional right to a fair trial because counsel's mistake did not deprive him of any substantive or procedural right. He further questioned the speculative nature of the majority's tests for effective counsel in plea bargaining.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55874:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55875:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55875:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFormer Maryland Court of Appeals employee Daniel Coleman filed a lawsuit under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, alleging that he was fired after requesting sick leave for a documented medical condition. The lower court dismissed Coleman's claim and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claim was properly dismissed because his employer is a state agency.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55875:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55875:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55875:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, in a 5-4 decision. In the plurality opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the self-care provision, standing alone, did not validly abrogate Maryland's immunity from suits for damages. Justice Kennedy argued that Congress' evidence failed to show a pattern of state constitutional violations when it wrote the self-care provision; instead, Congress considered evidence that men and women are on medical leave in roughly equal numbers. In contrast, Congress often referred to its concerns about discrimination against women when constructing the family-care portion of the act. Hence, the self-care leave provision was not a congruent and proportional response to discriminatory conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not abrogate Maryland's sovereign immunity.\nJustice Clarence Thomas concurred, arguing that Congress also failed to show a pattern of state discriminatory practice when it enacted the family-care provision.\nJustice Antonin Scalia agreed in the judgment and wrote a special concurrence, arguing that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only allows Congress to regulate conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stephen Bryer and by Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor as to all but Footnote 1, dissented. Looking to the Family and Medical Leave Act's history, Justice Ginsburg argued that the act as a whole was directed at sex discrimination. She argued that Congress presented ample evidence of a pattern of discrimination against pregnant women, by definition discrimination on the basis of sex. By mandating self-care leave for everyone, Congress intended to prevent further discrimination against pregnant women without discriminating against other sick persons.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55875:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55877:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55877:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOhio resident Denise Edwards bought title insurance from First American Financial Corp. through a referral from Tower City, the title company that conducted the closing on her home purchase. Edwards later filed a lawsuit against First American Title Insurance Co. and its parent, the First American Corp., under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging that First American improperly paid millions of dollars to individual title companies and in exchange those title companies entered into exclusive referral agreements with First American. Edwards also filed a class action complaint. The district court denied Edwards' motions to certify a nationwide class of customers of First American's captive title agents and a class limited to customers of First American's Tower City subsidiary.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the denials of class certification, holding that the district court had abused its discretion in denying certification of a nationwide class without allowing discovery and had abused its discretion in denying certification of the Tower City class.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55877:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55877:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55877:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55877:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55878:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55878:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVanessa Simmonds alleged in 54 separate complaints that several investment banks shared in the profits of customers who received IPO allocations and sold their shares on the open market at higher prices. The lawsuits also claim the banks strategically allocated IPO shares to customers who would return the favor by giving the banks more business. Simmonds holds stock in the companies that issued shares through the disputed IPOs. She sent those companies letters demanding that they sue the underwriting banks for disgorgement of ill-gotten profits. When the companies declined, she invoked a provision of the Securities Exchange Act that allowed her to sue the banks herself. The banks argued that the lawsuits should be dismissed because they were filed after a two-year time statute of limitations for bringing an action under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said the suits were not too late because the time limit had been postponed. The court did dismiss 30 of Simmonds' lawsuits on other legal grounds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55878:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55878:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55878:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In a unanimous decision, Justice Antonin Scalia held that while the limitations period for Section 16(b) is subject to tolling, it is not automatically tolled until the filing of a Section 16(a) statement. Justice Scalia looked to the language of the statute, which specified that the two-year clock started from \"the date such profit was realized,\" without reference to the filing statement. He rejected the Ninth Circuit's concern that persons could avoid the effects of Section 16(b) by failing to file statements and thus depriving prospective plaintiffs of needed information. He also rejected the Ninth Circuit's argument that the background rule of equitable tolling for fraudulent concealment operated to toll the limitations period until a defendant files a 16(a) statement, noting that a plaintiff typically must show that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. He noted that in cases of fraudulent concealment of facts, tolling ceases when a plaintiff discovers or should discover those facts.\nThe Court divided 4-4 on the question of how the usual rules of equitable tolling apply to the facts of the case, thus affirming without precedential effect the Ninth Circuit's ruling that 16(b) establishes a period of repose subject to tolling. Chief Justice John Roberts did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55878:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55879:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55879:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA jury found Eric Greene guilty of second-degree murder and other crimes, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment because he participated in a grocery store robbery that left the owner dead. Greene was tried along with four co-defendants, two of whom made pretrial statements that linked Greene to the robbery. The prosecution used redacted versions of these statements as evidence, but because the co-defendants did not testify in court, Greene could not use cross-examination to challenge the statements.\nGreene appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Among other arguments, he renewed his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that the codefendants' confessions as redacted did not so clearly implicate Greene as to violate the Confrontation Clause and Greene then filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, again pressing his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition but eight months later dismissed the appeal \"as having been improvidently granted.\"\nIn 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gray v. Maryland that the constitution forbids prosecutors from using redacted statements like those of Greene's co-defendants. Greene asked the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to vacate his conviction under a process known as \"habeas corpus.\" By federal statute, habeas relief is allowed only when a state court violates \"clearly established Federal law.\" The district court held that Greene could not rely on Gray because that decision was not \"clearly established\" when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55879:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55879:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55879:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court held that under §2254(d), \"clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States\" includes only the Supreme Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court adjudications on the merits. Since the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision predated the Supreme Court's decision in Gray by three months, the Third Circuit correctly held that Gray was not \"clearly established Federal law\" that would allow the federal court to grant Greene's application for a writ of habeas corpus.\nScalia further observed that Greene missed two opportunities to obtain relief under Gray . Greene could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed his appeal, which would have likely produced a remand in light of the Gray decision. Greene also could have asserted Gray in a petition for post-conviction relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55879:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55880:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55880:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55880:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55880:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55880:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 majority opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the FSA's lower minimum sentences apply to offenders sentenced after the FSA's passage, even for crimes committed before its passage. In the Court's view, Congress clearly intended for the sentencing guidelines to apply to pre-Act offenders. The FSA is intended to create uniformity and proportionality in sentencing, a goal that would be undermined by applying the old sentencing guidelines after the Act's passage. Instead, applying the old sentencing guidelines would create the exact sentencing disparities that Congress tried to prevent with the FSA.\nJustice Antonin Scalia dissented, concerned with the majority's finding of clear congressional intent. Rather than search for congressional intent, Justice Scalia focused on the text of the general saving statute. The saving statute maintains that the repeal of any statute will not extinguish liability or penalties incurred while the statute was still in effect, unless Congress expressly allows otherwise. Justice Scalia found no express showing that Congress intended for the FSA to extend to those who committed crimes under the prior sentencing statute; therefore the defendants should not be subject to the FSA. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55880:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55881:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55881:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPrometheus Laboratories Inc. patented steps of testing for proper dosages of drug treatments used to treat gastrointestinal diseases like Crohn's disease, and sued the Mayo Clinic when it attempted to use its own, similar test. A federal judge invalidated the patents, holding that the patent couldn't cover the body's reaction to drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which specializes in patent issues, overturned the lower court order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55881:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55881:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55881:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 decision, Justice Stephen J. Breyer wrote a unanimous opinion reversing the lower court and holding that the processes involved in this test are unpatentable laws of nature. The success of a patent application cannot rely on the art of the drafter. The \"steps\" Promethus added to their application are merely instructions to apply the laws of nature. Past Supreme Court decisions also support the concern that allowing patents on laws of nature would unnecessarily inhibit further discovery.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55881:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55882:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55882:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAntoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005, for drug possession after police attached a tracker to Jones's Jeep -- without judicial approval -- and used it to follow him for a month. A jury found Jones not guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on which point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the loss, re-filed a single count of conspiracy against Jones and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones owned the \"Levels\" nightclub in the District of Columbia. Jones and Maynard were then convicted, but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court specifically stated in a 1983 case regarding the use of a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not be used to justify 24-hour surveillance without a warrant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55882:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55882:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55882:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle, without a warrant, constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the government's argument that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's movement on public thoroughfares and emphasized that the Fourth Amendment provided some protection for trespass onto personal property.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that the government had obtained information by usurping Jones' property and by invading his privacy. However, she further reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was not only concerned with trespasses onto property. She stated that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, which is particularly important in an era where physical intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.\nJustice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment but criticized the framing of the question in terms of trespass to property. He believed that such a construction of the problem strained the language of the Fourth Amendment and that it would be better to analyze the case by determining whether the Government violated Jones' reasonable expectations of privacy.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55882:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55883:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55883:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNovo Nordisk sued Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. for infringement in the wake of Caraco filing an abbreviated new drug application (\"ANDA\") for a generic version of the Type 2 diabetes drug Prandin. Caraco and Sun promptly countersued. While the litigation was pending, Novo changed the FDA Orange Book's use code — a description of the scope of the patent —undermining Caraco's argument that patent did not apply to the purpose for which the generic product would be marketed. Caraco filed a counterclaim requesting an order that would require Novo Nordisk to change back the use code.\nThe Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 authorized ANDA applicants to assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the brand to correct or delete submitted patent information on the grounds that the patent does not claim 1) the drug for which the brand's new drug application was approved or 2) an approved method of using the drug.\nThe U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the counterclaim and issued an injunction ordering Novo Nordisk to change the code. Novo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the district court had abused its discretion. The Federal Circuit ruled in favor of Novo, holding that Caraco could only assert a counterclaim if Novo's patent did not claim any approved method of use.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55883:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55883:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55883:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that the Hatch-Waxman Act allows counterclaims to challenge unpatented uses of generic drugs even if other approved uses are still under patent. Justice Kagan looked to the language and purpose of the statute, focusing on the meaning of the phrase, \"the patent does not claim... an approved method of using the drug.\" While acknowledging that the words \"not an\" could be interpreted to mean \"not any,\" as Novo suggested, Justice Kagan rejected Novo's argument that the counterclaim right evaporates if Novo has a patent over another use not claimed or contested by Caraco and Sun. She argued that the act's counterclaim provision essentially allows a generic drug marketer to challenge a brand's assertion of rights over whichever use the generic drug marketer wishes to pursue. Justice Kagan noted that if Congress intended Novo's \"not any\" interpretation, it could have used that exact phrasing.\nJustice Kagan also held that Novo's use code was \"patent information submitted by the brand under subsection (b) or (c)\" for the purposes of the act. She pointed out that the use code describes the methods of use claimed in a patent, and must qualify as \"patent information\" under any ordinary understanding of that phrase. Looking to the Court's precedent, Justice Kagan determined that information \"submitted under\" a federal law suggests doing so in furtherance of or in compliance with a comprehensive scheme of regulation. Justice Kagan noted that subsections (b) and (c) provide the basis for the regulation requiring brands to submit use codes and dictate the form of those submissions; thus, a brand use code is \"submitted under\" sections (b) and (c). She rejected Novo's argument that congress only intended to allow generic drug marketers to correct improperly numbered or listed patents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55883:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55884:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55884:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 6, 2006, Kouichi Taniguchi, a Japanese baseball player, visited the Marianas Resort and Spa in the Northern Mariana Islands. During a tour of the resort, Taniguchi fell through a wooden deck. Immediately after the accident, Taniguchi stated that he did not need medical attention. Two weeks later, he informed Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the owner of the resort, that he had sustained injuries, which he claimed resulted in various medical expenses and loss of income.\nTaniguchi subsequently brought a diversity lawsuit against Kan Pacific alleging negligence and seeking damages for losses suffered because of the accident. After discovery, the district court awarded summary judgment to Kan Pacific and awarded Kan Pacific litigation costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. During litigation, Kan Pacific spent $5,517.20 for the translation of contracts and other documents from Japanese to English. The district court included these costs in the award because it interpreted \"compensation of interpreters\" in U.S.C. § 1920(6), as including compensation for the translation of documents.\nTaniguchi appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the award of $5,517.20 for the document translation. The court denied Taniguchi's petition for rehearing on May 11, 2011, and Taniguchi subsequently appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55884:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55884:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55884:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court held that Section § 1920(6) did not allow the district court to award Kan Pacific the costs of translating documents. Justice Alito described the history of the Court Interpreters Act, focusing on the original amendment adding the costs of compensating interpreters as a separate category of taxable costs that courts could award. Justice Alito noted that \"interpreter\" was not defined in the act itself or in any other relevant statutory provision.\nJustice Alito then looked to the ordinary meaning of the word \"interpreter\" as defined by dictionaries in 1978, the year § 1920(6) was amended to its current form. He determined that dictionaries generally defined the term as a person who translates oral communication from one language to another. Legal dictionaries used similar definitions. While Webster's Third New International defined \"interpreter\" more broadly, its definition specified that the most common meaning was a person who translated orally. Justice Alito also looked to contextual evidence and to references to technical language in the act, concluding that congress intended to limit the term to oral communications.\nWhile the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a broader interpretation was more consistent with Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure -which gave broad discretion to courts in awarding costs- Justice Alito wrote that this discretion was limited by the costs allowed by congress. He argued that congress may have limited interpretation costs out of a concern about excessive costs to litigants, and that Kan Pacific failed to show that distinguishing translating from interpreting would be a frequent problem for trial courts.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Ginsburg argued that many dictionaries' definitions of \"interpreter\" included the translation of written documents. She pointed out that several federal courts also used similar definitions, and that courts have awarded the costs of translating documents for decades. Justice Ginsburg emphasized the importance of parties' access to translated documents, and that the line between translated and interpreted communications was not a clear one.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55884:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55885:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55885:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCompuCredit marketed a subprime credit card under the brand name Aspire Visa to consumers with low or weak credit scores through massive direct-mail solicitations and the Internet. CompuCredit marketed the card and the cards were issued by Columbus Bank and Trust. Wanda Greenwood and other consumers filed suit against Compucredit and Columbus alleging violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The lawsuit claimed that the CompuCredit and Columbus' promotional materials were deceptive because they mentioned the credit card fees in small print, buried in other information and not in proximity to the representation that no deposit was required.\nThe United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the credit providers' motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The majority explained that a party must adhere to an agreement to arbitrate claims \"unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.\" Accordingly, the \"burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55885:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55885:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55885:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision, Justice Antonin Scalia held that the disclosure provision of the Credit Repair Organizations Act (\"CROA\") does not supply consumers with a right to bring an action in a court of law. Rather, it merely imposes an obligation on credit repair organizations to give consumers a specific statement of legal rights described in the statute; the only consumer right it creates is the right to receive this statement. Justice Scalia rejected Greenwood's contention that the CROA overrides the Federal Arbitration Act's (\"FAA\") requirement that courts enforce arbitration agreements. He cited cases where the Court held that a formulation of a cause of action did not establish a congressional command to override the FAA.\nJustice Scalia also argued that even if the CROA creates a nonwaivable right to judicial enforcement, this could include a judicial action involving initial adjudication through arbitration. He noted that arbitration agreements were commonplace when the CROA was enacted in 1996, and reasoned that congress would surely have been less obtuse if it intended to override all arbitration agreements with credit repair organizations.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayer concurred, joined by Justice Elena Kagan. Justice Sotomayer argued that Greenwood and CompuCredit's interpretations of the CROA were equally compelling given the lack of clear congressional intent. Hence, precedent requires that CompuCredit prevails, because the burden of showing congress disallowed arbitration lies with Greenwood. She also, however, rejected the majority's notion that congress must speak so explicitly to preclude arbitration of statutory claims.\nJustice Ruth Ginsburg dissented, rejecting the majority's formalistic interpretation of the CRO; here, congress' intended target was vulnerable consumers likely to read the words \"right to sue\" to mean the right to litigate in court. She distinguished the case from other decisions holding that a statutory right of action does not preclude arbitration agreements, noting that the CROA specifically refers to a \"right to sue\", mandates that consumers be informed of this right, and precludes the waiver of any \"right\" conferred by the act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55885:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55886:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55886:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael B. Elgin, Aaron Lawson, Henry Tucker, and Christon Colby, the petitioners, were all federal employees. Each man was terminated or constructively terminated under 5 U.S.C. § 3328, after the Office of Personnel Management determined that he was ineligible for federal employment under 5 U.S.C. § 3328 for failing to have registered for the selective service between the ages of 18 and 26.\nElgin initially challenged his termination before the Merit Systems Protection Board, which has jurisdiction over challenged terminations of federal employees under certain conditions under the Civil Service Reform Act. On November 16, 2007, the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed Elgin's appeal because it lacked jurisdiction over appeals where employees were terminated under absolute statutory prohibitions and that it lacked the power to rule on the constitutionality of a statute.\nOn December 28, 2007, Elgin and the other petitioners joined and brought an action challenging the constitutionality of 5 U.S.C. § 3328 to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They claimed that the statute was an unlawful Bill of Attainder, and that the statute violated the petitioners' rights to equal protection based on sex. Both sides moved for summary judgment as to certain issues, and the court granted the petitioner's motion by finding that the law was a Bill of Attainder and granted part of the respondents' motion by finding that the law was not a violation of the petitioners' rights to equal protection. The government filed a motion for reconsideration as to whether the statute was a Bill of Attainder, and also argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. The district court held that it did have jurisdiction, but, on reconsideration, determined that the statute was not a Bill of Attainder.\nPetitioners appealed the district court's decisions dismissing the equal protection claim and granting the motion for reconsideration on the Bill of Attainder claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Circuit confirmed the lower court's decision as to dismissal of the claims, and a divided court found that the district court did not have jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. The petitioners appealed in order to settle the question of jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55886:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55886:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55886:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Civil Service Reform Act precludes jurisdiction. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the First Circuit. The Court held that the Act precluded the federal district courts from hearing Elgin's claim even though Elgin brought a constitutional challenge. There is no textual basis to support Elgin's argument that the Act contains an exception for constitutional challenges to federal statutes. Justice Thomas argued that carving out an exception for constitutional challenges would undermine the act's purpose of creating of an integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review for aggrieved federal employees. The Act does not foreclose all judicial review of Elgin's claim. Instead, the Act directs it to the U. S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit..\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. dissented, arguing that congress did not intend for the MSPB to hear constitutional challenges. The MSPB lacks the authority and ability to properly adjudicate federal constitutional challenges. Also, Congress did not expressly limit the federal courts' ability to hear constitutional challenges related to federal employment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55886:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55887:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55887:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles Rehberg, a forensic accountant, discovered evidence of unethical billing practices at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, Georgia. He publicized his findings by sending a series of anonymous faxes to the hospital. As a \"favor\" to the hospital, former Georgia District Attorney Kenneth Hodges and Chief Investigator James Paulk began investigating Rehberg for allegedly sending harassing e-mail messages and faxes to hospital administrators. In the course of their investigation, Hodges wrote and issued subpoenas to Rehberg's Internet service provider to obtain copies of Rehberg's e-mails, which were given to private investigators. Hodges and Paulk later secured three grand jury indictments against Rehberg, which were all subsequently dismissed.\nRehberg filed a civil suit against Hodges, Paulk, and specially appointed prosecutor Kelly Burke alleging, among other things, that they conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining his e-mails through a subpoena. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the district court denied the motion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55887:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55887:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55887:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court held that a witness in a grand jury proceeding is entitled to the same absolute immunity from a § 1983 action as a witness who testifies at trial. Justice Alito looked to the Court's treatment of immunity in § 1983 suits. He determined that the Court has consistently interpreted § 1983 in the light of common law principles, using those principles to identify the government functions considered so important and vulnerable to interference by litigation that they require some form of absolute immunity. Justice Alito noted that witnesses at trial historically enjoy immunity by this reasoning.\nJustice Alito then turned to the Court's ruling in Briscoe v. LaHue, where it held that a trial witness has absolute immunity with respect to any § 1983 claim based on the witness' testimony. He reasoned that the justifications for granting trial witnesses absolute immunity apply to grand jury witnesses because in both contexts a witness' fear of retaliatory litigation might deprive the tribunal of critical evidence.\nJustice Alito rejected Rehberg's argument that law enforcement witnesses require less protection from litigation because they are less likely to be intimidated by the threat of suit and because their testimony is potentially more damaging. He responded that police officers testify frequently and that potential civil suits could improperly influence decisions on appeal and for collateral relief. Justice Alito also rejected Rehberg's argument that a \"complaining witness\" is not shielded by absolute immunity. He emphasized that testifying at trial was not a necessary characteristic of the traditional complaining witness, and that no modern grand jury witness plays a similar role in procuring arrests and initiating prosecutions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55887:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55888:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55888:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRaphael Arriaza Gonzalez was convicted of murder in Texas state court on June 14, 2005, and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. He filed an appeal to the Texas intermediate court of appeals, which affirmed his conviction on July 12, 2006. Gonzalez's counsel did not file a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals within the 30-day timeframe permitted by state law. 2. On July 19, 2007, Gonzalez filed in Texas state court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied that petition on the merits on November 21, 2007. On January 24, 2008, Gonzalez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55888:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55888:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55888:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote for the majority. The Court held that the fact that the certificate of appealability did not indicate a constitutional issue did not deprive the court of appeals of jurisdiction because Section 2253(c)(3) is a nonjurisdictional rule. The Court further held that the judgment becomes final for the purpose of Section 2244(d)(1) when the time for seeking review by the state's highest court expires.\nJustice Antonin Scalia dissented. He stated that the purpose of Section 2253(c) was to prevent appeals from denials of relief in habeas without the clear identification of a constitutional issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55888:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55889:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55889:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLos Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Curt Messerschmidt prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant for the residence of Jerry Bowen's foster mother. Bowen was suspected of assaulting his former girlfriend with a sawed-off shotgun. The affidavit requested a night search because Bowen had gang ties, so that a surprise search at night would be safer for the community and the personnel serving the search warrant. The warrant was reviewed by a sergeant, a police lieutenant and a deputy district attorney before it was presented to, and signed by, a judge. Officers executed the warrant in the early morning hours. The homeowner, Augusta Millender, and her family responded by filing suit under for alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights based on race, and for related state-law claims.\nThe district court found the warrant valid, Messerchmidt's conduct reasonable and that probable cause existed to believe that Bowen was at the residence and that nighttime service was appropriate. As to the scope of the warrant, however, the district court found it overbroad. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court order and remanded the action with directions. The court held that law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity where they reasonably relied on a deputy attorney general and a judge to restrict an overbroad search warrant's scope to items supported by probable cause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55889:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55889:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55889:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. delivered the opinion of the court, which reversed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court held that qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability when their conduct does not violate any clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known. The Court further determined that the officers in this instance acted in a reasonable manner.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer wrote separately to emphasize that the multiple facts together made it reasonable for an officer to believe that it was reasonable to search for all firearms and for evidence of gang-related activity.\nJustice Elena Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Kagan agreed with the Court's determination that a reasonable police officer could have thought that there was enough probable cause to authorize a search for all firearms. However, she disagreed with the Court's determination that a reasonable police officer could believe that there was enough probable cause to authorize a search for all evidence of gang membership.\nJustice Sonia M. Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority's assertion that the conduct of the police officers was objectively reasonable because the officer's search included a search for evidence unrelated to the specific crime the officers were investigating.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55889:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55890:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55890:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCory Maples was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an Alabama jury in 1997. Alabama does not provide death row inmates with lawyers to appeal their convictions and sentences; they must rely on pro bono lawyers to represent them on appeal. Two associates from Sullivan & Cromwell, a New York law firm, agreed to represent Maples without charge. However the two associates subsequently left the firm, and when the Alabama court sent two copies of a ruling in Maples' case to the firm's mailroom it sent them back unopened. The firm had not notified the court or the mailroom that new lawyers had stepped in.\nWhen Maples learned of the missed deadline, he immediately informed his step-mother, who contacted Sullivan & Cromwell. Other attorneys at that firm then sought leave to file an appeal notwithstanding the missed deadline, but that request was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court and later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also declined to waive the deadline for filing an appeal in his case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55890:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55890:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55890:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court reversing the appellate court's holding. After a critical discussion of Alabama's practices regarding post-conviction representation, the Court held that cause for a procedural default exists when something external to a petitioner impedes the petitioner's efforts to comply with a State's procedural rules. The Court noted that attorney negligence generally does not constitute cause, because an attorney is said to be the agent of the attorney's client which means that the client is responsible for the attorney's negligence. However, the court noted that in this case, Maples' attorneys' negligent actions did constitute cause because the attorneys effectively severed the principal agent relationship by abandoning Maples. In the case of the Alabama attorney, the Court determined his role to be so minimal that that it stated that the Alabama attorney never truly began to have an attorney client relationship.\nJustice Samuel Alito wrote a concurring opinion. The justice agreed that the petitioner effectively lacked legal representation. However, he emphasized that the Alabama system of relying on out-of-state lawyers for post conviction death penalty appeals was not to blame for Maples' misfortune, but that Maples' misfortune was the result of a unique set of circumstances.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. The Justice agreed with the principal that a court could excuse a procedural default due to abandonment by an attorney and that the two out-of-state attorneys of record abandoned representation of Maples. However, he disagreed with the Court's conclusion that Maples was left unrepresented during the relevant window. Instead, he concluded that Maples continued to be represented by the law firm Sullivan & Cromwell as well as the Alabama attorney John Butler.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55890:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55891:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55891:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLuis Mariano Martinez is serving two consecutive terms of 35 years to life, following his conviction for two counts of sexual conduct with a person under 15. On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Martinez' conviction, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Martinez then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in the first post-conviction relief proceeding in which he could present a claim of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel.\nThe U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that since there is no right to appointment of counsel during a defendant's post-conviction relief petition there is no right to effective assistance of counsel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55891:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55891:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55891:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court carved out an exception to its holding in Coleman v. Thompson, which held that attorney errors in post-conviction hearings do not qualify as cause to excuse procedural defaults. Justice Kennedy declined to answer whether this exception was required by the Constitution. Instead, he distinguished the initial-review collateral hearing from other postconviction review hearings because in the former an attorney's error will likely preclude state courts at any level from further reviewing a prisoner's claims. Justice Kennedy argued that the Court's ruling does not upset stare decisis because the prisoner in Coleman was not claiming ineffective assistance in an initial-review collateral hearing.\nJustice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented. He accused the majority of creating a constitutional right to effective counsel in all collateral hearings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55891:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55892:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55892:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Meat Association contends that the Federal Meat Inspection Act prevents California from imposing its requirements on federally inspected slaughterhouses. In 2008, the state enacted the law after the Humane Society of the United States released a video of so-called downer cows being kicked, electrocuted, dragged with chains and rammed with a forklift at a slaughterhouse. The California law bans slaughterhouses from buying or selling downer cows and from butchering them for human consumption. The measure also requires humane handling of the animals.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to grant a preliminary injunction blocking the law. Although the court said the humane-handling provision probably was pre-empted by federal law, the three-judge panel declined to block it, saying the trade group hadn't shown its members would suffer \"irreparable injury.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55892:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55892:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55892:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Elena Kagan, Court reversed the lower court, holding that the Federal Meat Inspection Act's preemption clause applied broadly to any additional or different regulations a state imposes on slaughterhouses. The act prevails even where state law does not conflict with the federal act. The Court rejected arguments that the Act did not apply to animals rendered non-ambulatory before reaching the slaughterhouse. The Court also held that the criminal penalties imposed by the state law were more than a mere incentive to improve humane animal slaughter practices.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55892:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55893:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55893:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 28, 2007, Alex Blueford and a friend of his were left in charge of the 20-month-old son of Blueford's live-in girlfriend. Approximately one hour after being left with the child, Blueford's friend called emergency services because the child was having difficulty breathing. The child died two days after being rushed to the hospital. A medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was a close head injury, and the State of Arkansas subsequently brought several charges against Blueford for the death of the child.\nThe state charged Blueford with capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury to consider each charge one at a time, and to consider the greater offenses before lesser offenses. After over four hours of deliberation, the jury returned. The forewoman stated that the jury was deadlocked. The Judge asked the forewoman about each charge, and she stated that the jury was unanimously against the capital murder charge, unanimously against the first-degree murder charge, and deadlocked on the manslaughter charge. The jury returned for further deliberation but remained deadlocked. The judge released the jury, and the court declared a mistrial.\nThe state sought to retry Blueford on all charges. Blueford filed a motion to dismiss the capital murder and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the jury had made a decision on those two counts. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that the juror's communication to the judge was a casual communication and not an acquittal. Blueford made an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion. After the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied Blueford's petition for rehearing, Blueford appealed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55893:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55893:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55893:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit Arkansas from retrying Blueford on charges of capital and first-degree murder. Chief Justice Roberts rejected Blueford's argument that the jury actually acquitted him of capital and first-degree murder. He determined that the forewoman's report was not a final resolution of anything, reasoning that the jury instructions left the jury free to reconsider its vote on the capital and first-degree murder charges after the forewoman's report. Unlike cases where acquittal on lesser charges precluded retrial on greater charges, the jury's decision here was not final.\nChief Justice Roberts also held that the trial court's declaration of a mistrial was proper, rejecting Blueford's argument that there was not manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. Blueford conceded that a jury deadlock was the classic basis for declaring a mistrial, and accepted that a second trial on manslaughter and negligent homicide would not pose a double jeopardy problem. Although Blueford argued that the court should have given effect to the jury's unanimous votes on capital and first-degree murder, Chief Justice Roberts noted that Arkansas law only allowed for a guilty verdict on one or more charges, or a complete acquittal on all charges.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan. She characterized the forewoman's announcements of unanimous votes on capital and first-degree murder as acquittals, arguing that Arkansas required a jury to acquit on greater charges before considering lesser charges. She also disagreed that the jury was free to reconsider its unanimous votes on the charges. Finally, Justice Sotomayor argued that manifest necessity required trial judges in acquittal-first jurisdictions to honor requests for a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial; moreover, there was no clear necessity for a mistrial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55893:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55894:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55894:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLynwood and Brenda Hall filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy and were forced to sell their family farm for $960,000 to settle their bankruptcy debts. That sale brought about capital gains taxes of $29,000. The Halls wanted the taxes treated as part of the bankruptcy, paying part of the debt and having the court discharge the rest. They argued that the taxes were dischargeable as a debt \"incurred by the estate\". The IRS objected to that plan, saying all of the taxes must be paid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, ruling that the Halls had to pay federal income tax on the gain from the sale of their farm during bankruptcy proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55894:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55894:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55894:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that there is no separately taxable estate in Chapter 12 bankruptcies, so the taxes in question were not \"incurred by the estate\". The debtor remains liable for these taxes independent of the bankruptcy proceedings. The Court noted that the Hall's position is sympathetic, but the plain language of the statute does not allow a ruling in their favor. Congress is free to amend the statute if they are unhappy with this result.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the majority's decision goes against the purpose of Chapter 12, which is to allow family farmers to reorganize debts without losing their farms. Justice Breyer read the statute's language more broadly to fit this purpose and allow discharge of the tax debt. Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55894:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55895:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55895:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn March 2006, U.S. Army sergeant Jeffrey L. Chafin married United Kingdom citizen Lynne Hales Chafin in Scotland. They had one child, who holds dual citizenship in the United States and the United Kingdom. In February 2010, Lynne Chafin traveled to Alabama with the couple's child and intended to return to Scotland in May 2010 for the child's schooling. Before they could leave the country, Jeffrey Chafin filed a divorce petition in the Alabama courts and sought emergency relief to prevent his wife from leaving the country with the child. The trial court ordered both parties to stay in the country with the child throughout the divorce proceeding. Lynne Chafin filed a motion in federal district court requesting to return to Scotland with the child and citing The Hague Convention ruling on international child abduction. The district court held that the child was being unlawfully detained in the United States and allowed Lynne Chafin to return to Scotland with the child. Jeffrey Chafin appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the issue as moot because the child had already returned to Scotland.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55895:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55895:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55895:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., in a unanimous opinion, vacated the Eleventh Circuit decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the controversy is not moot just because the child had already returned to Scotland. Jeffrey Chafin still maintains a valid claim in U.S. courts to have his child returned to the United States. Even though Lynne Chafin has returned to Scotland, U.S. courts continue to have personal jurisdiction over her. Therefore, a court has authority to issue an order for the child's return, regardless of Lynne's location. Even though Lynne may chose to defy the court's order, this does not necessarily render the case moot. Courts adjudicate disputes even where relief may not be likely or practical. A likelihood that Lynne will not comply with the order should not preclude Jeffrey from asserting his claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55895:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55896:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55896:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1941, the Georgia legislature enacted the Hospital Authorities Law, allowing the creation of hospital authorities as public bodies to oversee the public health needs of Georgia communities. The City of Albany and Dougherty County created the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County (\"Authority\"). Since its establishment, the Authority acquired hospitals throughout the area and leased the facilities to two non-profit corporations: Phoebe Putney Health System (\"PPHS\") and Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital (\"PPMH\"). In December 2010, PPHS presented to the Authority a plan to buy the only remaining hospital in the area, Palmyra Hospital. The Authority approved the plan in April 2011.\nFollowing the approval, the petitioner Federal Trade Commission (\"FTC\") initiated an administrative proceeding to determine whether the plan would create a monopoly in the hospital services market in Dougherty County and the surrounding area. To ensure that the plan did not come into fruition prior to the FTC's final determination, the FTC filed suit against the respondents: the Authority, PPMH, PPHS, and Palmyra. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the state-action doctrine immunized the Authority and its operation of the hospitals from antitrust liability. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss and the FTC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the lower court decision, holding that the legislature in its enactment of the Hospital Authorities Law must have anticipated the anti-competitive effects that the FTC alleged.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55896:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55896:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55896:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, delivering a unanimous opinion, reversed the lower court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that state-action immunity does not apply because the Georgia legislature did not clearly articulate any intent to allow anticompetitive activity through the Hospital Authorities Law. A state legislature is not required to expressly state this intent. State-action immunity applies if the anticompetitive effect was a foreseeable result of the State's legislation. However, the Court found no evidence that the State anticipated, or even contemplated, that hospital authorities would displace competition. While the Hospital Authorities Law grants hospital authorities general powers to participate in the marketplace, it does not allow them to use those powers anticompetitively.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55896:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55897:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55897:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2000, the citizens of California passed Proposition 22, which affirmed a legal understanding that marriage was a union between one man and one woman. In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that the California Constitution required the term \"marriage\" to include the union of same-sex couples and invalidated Proposition 22. Later in 2008, California citizens passed Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to provide that \"only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized by California.\"\nThe respondents, a gay couple and a lesbian couple, sued the state officials responsible for the enforcement of California's marriage laws and claimed that Proposition 8 violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law. When the state officials originally named in the suit informed the district court that they could not defend Proposition 8, the petitioners, official proponents of the measure, intervened to defend it. The district court held that Proposition 8 violated the Constitution, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55897:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55897:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55897:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, the petitioners do not have standing. The Court did not reach the question on the merits of the case. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal courts only have the authority to decide cases in which there is an \"actual controversy,\" which means that the complaining party must have suffered a \"concrete and particularized injury\" that can be redressed through court action. In this case, because the petitioners had only a generalized grievance in the form of a desire to defend Proposition 8, they did not have standing under Article III. The Court also held that the petitioners could not invoke the standing of the state to appeal because a litigant must assert his/her own rights and cannot claim relief through the intervention of a third party. Because the petitioners did not have standing to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that court did not have jurisdiction to reach a decision on the case.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Supreme Court should defer to states' rights in defining what parties may have standing. Because California law allows a third party to assert the state's interest when state officials decline to do so, the California Supreme Court's decision regarding the petitioners' standing is binding. He also argued that the majority's decision does not take into account the particularities of California's initiative system and the dynamics that may lead the state to allow proponents of an initiative to stand in for the state. Article III does not interfere with a state's rights to allow such proponents to support an initiative in court. Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55897:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55898:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55898:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnthony Kebodeaux was a registered sex offender. He served three years in prison in for his offense. After his release Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). When Kebodeaux moved from San Antonio, Texas to El Paso, Texas, he failed to update his residence in the registry within three days, as required, and was charged and convicted under SORNA. He appealed, arguing that the law was unconstitutional as it applied to him because regulating a sex offender's intrastate travel after being released from custody exceeds Congress' powers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that past commission of a federal crime is insufficient to permit the federal government to have unending criminal authority over Kebodeaux. While SORNA was unconstitutional under the circumstances of this case, the court did not question Congress' ability to place restrictions on federal prisoners after release, including requiring sex offenders convicted after SORNA to register intrastate changes of residence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55898:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55898:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55898:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to enact SORNA and apply it in this case, despite the fact that Kebodeaux was convicted and served his time prior to SORNA's enactment. Although SORNA was not in effect when Kebodeaux was sentenced, his release was not conditional. Rather, he was subject to the Wetterling Act, a federal act that entailed similar registration requirements later enacted under SORNA. Because Kebodeaux was subject to federal requirements at the time of his release, it is within Congress' power to modify those requirements through SORNA and apply them to Kebodeaux. The Court also held that the Necessary and Proper Clause granted Congress the power to create federal crimes and regulate their punishment, so SONRA did not represent Congress overstepping its bounds.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate the conduct of members of the military and impose penalties if those regulations are disobeyed. This power, in addition to the Necessary and Proper Clause, gave Congress the authority to act in this case. However, he argued that the majority's opinions analysis of the benefits of the registration requirement are unnecessary to reach the decision in the case and stray too far into justification for a federal police power. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to require the registration of members of the military who have been convicted of sex crimes as the gap between military and state laws often does not allow the state to do so.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that an act intended to execute a power of Congress is only necessary and proper if the power is as well. Because it is not clear that the Wetterling Act's registration requirement is a valid Congressional power, SORNA's modification and execution of that power is equally unsure. In his separate dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that SORNA's registration requirements are unconstitutional because they do not execute any Congressional powers explicitly granted by the Constitution. Instead, SORNA represents an unconstitutional usurpation of state powers regarding sex offender registration. Although Congress has the power to regulate the conduct of members of the military, once Kebodeaux became a civilian, there is no justification for the involvement of the federal government. Justice Antonin Scalia partially joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55898:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55899:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55899:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFloyd Perkins was convicted for the murder of Rodney Henderson in Michigan state court. The conviction became final on May 5, 1997 and under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Perkins should have filed a writ of habeas corpus by May 5, 1998, but he did not file until July 13, 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Perkins claimed problems with the sufficiency of evidence, jury instruction, trial procedure, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the petition as barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations. Perkins objected, arguing that the \"new evidence\" provision, which extends the statute of limitations to one year from when the \"factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence\", applied.\nIn support of his objection, Perkins produced three previously unpresented affidavits that alluded to his innocence. The affidavits were signed in 1997, 1999 and 2002, so the district court denied the writ, holding that the ADEPA statute of limitations extension expired in 2003, one year after the last affidavit was signed. Perkins then asked the court to extend the statute of limitations because he was actually innocent of the crime. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the \"new\" evidence was not the type needed to pursue an actual innocence claim, and even if it were, Perkins did not pursue his claims with reasonable diligence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that tolling the statute of limitations requires parties to be reasonably diligent in pursuit of their claims, no court has analyzed whether actual innocence claims must be pursued in the same way.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55899:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55899:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55899:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a credible showing of actual innocence allows a petitioner to pursue habeas corpus relief on the merits of the case regardless of any procedural bar, such as a statute of limitations. The miscarriage of justice exception that allows petitioners to pursue cases that would otherwise be dismissed as untimely demonstrates clear congressional intent to allow petitioners arguing actual innocence to do the same. The Court also held that, to prove the actual innocence claim, the petitioner must prove that it is more likely than not that a reasonable juror would not convict in light of the new evidence. Under this burden of proof, unexplained delay may impact the petitioner's credibility but does not necessarily defeat the claim.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that Congress enacted a valid barrier to habeas corpus relief, and the majority's opinion does not have the authority to overrule Congress. He argued that the Supreme Court does not have the legislative power to create an exception where one does not exist. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55899:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55900:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55900:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 23, 1993, Burt Lancaster, a former Detroit police officer with a history of mental health problems, shot and killed his girlfriend. He was charged with first-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At his trial in state court, Lancaster admitted to the killing but argued he was not guilty by reason of insanity and diminished capacity. The jury convicted Lancaster on both counts.\nAfter exhausting his appeals in state courts, Lancaster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court and argued that the state had improperly excluded a black juror based on his race. The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus, and Lancaster received a new trial in 2005. At the new trial, Lancaster waived his right to a jury and limited his defense to diminished capacity. Since Lancaster's first trial, the Michigan Supreme Court had held that diminished capacity defense was no longer valid. The trial court held that the Michigan Supreme Court ruling applied retroactively and that Lancaster could not use the diminished capacity defense. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and Lancaster was again convicted on both counts.\nLancaster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that the abolition of the diminished capacity defense was a substantive change in the law and that the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by retroactively applying the change to his case. The district court denied his petition and held that the abolition of the diminished capacity defense was a reasonable change because the defense was not well established under Michigan law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the retroactive application of the new ruling denied Lancaster his right to due process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55900:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55900:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55900:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that the Michigan Supreme Court ruling eliminating the diminished capacity defense was reasonable as the defense had limited standing in Michigan's jurisprudence and was not encompassed in the legislature's statutory scheme. The Court also held that the retroactive application of the ruling to this case did not violate due process because it represented a foreseeable interpretation of statutory language by the Michigan Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55900:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55901:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55901:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2009, Dan's City Used Cars towed Robert Pelkey's car from the parking lot of the Colonial Village apartments pursuant to a policy requiring tenants to move their cars during snowstorms. Pelkey was confined to bed with a serious medical condition, so he did not know his car had been towed. Soon after, he was admitted to the hospital to amputate his left foot. During the operation, Pelky suffered a heart attack. After recovering and returning home, Pelky discovered that his car was missing. Pelkey's attorney learned that Dan's had possession of the car and planned to sell it at public auction. When the attorney tried to arrange return of the vehicle, Dan's falsely told him that the car had already been sold. Dan's later traded the car to a third party, but Pelky did not receive any compensation.\nPelkey sued for violations of the Consumer Protection Act, a statute concerning liens, and a negligence claim based on the common law duty of a bailee. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dan's, holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act) preempted Pelkey's claims. The Act provides that state law claims \"related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier, with respect to the transportation of property\" are preempted. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed, holding that Pelkey's claims only related to Dan's role in disposing of the vehicle, and did not concern the transportation of property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55901:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55901:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55901:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered a unanimous opinion holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Act of 1994 does not preempt the state law because the claims are not \"related to\" the transportation of property. That phrase limits the scope of the preemption solely to transportation, rather than the disposal of property that occurs after the transportation, with which Pelkey's claim is concerned.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55901:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55902:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55902:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSupap Kirtsaeng came to the United States from Thailand in 1997. He obtained an undergraduate degree at Cornell University before being accepted into a PhD program at the University of Southern California. To subsidize the cost of his education, Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to buy copies of textbooks in Thailand and to ship those books to him in the United States. Kirstaeng then sold the textbooks on eBay at a profit. Among the books Kirtsaeng sold, were eight textbooks printed in Asia by John Wiley and Sons, Inc.\nWiley sued Kirtsaeng in district court for copyright infringement under Section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, which makes it impermissible to import a work \"without the authority of the owner.\" Kirtsaeng asserted a defense under Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act, which allows the owner of a copy \"lawfully made under this title\" to sell or otherwise dispose of the copy without the copyright owner's permission. The district court rejected Kirtsaeng's argument, and held that the doctrine was inapplicable to goods manufactured in a foreign country.\nKirtsaeng appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A divided panel acknowledged that it was a difficult question of statutory construction, but the majority held that Section 109(a) referred specifically to works that are made in the United States and did not apply to works manufactured abroad. Kirtsaeng's request for rehearing was denied, and he appealed the appellate court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55902:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55902:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55902:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no geographic restriction on the \"first sale\" doctrine, which states that the copyright owner maintains control of the first sale only. The language and common-law history of the Copyright Act support a non-geographic reading of the Act that allows for unrestricted resale of copyrighted goods regardless of the location of their manufacture. The Court also held that a geography-based reading of the \"first sale\" doctrine would drastically harm the used-book business as it would force book sellers to be subject to the whim of foreign copyright holders.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that the majority's decision did not limit copyright protection for copyright owners any further than previous decisions had. She argued that a stricter reading of copyright protection goes against the demonstrated legislative intent of the Act. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the majority's opinion runs counter to the Copyright Act's purpose of protecting copyright owners from the importation of low-cost versions of their products. The language and legislative history of the Copyright Act indicate that Congress did not intend the \"first sale\" doctrine to apply to copies manufactured abroad. She also argued that the majority's opinion drastically shifts the government's policy in regards to international copyright agreements. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55902:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55903:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55903:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA) was enacted to protect farmers from radical fluctuations in the market. The AMAA allows the Secretary of Agriculture to impose production quotas or supply limitations on products as needed. Refusal to comply with these orders can result in civil and criminal penalties. The orders only applied to \"handlers,\" those who process and package the products for distribution. The Raisin Marketing Order of 1949 created reserve-tonnage, a percentage of raisins that must be turned over the government each year.\nMarvin and Laura Horne were raisin producers living in California who implemented a system to bring their raisins to market without handlers to avoid the AMAA. The Administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service initiated an enforcement action against the Hornes for failure to comply with the orders. The Administrative Law Judge held that the Hornes should be subject to the Order under the auspices of the AMAA. The Judicial Officer affirmed the decision and held the Hornes liable. The Hornes filed for judicial review in district court, and the court granted summary judgment for the Department of Agriculture.\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the Hornes' claim that the Order violated their Fifth Amendment rights under the Takings Clause. The Court held that the Hornes must bring that claim before the Court of Federal Claims, as required by the Tucker Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55903:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55903:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55903:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that the defendants' Takings Clause claims must be evaluated under their capacity as handlers rather than producers, because it is only in their capacity as handlers that they would be subject to the fines in question. The Court also held that, as handlers, the defendants may raise a Takings Clause challenge to AMAA marketing orders and do not need to file in the Court of Federal Claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55903:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55904:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55904:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nElenea Marx defaulted on her student loans. In September 2008, her guarantor, EdFund, a division of the California Student Aid Commission, hired the General Revenue Corporation (\"GRC\") to collect on the account. That same month, a GRC agent faxed Marx's employer a form displaying basic contact information for GRC. It also left blanks for the employer to fill in information about the employee's employment status and other related information.\nThe Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (\"FDCPA\") prohibited communications with third parties in connection with the collection of debt. It also allowed courts to award costs to prevailing defendants in actions brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, prevented courts from awarding courts if a statute provided otherwise. Marx sued GRC in October 2008, alleging abusive and threatening phone calls in violation of the FDCPA. She amended her complaint in March 2009 to add a claim that GRC violated the FDCPA by sending the fax to her workplace to request employment information.\nThe district court dismissed her complaint, holding that the fax was not a \"communication\" within the meaning of the act, and ordering Marx to pay court costs. The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, affirmed with one dissent, holding that the fax was not a communication. The Tenth Circuit also held that the act did not prevent courts from awarding costs to prevailing defendants. Marx's petition for an en banc rehearing was denied.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55904:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55904:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55904:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure operate on the presumption that the prevailing party is entitled to be awarded costs unless a statute explicitly states otherwise. Because the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act lists another situation in which costs may be awarded to the prevailing party, the statute does not contradict the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also held that, had Congress intended the statute to limit a court's discretion in awarding costs, the language would have been explicit in doing so.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the default position of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives way to a statute that \"provides otherwise.\" The language of the Rule in question indicates that a statute that provides an alternative provision for awarding costs overrides it, but the statute does not necessarily need to directly contradict the Rule. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55904:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55905:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55905:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn October 2000, the United States Treasury Department launched Pay.gov, a billing and payment processing system that allows consumers to make online payments to government agencies by credit or debit card. Numerous government agencies use Pay.gov to process credit and debit payments. On August 9, 2008, attorney James X Bormes filed a lawsuit on behalf of one of his clients in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, paying the filing fee with a credit card via Pay.gov. The confirmation page displayed the expiration date of Bormes' credit card.\nBormes alleged that the inclusion of his card's expiration date violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (\"FCRA\"); he brought this action on behalf of himself and a class of individual cardholders. The statute provides that no person accepting credit or debit cards for a business transaction shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card or the expiration date on any receipt provided to the cardholder after a transaction. The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction under the FCRA, but granted the government's motion to dismiss because the FCRA did not waive the government's sovereign immunity. It held that Bormes' invocation of the Little Tucker Act was moot because the court had jurisdiction under the FCRA.\nOn appeal, a motions panel denied the government's motion to transfer to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. It held that Bormes' complaint invoked the district court's jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act; the Little Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to district courts over claims against the United States not exceeding $10,000. Afterwards, a panel of the Seventh Circuit determined that the Little Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for the FCRA in Talley v. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Seventh Circuit later vacated this opinion; the Talley case remains pending. Bormes appealed his case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which determined that the FCRA mandates money damages from the federal government, giving jurisdiction to the district courts through the Little Tucker Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55905:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55905:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55905:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, vacated the lower judgment and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the Little Tucker Act does not apply when the underlying law imposing monetary liability has its own specific judicial remedies, as in the FCRA. The Little Tucker Act does not create any substantive rights, and was intended to fill the gaps left in more general statutes where monetary relief might be warranted. The lower court should have used the text of the FCRA itself to decide whether sovereign immunity was waived. The Court did not decide whether the FCRA waives the government's sovereign immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55905:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55906:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55906:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 3, 2006, the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified \"crime stoppers\" tip that the home of Joelis Jardines was being used to grow marijuana. On December 6, 2006, two detectives, along with a trained drug detection dog, approached the residence. The dog handler accompanied the dog to the front door of the home. The dog signaled that it detected the scent of narcotics. The detective also personally smelled marijuana.\nThe detective prepared an affidavit and applied for a search warrant, which was issued. A search confirmed that marijuana was being grown inside the home. Jardines was arrested and charged with trafficking cannabis. Jardines moved to suppress the evidence seized at his home on the theory that the drug dog's sniff was an impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment and that all subsequent evidence was fruit of the poisonous tree.\nThe trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently ruled to suppress the evidence. The state appealed the suppression ruling and the state appellate court reversed, concluding that no illegal search had occurred since the officer had the right to go up to the defendant's front door and that a warrant was not necessary for the drug dog's sniff. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and concluded that the dog's sniff was a substantial government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The state of Florida appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55906:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55906:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55906:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered a 5-4 opinion affirming the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The Court held that the front porch of a home is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Typically, ordinary citizens are invited to enter onto the porch, either explicitly or implicitly, to communicate with the house's occupants. Police officers, however, cannot go beyond the scope of that invitation. Entering a person's porch for the purposes of conducting a search requires a broader license than the one commonly given to the general public. Without such a license, the police officers were conducting an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.\nJustice Elena Kagan wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that the case dealt with privacy issues as well as the property issues the majority opinion addressed. People have a heightened expectation of privacy in their homes and the areas immediately surrounding their homes, and in this case, the police violated that expectation. Because the police officers used a device (a drug-sniffing dog) not in public use to learn details about the home, Justice Kagan argued that an illegal search had been conducted. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito dissented, arguing that the majority's interpretation of the public license to approach a person's front door is too narrow and should extend even to police officers collecting evidence against an occupant. The dissent argued that the common law of trespass does not limit the public license to a particular category of visitors approaching the door for a specific purpose. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55906:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55907:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55907:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAmgen, Inc. is an American pharmaceutical corporation. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved two Amgen products that stimulate production of red blood cells and reduce the need for blood transfusions in anemic patients. Amgen allegedly made misrepresentations to the FDA about the safety of these products. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds brought an action against Amgen alleging four counts of misrepresentation. Connecticut Retirement Plans specifically alleged that Amgen misrepresented the nature of several FDA committee meetings to shareholders. It sought to certify a class of persons who purchased Amgen stock between April 22, 2004 and May 10, 2007, the dates when two of the meetings in question occurred. On May 10, 2007, Amgen's stock value dropped by more than nine percent.\nTo certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must show that there are questions of law or fact common to the class, and that these questions predominate over questions affecting only individual members. Amgen opposed the class certification, arguing that the that the misrepresentations did not have any impact on the price of Amgen stock. The district court rejected Amgen's arguments and granted the class certification. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed, rejecting Amgen's argument that a plaintiff must give proof that the misrepresentations were material at the class certification stage.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55907:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55907:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55907:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the issue of materiality is dealt with when the case is decided on the merits, not during class certification. For a class to be certified, the members of the class must show only that the questions they have in common predominate over questions affecting solely individual members of the class. The Supreme Court also held that the district court ruled appropriately in preventing Amgen from bringing in rebuttal evidence to prevent class certification. Such evidence dealt with material issues of the case that would be decided when the case was considered on the merits, and thus did not relate to the issue of class certification.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that, while he joins the majority's opinion, recent economic evidence suggests that the fraud-on-the-market theory might rest on faulty economic presumptions that would be worth reexamining.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that a presumption of materiality was necessary for class certification in a fraud-on-the-market case. Because such a case is predicated on the idea that the members of the class relied on faulty information, there cannot be a suit without evidence that the faulty information was material.\nIn his separate dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that plaintiffs seeking to use the fraud-on-the-market theory must show evidence of all aspects of the theory, including materiality, to be certified as a class. Without proof of materiality along with the other elements, there is no evidence that the claim has class-wide relevance. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Scalia joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55907:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55908:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55908:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLamar Evans was accused of burning a vacant house in Detroit, Michigan. He was charged with \"burning other real property.\" The trial court required the prosecution to prove that the building was not a dwelling, although that is not an element of the crime under Michigan law. As a result of this extra element, the court granted Evans' motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed the trial court decision and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that Double Jeopardy did not bar a retrial because the trial court did not resolve any factual element of the case. The directed verdict was based only on the prosecution's failure to prove an element that is not part of the crime. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55908:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55908:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55908:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in an 8-1 opinion, reversed the lower court's decision and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars Evans' retrial. Even though the trial judge arrived at his ruling by erroneously adding a statutory element, Evans was acquitted for double jeopardy purposes. In general, any ruling based on the prosecution's failure to establish criminal liability will result in an acquittal. However, the Court distinguishes between an acquittal granted for substantive purposes and one granted for procedural purposes. When determining whether double jeopardy applies, only an acquittal based on the culpability of the defendant will conclude the proceedings entirely. If the acquittal is merely procedural and unrelated to the factual guilt or innocence of the defendant, there is no expectation that double jeopardy will bar further proceedings. The Court held that the trial court's acquittal factually resolved whether Evans was guilty or not; therefore it would be unfair to prosecute him again for the same crime.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito Jr. filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority's ruling goes beyond the original intent of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause is intended to protect people from prosecutors' repeat attempts to convict an individual for the same offense. Since Evans moved for the directed verdict himself, the typical fear of repeat prosecution by the State does not arise. Despite the trial judge's error, the State was entitled to one complete opportunity to convict the defendant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55908:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55909:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55909:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1992, Houston police officers found two homicide victims. The investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas. Salinas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station where he was questioned for about one hour. Salinas was not under arrest at this time and had not been read his Miranda rights. Salinas answered every question until an officer asked whether the shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime would match the gun found in Salinas' home. According to the officer, Salinas remained silent and demonstrated signs of deception. A ballistics analysis later matched Salinas' gun with the casings at the scene. Police also found a witness who said Salinas admitted to killing the victims. In 1993, Salinas was charged with the murders, but could not be located.\n15 years later, Salinas was finally captured. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of Salinas' silence about the gun casings. Salinas objected, arguing that he could invoke his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination whether he was in custody or not. The trial court admitted the evidence and Salinas was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Harris County, Texas affirmed, noting that the courts that have addressed this issue are divided. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55909:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55909:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55909:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Samuel A. Alito announced the judgment for a divided Court. Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy concluded that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to defendants who simply decide to remain mute during questioning. Long-standing judicial precedent has held that any witness who desires protection against self-incrimination must explicitly claim that protection. This requirement ensures that the government is put on notice when a defendant intends to claim this privilege and allows the government to either argue that the testimony is not self-incriminating or offer immunity. The plurality reiterated two exceptions to this principle: 1) that a criminal defendant does not need to take the stand at trial in order to explicitly claim this privilege; and 2) that failure to claim this privilege must be excused when that failure was due to government coercion. The opinion declined to extend these exceptions to the situation in this case. Notwithstanding popular misconceptions, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment does not establish a complete right to remain silent but only guarantees that criminal defendant may not be forced to testify against themselves. Therefore, as long as police do not deprive defendants of the opportunity to claim a Fifth Amendment privilege, there is no Constitutional violation.\nIn a separate opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that Salinas' Fifth Amendment privilege would not have been applicable even if invoked because the prosecutor's testimony regarding his silence did not compel Salinas to give self-incriminating testimony. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the opinion.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that Salinas' silence was enough to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege and that the majority's decision raised clear problems for uneducated defendants who may not know the explicit language necessary to protect their rights. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55909:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55910:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55910:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 2, 2004, Arizona passed Proposition 200, which required voters to provide proof of citizenship when registering to vote or casting a ballot. Shortly after the Proposition passed, a group of plaintiffs, including the Inter Tribal Council of Arizona sued the state. They argued that Proposition 200 violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments, and is inconsistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). The district court denied a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs appealed.\nThe U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted an emergency injunction to allow the case to proceed without allowing Proposition 200 to affect the 2006 election. The Supreme Court vacated the emergency injunction and remanded the case for consideration on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and held that the Proposition was not an unconstitutional poll tax and did not violate the NVRA. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Arizona. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the Proposition was not an unconstitutional poll tax and did not violate the NVRA, but that the NVRA preempts the Proposition's requirements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55910:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55910:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55910:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that NVRA preempts other voter registration requirements. To allow states to impose additional requirements would allow them to reject voter registrations applicants who met the federal requirements to vote, which would defeat the purpose of the Act. However, the Court also held that Arizona may petition to have more requirements added to the federal standard.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that there is no judicial basis for the majority's opinion that sometimes federal law preempts state law and sometimes it does not. However, he also argued that a presumption against preemption was not necessarily the best formulation of the relationship between state laws and federal ones. In this case, Kennedy agreed with the majority's opinion regarding the NVRA preempting the Arizona statute but not regarding the presumption of preemption.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the states have the right to determine voter qualifications for federal elections. He also argued that the NVRA only requires the states to use the federal requirements as part of the state's voter registration process. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. argued that the Constitution grants the power to decide voter qualifications in federal elections to the states. He wrote that the NVRA does not require the states to treat the federal requirements as the sole requirements for voter registration. He also argued that the majority's opinion should have applied the presumption against preemption to this case because states have a vested interest in preserving the integrity of the election process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55910:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55911:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55911:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn July 28, 2005, an informant told Officer Richard Sneider of the Suffolk County Police Department that he had purchased six grams of crack cocaine at 103 Lake Drive, Wyandanch, New York, from an individual named \"Polo.\" Officer Sneider obtained a warrant to search the basement apartment at that address; the warrant provided that the apartment was occupied by a heavy set black male with short hair, known as \"Polo.\" That evening during surveillance, officers observed two men -later identified as Chunon L. Bailey and Bryant Middleton-exiting the gate that led to the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive. The officers followed Bailey and Middleton as they left the premises in a black Lexus, and pulled the Lexus over about one mile from the apartment.\nThe officers patted down Bailey and Middleton, finding keys in Bailey's front left pocket. They placed both men in handcuffs and informed them that they were being detained, not arrested. Bailey insisted that he did not live in the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive, but his driver's license address in Bay Shore was consistent with the informant's description of Polo. The police searched the apartment while Bailey and Middleton were in detention, finding a gun and drugs in plain view. The police arrested Bailey, and seized his house keys and car key incident to his arrest; later, an officer discovered that one of the house keys opened the door to the basement apartment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55911:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55911:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55911:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the rule from Michigan v. Summers did not apply because Bailey was not in or immediately outside the residence being searched when he was detained. Also, none of the law enforcement interests mentioned in Summers were served by detaining Bailey. Arrests incident to the execution of a search warrant are lawful under the Fourth Amendment, but once an individual leaves the premises being searched, any detention must be justified by another means. On remand, the Second Circuit should consider whether stopping Bailey was proper under Terry v. Ohio.\nJustice Antonin Scalia concurred, emphasizing that Summers provides a bright line rule for law enforcement to follow. The Second Circuit's balancing test was an improper and would make it harder for officers to decide whether a seizure is constitutionally permissible before carrying it out. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the majority applied an arbitrary geographical line instead of weighing actual Fourth Amendment concerns. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55911:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55912:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55912:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, the Texas legislature enacted a law requiring the University of Texas to admit all high school seniors who ranked in the top ten percent of their high school classes. After finding differences between the racial and ethnic makeup of the university's undergraduate population and the state's population, the University of Texas decided to modify its race-neutral admissions policy. The new policy continued to admit all in-state students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school classes. For the remainder of the in-state freshman class the university would consider race as a factor in admission.\nAbigail N. Fisher, a Caucasian female, applied for undergraduate admission to the University of Texas in 2008. Fisher was not in the top ten percent of her class, so she competed for admission with other non-top ten percent in-state applicants. The University of Texas denied Fisher's application.\nFisher filed suit against the university and other related defendants, claiming that the University of Texas' use of race as a consideration in admission decisions was in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The university argued that its use of race was a narrowly tailored means of pursuing greater diversity. The district court decided in favor of the University of Texas, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Fisher appealed the appellate court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55912:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55912:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55912:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, but only under a standard of strict judicial scrutiny. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that, in affirming the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals did not hold the University's admission policies to a standard of strict scrutiny, so the judgment was incorrect. Based on previous judicial precedent in cases dealing with minority admissions, the Court has held that such cases are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment and that they must be reviewed under a standard of strict scrutiny to determine whether the policies are \"precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.\" If the policy does not meet this standard, race may not be considered in the admissions process. The Court held that it was the duty of the reviewing court to \"verify\" that the University policy in question was necessary to achieve the benefits of diversity and that no race-neutral alternative would provide the same benefits. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not conduct a sufficient strict scrutiny examination in this case.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Constitution prohibits governmental discrimination on the basis of race. However, because this case did not ask the Court to overrule precedent that allowed universities to consider diversity a compelling interest that justified race-based admission policies, he joined the majority's opinion in full. In his separate concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that he joined the majority's opinion that the lower courts did not sufficiently apply strict scrutiny, but he also argued that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state's use of race as a factor in higher education admissions. He further argued that there is nothing \"necessary\" about the benefits that flow from racial diversity in higher education, so there in no compelling state interest to promote it.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the University's admission policy treats race as merely one factor in the overall decision to admit a student, which is permissible under previous judicial precedent. She also argued that the Equal Protection Clause does not require that state universities be blind to the history of overt discrimination and that it is preferable that they explicitly include race as a factor in admission decisions rather than attempt to obfuscate its role.\nJustice Elena Kagan did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55912:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55913:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55913:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile a student at the University of Missouri, Dr. Melissa Cloer was vaccinated for Hepatitis B in 1996 and 1997. Soon after, she began developing symptoms of multiple sclerosis (MS). Several years later, Dr. Cloer learned about a possible connection between the vaccine and MS. Dr Cloer sued under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (the Act). The Chief Special Master denied her claim as untimely because she brought it more than 36 months after the onset of symptoms. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. Dr. Cloer appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Federal Circuit granted the government's petition for rehearing and held that the Act's statute of limitations can be paused in certain circumstances, but Dr. Cloer's case did not meet the requirements. Her claims were again dismissed as untimely, but she filed a petition for attorney fees and costs incurred in the appeal. The Act provides that a claimant may recover attorney fees in connection with any proceeding under the Act brought in good faith with a reasonable basis for the claim even if the claimant does not win the case. The Federal Circuit held that Dr. Cloer was entitled to attorney fees if her claim was brought in good faith with a reasonable basis. The court remanded the case with instructions to decide those issues", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55913:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55913:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55913:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayer delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act made eligibility for attorney's fees contingent on the filing of a petition, rather than its ultimate success. According to the plain text of the Act, as long as the petition was filed in good faith and a reasonable basis, the petitioner is eligible for an award of attorney's fees. To limit the ability of good-faith petitioners to obtain assistance with attorney's fees would run counter to Congress' express goals in the fees provision of the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55913:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55914:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55914:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHospitals receive compensation from the federal government based on the number of low-income patients they serve. The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) decides how much this payment will be. In an unrelated case, it came out that CMS miscalculated this payment between 1993 and 1996 so hospitals received less than they were due. In 2006, a group of hospitals filed claims with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) for full payment from the Department of Health and Human Services for years 1987-1994. Although the statute of limitations for such claims is 180 days, the hospitals argued that the limitations period should be tolled because CMS knowingly and unlawfully failed to disclose its error. The PRRB held that it did not have the authority to toll the statute of limitations, so the claims were untimely.\nThe hospitals sued in district court, but the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the PRRB's decision was not final. The court also held that the relevant statute does not allow for tolling the statute of limitations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that it did have jurisdiction because the PRRB decision was final. It also held that tolling the statute of limitations for \"good cause\" is possible, but whether it is appropriate in this case is a question for remand. The court of appeals denied a petition for a rehearing en banc.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55914:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55914:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55914:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, but only up to 3 years. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the lower court and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the 180-day statute of limitations is not \"jurisdictional\" so it may be extended in some cases. Unless Congress has clearly stated that a statutory limitation is jurisdictional it is presumed to be non-jurisdictional. The Secretary of Health and Human Services regulation allowing a 3-year extension for good cause was permissible, as courts must defer to agency regulations unless they are \"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.\" The general presumption in favor of equitable tolling does not apply to an agency's internal deadline, absent evidence of congressional intent, so the Court could not extend the deadline indefinitely. Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred, noting that the majority's opinion does not establish that equitable tolling is never applicable to internal administrative deadlines.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55914:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55915:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55915:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe State of Florida charged Clayton Harris with possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. At trial, Harris moved to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his car. Police searched the car during a traffic stop for expired registration when a drug detection dog alerted the officer. This dog was trained to detect several types of illegal substances, but not pseudoephedrine. During the search, the officer found over 200 loose pills and other supplies for making methamphetamine. Harris argued that the dog's alert was false and did not provide probable cause for the search. The trial court denied Harris motion, holding that the totality of the circumstances indicated that there was probable cause to conduct the search. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State did not prove the dog's reliability in drug detection sufficiently to show probable cause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55915:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55915:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55915:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Florida Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the lower court's rigid requirement that police officers show evidence of a dog's reliability in the field to prove probable cause. Probable cause is a flexible common sense test that takes the totality of the circumstances into account. A probable cause hearing for a dog alert should proceed like any other, allowing each side to make their best case with all evidence available. The record in this case supported the trial court's determination that police had probable cause to search Harris' car.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55915:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55916:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55916:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted in 1996, states that, for the purposes of federal law, the words \"marriage\" and \"spouse\" refer to legal unions between one man and one woman. Since that time, some states have authorized same-sex marriage. In other cases regarding the DOMA, federal courts have ruled it unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, but the courts have disagreed on the rationale.\nEdith Windsor is the widow and sole executor of the estate of her late spouse, Thea Clara Spyer, who died in 2009. The two were married in Toronto, Canada, in 2007, and their marriage was recognized by New York state law. Thea Spyer left her estate to her spouse, and because their marriage was not recognized by federal law, the government imposed $363,000 in taxes. Had their marriage been recognized, the estate would have qualified for a marital exemption, and no taxes would have been imposed.\nOn November 9, 2010 Windsor filed suit in district court seeking a declaration that the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the government's position was that DOMA must be defended. On February 23, 2011, the President and the Attorney General announced that they would not defend DOMA. On April 18, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives filed a petition to intervene in defense of DOMA and motioned to dismiss the case. The district court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55916:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55916:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55916:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, unanswered, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the United States Government, despite the executive branch's agreement regarding DOMA's unconstitutionality, retains a significant enough stake in the issue to support Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Because the judgment in question orders the U.S. Treasury to refund tax money, the Government stands to suffer a real economic injury and therefore maintains standing in the case. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) presented substantial arguments for the constitutionality of DOMA that reflected an actual controversy under Article III, which allowed the Supreme Court to address the case without needing to decide whether BLAG would have had standing before a lower court. The Court also held that states have the authority to define marital relationships and that DOMA goes against legislative and historical precedent by undermining that authority. The result is that DOMA denies same-sex couples the rights that come from federal recognition of marriage, which are available to other couples with legal marriages under state law. The Court held that the purpose and effect of DOMA is to impose a \"disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma\" on same-sex couples in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court lacked the jurisdiction to review the case and that interests in uniformity and stability justified Congress' enactment of DOMA. He also argued that the majority's opinion did not address the issue of state definitions of marriage affecting same-sex couples. In his separate dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Supreme Court had neither the jurisdiction to review the case nor the power to invalidate democratically enacted legislation. He argued that the majority's opinion wrongly asserted the supremacy of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of government. However, the majority opinion did not address the issue of whether or not the Equal Protection Clause required laws restricting the definition of marriage to be reviewed under a rational basis or strict scrutiny standard. He also argued that the majority misconstrued DOMA's insidious intent and should not rule based on that presumption. Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts joined in the dissent. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the United States Government did not have standing in the case because the executive branch declined to defend the statute, but that BLAG did have standing because it chose to defend the otherwise undefended statute. He also argued that the Constitution does not guarantee the right to enter into a same-sex marriage because that right is not \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.\" Instead, the issue of the definition of marriage is left to the people to decide, a decision in which DOMA does not interfere. Justice Clarence Thomas partially joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55916:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55917:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55917:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMaetta Vance began working for University Dining Services at Ball State University in 1989 as a substitute server. She was the only African-American working in the department. Vance submitted a complaint to the University when a coworker used a racial epithet directed at her and African-American students at the University. The University issued the coworker a written warning, but following a series of incidents that resulted in Vance reporting that she felt unsafe in her workplace, the University investigated but found no basis for action. On October 3, 2006, Vance sued Ball State University in federal district court for lessening her work duties and ability to work overtime, forcing her to work through her breaks, and unjustly disciplining her. After filing the suit, Vance claimed her work environment continued to worsen, but the University's investigations did not yield enough evidence to discipline anyone.\nThe University moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and held that there was not enough evidence to prove a hostile work environment and that the University was not liable for the actions of individual coworkers. Vance appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55917:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55917:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55917:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, for the purposes of liability for workplace harassment under Title VII, the definition of a \"supervisor\" is limited to a person empowered to take tangible employment action against the victim. Because Title VII creates a distinction between an employer's liability for the actions of a coworker and the actions of a supervisor, it is important to have clear distinction between the two definitions to aid in the application of the Title VII guidelines. Allowing the colloquial usage of \"supervisor\" that tends to conflate the concept of supervisor and coworker lacks the necessary specificity. The Court held that, to be considered a supervisor for the purposes of workplace employer liability, an individual must have the power to hire, fire, fail to promote, reassign to a task with significantly different duties, or cause a significant change in benefits available to the victim.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the majority's opinion establishes the \"narrowest and most workable rule\" for ruling on an employer's liability for harassment.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority's opinion ignores the conditions of the modern workforce and that a more workable definition of a supervisor would be that offered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC): anyone with the authority to direct an employee's daily activities. She argued that although a supervisor may not have the authority to discharge or demote the victim, a supervisor who can effect change in the victim's working conditions has similar power over the victim. The EEOC's definition reflects the agency's informed experience of the modern workplace and the importance of the specific facts of an employee's duties and relationship to other workers who can enable harassment. The majority's opinion, however, adopts an inflexible standard that is not responsive to these concerns. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55917:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55918:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55918:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nErnest Valencia Gonzales was convicted for the murder of Darrel Wagner. His conviction and death sentence became final on January 8, 1996. Gonzalez exhausted his state-court post-conviction relief opportunities before challenging his conviction in federal court.\nIn November 1999, Gonzales initiated a federal habeas proceeding, which raised 60 claims for federal habeas relief, including claims relating to Gonzales' competence and ability to rationally communicate with his court-appointed attorneys. The federal court stayed Gonzales' execution pending resolution of those proceedings. Ultimately, the district court denied Gonzales' motion for a competency hearing and a stay of proceedings. Even though it determined that Gonzales was incompetent, the court considered this irrelevant because Gonzales' claims could not benefit from rational communication with counsel.\nGonzales appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It disagreed with the lower court and held that Gonzales was entitled to a stay pending a competency determination. The Arizona Department of Corrections appealed.\nThe related case, Tibbals v. Carter, was a similar capital murder appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Sean Carter, the defendant, was adjudged incompetent to assist his attorneys following his murder conviction. The district court granted Carter a stay on his habeas corpus proceedings based on a right to competence in such proceedings. After the appellate court affirmed, the State appealed further and the Court granted certiorari to answer the same question as in Ryan v. Gonzales.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55918:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55918:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55918:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. The Court reasoned that neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to competence exists during federal habeas corpus proceedings. Though the district court has broad discretion to grant a stay on habeas proceedings, this discretion is not without its limitations. In both cases, a stay was unwarranted because communication between the defendant and his attorney was unnecessary. The record provided adequate information for an attorney to handle habeas proceedings on his own, regardless of a client's incompetence. Even if the district court were to decide that the defendant's competence was necessary, it should only grant a stay if the defendant is likely to regain competence in the foreseeable future. Otherwise, allowing a stay on their proceedings would unreasonably burden the judicial system.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55918:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55919:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55919:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1997, the Port of Los Angeles (\"the Port\") introduced a plan to expand its cargo terminals to better accommodate its high shipping volume. Following public concern that the plan could significantly increase air pollution, the Board of Harbor Commissioners adopted a Clean Air Action Plan (\"CAAP\"). The CAAP aimed to reduce emissions and specifically targeted the Port's drayage truck business. Roughly 16,000 drayage trucks regularly serve the Port, transporting goods between customers and the cargo terminals. Beginning in 2008, the CAAP banned drayage trucks from the Port, unless the carriers entered into a series of concession agreements. These agreements imposed a progressive ban on older trucks and provided incentives for drayage truck operators to convert their aging fleets to cleaner trucks.\nAmerican Trucking Associations (\"ATA\"), a national association of motor carriers, challenged several provisions within the concession agreements and brought suit against the City of Los Angeles and its Harbor Department. ATA argued that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (\"FAAA\") preempted the agreements. The FAAA Act prohibits a state from enacting any regulation related to the \"price, route, or service of any motor carrier.\" ATA claimed that the concession agreements amounted to such a regulation. ATA further argued that the State could not limit a federally licensed motor carrier's access to a port.\nThe district court disagreed with ATA and held that none of the provisions were preempted; ATA appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court determined that when the Port was acting as a market participant, rather than a market regulator, the FAAA Act did not apply. ATA appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari limited to the two questions below.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55919:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55919:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55919:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, and the Court declined to address the issue of whether a municipal government can ban federally licensed motor carriers' access to the ports. Justice Elena Kegan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that the FAAA Act draws a rough line between a government's exercise of regulatory power and its own contract-based participation in a market. In this case, the government was not acting as a private participant in a contract but was wielding coercive power over private companies by threatening criminal punishment. The Court held that these actions clearly fit within the FAAA Act's prohibition on government regulating the \"price, route, or service of any motor carrier.\" Contractual commitments resulting from the threat of criminal sanctions rather than ordinary bargaining clearly represent the government taking on a regulatory role.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he noted that the FAAA Act's provision giving the federal government authority over intrastate commerce raises serious Constitutional concerns because the Constitution explicitly limits Congress' regulatory power to interstate commerce. However, because neither party raised a constitutional challenge to the FAAA Act, Justice Thomas joined with the majority.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55919:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55920:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55920:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1996, Marvin Peugh and Steven Hollewell formed two companies: the Grainary, Inc., which bought, stored and sold grain; and Agri-Tech, Inc., which provided custom farming services to landowners and tenants. From January 1999 to August 2000, the two obtained bank loans by falsely representing future contracts and inflating the bank accounts by writing bad checks between the two accounts. Peugh pleaded not guilty to all counts, while Hollewell pleaded guilty to one count and agreed to testify against Peugh in exchange for the other charges being dropped. After a jury trial, Peugh was convicted on five counts of bank fraud. At sentencing, Peugh argued that he should be sentenced under the 1999 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that were in effect at the time of the offense, rather than the 2009 Guidelines that were in effect at the time of sentencing. He argued that use of the later Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. He was sentenced to 70 months in prison, and he and Hollewell were jointly ordered to pay nearly $2 million. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55920:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55920:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55920:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delievered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Peugh's sentencing violated the ex post facto clause because, although the Supreme Court has held that the Sentencing Guidelines are not binding on lower courts, the Guidelines still must be used as an initial benchmark for sentencing. By setting an initial benchmark, the Guidelines forbid the government from altering the formula used to calculate an appropriate sentencing range. The lower court's refusal to apply the previous Guidelines in this case created a type of ex post facto law that changed the nature of a crime by inflicting a greater punishment than would be applied when the crime was committed.\nIn his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Guidelines are not binding on lower courts, so they have no legal effect on a defendant's sentences. He also argued that any risk that a defendant might receive a harsher sentence results from the Guidelines' persuasive power, not any legal effect. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia, also filed a separate dissent in which he argued that retroactive application of advisory guidelines do not violate the test established in California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales. Under that test, laws only violate the ex post facto clause if they create a \"sufficient risk\" of increasing the measure of punishment attached to a crime.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55920:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55921:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55921:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 10, 2010, Greg Knowles' home was damaged in a hailstorm, and he requested payment from his insurer, Standard Fire Insurance Company, for the full amount of the damage. On April 13, 2011, Knowles filed a class action lawsuit against Standard Fire Insurance Company alleging that he and others had been denied the full payment for damages that their contracts provided.\nAccording to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), defendants in a class action lawsuit can move the case to federal court if the potential damages exceed $5 million. In the past, plaintiffs have attempted to avoid federal jurisdiction by stipulating that the potential damages in a given case are worth less than $5 million, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has allowed such a stipulation.\nThe defendant, Standard Fire Insurance Company moved the case from the Miller County Circuit Court to the Western District of Arkansas. The district court held that the plaintiffs' stipulation that the potential damages were less than $5 million was sufficient to prove with \"legal certainty\" that was the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55921:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55921:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55921:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for a unanimous court, vacated the lower court decision and remanded. To defeat jurisdiction the stipulation must be binding, and a plaintiff bringing a proposed class action cannot bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified. Knowles only has the authority to bind himself to a stipulated claim amount. Federal jurisdiction cannot be based on contingent future events, and the non-binding stipulation may not survive the certification process. For example, the complaint may clearly show an amount in controversy over $5 million, Knowles may be an inadequate class representative, or another party might intervene with an amended complaint. Individual plaintiffs may control jurisdiction through stipulation, but a named plaintiff in a not yet certified class action cannot.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55921:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55922:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55922:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCarolyn Kloeckner filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging hostile work environment as well as sex and age discrimination. When her employer charged her with being \"absent without leave,\" she amended her complaint to include retaliation. Kloeckner never returned to work, and eventually her employer terminated her. Kloeckner challenged the termination while her initial complaint was still pending, making it a \"mixed case.\" Kloeckner appealed the termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but then requested a dismissal so she could amend her EEOC complaint. The MSPB granted the dismissal, giving her a set period to refile.\nWhen the EEOC found there had been no discrimination or retaliation, Kloeckner appealed the decision to the MSPB. While the appeal was within 30 days of the EEOC decision, it was 10 months after the refilling period set by the MSPB. The MSPB dismissed the case as untimely. Kloeckner filed an appeal in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was removed to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction because the MSPB had not ruled on the merits of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55922:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55922:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55922:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, the district court has jurisdiction. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that the two relevant sections of Civil Service Reform Act both direct mixed cases to the district court rather that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. There was no legislative history to support a reading of the statutes as creating a distinction between merits-based as opposed to procedural appeals. The Court also held that Kloeckner's appeal was timely because it was filed within 30 days of her received notice of a \"judicially reviewable action.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55922:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55923:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55923:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn the night of June 9, 1996, Carlos Trevino and four others drove to a nearby store to pick up beer for a party. One of the men noticed 15-year old Linda Salinas and offered to drive her to a nearby restaurant. Instead, the group drove Linda to Espada Park in San Antonio, Texas where they started to sexually assault her. Trevino's cousin, Juan Gonzalez, refused to participate and returned to the car; meanwhile, Trevino and the three other men continued the assault. Linda's body was discovered in the park the next day with fatal stab wounds to her neck.\nAfter their investigation, the San Antonio Police arrested Trevino and a grand jury indicted him on one count of intentional murder and attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault. At trial, Trevino's cousin Gonzalez testified against him. Gonzalez testified that the men returned to the car with blood on their shirts discussing the murder, with Trevino bragging about how he learned to kill in prison. With this evidence, the jury found Trevino guilty and was left to decide on an appropriate punishment. They determined that Trevino intended to kill Linda and was likely to commit such violent acts in the future. At the jury's suggestion, the trial court sentenced Trevino to death.\nThrough both the punishment phase of the trial and the first state habeas corpus proceeding, Trevino's attorney did not investigate or present any mitigating evidence that could have reduced Trevino's sentence. During the federal habeas proceeding that followed, Trevino's attorney withdrew and the court appointed new counsel. Trevino's new counsel undertook his own investigation and discovered several pieces of evidence that the jury could have found relevant during the punishment phase of the trial.\nTrevino returned to state court and filed a second habeas corpus application on the basis that his first attorney had a duty to investigate and present the mitigating evidence. Since the attorney failed to do so, Trevino claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to a competent attorney had been denied. The state court denied his application, stating that Trevino should have presented the ineffective assistance of counsel claim during the first state habeas proceeding. Trevino returned to the federal district court to reassert this claim, but that court also denied his claim because it was never properly raised in state court. The district court went on to explain that the allegedly ineffective performance of his first attorney during state habeas proceedings did not excuse his failure to present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim during those proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and Trevino appealed further. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question below.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55923:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55923:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55923:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court vacated the lower courts' decisions and held that a procedural default will not bar a federal court from hearing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court upheld a previous precedent established in Martinez v. Ryan that stated that an attorney's ignorance in a post-conviction hearing did not qualify as a reason to excuse a procedural default ruling. Because Texas' law made it virtually impossible for a defendant to present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim during an appeal, it was highly unlikely that a typical defendant could raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel\nChief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., dissented, and argued that the rule established in Martinez was specifically designed to be applied in a very narrow fashion and that the majority's opinion represented an inconsistent expansion of that holding. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a separate dissent in which he argued the rulings in both this case and Martinez drastically altered habeas corpus jurisprudence without providing clear benefits to the judicial process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55923:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55924:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55924:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGenerally, wireless phone service providers must obtain zoning approvals from state and local governments before building wireless towers or attaching wireless equipment to buildings. To speed up the process, Congress amended the 1934 Communications Act and required local governments to respond to zoning requests within a reasonable period of time. Despite this law, the zoning approval process still dragged on and severely delayed construction. In 2008, the Wireless Association petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (\"FCC\") to bring an end to these unreasonable delays. The Association recommended placing time limits on how long these zoning requests could take. The FCC agreed and in November 2009 set the following \"reasonable time\" limits for zoning requests: 90 days for attachments to current buildings and a 150 days for new structures.\nThe local governments claimed that the FCC cannot set these limits because the FCC cannot determine its own power under the Communications Act. When Congress passed the Act, it granted a certain amount of power to the FCC to enforce and define the rules under the Act. Under the long-standing Chevron doctrine of interpretation, courts should always defer to an agency's interpretation of a particular act. However, the Supreme Court had never determined whether this applies to situations where the agency defines its own power under a particular law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless deferred to the FCC and affirmed the declaratory ruling. The local governments appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari exclusively to answer whether the Chevron doctrine applies in this situation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55924:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55924:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55924:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing himself and four other justices, held that courts must apply the Chevron doctrine and defer to an agency's interpretation of its jurisdiction when that jurisdiction is called into question. The Chevron doctrine is supported Congressional intent that an agency should determine its jurisdiction when there is ambiguity in a statute. The Court held that there was no significant difference between \"run-of-the-mill\" ambiguity and important, \"jurisdictional\" ambiguity. Instead, every new application of an ambiguous statutory term could be reframed as a jurisdictional issue concerning the who, what, where, or when questions of an agency's regulatory power. The test should look at whether the statute's language prevents the agency's assertion of authority. If the agency's assertion is based on a permissible interpretation of the statute, then the courts must defer to the agency.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Although he agreed that courts should not get involved where Congress has deferred to an agency's judgment, he argued that the mere existence of ambiguity should not be considered conclusive evidence of Congress' intent to defer to that agency. Where Congressional intent is not clear, the courts should be permitted to interpret the statute accordingly.\nChief Justice John Roberts dissented and argued that a court should not defer to an agency until that court decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to deference. However, once a court has made such a determination, Chevron deference may be warranted. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55924:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55926:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55926:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, Congress enacted the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (\"the Act\"). Through the Act, Congress apportioned billions of dollars towards the funding of non-governmental organizations (\"NGOs\") involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS. NGOs qualify to receive this funding only if they satisfy certain conditions. One of these conditions requires that all federally funded NGOs implement a policy explicitly opposing prostitution.\nThe Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., Pathfinder International, Global Health Council, and InterAction are NGOs that receive funding under the Act. The NGOs brought suit against the Agency for International Development and the other agencies responsible for enforcing the Act, challenging the constitutionality of the Act's funding provisions. The NGOs argued that the funding provisions violate the First Amendment by restricting the organizations' speech and forcing them to promote the government's viewpoint on prostitution. The district court agreed with the NGOs and held that the provisions were too broad of a restriction on free speech. The agencies appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55926:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55926:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55926:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the majority opinion. The Court held 6-2 that the government may not use funding and the threat of the loss of funding as a method for the regulation of speech and policies of non-governmental organizations. Because the Act's funding provisions represent an ongoing condition on the actions of the group receiving funding, the provisions essentially act as government coercion. The Court held that the funding provisions require the groups to accept the beliefs of the government, which infringes on their First Amendment rights.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the government has the right to choose to give financial support only to groups which share its views on how to address a particular issue. The fact that the government must often choose among many policy options does not mean that the government is coercing groups to adopt its views. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.\nJustice Elena Kagan did not participate in the discussion or decision in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55926:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55927:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55927:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince 1982, Nike Inc. sold a shoe called the Air Force 1. The shoe has a distinctive appearance and Nike owns multiple federal trademark registrations for the shoe's design. In July 2009, Nike filed suit against Already, LLC for selling shoes that were confusingly similar to the Air Force 1 shoe. In November 2009, Already counterclaimed and requested cancellation of Nike's trademark on the basis that it interfered with Already's ability to continue selling its shoes.\nTo avoid further litigation, Nike provided Already with a covenant not to sue. The agreement promised that Nike would not pursue any legal action against Already with regard to trademark infringement. The District Court held a hearing to determine whether the covenant caused the court to lose subject matter jurisdiction over Already's counterclaims. Following the hearing, the District Court determined that it no longer had subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that the counterclaim alone did not create a case or controversy before the court; therefore the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55927:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55927:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55927:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that Nike's covenant not to sue made the case moot. Nike met its burden to show that it \"could not reasonably be expected\" to resume trademark enforcement action against Already. The language of the covenant was broad enough that the Court could not conceive of a shoe that would fall outside of its scope. The Court also rejected Already's assertion that dismissing the case would allow Nike to enforce invalid trademarks against any competitor by continually issuing covenants not to sue. Nike has an incentive not to do this because allowing many competitors to use Nike's marks, or confusingly similar ones, could lessen the strength of Nike's mark.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred, emphasizing that covenants not to sue should not be a first reaction to trademark litigation. Courts should be wary of large companies intentionally burdening smaller competitors with infringement actions only to turn around and promise not to sue after learning valuable future business information. A covenant not to sue should only terminate litigation when it meets the high burden required by in this case. Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55927:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55928:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55928:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) allows state and local law enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence, burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first and second degree assault charges. While under arrest, but prior to conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged in Maryland's DNA database. That database matched King's DNA to a DNA sample from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the only evidence linking King to the rape. The trial judge denied King's motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison.\nKing appealed the conviction, arguing that the MDCA was an unconstitutional infringement of his Fourth Amendment privilege against warrantless searches. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the MDCA was unconstitutional. The court held that King's expectation of privacy was greater than Maryland's interest in using the DNA for identification purposes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55928:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55928:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55928:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that conducting a DNA swab test as a part of the arrest procedure does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as to require a warrant. The routine administrative procedures that occur during a booking for an arrest do not require the same justification and the search of a location. The Court held that ascertaining an arrestee's identity and criminal history is a crucial part of the arrest procedure and that a DNA test is just as valid and informative as fingerprinting. Determining an arrestee's criminal history also serves the legitimate state interest of determining what level of risk the individual poses to the public and what conditions should be set on his/her release from custody.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Fourth Amendment categorically prevents searching a person for evidence of a crime without cause. Because the majority's opinion allows for DNA tests to be conducted in the absence of evidence linking the arrestee to a specific DNA-related crime, these tests fall within the boundaries of the British \"general warrants\" the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit. He also argued that the procedural safeguards on the DNA evidence make it an ineffective and redundant identification tool. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55928:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55929:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55929:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 12, 2003, Steven Levin was scheduled to undergo cataract surgery performed by Lieutenant Commander Frank Bishop, M.D., a United States Navy surgeon in Guam. Levin previously gave his written consent to the procedure but claims that he attempted to orally withdraw it prior to the surgery. He suffered complications from the surgery and faces continuing treatment with unclear likelihood of success. Levin sued Dr. Bishop for battery and negligent medical malpractice. The United States substituted itself for Dr. Bishop and filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the negligent medical malpractice claim, not the battery claim. The United States then filed for dismissal of the battery claim and alleged that the Federal Tort Claims Act preserved sovereign immunity against battery claims. The district court dismissed the claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55929:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55929:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55929:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered a unanimous opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanding for further proceedings. In general, the Federal Tort Claims Act (\"FTCA\") allows a plaintiff to bring a tort claim against the United States, unless that claim alleges an intentional tort, such as battery. However, the Medical Malpractice Immunity Act, also known as the Gonzalez Act, carved out a specific exception to this rule. The Gonzalez Act states that the intentional tort exception to the FTCA \"shall not apply\" to certain tort claims alleging wrongful or negligent medical care. The Court applied the plain meaning of the statute and held that the Gonzalez Act nullifies the FTCA's intentional tort exception when a plaintiff alleges medical battery by an armed forces physician. Since the intentional tort exception does not apply, Levin should be allowed to proceed with his suit against the United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55929:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55930:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55930:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn early 2010, Anthony Davila was tried for defrauding the federal government by filing false tax returns. During a hearing before the magistrate judge, Davila requested to discharge his court-appointed attorney. Davila was concerned that the attorney had not discussed any possible trial strategies with him; the attorney merely insisted that Davila plead guilty. The magistrate judge explained to Davila that there might not be another viable option and that pleading guilty may be the best advice his attorney could have given him. Following the judge's advice, Davila plead guilty and was subsequently sentenced to 115 months imprisonment.\nDavila appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Davila argued that the magistrate judge's advice to plead guilty warranted a new trial. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court must not be involved in any plea discussions. Since the judge commented on the weight of the evidence against Davila and suggested that a guilty plea would result in a more lenient sentence, he participated in such a plea discussion. As a result of this violation, Davila claimed that the court should vacate the judgment. The appellate court agreed with Davila, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55930:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55930:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55930:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a judge's improper participation in plea discussions does not belong in the \"highly exceptional\" category of errors that trigger an automatic reversal of a defendant's guilty plea. Instead, such misconduct falls within the category of \"harmless error.\" Because Davila failed to raise the issue of the magistrate judge's comments at his hearing, he had the burden to show that, but for the misconduct, he would not have pled guilty. In this case, the three-month window between Davila's conversation with the magistrate and his guilty plea de-emphasized the role of the judge's comments in affecting the plea.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that the case could be decided based simply on the text of the harmless error rule, which states that a harmless error is one that \"does not affect substantial rights.\" According to Scalia, the majority's analysis of legislative history to discern the scope of the harmless error rule was unnecessary. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the partial concurrence and concurrence in judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55930:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55931:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55931:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEmily M. Armstrong, daughter of Sandra and William Earl Armstrong, was born on February 25, 2000. She was seriously injured during her delivery resulting in mental retardation, cerebral palsy and several other medical conditions. Emily's mother applied for Medicaid two months after her daughter's birth. Since then the North Carolina state Medicaid program had paid over $1.9 million in medical expenses on Emily's behalf. Emily's parents and guardian sued the physicians for negligently delivering their child and won a settlement of $2.8 million. As a result, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (\"DHHS\") placed a lien on Emily's settlement, looking to recover some of the money it paid for Emily's health care services. Under the North Carolina third-party liability statutes, when a patient wins an award of medical expenses, the DHHS has the right to recover either the total amount spent on the patient's health care, or one third of the patient's recovery payment, which ever is less.\nEmily's parents and guardian brought suit against the DHHS, claiming that federal Medicaid law prevents the DHHS from taking her proceeds. Federal law prohibits recovery from any payments not made for past medical expenses. Since under North Carolina law a minor child is not allowed to recover for past medical expenses, Emily's settlement could not include such expenses. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina disagreed with this argument and granted summary judgment to the state.\nThe Armstrongs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision. While the appellate court agreed with the lower court that the DHHS has the right to recover from Emily's settlement, it remanded the case because the state failed to provide a mechanism for determining what part of a settlement covers past medical expenses. Since the North Carolina statutes do not attempt to recover payment for past medical expenses, they violate federal Medicaid law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55931:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55931:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55931:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the lower court. The North Carolina law is preempted by federal law to the extent that it would allow the state to recover part of a Medicaid beneficiary's tort judgment or settlement not designated for medical expenses. Arbitrarily designating one-third of a judgment as recoverable medical expenses lacks any limiting principle. If upheld, nothing could stop a state from arbitrarily designating one-half or all of a judgment as medical expenses. Calculating the actual amount of medical expenses in each case may be more difficult than the one-third rule, but similar allocation procedures are already used other circumstances, such as worker's compensation and separating compensatory and non-compensatory damages for tax purposes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred, stating that he agreed with the majority because the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services had already reached the same conclusion.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. dissented, arguing that no regulation or prior case law requires a specific allocation of damages recovered for medical expenses. States should be allowed more leeway to come up with a workable regulation to recoup Medicaid payments. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55931:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55932:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55932:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Fourteenth Amendment protects every person's right to due process of law. The Fifteenth Amendment protects citizens from having their right to vote abridged or denied due to \"race, color, or previous condition of servitude.\" The Tenth Amendment reserves all rights not granted to the federal government to the individual states. Article Four of the Constitution guarantees the right of self-government for each state.\nThe Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted as a response to the nearly century-long history of voting discrimination. Section 5 prohibits eligible districts from enacting changes to their election laws and procedures without gaining official authorization. Section 4(b) defines the eligible districts as ones that had a voting test in place as of November 1, 1964 and less than 50% turnout for the 1964 presidential election. Such districts must prove to the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of a Washington, D.C. district court that the change \"neither has the purpose nor will have the effect\" of negatively impacting any individual's right to vote based on race or minority status. Section 5 was originally enacted for five years, but has been continually renewed since that time.\nShelby County, Alabama, filed suit in district court and sought both a declaratory judgment that Section 5 and Section 4(b) are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the Sections and granted summary judgment for the Attorney General. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress did not exceed its powers by reauthorizing Section 5 and that Section 4(b) is still relevant to the issue of voting discrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55932:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55932:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55932:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act imposes current burdens that are no longer responsive to the current conditions in the voting districts in question. Although the constraints this section places on specific states made sense in the 1960s and 1970s, they do not any longer and now represent an unconstitutional violation of the power to regulate elections that the Constitution reserves for the states. The Court also held that the formula for determining whether changes to a state's voting procedure should be federally reviewed is now outdated and does not reflect the changes that have occurred in the last 50 years in narrowing the voting turnout gap in the states in question.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional in addition to Section 4. He wrote that the blatant discrimination against certain voters that Section 5 was intended to prohibit is no longer evident. Without such extraordinary circumstances, Congress cannot constitutionally justify placing the burden of Section 5 on the states in question.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments encompasses legislative action such as the Voting Rights Act. The legislative history and text of the Amendments as well as previous judicial precedent support Congress' authority to enact legislation that specifically targets potential state abuses. However, Congress does not have unlimited authority but must show that the means taken rationally advance a legitimate objective, as is the case with the Voting Rights Act. The evidence Congress gathered to determine whether to renew the Voting Rights Act sufficiently proved that there was still a current need to justify the burdens placed on the states in question. She also argued that, by holding Section 4 unconstitutional, the majority's opinion makes it impossible to effectively enforce Section 5. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55932:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55933:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55933:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo logging roads in Oregon, Trask River Road and Sam Downs Road, are owned by the Oregon Department of Forestry and the Oregon Board of Forestry. The roads are used primarily by various logging companies. These roads run parallel to rivers and use a series of ditches, culverts, and channels to direct storm water runoff into the nearby rivers. This runoff deposits large amounts of sediment in the rivers, which adversely affects the fish and other wildlife that relies on the water.\nThe Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) sued the Oregon State Forester, the Oregon Board of Forestry and several timber companies. The NEDC alleged that, since the runoff ditches and channels can be defined as \"point sources,\" the petitioners violated the Clean Water Act by failing to obtain permits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. In district court, the petitioners moved for dismissal by arguing that the runoff was exempt from the permits. The district court granted the motion. The NEDC appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the decision based on precedent that supported the NEDC interpretation of both the \"point source\" and the permit requirement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55933:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55933:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55933:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 7-1 majority, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the Clean Water Act exempts the storm water runoff from the permitting scheme because the runoff is not associated with industrial activity. Even though the roads are used for the transport of raw materials, they are not used for the manufacturing, processing, or storage of those materials. The Court deferred to the Environmental Protection Agency's own reasonable interpretation that the permit requirement extends only to traditional industrial sites, such as factories. Therefore, the runoff ditches and channels did not constitute point sources that require permits under the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55933:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55934:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55934:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoselva Chaidez came to the United States from Mexico in 1971; she became a lawful permanent resident in 1977. In 2003, she was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on three counts of mail fraud in connection with an insurance scheme. On the advice of her attorney, Chaidez pleaded guilty and received a sentence of four years of probation. The U.S. government initiated removal proceedings in 2009 under a federal law that allows deportation of any alien who commits an aggravated felony. Chaidez's attorney never told her that pleading guilty could lead to her deportation.\nChaidez filed for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. While this motion was pending before the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that it is ineffective assistance of counsel when an attorney fails to advise a client that he or she may face deportation as a result of pleading guilty. The district court concluded that Padilla did not announce a new rule, so its holding applied to Chaidez's case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla does announce a new rule and is not retroactively applicable in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55934:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55934:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55934:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Padilla ruling created an entirely new rule relating to whether advice about deportation fell under the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Because the Court considered this rule separately from previous cases, it was considered a new rule and therefore could not retroactively apply to already decided cases.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment only arguing that the Sixth Amendment provides for adequate assistance of counsel in the charged offense and does not extend to advice regarding possible consequences, such as deportation. He dissented in the Padilla case and therefore concurred only in the judgment in this case.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the decision in Padilla did not create a new rule but only extended previous analysis of Sixth Amendment rights to a new set of facts. Because the Padilla decision only clarified an attorney's responsibility to a client and did not create any new distinctions, the ruling should apply retroactively to previously decided cases. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55934:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55935:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55935:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDefendant Mark Gabelli was the portfolio manager for the Gabelli Global Growth Fund (GGGF), as well as several affiliated funds, from 1997 until 2004. Defendant Bruce Alpert had been the Chief Operating Officer of Gabelli Funds, a company that advises GGGF, since 1988. Beginning in 1999, Gabelli permitted another company, Headstart, to engage in \"market-time\" trading with GGGF. \"Market-time\" trading is premised on the fact that price movements during the New York trading day can cause corresponding movements in the international markets that will not be incorporated into new stock prices until the following day. Traders can then buy and sell at artificially low and high prices, respectively. By early 2002, Alpert became concerned about the effects of market-timing and instructed Headstart to reduce the number of those transactions. On August 7, 2002, Gabelli announced that all market-timing must stop, and Headstart pulled its money from GGGF.\nOn September 3, 2003, the New York Attorney General announced an inquiry into market-timing. On April 24, 2008, the SEC sued the defendants and alleged that Gabelli and Alpert knew of Headstart's market-timing but deliberately mislead GGGF's Board and shareholders in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The district court dismissed the SEC's claims for failure to bring the suit within the five-year statute of limitations, and the SEC appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55935:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55935:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55935:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWhen the alleged violation is committed. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Second Circuit and remanded. Starting the limitations period at the time of the violation is the most natural reading of the statute. This reading is supported by past precedent and dictionary definitions. In the past, the \"discovery rule\", which pauses the statute of limitations until fraud is discovered, has been applied when the victims of the fraud would be denied relief. The protection that the rule provides for the injured is not relevant to a Government enforcement action such as this one. It would also be nearly impossible to determine when the Government \"knows\" of a violation and Congress did not require that determination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55935:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55936:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55936:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDr. Naiel Nassar, who is of Middle Eastern descent, was hired by the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW) in 1995 to work at the Amelia Court Clinic (Clinic), which specializes in HIV/AIDS treatment. After three years there, he left to pursue additional training and returned in 2001 as an Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine and Infectious Diseases and Associate Medical Director of the Clinic. His immediate supervisor at the Clinic was Dr. Philip Keiser, whose supervisor at UTSW was Dr. Beth Levine. After being hired in 2004, Levine immediately began inquiring into Nassar's productivity and billing practices. In 2005, after interviewing a candidate who was of Middle Eastern descent, Levine stated in Nassar's presence, \"Middle Easterners are lazy.\" In 2006, after hiring the candidate, Levine made a similar statement in Keiser's presence. Keiser informed Nassar of these comments as well as the fact that Levine scrutinized Nassar's productivity more than any other doctor. Around this time, Nassar applied for a promotion that Levine actively undermined. In 2006, Nassar resigned from the UTSW faculty and cited Levine's harassment and the creation of an unhealthy work environment in his resignation letter. Nassar resigned with the understanding that he would be offered a position at the Amelia Court Clinic unaffiliated with the UTSW, but the Clinic was forced to withdraw its offer after heavy opposition from the UTSW faculty, who have an agreement with the Clinic regarding positions to be filled by faculty doctors.\nIn 2008, Nassar sued UTSW under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and argued that UTSW had constructively discharged and retaliated against him. The jury found in favor of Nassar and awarded him back pay and compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the retaliation claim but insufficient evidence to support the claim of constructive discharge.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55936:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55936:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55936:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe retaliation provision of Title VII requires the plaintiff to prove than an employer would not have taken an action but for the existence of improper motives. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that there must be a demonstrable causal link between the injury sustained and the wrong alleged. A standard understanding of causation supports the view that an action cannot be the cause of an event unless it can be shown that the event would not have occurred without the action in question. Because there is no language in the retaliation provision that states otherwise, it must be assumed that Congress intended to support the standard understanding of causation. The Court also held that lessening the causation standard would increase the number of frivolous claims and decrease the ability of employers and the courts to deal with the pressing issues of real workplace harassment.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the majority's decision creates an unnecessary dichotomy between discrimination cases and retaliation cases by restricting retaliation cases to a stricter standard of proof. In doing so, the majority's opinion ignores extensive judicial precedent that supports the close connection between anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions. Additionally, there is no evidence that Congress intended to provide less protection from discrimination than from retaliation, as the majority's reading of the provision suggests. She also argued that the \"but-for\" causation test is particularly difficult to implement in employment discrimination cases as it requires trial courts to reach conclusions as to what would have happened had the employer's thoughts been different. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55936:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55937:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55937:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, Coy A. Koontz requested a permit from St. John's River Water Management to develop more of his land than the original permit allowed. St. John's had jurisdiction over Koontz's land. St. John's agreed to issue the permit on the condition that Koontz deed the rest of his property into a conservation area and do some mitigation work on the surrounding areas. Koontz agreed to the deed but not to the mitigation work. St. John's denied the permit application.\nKoontz sued St. John's River Water Management, and the trial court found in favor of Koontz. A Florida trial court held that St. John's actions effected a taking of Koontz land and that imposing requirements for the issuance of a permit is only constitutional if the required action serves the same governmental purpose as the ban on development. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55937:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55937:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55937:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the government may not conditionally approve land-use permits unless the conditions are connected to the land use and approximately proportional to the effects of the proposed land use. This standard even applies when the government does not approve the permit but instead demands that the condition be met before granting the permit. Such demands, which amount to asking for property or money from an applicant, place a burden the applicant’s ownership of the land. This burden diminishes the value of the land, which violates the Constitutional protections against having property taken without just compensation.\nJustice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the limitations on the government’s ability to conditionally approve land-use permits do not apply to monetary exactions. She also wrote that applying those limits would likely inhibit local governments’ ability to charge reasonable permitting fees. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55937:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55938:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55938:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nArmarcion D. Henderson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of federal law. The sentencing guideline range was 33-41 months, but the judge sentenced Henderson to 60 months to ensure that he had the opportunity to enroll in the Bureau of Prisons drug program. Henderson did not object to the sentence. Eight days after sentencing, Henderson filed a motion to correct the sentence. The district court denied the motion.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Henderson did not preserve the error for correction under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, so the court reviewed the decision for plain error. Henderson did not show plain error because the error was not clear under current law at the time of trial. The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55938:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55938:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55938:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for a 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that that an error is deemed to be a \"plain error\" based on the law at the time of the appellate review of the case, not at the time of the trial. It is unreasonable to expect either the defendant or the trial court to predict the outcome of unsettled issues of law, therefore it is the role of the appellate court to review what is considered \"plain error\" at the time of the appellate review.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that an issue of law that is unsettled at the time of the trial cannot be considered \"plain error\" for the purposes of appellate review. An error can only be plain if it should have been obvious to the court and the prosecution at the time of the trial. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55938:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55940:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55940:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving above the speed limit. When Winder followed McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his eyes were red and glassy, and that his breath smelled like alcohol. McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered the sample taken anyway, and the blood test revealed McNeely's blood alcohol level was far above the legal limit.\nThe state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. The state appealed and argued that the risk of McNeely's blood alcohol level decreasing over time represented an exigent circumstance requiring a blood draw. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but that the case represented a departure from current case law; it transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55940:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55940:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55940:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against warrantless searches applies to blood alcohol tests unless specific exigent circumstances exist. Because each case must be considered based on its individual facts, there are cases in which the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood would be considered an exigent circumstance, but there is no reason to create a categorical rule. The Court also held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against bodily intrusions outweighs the state’s interest in gaining evidence quickly.\nIn his partial concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the case in question does not provide the basis for any categorical rule on the issue of conducting a blood alcohol test without a warrant. He also wrote that the Fourth Amendment does not allow the warrant requirement to be entirely ignored in drunk driving arrests. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that there must be a categorical rule on this issue to provide appropriate guidance to law enforcement officials. He argued that exigent circumstances exist and justify a warrantless blood test if the officer believes there is not sufficient time to obtain a warrant before critical evidence is lost through natural metabolic processes. If there is time to secure a warrant, the officer must do so. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the body’s natural metabolization of alcohol constitutes the destruction of evidence and represents an exigent circumstance. The importance of obtaining evidence allows the police to conduct a warrantless blood alcohol test without violating the Fourth Amendment.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55940:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55941:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55941:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKim Millbrook was an inmate at the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Millbrook alleges that a correctional officer took him to the basement of the Special Management Unit and sexually assaulted him while other officers stood by. Millbrook filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging sexual assault. Under 28 U.S.C. §2680(h), the United States is not liable for the intentional torts of its employees, except for certain torts committed by law enforcement officials. Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d. 868 (1986) limited claims that arise under §2680(h) to intentional torts by a law enforcement officer while executing a search, seizing evidence, or making arrests for violations of federal law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, holding that Millbrook's claim was precluded by Pooler. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the definition of seizure is limited to seizure of evidence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55941:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55941:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55941:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Supreme Court. The Court held that nothing in the text of the proviso itself implies a more specific reading than that a tort law claim may be filed when a law enforcement officer’s actions fall within the scope of his employment. The text indicates that Congress intended the proviso to focus on the status of the individual rather than the type of action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55941:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55942:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55942:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 1, 2009, Allen Ryan Alleyne and two accomplices robbed the store manager of a Mapco/East Coast convenience store in Petersburg, Virginia as he was dropping off the nightly deposit at the bank. In April 2010, after an extensive investigation, the authorities arrested Alleyne and a grand jury indicted him for robbery and possessing a firearm. On September 7, 2010, after a week-long trial, the jury convicted Alleyne on both counts and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced him to 130 months imprisonment.\nAlleyne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, claiming the district court made three specific errors: 1) the evidence against him wasn't strong enough to support his convictions; 2) he was convicted of aiding and abetting the robbery and not carrying it out, which changed his original indictment; and 3) he should not have received a mandatory 7 year sentence for possession of a firearm. The Fourth Circuit rejected all three of his claims. First, the appellate court refused to overrule the jury's decision on the strength of the evidence because a jury is best equipped to determine whether evidence is credible. Second, since aiding and abetting a crime is not itself a separate offense, it does not need to be included in the indictment and does not change the original charge. Finally, there was no indication that the district court should not have imposed the minimum sentence for possessing a firearm.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55942:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55942:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55942:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes, no. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury, which can only be accomplished if all of the facts that are elements of the crime are presented to the jury. If an element of the crime increases the mandatory minimum punishment, it must be submitted to the jury and found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also held that, because an indictment must contain every allegation legally essential to punishment, a defendant cannot be found guilty of a crime not included in the indictment.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that, although the Court generally follows precedent, when the analysis supporting a previous decision has been sufficiently undermined, it is appropriate to overturn it. She argues that the majority's opinion is not the result of judicial sentiment but rather a recognition of shifting Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that jury factfinding would serve as a check on judicial power to impose maximum or minimum sentences.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Sixth Amendment was intended to protect defendants from the government but does not limit a judge's discretion within the limits set by the jury. Once a jury finds a defendant guilty, it is the judge's duty to set a punishment within the appropriate limits, and there is no risk of judicial overreach within those limits. He also argued that the majority's decision does not have a basis in judicial history. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the majority's opinion alters judicial precedent simply because a majority disagrees with it, without the proper justification.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55942:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55943:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55943:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2002, Fane Lozman purchased a floating residential structure. The structure was rectangular and made of plywood. It contained no bilge pumps, no raked bow, no navigation aids, no lifeboats, no propulsion mechanism, no steering, and cleats, which were inappropriate for towing.\nLozman kept his floating home in a marina in the City of Riviera Beach. Lozman signed a lease with the city, moored the floating home to the dock, and affixed the home to land based utilities. Later, the city council passed a revised dockage agreement and accompanying Marina Rules. Pursuant to these rules, the city informed Lozman it would revoke his permission to remain on the Marina unless he executed a new agreement and complied with the new regulations. Lozman did not execute a new agreement and continued to remain at the marina.\nIn response, the city filed an in rem suit in federal court for trespass under federal maritime law. The city filed for partial summary judgment on its trespass claim. Lozman argued that his floating home was not a \"vessel\" under 1 U.S.C. § 3, and therefore not subject to maritime law. The district court granted the city's motion and held that Lozman's floating home was a \"vessel\" for purposes admiralty jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the lower court, and Lozman appealed the appellate court's determination that his floating home was a \"vessel\" under 1 U.S.C. § 3.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55943:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55943:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55943:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the 11th Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the 11th Circuit's definition of \"vessel\" is too broad. The Court focused on the language of the statute, which states that a vessel is \"capable of being used...as a means of transportation.\" While the floating home can move, it is not used for transportation in a practical way. The Court employed a \"reasonable observer\" test, holding that something's ability to float, does not automatically make it a vessel.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the reasonable observer test introduces a subjective element that upsets long established maritime precedent. The dissent would also remand the case to develop the record further. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55943:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55944:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55944:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1994, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted a patent to the Monsanto Company for genetic material from a virus that can be used to incorporate new genetic material into a plant. In 2006, Monsanto patented a gene that makes plants resistant to the glyphosate-based herbicides that farmers can use on weeds. Both patents are included in the Monsanto Technology agreement which states that growers who purchase Monsanto's products may only use the seed for a single season and may not sell the seeds to any other grower. Growers may sell the second-generation seed to a grain elevator.\nVernon Hugh Bowman, a farmer in Knox County, Indiana, began purchasing Monsanto's Pioneer Hi-Bred seed in 1999 and followed the terms of the agreement by not saving any of his seed. Also beginning in 1999, Bowman purchased second-generation seed from a grain elevator for his second planting and saved seeds from that purchase for reuse later. In 2006, Monsanto contacted Bowman to examine his planting activities and found that his second-round crops contained the patented genetic material. Monsanto sued Bowman for patent infringement. The district court granted summary judgment for Monsanto. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55944:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55944:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55944:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Elena Kagan delivered a unanimous opinion holding that the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not allow the purchaser to make copies of a patented item. Because the product in question is a seed, using the seed to grow a crop and then harvesting those seeds for future use constitutes creating copies of a patented item. In this case, Bowman's one-time purchase of Monsanto's product allowed him to take advantage of their patented product over the course of many seasons without respecting the rights of the patent holder. The Court also held that this reading of the doctrine allowed patents for plants to retain their value.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55944:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55945:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55945:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the early 1990s, Vernon Minton, a former securities broker, developed the Texas Computer Exchange Network (TEXCEN) software that allowed financial traders to execute trades on their own. R.M. Stark & Co. (Stark) agreed to lease TEXCEN. More than one year later, Minton filed for a patent that was granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office on January 11, 2000.\nMinton later sued the NASDAQ and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and alleged that their services infringed on his patent. NASD and NASDAQ argued that a patent is invalid when the invention claimed is sold more than a year before the patent application is filed. The district court granted summary judgment for NASD and NASDAQ. Minton retained new counsel to argue his case under the experimental use exception, which states that the patent remains valid if the invention was sold primarily for experimental, rather than commercial, use. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.\nMinton sued his original attorneys (collectively referred to as Gunn) for legal malpractice and argued that their failure to argue the experimental use exception in the original suit cost him the case. Gunn filed for summary judgment arguing no-evidence due to the fact that the attorneys did not know of the earlier sale in order for the experimental use exception to be relevant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Gunn. Minton appealed to the Second Court of Appeals for Texas. Shortly after he filed his appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided a case that gave jurisdiction to the federal courts in malpractice suits arising from patent litigation. Minton filed a motion to dismiss his case from the Second Court of Appeals for Texas, but the court denied his motion and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and dismissed the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55945:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55945:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55945:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the lower court and remanded. The Supreme Court applied Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., which provided that a case only arises under federal patent law when it \"necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.\" The Court held that Minton failed to show that the federal issue in the case carried the necessary significance. The need to decide a hypothetical patent case is not substantial enough to deprive the state court of jurisdiction. A state court decision in a state law malpractice case relating to patent law will not substantially affect federal patent law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55945:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55946:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55946:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (\"ACCA\"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.\nDescamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55946:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55946:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55946:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that Descamps' ACCA enhancement was improper because a felony burglary conviction under the California Penal Code is not a generic burglary conviction. To count for sentence enhancement under the ACCA, a prior burglary conviction must at least match a conviction using the traditional elements of the offense: \"breaking and entering a building.\" The Court also held that the Ninth Circuit's examination of Descamps' burglary plea hearing transcript exceeded the purview of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reiterated that sentencing courts may only consult outside documents to ascertain the basis of the defendant's conviction (\"modified categorical approach\") when the statute defines elements in the alternative—for example, \"breaking and entering a building [generic] or automobile [non-generic].\" California's burglary statute does not require \"unlawful entry\" as an element, or an alternative element, of the offense, so courts may not use the modified categorical approach. Allowing a sentencing court to determine, from the record, whether a defendant's prior conviction could have satisfied the traditional elements of the offense \"raises serious Sixth Amendment concerns,\" Such as encouraging ill-advised guilty pleas.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the majority opinion's concern that defendants would enter guilty pleas or let certain facts go uncontested without considering the potential consequences under the ACCA. He also expressed concern over the burden the majority's opinion places on state legislatures to revise their statutes. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the ACCA framework amounts to a judicial factfinding expedition that runs counter to what is allowed by previous precedent. However, because the majority opinion limited the circumstances under which courts may consult documents relating to the defendant's prior conviction, Thomas concurred in the judgment.\nJustice Samuel Alito wrote a dissenting opinion in which he contended that the majority opinion artificially limits the reach of the ACCA and treats similar convictions differently based solely on the arbitrary wording of state statutes. To remedy this problem, he argued that sentencing courts should always be permitted to consult the record to determine whether the defendant's conviction matched the generic offense.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55946:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55947:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55947:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn December 1996, Warren Hillman made his wife, Judy Maretta, the beneficiary of his Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance (\"FEGLI\") policy. In 1998, the two divorced and Mr. Hillman remarried. Despite the divorce, Mr. Hillman never changed the beneficiary designation on his policy to his new wife, Jacqueline Hillman. In 2008, Warren died and Jacqueline Hillman attempted to claim the death benefits under his policy. Her claim was denied because she was not the named beneficiary on her husband's policy; Ms Maretta received the death benefits instead. Mrs Hillman sued Ms Maretta for the full amount of death benefits under the policy.\nWhen a divorce is finalized in Virginia, state law revokes any beneficiary designations between former spouses. State law also creates a cause of action against anyone who wrongfully receives FEGLI policy proceeds. However, federal law under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act dictates that death benefits from FEGLI policies shall go to the designated beneficiary, regardless of state regulation to the contrary. The trial court applied state law and granted summary judgment to Mrs. Hillman, but Ms Maretta appealed. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the lower court's decision and held that federal law preempted the state law; therefore Mr. Hillman's beneficiary designation was not revoked. Mrs. Hillman appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55947:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55947:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55947:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA) preempts the Virginia law. By passing FEGLIA, Congress clearly intended that the insurance proceeds go to the named beneficiary. The state law, which allows a deceased employee's family to sue a designated beneficiary for the proceeds of a FEGLI life insurance policy, conflicts with Congress' intent.\nJustice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. He stated that he cannot join with the majority's conclusion because the consideration is unnecessary. The Supremacy Clause effectively repeals state laws that directly conflict with federal law as the Virginia law does with FEGLIA. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. stated that one of the purposes of FEGLIA is to implement the expressed wishes of the insured. Since the Virginia law has the effect of overriding an insured's choice of beneficiary, FEGLIA preempts it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55947:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55948:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55948:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2000, Solvay Pharmaceuticals successfully patented AndroGel, a topical gel medication. Shortly after the FDA approved the medication, generic drug manufacturers Watson Pharmaceuticals and Paddock Laboratories began developing generic versions of the gel. Solvay filed a patent infringement suit against Watson and Paddock, but the manufacturers counter-claimed that Solvay's patent was invalid to begin with. As the infringement suit progressed, Solvay feared that it would lose its monopoly on AndroGel. To prevent this, Solvay entered into a reverse payment agreement with the two manufacturers. In return for dropping the suit and maintaining exclusivity, Solvay agreed to pay the manufacturers a sizeable fee. The agreement allowed Solvay to maintain its monopoly, despite the possible invalidity of the patent, in exchange for sharing some of the profits with its potential competitors.\nShortly after entering the agreement, the Federal Trade Commission (\"FTC\") filed a complaint against the pharmaceutical companies. The FTC claimed that Solvay was unlikely to win the patent infringement suit; therefore the settlement unfairly protected an invalid patent monopoly. By limiting competition in the AndroGel market, the manufacturers were restraining trade in violation of antitrust laws. The manufacturers argued that the FTC failed to state a valid claim because the agreement merely protected Solvay's already existing patent rights. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with the manufacturers and dismissed the case. The FTC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court explained that the manufacturers' reverse payment settlement is lawful as long as it restrains competition in the same way that patent protection typically restrains competition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55948:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55948:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55948:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that reverse payment settlements are not presumptively unlawful and that the FTC's lawsuit should have been allowed to proceed. Although patent-based settlement agreements can sometimes violate anti-trust laws, the Court declined to apply an all-or-nothing rule regarding these agreements. Instead, the Court stated that there are five considerations that should have allowed the consideration of FTC's case. These considerations are: 1) that specific restraints in the settlement agreement had the potential to adversely effect competition; 2) that certain anti-trust consequences will sometimes prove unjustified; 3) that if a reverse payment settlement can cause anticompetitive harm, the patent-holder likely has the power to bring about that harm as well; 4) an anti-trust claim may be more administratively feasible than the lower court believed; and 5) the fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment settlement risks anti-trust liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuits. The Court held that these considerations outweighed the lower court's decision to provide anti-trust immunity to reverse payment settlements.\nChief Justice John Roberts wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority's decision discourages generic pharmaceutical companies from challenging patents because it eliminates the possibility of meaningful settlements. He argued that this decision instead forces generic companies into costly litigation that could be more efficiently handled through settlement negotiations. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55948:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55949:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55949:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrom 1993 through 2000, the United States Army Corps of Engineers imposed a temporary flood regime around the Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area. The flood regime caused flooding across the region encompassed by the wildlife management area, which restricted access to and destroyed or degraded thousands of timber trees.\nThe petitioners brought a case in federal court in an attempt to recover under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment for the loss of their property resulting from the United State's flood regime. The federal court held that the flood regime constituted a Fifth Amendment taking and that the United States owed petitioners approximately $5.6 million as just compensation.\nThe government appealed, and the appellate court reversed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court reasoned that the flood regime was a temporary government action, and that only a permanent flooding condition would constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The petitioners appealed the appellate court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55949:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55949:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55949:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, in some cases. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for an 8-0 majority, reversed the Federal Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that there is no temporary flooding exception to the Takings Clause. Prior precedent clearly establishes that a temporary interference with property can constitute a compensable taking. The length and severity of the interference is just one factor among many a court must consider when determining whether a specific action was a taking. Other factors include the intent behind the action and the degree to which the interference was a foreseeable result of an authorized government action. On remand, the Federal Circuit must decide whether the circumstances in this case constituted a Fifth Amendment taking.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55949:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55950:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55950:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGenesis Healthcare Corporation (\"Genesis\") employed Laura Symczyk as a registered nurse between April 2007 and December 2007. During her employment, Genesis implemented a policy that automatically deducted pay for employees' meal breaks whether or not they worked during those breaks. This prompted Symczyk to file a collective action on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals, alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\"). In February 2010, Genesis offered to pay all of Symczyk's unpaid wages and attorney's fees. Symczyk did not respond to the offer. Genesis filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that Symczyk no longer had a real interest in the outcome of the action since they offered her full relief.\nSince Genesis made an offer of judgment and no one had yet joined Symczyk's collective action, the District Court dismissed the case. Symczyk appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The Third Circuit held that a full offer of relief does not cause an FLSA collective action suit to be dismissed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55950:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55950:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55950:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that established mootness principles determined that, in cases that lack other claimants, the suit on behalf of other \"similarly situated\" employees becomes moot when the individual claim does. Since Symczyk no longer had a personal interest and was not representing the interests of a broader class, the case was properly dismissed.\nIn her dissenting opinion, Justice Elena Kagan argued that the premise on which the majority's decision is based—that Symczyk's individual claim is moot—is incorrect. She wrote that, because Symczyk rejected the settlement offer, she retained her personal interest in the case, and there was no reason to consider her claim moot. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55950:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55952:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55952:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2008 the General Counsel for the Office of the State Comptroller of New York advised against investing in a fund managed by FA Technology Ventures. The investment would have given FA Technology millions in service fees. The General Counsel received an anonymous email of \"blackballing a recommendation on a fund\" and threatened to disclose the General Counsel's extramarital affair to his wife, to the Comptroller, and to others if he did not change his recommendation within 36 hours. On the advice of law enforcement, the General Counsel asked for more time, which the individual granted. The FBI traced the emails to Giridahr Sekhar, a managing partner of FA Technology. Sekhar later admitted to sending the emails.\nSekhar was charged with one account of extortion and six counts of interstate transmission of extortionate threats under the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act prohibits obtaining property by threats. Sekhar moved to dismiss, arguing that the General Counsel's recommendation was not property. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the General Counsel's right to make professional decisions without outside influence was intangible personal property. Sekhar was convicted on six of the seven counts and sentenced to 15 months in jail. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55952:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55952:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55952:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that attempting to compel a person to issue a favorable recommendation does not amount to extortion under the Hobbs Act. The Court determined that the right of the General Counsel to issue a professional recommendation is not transferrable, and therefore lacks an essential characteristic of extorted property.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the key question was whether the General Counsel’s recommendation constituted property. As internal recommendations are not property, the issue of transferability became irrelevant. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined the concurrence in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55952:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55953:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55953:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter James E. McCutchen suffered a serious injury in a car accident, a benefit plan administered by US Airways paid $66,866 to cover his medical expenses. The plan requires the beneficiary to pay back the medical expenses out of any amount recovered from third parties. Once McCutchen recovered over $100,000 from third parties in a separate suit, the plan demanded that McCutchen reimburse them for the full amount they paid out. McCutchen argued that US Airways did not take into account his legal fees, which reduced his recovery amount from third parties to less than the amount demanded. US Airways then filed suit for \"appropriate equitable relief\" under the Employment Retirement Security Income Act (ERISA). The district court ordered McCutchen to pay the full $66,866.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, holding that ERISA is subject to equitable limitations. To determine appropriate equitable relief, the district court must take into account the distribution of the amount recovered from third parties between McCutchen and his attorneys.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55953:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55953:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55953:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a 5-4 majority, vacated the Third Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that equitable limitations did not apply to the benefit plan as a whole because the plan is a valid contract and the parties are only demanding what they bargained for under that contract. The common fund doctrine, however, may provide relief because the benefit plan is silent on the allocation of attorney fees. The common fund doctrine allows a litigant to recover attorney fees from a fund that is created, increased, or protected by that litigant. Because the parties did not contract otherwise, the common fund doctrine provides the best indication of the parties' intent. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nJustice Antonin Scalia dissented, arguing that the majority should not have discussed the plan's lack of a provision for attorney fees because it was not included in the question presented. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55953:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55954:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55954:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe level of pollution detected in the Santa Clara River, the Los Angeles River, the San Gabriel River, and Malibu Creek—collectively known as the Watershed Rivers—far exceeds what is allowed by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit held by Los Angeles County. The National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) and other environmental organizations brought legal action against the county and the district, alleging that the county violated the Clean Water Act. The allegations stem from the fact that the county and district allowed untreated storm water that had collected myriad pollutants to run unchecked through storm sewers and into the rivers. The county and district did not contest the fact that the amount of pollutants was high but rather contested the allegations that they were solely responsible.\nThe federal district court found for county and the district and held that there was no evidence that they were directly responsible. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision with respect to the Santa Clara River and the Malibu Creek but reversed the decision with respect to the San Gabriel River and the Los Angeles River.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55954:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55954:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55954:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the pumping of polluted water from one portion of a waterway to another section of the same waterway did not constitute pollution under the Clean Water Act. Based on the text of the CWA, the \"discharge of a pollutant\" refers to the addition of a pollutant to a waterway. Because the pollutant is coming from farther up the same waterway, it cannot be considered an addition. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55954:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55955:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55955:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2002, Jonathan Edward Boyer and his brother Anthony walked along a roadway in Sulphur, Louisiana. When Bradlee Marsh gave the brothers a ride, Boyer demanded money from Marsh. Marsh refused, and Boyer shot him in the head three times and took his money and a silver chain. Marsh died from his injuries.\nBoyer was indicted in Louisiana state court on second-degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm charges. The jury found Boyer guilty on both counts. Boyer filed a motion for a new trial, but was denied. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the second-degree murder charge, and 104 years without parole for the armed robbery charge. On appeal, Boyer argued that that the trial court erred in determining his mental competency, by sustaining the State's objection to Boyer's attempt to present testimony showing his brother - Anthony - had violent tendencies, and by giving Jonathan Boyer an excessively long sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and did not prejudice Boyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55955:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55955:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55955:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred, writing that the majority of the delay in the trial was due to the defendant himself. The defendant even moved to delay a hearing to solve the funding issue multiple times. The record did not support a finding that lack of funding was a significant cause of the delay. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the Court should defer to the lower court's finding that the majority of the delay was caused by a lack of funding. If the Court had addressed the question presented, Justice Sotomayor would hold that a delay due to lack of funding weighs against the State when determining whether there was a Sixth Amendment violation. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55955:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55956:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55956:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1978, Randy Curtis Bullock became the trustee of his father's trust. The trust's only asset was his father's life insurance policy, and Bullock and his four siblings were the trust's only beneficiaries. As trustee, Bullock was only allowed to borrow from the trust to pay the life insurance premiums and to satisfy a withdrawal request from another trustee. Despite these restrictions, Bullock borrowed from the trust three times: to satisfy a debt on his father's business, to allow him and his mother to purchase certificates of deposit, and to allow him and his mother to purchase real estate. All of the loans were fully repaid.\nWhen Bullock's two brothers learned of the existence of the trust and their brother's actions, they sued him in Illinois state court. They claimed that Bullock had breached his fiduciary duty by taking loans that violated the guidelines of the trust. The brothers moved for summary judgment and the court granted it. The court ordered Bullock to pay $250,000 in damages for the benefits he received from his dealings with the trust, $35,000 in attorneys' fees, and placed the property Bullock purchased—a mill in Ohio—in a constructive trust. The constructive trust was awarded to BankChampaign, which replaced Bullock as the trustee of his father's trust. Bullock was unable to sell the mill to satisfy the Illinois judgment.\nIn 2009, Bullock filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 to discharge his debt from the Illinois judgment. The bank started an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court where it argued that debts arising out of \"fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity\" are not dischargeable by bankruptcy. The bank moved for summary judgment and the bankruptcy court granted the motion. Bullock appealed the bankruptcy court's judgment to district court, and the district court affirmed. The district court recognized that the only way for Bullock to satisfy the judgment debt was to sell the mill, and the bank could not hold it in perpetuity, so the district court concluded that the bank was abusing its power; however, it still affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court and held that Bullock's conduct met the standard for defalcation because it was objectively reckless and constituted a known breach of a fiduciary duty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55956:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55956:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55956:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen J. Breyer delivered a unanimous opinion holding that a bankruptcy proceeding resulting from \"fraud or defalcation\" is not dischargeable and that the term \"defalcation\" encompasses knowledge of or grossly reckless behavior in a fiduciary capacity. The Court held that the term should include a knowledge or intent requirement because such a reading follows statutory and judicial precedent. Additionally, this interpretation differentiates the term from others in the statute and provides a clear definition on which courts may rely. The Court then vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case to determine if further proceedings were necessary under this heightened standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55956:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55957:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55957:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAmerican Express Company provides charge card services to supermarkets and other merchants throughout the United States. When a store decides to accept American Express cards, it must enter into a Card Acceptance Agreement. This standard form contract outlines the basic relationship between American Express and the merchant. A clause within the agreement requires arbitration of all claims brought against American Express and prohibits merchants from bringing any class action claims.\nSeveral merchants, including Italian Colors Restaurant, brought individual lawsuits against American Express, claiming that the Card Acceptance Agreement violates U.S. antitrust laws. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York consolidated the cases and American Express moved to dismiss in order to force the merchants to arbitrate. The district court enforced the arbitration clause and dismissed the case. The merchants appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the arbitration clause, in particular the class action waiver, is unenforceable because it would essentially protect American Express from antitrust suits. American Express further appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court vacated the ruling and remanded for further proceedings in light of its decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International. The appellate court reevaluated its decision and still found the class action waiver to be unenforceable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari again to resolve this issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55957:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55957:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55957:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the prohibitively high cost of arbitration is not a sufficient reason for a court to overrule an arbitration clause that forbids class action suits. Federal law does not guarantee that a claim will be resolved affordably. The fact that it can be more expensive to litigate individual arbitrations than they are worth does not negate the right to pursue a statutory remedy. Therefore, no exception to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) can be applied.\nJustice Elena Kagan wrote a dissent in which she argued that the purpose of the FAA is to resolve disputes and facilitate compensation of injuries. By barring any means of sharing or shrinking arbitration costs, the arbitration clause in the American Express form contract functions to confer immunity from potentially meritorious federal claims, which runs counter to the purpose of the FAA. The contract also violates the Sherman Act by depriving parties of a chance to challenge allegedly monopolistic conduct. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55957:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55958:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55958:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPPL Corporation held a 25 percent stake in South Western Electricity Board, a utility in England subject to a onetime windfall tax. After PPL paid the tax, it claimed a foreign tax credit under I.R.C. §901 on its U.S. tax return. §901 allows a credit for foreign taxes on \"income, war, profits, [or] excess profits.\" The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied the tax credit and issued a notice of deficiency. PPL then filed a petition in Tax Court to challenge the IRS's determination. The Tax Court agreed with PPL and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that §901 does not cover the windfall tax because it is a tax on the company's value, not its profits. PPL argued that, looking beyond the face of the statute, the windfall tax was intended to act as a tax on excess profits. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the CIR, holding that the windfall tax is not eligible for credit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55958:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55958:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55958:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Clarence Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that courts should apply a common-sense, substance-based approach when considering the effect of a foreign tax. Using this approach, the Court held that the U.K. tax is creditable under §901. The predominant character of the windfall tax was, for all intents and purposes, an income tax under U.S. definitions. The Court also held that the windfall tax should not fall under the same approach as a general tax on value. Value taxes, such as gift and estate taxes in the U.S., use past profits to estimate the tax value of future income. Conversely, the windfall tax is solely based on past, realized net income.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, but noted that an argument could have been made that the windfall tax was a tax on values as opposed to an excess profits or income-based tax. However, because that argument was not raised in oral arguments, she declined to rule on that issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55958:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55959:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55959:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, Caroline Behrend, along with Stanford Glaberson, Joan Evanchuk-Kind, and Eric Brislawn, brought an antitrust class action suit against Comcast Corporation. The petitioners were all Comcast cable customers, alleging that the company obtained a monopoly on the cable market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. By contracting with competitors to swap customers and subsume the regional cable markets, the company excluded and prevented competition amongst cable providers in the Philadelphia area. The proposed class of plaintiffs included all cable television customers in the Philadelphia area who subscribe or subscribed to Comcast's video programming services since December 1999.\nIn May 2007, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified the class, allowing the case to move forward. In light of a new antitrust decision in 2008 on class certification from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the District Court reconsidered its certification decision. The court held evidentiary hearings in October 2009, which consisted of dozens of expert testimonies and depositions. Following the hearings, the District Court recertified the class, finding sufficient evidence of a common impact amongst class members and a common methodology available to measure damages on a class-wide basis. Comcast subsequently appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55959:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55959:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55959:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Kennedy, held that the plaintiff’s class action was improperly certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because the lower courts failed to entertain competing arguments against the plaintiff’s claim for damages. Specifically, Justice Scalia noted that the lower courts only required that the plaintiffs provide a method to measure and quantify damages for the class without deciding whether such a method was a just and reasonable inference or if it was based on speculation. Because the lower courts failed to adequately establish the economic impact Comcast’s actions had on the plaintiffs, the lower courts were reversed.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a joint dissent joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. They argued that the Supreme Court did not actually decide the issue granted in the writ of certiorari. Instead, they argued that the court addressed the “merits arguments” present in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Because the question was reformed, it was inadequately addressed and the Court should not have issued a ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55959:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55960:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55960:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCalvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55960:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55960:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55960:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the unanimous court. The Court held that the defendant has the burden of proving withdrawal from a conspiracy regardless of when the withdrawal took place. Placing the burden on the defense does not violate the Due Process Clause because a defense of withdrawal does not negate an element of the crime of conspiracy. Instead, it assumes that the crime has occurred and starts the clock on the statute of limitations period for the prosecution. The Court held that a defense of withdrawal is considered an affirmative defense that places the burden of proof on the defendant. The Court also held that placing the burden on the prosecution to prove the withdrawal never happened would be a nearly impossible task, as witnesses would invoke the Fifth Amendment rather than discuss their criminal associations with the defendant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55960:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55961:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55961:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAdrian Moncrieffe, a native of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1984. In 2008, police arrested Moncrieffe while he was in possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana. Moncrieffe pleaded guilty in a Georgia court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.\nIn 2010, the department of Homeland Security started removal proceedings against Moncrieffe for being an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and as an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense. Moncrieffe did not dispute his conviction but argued that that the conviction was not an \"aggravated felony\" and did not make him removable.\nAn immigration judge ruled that Moncrieffe was removable, holding that the petitioner's conviction was an aggravated felony because Moncrieffe was convicted under a state law which was similar to a federal law which made possession of marijuana with intent to distribute a felony. Moncrieffe appealed and argued that possession of such a small amount of marijuana would not be a felony under federal law, but rather a misdemeanor. The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Moncrieffe's argument and dismissed the appeal. The United State Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the deportation order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55961:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55961:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55961:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a categorical approach must be used to determine whether a state offense is comparable to one listed in a federal statute. Because the Controlled Substances Act contains provisions for the conviction of the possession of marijuana as both a felony and a misdemeanor, it is unclear which one aligns with a conviction for the possession of marijuana under the Georgia state statute. Under the categorical approach, it is not possible to tell whether Moncrieffe's conviction under the Georgia state statute would constitute an aggravated felony. The Court held that if a noncitizen's conviction for possession of a controlled substance fails to establish whether remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, it cannot be considered an aggravated felony.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, because the Georgia state statute punishes Moncrieffe's offense as a felony, and it is punishable as a felony under the Controlled Substances Act, the conviction should be considered an aggravated felony. He also argued that the majority's opinion allows state felonies to be treated as federal misdemeanors, which runs counter to existing precedent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the majority's decision allows the leeway for convicted drug traffickers to remain in the country, which runs counter to the government's interest and existing precedent. Rather than following a purely categorical approach, the majority's decision creates a great deal of variation in the consequences for the conviction of the possession of a controlled substance based on the different state laws. He also argued that, because Moncrieffe did not prove that his offense falls under the definition of a misdemeanor, the deportation decision should be upheld.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55961:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55962:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55962:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn December 2004, Karen Bartlett's doctor prescribed Sulindac, a generic anti-inflammatory medication, to help treat her shoulder pain. Within months she began suffering from a severe reaction called Stevens-Johnson syndrome, which caused the skin condition toxic epidermal necrolysis. This condition deteriorated over 60 percent of her skin to the point of causing open wounds. As a result, she has suffered permanent and serious injuries, including near-blindness.\nBartlett filed a lawsuit against the Sulindac medication manufacturer, Mutual Pharmaceutical Company. Bartlett initially presented several negligence and product liability claims, but only her design defect product liability claim made it to trial. Beginning in August 2009, a jury at the Federal District Court for the District of New Hampshire heard evidence that Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous to consumers and therefore was defectively designed. Mutual countered, among several other defenses, that federal law governs generic drug manufacturers' conduct; therefore Karen could not pursue a state design defect claim.\nAfter 14 days of trial, the jury deliberated and sided with Bartlett, awarding over $20 million in compensatory damages. Mutual appealed the decision for several reasons, including the following: the district court misunderstood New Hampshire product liability law; and, the court improperly admitted several pieces of evidence and the jury award of damages was excessive. Mutual also reasserted its claim that federal law should prevail over a state defective design claim. Despite Mutual's arguments, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. Mutual appealed further to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55962:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55962:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55962:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that state law design-defect claims regarding the adequacy of a drug’s warnings are pre-empted by federal law which prohibits generic drug manufacturers from independently changing Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved drug labels. New Hampshire state law obligates Mutual Pharmaceutical to place a stronger warning on the generic drug labels, a requirement that is irreconcilable with federal requirements. Therefore, the state law is pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause, which states that federal law supersedes that of the states.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that state law should not be pre-empted without evidence that Congress acted with the intent to supersede state law, especially in fields historically dominated by states. The objective of Congress in creating the law prohibiting the alteration of labels was to prevent misbranding as a protection for the consumer; state law requiring adequate warnings on labels complements this purpose. The New Hampshire design-defect laws are an incentive to avoid strict-liability not a mandate that product labels must be altered, so they are not irreconcilable with the federal law. She also argues that design-defect claims are distinct from failure-to-warn claims. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent arguing that Mutual Pharmaceutical could comply with both state and federal law by not doing business in the state. However, if Mutual Pharmaceutical options are limited by the conflicting laws to paying a substantial damages remedy or leaving New Hampshire and these options are an obstacle to the goals of the federal law, then the relevant state law is pre-empted. Without any direction from the relevant federal agency, the FDA, or a general pre-emption clause in the federal statute, he concludes that the New Hampshire law is not a substantial obstacle and should not be pre-empted. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55962:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55963:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55963:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Ivan Sutter and Oxford Health Plans entered into a Primary Care Physician Agreement (PCPA). Under this agreement, Sutter provided primary care health services to patients in Oxford's care network in exchange for reimbursement by Oxford. The contract also included a general arbitration clause, which stated, in part, \"No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court.\" In 2002, Sutter initiated a class action, on behalf of himself and other health care providers under the PCPA, against Oxford, alleging breach of contract and violations of New Jersey law. Oxford moved to compel arbitration. The arbitrator found that the arbitration clause was so general that it encompassed any conceivable court action, including class actions. The arbitrator certified the class, and Oxford moved to vacate that decision in district court arguing the arbitration clause did not encompass class actions and the arbitrator exceeded his authority. The district court denied the motion and class wide arbitration proceeded.\nIn 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stolt-Neilson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., which held that an arbitrator exceeded his authority by allowing class arbitration when the parties had no agreement on the issue. Oxford moved for reconsideration from the arbitrator in light of Stolt-Neilson, and then moved in district court to vacate the arbitrator's most recent award. Both motions were unsuccessful. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55963:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55963:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55963:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Elena Kagan, delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the arbitrator's interpretation, deciding that the parties intended to authorize class-wide arbitration, did not exceed his powers. When parties agree to arbitration, the price of that decision is that an arbitrator may not interpret the contract correctly. Under the Federal Arbitration Act a court cannot overrule the arbitrator as long as the arbitrator provides an interpretation of the contract.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote a concurrence in which he noted that absent members of the plaintiff class did not consent to the arbitrator's authority and that an arbitrator may only authorize class-wide arbitration when given permission. However, since the petitioner submitted to the arbitration the question of abitrability cannot be raised. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55963:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55964:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55964:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral groups, including attorneys, journalists, and human rights organizations, brought a facial challenge to a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The provision creates new procedures for authorizing government electronic surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside the U.S. for foreign intelligence purposes. The groups argue that the procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment, Article III of the Constitution, and the principle of separation of powers. The new provisions would force these groups to take costly measures to ensure the confidentiality of their international communications. The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the groups did not have standing to bring their challenge. The groups only had an abstract subjective fear of being monitored and provided no proof that they were subject to the FISA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the groups had standing based on a reasonable fear of injury and costs incurred to avoid that injury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55964:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55964:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55964:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Samuel A. Alito, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the respondents did not have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because no injury occurred. Claiming a reasonable likelihood that their communications would be intercepted under FISA is not enough to show future injury for standing purposes. The Court also refused to acknowledge a present injury stemming from the respondents' choice to take costly measures to protect their confidential communications.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the future harm to respondents is not speculative and therefore should be sufficient to establish standing. Since there is a high probability that the government will intercept at least some of the respondents' communications, the respondents should have standing to bring the suit. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55964:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55965:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55965:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1999, Tara Williams was charged with the 1993 robbery-murder of Hung Mun Kim. During jury deliberations at Williams' trial, the judge received a jury note saying that one of the jurors, juror number six, expressed an intention to disregard the law due to a concern about the severity of the charge of first-degree murder. After an inquiry and evidentiary hearing, the judge dismissed the juror for bias.\nWilliams appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it removed juror number six, because the removal of the \"lone holdout\" juror violated Williams' Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury. The California Court of Appeals rejected her claim as meritless, and the California Supreme Court denied further direct appellate review.\nWilliams filed a state habeas corpus petition in Los Angleles County Superior Court. The court denied the petition, ruling that the issues raised in the petition were issues for direct appeal, not collateral attack. Williams next filed a federal habeas corpus petition, in which she again challenged the removal of juror number six. The magistrate judge concluded that the trial court's factual finding of bias was entitled to deference and that the discharge of juror number six did not constitute a constitutional violation. The district court adopted the report of the magistrate judge and dismissed the petition with prejudice.\nWilliams appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed the district court, holding that the deferential-review standard did not apply because the California Court of Appeal had only reviewed her state claim and had not adjudicated her federal constitutional claim. The appellate court then conducted a review of Williams' federal claim and concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not allow a trial judge to discharge a juror on account of his views on the merits of the case. The State of California appealed to the appellate court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55965:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55965:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55965:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. delivered a unanimous opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanding for further proceedings. The Court held that Williams' entire claim had been \"adjudicated on the merits,\" even though the California court did not expressly address the federal law claim. To adjudicate a claim on its merits, a state court is only required to evaluate the evidence and arguments; it is not required to expressly address every single claim. When a defendant presents a federal claim to a state court and the state court denies relief, it must be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on its merits. It is up to the defendant to rebut this presumption in order to seek federal habeas relief. To rule otherwise would unreasonably burden the state courts and require them to spend time expressly addressing even the most insignificant claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55965:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55966:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55966:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen the biological mother of Baby Girl became pregnant she did not live with the father and the father did not support the mother financially. The mother sent the father a text message asking if he would rather pay child support or relinquish his parental rights. He sent a text back, saying that he would relinquish his rights, though he later testified that he thought he was relinquishing his rights only to the mother. The biological father was a registered member of the Cherokee Nation. The biological mother attempted to verify this status, but spelled the father's name wrong and misrepresented his birthday in the request, so the Nation could not locate the father's registration. The mother listed Baby Girl's ethnicity as \"Hispanic\" instead of \"Native American\" on the birth certificate. The mother decided to put Baby Girl up for adoption because she had two other children that she struggled to support.\nAdoptive Couple, who resided in South Carolina, began adoption proceedings in that state. The Cherokee Nation finally identified the father as a registered member and filed a notice of intervention, stating that Baby Girl was an \"Indian Child\" under the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The father stated that he did not consent to the adoption and would seek custody of Baby Girl. After trial, the family court denied Adoptive Couple's petition for adoption and granted custody to the biological father. The court held that the biological father was a \"parent\" under the ICWA because of his paternity and pursuit of custody as soon as he learned that Baby Girl was being put up for adoption. Adoptive Couple did not follow the procedural directives in the ICWA to obtain the father's consent prior to initiating adoption proceedings. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55966:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55966:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55966:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, a non-custodial parent cannot invoke the ICWA to block an adoption voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent. The Court did not rule on the definition of \"parent,\" but, for the sake of argument, assumed that the biological father was a \"parent\" under the ICWA. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the ICWA was designed to stop the practice of unwarranted removal of Indian children from Indian families \"due to the cultural insensitivity and bias of social workers and state courts.\" In this case, however, the Court noted that the biological father never had either legal or physical custody of Baby Girl and had previously relinquished his parental rights. Because the biological father gave up custody before birth, and because Baby Girl had never been in his legal or physical custody, the ICWA's goal to prevent the breakup of Indian families did not apply. Furthermore, the Court held that the ICWA's preference for placing an Indian child with family, other members of the tribe, or other Indian families did not apply in this case because no other parties beside the adoptive parents had come forward to adopt Baby Girl. The Court feared that applying the lower court's rationale could lead to a scenario where a biological Indian father could play an \"ICWA trump card\" to override the mother's decision and the child's best interests.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas stated that the federal government, in passing the ICWA, may have interfered in the area of family law, a topic constitutionally reserved to the states. However, because the majority opinion avoided constitutional problems, he concurred with the decision. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate concurrence in which he stated that the majority's decision may adversely affect parents without looking at whether the parent would look out for the child's best interest, and that the ruling still raised the possibility of allowing an absentee father to re-gain custody with the support of his tribe.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority's opinion distorted the statute and led to a result that was both contrary to Congress' intent and potentially devastating to Baby Girl. Additionally, she argued that the majority completely ignores Congress' policy reasons for passing the ICWA and distorts the clear provisions in the act. Finally, Justice Sotomayor stated that the majority's interpretation of the ICWA applies adversely to all noncustodial Indian parents, regardless of whether those parents actively participated in their child's upbringing. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent, and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in part. In his separate dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the majority's definition of the phrase, \"continued custody,\" should have also included future custody. He also wrote that the majority's decision \"needlessly demeans the right of parenthood\" by removing a father's right to raise his child.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55966:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55967:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55967:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Association for Molecular Pathology along with several other medical associations, doctors and patients sued the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and Myriad Genetics to challenge several patents related to human genetics. The patents cover the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and certain mutations that indicate a high risk of developing breast cancer. The suit also challenged several method patents covering diagnostic screening for the genes. Myriad argued that once a gene is isolated, and therefore distinguishable from other genes, it could be patented. By patenting the genes, Myriad had exclusive control over diagnostic testing and further scientific research for the BRCA genes. Petitioners argued that patenting those genes violated §101 the Patent Act because they were products of nature. They also argued that the patents limit scientific progress. §101 limits patents to \"any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.\"\nThe district court granted summary judgment in favor of petitioners, holding that isolating a gene does not alter its naturally occurring fundamental qualities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that isolated genes are chemically distinct from their natural state in the human body. In March 2012, Petitioners sought certiorari; the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Mayo Collective Services v. Prometheus Laboratories. On remand, the Federal Circuit again upheld the patentability of the BRCA genes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55967:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55967:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55967:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that naturally occurring gene sequences, and their natural derivative products, are not patent eligible. Under §101 of the Patent Act, the discovery of natural products does not warrant a patent. However, the Court also held that the creation of a new product in a lab exempts that product from being a product of nature. Therefore, gene sequences refined by synthetic processes to create molecules that do not occur naturally are patent eligible.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55967:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55968:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55968:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTarrant Regional Water District (Tarrant) supplies water to north-central Texas. In 1955, Congress allowed Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas to negotiate an agreement allocating the water from the Red River, which forms the boundary between southeastern Oklahoma and northeastern Texas. In 1980, the states signed the Red River Compact and Congress ratified it.\nIn 2007, Tarrant sought to appropriate water from three locations in Oklahoma for use in Texas and applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), which was established to regulate in-state and out-of-state water usage. On November 1, 2007, Tarrant sued the OWRB and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Oklahoma statutes on water usage. Tarrant argued that the statutes placed burdens on interstate water commerce that are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and overstep the bounds of the Compact that Congress allowed the states to establish. OWRB moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55968:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55968:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55968:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the Compact's silence regarding state lines indicated an understanding that the Compact was meant to respect state lines, so state statutes do not conflict with the Compact's allocation of water. Long-running precedent supports the principle that states do not cede water rights within their own territories. Any other reading of the Compact would create jurisdictional and administrative confusion. The Court also held that the Compact does not violate the Commerce Clause by allowing states to interfere in interstate commerce because the Compact does not leave water unallocated for states statutes to affect.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55968:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55969:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55969:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Eugene Spears and three other lawyers instituted several \"group action\" lawsuits against several South Carolina car dealerships for allegedly collecting unlawful fees from car buyers. The lawyers obtained the personal information of thousands of car buyers from the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles through a Freedom of Information Act request. The lawyers used this data to identify potential plaintiffs for the group action, and sent mailings to each of those plaintiffs notifying them of the litigation.\nEdward F. Maracich and two other car buyers who received mailings, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, sued the lawyers. The buyers alleged that the lawyers violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) by obtaining their personal information for purposes of mass solicitation. The lawyers argued that they acted properly under the litigation exception to the DPPA. The DPPA allows disclosure of private information in connection with any state or federal litigation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the lawyers, holding that they did not engage in prohibited solicitation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the lawyers did engage in solicitation, but their actions were within the litigation exception to the DPPA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55969:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55969:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55969:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the exceptions to the DPPA's protections do not encompass the use of personal information for solicitation of legal clients. If the exceptions could be interpreted so broadly, the purpose of DPPA—protecting personal information—would be defeated. The Court also held that solicitation was a distinct act separate from litigation and therefore not subject to the litigation exception to the DPPA. Similarly, the DPPA does not allow access to personal information after a lawsuit has been filed. The Court held that a lawyer would only need to file a placeholder lawsuit to gain access to the personal information database, which would prevent the DPPA from providing sufficient protection.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that the DPPA allows the use of DMV-supplied personal information when connected with a specific, concrete legal proceeding. In such cases, the information adds directly to the development of a case. She also argued that the majority's opinion creates a limitation that has no basis in the text of the DPPA. The majority's reading also confuses the interpretation and implementation of the DPPA as a whole. Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55969:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55971:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55971:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMark McBurney is a citizen of Rohde Island and a former resident of Virginia where his son lives. When McBurney's wife defaulted on child support obligations, he asked the Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement (VDCSE) to file a petition for child support on his behalf. After a nine-month delay, the petition was filed and granted. He then filed a Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) request with the VDCSE for all records pertaining to his son and ex-wife. The VDCSE denied the request, arguing that the information was confidential and McBurney was not a citizen of the state. While McBurney eventually obtained most of needed the information through other sources, he never got all of the information from his VFOIA request.\nMcBurney sued in district court arguing that denial of the VFOIA request violated the privileges and immunities clause and the dormant commerce clause of the Constitution. The district court ruled against McBurney. Mc Burney along with two others appealed their VFOIA denials to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court. The Court of Appeals held that VFOIA did not hinder a non citizen's right to pursue buisness in the state and did not place a burden on interstate commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55971:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55971:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55971:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Samuel A. Alito delivered a unanimous opinion affirming the Fourth Circuit’s judgment. The Court held that VFOIA does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because VFOIA does not actually violate any fundamental privileges or immunities. Though the Petitioners argued that VFOIA interferes with their fundamental ability to earn a living, own property, and access Virginia courts, the Court rejected these arguments. The Court was also unconvinced that the right to access public information is a fundamental privilege or immunity because neither the Constitution nor the common law guarantees the existence of acts like VFOIA. The Court further held that VFOIA does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because the law does not interfere with the natural functioning of the interstate market. Since VFOIA neither prohibits access to an interstate market nor imposes burdensome regulation on that market, there is no dormant Commerce Clause issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55971:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55973:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55973:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Department of the Air Force owns a section of land that Highway 1 crosses, and the Department has granted roadway easements to the State of California and Santa Barbara County. Highway 1 runs next to the main gate of Vandenberg Air Force Base (Vandenberg). Near the gate is a designated area for public protesting that falls under the Highway 1 easement.\nJohn D. Apel was barred from Vandenberg's property in 2007 for trespassing. In 2010, while the order barring him was still in effect, he entered the designated protest area three times and was asked to leave. On all three occasions the respondent failed to leave. In two separate trials, Apel was convicted of three violations of a federal statute prohibiting a person from reentering a military installation after a commanding officer has ordered him not to reenter. Apel appealed, arguing that the federal statute requires that the base has exclusive possession over the area. The district court affirmed the convictions by holding that, under the terms of the easement, the land is subject to base rules and regulations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, because the area is subject to an easement, the federal government does not have an exclusive right of possession, so the conviction cannot stand.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55973:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55973:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55973:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that there has historically been a great deal of variation in the ownership status of U.S. military sites around the world, so there is no precedent to support the view that a statute does not apply on a base merely because the base does not have exclusive ownership of the land. Although the base granted the easement, it remained under the jurisdiction of the base commander, who remained in control of all points of access to the base.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that, when the government creates specific protest places on its property, the First Amendment requires that the government only impose reasonable limitations that are content-neutral and tailored to serve a significant government interest. Although Apel's removal might not stand up to this constitutional review, the Court was correct in not reaching a decision on this issue. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence. Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he argued that the Supreme Court did not address the constitutional issues in this case because they were not addressed by the Court of Appeals. The failure to address these issues does not indicate agreement or disagreement with the views outlined in Justice Ginsburg's concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55973:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55974:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55974:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn November 2006 election, a majority of Michigan voters supported a proposition to amend the state constitution to prohibit \"all sex-and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting.\" The day after the proposition passed, a collection of interest groups and individuals formed the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (Coalition). The Coalition sued the governor and the regents and boards of trustees of three state universities in district court by arguing that the proposition as it related to public education violated the Equal Protection Clause. About a month later, the Michigan Attorney General and Eric Russell, an applicant to the University of Michigan Law School, filed separate motions to intervene as defendants, which were granted. Both sides moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved to have Russell removed from the case as he did not represent interests separate from those of the Michigan Attorney General. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and granted the motion to remove Russell as an intervenor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding the proposed amendment unconstitutional and upholding the removal of Russell as a party to the litigation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55974:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55974:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55974:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the three-justice plurality. The plurality held that this case was not about the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions, but rather about whether the voters of a state can choose to prohibit the use of race preferences in the decisions of governmental bodies, specifically with respect to school admissions. The plurality held that the attempt to define and protect interests based on race ran the risk of allowing the government to classify people based on race and therefore perpetuate the same racism such policies were meant to alleviate. While voters may certainly determine that some race-based preferences should be adopted, it is not the role of the courts to disempower the voters from making such a choice. If certain issues were decided to be too sensitive to be addressed by voters, it would be denying the voters their right to debate and act through the lawful democratic process.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the use of racial preferences might reinforce racial awareness and therefore do more harm than good. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that a state law that provided equal protection by not allowing the use of racial preferences at least facially did not violate the Constitution. Justice Scalia argued that judges should not be in the position of dividing the country into racial blocs and determining what policies are in each one's interests. Additionally, Justice Scalia saw no reason to allow local subordinate authorities to have more power over the use of race-based preferences than the voters of the state. Since the amendment in question prohibits the use of racial preferences, it patently provides equal protection under the law rather than denying it. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, while the Constitution allows local, state, and national communities to implement narrowly tailored, race-conscious policies, it is the voters and not the courts who should determine the merits of such strategies. The amendment better allowed for this process to take place because it took the power to decide whether to implement race-conscious policies away from unelected actors and placed it firmly in the hands of the voters.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the democratic process does not in and of itself provide sufficient protection against the oppression of minority groups, which is why the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment exists. Although equal protection is typically construed as referring to the treatment of different groups under existing laws, it also protects against the implementation of new laws that would oppress certain groups on the basis of race, among other things. Because the amendment in question creates one admission process for those who do think race should be considered and a separate one for those who do not, it places special burdens on minority groups in a manner that violates the Equal Protection Clause. Judicial precedent holds that governmental action violates the Equal Protection Clause when it has a racial focus that places a greater burden on minority. The amendment in question both has a racial focus and places a greater burden on the minority; therefore, it violates the Equal Protection Clause, and the voters of a state cannot democratically ratify an amendment that violates the Constitution. Justice Sotomayor argued that the plurality and concurring opinions allow a majority of voters in Michigan to prevent the elected university boards from implementing constitutional race-sensitive admission policies, and therefore they ignore a key purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissenting opinion.\nJustice Elena Kagan did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55974:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55975:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55975:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) provides that if certain requirements are met, including a compact between the state and the tribe, an Indian tribe can operate a casino on Indian lands. Under the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, lands bought with funds from a congressionally established trust are Indian lands. On November 3, 2010, the Bay Mills Indian Community, a federally recognized Indian tribe with a reservation located in northern Michigan, opened a small casino in the town of Vanderbilt, Michigan, on lands purchased with funds from this trust. The state of Michigan sued for closure of the casino by claiming that the Bay Mills casino violated state gaming laws, as well as various provisions of its Tribal-State compact. The district court entered a preliminary injunction ordering Bay Mills to stop the gambling at the Vanderbilt casino. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction and held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over some of the plaintiffs' claims, while Bay Mills' sovereign immunity bars the others.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55975:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55975:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55975:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Indian tribes have sovereign immunity that can only be revoked by Congress. Additionally, the Supreme Court's decision in Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies extended an Indian tribe's sovereign immunity to lawsuits arising out of the tribe's commercial activity. In this case, Congress, via the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, only regulated an Indian tribe's sovereignty for suits concerning gambling activity on Indian lands. Because Michigan's suit against the Tribe was based on the claim that the new gambling activity was taking place off of the Tribe's land, Michigan cannot rely on the sovereignty abrogation in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The Court also held that states may still act against tribe's who establish gambling venues outside of Indian lands, either by denying a gambling license if the establishment is not located on Indian land or by waiving the tribe's sovereign immunity when negotiating the agreement required by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.\nIn her concurrence in the judgment, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the principle of \"comity,\" or mutual respect between sovereigns, supported the majority's opinion because the Court had previously ruled that states have sovereign immunity against suits brought by Indian Tribes. Furthermore, tribal sovereign immunity should not be abrogated simply because the Tribe was participating in commercial activity, as such a precedent would deter Tribes from participating in commercial activity, which is a necessary aspect of the Tribes becoming actually sovereign as opposed to relying on federal funds.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that a sovereign's immunity relates to immunity within the sovereign's own court system, not to immunity from the courts of other sovereigns. Therefore, an Indian tribe would only be immune from federal and state courts when federal or state law says that Indian tribes are immune. Justice Thomas also argued that any federal law that granted Indian tribes immunity from state courts for off-reservation acts would infringe upon the sovereignty of the individual states. Congress had previously abrogated foreign sovereign immunity when suits are based on a foreign sovereign's commercial activity in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; similarly, in this case, immunity from commercial suits is not fundamental to protecting a Tribe's interest in controlling its internal affairs. Lastly, Justice Thomas stated he would overrule the Court's previous decision in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, which first extended tribal sovereign immunity to a tribe's commercial activities. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that, for the reasons stated in Justice Thomas' dissent, he would also overrule the previous decision in Kiowa. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissent in which she expressed her general concurrence with Justice Thomas's dissent, but she noted a reservation concerning Justice Thomas's expansive view of state sovereignty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55975:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55976:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55976:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 25, 2011, the State of Mississippi sued a group of liquid crystal display (LCD) manufacturers and claimed that they harmed consumers by engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices for LCD panels, which artificially inflated prices. On June 9, 2011, the respondents jointly removed the case from the Chancery Court of Hinds County to the federal district court and asserted federal jurisdiction was satisfied under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Class action and mass action suits can be properly removed to federal court under the CAFA.\nThe State of Mississippi moved to remand the case to state court because the claims in the suit were asserted on behalf of the general public, which prevented the case from falling under federal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion. The respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals of Fifth Circuit, which reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the suit qualified as a mass action under the CAFA and that Mississippi brought the case in the interest of individual citizens, so the general public exception was not applicable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55976:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55976:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55976:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that, while CAFA allows defendants in mass action civil suits to remove the case to federal district court, this case does not qualify as a mass action under CAFA. The plain text of CAFA states that a mass action refers to any case with 100 or more persons seeking to try a case jointly for monetary compensation. The Court held that the language of the statute reinforces the interpretation that \"persons\" refers to plaintiffs in the sense of real named parties to the suit. Because Mississippi is the only named plaintiff in this case, it does not fulfill the meaning of a mass action under CAFA, and the case should be considered in state court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55976:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55977:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55977:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the early 1990s, BG Group PLC (BG), a British company, made a major investment in Argentina's natural gas industry. Later, in the midst of an economic crisis, Argentina enacted an emergency law that required investors to collect tariff revenues in Argentinian pesos at a rate of one peso per dollar. Given the weak international peso-to-dollar exchange rate, these changes that made it difficult for BG to see a return on its investment. Simultaneously, Argentina adopted legislation that stayed all lawsuits arising from the emergency measures. . BG sought recourse under a bilateral investment treaty (Treaty) between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The Treaty required that BG first attempt to resolve its dispute before a \"competent tribunal\" in Argentina for at least eighteen months. Instead, BG bypassed the Argentinian courts and submitted its dispute directly to an arbitral tribunal. The arbitral panel, seated in Washington, D.C., held that Argentina's changes to its judicial system excused the eighteen-month precondition to arbitration and awarded BG over US$185 million in damages. Argentina petitioned the district court to vacate the award under the Federal Arbitration Act by arguing that the arbitral panel exceeded its powers. The court denied the petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the determination of whether BG could submit its dispute directly to arbitration must be made by a court, not the arbitral tribunal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55977:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55977:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55977:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the task of interpreting the Treaty's local litigation provision fell to the arbitrator, and courts should give deference to the arbitrator's findings. Whether a party has satisfied a precondition to arbitration is a procedural matter left for arbitrators under ordinary contract law. The fact that the document at issue is a treaty does not make a critical difference because the text contained no evidence that the parties intended to bypass ordinary contract presumptions about who should decide threshold arbitration issues. The Court further held that the arbitrators' determination that the local litigation provision did not act as a bar to arbitration was within their interpretative authority.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote an opinion concurring in part in which she noted that explicitly labeling a local litigation provision as a condition on the parties' consent to arbitrate would change her analysis. Justice Sotomayor argued that such a label signals the parties' intent for courts, not arbitrators, to decide the issue.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the local litigation provision is a condition to the formation of an agreement between the investors and host country to eventually submit their dispute to arbitration. As courts usually decide issues concerning conditions on a party's consent to arbitrate, Justice Roberts would have remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55977:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55978:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55978:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over 500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.\nOn September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment-based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were \"persons\" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55978:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55978:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55978:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress intended for the RFRA to be read as applying to corporations since they are composed of individuals who use them to achieve desired ends. Because the contraception requirement forces religious corporations to fund what they consider abortion, which goes against their stated religious principles, or face significant fines, it creates a substantial burden that is not the least restrictive method of satisfying the government's interests. In fact, a less restrictive method exists in the form of the Department of Health and Human Services' exemption for non-profit religious organizations, which the Court held can and should be applied to for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby. Additionally, the Court held that this ruling only applies to the contraceptive mandate in question rather than to all possible objections to the Affordable Care Act on religious grounds, as the principal dissent fears.\nIn his concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the government had not met its burden to show that there was a meaningful difference between non-profit religious institutions and for-profit religious corporations under the RFRA. Because the contraception requirement accommodates the former while imposing a more restrictive requirement on the later without showing proper cause, the requirement violates the RFRA.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority's decision was precluded by the Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith in which the Court held that there is no violation of the freedom of religion when an infringement on that right is merely an incidental consequence of an otherwise valid statute. Additionally, judicial precedent states that religious beliefs or observances must not impinge on the rights of third parties, as the sought-after exemption would do to women seeking contraception in this case. Justice Ginsburg also wrote that the majority opinion misconstrued the RFRA as a bold legislative statement with sweeping consequences. Because for-profit corporations cannot be considered religious entities, the burden the respondents claim is not substantial, and the government has shown a sufficiently compelling interest, Justice Ginsburg argued that the contraception mandate does not violate the RFRA. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent. In their separate dissent, Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan wrote that the Court need not decide whether for-profit corporations or their owners may sue under the RFRA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55978:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55980:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55980:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe workers and relatives of workers in the Gonzalez-Catan plant of Mercedes Benz Argentina, a wholly owned subsidiary of German-based DaimlerChrysler AG (\"the company\"), sued the company for violations of the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991. They argued that, during Argentina's \"Dirty War\" of 1976-1983, the company sought to punish plant workers suspected of being union agitators and worked with the Argentinean military and police to do so by passing along information and allowing the plant to be raided. The plaintiffs also argued that the company stood to gain from these actions as they ended strikes and allowed the plant to continue operating at maximum production levels.\nThe plaintiffs sued the company in district court in California, where some of the company's major subsidiaries are located under the Alien Torts Act, and the company moved for dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion for dismissal and held that the company did not have enough contacts in California to warrant a California court exercising jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision and held that it is reasonable for a California court to have jurisdiction over a multinational company that is capable of litigating the case regardless of the location and has pervasive business contacts in the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55980:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55980:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55980:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the company's slim contacts in California, relative to its other national and international contacts, are not sufficient to render it \"at home\" in the state for the purpose of general jurisdiction. Because the company had so little connection to California and this suit had nothing to do with the company's conduct in the state, to allow the district court to adjudicate such a case would grant the courts essentially global reach as long as the foreign company in question did any business with the state. The Court also held that subjecting the company to this suit would not be in line with the \"fair play and substantial justice\" standard the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands.\nIn her opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the majority opinion ignored due process and jurisdiction precedent by basing the decision on the company's contacts outside the state rather than inside. She argued that such a case should be decided based solely on whether a company has sufficient contacts within the state to establish jurisdiction, without considering those contacts in relation to a larger company presence. Because this case dealt with foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign company for actions committed abroad, California jurisdiction should be considered unreasonable without the analysis of the majority opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55980:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55983:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55983:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 23, 2008, the Mendocino County dispatch center received a call from a Humboldt County dispatcher with the information that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck had run an unidentified vehicle off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. The original caller had also provided the license plate number of the pickup truck in question. The dispatch center broadcast that information to officers in the area, and two separate officers soon reported seeing the vehicle and began following it. The officers pulled the vehicle over, and while requesting information from the driver, smelled marijuana. During a search of the vehicle, the officers found four large bags of marijuana in the truck bed. The occupants of the vehicle, Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette, were arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale.\nAt trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop and argued that the evidence did not establish a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the stop. The state argued that the anonymous tip combined with the officers' observations of details that matched the tip constituted reasonable suspicion of the alleged reckless driving. The magistrate judge denied the motion. After the defendants petitioned for a review of this decision and were denied by both the California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five and the California Supreme Court, the defendants pled guilty. The California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55983:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55983:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55983:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated, which justified the traffic stop. Because the reasonable suspicion standard allows an officer to rely on information beyond what that officer personally observed, a stop based on an anonymous tip does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the officer had reason to believe the information contained in the tip was reliable. In this case, the information came in the form of a call from the driver who had been run off the road, which means that the caller claimed eyewitness knowledge of the incident. Additionally, the timeline of the events suggest that the call was made almost immediately after the incident, so the caller presumably would not have had sufficient time to concoct a story. The Court held that, because the anonymous tip had these indicators of reliability and reported driving behavior consistent with reports of drunk driving that resulted in a car being run off the road, the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion and did not need to observe the alleged behavior at length.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the aspects of the anonymous tip that the majority opinion argues make it reliable do not in fact make the information trustworthy enough to stand uncorroborated. Justice Scalia argued that the supposed eyewitness status of the caller could be afforded to anyone who saw the truck and wanted the driver to be pulled over and that any time at all between the alleged incident and the phone call allowed the caller to create a false story. Since the caller only reported a specific instance of unsafe driving—forcing another car off the road—there was no reason for the police officer to suspect ongoing drunk driving. When the officers observed the car and still did not see any indication of impaired driving, the reliability of the anonymous tip was further undermined, and there was no reasonable suspicion for the officer to conduct a traffic stop. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55983:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55984:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55984:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 12, 2009, Abel Lopez was attacked and robbed by a man he later identified as Walter Fernandez. Lopez managed to call 911, and a few minutes after the attack, police and paramedics arrived on the scene. Detectives investigated a nearby alley that was a known gang location where two witnesses told them that the suspect was in an apartment in a house just off the alley. The detectives knocked on the door of the indicated apartment, and Roxanne Rojas answered. The detectives requested to enter and conduct a search, at which point Walter Fernandez stepped forward and refused the detectives entry. They arrested Fernandez and took him into custody. Police officers secured the apartment, informed Rojas that Fernandez had been arrested in connection with a robbery, and requested to search the apartment. Rojas consented to the search verbally and in writing. During the search, officers found gang paraphernalia, a knife, and a gun.\nAt trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search, and the trial court denied the motion. The jury found Fernandez guilty on the robbery charge, and he did not contest the charges for possession of firearms and ammunition. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed and held that the warrantless search was lawful because a co-tenant consented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55984:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55984:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55984:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that, although a warrant is generally required for a search of a home, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is whether the search was reasonable. Although warrantless searches are unreasonable when two co-tenants are present and one objects to the search, the Court has held that the same search is reasonable when the objecting tenant leaves. In this case, because the objecting tenant was arrested and no longer present, the Court held that the search was reasonable because the consenting tenant had the authority to allow the police into her home.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he refused the petitioner's argument that general property law should govern in this case. Specifically, he noted that a guest could not trespass on a property if one tenant allowed that guest to enter the property despite a co-tenant's objection. Therefore, he argued that the police could not have infringed on any property rights. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that he disagreed with a prior holding regarding warrantless searches, Georgia v. Randolph . There, the Court held that, where two co-tenants are present and one tenant consents to a police search while the other refuses, the search is not constitutional. Instead, Thomas argued that a warrantless police search is constitutional if the police obtain voluntary consent from a person authorized to give that consent.\nIn her dissent Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg argued that the police, once they were aware of Fernandez' objection, should have gotten a warrant prior to searching the premises. Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55984:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55985:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55985:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2006 Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson traveled from Las Vegas, Nevada to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to San Juan, Puerto Rico before returning to Las Vegas by way of Atlanta, Georgia. The two are professional gamblers with residences in California and Las Vegas. At a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) checkpoint in San Juan, Fiore and Gipson were subjected to heightened security because they were travelling on a one-way ticket. TSA officers search the gamblers luggage and found $97,000 in U.S. currency. San Juan Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers arrived and questioned the pair to determine whether the money was the proceeds of illegal drug trade. Fiore and Gipson stated that the cash was their seed money and winnings from gambling. The DEA let Fiore and Gipson board the plane to Atlanta with their luggage.\nWhen Fiore and Gipson landed at Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, Anthony Walden and other DEA agents approached and questioned them. Fiore and Gipson repeated their story and produced records of their travels. When a drug-detecting dog pawed Gipson's bag once, Walden stated that he had probable cause to seize the cash and took both Fiore and Gipson's bags before allowing them to continue on to Las Vegas without the money. When Fiore and Gipson got to Las Vegas they sent records of their gambling earnings along with past tax returns to prove their status as professional gamblers to Walden. Walden refused to return the money and referred the matter to a U.S. Attorney in Georgia based on a false probable cause affidavit. The U.S. Attorney found no probable cause and ordered the money returned. The money was returned to Fiore and Gipson seven months after it was seized.\nFiore and Gipson sued Walden in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada alleging that the seizure violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Walden moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the District Court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the court did have personal jurisdiction because Walden intentionally caused foreseeable harm in Nevada by falsifying the probable cause affidavit and attempting to secure the seized funds permanently for the Atlanta DEA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55985:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55985:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55985:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, unanswered. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the district court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Walden because he lacked contacts with Nevada. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a non-resident defendant have a substantial connection with the state in which he is sued. This connection must arise from the contacts that the defendant himself creates; yet all of Walden's conduct occurred in Georgia. The fact that Fiore and Gibson were injured in Nevada was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Walden their only connection to Nevada was that they chose to reside there during the months the money was seized.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55985:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55986:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55986:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn October 2001, Quality Stores -- a national company -- and its affiliates commenced bankruptcy proceedings. When laying off employees, Quality Stores issued severance pay as part of its employees' gross income and reported the payments for federal income tax purposes as \"wages\" on W-2 forms. As required for \"wages\", the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax was paid on severance payments. FICA is a tax imposed on wages earned to fund Social Security and Medicare; both employer and employee pay part of the tax. The employee's part is withheld from his paycheck. Quality Stores contends that severance pay does not qualify as \"wages\", but rather payments under a Supplemental Unemployment Benefit (SUB) plan that are not taxable under FICA. SUB is a corporate program that creates severance payments in the event of involuntary termination; SUB payments do not qualify as \"wages\" under FICA because they are given after termination of a job rather than for work completed.\nBased on this line of reasoning, Quality Stores filed for a refund from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS did not respond to Quality Stores' request for a refund, neither by allowing the claim nor denying it, and Quality Stores sued the IRS. The federal district court agreed with Quality Stores' view on severance payments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that severance pay satisfies the elements Congress set out to determine SUB payments, which therefore makes such payments exempt from FICA taxes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55986:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55986:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55986:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the Federal Insurance Contributions Act's broad definition of wages did include severance pay. Because the statutory definition of wages in FICA is \"remuneration for employment,\" the fact that the employment has ended is irrelevant, as the severance pay is still remuneration for services rendered when the workers were still employed. The Court also held that the specific exemptions that FICA lays out indicate that anything not specifically included in the exemptions should be considered taxable wages. Given the legislative history surrounding the issue, the appropriate reading is that severance payments should be treated as wages and subject to the withholding of taxes.\nJustice Elena Kagan took no part in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55986:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55987:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55987:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn November 2009, Bruce Abramski learned that his uncle wanted to purchase a new 9mm Glock handgun. Abramski offered to purchase this weapon because, as a former Virginia police officer, he could get a discount. On November 17, Abramski purchased the handgun and completed a form distributed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (\"ATF\") on which he checked a box indicating that he was not buying the gun on behalf of another person.\nIn June 2010, Abramski was arrested for suspicion of committing a bank robbery. During a search of his home, the police found a receipt showing that Abramski gave the handgun to his uncle in exchange for $400. The police charged Abramski with violating federal law by making a false, material statement on an ATF form and with respect to information kept by a licensed firearms dealer. Specifically, the government argued that Abramski knowingly made a false statement to a firearms dealer, that he intended to deceive the firearms dealer, and that he made the false statement about a \"material fact\" when he did not disclose that he was buying the firearm for his uncle. A grand jury subsequently indicted Abramski.\nAbramski moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress evidence regarding the receipt. He argued that he legally transferred the firearm to his uncle and therefore never made any false statements to the ATF or the firearms dealer. He also argued that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they did not have a proper warrant to conduct the search of his home from which the receipt resulted. The trial court denied Abramski's motion, stating that, because he did not disclose that the firearm was meant for his uncle, Abramski withheld a \"material fact\" required when purchasing a firearm. The trial court also held that the police did not violate Abramski's Fourth Amendment rights. Abramski entered a conditional guilty plea and received five years of probation and a $200 fine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55987:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55987:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55987:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, because the statute clearly sets up a system for verifying the would-be buyer's identity and for the maintenance of the seller's records, it is evidently interested in the final purchaser and not simply the middleman who initially purchases the firearm. Therefore, the statute is meant to keep guns out of the hands of those who cannot legally posses them, and this purpose can only be served if the records reflect the information of the person who actually takes control of the gun after its purchase. Such a reading follows previously established precedent that focuses on a transaction's true participants rather than the initial, nominal ones. In this case, by hiding the fact that Alvarez was the actual buyer, Abramski prevented the gun dealer from interacting directly with Alvarez and violated the statute.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that, because neither Abramski nor his uncle were legally prohibited from owning a gun, the fact that Abramski was buying the gun for his uncle was immaterial to the sale itself. In attempting to otherwise read the statute, the majority opinion ignored the plain language of the statute itself, which is solely focused on the initial sale and not its ultimate consequences. Because there are other situations in which a gun changes hands that the statute does not consider to create a nominal purchaser and a true purchaser, Justice Scalia argued that the majority opinion misconstrues the statute's intended effect and broadens the statute beyond what Congress intended. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55987:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55988:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55988:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Dudenhoeffer and Alireza Partivopanah are former employees of Fifth Third Bank and are participants in the Fifth Third Bancorp Master Profit Sharing Plan, an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), which is a defined contribution retirement fund for employees with Fifth Third as a trustee. Participants make voluntary contributions to the ESOP from their salaries and Fifth Third matches the contributions by purchasing Fifth Third stock for their individual accounts. During the time period in question, a large amount of the ESOP's assets were invested in Fifth Third stock. Also during this period, Fifth Third switched from being a conservative lender to a subprime lender and the portfolio became increasingly vulnerable to risk, which it failed to disclose. The price of the stock declined drastically and caused the ESOP to lose tens of millions of dollars. The respondents sued Fifth Third and argued that Fifth Third breached its fiduciary duty as imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by continuing to invest in Fifth Third stock despite having knowledge of its increasingly precarious value. The federal district court granted Fifth Third's motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted because under ERISA, the investment decisions made by ESOP fiduciaries are presumed to be prudent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that, while ESOP fiduciaries have a presumption of prudence, this presumption was an evidentiary matter and thus not grounds for a motion to dismiss.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55988:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55988:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55988:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the presumption of prudence found by the lower courts is not included in ERISA's language; instead, the presumption is a court-made response to the different fiduciary duties of an ESOP fiduciary rather than fiduciaries of other eligible retirement plans under ERISA. Unlike other plans, ESOP plans prioritize buying a company's own stock, as opposed to diversifying retirement funds across a number of different investments. For non-ESOP retirement funds, normal prudence requires fiduciaries to spread the investment risk out across multiple investments, which is a prudential standard that cannot be applied to ESOP. Therefore, some courts had held that ESOP fiduciaries were entitled to a presumption of prudence regarding their choice of whether to purchase their own company stock or not. The Supreme Court, however, held that these differing requirements did not amount to a presumption of prudence for ESOP fiduciaries. Instead, the Court found that ESOP fiduciaries have the same fiduciary duty as non-ESOP fiduciaries, except as it applies to diversification of investments. The Court remanded the case back to the district court, instructing the lower court to analyze Fifth Third's motion to dismiss under the pleading standards set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, requiring a plaintiff's pleadings contain enough facts to give rise to a plausible entitlement to relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55988:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55989:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55989:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 19, 2005, Scott D. Cheever shot and killed Greenwood County Sheriff Matthew Samuels at the residence of Darrell and Belinda Coopers in Hilltop, Kansas. Samuels had gone to the Coopers' residence based on a tip to arrest Cheever for outstanding warrants. He found the Coopers, Cheever, and two others cooking and ingesting methamphetamines. In the following attempts to arrest Cheever and retrieve the injured Samuels, Cheever also shot at several other officers.\nAt trial, Cheever asserted a voluntary intoxication defense and argued that the methamphetamine use rendered him mentally incapable of the premeditation required for murder. During the course of the trial, the judge ordered Cheever to undergo a psychiatric examination conducted by a psychiatric hired by the government. The prosecution sought to bring the transcript of the interview into evidence to impeach Cheever's testimony regarding the order of events at the Coopers' residence, which the court allowed. After the defense rested their case, the prosecution called the psychiatrist to the stand as a rebuttal witness to respond to the defense's claims regarding Cheever's mental capacity at the time of the crime. The trial court allowed the psychiatrist's testimony as a rebuttal witness. The jury found Cheever guilty and, at a separate sentencing hearing, sentenced him to death. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the admission of the government psychiatrist's testimony into evidence violated Cheever's Fifth Amendment rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55989:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55989:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55989:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the prosecution from introducing psychiatric evidence to rebut psychiatric evidence presented by the defense. To deny the prosecution that right would undermine the adversarial process, because the jury should hear both sides of any discussion of the defendant's mental state at the time of the alleged crime. The Court also held that this ruling was in line with Fifth Amendment jurisprudence that does not allow a defendant to avoid cross-examination. When the defendant's mental state is at issue and the defense offers evidence through expert testimony, it may be rebutted by expert testimony from the prosecution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55989:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55990:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55990:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKevin Loughrin created a scheme to obtain cash by stealing checks from people's outgoing mail, altering them to make purchases at Target, and returning the purchases for cash. When the scheme came to an end, he and Theresa Thongsarn were indicted on six counts of bank fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and one count of possession of stolen mail. Loughrin moved to dismiss the case and alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act; the district court denied the motion to dismiss. At trial, Loughrin requested that the jury instructions specify that the jury had to find that he had the intent to defraud a financial institution in order to find him guilty of bank fraud. The district court held that such an instruction was not necessary and declined to use it. Loughrin was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 36 months in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55990:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55990:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55990:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Elena Kagan wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, while one clause of the statute requires the intent to defraud a bank, the second clause does not require it. Instead, this second clause only requires that the defendant intend to obtain any property under the control of a bank. The Court held that requiring these two clauses to be read as having the same intent would render the second one meaningless; the structure of the statute indicated that the two clauses had different requirements. However, because the second clause should not apply to any and all fraud where the defrauder receives a check, the Court stated that the specific language limited its coverage to circumstances where the defendant's false statement \"naturally induces\" the bank to part with money in its control, instead of where a bank is only tangentially involved.\nJustice Antonin G. Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued against the \"natural inducement\" test promoted by the Court. He argued that the dictionary definition of \"by means of\" language of the second clause included tangential involvement of a bank, although he agreed that the clause should not apply to all fraud where the defrauder receives a check. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment. In his separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the second clause only requires that the defendant knowingly execute a scheme to obtain bank property, instead of intentionally doing so.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55990:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55991:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55991:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2007, the Massachusetts state legislature created a 35-foot buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of abortion clinics. The petitioners, individuals who routinely engage in \"pro-life counseling\" outside of state abortion clinics, sued in federal district court and argued that the law violated the First Amendment protection of free speech. The district court held that, although the law placed a restriction on the time, place, and manner of speech, the law was constitutional because it was content-neutral and still left adequate, if not perfect, alternative means of communications. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed and held that the Supreme Court, in Hill v. Colorado had already affirmed a similar statute in Colorado that prohibited certain activities within 100 feet of abortion clinics.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55991:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55991:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55991:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, unanswered. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Massachusetts law was content-neutral on its face because a violation depends not on the speech itself but on the location of the speech, and therefore does not need to be analyzed under strict scrutiny. However, the Court also held that the law is still not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest because it places too great a burden on the petitioners' First Amendment Rights. By denying the petitioners the ability to engage in conversation and leafleting on public streets and sidewalks, the law prevents the petitioners from engaging in exactly the transmission of ideas the First Amendment is meant to protect. The Court also held that, in enacting the law, Massachusetts overlooked other options that could serve the same interests without placing an undue burden on historical avenues of speech and debate.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the law is content-based and therefore must be examined under strict scrutiny. A blanket prohibition of speech in areas where only one type of politically charged speech is likely to occur cannot be content-neutral. Justice Scalia also pointed out that the majority opinion did not address the question of whether Hill v. Colorado should be limited or overruled. Because Justice Scalia argued that the law was content-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, he wrote that Hill should be overruled because it contradicts First Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment in which he argued that the law's exemption for clinic employees and volunteers constitutes viewpoint discrimination because it silences abortion opponents while allowing clinic workers and supporters to express their views.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55991:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55992:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55992:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn January 2010, Sprint Communications Co. filed a complaint with the Iowa Utilities Board (\"IUB\") asking for a declaration that it was proper to withhold certain VoIP call access charges from Windstream (formerly Iowa Telecom). Before IUB addressed the complaint, Sprint settled the dispute with Windstream and withdrew its complaint. However, IUB continued the proceeding so that it could decide a greater underlying issue of how VoIP communications should be classified under federal law. In February 2011, IUB issued an order with its own interpretation of VoIP's classification under federal law along with a determination that Sprint was liable to Windstream for the access charges.\nSprint challenged IUB's order by filing a complaint in both state court and federal district court, alleging that federal law preempts the IUB's decision. In order to proceed with the federal complaint first, Sprint filed a motion to stay the state case until resolution of the federal case. In turn, the IUB filed a motion asking the federal court to abstain and dismiss the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Generally, this doctrine states that a federal court shall abstain from hearing a case if there is a threat of interference with a state court proceeding involving important state interests. The district court granted IUB's motion and dismissed Sprint's federal complaint. Sprint appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which upheld the district court's abstention, but determined that a stay on the federal proceedings was more appropriate than dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55992:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55992:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55992:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that a federal court is not required to abstain from deciding a case simply because there is a case in state court that deals with the same subject matter. Because the Younger doctrine only required a court to abstain when there are parallel criminal cases in federal and state courts or when there are certain civil proceedings that are very similar to criminal ones, it is meant only for exceptional cases. The proceeding in question is civil, not criminal, and does not affect a state court's ability to perform its judicial function, so none of the Younger exceptions are triggered in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55992:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55993:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55993:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (ICON) manufactures and sells exercise equipment throughout the United States. In 2000, ICON obtained U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710 (the '710 patent) for a system designed to link parts in elliptical exercise machines. In 2010, ICON filed a complaint against another manufacturer and seller of exercise equipment, Octane Fitness (Octane), and claimed that Octane's elliptical design infringed upon the '710 patent.\nThe federal district court held that Octane's design did not violate ICON's '710 patent. ICON appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit. Octane argued that ICON's lawsuit was not based on any real patent infringement, but instead aimed at hampering upstart competitors with expensive, frivolous lawsuits. Therefore, Octane asked the court to apply a patent law attorney fees statute, a statute that awards attorney fees when the plaintiff's suit is found to be \"exceptional.\" The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, but found that ICON had not acted \"exceptionally\" under the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55993:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55993:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55993:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the appellate court construed the attorney fees statute in a manner that was unduly rigid. Restricting the grant of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in all but two exceptions would render the statute meaningless and would contradict patent litigation norms. The appellate court’s interpretation of the statute would also impermissibly encumber the district court’s discretionary power to award such fees. The Court also held that an “exceptional” case is simply one that stands out from others because of its frivolous nature relating to the legal arguments or merits of the claim. District courts may determine exceptionalness by considering the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Finally, the Court rejected the appellate court’s “clear and convincing evidence” standard that successful patent litigants would have to establish in order to receive fees. Instead, the Court held that a simple discretionary inquiry would serve to determine whether granting attorney fees is appropriate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55993:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55994:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55994:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) is a large producer of printers and toner cartridges. In 2002, Lexmark sued Static Control Components, Inc. (SCC) and alleged that SCC violated Lexmark's intellectual property when it manufactured microchips used in the repair and resale of Lexmark toner cartridges. SCC filed a counterclaim and argued that Lexmark, among other things, violated the Lantham Act by engaging in false advertising. The district court dismissed SCC's Lantham Act claims for lack of standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling and held that the lower court employed the wrong test to establish standing.\nThe Sixth Circuit relied on the \"reasonable interest\" test to establish standing under the Lantham Act, but unlike its sister circuits, did not use the AGC Factors, which use the same standards as those to establish an antitrust claim. Under this test, a claimant must demonstrate 1) a reasonable interest against the alleged false advertising and 2) a reasonable basis for believing that the alleged false advertising will damage that interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55994:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55994:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55994:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the Lanham Act allowed any party to sue that had been injured by false advertising. However, because that language is so broad, the Court held that a determination of standing to sue should be based on proof that the plaintiffs' interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the law and that a violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the injury in question. In order to prove that the plaintiffs' interest fall within the zone of interest the Lanham Act protects, the plaintiffs must prove that they have a commercial interest in reputation or sales. To prove that the injury in question was caused by a violation of the statute, the plaintiff must show that that economic or reputational injury stemmed directly from the defendant's false advertising. The Court also held that the \"reasonable interest\" test the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied was not feasible because it was too vague. In this case, Static Control Component's claim satisfied both the zone of interest and proximate cause requirements to pursue a claim under the Lanham Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55994:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55995:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55995:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPamela J. Harris is a personal care assistant who provides in-home care to disabled participants in the Home Services Program administered by a division of the Illinois Department of Human Services (Disabilities Program). The state pays the wages of assistants who work with participants in either the Disabilities Program or a program run by the Division of Rehabilitation Services (Rehabilitation Program). In 2003, a majority of the Rehabilitation Program personal assistants elected Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois & Indiana as their collective bargaining representative. The union and the state negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that included a \"fair share\" provision, which required all personal assistants who are not union members to pay a proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process and contract administration. The Disabilities Program assistants rejected union membership in 2009.\nIn 2010, Harris and other personal assistants from both programs sued Governor Pat Quinn and the unions and claimed that the fair share fees violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that the state may require its employees, including personal assistants such as the plaintiffs, to pay fair share fees and further held that the claims of the Disability Program were not ripe for judicial review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55995:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55995:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55995:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, undecided. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the apparently controlling precedent of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which stated the necessity of the fair share provision to prevent non-union members from taking advantage of the union's collective bargaining, cannot justify the violation of the petitioners' First Amendment rights in this case. Upon review, the Court held that the analysis in the Abood decision fundamentally misconstrued previous judicial precedent on the issue of collective bargaining as well as the differences between union relations in public-and private-sector employment. That precedent especially does not apply in this case because the petitioners are not full public-sector employees but are only considered such for the sake of limited collective bargaining. Because the union's role is so narrow in this case, there is no compelling interest served by forcing the petitioners to contribute that cannot be satisfied by less restrictive means.\nJustice Elena Kagan wrote a dissent in which she argued that the precedent Abood established was highly influential in protecting the best interests of employees and government entities by enabling the government to bargain with a single body without allowing non-union members to take advantage of these benefits. Although the majority opinion focused on the ways in which the petitioners are not public-sector employees and not subject to this precedent, Justice Kagan emphasized the vast degree of oversight the state exercised over them and the state's interest in working with an effective bargaining agent. Therefore, there is no reason to differentiate this case from the ruling required by the Abood precedent. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55995:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55996:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55996:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Jake LaMotta retired from boxing, he and Frank Peter Petrella (F. Petrella) created two screenplays and a book based on LaMotta's life. These works were registered with the United States Copyright Office in 1963, 1973, and 1970, respectively. In 1976, LaMotta and F. Petrella signed a written agreement that granted the exclusive rights to the book and the screenplays to Chartoff-Winkler Productions, Inc, which in turn assigned those rights to a subsidiary of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. (MGM), United Artists Corporation. In 1980, United Artists Corporation registered a copyright for the film \"Raging Bull\" based on LaMotta and F. Petrella's work. When F. Petrella died in 1981, which was still within the original 28-year period of the copyright, his renewal rights passed to his heirs.\nIn 1991, Paula Petrella (Petrella), the daughter of F. Petrella, filed an application for the renewal of copyright rights on the 1963 screenplay. In 1998, Petrella's attorney contacted MGM and asserted that Petrella had obtained the rights to the screenplay and its derivative works, which included the movie \"Raging Bull,\" and that MGM was infringing on those rights. MGM argued that the 1963 screenplay was a collaboration between LaMotta and F. Petrella, so MGM retained the rights to the screenplay under the agreement with LaMotta. MGM also argued that there was no \"substantial similarity of protectable elements\" between the 1963 screenplay and the film. In 2009, Petrella sued MGM for copyright infringement, and the federal district court granted summary judgment for MGM under the doctrine of laches, which prevents a legal claim from being enforced if a long delay in filing the claim adversely affected the defendant's ability to fight the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55996:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55996:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55996:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the doctrine of laches could not be used to bar a copyright suit that seeks relief for damages that occurred within the three-year timeframe allowed by the Copyright Act. This limitation prevents a defendant from being held liable for multiple violations of the same work. Because Petrella did not seek relief for damages prior to three years before the filing of her suit, the doctrine of laches does not apply to this case. The Court also held that the doctrine of laches has never been used to bar claims for wrongs that occurred within the acceptable timeframe, so there was no precedent for the type of reading that MGM argued was necessary. Because laches originally served as a guide to adjudicating copyright disputes when there was no statutory limitation, there is no reason to use the doctrine to interpret the statute.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that the doctrine of laches must be applied to the three-year statute of limitations in order for the courts to protect the equity of the legal system. Allowing the three-year limitation to control every copyright case regardless of the circumstances could create loopholes such as permitting plaintiffs to sue for copyright violations on the same work every three years or to wait long enough that evidence that could be used to defend against the suit is lost. Justice Breyer also argued that judicial precedent held that statutory limitations are subject to further adjustment in the name of equity. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55996:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55997:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55997:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSection 125 of the Aviation Transportation Safety Act (ATSA) states that an air carrier who voluntarily reports suspicious transactions or behavior shall not be \"civilly liable.\" The immunity does not apply to disclosures made with \"actual knowledge\" that the disclosure is false, inaccurate, or misleading. Likewise, the immunity does not extend to an air carrier that makes a disclosure with \"reckless disregard\" as to its truth or falsity.\nWilliam Hoeper, a pilot for Air Wisconsin, made four unsuccessful attempts to become certified to fly another type of aircraft after Air Wisconsin discontinued use of the type of plane that Hoeper had previously piloted. During his fourth and final opportunity to pass the test, Hoeper abruptly ended the test because he believed that the test administrators were deliberately sabotaging his efforts to pass. One test administrator knew that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had issued a firearm to Hoeper in his role as a federal flight deck officer (FFDO). FFDO pilots are not allowed to carry the firearm while traveling as passengers. This administrator booked Hoeper on a flight from the testing center in Virginia to Hoeper's home in Denver and then called the TSA to report that Hoeper was a disgruntled, and possibly armed, employee. In response, TSA officials arrested and searched Hoeper.\nHoeper sued Air Wisconsin in a Colorado state court and alleged defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin moved for a directed verdict based on the argument that it was immune from civil liability under ATSA. Air Wisconsin also argued that Hoeper could not prove \"actual malice\" because its statements were \"substantially true\" and therefore protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The jury found that Air Wisconsin's statements to the TSA were false and that it made at least one statement with reckless disregard for the truth, so the jury awarded Hoeper damages. A Colorado appellate court affirmed the verdict. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial court's submission of the matter to the jury was improper; however, the error was harmless in this case because Air Wisconsin was not entitled to claim immunity under ATSA. The Colorado Supreme Court further held that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that the statements were false.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55997:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55997:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55997:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that ATSA immunity protects false statements, as long as they are not materially false within the ATSA context, which means that they would not affect a reasonable security officer's perception of and response to a particular threat. Although Air Wisconsin's report to the TSA contained slight inaccuracies, they would not have influenced a TSA security officer's desire to investigate Hoeper, given the true facts that he was an FFDO and upset about losing his job. The Court further held that the Colorado Supreme Court erred in its analysis of material falsity and that Air Wisconsin was entitled to ATSA immunity as a matter of law.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that, while he agreed with the majority opinion's ATSA immunity analysis, he would have remanded the case for further proceedings. He argued that the issue of material falsity was an important question for the jury and that a reasonable jury could find that Hoeper's conduct did not justify the making of any report to the TSA. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55997:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55998:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55998:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring the 2004 presidential campaign, President George W. Bush's team scheduled a campaign stop in Jacksonville, Oregon. With the approval of local law enforcement agencies, opponents of President Bush organized a peaceful demonstration to protest his policies. The demonstration took place at a public park before moving to the street near the local inn where the President was staying. Eventually, both opponents and supporters of President Bush gathered on the street of near the entrance to the inn, and each group had equal access to deliver its message to the President at the time of his arrival. Before the President arrived, Secret Service agents ordered local police to push protestors away from the immediate area for security reasons. The agents then ordered that the protesters be driven farther away from the inn onto the east side of 5th street. However, agents failed to give the same directive for supporters who remained stationed on the streets close to the inn. The plaintiffs alleged that the orders to move were unintelligibly given and that police proceeded to use force before confirming that the orders were understood or were being followed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55998:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55998:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55998:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the agents had not violated any clearly established law in their attempt to maintain an appropriate level of protection for the President despite his unscheduled detour. Because the plaintiffs were unable to establish that the Secret Service agents engaged in crowd control should have been aware of their duty to ensure that different groups obtained equal access to the President, the agents are eligible for qualified immunity. The Secret Service agents' actions were in direct response to the relative security risks the groups posed based on their locations, and so their actions did not violate the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55998:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55999:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "55999:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn August 2000, Vonlee Nicole Titlow helped his aunt Billie Rogers murder his wealthy uncle Donald Rogers. After Titlow was charged with first-degree murder, the prosecution offered him a plea bargain. In exchange for testifying against Billie Rogers, Titlow could plead guilty to manslaughter and receive a reduced sentence. After consulting with his attorney, Titlow accepted the deal. However, before sentencing, Titlow spoke to a sheriff's deputy who suggested that he withdraw his guilty plea and consult another attorney. Titlow followed the deputy's advice, hired a new attorney and withdrew his guilty plea.\nFollowing his trial, a jury convicted Titlow of second-degree murder and sentenced him to 20-to-40 years in prison. This led Titlow to accuse his second attorney of ineffective assistance of counsel for allowing him to withdraw the original guilty plea. Both the trial court and the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Titlow's claim. Titlow petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court to hear his case, but they refused to do so.\nTitlow then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, but the district court denied his claim as well. The district court held that Titlow failed to meet the standard for overturning a state-court conviction under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (\"AEDPA\"). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and ordered the state to reoffer Titlow's original plea agreement. The appellate court held that Titlow's second attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate his claims further, failing to obtain documents from the first attorney, and failing to convince Titlow to take the plea bargain.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "55999:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "55999:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "55999:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo; no; unanswered. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that, when a state prisoner asks a federal court to set aside a sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the AEDPA requires the Court of Appeals to apply a \"doubly-deferential\" standard in which both the state court and the defense attorney are given the benefit of the doubt. Because the state court's factual determination is assumed to be correct, the state prisoner has the burden to disprove that determination with clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the Court held that there was no convincing evidence that the new counsel's advice did not stem from the defendant's continued protestations of innocence. In the absence of such evidence, the new counsel's advice was reasonable and the defendant could not prove that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the defendant had the burden to prove that the new counsel acted ineffectively and that the state court decided the case incorrectly—both burdens that the defendant did not meet. Justice Sotomayor also emphasized the limited scope of the ruling in this case, which referred only to the facts at hand. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she argued that the plea deal became invalid when the defendant refused to testify against her aunt, so the prosecutor could not be directed to renew a plea deal that could no longer exist. Without the existence of a still-possible plea deal, there was no reversible error in the trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "55999:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56000:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56000:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBetween 1969 and 1980, Dr. Morton Mower worked with Dr. Mieczyslaw Mirowski to develop the implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) and the cardiac resynchronization therapy device (CRT), both devices that are meant to treat different kinds of heart failure. Mirowski Family Ventures (MFV) held both patents and licensed them to Guidant Corp. In 1991, Medtronic, a manufacturer of medical devices and equipment, entered into a sublicense agreement with Eli Lilly & Co., Guidant Corp's predecessor-in-interest regarding these patents. The agreement obligated MFV to inform Medtronic which items were covered by which patents, and if Medtronic disagreed, Medtronic could retain patent rights and file for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement on the patents. In October and November of 2007, MFV identified several Medtronic products that it believed infringed on its patents, and Medtronic subsequently sued for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement.\nIn the bench trial in district court, the court, relying on precedent, stated that the patent holder bears the burden of proving that infringement occurred and found in favor of Medtronic. MFV appealed and argued that the burden falls on the alleged patent infringer to prove that infringement did not occur. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, because Medtronic is the party seeking relief from the court, it bears the burden to prove that it did not infringe on MFV's patents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56000:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56000:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56000:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that judicial precedent supports the view that the burden of proof in patent cases always rests with the owner of the patent, regardless of the type of legal action in question. To shift the burden based on the type of legal action could create ambiguity regarding the rights of each party. Because the public interest favors a well-functioning patent system, it is in the best interest of the public not to shift the ordinary rule regarding burden of proof in patent cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56000:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56001:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56001:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2009 the U.S. Corps of Engineers contracted with Atlantic Marine Construction Company (Atlantic) to build a child development center at Fort Hood, a military base located in the western district of Texas. Atlantic then subcontracted with J-Crew Management, Inc. (J-Crew) to provide labor and materials. The subcontract agreement contained a forum selection clause stating that any dispute would be litigated in Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. Despite this clause, J-Crew brought suit against Atlantic in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas for failure to pay for work J-Crew performed.\nAtlantic moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. §1406, arguing that the forum selection clause required the suit to be brought in Virginia. Atlantic also moved, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). The district court denied Atlantic's motions, holding that Atlantic did not show why the interest of justice or the convenience of the parties weighed in favor of Virginia. Atlantic petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to dismiss the case or transfer it to Virginia. The court of appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and venue was proper in the Texas court because the parties entered into and performed the agreement in that district.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56001:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56001:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56001:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes; the party acting in violation of the forum-selection clause. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that Section 1404 codified a doctrine of transfer that allowed cases to be transferred to a more convenient forum rather than being dismissed. Because both Section 1404 and the forum non conveniens doctrine from which it derives depend on a balancing-of-interests standard, courts should use that standard when evaluating claims under Section 1404. The Court also held that, when parties have agreed to a forum-selection clause, a court should transfer the case to that forum unless there are exceptional factors at work. Therefore, the party requesting the change of forum should bear the burden of proving that such a change is necessary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56001:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56002:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56002:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHarvey N. Levin was hired as an Illinois Assistant District Attorney on September 5, 2000. On May 12, 2006 when he was fired, Levin was over the age of sixty, and he believed that he was fired due to his age and gender. He was replaced by a female attorney in her thirties. Levin sued the state of Illinois, the Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan in both her individual and official capacities, and four other Attorney General employees under the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA), the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit by arguing that either the claim under the ADEA precluded the Civil Rights Act claim or that they were entitled to qualified immunity under the ADEA. The district court originally ruled that the ADEA did not prevent the claim from proceeding under the Civil Rights Act and granted the qualified immunity. After the case was reassigned to a different district court judge, the district court held that Levin was not an employee for the purpose of the Civil Rights Act and the ADEA, so he could not pursue those claims, and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56002:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56002:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56002:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered. In an unsigned, per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56002:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56003:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56003:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 25, 1997, a sixteen-year-old girl was kidnapped, murdered, and raped. After an investigation, the police arrested Robert Woodall, who subsequently pled guilty to capital murder, capital kidnapping, and first-degree rape. At trial, Woodall invoked his Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination and declined to testify, and so he asked the judge to instruct the jury not to make any adverse inferences from that decision. The judge refused to issue the \"no adverse inference\" instruction and stated that, by entering a guilty plea, Woodall waived his right to be free from self-incrimination. The jury found Woodall guilty on all charges and the judge sentenced him to the death penalty and two subsequent life sentences.\nWoodall appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed both Woodall's conviction and sentence. In 2006, Woodall filed a habeus corpus petition in federal court, and that court held that the trial court violated Woodall's Fifth Amendment right when it refused to offer the requested jury instruction. In addition, that court also held that Woodall's Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court allowed the state to dismiss an African-American juror without a mandatory hearing for cause. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the issue of self-incrimination but did not address the other issues.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56003:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56003:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56003:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, unanswered. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the trial court did not violate Woodall's Fifth Amendment rights by not providing a \"no adverse influence\" jury instruction because Woodall's guilty plea negated the possibility of any adverse influence. Because Woodall admitted to the elements of the case that the prosecution would otherwise have had to prove, there was no inference left for the jury to make. The Court therefore held that the state courts' rejection of Woodall's Fifth Amendment claim was not objectively unreasonable and should not have proceeded to federal courts.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that a criminal defendant is entitled to a \"no adverse influence\" jury instruction at the penalty phase of a capital trial just as he is during the guilt phase if he requests one. Justice Breyer wrote that there was no reason to deviate from established Fifth Amendment jurisprudence on this issue and that, in doing so, the majority opinion construes the precedent too narrowly. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56003:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56004:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56004:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which was meant to combat issues such as nuisance filings, targeting of specific clients, and client manipulation in class action suits. To prevent plaintiffs from filing class action suits in state courts in order to get around the restrictions of PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which provided for the dismissal or removal of a class action suit brought by more than 50 plaintiffs in connection with a \"covered security.\" The term \"covered security\" was limited to a subset of securities that were traded on a national exchange or issued by a federally registered investment company.\nIn 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued the Stanford Group Company and other holdings of R. Allen Stanford for allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. Two groups of Louisiana investors also sued Stanford holdings for their roles in the Ponzi scheme and for violations of the Louisiana Securities Act. These cases were consolidated with two others against Stanford holdings and moved to the district court for the Northern District of Texas. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints under SLUSA and argued that the court should adopt an expansive interpretation of \"covered securities.\" The district court held that the funds were not covered securities, but it granted the dismissal because the funds were represented as covered securities and because it was likely that at least one of the plaintiffs liquidated a retirement account, which a covered security, in order to purchase the funds in question. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that there was not a sufficient connection between the misrepresentation and the stock sale to consider them connected and for the securities to function as \"covered\" for the purposes of a SLUSA dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56004:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56004:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56004:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the scope of SLUSA does not extend beyond misrepresentations that are material to the purchase or sale of a covered security. Because the focus of SLUSA deals with covered securities, the purchase or sale of uncovered securities is beyond SLUSA's purview. The Court also held that nothing in the language of SLUSA itself or the underlying regulatory statutes suggests that the relevant language should be interpreted more broadly. To do so would prohibit more lawsuits and interfere with state efforts to provide remedies to victims of frauds.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that, while SLUSA precludes class action cases dealing with fraud \"in connection with\" covered securities, the connection does not extend to all securities.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority's opinion unnecessarily narrows and constricts protection from fraud in national securities markets. Justice Kennedy argued that the relevant language must be interpreted broadly in order for SLUSA to accomplish its purpose of protecting the integrity of the markets. If misrepresentations were made relating to covered securities to perpetrate fraud, federal regulation is necessary, and it is this interest that Congress intended SLUSA to protect. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56004:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56005:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56005:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) established the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to decide labor disputes among employers, unions, and employees. Parties first file unfair labor practice allegations to a Regional Office, which then conducts an investigation and, if necessary, files a complaint. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presides over the hearing on the complaint and issues a recommendation to the Board. Unless a party to the dispute files a timely appeal, the ALJ's recommendation becomes the final order of the Board. To hear a case and issue a ruling, the Board must have at least three of its five members present. The NLRA allows parties to appeal a Board ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the area where the alleged unfair labor practice occurred or to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Board members are appointed by the president and serve five-year terms.\nIn 2010, Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor of Pepsi-Cola products, was engaged in negotiations with its employee union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 760 (Union). During the final bargaining session that December, Noel Canning agreed to submit two wage and pension plans to a vote by the Union membership. The membership approved the union's preferred proposal. However, Noel Canning argued that the discussions did not amount to a binding agreement and refused to incorporate the changes into a new collective bargaining agreement. The Union filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Noel Canning's actions constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. An ALJ determined that the agreement was binding and ordered Noel Canning to sign the collective bargaining agreement. The Board affirmed the ruling against Noel Canning.\nNoel Canning appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that the Board's ruling was invalid because not enough members of the Board were present. The panel that heard the Noel Canning case consisted of one member who was appointed by President Barack Obama and confirmed by the Senate in 2010 and two members whom President Obama appointed without Senate confirmation in January 2012. Although the Recess Appointments Clause allows the president to fill vacancies that occur while Congress is in recess, between December 2011 and the end of January 2012, the Senate met in pro forma meetings every three business days. Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the Senate was not in recess on the days the Senate did not meet because, for the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, recess is defined as the time in between sessions of Congress.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56005:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56005:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56005:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a pro forma session does not create a recess long enough to trigger the Recess Appointments Clause. While the term \"recess\" in the Clause refers both to inter-and intra-session recesses, its legislative history and historical context indicate that the term should be presumed to mean a recess of substantial length. The Court held that the three-day break that occurs during pro forma sessions does not represent a significant interruption of legislative business and therefore cannot justify the exercise of the Clause. Additionally, a pro forma session cannot be viewed as a single, long recess because the Senate retains its capacity to conduct business during such sessions. Because recess appointments made during a recess that was shorter than ten days have been so historically rare, the Court held that ten days was the appropriate presumptive lower limit to place on the exercise of the Clause. The Court also held that the Clause applies to vacancies that occur during a recess as well as those that originally occur before a recess but continue to exist at the time of the recess. Although a plain reading of the Clause does not require such an interpretation, the historical context of the wording favors the more broad reading because a vacancy can be considered a continuing state.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurrence in judgment in which he argued that the Recess Appointments Clause was only meant to cover breaks between congressional sessions rather than breaks within them. Therefore, the appointments in question are invalid because they were made during the session. Justice Scalia argued that a plain reading of the text as well as the historical meaning of the term \"recess\" clearly places it in opposition to the term \"session,\" and it is therefore illogical to interpret the Clause as allowing appointments while Congress is in session. In offering a broader reading of the Clause, the majority opinion disregards the Clause's purpose: to preserve the balance of power between the President and the Senate regarding appointments. Justice Scalia also argued that the majority's ten-day rule cannot stand because it is based purely on judicial interpretation of historical practices without any textual basis. For these same reasons, the Clause should be read as only granting the President the power to fill vacancies that originally occurred during a recess. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence in judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56005:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56006:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56006:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (BIA) was a company owned by Nicholas Paleveda and his wife, Marjorie Ewing. Shortly before BIA filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2006, the company assigned the insurance commission from one of its largest clients to Peter Pearce, a long-time employee. Additionally, Paleveda used BIA funds to incorporate the Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, Inc. (EBIA). Pearce then deposited over $100,000 into an account held jointly by EBIA and another company owned by Paleveda and Ewing. The Trustee, Peter Arkison, filed a claim against EBIA in the BIA bankruptcy proceeding. Arkison alleged fraudulent conveyances and that EBIA, as a successor corporation, was liable for BIA's debts. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and the district court affirmed.\nOn appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, EBIA argued, for the first time, that the bankruptcy judge's entry of a final judgment on the Trustee's claims was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that, while a bankruptcy court may not decide a fraudulent conveyance claim, it may hear the claim and make a recommendation for review by a district court. Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that EBIA, by failing to object to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, waived its Seventh Amendment right to a hearing before an Article III court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56006:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56006:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56006:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and Undecided. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court began by noting that, under federal law, issues related to a bankruptcy proceeding fall into one of two categories: \"core\" and \"non-core.\" Bankruptcy courts may render final decisions, subject to appeal, on \"core\" issues, but when an issue is \"non-core,\" the bankruptcy court may only issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are to be reviewed de novo by district courts. However, bankruptcy courts may render final decisions on \"non-core\" issues if both parties consent. In Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court held that some claims labeled as \"core,\" specifically those considered \"public rights,\" could not be adjudicated by bankruptcy courts because they do not comply with the constitutional requirements in Article III and thus Congress can only grant them limited subject matter jurisdiction. While a fraudulent conveyance claim may be the type of \"core\" claim on which Stern prohibits bankruptcy courts from ruling, here the claim was related to the bankruptcy proceedings and should thusly be treated as a \"non-core\" issue, which would allow the bankruptcy judge to submit proposed findings to a district court. The Court found it unnecessary to address the petitioner's issue regarding consent, because although the bankruptcy court had rendered a final decision on the claim instead of a proposed finding, the district court had reviewed the bankruptcy court's holding de novo, which meant that it had effectively treating the claim as if it had been a \"non-core\" claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56006:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56007:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56007:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt midnight on July 18, 2004, West Memphis Police Officer Forthman pulled over Donald Rickard's vehicle because of an inoperable headlight. After Officer Forthman noticed damage on the vehicle and asked Rickard to step out of the car, Rickard sped away. Officer Forthman called for backup and pursued Rickard from West Memphis, Arkansas to Memphis, Tennessee. The police officers were ordered to continue the pursuit across the border and ultimately surrounded Rickard in a parking lot in Memphis, Tennessee. When Rickard again attempted to flee, the police fired shots into the vehicle, ultimately killing both Rickard and Kelley Allen, a woman who had been a passenger in the vehicle. The entire exchange was captured on police video.\nRickard and Allen's families sued the police officers, the chief of police, and the mayor of West Memphis under federal and state law claims. The families argued that the police used excessive force when pursuing and ultimately killing Rickard and Allen and that using that force violated the Fourth Amendment. They also brought claims of assault, battery, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and abuse of process. The government argued that, because the police acted in their official capacity, they were entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity from any lawsuit. The district court refused to dismiss the case against the government, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that qualified immunity only applies when officers are acting reasonably, and after reviewing subsequent cases, held that the police did not act reasonably in this case. Additionally, because the video evidence showed that the police fired on unarmed, fleeing drivers, a jury could determine that the police were not acting reasonably.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56007:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56007:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56007:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the requirement that a final decision be made by a district court prior to an appeal does not apply to motions for summary judgment when the motion is based on a claim of qualified immunity. Because the determination of qualified immunity is not merely a defense but actually immunity from the suit, it cannot be effectively reviewed after a final judgment at which point the protection from suit would have been “irretrievably” lost. The Court also held that the evidence showed that Rickard was still attempting to flee when the officers opened fire and that the officers reasonably could have believed that if the chase resumed Rickard would once again pose a deadly threat to others on the road. Furthermore, the total number of shots fired also did not qualify as excessive force. Therefore, if officers are justified in opening fire to end a threat to public safety, they are similarly justified in continuing to fire until the threat to public safety has ended.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56007:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56009:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56009:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1999, Gary Woods and Billy McCombs became investors in two partnerships. Those partnerships then transferred their assets to a corporation that was jointly owned by Woods and McCombs, which caused the partnerships to be considered liquidated for tax purposes. Because the value of a liquidated asset is equal to the partner's basis in the investment, the partnerships reported their losses on their tax reports as equal to the purchased options Woods' and McCombs' separate companies originally contributed to the partnerships. After conducting an audit, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that the partnership transactions served no business purpose and were solely for the purpose of tax avoidance. Therefore they had no legal basis and the IRS did not consider the partnerships valid. The IRS imposed accuracy-related penalties for understatements of income and gross valuation misstatements.\nIn 2005, Woods (as the tax matters representative for the partnership) brought the matter before a district court and argued that penalties were inappropriate because the tax consequences of the transactions were accurately reported. The district court held that the transactions \"lacked economic substance\" and that their reported losses should be disregarded. The court also held that, because the transactions had no economic substance, the valuation misstatement penalties did not apply. The United States appealed the decision with regard to the valuation misstatement penalties, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56009:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56009:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56009:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes; yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that, under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), a court in a partnership-level proceeding has the jurisdiction to consider the applicability of any penalty that relates to the partnership. Therefore, a district court must determine whether the partnership situation in question had the potential to trigger a penalty, as happened in this case. The Court also held that a transaction that was determined to lack economic substance can still trigger the penalty for overstatement because the overstatement and the action that led to it are inherently tied together.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56009:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56010:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56010:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 23, 2004, Unite Here Local 355 (UHL) entered an agreement with Mardi Gras Gaming (Mardi Gras), the owner of a casino and dog track in Florida. Under the terms of the agreement, UHL would pay for advertisements to support a gambling ballot initiative that Mardi Gras wanted to pass, and Mardi Gras would facilitate the union organizing Mardi Gras' workers by providing the union with access to work premises, employee information, and neutrality toward the unionization of their employees. UHL also agreed not to strike, protest, picket or otherwise pressure the company's business.\nMartin Mulhall, a Mardi Gras employee, sued both Mardi Gras, and UHL. He opposed the agreement and argued that it violates the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which prohibits an employer giving or a union receiving a \"thing of value.\" The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing, holding that Mulhall was not injured by UHL merely seeking to represent him. Mulhall appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Mulhall appealed again and the Court of Appeals again reversed and remanded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56010:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56010:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56010:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, rather than dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, the Court should have asked for briefs addressing issues antecedent to the one brought up by the case. The Court could then determine whether the case was moot because the contract expired in 2011 and whether Mulhall had Article III standing, as well as whether there is a private right of action in this case. Justice Breyer argued that it was important that the Court address the issues presented in this case because the outcome could negatively affect the collective bargaining process. Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56010:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56011:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56011:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2005, a grand jury began investigating Kerri Kaley and her husband Brian Kaley for stealing prescription medical devices from hospitals. In February 2007, the grand jury indicted the Kaleys on seven criminal counts. One of these counts was a criminal forfeiture count, which would require the Kaleys to forfeit all property that could be traced to their offenses. This property included a certificate of deposit for $500,000, which the Kaleys intended to use to pay their defense attorneys.\nFollowing the indictment, the district court issued a protective order preventing the Kaleys from transferring or disposing of any property in the forfeiture count. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order because it prevented them from hiring their attorneys in violation of their right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court denied their motion without granting a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The Kaleys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded.\nOn remand, the district court granted a pretrial hearing, but limited it to the question of whether the property in the forfeiture count was traceable to the Kaleys' offenses. When the Kaleys failed to present evidence regarding traceability, the district court refused to vacate the protective order. The Kaleys appealed again, arguing that they should have been allowed to challenge the validity of the indictment in the pretrial hearing. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56011:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56011:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56011:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not allow a defendant to use ill-gotten gains to pay an attorney. The Court also held that, since the government had the power to restrain persons given probable cause that they committed a crime, it follows that the government can constitutionally restrain property as well. Similarly, because the criminal justice system entrusts to the grand jury the determination of whether there is probable cause to restrain a defendant prior to trial, there is not reason to use another method to determine whether there is probable cause to restrain a defendant's property. The Court also held that the alternative ruling, which would allow a judge to overrule a grand jury's finding of probable cause, could have destructive impacts on the criminal justice system as a whole. Previous precedent has maintained that there is no need for an adversarial hearing to determine probable cause because it is such a relatively low standard of proof, and the Court found no reason to depart from that precedent in this case.\nIn his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote that, while the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not equate to an absolute right to choice of counsel, the right cannot be denied based on the discretion of the prosecutor. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the issue of the forfeiture of assets is entirely separate from the issue of indictment for a crime and requires different evidence. Therefore, a hearing to determine whether the Kaleys' assets were forfeitable would not be relitigating a decided issue but rather allowing a judge to determine whether the government met its burden. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion essentially allows the government to deprive defendants of the counsel of their choice, which is fundamentally at odds with the ideals of the criminal justice system. While the government does have a legitimate interest in ensuring that ill-gotten assets are available to be returned if the defendant is convicted, there are other ways to protect the assets that do not require the defendant to forfeit his right to the counsel of his choice. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56011:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56012:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56012:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe town of Greece, New York, is governed by a five-member town board that conducts official business at monthly public meetings. Starting in 1999, the town meetings began with a prayer given by an invited member of the local clergy. The town did not adopt any policy regarding who may lead the prayer or its content, but in practice, Christian clergy members delivered the vast majority of the prayers at the town's invitation. In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens complained about the town's prayer practices, after which there was some increase in the denominations represented.\nIn February 2008, Galloway and Stephens sued the town and John Auberger, in his official capacity as Town Supervisor, and argued that the town's practices violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by preferring Christianity over other faiths. The district court found in favor of the town and held that the plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence that there was intentional seclusion of non-Christian faiths. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the practices violated the Establishment Clause by showing a clear preference for Christian prayers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56012:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56012:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56012:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the context and jurisprudence surrounding the First Amendment suggested that the Establishment Clause was never meant to prohibit legislative prayer, which created the proper deliberative mood and acknowledged religion's role in society. The content of this prayer does not need to be non-sectarian, because such a requirement would place the courts in the role of arbiters of religious speech, which would involve the government in religion to an extent that is impermissible under the Establishment Clause. The Court thus held that the prayers in question do not violate this tradition and are therefore acceptable under the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy further argued that legislative prayer is primarily for the members of the legislative body, and therefore such prayers do not coerce the public into religious observance. Though the respondents testified that they felt offended by these prayers, Justice Kennedy distinguished between offense and coercion and noted that the former does not violate the Establishment Clause. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas did not join in this portion of the opinion.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that there is a long tradition of constitutionally permissible legislative prayer and that such prayer need not be non-sectarian, especially when such a requirement would place the government in the position of policing prayer. Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Establishment Clause should be read as a federalist provision that protected states' rights rather than individual rights.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that, as the Court of Appeals held, the Town of Greece must do more to make its legislative prayer inclusive of other faiths. Despite the fact that the town is not exclusively Christian, the town made no significant effort to inform non-Christian clergy about the possibility of delivering an invocation, and in doing so, marginalized religious minority populations. Justice Elena Kagan wrote in a separate dissent that the town's failure to represent a variety of religions in its meetings amounted to the unconstitutional preference of one religion over others. To do so in a public forum where people come to participate in the political process forces individuals who do not agree with the beliefs represented in the prayer to either acquiesce or visibly make their dissent known. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Breyer joined in the dissent.\n\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56012:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56014:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56014:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which established two sets of limits to campaign contributions. The base limit placed restrictions on how much money a contributor—defined broadly as individuals, partnerships, and other organizations—may give to specified categories of recipients. The aggregate limit restricted how much money an individual may donate in a two-year election cycle. The limits were periodically recalibrated to factor in inflation.\nShaun McCutcheon is an Alabama resident who is eligible to vote. In the 2011-2012 election cycle, he donated to the Republican National Committee, other Republican committees, as well as individual candidates. He wished to donate more in amounts that would be permissible under the base limit but would violate the aggregate limit. McCutcheon and the other plaintiffs sued the Federal Election Commission, arguing that the aggregate limit violated the First Amendment by failing to serve a \"cognizable government interest\" and being prohibitively low. The district court held that the aggregate limit served government interests by preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption and was set at a reasonable limit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56014:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56014:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56014:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the four-justice plurality. The plurality held that the aggregate limit did little to address the concerns that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was meant to address and at the same time limited participation in the democratic process. Because the aggregate limit fails to meet the stated objective of preventing corruption, it does not survive the \"rigorous\" standard of review laid out by previous precedent dealing with campaign contributions from a First Amendment perspective and is therefore unconstitutional. The aggregate limit also prevents a donor from contributing beyond a specific amount to more than a certain number of candidates, which may force him to choose which interests he can seek to advance in a given election. The plurality held that the collective interest in combating corruption can only be pursued as long as it does not unnecessarily curtail an individual's freedom of speech, and in this case the aggregate limit is not sufficiently closely tailored to accomplish this goal. The plurality also noted that there are many other means by which the government may fight election corruption without setting an aggregate limit on campaign contributions.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, a previous case dealing with limits on campaign contributions, should be overruled because it denigrates the core values of the First Amendment. Because the reasoning in Buckley v. Valeo could not sufficiently justify using a standard lower than strict scrutiny to examine limits on campaign contributions, Justice Thomas wrote that Buckley should be overruled and the BCRA should be subject to strict scrutiny.\nIn his dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the plurality's opinion misconstrues the nature of competing constitutional issues and destroys campaign finance laws, which causes great harm to the democratic process. Justice Breyer argued that the plurality's opinion was based on a definition of corruption that is too narrow to be effective. He went on to state the reasoning that the aggregate limit is faulty is because there is no substantial mismatch between Congress' goal of combating corruption and the means established to achieve it. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56014:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56017:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56017:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Patent Act allows a court to award reasonable attorneys fees in exceptional cases in which the lawsuit is objectively baseless and brought in bad faith. Allcare Management Systems, Inc. (Allcare) owns a patent that covers a computer-based method of generating treatment options based on symptom data entered by a physician. This process can help an insurance company determine whether to approve a particular treatment for a patient. In 2003, Highmark, Inc. (Highmark), a health insurance company, sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement of Allcare's patent. Allcare filed a counterclaim and alleged that Highmark infringed on two sections of its patent. The federal district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Highmark. The court also found that Allcare had willfully pursued frivolous infringement claims and ordered it to pay Highmark's attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit independently reviewed the district court's determination that Allcare's claims were objectively baseless. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding with respect to one of Allcare's claims and reversed the court regarding Allcare's second claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56017:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56017:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56017:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that a district court is in the best position to determine whether a lawsuit is objectively baseless and, as such, is entitled to deference upon appeal. The Federal Circuit applied too strict of a standard in its independent review of the case, which should be reserved for questions of law. The Court remanded the proceedings and instructed the Federal Circuit to examine the district court’s findings for abuse of discretion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56017:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56019:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56019:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2001, James Alvin Castleman was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic assault under the relevant Tennessee statute, which dealt with knowingly or intentionally causing bodily harm to the mother of the defendant's child. Seven years later, federal agents discovered that Castleman and his wife were buying firearms from dealers and selling them on the black market. Because Castleman's domestic assault conviction prohibited him from purchasing firearms, Castleman's wife bought the weapons in her own name. Castleman was indicted in federal district court and charged with two counts of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The district court dismissed the charges and held that Castleman's misdemeanor domestic assault conviction under Tennessee law did not constitute the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as required by the federal statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56019:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56019:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56019:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that, because the statute in question—that prevents people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms—incorporates an element regarding the use of physical force, it includes those convicted of domestic assault under state law. This reading of the statute is consistent with the common-law meaning of violence, and to read it otherwise would have meant that the statute was ineffective in many states at the time of its enactment. Because the Tennessee statute under which Castleman was convicted necessarily involved the use of physical force, it should be considered a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction for the purpose of the federal statute.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the majority opinion could have settled the case on much narrower grounds than it did. Because the meaning of the Tennessee statute in question categorically includes the meaning of \"physical force,\" a conviction under that statute qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the reasoning in the majority opinion purports to rely on the reasoning in Johnson v. United States, but because the majority opinion in this case holds that force does not need to be violent, it is an improper application of the precedent. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56019:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56020:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56020:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1908, the United States granted land, known as a right-of-way (ROW) to the Hahn's Peak and Pacific Railway Company to build a 66-mile railway from Laramie, Wyoming to Colorado. In 1976, the United States granted Fox Park, Wyoming⎯land that surrounds the ROW⎯to Melvin and Lula Brandt. In 1986, a new company, the Wyoming and Colorado Railway Company, acquired the ROW. The company operated the ROW until it officially abandoned the land in 2003. Following the abandonment, the United States sued the Brandt Revocable Trust and other potential property owners under 42 USC 912, a statute governing the disposition of abandoned or forfeited railroad grants. The government argued that this statute reverts abandoned ROWs back to the federal government's exclusive possession. The United States sought a judicial order of abandonment and exclusive possession of the ROW. The Brandt Revocable Trust and property owners filed a countersuit seeking full possession of the ROW, insofar as it cut through their land. They argued that the statute only granted an easement to the United States, not full possession. The district court granted the interest in the ROW to the United States and the US. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56020:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56020:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56020:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the language, legislative history, and subsequent administrative interpretation of the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 (1875 Act) clearly grants an easement for the railroad's land and not a more enduring property interest. When the United States granted Fox Park to Melvin and Lula Brandt, it did not reserve for itself any additional interest in the railroad property. Therefore, pursuant to the 1875 Act, when the railroad company abandoned the land, it should have been settled as an easement. When an easement is abandoned, the easement disappears and the land reverts to its previous owner, so in this case, the land would revert to the Brandt Revocable Trust and property owners.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that there is judicial precedent to support the view that, in granting land to railroad companies, Congress did not intend to allow those land grants to be disposed at the will of the private companies. Justice Sotomayor also argued that the majority opinion failed to take into account the fact that railroad rights have historically not been treated as property rights that can be decided simply on the basis of common law principles. Therefore, even if the 1875 Act only granted an easement, it should not be treated as an ordinary easement. Instead, such an easement should be settled according to the presumption in favor of the sovereign grantor, the United States, as has typically governed railroad ROW property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56020:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56022:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56022:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn August 2007, Justus Rosemond and Ronald Joseph met Ricardo Gonzalez in a Tooele, Utah, park to sell him a pound of marijuana. When Gonzalez attempted to take the marijuana without paying, he was fired upon while fleeing. The government charged Justus Rosemond with several drug-and firearm-related offenses. At trial, the government alleged that Rosemond was either the shooter or that he aided and abetted the shooter. The jury convicted Rosemond on all charges.On appeal, Rosemond argued that the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the aiding and abetting theory were insufficient and that the jury must find that Rosemond \"intentionally took some action to facilitate or encourage the use of a firearm\" to convict. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Rosemond's conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56022:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56022:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56022:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the government must prove that the defendant actively participated in a drug or violent crime intending to see it succeed and knew in advance that one of his coconspirators had a gun during the crime. Whether the defendant approved or disapproved of having or using the gun is irrelevant, as long as he participated in the underlying drug or violent crime with knowledge of a gun. Proof that the defendant knew that a gun was used sometime in the commission of the crime is insufficient; if, as in this case, a defendant learns of a gun upon seeing or hearing an accomplice fire shots after the criminal scheme has begun, he cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting under this statute. The State must prove as part of the knowledge element that the accomplice had the opportunity to walk away after learning of the gun but chose to proceed thereby incurring the liability of this statute.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreeing only with the majority's new rule that the State prove that the aider and abetter had an opportunity to refrain from the criminal conduct after learning of a gun. His dissent rests on the position that this requirement deviates from the traditional aiding and abetting doctrine, and it opens up the affirmative defense of necessity or duress for the accomplice that does not object to having a gun for fear violence might be directed at him. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56022:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56023:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56023:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA collective bargaining agreement directed Ray Holuch Gravel, a landscape supply company, to remit contributions to several benefit funds affiliated with the Central Pension Fund, a labor union which represents landscape supply company employees. After conducting an audit of the company's books in 2009, the union sued for additional remittances of past unreported work. They also sued for attorney's fees. The district court ruled in favor of the labor union on both issues with respect to one employee, but ruled against them with respect to employees who could not be identified because the landscape supply company failed to keep the required records. The two decisions were announced separately and one week apart. The labor union appealed both rulings within thirty days of the second ruling, but more than thirty days after the first ruling. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the appeal was timely because the attorney's fees are a merits issue, so the first decision was not final until the lower court had decided both cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56023:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56023:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56023:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that the decision on the merits, even if the issue of attorney's fees remains unresolved, is the final decision for the purpose of appeal. Because attorney's fees do not remedy the injury giving rise to the action and are often available to the defendant(s) as well as the plaintiff(s), the issue is generally not considered part of a merits decision. Although this distinction could lead to piecemeal litigation, the Court held that the concern was counterbalanced by the clarity that such a uniform rule provided to the appeals process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56023:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56025:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56025:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFormer shareholders of Halliburton Company (Halliburton) filed a class action lawsuit against the company and argued that Halliburton falsified its financial statements and misrepresented projected earnings between 1999 and 2001. In their petition for class certification, the shareholders invoked the \"fraud on the market\" presumption to demonstrate their class-wide reliance on Halliburton's statements. The \"fraud on the market\" theory assumes that, in an efficient market, the price of a security reflects any material, public representation affecting that security. Therefore, under this theory, the law presumes that investors have relied on a material misstatement when they purchase a security at an artificially high or low price. The federal district court certified the shareholders as a class and prevented Halliburton from introducing evidence that the statements did not impact its stock prices at all. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that Halliburton could not rebut the presumption that the plaintiffs relied on the statements until a trial on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56025:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56025:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56025:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that there was no reason to prevent defendants in a securities fraud case from presenting evidence regarding the impact of alleged misinformation on stock prices during the class certification stage. The Court also held that Halliburton was unable to provide adequate justification to overrule the established precedent that plaintiffs in securities fraud cases only need to prove a presumption of reliance on fraudulent information. The presumption standard is based on the generally agreed-upon principle that public information affects stock prices. Without any evidence that this principle was misunderstood or no longer reflects current economic realities, the presumption standard should remain. Additionally, because Congress had the opportunity to pass a law that created a new standard and chose not to do so, Congress clearly intended the presumption to stand.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that, while allowing the defendants to present price-impact evidence at the class certification stage may broaden the scope of those proceedings, it should not present an undue burden to plaintiffs with legitimate claims. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the presumption of reliance standard should not be used because it is based on a flawed understanding of economics and effectively lowers the burden of proof for the plaintiffs. For these reasons, Justice Thomas argued that the decision in Basic v. Levinson—the decision that established the “fraud on the market” presumption standard—should be overruled. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56025:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56027:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56027:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe plaintiffs, Jackie Lawson and Jonathan Zang, brought a lawsuit against their former employer, FMR LLC, a subcontractor of Fidelity Investments (Fidelity), alleging that the company unlawfully fired them in retaliation for filing complaints. Both Lawson and Zang told the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) that they believed that Fidelity had violated certain rules and regulations set forth by both the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders. Sometime after filing these complaints, Zang was terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Lawson filed several retaliation claims against her employer with OSHA, and resigned in 2007, claiming that she had been constructively discharged.\nZang and Lawson each filed separate actions against their former employers in district court. They alleged that the defendants violated \"whistleblower\" protection sections of the Sarbanes-Oakley Act by taking retaliatory actions against them. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the whistleblower provisions extended to employees of private agents, contractors, and subcontractors to public companies and that the plaintiffs had engaged in protected activity under the statute. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which reversed the decision. Looking at both Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not protected employees under the act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56027:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56027:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56027:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that whistleblower-protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act protects employees of private contractors and subcontractors just as it does employees of the public company served by the private contractors and subcontractors. Because there was no language in the Act that specifically limited the covered employees to those working for the public company, the Court held that Congress must not have intended the Act to have such a limited scope. The legislative record supports the view that Congress was aware of the role that outside contractors can play in recognizing and reporting fraud, and that fear of retaliation can prevent them from fulfilling that role.\nIn his opinion concurring in principal part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that, while he agreed with the judgment of the majority opinion, the majority opinion's reliance on legislative history is an ineffective measure of proof because it cannot accurately reflect Congressional intent. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence in principal part and in the judgment.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority opinion was an over-broad interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. There are several key indicators that support a narrower reading of that Act, not the least of which is the fact that the relevant section is entitled \"Protection for Employees of Publically Traded Companies Who Provide Evidence of Fraud.\" Beyond the evidence of the Act's context that support a narrow reading, Justice Sotomayor also argued that the majority opinion's interpretation would result in opportunities for litigation any time any employee claims to be harassed for providing information regarding any offense; it is not plausible that Congress would have intended to place such burdens on the courts. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56027:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56028:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56028:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Clean Air Act creates a federal-state partnership that aims to control air pollution in the United States. The Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to both establish air quality standards and gives the states significant freedom to implement plans in order to meet those standards. Among the problems the Act sought to prevent was the possible spread of air pollution from \"upwind\" states to \"downwind\" states.\nIn 2011, the EPA created the Transport Rule, a rule which sets emission reduction standards for 28 \"upwind\" states based on the air quality standards in \"downwind\" states. Various states, local governments, industry groups, and labor organizations brought suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and argued that the Transport Rule created federal standards with no deference to the states, which violated federal law. The court held that the Transport Rule violated federal law because the Clean Air Act allows states to implement their own plans to curb air pollution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56028:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56028:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56028:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no, no. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the Clean Air Act supports the EPA's contention that if a state implementation plan (SIP) is determined to be insufficient, then the EPA has an absolute mandate to create and enforce a federal implementation plan (FIP) at any point within the next two years unless the state revises the SIP in question. Nothing in the Act required the EPA to provide states with specific metrics regarding upwind states' contributions to the pollution of downwind states, especially since this schedule could prolong the process by instituting a delay that Congress did not order in the Act. The Court held that the Transport Rule was necessary for the EPA to fulfill its statutory requirement to balance the possibility of under-and over-control of emissions standards. The Court also held that there was no jurisdictional bar to the Court of Appeals and then the Supreme Court hearing the case.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Clarence Thomas arguing that the majority opinion failed to rely on a textual justification for its holdings. Instead, the majority opinion reached the logically inconsistent conclusion that the EPA did not have to provide states with information regarding emission standards before states were required to implement plans that conformed to those standards.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.\n[In the initially published opinion, Justice Scalia's dissent cited a Supreme Court case dealing with the EPA, Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., as an example of a case that had denied the EPA the ability to expand its mandate. However, the case actually had to do with the EPA defending its more limited mandate, and the majority sided with the EPA. Additionally, Justice Scalia was the author of the opinion he mischaracterized. The Supreme Court then issued a corrected version of Justice Scalia's dissent that removed the incorrect reference.]", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56028:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56029:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56029:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDiana Alvarez and Manuel Lozano, two native Columbians, met while living in London and had a daughter together. At trial Alvarez testified that, from 2005 until 2008, Lozano was abusing and threatening to rape her. Lozano denied these allegations and claimed that, although they had normal couple problems, they were generally \"very happy together.\" In November 2008, Alvarez took the child and, after a stay at a women's shelter, moved to her sister's home in New York. A psychiatrist diagnosed the child with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by her experience living in the United Kingdom, moving to America, staying at a women's shelter, and knowing that her mother had been threatened. However, six months later, the child's condition drastically improved.\nAfter Lozano exhausted all remedies within the UK to attempt to locate the child, on November 10, 2010, he filed a Petition for Return of Child under Article 2 of the Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act in U.S. district court. The district court held that the child was now settled in New York and that removing the child would cause undue harm. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56029:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56029:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56029:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that the policy of equitable tolling, which pauses the running of a statute of limitations when a litigant has diligently pursued his rights, does not apply to the Hague Convention's provision on international child abduction. Because equitable tolling extends an otherwise discrete time period, it must be proven to align with statutory intent. However, the Hague Convention is a treaty, not a statute, and a treaty by its nature must be interpreted based on principles shared by the nations involved. Equitable tolling is not an established part of the background law of all signatories of the Hague Convention and therefore has no role in the interpretation of the treaty. The Court also held that the one-year period is not actually a statute of limitations because its expiration opens the door for other considerations that could result in the return of the child to the home country.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Hague Convention allowed courts to consider all factors relevant to the child's wellbeing and order the child's return to the home country even after the one year has elapsed. Nothing in the Hague Convention specifies that the one-year period places limits on a court's discretionary power to order the child's return. The one-year period is the time when the court must order the return, but not the only time the court may do so. Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56029:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56030:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56030:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDoyle R. Paroline pled guilty to possession of 150-300 images of child pornography. Included among those files on his computer were two photographs of Amy Unknown, a victim of child pornography. He was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration followed by release under supervision. Under a federal statute that mandates full restitution to victims of child pornography by those convicted of creating, distributing or possessing such material, the Government and Amy sought restitution in the amount of nearly $3.4 million. The district court denied restitution and held that the statute required the Government to prove that Paroline's possession of the images was the proximate cause of the injuries for which restitution was sought. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Paroline was responsible for restitution for all the victim's losses even if his criminal acts occurred after the victim's losses.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56030:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56030:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56030:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the government or victim must prove that the costs for which the victim seeks restitution stem from the offense in question. However, this causal link must be not simply factual but rather proximate, which means that there must be a sufficient connection between the offense and the victim's costs. The proximate cause requirement prevents a defendant from being held liable in situations where the link between the offense and the alleged harm could best be described as coincidental. In this case, although Paroline's individual possession of the pornographic images may not have directly caused the extent of the victim's losses that stem from the continuing traffic of her images, the Court held that it would be appropriate for a court to order restitution in an amount that represents the defendant's relative role in the larger process that caused harm to the victim.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, because there is no way to prove exactly what amount of the victim's harms were caused by this specific defendant's possession of her images, the court would only be able to pick an arbitrary restitution amount, which undermines a criminal defendant's right to due process of law. Since the statute requires the government or the victim to demonstrate the amount of the victim's loss that was caused by the offense in question, the restitution system fails in cases like this one, where the injury is not divisible. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that the restitution statute in question requires the defendant to pay restitution for the victim's costs in full, though a periodic payment schedule may be implemented. If the defendant were to avoid paying restitution simply because he was one of many people who contributed to the victim's harms, such logic would excuse all similar offenders and the victim would be unable to obtain any restitution. Because individual possessors of child pornography act in concert as part of a larger network, they act with the knowledge of their roles and the larger harms their actions cause to the victim, which means that they must be held liable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56030:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56031:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56031:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56031:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56031:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56031:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot decided, no. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the majority opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the law considers causation as a hybrid between two constituent parts: actual cause, or cause-in-fact, and legal cause, which is also known as proximate cause. Because the cause-in-fact requirement was not met in this case, the Court did not rule on whether the crime of distribution of drugs causing death required a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement. Instead, the Court focused on the specific text found in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), the federal law requiring heightened sentences for drug sales causing death or serious bodily injury. The language in that statute requires that the death \"results from\" the sale of illegal drugs. Because the deceased in this case was found with multiple drugs in his system, the heroin sold by the defendant could not be considered an independently sufficient cause of death.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsberg wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which she objected to an analogy made in the majority opinion that compared the \"results from\" language in drug statutes to similar language found in Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Instead she cited to her dissent in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar . There, Ginsburg also dissented, arguing that the Court's interpretation of similar language (in that case, \"because of\") lacked sensitivity to real-life concerns. Despite her reservations about the Court's statutory interpretation, she agreed with the ruling in this case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined Ginsburg's special concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56031:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56032:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56032:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2006, Edward Lane accepted a probationary position as Director of the Community Intensive Training for Youth (\"CITY\") program at Central Alabama Community College (\"CACC\"). He subsequently terminated the employment of Suzanne Schmitz, a state representative who had not performed any work for the program despite being listed on CITY's payroll. Lane also testified against Schmitz in two federal criminal trials between 2008 and 2009. In January 2009, Steve Franks, the president of CACC, sent termination letters to 29 CITY employees, including Lane, but rescinded the terminations of 27 of those employees within a few days. Lane sued Franks in federal district court and alleged that his termination from the CITY program was in retaliation for his testimony against Schmitz and therefore violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Franks from liability and granted summary judgment in his favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed but declined to reach a decision on the qualified immunity question. Instead, the appellate court held that the First Amendment did not protect Lane's testimony because it was made pursuant to his official duties as a public employee.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56032:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56032:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56032:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that Lane’s testimony clearly constituted citizen speech on a public matter and that the testimony was elicited during a trial for misuse of state funds and corruption. Therefore, Lane did not testify as part of his employment responsibilities. Though Lane learned some of the subject matter of his testimony through the course of his employment, that alone does not make the testimony a part of Lane’s employment responsibilities. However, even though the Court found that Lane’s speech was protected under the First Amendment, ultimately Lane’s claim must be dismissed because Franks had qualified immunity. Previous precedent, specifically Morris v. Crow, had held that public employee testimony was unprotected speech, and thus when Franks fired Lane, he was not violating a clearly established constitutional right.\nIn his concurring opinion Justice Clarence Thomas agreed that, because Lane did not testify as a part of his employment duties and responsibilities, his testimony constituted citizen speech on a public matter and was entitled to First Amendment protection. Justice Thomas further applauded the Court for not addressing whether the First Amendment protects the testimony of public employee when that testimony is part of the employee’s employment duties. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Justice Antonin Scalia joined the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56032:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56033:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56033:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFreddie Lee Hall was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1978 murder of Karol Hurst. Hall sought a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution in state court, which was denied. Hall then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Hall appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed in part and remanded the case for a hearing regarding the potential effect of his absence from the courtroom during the trial and ineffective counsel. On remand, the district court again denied habeas corpus and held that Hall's absences from the courtroom were harmless and that he deliberately bypassed ineffective counsel claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.\nHall petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for habeas corpus relief based on the Supreme Court decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger, which held that all mitigating factors should be considered rather than just the mitigating factors listed in the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition and held that no error occurred in sentencing. After the governor signed his second death warrant, Hall filed a motion to vacate the sentence, which the trial court denied by holding that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision barred further review of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed and held that the case involved additional non-record facts that had not been considered in the previous review. The case was vacated and remanded for new sentencing. At the new sentencing trial, the trial court held that Hall's mental retardation was a mitigating factor with \"unquantifiable weight,\" and he was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.\nIn 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the execution of mentally retarded defendants constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hall filed a motion to declare certain sections of the Florida death penalty statute unconstitutional based on this decision and filed a claim to be exempt from the death penalty under that ruling. The trial court held a hearing to determine if Hall was eligible for such a claim and found that he was not because the first prong of the test—whether he had an IQ below 70—could not be met. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56033:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56033:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56033:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that executing an intellectually disabled person violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. If a person is unable to make the calculated judgments that are the premise for the rationale that the death penalty functions as a deterrent and as retribution, then the death penalty serves no legitimate purpose. While the Florida statute in question may be constitutional on its face, the Florida courts have interpreted the statute too narrowly by relying only on an IQ test score—which itself is not infallible—instead of allowing for the consideration of other evidence regarding the defendant’s intellectual disability. In this manner, the mandatory cutoff at an IQ of 70 allows for intellectually disabled people to be sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion represented an unprecedented departure from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence because it relied on professional standards rather than the evolving standards of society at large. Because the standards of professional organizations frequently change, tying Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to them will likely result in legal instability and protracted litigation. In fact, Justice Alito argued that there was no evidence that the new method the majority opinion favored was any more accurate than the IQ test, and that Florida’s statutory scheme already took the risk of testing error into account by allowing for the introduction of multiple test scores into evidence. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56033:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56034:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56034:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nS. Binyomin Ginsberg became a member of the Northwest Airlines frequent flyer program in 1999 and obtained Premium Elite Status in 2005. In 2008, his membership was terminated, as per the terms of the program that allow Northwest Airlines discretion over the removal of participants. In January 2009, Ginsberg sued Northwest Airlines and argued that, by terminating his membership in the frequent flyer program, the company breached both the contractual agreement and the implied doctrine of good faith and fair dealing under Minnesota law.\nAt trial in district court, the defense argued that Ginsberg's claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), which prohibits states from enacting or enforcing regulation over the price, route, or service of an air carrier. The district court found in favor of Northwest Airlines. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the ADA did not preempt the claims because the claims were unrelated to the price, route, or services of the air carrier.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56034:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56034:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56034:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, the Airline Deregulation Act pre-empts state law claims when such claims seek to enlarge the contractual obligations that the parties voluntarily adopted. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that exempting such claims from pre-emption would negate the ADA's goal of allowing market forces to establish aspects of air transportation without the interference of state laws. Additionally, since Minnesota state law does not allow parties to contract out of the covenant into which they voluntarily entered, a claim of a breach of covenant is pre-empted unless otherwise specified.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56034:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56035:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56035:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWorkers at the United Steel Corporation brought a class action suit against the company arguing that the Fair Labor Standards Act required the company to compensate them for time spent changing into and out of work clothes and the transit time from the locker room to their work stations. The Act states that an employer does not need to compensate employees for time spent \"changing clothes.\" United States Steel Corporation moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion as it relates to compensation for changing clothes but not in relation to compensation for transit time.\nThe company appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Act did not require the company to compensate the employees for either the time spent changing or the time spent in transit between the locker room and the work stations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56035:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56035:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56035:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that safety gear falls within the parameters of \"clothes\" for the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act and therefore is subject to the separate collective bargaining agreement that does not provide compensation for changing into and out of safety gear. Because the statutory context makes it clear that the concept of \"clothes\" refers to items that are necessary for job performance, there is no need to construe the term more strictly. Additionally, since \"changing\" clothes does not require the substitution of one outfit for another, the act of donning or doffing safety can be considered \"changing clothes\" for the purposes of the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56035:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56036:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56036:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJulie Heimeshoff worked for Wal-Mart as Senior Public Relations Manager from April 1986 through June 2005. In January 2005, she began suffering from pain from fibromyalgia as well as Irritable Bowel Syndrome and lupus. By June, her condition was so severe that she had to leave work. In August 2005, Heimsehoff filed a claim with Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. (Hartford) for Long Term Disability benefits. Heimsehoff's doctor failed to provide an analysis of her condition to Harford, so Hartford denied her claim in December 2005. In May 2006, Heimsehoff obtained counsel to assist her in obtaining benefits. After several evaluations by other doctors, Hartford denied Heimsehoff's claim again in November 2006, finding that she could perform the duties of her former position. Heimsehoff appealed the decision, but Hartford denied her claim for a final time in November 2007.\nHeimsehoff sued in district court, alleging that Hartford violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in denying her claim. The district court dismissed the suit as time barred because the plan unambiguously prohibited legal action more than three years after proof of loss is required. Heimsehoff argued that the three-year statute of limitations should instead run from the date when Hartford denied her claim for the final time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56036:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56036:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56036:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, because ERISA does not mandate a statute of limitations, parties may agree to one that begins before a final denial of coverage that allows a party to state a claim in district court. Since Hartford's agreed-upon limitations period is neither too short nor is there a statute that prevents it from taking effect, the courts are bound to enforce the limitations period and its start date as written in the coverage plan. The Court also held that there is no evidence that the limitations period would prevent a party from fully pursuing internal review followed by judicial review, and if that were to happen, the courts could apply well-established doctrines to allow the suit to proceed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56036:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56037:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56037:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe respondents are all immigrants to the United States and are considered lawful permanent residents. At various times each of the respondents applied for family-sponsored visas. However, because of the delays caused by visa quotas and serious backlogs in the U.S. immigration system meant that all of their children had turned twenty-one and, based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), had \"aged out\" of eligibility for any derivative child-visas. As a result, their visa applications converted from child-applications to adult-applications and were moved to the bottom of the adult-application list, which potentially added years to their wait to receive a visas.\nIn 2009, after the Board of Immigration Appeals converted several child visa petitions to adult petitions, the respondents filed two cases in federal district court in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California asking hat the court order the Board to retain use of their children's original visa filing dates. That court denied the request. The respondents then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. There, the petitioners argued that certain provisions in the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) should allow the use of the children's original application dates for certain visa applications. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the language of both CSPA and the INA allow the child-status petition to convert to an adult petition while still retaining the original date when the visa petition was filed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56037:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56037:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56037:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the three-justice plurality. The plurality held that the relevant sections of the Child Status Protection Act are not ambiguous but rather allow children to retain their original application date only in certain situations and not in others. Therefore, the interpretation of the Board of Immigration Appeals is reasonable and should receive deference in this case. However, the plurality also noted that the CSPA does not require the Board's interpretation in this case; it is simply one possible reading based on the differences in the text of the statute.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in judgment in which he argued that Congress intended any ambiguity in the statute to be resolved by the Board. Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the plurality that the Board's interpretation of the statute was reasonable and should be allowed to stand. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.\nIn his dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the CSPA has an appropriate category into which to convert the petitions of children who have \"aged out\" of their previous category. Because such a conversion is possible without any action on the part of the INA, the respondents' petitions should have been immediately converted and their original petition dates should be retained. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a separate dissent in which she argued that, because all five categories of aged out children meet the requirement in the initial clause of the statute, they are entitled to relief in the form of retaining their original petition dates. By holding that the Board's interpretation was a reasonable one, the plurality's opinion ignores the principle of statutory interpretation that requires courts to assume that Congress constructed the statute as a coherent whole. Because the Board's construction of the statute neglected this principle and treated the statute as entirely disparate parts, Justice Sotomayor argued that the Board's interpretation was impermissible. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56037:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56038:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56038:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCarol Anne Bond worked for the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas. When she learned that her friend Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant and that Bond's husband was the father, she used her connections with the chemical company to obtain the means for revenge. She stole and purchased highly toxic chemicals that she applied to Haynes' doorknobs, car door handles, and mailbox. Haynes suffered a minor burn, and after contacting a federal investigator, Bond was identified as the perpetrator. She was charged with several violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Act).\nIn the district court, Bond moved to dismiss the case and argued that Congress did not have the authority to enforce the Act because it subverted states' rights in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Bond conditionally pled guilty with the understanding that she could continue to appeal the decision regarding the validity of the Act. She was sentenced to six years in prison. Bond renewed her challenge to the Act in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that Bond did not have standing to appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the case must be considered on its merits. The case was remanded back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3d Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the Act was within Congress' power to enact and enforce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56038:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56038:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56038:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that federal law typically does not intrude on the ability of states to regulate local matters, and the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act is not an exception to that general rule. While Congress has the authority to create legislation to enforce treaties, it must do so while respecting the traditional division of sovereign responsibility between the federal government and the states. The Court also held that it is incumbent upon the courts to be sure of Congress' intent before ruling based on such a rationale; in this case, because there is no evidence that Congress intended the statute to have expansive powers, it must be read more narrowly. In fact, the language of the statute suggests that the facts of this case do not match the types of situations the statute was enacted to govern.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, in determining whether the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act covers Bond's actions, the majority opinion overstepped its bounds and performed Congress' duty. Justice Scalia also wrote that it was clear from the wording of the statute that Bond's actions were covered, and the majority opinion's interpretation of the statute made it so broad as to be unintelligible. However, the statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on the rights of the states. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas wrote that, while Congress has the power to create laws that enforce treaties, that power does not extend to the enforcement of laws that would infringe on states' rights. The historical context of this \"Treaty Power\" indicates that it was meant to be limited to international affairs and not interfere with the constitutional structure of federal and state power. Justice Scalia and Justice Alito joined in the concurrence in judgment. Justice Alito also wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the statute went beyond Congress' power to enforce treaties and is therefore unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56038:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56041:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56041:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPeggy Young was employed as a delivery driver for the United Parcel Service (UPS). In 2006, she requested a leave of absence in order to undergo in vitro fertilization. The procedure was successful and Young became pregnant. During her pregnancy, Young's medical practitioners advised her to not lift more than twenty pounds while working. UPS's employee policy requires their employees to be able to lift up to seventy pounds. Due to Young's inability to fulfill this work requirement, as well as the fact that she had used all her available family/medical leave, UPS forced Young to take an extended, unpaid leave of absence. During this time she eventually lost her medical coverage. Young gave birth in April 2007 and resumed working at UPS thereafter.\nYoung sued UPS and claimed she had been the victim of gender-and disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. UPS moved for summary judgment and argued that Young could not show that UPS's decision was based on her pregnancy or that she was treated differently than a similarly situated co-worker. Furthermore, UPS argued it had no obligation to offer Young accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act because Young's pregnancy did not constitute a disability. The district court dismissed Young's claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56041:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56041:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56041:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, but courts must evaluate the extent to which an employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than non-pregnant workers with similar inabilities to work and determine whether there are any legitimate reasons for such differences. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that an interpretation of the Act that requires employers to offer the same accommodations to pregnant workers as all others with comparable physical limitations regardless of other factors would be too broad. There is no evidence that Congress intended the Act to grant pregnancy such an unconditional “most-favored-nation status.” However, Congress clearly intended the Act to do more than defining sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination. The Court held that a plaintiff may show that she faced disparate treatment from her employer according to the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which requires evidence that the employer’s actions were more likely than not based on discriminatory motivation, and that any reasons the employer offered were pretextual.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the language of the Act makes employers liable for discriminatory conduct regardless of intent. To determine whether the conduct was discriminatory, Justice Alito argued that the treatment of pregnant employees should be compared to the treatment of non-pregnant employees in similar jobs with similar abilities and inabilities to work.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Act only prohibited an employer from distinguishing between employees of similar abilities and inabilities because of pregnancy, while differing treatment for other reasons is permissible. To adopt a broader reading of the Act’s protections would entitle pregnant workers to every possible accommodation. Justice Scalia also argued that the Act’s main intent is to clarify that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Kennedy wrote that the majority opinion interpreted the Act in a manner that conflates evidence of disparate impact with that of disparate treatment, which creates unnecessary confusion in litigating pregnancy discrimination cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56041:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56043:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56043:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn early 2005, Benjamin Carter worked for Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), a U.S. Government contractor providing logistical services to the U.S. military in Iraq. In 2006, Carter filed a whistleblower suit against KBR for fraudulent billing practices under the False Claims Act (FCA). Carter alleged that KBR had a standing policy of filling out fraudulent time sheets and thus overbilling the U.S. Government for services rendered in Iraq.\nIn 2010, just before trial, the U.S. Government informed the parties of a complaint that was filed earlier and alleging similar claims. The district court ruled that the earlier suit was related to Carter’s claims and dismissed the suit under the FCA’s “first-to-file” requirement, which bars a suit if a related one is pending. In 2011, Carter refiled his complaint, and KBR moved to dismiss by arguing that the latest complaint was filed after the FCA’s six-year statute of limitations had expired, and Carter’s complaint did not satisfy the first-to-file rule because there was yet another related matter pending. The district court dismissed Carter’s complaint, but the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), which suspends the applicable six-year statute of limitations, only applies to criminal charges and, because the remaining related cases had since been dismissed, there was no pending related matter to prevent Carter’s claim from proceeding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56043:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56043:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56043:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court looked to the WSLA’s text, structure, and history to show that it applies only to criminal offenses, and not to civil claims like the ones in this case. However, the Court also held that the False Claims Act’s first-to-file bar keeps new claims out of court only while related claims are still alive, not in perpetuity. The Court deemed KBR’s interpretation of the word “pending” to be “peculiar” and turned to the dictionary definition of “pending,” which means “remaining undecided; awaiting decision.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56043:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56045:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56045:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRetirees from the Point Pleasant Plant in Apple Grove, West Virginia⎯owned by M&G since 2000⎯sued after M&G announced that the retirees would be required to contribute to the cost of their medical benefits. The retirees, who had been employees of Apple Grove before the plant was bought by M&G, entered into a series of collective bargaining negotiations through their unions regarding healthcare benefits. Just as earlier versions had included, the 2005-2008 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) included a provision that \"capped\", or limited, the company's annual contribution towards employee healthcare benefits. In 2006, M&G announced it was requiring employees to cover their individual costs once that cap was exceeded in response to the shifting healthcare landscape. The retirees claimed that language in the effective CBA promised full coverage of healthcare benefits for life without any contribution requirement and sued the company because that \"capping\" provision was not included in the pension and insurance booklet or adopted by the union on behalf of employees in the latest agreement. The retirees sued under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).\nThe district court dismissed the retirees' claim, and they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court found in favor of the retirees but ordered that their healthcare benefits be reinstated to the post-2007 version that included employee contributions. Both parties appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56045:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56045:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56045:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nCourts should apply ordinary principles of contract law. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that collective bargaining agreements, including those established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) plans, should always be interpreted according to ordinary principles of contract law. In this case, the appellate court's holding relied on an understanding of contract law that leaned too heavily in favor of vested retiree benefits in all collective bargaining agreements and therefore distorted the efforts to ascertain the intentions of the parties, a principle on which ordinary contract law is based. Additionally, the Court held that the appellate court relied on inferences that did not have sufficient support in the factual record of this case and therefore failed to properly apply principles of contract law, such as not construing ambiguous writings to create lifetime promises.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that courts must apply ordinary principles of contract law, which require courts to consider whether the agreement as a whole adequately expresses the parties' intents. If not, then courts may turn to extrinsic evidence. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56045:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56046:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56046:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received a complaint from a woman who claimed Mach Mining, LLC (Mach Mining) denied her a job because of her gender. The EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe Mach Mining had discriminated against female applicants and began conciliation, but the parties ultimately could not agree and the EEOC sued on the female applicants' behalf. Mach Mining argued that the EEOC did not conciliate in good faith, and the EEOC moved for summary judgment on whether failure to conciliate in good faith is a viable defense to its suit for unlawful discrimination. The district court denied the motion and held that courts may review the EEOC's informal settlement efforts to determine whether the EEOC made a sincere and reasonable effort to negotiate.\nNonetheless, the court certified the question to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that, so long as the EEOC has pleaded that it complied with Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient, judicial review is satisfied. The appellate court noted that Title VII gives the EEOC complete discretion to accept or reject settlement offers during informal conciliation and provides no standard to evaluate the failure-to-conciliate affirmative defense. Therefore, the appellate court determined that allowing an employer to use failure-to-conciliate as an affirmative defense would protract and complicate employment discrimination cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56046:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56046:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56046:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, but the scope of the review is narrow. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that, while judicial review to ensure that the EEOC fulfilled its statutory obligation to attempt conciliation before suing was appropriate, the scope of such review must be narrow in recognition of the EEOC’s extensive discretion. Because there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review, the Court will only hold that judicial review is inappropriate when Congress has expressly stated in statute that an agency is permitted to police itself. Despite the fact that Congress granted the EEOC broad leeway on when to begin and end conciliation, there is no indication that Congress intended to make the EEOC immune to judicial review. The scope of such review must be limited to what Title VII requires of the EEOC: that the EEOC provide the employer with notice of the specific allegation and allow the employer the opportunity to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56046:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56048:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56048:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nColorado imposes a 2.9% tax on the sale of tangible goods in the state, which retailers with a physical presence in the state are required to collect from purchasers and remit to the state. If a Colorado purchaser has not paid the sales tax on tangible goods, as occurs in some online and mail-order transactions in which the businesses have no physical presence in Colorado, the purchaser must pay a 2.9% use tax and is responsible for reporting and paying the tax to the state. To increase the rate of collection of the use tax, in 2010, Colorado implemented regulations for non-collecting retailers whose gross sales in Colorado exceed $100,000. These retailers must provide transactional notices to Colorado purchasers, send annual purchase summaries to Colorado customers, and annually report Colorado purchaser information to the Colorado Department of Revenue. Retailers that do not comply with these regulations are subject to penalties.\nIn June 2010, Direct Marketing Association (DMA)—a group of businesses and organizations that market products via catalogs, advertisements, broadcast media, and the Internet—sued the Colorado Department of Revenue's executive director and argued that the regulations violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The district court granted DMA's request for an injunction and later granted summary judgment in favor of DMA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not reach a decision on the merits of the appeal and instead held that the Tax Injunction Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin Colorado's tax collection effort.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56048:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56048:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56048:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that the requested relief would not \"enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax,\" and therefore the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) did not prevent a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction to hear the case. Because the requested relief was an injunction, which would constitute the type of action the TIA bars, the question was whether the notice and reporting requirements constitute the assessment, levying, or collection of a tax. The Court held that the notice and reporting requirements are a preliminary part of the tax administration process that occur before assessment, levying, or collection, and therefore do not fit into any of those categories. Because the requested relief would not affect any of the categories the TIA protects, the federal district court could hear the case.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that outdated precedents preventing states from collecting use taxes from businesses that do not have a physical presence within the state should be reexamined in light of modern economic realities. However, Justice Kennedy also noted that this case did not present that question to the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she noted that this case did not implicate Congress' intent in enacting the TIA, which was to prevent taxpayers from avoiding their liability by pursuing an alternate legal challenge route, and was consistent with previous jurisprudence on the TIA. Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined in the concurrence and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined the concurrence in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56048:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56049:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56049:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2010, Moones Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia residing in the United States, was arrested for driving under the influence. While Mellouli was detained, police discovered four tablets of Adderall in his sock. Although initially charged with trafficking a controlled substance in a jail, Mellouli ultimately pled guilty to the lesser charge of possessing drug paraphernalia in violation of a Kansas statute. In 2012, the government attempted to deport Mellouli pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which states that aliens convicted under any law \"relating to a controlled substance\" as defined by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), are deportable.\nIn immigration court, Mellouli argued that, since his 2010 conviction did not specify a particular controlled substance and the Kansas statute includes some substances not included in the CSA, his conviction did not necessarily \"relate to a controlled substance\" for the purposes of the INA. The judge rejected the argument and held that Mellouli was deportable because the particular controlled substance involved in his conviction was irrelevant. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and held that possession of drug paraphernalia involves drug trade in general, which is \"related to a controlled substance,\" and therefore Mellouli's conviction met the criteria required by the INA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit denied Mellouli's petition for review and his petition for rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the BIA's conclusion was reasonable in light of the INA's use of the general term \"relating to\" instead of a more specific term like \"involving.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56049:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56049:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56049:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a drug conviction under state law triggers deportation only if the crime falls within a category of deportable offenses defined by federal law. It has long been established that, if a state criminalizes certain “narcotics” not listed as a “narcotic drug” under federal law, a state conviction cannot serve as the basis for deportation. Because the Board of Immigration Appeals’ approach in this case makes state paraphernalia convictions deportable because they generally “relate to” any and all controlled substances, whether or not federally listed, less grave paraphernalia possession misdemeanors can have harsher consequences than certain drug possession and distribution offenses. The text of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) limits the meaning of “controlled substance” for removal purposes to those listed under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Because the Kansas paraphernalia statute does not depend on whether the substance is listed under the CSA, nor did state prosecutors seek to prove that Mellouli possessed a substance listed under the CSA, Mellouli’s conviction does not warrant deportation.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the narcotics on Kansas’ controlled substances list are the same as those listed in the CSA, with nine additions. Therefore, the Kansas law under which Mellouli was convicted “relates to” a “controlled substance” as defined in the CSA, and Mellouli’s state paraphernalia conviction could trigger deportability under the INA. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56049:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56051:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56051:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay overtime wages to employees who work more than 40 hours per week. However, the FLSA also provides exemptions to this overtime rule for employees, including those \"employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity...or in the capacity of outside salesman.\"\nMortgage Bankers Association (MBA) is a national trade organization that represents real estate financial companies and their employees across the country. Among these employees are mortgage loan officers, who assist prospective buyers in finding and applying for mortgage offers. In 2006, the Department of Labor issued an opinion letter that stated that mortgage loan officers' duties fell within the definition of \"administrative\" and that they qualify for the exception to the overtime rule in the FLSA. In 2010, however, the Deputy Administrator issued a second pronouncement that declared that a mortgage loan officer did not qualify for the administrative employee exception. MBA sued the Department of Labor in district court and argued that the agency could not change its interpretation without first going through a notice-and-comment period required by the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied MBA's motion for summary judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the Department of Labor's 2010 interpretation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56051:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56051:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56051:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the appellate court improperly relied on the rule established in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., which required an agency to use notice-and-comment procedures when making significant changes to a previously interpreted legislative rule. The Court held that this rule was invalid because it was contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) clear provision that agencies need only use notice-and-comment procedures when enacting a legislative rule that has the \"force of law.\" Because notice-and-comment procedures are not required when agencies enact interpretive rules, they should not be required to make subsequent interpretations, as occurred in this case. The Court rejected Mortgage Banker Association's policy argument and noted that the APA contains other safeguards to prevent agencies from creating substantive changes to legislative rules under the guise of \"interpretation.\"\nIn his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the majority opinion correctly overruled the Paralyzed Veterans rule as incompatible with the APA. Justice Alito also noted his agreement with Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in the judgment.\nJustice Antonin M. Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the majority opinion continued the dangerous trend of judicial deference to agencies' interpretation of their own rules. The APA allows reviewing courts to interpret disputed terms in agencies' legislative rules, but traditionally courts have deferred to the definitions that agencies have enacted through their interpretive rules. Justice Scalia pointed out the majority opinion failed to curb growing agency power and would continue to allow the use of interpretive rules to bind the public without notice-and-comment oversight. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas echoed Justice Scalia's concerns and took issue with judicial deference making way for agencies to enact \"interpreting rules\" that, in reality, have substantive outcomes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56051:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56053:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56053:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKwai Fun Wong, a citizen of Hong Kong and leader of the Wu Wei Tien Tao religious organization, was arrested and deported by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for unlawful entry into the U.S. Prior to her deportation, Wong was briefly detained by the INS, during which she claimed to have been treated negligently by the INS. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), no civil suit may be filed against the United States unless the claimant has first filed a claim with the relevant federal agency and that claim has been denied.\nFollowing denial, a claimant has six months to file suit or the suit is permanently barred. Wong filed a claim with the INS and, following the denial of that claim, sought leave from the district court to add a civil claim against the U.S. to her already outstanding suit against a number of federal officials. For unexplained reasons, the district court did not allow Wong to amend her complaint until seven months later, after the six-month deadline had passed. The district court then dismissed Wong’s federal civil complaint and held that the six-month deadline was “jurisdictional” and thus not subject to equitable tolling, or delaying the time at which a statute of limitations begins to run. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and found that equitable tolling could be applied to the six-month deadline.\nThis case was consolidated with United States v. June, a case in which the conservator (financial manager) of an estate argued that the two-year statute of limitations for filing suit under the FTCA should not have begun to run until she had access to the depositions of federal employees without which she could not have been aware of her claim against the federal government. As in Wong, the federal government claimed that this statute of limitations was “jurisdictional,” and thus not subject to equitable tolling. The district court agreed with the federal government and dismissed the suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that equitable tolling was appropriate based on its earlier opinion inWong v. Beebe.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56053:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56053:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56053:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, as in suits between private parties, there is presumption that equitable tolling is available for suits against the federal government. That presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional, as the government attempted to show in these cases. Because such a determination would completely deprive a court of the authority to hear a case, the Court will only find that the time limitation is jurisdictional if Congress has clearly intended that result. The Court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not provide any such clear statement that Congress intended the statute of limitations provisions to be jurisdictional.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the history of the FTCA and its statutory language indicate that the statute of limitation provisions are not subject to equitable tolling. Because the FTCA waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity, Congress placed strict limits on situations in which the federal government might be subject to liability. The statute of limitations provisions at issue in these cases are examples of such protections against extensive governmental liability and have been interpreted as such. Even if the statute of limitations provisions are not jurisdictional, Justice Alito argued that they should still be interpreted as inflexible based on the statutory language and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56053:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56056:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56056:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1970, Congress created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) through the Rail Passenger Service Act and gave them the priority to use track systems owned by freight railroads for passenger travel. In 2008, Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue metrics and standards addressing scheduling, including on-time performance and train delays. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) sued the Department of Transportation, the FRA, and two officials alleging that the metrics and standards are unconstitutional. The AAR alleged that allowing a private entity, like Amtrak, to exercise joint authority in their issuance violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by vesting the coercive power of government in an interested private party, and also violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers by placing legislative authority in a private entity.\nThe district court rejected the AAR’s argument, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed holding that Amtrak is a private corporation and Congress violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56056:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56056:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56056:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the majority. The Court held that, for purposes of determining the validity of the metrics and standards, Amtrak is a governmental entity. The members of Amtrak’s Board of Directors are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and Amtrak is required by statute to pursue broad public objectives. Because of Amtrak’s significant ties to the government, Amtrak is not a private enterprise, and therefore, treating Amtrak as a governmental entity is consistent with the constitutional separation of powers.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he addressed the issues of accountability and the constitutional questions that arise out of the recognition that Amtrak is functionally a governmental entity. First, unlike other governmental officers, Amtrak’s board members are not required to take an oath to uphold the Constitution. Next, the arbitration clause of the PRIIA is potentially unconstitutional if it is interpreted to allow for a private arbitrator because private parties are not vested with legislative powers. Finally, although all of the other board members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, Amtrak’s president is not but is rather selected by the other board members.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that Amtrak is a private entity and therefore should be subject to generally applicable rules of private conduct created through the proper exercise of legislative power. Because Congress has permitted Amtrak, a private corporation, to make legally binding rules, there are serious constitutional questions that the majority opinion failed to address.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56056:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56057:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56057:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) is a daily interest rate benchmark that is used to help set the interest rate of financial transactions across the globe. Between August 2007 and May 2010, it has been alleged that the LIBOR rate was artificially manipulated downward by a number of colluding financial institutions. Ellen Gelboim was one of many parties to file individual suits against these financial institutions. Given the large number of cases, Gelboim's case was consolidated with a number of other similar cases for pre-trial purposes. During this pre-trial phase, the district court dismissed a number of the cases, including Gelboim's, for failure to state a claim. Gelboim sought to appeal the dismissal, however the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed Gelboim's appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the district court had not entered a final order concerning all the claims in the consolidated action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56057:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56057:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56057:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, because cases that are consolidated for pretrial proceedings retain their separate identities, the question is not whether all claims within the consolidated cases have been subject to a final order, but whether the specific case which is being appealed has been subject to a final order. Because Gelboim's case had been dismissed without leave to amend, the dismissal acted as a final order and thus Gelboim could appeal the district court's dismissal of her case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56057:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56058:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56058:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNaranjibhai and Ramilaben Patel are owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) requires motel operators to keep records with specified information about their guests. The LAMC also authorizes police officers to inspect hotel records at any time without a search warrant. The Patels filed suit and argued that the provision violated their Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. The city of Los Angeles argued that motels are \"closely regulated\" businesses and are therefore subject to warrantless inspections.\nThe district court determined that motels were not subjected to the same kind of pervasive and regular regulations as other recognized \"closely regulated\" businesses. Nonetheless, the court held that motels do not have an ownership interest that gives rise to a privacy right in their records because the records were created to comply with the ordinance. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, but later reversed in rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the hotel records were private \"papers\" protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the LAMC's warrantless search provision was unreasonable because it does not provide for pre-compliance judicial review of an officer's demand to inspect a motel's records.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56058:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56058:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56058:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that an individual may challenge a statute for violating the Constitution on its face without needing to allege unconstitutional enforcement, and that the municipal ordinance in question is unconstitutional on its face because it does not allow for hotel operators to engage in pre-compliance review by questioning the reasonableness of the subpoena in district court. The type of search the municipal ordinance authorizes is an administrative one, which means that its purpose is to ensure that the hotel operators are complying with the record requirement, and judicial precedent has held that there must be an opportunity for the subpoenaed party to contest the subpoena for an administrative search before penalties are imposed. Such pre-compliance review is necessary to ensure that the search is not a pretext to harass the business owner. The Court also held that hotels are not a “closely regulated” business and therefore do not fall under that exception to the warrant requirement.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the municipal ordinance in question is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment in most, if not all, of its applications because warrantless searches are not unreasonable under certain conditions. One of those conditions is when the premises to be searched is that of a closely regulated business, as long as the regulatory scheme of which the search is a part furthers a substantial government interest, the search is necessary to further the regulatory scheme, and the regulatory scheme provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. Because hotels have a long tradition of being closely regulated and the municipal ordinance in question satisfies the conditions of a regulatory scheme for closely regulated businesses, the unwarranted search of hotel records is not unreasonable. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that, in order to hold a statute unconstitutional on its face, the Court must find that the statute is unconstitutional in every application. Because there are many circumstances in which the municipal ordinance in question could be applied constitutionally, relief should only be granted in cases when applying the ordinance would conflict with the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56058:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56061:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56061:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the spring of 1994, Hana Bank, a Korean entity, began to extend its services to the United States under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club. In advertisements distributed during the summer of 1994, Hana Bank included the name \"Hana Overseas Korean Club\" in English as well as \"Hana Bank\" in Korean. The advertisements also included Hana Bank's logo, known as the \"dancing man.\" A second, distinct entity, Hana Financial, Inc. (HFI) was founded in California in the fall of 1994. In 1996, HFI obtained a federal trademark for their logo, a pyramid, with the words \"Hana Financial\" for use in financial services. Hana Bank officials were aware of HFI's use of the name Hana Financial but did not see the need to take any action because the entities did not directly compete with each other.\nIn 2007, HFI filed a complaint against Hana Bank alleging trademark infringement. The district court jury found that Hana Bank had used the \"Hana Bank\" trademark in the United States continuously since before HFI began using the \"Hana Financial\" trademark in 1995 and that Hana Bank's trademark could be \"tacked\" to their 1994 advertisements, which included a similar, but distinct use of the phrase \"Hana Bank.\" HFI appealed, claiming that the determination of whether a trademark may be \"tacked\" to a prior mark is a question of law that must be determined by the court, not a question of fact that may be decided by a jury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the affirmed the jury's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56061:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56061:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56061:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe issue of \"tacking\" is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by the jury. Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court noted that the test for \"tacking\" is whether the two marks create the same, continuing commercial impression so that consumers consider both as the same mark. The Court held that juries are better equipped to make a determination under a test that relies on consumer impressions. Juries can also apply legal standards to facts when given adequate jury instruction. However, a judge may decide a \"tacking\" question on a motion for summary judgment, a motion for judgment as a matter of law, and during a bench trial. The Court concluded that allowing juries to resolve \"tacking\" questions would not create any more unpredictability in the law of trademarks than other jury determinations across all legal fields.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56061:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56062:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56062:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUntil 2000, the Arizona State Constitution granted the State Legislature the ability to draw congressional districts, subject to the possibility of a gubernatorial veto. In 2000, the Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, which amended the state constitution to remove the congressional redistricting power from the legislature and vest it in the newly created Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC).\nIn 2012, after the IRC approved a new congressional district map, the legislature sued the IRC and argued that Proposition 106 violated the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution by removing redistricting authority from the legislature and therefore that the new district map was unconstitutional and void. The legislature also requested that the district court permanently enjoin the IRC from adopting, implementing, or enforcing the new congressional district map. The district court held that Proposition 106 did not violate the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56062:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56062:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56062:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution did not preclude an independent commission, created by initiative, from creating the map for congressional districts. Although the Elections Clause specifically mentions the state legislature, at the time the federal Constitution was ratified, direct lawmaking by the people did not occur. Since then, state Constitutions have been ratified that specifically place lawmaking power in the hands of the electorate in the form of an initiative, as the Arizona State Constitution did. Judicial precedent establishes that redistricting is a legislative function that must be performed in accordance with the state Constitution’s structure of lawmaking; because the Arizona state Constitution allows lawmaking to occur by a referendum of the electorate, Proposition 106 was an acceptable use of that power. Additionally, because the use of such an initiative would not be questioned if it were employed to redistrict for local and state elections, it should also be allowed for federal elections.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Elections Clause’s use of the word “legislature” should be read to mean “representative body,” which is consistent with other uses of the word in the federal Constitution as well as its meaning at the time of ratification. The debate surrounding the Seventeenth Amendment, which altered the Constitution to provide for the election of U.S. Senators by the people of the state rather than its legislature, strongly indicated that the state legislature and the electorate were not interchangeable lawmaking bodies. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that there was no precedent to support entirely supplanting the legislature’s redistricting role and no policy argument that such a drastic move is necessary. Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the Constitution did not grant the judicial branch the power to decide separation-of-powers cases until an action by one of the governmental subunits had caused a private individual harm. Because no such action has occurred in this case, the Court did not have the jurisdiction to decide it. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion’s celebration of direct democracy conflicts with previous judicial precedent and in this case results in removing the redistricting power from the people’s elected representatives. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56062:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56066:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56066:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe \"three strikes\" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis in federal court if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim. Andre Lee Coleman, a Michigan state prisoner, filed several claims while incarcerated. His first claim was dismissed as frivolous, and his second claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Coleman's third claim was also dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he appealed the judgment. Coleman's appeal of his third claim was unresolved when he subsequently filed his fourth claim and moved to proceed in forma pauperis.\nThe district court denied Coleman's motion and held that Coleman's three previous dismissals prevented him from proceeding in forma pauperis on his fourth claim. The court then ordered Coleman to pay the $350 filing fee. After Coleman failed to pay the fee and his fourth claim was dismissed, Coleman appealed. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and held that the PLRA does not require that all dismissals be final to count as a \"strike.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56066:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56066:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56066:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that a plain reading of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) indicates that a dismissal is a “strike” for the purpose of the “three strikes” provision when the case is pending on appeal. The text of the statute refers to when an action is “dismissed,” which does not normally include subsequent activity on appeal. A reading of the statute that does not include appellate action within the meaning of “dismissed” is consistent with the rest of the statute, which treats trials and appeals separately, and with the statute’s purpose of filtering out bad claims. The Court also held that there was little risk that a prisoner would erroneously be denied in forma pauperis status.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56066:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56069:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56069:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 17, 2010, a preschool teacher at Cleveland's William Patrick Day Head Start Center noticed some facial injuries on one of her three-year-old students. When the teacher inquired about the injuries, the student indicated that his mother's boyfriend, Darius Clark, caused them. The teacher forwarded her concerns to a child-abuse hotline, which resulted in the arrest and subsequent charging of Clark for child abuse.\nPrior to trial, a judge ruled the three-year-old child was incompetent to testify but refused to exclude the child's out-of-court identification of Clark as his abuser. Clark was found guilty. On appeal Clark claimed that the admission of the child's out-of-court statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court's ruling and held that, because state law required the teacher to report suspected incidences of child abuse, the teacher was acting as an agent for law enforcement when inquiring about the child's injuries. Therefore, the child's out-of-court statements could only be admitted if the primary purpose of the teacher's questioning was to address an ongoing emergency, as opposed to attempting to establish past events. Because the child was not in immediate danger of further injury, the out-of-court statement could not be admitted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56069:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56069:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56069:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., delivered the opinion of the Court in which five justices joined. The Court held that the three-year-old’s statements to his teachers were non-testimonial because the totality of the circumstances indicated that the primary purpose of the conversation was not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. In this case, there was an ongoing emergency because the child, who had visible injuries, could have been released into the hands of his abuser, and therefore the primary purpose of the teachers’ questions was most likely to protect the child. Moreover, a very young child who does not understand the details of the criminal justice system is unlikely to be speaking for the purpose of creating evidence. Finally, the Court held that a mandatory reporting statute does not convert a conversation between a concerned teacher and a student into a law enforcement mission aimed primarily at gathering evidence for a prosecution.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment and argued that a statement that satisfies the primary purpose test alone is sufficient to be testimonial. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined this opinion. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the primary purpose test was not the proper test to determine whether a statement is testimonial. Instead, Justice Thomas argued that only statements that bear “sufficient indicia of solemnity” are testimonial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56069:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56072:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56072:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLow Income Housing Tax Credits are federal tax credits distributed to low-income housing developers through an application process, and the distribution is administered by state housing authorities. In 2009, the Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), a non-profit organization dedicated to racial and economic integration of communities in the Dallas area, sued the Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA), which administers the Low Income Housing Tax Credits within Texas. ICP claimed that TDHCA disproportionately granted tax credits to developments within minority neighborhoods and denied the credits to developments within Caucasian neighborhoods. ICP claimed this practice led to a concentration of low-income housing in minority neighborhoods, which perpetuated segregation in violation of the Fair Housing Act.\nAt trial, ICP attempted to show discrimination by disparate impact, and the district court found that the statistical allocation of tax credits constituted a prima facie case for disparate impact. Using a standard for disparate impact claims that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated in Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch , the court then shifted the burden to TDHCA to show the allocation of tax credits was based on a compelling governmental interest and no less discriminatory alternatives existed. TDHCA was unable to show no less discriminatory alternatives existed, so the district court found in favor of ICP. TDHCA appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and claimed that the district court used the wrong standard to evaluate disparate impact claims. The appellate court affirmed and held that the district court's standard mirrored the standard promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the agency tasked with implementing the Fair Housing Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56072:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56072:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56072:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the statutory language of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) focuses on the consequences of the actions in question rather than the actor’s intent. This language is similar to that used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, both of which were enacted around the same time as the FHA and encompass disparate-impact liability. Additionally, the 1988 amendments retained language that several appellate courts had already interpreted as imposing disparate-impact liability, which strongly indicates Congressional acquiescence to that reading of the statute. Disparate-impact liability is also consistent with the FHA’s purpose of preventing discriminatory housing practices because it allows plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised discrimination that may be harder to uncover than disparate treatment. However, a prima facie case for disparate-impact liability must meet a robust causality requirement, as evidence of racial disparity on its own is not sufficient.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., on which the majority opinion based its Title VII analysis, wrongly interpreted Title VII as enabling disparate-impact liability, and therefore that opinion should not serve as the basis for the majority opinion’s interpretation of the FHA in this case. In holding that Title VII allows for disparate-impact liability and applying that analysis to the FHA, the majority relied on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s interpretation of the statute rather than the statutory language that Congress enacted. Justice Thomas also argued that racial imbalance alone is not sufficient to prove unlawful conduct and should not be punished as such. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the FHA did not encompass disparate-impact liability when it was enacted, and no further amendments or precedents have created such liability. The plain language of the statute clearly focuses on intentional discrimination rather than the racial disparity itself, and the 1988 amendments have not been interpreted as altering that understanding of the statute. Justice Alito also argued that precedent interpreting similar text has held that the use of “because of” language linking a cause to a particular reason criminalizes the intention behind discrimination rather than solely the result. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56072:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56074:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56074:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFauzia Din, who is a United States citizen, filed a visa petition for her husband Kanishka Berashk, a citizen and resident of Afghanistan. Nine months later, the State Department denied the petition based on a broad provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that excludes aliens on terrorism-related grounds. Berashk asked for clarification of the visa denial and was told that it is not possible for the Embassy to provide him with a detailed explanation of the reasons for denial.\nAfter several other unsuccessful attempts to receive explanation of the visa denial, Din sued and argued that denying notice for aliens who were not granted a visa based on terrorism grounds is unconstitutional. The district court held that Din did not have standing to challenge the visa denial notice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the government is required to give notice of reasons for visa denial based on terrorism grounds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56074:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56074:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56074:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the three-judge plurality, which held that no Constitutional rights were violated by denying a full explanation of why an alien’s visa was denied. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no citizen may be deprived of “life, liberty, or property” without due process, but judicial precedent has held that no due process is owed when these interests are not at stake. Because none of these interests are implicated in the denial of a nonresident alien’s visa application, there is no denial of due process when the visa application is rejected without explanation. Although “liberty” has been construed to refer to fundamental rights, there is no precedent that supports the contention that the right to live with one’s spouse is such a fundamental right.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the notice of the denial of the visa application was sufficient to satisfy the due process requirement. Because the decision was made based on a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason,” the courts do not need to look further, especially when national security is involved. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence in the judgment.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Due Process Clause entitles a citizen to procedural due process when a liberty interest flows implicitly from the Due Process Clause or when a statute creates the expectation that the interest will not be denied without due process. The right at issue in this case—the right to live with one’s spouse—satisfies those requirements, and therefore entitles Din to procedural due process. Because a statement of the reasons for a decision is a fundamental element of due process, its denial in this case amounts a denial of due process. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56074:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56075:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56075:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTeresa Sheehan suffered from a mental illness and lived in a San Francisco group home. After Sheehan threatened her social worker when he attempted to perform a welfare check, he became concerned that she was a danger to herself or others and summoned the police for help transporting her to a mental health facility for a 72-hour involuntary commitment. When the police officers arrived, they entered Sheehan's room without a warrant to take her into custody. Sheehan grabbed a knife and threatened to kill the officers. They were forced to withdraw outside her room and call for backup, but instead of waiting for the backup to arrive, they drew their weapons and forced their way back into her room. When Sheehan again threatened the officers with a knife, they shot her several times.\nSheehan sued the officers and the city for violations of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Sheehan appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether the officers' second entry into Sheehan's room was reasonable under the circumstances and whether the officers failed to reasonably accommodate Sheehan's disability as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56075:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56075:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56075:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, and unanswered (because the oral arguments did not address the Americans with Disabilities Act). Justice Samuel A. Alito delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that public officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless they have violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. A right is not clearly established unless a reasonable official in that public official’s shoes would have understood his actions to be in violation of that right. In this case, the officers’ second entry into Sheehan’s room without a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment because law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant in an emergency situation when there is potential for injury to the occupant. The Court also held that the officers’ use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, even to the extent of firing multiple rounds.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court should have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted so as not to reward the petitioners for presenting a question that induced the Court to grant the writ and then failing to brief or argue that question. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56075:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56078:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56078:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHector Ayala, a Hispanic man, was charged with three counts of murder and one count of attempted murder stemming from a failed robbery. During jury selection for his trial in California state court, the prosecution used seven preemptory challenges to exclude each black or Hispanic prospective juror. Ayala challenged the prosecution's use of preemptory challenges as a violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which held that the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In accordance with Batson, if a party can make a prima facie showing that preemptory challenges are being used in a racially motivated way, the other party must give a non-racially motivated reason for their use of the preemptory challenges. The state court allowed the prosecution to give their non-racially motivated reasons in a closed hearing, from which Ayala and his attorneys were excluded, and subsequently found the prosecution's use of preemptory challenges was not racially motivated. Ayala was not given the prosecution's reasoning or a transcript of the meeting until after the conclusion of his trial. Additionally, after the trial it was discovered that the vast majority of the questionnaires all the potential jurors had to fill out had been lost. Ayala was found guilty of the majority of the charges against him and sentenced to death.\nOn appeal, the California Supreme Court found that the state court erred in excluding Ayala from the Batson hearing, but that error as well as the loss of the questionnaires were harmless, and therefore upheld Ayala's conviction. Ayala appealed to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that the Batson hearing procedure and loss of the questionnaires violated his constitutional rights. In accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the appellate court found that the California Supreme Court had not adjudicated Ayala's claims of federal constitutional violations on the merits largely on the basis that the California Court had determined the procedure used for the Batson hearing violated California state law; therefore the appellate court reviewed Ayala's claims de novo and found that the exclusion of Ayala from the Batson hearing, as well as the loss of the questionnaires, violated Ayala's constitutional rights. To determine whether the errors were harmless, the Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson , which asked whether the errors had a substantial and injurious influence on the jury's verdict, and found that the exclusion of Ayala from the Batson hearing deprived him of the ability to prevail on a compelling Batson challenge.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56078:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56078:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56078:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that habeas petitioners are not entitled to relief unless they can establish that the alleged error resulted from “actual prejudice,” which is the standard established in Brecht v. Abrahamson. The standard requires that the reviewing court find that there was more than a “reasonable possibility” that the error was harmful; there must be “grave doubt” as to whether the error had a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury’s determination. The Court also held that the California Supreme Court had adjudicated the case on the merits based on the statutory language of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which means that the highly deferential AEDPA standard applies to a federal habeas petition to review the state court’s decision. Therefore, a federal court cannot overturn a state court’s determination unless the decision was contrary to clearly established law or based on an unreasonable view of the facts. Because the record supports the state court’s interpretation of the facts, the federal appellate court erred in holding that the prosecutions use of peremptory strikes was not harmless.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that there is a great deal of focus on the adjudication of guilt or innocence but not enough on the conditions prisoners face in prison, particularly solitary confinement and its long-term effects on their mental health. Justice Clarence Thomas also wrote a separate concurrence in which he addressed the concerns Justice Kennedy raised by noting that any prison accommodations are more comfortable than those afforded to the victims of Ayala’s crimes.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority opinion’s analysis is based on a consideration of whether Ayala’s attorney’s could have raised successful arguments had they been present at the Batson hearing rather than whether they were erroneously excluded. Had Ayala’s attorney’s been present, they likely could have raised potentially significant arguments and at the very least could have added to the record in a manner that would have been helpful on appeal. Because the procedural error of excluding Ayala’s attorneys from the Batson hearing likely prevented Ayala from raising significant arguments, the appellate court could properly review the state court’s determination and find that the errors were not harmless. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56078:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56079:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56079:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1995, Kevan Brumfield was convicted of the murder of a Louisiana police officer and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, which held the execution of mentally retarded criminals violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, Brumfield filed for post-conviction relief on the basis that he was mentally retarded. Brumfield also requested funds to help develop his Atkins claim. The Louisiana state court found that Brumfield was not entitled to an Atkins hearing because Brumfield did not present enough evidence to establish he was mentally impaired. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied his appeal without explanation.\nBrumfield next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and argued that the state courts had erred in failing to give him a full Atkins hearing. He also requested funding to enable him to fully present his claims, which was granted. A federal magistrate found that, while the state court had correctly ruled that Brumfield's initial evidence regarding his mental retardation was not adequate for the court to have granted Atkins relief, the additional funds enabled Brumfield to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation. The federal magistrate subsequently recommended that the district court admit Brumfield's new evidence when determining his habeas claim; the district court did so and ruled in favor of Brumfield by forbidding Louisiana from executing him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the state court's ruling on Brumfield's Atkins claim constituted a decision on the merits, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prevented the district court from reviewing the decision unless the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because the state denied Brumfield additional funds to develop his case due to his failure to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation, the decision was not a violation of Brumfield's constitutional due process rights nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56079:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56079:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56079:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the state trial court’s decision that Brumfield did not present sufficient evidence of mental impairment was an unreasonable determination of the facts, and therefore the federal district court could review the state court’s decision. The state court’s decision rested on its determination that Brumfield’s IQ score was not low enough to prove that he had subaverage intelligence and that Brumfield did not show that his adaptive skills were impaired. However, an IQ test has a margin of error that, if applied to the score in this case, would place Brumfield in the category of subaverage intelligence; therefore, the state court could not definitively preclude the possibility that Brumfield satisfied this criterion, and to hold otherwise was unreasonable. Additionally, the factual record presented to the state court provided sufficient evidence to question Brumfield’s adaptive skills. Because Brumfield only needed to raise reasonable doubt regarding his intellectual capacity to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the state court’s decision that Brumfield did not meet that low threshold was unreasonable.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that judicial precedent establishes that, as long as the factual record supports the state court’s decision, a federal court cannot rule that decision unreasonable simply because it would have concluded differently. In this case, the record showed that Brumfield’s IQ score was not low enough for him to be declared of subaverage intelligence and that he did not have impaired adaptive skills because he had a normal capacity to learn when given time for repetition. Because the factual record supported the state court’s determination that Brumfield was not intellectually disabled based on the relevant state standards to prove intellectual disability, the determination was reasonable. Justice Thomas also wrote that Brumfield’s claim could not succeed based on the argument that the state court’s decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, which is a high standard that requires the habeas petitioner to show that the state court confronted a set of facts “materially indistinguishable” from a Supreme Court case and nonetheless reached a different conclusion. In this case, Brumfield could not show that the Supreme Court had ever decided a case with facts materially indistinguishable from this one, and the state court’s decision was in line with existing precedent; therefore the state court’s decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. also joined Justice Thomas’ dissent in part and wrote separately to note that Justice Thomas’ inclusion of the life story of the victim’s son in his dissent should not be considered a part of the legal analysis.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56079:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56080:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56080:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTony Henderson was a former United States Border Patrol Agent who was charged with, among other crimes, distribution of marijuana. On June 9, 2006, two days after he was arrested, Henderson voluntarily turned 19 firearms over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which he argued was for \"safekeeping as a condition of the bond.\" He later pled guilty to his narcotics charges.\nIn 2008 and 2009, Henderson requested that the FBI return his firearms so that he could transfer them to a purported buyer, but the FBI refused to do so. Henderson then moved the district court to allow him to transfer the firearms to the 2009 buyer or his wife. The magistrate judge recommended denial of the motion because Henderson was a convicted felon, and the district court adopted the recommendation. Henderson appealed and argued that, because he had not been given notice that his guilty plea would disqualify him from firearm ownership, he is entitled to relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56080:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56080:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56080:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that a court may order the transfer of a felon’s lawfully owned firearms to a third party as long as the court is satisfied that the defendant will neither use them nor direct their use. While a felony conviction does not prevent the felon from owning firearms, it prohibits both actual and constructive possession of firearms, so a court may not order a transfer to a third party if the felon will continue to exert authority over the firearms in a manner that amounts to constructive possession. However, if the transfer to a third party represents merely a sale or disposition of the firearms, the prohibition on possession is not implicated, and the court may order the transfer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56080:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56081:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56081:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring her candidacy for County Court Judge in Hillsborough County, Florida, Lanell Williams-Yulee personally solicited campaign contributions. She stated that she served as the \"community Public Defender\" – although her title was \"assistant public defender\" – and inaccurately stated in the media that there was no incumbent in the judicial race for which she was running.\nThe Florida Bar filed a complaint against Williams-Yulee and alleged that her actions during the campaign violated the rules regulating The Florida Bar. A referee was appointed who suggested that Williams-Yulee receive a public reprimand. Williams-Yulee appealed the referee's finding, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Williams-Yulee violated bar rules for directly soliciting funds for her judicial campaign. Williams-Yulee appealed and claimed that The Florida Bar rule prohibiting a candidate from personal solicitation of funds violated the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56081:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56081:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56081:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that rules limiting speech in charitable solicitation contexts have typically been subjected to strict First Amendment scrutiny because such speech often deals with issues of public concern in precisely the manner the First Amendment was meant to protect. Therefore, the government may only restrict the speech of a judicial candidate when the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The Court held that the restriction in this case serves the compelling state interest of preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and is sufficiently narrowly tailored to that interest. Although Williams-Yulee claimed that the rule’s underinclusivity was evidence that it was not sufficiently narrowly tailored, First Amendment jurisprudence does not require that a state take an all-or-nothing approach to regulating problematic speech.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the Court’s doctrine of tiers of scrutiny, such as the strict scrutiny applied in this case, should be viewed as a guideline rather than a mechanical test.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which she argued that there was no need to apply an exacting standard of scrutiny to a state’s endeavor to distinguish between political and judicial elections. Therefore, states should be granted broad latitude to regulate judicial elections, particularly with respect to campaign finance issues, as vast amounts of spending in judicial elections threatens the appearance and reality of an independent judiciary. Justice Breyer joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment protects all speech unless widespread and longstanding tradition permits its regulation, which is not the case here. Because the rule in question presumptively violates the First Amendment, the Court can only uphold it if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. In this case, there is no evidence that banning personal requests for contributions in a judicial election increases public faith in judicial integrity, and the rule bans much more speech than would be narrowly tailored to serve such an interest. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the First Amendment protections of speech should especially apply in an electoral context and that the majority opinion erred in its application of strict scrutiny analysis because the rule in question was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent to emphasize that the rule in question fails the test of strict scrutiny.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56081:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56082:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56082:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLearjet, Inc. and other retail buyers of natural gas (Learjet) sued Oneok, Inc. and other energy trading companies (Oneok) for artificially increasing energy prices during the 2000–2002 energy crisis in violation of several states' antitrust laws. Learjet claimed that Oneok reported false data and engaged in \"wash sales,\" which are prearranged sales in which traders execute a trade on an electronic trading platform, and then immediately offset that trade by executing an equal and opposite trade. Oneok moved to dismiss Learjet's claims and argued that the claims were pre-empted by the federal Natural Gas Act (NGA). The Natural Gas Act regulates interstate, wholesale natural gas trade, but it does not apply to retail sales of natural gas. The district court granted Oneok's motion to dismiss and held that Learjet's claims were pre-empted by the NGA because Oneok's actions affected wholesale prices as well as retail prices. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, because Learjet suffered harm in retail transactions, which the NGA does not regulate, Learjet's claims were not pre-empted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56082:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56082:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56082:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, because the Natural Gas Act (NGA) was carefully drawn so as not to dilute state power, the courts can only find that the NGA pre-empts a claim when that claim falls within a pre-empted field as enumerated by judicial precedent. In this case, because the state laws at issue are directed at practices affecting the retail rates of natural gas prices, and those are the claims the respondents raised, the state laws control and the NGA did not pre-empt the claims. Because the petitioners in this case did not argue that the state laws conflict with the NGA, the Court did not address the question of conflict pre-emption.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution only allows federal laws to pre-empt state ones when the federal law falls within one of Congress’ enumerated powers. Therefore, the potential pre-emptive scope of the NGA may be impermissibly broad, though the majority opinion in this case stayed within the limits prescribed by precedent.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion unnecessarily introduced uncertainty into precedent that has interpreted the NGA as pre-empting state law claims on issues that the federal government already exclusively regulates. Additionally, the majority opinion lacked any precedential support for its view that there are situations in which state regulation of federally regulated activity is acceptable and could not justify the sort of case-by-case analysis that it espouses. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56082:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56083:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56083:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nB&B Hardware (B&B) sells a fastener product in the aerospace industry under the trademark \"Sealtight,\" which it registered in 1993. Hargis Industries (Hargis) sells self-drilling screws under the mark \"Sealtite\" in the construction industry. After Hargis applied to register its mark in 1996, B&B opposed the application and sued Hargis for infringement. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) eventually determined that there was a likelihood of confusion between the two marks and denied Hargis' application. On appeal, the district court held that, because the TTAB is not an Article III court, it need not give deference to the TTAB decision and refused to admit the decision into evidence. A jury then found in favor of Hargis. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that, since the Eighth Circuit uses a slightly different likelihood of confusion test from the TTAB, the TTAB did not decide the same likelihood of confusion issues presented to the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56083:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56083:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56083:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, when a single issue is before a court and an administrative agency, preclusion often applies. When parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate an issue of fact and an administrative agency acting in a judicial capacity properly resolves the issue, re-litigation is precluded unless Congress has indicated otherwise. The Court determined that nothing in federal trademark law prohibited issue preclusion, although a party could seek judicial review of an agency’s decision. The Court also held that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (TTAB) decision met the ordinary elements for claim preclusion: the likelihood-of-confusion standards for registration and infringement are the same; there was no reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of the agency’s procedures, and parties are likely to treat both contested registration and infringement seriously.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that, when contested registrations are decided upon a comparison of trademarks in the abstract and separate from their marketplace usage, the issue of likelihood of confusion would not be precluded.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that decisions by administrative agencies should not qualify for issue preclusion. Historically, federal courts had been hesitant to preclude issues determined by administrative tribunals. Justice Thomas noted that Congress authorized the TTAB to determine the respective rights of trademark registration only, not to decide questions of infringement, and that Congress included a provision allowing judicial review. Therefore, Congress likely did not intend preclusion to apply. Finally, Justice Thomas argued that allowing an administrative agency, part of the Executive Branch, to decide central issues in private claims may effect an unconstitutional transfer of judicial power. Justice Antonin Scalia joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56083:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56085:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56085:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJesse Busk and Laurie Castro were former employees of Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Integrity), a company that provides warehouse space and staffing to clients such as Amazon.com. Busk and Laurie both worked in warehouses in Nevada filling orders placed by Amazon.com customers. At the end of each day, all the workers were required to pass through a security clearance checkpoint where they had to remove their keys, wallets, and belts, pass through a metal detector, and submit to being searched. The whole process could take up to 25 minutes. Similarly, up to ten minutes of the workers' 30-minute lunch period was consumed by security clearance and transition time. In 2010, Busk and Castro sued Integrity and argued that these practices violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as well as Nevada state labor laws.\nThe district court granted Integrity's motion to dismiss and held that time spent clearing security was non-compensable under the FLSA and that the shortened meal periods were not relevant to the FLSA because the plaintiffs did not argue that they performed work-related duties during their lunch periods. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. While the Court of Appeals agreed that the shortened lunch periods were not relevant to the FLSA, the Court of Appeals held that the district court should have assessed the plaintiffs claims that the security clearances were \"integral and indispensable\" to their work in order to determine if that time was compensable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56085:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56085:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56085:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held that the time spent by warehouse workers undergoing security screenings is not compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Portal-to Portal Act exempted employers from liability for claims dealing with activities that are preliminary or postliminary to the principle activities that an employee is employed to perform. The screenings in this case are not a principle activity and were not integral to the employees' duties; therefore the screenings are not compensable.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which she stated that the screenings are not integral or indispensable activities because the employee could dispense with them without impairing his ability to perform the principle activity safely and effectively. Justice Elena Kagan joined the concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56085:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56086:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56086:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPlaintiffs were investors who bought Omnicare securities in a December 15, 2005 public offering. At the same time, Omnicare offered 12.8 million shares of common stock and made related filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings were incorporated into a Registration Statement. The plaintiffs sold all the securities by January 31, 2006. Plaintiffs brought suit under §11 of the Securities Act of 1993 claiming Omnicare materially misled or omitted material information on the registration statement because they were engaged in illegal activities that included kickback arrangements with pharmaceutical manufacturers and submitting false claims to Medicare and Medicaid. Plaintiffs further allege that Omnicare failed to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which resulted in a substantial overstatement of the company's revenue affecting the 2005 public offering.\nThe original suit filed in the district court had multiple claims from which this case arose, but all were dismissed in favor of Omnicare. The claims were dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to plead that the defendants had knowledge of wrongdoing when they materially falsified information on the registration statement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissals except one filed under §11 for materially misleading or omitting material information because that claim was filed under a strict liability statute which did not require pleading to knowledge of wrongdoing. The Court held that plaintiffs had met their burden for making a prima facie case under §11 and remanded the case to district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56086:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56086:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56086:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held a statement of opinion, even if shown to be objectively false, cannot constitute an untrue statement of fact because of the different nature between opinions and facts. Facts are intended to express certainty; opinions are not. Therefore, an opinion can only constitute an untrue statement of fact if a plaintiff can show that the entity which put forth the opinion does not actually hold the stated opinion. Because the determination of whether a statement is misleading depends on a reasonable investor’s perspective, the Court remanded the case in order for the lower court to determine whether Omnicare omitted facts that a reasonable investor would find misleading.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he emphasized that a statement of opinion, which does not convey additional facts, only implies two facts: (1) that the speaker genuinely believes the opinion; and (2) that the speaker believes his/her basis for the opinion is sufficient. Only if a plaintiff can show that one of these two implications is false may a statement of opinion, which does not convey additional facts, constitute an untrue statement of fact.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56086:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56089:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56089:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBrian Wynne and his wife are Howard County, Maryland residents who own stock in Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (Maxim), a company that provides health care services nationally. Maxim's income is \"passed through\" to its owners, and the owners are then taxed individually. In 2006, Maxim filed income tax returns in 39 states and allocated a share of taxes paid to each shareholder. The Wynnes claimed the share of Maxim's income taxes that they paid as a credit against their Maryland individual income tax, which includes Maryland state taxes and Howard County taxes. The Comptroller of Maryland determined that the Wynnes had incorrectly calculated their county tax credit by including the taxes they had paid to other states and issued an assessment for the remaining tax owed. The Wynnes appealed to the Hearings and Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office, which noted that the wrong county tax rate had been applied initially and revised the assessment, but nonetheless affirmed that the tax credit was limited to Maryland state taxes and not applicable to Howard County taxes.\nThe Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax Court and argued that the limitation violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Tax Court rejected the Wynnes' argument and affirmed the revised assessment. The Wynnes then appealed to the Maryland Circuit Court for Howard County. The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that the county tax without a credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Comptroller appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals and argued that the Commerce Clause was not implicated by the county tax. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court by finding that the county tax implicates the dormant Commerce Clause because it affects the interstate market for capital and business investment and the overlapping power to tax income from such sources. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the county tax without a credit violated the Commerce Clause because the county tax is not fairly apportioned, since taxpayers who earn income from interstate activities would be taxed at higher rates than taxpayers who earn income exclusively in Maryland while the tax covers income earned wholly outside of Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals also held that the county tax is discriminatory against interstate commerce since it favors businesses that do business primarily in Maryland.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56089:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56089:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56089:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibited a tax scheme like Maryland’s, which discriminates against interstate commerce without Congressional approval. This decision is directly in line with previous dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court held that, to be permissible under the dormant Commerce Clause, a tax scheme must satisfy the “internal consistency test,” which asks whether the tax scheme in question would disadvantage interstate commerce if it were applied identically in every state. If so, then the tax is unconstitutional. Because Maryland’s tax scheme fails the internal consistency test, it is therefore unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the dormant Commerce Clause does not exist in the Constitution. The Constitution explicitly gives the federal government the power to regulate interstate commerce, but it does not say anything about prohibiting state laws that burden interstate commerce. The supposed doctrine also lacks a governing principle as well as internal consistency. Justice Scalia also noted that following precedent would require the tax in this case to be held unconstitutional only if it discriminated against interstate commerce on its face and was indistinguishable from a tax the Court had previously held unconstitutional. Because those factors are not met in this case, the tax should be upheld. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that laws passed by the same legislators that ratified the Constitution would have violated the dormant Commerce Clause under the majority’s analysis. Therefore, that reading of the dormant Commerce Clause, assuming it exists at all, cannot be correct. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissent in which she argued that the dormant Commerce Clause does not prevent the operation of a tax scheme when the discriminatory effect is the result of the combination of two otherwise-lawful tax schemes, as is the case here. Although Maryland chooses not to offer tax credits for taxes paid out of state, it is still entitled to tax that income. Justice Ginsburg also noted that the Court has not rigidly enforced the “internal consistency test” and need not do so here. Justice Scalia and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56089:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56091:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56091:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nClyde Reed, pastor of Good News Community Church (Good News), rented space at an elementary school in Gilbert, Arizona, and placed about 17 signs in the area announcing the time and location of Good News' services. Gilbert has an ordinance (Sign Code) that restricts the size, number, duration, and location of certain types of signs, including temporary directional ones, to prevent improper signage. After Good News received an advisory notice from Gilbert that it violated the Sign Code, Good News sued Gilbert and claimed that the Sign Code violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nThe district court found that the Sign Code was constitutional since it was content-neutral and was reasonable in light of the government interests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that, even though an official would have to read a sign to determine what provisions of the Sign Code applied, the restrictions were not based on the content of the signs, and the Sign Code left open other channels of communication.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56091:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56091:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56091:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the restrictions were subject to strict scrutiny because they were content-based restrictions, or restrictions that were applied differently depending on the message of the sign. Because these restrictions were content-based on their face, the Court need not examine justifications or the government’s motives in determining whether the restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. Despite the Town of Gilbert’s argument that the restrictions do not single out a specific nonprofit or church but restrict all, the Court stated that the First Amendment prohibits censorship of all speech on a whole topic. The Court also held that the restrictions cannot survive strict scrutiny because they had no compelling interest in adding restrictions to only a certain type of sign.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that this decision does not preclude towns from continuing to regulate signs, but it does stop them from restricting them in an unconstitutional manner. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that content discrimination should have been the consideration and legal analysis, and that this case did not trigger strict scrutiny. The presumption against constitutionality is too strong to use automatically and was unnecessary in this case as there was another, more appropriate method of analysis available. In her separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that constantly using strict scrutiny to judge government-regulated communication is too restrictive and would water down the meaning of strict scrutiny. The risk that the government will limit the public’s ability to debate ideas with these regulations is very low and does not warrant strict scrutiny. In this case, the restrictions were not brought on by any reason or need, and so they did not pass any level of scrutiny. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Breyer joined in the concurrence in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56091:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56092:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56092:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2006, Gregory Warger was involved in an automobile collision with another car driven by Randy Shauers. Warger filed suit against Shauers for damages resulting from the crash, and Shauers filed a counter-suit. After an initial mistrial, a jury found for Shauers. Warger appealed on the basis that, following the verdict, Warger's attorney had been contacted by a jury member who expressed concern that the jury foreperson had improperly gained the sympathy of the other jurors by informing them all that her daughter had been in a similar type of automobile accident and that the verdict would have had a negative impact on her life had she been found responsible. Warger claimed that the foreperson's alleged misconduct should result in a new trial because it was improper outside influence, which tainted the jury's verdict, and because it was evidence that the foreperson had lied during jury selection.\nThe district court ruled that the concerned jury member's statement was inadmissible based on Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which bars the testimony of a juror concerning any statements made during the jury's deliberations for purposes determining the validity of a verdict, with an exception for testimony regarding whether an improper outside influence was used to persuade any juror. Specifically, the court ruled that the past life experiences of the foreperson did not constitute improper outside influence. While 606(b) does not explicitly bar juror testimony for the purposes of proving dishonesty by a potential juror during jury selection, in this case the evidence was barred by 606(b) because it was based on statements the foreperson made during the jury's deliberations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56092:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56092:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56092:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that a plain reading of Rule 606(b) precludes the use of juror testimony when a party is seeking a new trial on the basis of juror dishonesty during voir dire. Prior to Congress' enactment of the rule, judicial precedent had established the inadmissibility of testimony of jury misconduct for the purpose of impeaching a verdict, and the legislative history of Rule 606(b) indicates that Congress intended the rule to apply broadly. The Court also held that the rule did not raise any issue of constitutionality because juror impartiality continued to be assured by either party's ability to bring forward evidence of juror bias at any time before the verdict is rendered.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56092:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56094:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56094:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners (Board) is a statutorily created agency that regulates the practice of dentistry. It is composed of six dentists⎯who are elected by other dentists in North Carolina⎯one dental hygienist, and one consumer member. The Board may bring an action in the North Carolina Superior Court to enjoin the conduct of any individual the Board suspects of engaging in the unlawful practice of dentistry.\nIn 2003, non-dentists began offering teeth-whitening services to consumers in mall kiosks and salons across the state. After dentists complained, the Board sent 47 cease and desist letters to 29 non-dentist teeth-whiteners. The non-dentists ceased offering the service, and manufacturers and distributors of over-the-counter teeth-whitening products exited the North Carolina market.\nThe Federal Trade Commission (FTC) subsequently charged the Board with violating the Federal Trade Act by excluding the non-dentists. An Administrative Law Judge found that the Board had engaged in unfair competition and enjoined the Board from issuing any more cease and desist letters; the FTC upheld that ruling on appeal. The Board petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the FTC decision and argued that, as a state agency, it was exempt from federal antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals declined to review the case and held that, when a state agency is operated by market participants who are elected by other market participants, the agency is a private actor and subject to federal antitrust laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56094:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56094:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56094:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, because the Board was made up of market participants, the Board could only claim immunity from federal anti-trust actions if the Board were subject to active supervision by the State. Under the Court's decision in Parker v. Brown, when a state acts to regulate activity within its boundaries, that regulation is immune from federal anti-trust actions. However, when the regulatory action is undertaken by an entity made up of non-state actors, courts must ensure the regulatory action is attributable to state policy. Courts must determine whether the state has clearly authorized to the entity to regulate and whether the entity is subject to active supervision from the state. While an entity may be excused from the active supervision requirement in some situations, such as when the entity is electorally accountable, none of these considerations applied to the Board. Because the Board was not subject to active supervision from the state, the Board could not claim immunity from federal anti-trust actions.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito Jr. authored a dissent in which he argued that the case should be controlled by Parker v. Brown, and thus the Court should limit its inquiry to whether or not the Board constituted a state agency. Because the Board is a state-created agency, empowered by the state to regulate dentistry within the state, the Court should have found the Board was immune from federal anti-trust actions. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56094:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56096:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56096:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEdison International is a holding company for electric utilities and energy interests. Since 1999, Edison International and its related benefits and investment committees (collectively, Edison) have offered retail-class mutual funds as part of its 401(k) employee benefits plan, even though otherwise identical institutional-class funds that charged lower fees were available. Those mutual funds also give a portion of the fees collected back to plan service providers, including Edison's, which thereby reduces Edison's administrative costs.\nIn 2007, Glenn Tibble and other Edison employees (Employees) sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which requires fiduciaries of an employee benefit plan to administer the plan prudently for the exclusive benefit of the participants. The Employees argued that the continued inclusion of the higher-cost funds in the benefit plan was a \"continuing violation\" of ERISA. Edison argued that ERISA's statute of repose, which bars claims filed more than six years after the date of the last action which constituted a part of the violation, prevented Employees' claim. The district court granted summary judgment for Edison and held that there was no \"continuing violation\" theory under ERISA. The court stated that the act of designating an investment for inclusion started the six-year period, and since Edison had not made any misstatements or actively concealed any breach following the initial inclusion, the six-year period had passed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56096:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56096:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56096:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the nature of the fiduciary duty under trust law creates a continuing obligation to monitor trust investments and remove imprudent ones. Because this continuing duty is separate from the initial duty to choose investments carefully, violation of the continuing duty counts as a breach of the fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). As long as the breach of the continuing duty occurred within six years of the filing of the lawsuit, ERISA’s statute of repose does not bar the claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56096:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56098:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56098:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlabama imposes a 4% sales tax on the gross receipts of retail businesses and a 4% use tax on storage, use, or consumption of tangible personal property. Accordingly, rail carriers that purchase diesel fuel within the state are subject to a 4% sales tax. However, motor and water carriers that purchase fuel in Alabama pay an excise tax of $0.19 per gallon.\nIn 2008, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) sued the Alabama Department of Revenue for violating the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1974 (4-R Act), which targeted local and state taxation schemes that discriminated against rail carriers. CSX argued that the sales tax was discriminatory because it required the rail carriers to pay more than their competitors for purchasing diesel fuel in the state. The district court dismissed the case and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal by citing precedent that held that a railroad could not challenge its competitors' exemptions from a sales tax as discriminatory under the 4-R Act. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, overturned the ruling, and remanded the case. On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and issued an order holding that the state's sales tax does not discriminate against rail carriers for the purposes of the 4-R Act, because the amount that motor carriers paid was roughly equal to that paid by rail carriers. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and held that the tax is discriminatory because the state had not offered sufficient justification for exempting CSX's competitors from the sales tax.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56098:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56098:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56098:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnanswered, and yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the appellate court correctly examined the railroad's situation in relation to its comparison class of competitors in the transportation industry. The Court also held that, in determining whether discrimination occurred, a court must look at the state's tax scheme as a whole rather than just the challenged provision. A provision may seem discriminatory when examined in isolation, but the tax code as a whole may subject a competitor to a comparable tax. Because the appellate court did not examine the state's justifications for its tax regime, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether discrimination in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1974 occurred.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion's definition of discrimination was overly broad and could lead to inconsistent applications of the statute. Because the railroad was unable to prove that the tax \"targets and singles out\" the railroad as compared to other taxpayers, there was no discrimination. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56098:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56100:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56100:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 29, 2010, Sergeant Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff's Department observed Maynor Javier Vasquez driving north on I-77 with a broken brake light. When Darisse pulled over the vehicle, he noticed another man, Nicholas Heien, lying under a blanket in the backseat. Darisse spoke with the two men, felt that their stories did not match up, and was concerned that Heien had not gotten up from the back seat. Darisse asked for permission to search the vehicle. Heien agreed, and Darisse found a bag containing 54.2 grams of cocaine in the car.\nA grand jury indicted Heien for two counts of trafficking cocaine. Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, and the trial court denied the motion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable because North Carolina law only required one working brake light. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that when an officer's mistake of the law is reasonable, it may give rise to the \"reasonable suspicion\" required for a traffic stop of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. That North Carolina Supreme Court sent the case back to the state Court of Appeals.\nThe North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's judgment. A dissenting judge, however, stated that the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling created \"fundamental unfairness\" because it held citizens to the traditional rule that \"ignorance of the law is no excuse\" while allowing police to be ignorant of the law. Based on this dissent, Heien again appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court which rejected Heien's appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56100:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56100:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56100:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when an officer has made a reasonable factual or legal mistake. Because Fourth Amendment jurisprudence turns on the question of reasonableness, governing officials have traditionally been allowed leeway to enforce the law for the community's protection. As long as the mistake of fact or law in question was reasonable, the Fourth Amendment does not hold such mistakes to be incompatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion. However, the Court also held that those mistakes must be objectively reasonable; an officer cannot gain the benefits of Fourth Amendment reasonableness through a sloppy or incomplete knowledge of the law.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Elena Kagan emphasized that the majority opinion's analysis was limited to when the mistake of law in question is an objectively reasonable one. Justice Kagan also wrote that the test to determine whether an officer made an objectively reasonable mistake is much more stringent than the one to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the concurring opinion.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has traditionally focused on the officer's factual conclusions rather than understanding of the law. Expanding leeway allowed to police officers with respect to their factual assessment to the meaning of the laws they are meant to enforce runs the risk of eroding the Fourth Amendment's protections. In the absence of any evidence that holding police officers to this standard would prevent effective enforcement of the law, mistakes of law should not be considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56100:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56102:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56102:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2002, Manachem Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to parents who are United States citizens. Manachem's parents requested that the U.S. State Department record his place of birth on his passport as \"Israel,\" in accordance with Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 (Act). The State Department refused and instead issued Manachem a passport that listed \"Jerusalem\" as his place of birth. His parents sued the Secretary of State on his behalf and sought the enforcement of Section 214(d). The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that it presented a non-justiciable political question. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, reversed that holding and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that Section 214(d) \"impermissibly intereferes\" with the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign states. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed and held that the section goes beyond the scope of Congress's passport power to affect United States foreign policy, which is a realm the Constitution reserves for the executive branch.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56102:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56102:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56102:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority holding that the federal statute unconstitutionally usurped the President’s power to recognize foreign nations as it relates to passports. The Court held that, although the Constitution does not explicitly address the issue of recognition of foreign nations, the Reception Clause in Article II of the Constitution—which states that the President will receive foreign ambassadors—grants the President the power to recognize foreign states. The fact that Article II also vests the President with the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors gives the President further control over recognition decisions. Although Congress has a role to play in other aspects of foreign policy, often by granting the President’s formal recognition practical effect, Congress has no such power to initiate international diplomacy without involving the President. Because the question of whether the American government recognizes a foreign nation must have only one answer, the President’s power is assumed to be exclusive, and therefore Congress cannot act in a manner that contradicts Executive branch policy regarding recognition. The Court also held that precedent and history support the view that the formal recognition power belongs exclusively to the President. Because the Executive branch has maintained a neutral position by not recognizing any nation’s sovereignty over Jerusalem, the federal statute in question unconstitutionally infringes on the President’s recognition power.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that this case presented a political question beyond the purview of the judiciary, but because precedent precluded political resolution, he joined in the majority opinion.\nOn a second issue -- whether the statute unconstitutionally usurped the President's power to recognize foreign nations in relation to consular reports -- the Court answered 5-4 in the affirmative with Justice Clarence Thomas joining the dissenters arguing that the federal statute in question was an unconstitutional usurpation of the President’s recognition power with regard to passports but not consular reports of birth abroad. The historical record indicates that any residual foreign affairs powers that were not explicitly allocated were assumed to be vested in the President. While passport regulation has traditionally been an executive function and falls squarely within the residual foreign affairs power reserved to the President, the consular reports are part of the naturalization powers that are granted to Congress. Therefore, the enforcement of the statute in question as it relates to passports would violate the separation of powers doctrine, but it may be constitutionally applied to consular reports of birth abroad.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, in order for the President to constitutionally ignore the express will of Congress, the President must be exercising a power that the Constitution “conclusively and preclusively” granted to the Executive branch. Because the history and the precedent regarding the power to recognize foreign states is at best conflicting, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Constitution does not conclusively and preclusively grant the President the power to recognize foreign states. Even if the President did have that power, the statute in question would not be unconstitutional because an optional passport designation does not amount to official recognition. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that, to the extent that the Constitution grants the President the power to recognize foreign states, the power is not exclusive. The Constitution grants Congress such a power in the form of its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Regardless, the statute in question does not implicate the recognition power; it merely directs the State Department to make an accommodation regarding a geographic description that is in line with similar accommodations the State Department already offers. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56102:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56105:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56105:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGregory Holt (also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad) was an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Corrections and a practicing Salafi Muslim. He sought an injunction and temporary relief from the enforcement of the Arkansas Department of Corrections' grooming policy, which allowed trimmed mustaches and quarter-inch beards for diagnosed dermatological problems but otherwise no facial hair. Holt argued that growing a beard was a necessary part of the practice of his religion, that the grooming policy significantly burdened his ability to do so, and that the grooming policy was therefore a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Holt was willing to limit his beard to a length of one-half inch as a form of compromise with the policy.\nThe district court granted temporary relief but then dismissed the complaint upon being presented with evidence of the other ways in which Holt was allowed to practice his religion and the extent to which the grooming policy was necessary to maintain prison security. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56105:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56105:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56105:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Arkansas Department of Corrections policy on beards violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). The Court held that, while providing substantial protection of religious exercise, RLUIPA allows prison officials to test the sincerity of religious beliefs to prevent these from being used for illicit conduct. In this case, Holt met the standard for accommodation established in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. —that an accommodation must be based on a sincerely held religious belief—because he was neither slight nor idiosyncratic with the tenets of Islam. Further, the Court held that the district court erred in suggesting that Holt's other religious privileges demonstrated a reasonable accommodation of Holt's beliefs. The prison officials had the burden to prove that preventing inmates from growing beards furthered a compelling government interest and that this policy was the least restrictive means of interference, but the Court held that prison officials did not satisfy that burden in this case because other steps could be taken to ensure quick identification and an inability to hide contraband.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that, while RLUIPA does not require prison officials to refute every less restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest, Arkansas officials responded inadequately to the Holt's objections. However, Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority opinion's dismissal of the explanations of the prison officials. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she objected to the majority opinion's use of the Hobby Lobby decision, because in this case the requested accommodation would not affect the religious beliefs of others.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56105:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56106:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56106:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn February 23, 2007, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski refinanced their Eagan, Minnesota, home by borrowing $611,000 from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The Jesinoskis received a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) disclosure and a Notice of the Right to Cancel, which gave them until midnight on February 27, 2007, to rescind the loan. The Jesinoskis did not exercise their right to cancel the loan, and they used the money to pay off several consumer debts. On February 23, 2010, the Jesinoskis attempted to rescind the loan and argued that they did not receive sufficient copies of the TILA disclosure and the Notice of the Right to Cancel. After the request to rescind the loan was denied, the Jesinoskis sued Countrywide Home Loans for failure to rescind their loan on February 24, 2011.\nCountrywide Home Loans sought a judgment on the pleadings and argued that the Jesinoskis did not file their suit within the three-year time period allowed by TILA. The Jesinoskis argued that, because they attempted to rescind the loan within the three-year time period, their suit fulfills that requirement and should be allowed to proceed. The district court found in favor of Countrywide Home Loans; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56106:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56106:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56106:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that the three-year period required by the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is satisfied when the borrower notifies the lender of his intent to rescind the loan within that period, even if a lawsuit has not yet been filed. The plain language of TILA specifies that a borrower need only notify the creditor of his intent to rescind the loan; it does not require the borrower to file a lawsuit. Although common law recession traditionally requires the borrower to return what was borrowed (as would result from a lawsuit), modern jurisprudence does not require that a statute be interpreted as implementing its common law analog.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56106:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56108:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56108:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating Samuel Johnson based on his involvement in an organization called the National Social Movement. Later in 2010, Johnson left that group to found the Aryan Liberation Movement. In November of that year, Johnson told an undercover FBI agent that he manufactured napalm, silencers, and other explosives for the Aryan Liberation Movement in addition to possessing an AK-47 rifle, several semi-automatic weapons, and a large cache of ammunition. In April 2012, Johnson was arrested at a meeting with his probation officer and admitted to possessing some of the previously mentioned weapons.\nA grand jury charged Johnson with six counts of firearm possession, three of which relied on his classification as an \"armed career criminal.\" This classification was based on the fact that he had three prior felony convictions that the district court designated as \"violent felonies\"—attempted simple robbery, simple robbery, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Johnson was then subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. Johnson argued that the convictions in question should not be considered violent felonies and that the ACCA was unconstitutionally vague. The district court held that the felony convictions in question were in fact violent felonies and that Johnson was an armed career criminal for the purposes of the mandatory minimum sentence required by the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56108:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56108:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56108:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Criminal Career Act (ACCA)—that defines a “violent felony” as one involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”—is unconstitutionally vague. Judicial precedent has held that laws that do not give ordinary people fair notice of what conduct is punished or can be enforced arbitrarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because the residual clause of the ACCA gives no guidelines for how the court can assess whether the conduct in question poses a “serious potential risk of physical injury” and therefore qualifies as a violent felony, the residual clause allows for unpredictable and arbitrary enforcement in violation of the Due Process Clause. The Court also held that it was not bound to follow precedent that upheld the residual clause because subsequent cases had shown that the judicial interpretation of the clause was not sufficiently predictable.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague under both a categorical approach and a records-based approach. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the case does not need to be resolved on Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause grounds; instead, the ACCA should not apply in this case because unlawfully possessing a short-barreled shotgun does not constitute a violent felony. Because the elements of the offense and records of convictions for possessing a short-barreled shotgun do not support the contention that the offense is inherently dangerous, the risk of harm is too remote from the conduct for the offense to constitute a violent felony. Therefore, the majority opinion did not need to nullify the residual clause in order to hold that Johnson should not be punished under the ACCA. Justice Thomas also argued that the field of vagueness jurisprudence has expanded to the point where it is used to invalidate democratically enacted laws and is now potentially beyond the bounds of due process jurisprudence.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that a statute is unconstitutionally vague only when it is vague in all of its applications. Because the residual clause of the ACCA can be construed in a manner that makes it constitutional by reading its language in the context of similar language in state and federal laws that direct a court to make fact-specific determination, the residual clause does not violate the Due Process Clause. Additionally, judicial precedent has upheld the residual clause, and this case presents no reason to overturn that precedent. Because the residual clause is constitutional and Johnson’s previous convictions constitute violent felonies, Justice Alito argued that the ACCA can be properly applied to his case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56108:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56111:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56111:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 30, 2012, Brandon W. Owens filed a class action petition in state court that alleged that Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company and Cherokee Basin Pipeline underpaid the members on the class on royalties they were owed from wells. The petition alleged that this underpayment constituted a breach of contract and sought damages without specifying an amount.\nOn December 5, 2012, the defendants removed the case from state court to federal district court and cited that federal jurisdiction existed under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). CAFA requires that three elements be established for a class action case to fall under federal jurisdiction: at least one plaintiff and one defendant must be citizens of different states, the class must consist of at least 100 members, and the amount in controversy must exceed $5 million. The defendants in this case claimed that they met the requirements for removal to federal court under CAFA because the amount in controversy exceeded $8 million, but did not include specific evidence in the notice of removal. The federal district court held that defendants had not provided evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million in the notice of removal and therefore remanded the case back to state court.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court should not have remanded the case because requiring the party requesting the removal to produce evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million creates an evidentiary burden. The Court of Appeals held that that such evidence is wholly unnecessary unless the removal is contested. A party requesting that a case be removed to federal court need only allege that the grounds for removal exist and need only prove those allegations if they are contested.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56111:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56111:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56111:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a defendant's notice of removal to federal court must only include a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal jurisdictional threshold, not evidentiary proofs. Because the requirements for a notice of removal track those for a normal pleading, the defendant seeking removal should similarly be allowed to allege in good faith that the amount in controversy is sufficient. Evidence only becomes necessary in response to a plaintiff's contestation of the removal.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the only issue properly before the Court was whether the appellate court abused its discretion. Because the majority opinion addressed the district court's analysis, it presumed the basis for a lower court's decision, which violates previously established standards of review. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Elena Kagan, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that the Court did not have the jurisdiction to review the appellate court's decision because the Court can only review \"cases\" that were before an appellate court. This case does not qualify for such review because it was never before the court seeking a remedy or redress for legal injury; instead, the appellate court denied the application for permission to appeal a remand order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56111:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56112:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56112:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1990, Stephen Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider-Man toy that was set to expire in May 2010. Kimble claimed that he discussed the idea with the president of Marvel Enterprises Inc., and that he would be compensated for use of his ideas. Although no agreement was reached, Marvel produced a toy that was similar to Kimble's design. In 1997, Kimble sued for patent infringement, and the parties settled in 2001, with Marvel agreeing to purchase the patent and pay royalties to the petitioner without an expiration date. The case was subsequently dismissed. In 2006, Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro Inc. that gave it the right to produce the toy. Disagreements arose between Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments, and Kimble claimed that the original patent would be infringed if royalties were not paid. Kimble sued Marvel in Arizona state court, and the case was then removed to the federal district court.\nThe magistrate judge determined that settlement agreement was a \"hybrid\" agreement, in which patent and non-patent rights were inseparable, and that the Supreme Court decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. applied. In that case, the Court ruled that, when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser was not obligated to continue these payments beyond the expiration date of the patents because doing so would over-compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extend the patent monopoly beyond the intended time limit. On recommendation of the magistrate, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and ruled that the settlement agreement transferred patent rights, but that it was unclear if non-patent rights were transferred. Kimble appealed and argued that the settlement agreement transferred both patent and non-patent rights and that, while royalty payments ended for the patent, they did not end for the toy itself. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56112:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56112:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56112:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the precedent established in Brulotte v. Thys Co.—that a patentee cannot receive royalty payments after the patent has expired—should be upheld because there was no sufficient reason to overturn it. Patent law jurisprudence has typically struck down statutes that overly limit free access to formerly patented inventions, and the Brulotte decision was in line with these cases. Because no subsequent legal developments have made the rule announced in that decision obsolete and it has remained workable, there is no reason to overturn the decision. The Court also noted that Congress had ample opportunity to enact a statute that forecloses the Brulotte rule but has not done so.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, because the Brulotte rule impermissibly interferes in parties’ abilities to negotiate licensing agreements that reflect the true value of the product, the decision has no precedential weight and should be overturned. The Brulotte rule represents a poor interpretation of the Patent Act and promotes economic inefficiency, so the decision lacks the support of legal standing as well as public policy, and therefore the Court should not uphold it. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56112:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56114:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56114:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn July 19, 1988, Houston Police Officer Elston Howard was in the midst of arresting the clerk of an adult bookstore when Robert Mitchell Jennings entered the store intending to rob it. Jennings shot Officer Howard four times and then proceeded to rob the store. The trial court jury subsequently convicted Jennings of capital murder. In the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Jennings' long criminal history as an aggravating factor. The defense called the jail chaplain to testify to his opinion that Jennings was not \"incorrigible,\" and the defense did not present any further evidence of mitigating factors.\nIn 1996, Jennings filed a state habeas petition and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment phase because his attorneys had failed to contact his family to provide evidence of a disadvantaged background and had failed to find and present a 1978 psychological report that suggested that Jennings had a \"mild organic brain dysfunction.\" The state court held that Jennings' attorneys had conducted a sufficient investigation into his background, and that their decision not to introduce this testimony and evidence was a reasonable trial strategy. The state court recommended that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals deny the request for habeas relief, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acted accordingly.\nIn 2009, Jennings filed a federal habeas petition with the district court. The district court granted the petition and held that Jennings had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to present evidence of his disadvantaged background and possible mental incapacities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Jennings' counsel's decision not to pursue these avenues of argument was a legitimate trial strategy. The Court of Appeals also held that a federal habeas petitioner must file a certificate of appealability in order to respond to arguments concerning the state's appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56114:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56114:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56114:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, when an appellee does not cross-appeal, he may urge a defense of his judgment on alternative grounds without filing a certificate of appealability unless doing so would enlarge his rights or lessen those of his adversary as provided by the previous judgment. In this case, allowing Jennings to urge a defense of his judgment did not materially affect either his rights or those of the state. The Court held that this rule provides sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent a proliferation of frivolous habeas claims. Additionally, the statutory language that created the certificate of appealability requirement only dealt with the taking of appeals, not with a defense of a judgment from which an appeal has already been taken. Therefore, that requirement was not relevant in cases such as this one.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that Jennings' argument in defense of a previous judgment constituted a cross-appeal because it altered the grounds on which he could obtain relief. Because the argument was essentially a cross-appeal, a certificate of appealability should be required. Adhering to this standard rule not only aligns with previous habeas corpus jurisprudence but also prevents a rise in the number of frivolous appeals. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56114:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56116:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56116:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 17, 2007, John L. Yates and his crew prepared his fishing vessel for a commercial fishing trip into federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico. On August 23, 2007, Officer John Jones, a field officer with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission who was empowered to enforce federal fisheries laws, boarded the vessel and noticed red grouper fish that appeared to be smaller than the requisite 20 inches. Officer Jones measured the grouper that appeared smaller and found a total of 72 fish that measured under 20 inches. Officer Jones placed these fish in wooden crates, issued Yates a citation, and informed Yates that the National Marine Fisheries Service would seize these fish upon the vessel's return to port. Contrary to Officer Jones' directions, Yates instructed his crew to throw the fish in question overboard and replace them with larger fish. When the vessel returned to port and the fish were measured on August 27, Officer Jones suspected that Yates had disposed of the fish he had measured.\nYates was charged with destruction and falsification of evidence. At trial he argued that the fish thrown overboard were not actually undersized because Officer Jones had measured the fish with their mouths closed, which shortens the length of fish. The district court found Yates guilty of disposing of undersized fish and therefore in violation of a statute that makes it a crime to destroy or conceal \"a tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence\" a governmental investigation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56116:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56116:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56116:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the four-justice plurality. The Court noted that the broad dictionary definition of \"tangible objects\" would cover fish, but held that the term must be read in the financial context of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which was enacted as a reaction to the Enron scandal and contained the specific provision Yates was charged with violating. In this context, the Court held that the term was ambiguous because the caption of the section in question, \"Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy,\" and the title of the section in which it was originally placed, \"Criminal penalties for altering documents,\" indicated that Congress was referring only to financial records. Additionally, the section's placement amongst other sections that prohibited specific actions cuts in favor of narrow construction. The Court argued that reading the section to apply to all physical objects would create significant overlap with another section. The words immediately surrounding \"tangible object\" — \"falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or] document\" —indicated that Congress intended to restrict the term to related objects. Finally, the Court held that any statutory ambiguity in criminal proceedings should be resolved in favor of the defendant.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the plurality's holding should be narrowly construed. He contended that the statute's list of nouns, its list of verbs, and its title, all working in conjunction, indicated that \"tangible object\" should be limited to something similar to records or documents.\nJustice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the term \"tangible object\" should be given its ordinary meaning and therefore subsumes all things that possess physical form, including fish. She noted that the use of the word \"any\" before \"tangible object\" demonstrated a congressional intent for broad application. Justice Kagan also pointed out that the section's language tracked the language in other statutes that had been interpreted to include all physical objects. This section's legislative history showed that it was enacted to close a loophole created by another section and therefore did not create any unnecessary overlap. Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56116:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56117:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56117:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSandoz, Inc., (Sandoz) and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Mylan) submitted Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to produce and market generic versions of Copaxone, a drug used to treat Multiple Sclerosis. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the manufacturer of the original drug, sued Sandoz and Mylan and used two different types of claims that are based on different ways to use molecular weight to distinguish between polymer samples. The district court did not distinguish between the different methods of using molecular weight and held that the claims were not indefinite as Sandoz and Mylan argued. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Sandoz and Mylan products infringed on Teva's patent.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not error in holding that the patents were infringed, but that some of the claims had not been effectively shown to be definite.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56117:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56117:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56117:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a federal appellate court could only overturn a district court's finding of fact if those findings were determined to be \"clearly erroneous.\" Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) established this standard without any exceptions, and there was no reason to create one in this case. Because the construction of a patent claim is essentially a factual determination, it should be governed by this well-established standard. Therefore, while an appellate court may still review a lower court's construction of a claim de novo, to overturn the lower court's ruling, the appellate court must find that the lower court has made a clear error with respect to the findings of fact.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the construction of patent claims deals with questions of law, so Federal Rule of Procedure 52(a)(6), which only applies to questions of fact, is not the controlling standard. Instead, the appellate court was correct to apply a de novo standard of review, which increases uniformity. Justice Thomas wrote that a district court's determination is factual in nature when it deals with the historical fact of the case, as in the case of contracts and deeds, while it is a legal conclusion when it defines rules applicable beyond the specifics of the case at hand, as in the case of statutes. Based on this definition, the construction of patent claims should be considered a question of law. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56117:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56118:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56118:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) learned of a potential plot to hijack US planes and briefed the Federal Air Marshals accordingly. Not long after that briefing, the TSA notified the Marshals that all missions on flights from Las Vegas would be cancelled until August. Federal Air Marshal Robert J. MacLean became concerned that the TSA was not appropriately responding to the threat and creating a danger to the flying public, so he contacted an MSNBC reporter about the situation in an attempt to create a public controversy. MSNBC published an article, and several members of Congress joined in criticizing the decision to cancel the missions. That decision was then rescinded. In 2004, MacLean appeared disguised on NBC Night News, and some TSA employees recognized his voice. During the course of the investigation that followed, MacLean revealed his role in the 2003 MSNBC article. This contact was deemed to be an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security information, and MacLean was removed from his position.\nMacLean challenged the determination that he disclosed sensitive security information before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MacLean argued that the information about the cancellation of missions was not classified at the time he received it and could not be retroactively classified. The Court of Appeals held that the TSA had simply applied regulations already in force in 2003 to determine that information should fall under that classification. MacLean also challenged his removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) and argued that his actions were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). The Board determined that MacLean's actions did not fall under the WPA because they were explicitly prohibited by law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's ruling and held that MacLean's actions were not explicitly prohibited by law under the WPA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56118:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56118:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56118:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the language that Congress used in the exception within the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) that allows for prosecution of disclosures \"specifically prohibited by law\" is significant. Because Congress used the phrase, \"law, rule, or regulation\" in other places in the WPA, the fact that the exception only addressed disclosures \"specifically prohibited by law\" indicated that Congress did not intend for the exception to apply to disclosures prohibited by regulations such as the TSA regulation in question. The Court rejected the government's argument that it should prevail because disclosures like MacLean's were specifically prohibited and \"gravely endanger[ed] public safety.\" The Court noted that these concerns were legitimate but held that they must be addressed by Congress or the President.\nJustice Sonia M. Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the Homeland Security Act explicitly prohibited the type of disclosure at issue. Therefore, Congress intended to prohibit these types of disclosures because it passed the Homeland Security Act, which required the TSA to enact regulations to prevent such disclosures. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in this dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56118:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56120:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56120:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Voting Rights Act of 1965 focuses on preserving the equal representation of voters in different legislative voting districts. In 2012, the Alabama legislature redrew Alabama’s electoral districts with the goal of creating districts with a population deviation of only 1%, as opposed to the 5% courts traditionally allow when evaluating redistricting efforts. Alabama also tried to maintain the existing percentage of minority voters in each electoral district. Petitioners sued in district court and argued that Alabama’s redistricting violated the Voting Rights Act and amounted to racial gerrymandering that had negative impacts on the equal representation of racial minorities in multiple electoral districts. The district court held that the petitioners had failed to prove that Alabama used race as a “dominant and controlling” factor in redrawing its electoral districts and also that Alabama’s goal of maintaining the minority population percentages in existing districts was “narrowly tailored” to a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to address the district court’s application of existing legal principles.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56120:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56120:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56120:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the district court improperly considered evidence of statewide racial effects as a claim that the state used race as a factor when redrawing all of the boundary lines, when the actual allegations were that the racial gerrymandering took place in a few select electoral districts. Next, the Court held that the evidence suggested that the Caucus had standing to sue because it appeared to have members in every electoral district in the State of Alabama; the Court directed the Caucus to provide membership information sufficient to support this inference on remand. The district court also erred by considering Alabama’s goal of obtaining a 1% population deviation among districts as a relevant factor to determine whether race was a “predominate” factor in redrawing the electoral districts rather than considering the traditional goals of the Voting Rights Act. Finally, the Court rejected the district court’s holding that Alabama’s gerrymandering satisfied strict scrutiny. In application, Alabama’s interest in maintaining a particular population percentage of minority voters in each district did not equate to the Voting Rights Act’s goal of preventing “retrogression in respect to racial minorities’ ‘ability . . . to elect their preferred candidates of choice’; therefore, using a race as a factor to meet Alabama’s extraneous goals was not justified. The Court vacated and remanded the district court’s decision for further consideration consistent with its holding and additional evidence.\nJustice Antonin M. Scalia authored a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority decision reached beyond the record because the Caucus’ complaint failed to adequately address the issues of standing and whether the allegations were a statewide claim or a select electoral district claim. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court’s quest to obtain “the best racial quota” was an ill-begotten one, and that Alabama’s task of complying with the convoluted goals of the Voting Rights Act was nearly impossible given all of the competing laws, jurisprudence, policies, and procedures.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56120:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56121:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56121:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCommil USA, LLC (Commil) holds a patent on a method to implement short-range wireless networks. Commil sued Cisco Systems, Inc. (Cisco) and alleged that Cisco performed the patented method and induced its customers to infringe by performing the patented method. Cisco argued that Commil's patent was invalid for indefiniteness, non-enablement, and lack of written description. The district court found for Commil and awarded more than $70 million in damages. Cisco appealed and argued that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the standard for inducement was negligence and precluded the submission of evidence of Cisco's good-faith belief that Commil's patent was invalid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that the standard for induced infringement is actual knowledge or willful blindness, and therefore that a good-faith belief of patent invalidity was a defense to claims of induced infringement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56121:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56121:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56121:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, although precedent established that liability for induced infringement required knowledge, infringement and validity are separate matters, and the knowledge requirement does not extend to patent validity. To permit a defense of belief in invalidity “would conflate the issues of infringement and validity.” Because a patent is presumed to be valid, if belief in invalidity were a defense to induced infringement, then the force of that presumption would be lessened significantly. Additionally, the Court held that allowing a good-faith belief in the patent’s invalidity to be a defense would burden the courts by creating increased litigation regarding the recognition of such invalidity. Therefore, a defendant’s good-faith belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to a claim of induced infringement.\nJustice Antonin Scalia authored a dissenting opinion in which he argued that good-faith belief in a patent’s invalidity is a defense to induced infringement because knowledge of infringement is a requirement for induced-infringement liability, and there can be no infringement (and hence no knowledge of infringement) of an invalid patent. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56121:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56124:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56124:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn September 26, 2008, Larry Whitfield and Quanterrious McCoy attempted to rob the Fort Financial Credit Union in Gastonia, North Carolina. After their robbery attempt was foiled by the bank's security system, the two fled. McCoy was later found hiding under a van, while Whitfield entered the Parnell residence and attempted to contact a getaway vehicle. Mary Parnell was subsequently pronounced dead of a heart attack. Whitfield was arrested nearby and signed a confession admitting to breaking into several homes as well as the attempted bank robbery.\nA grand jury indicted McCoy and Whitfield on several counts relating to the failed robbery, but only Whitfield was indicted for forcing someone to accompany him and killing that person while trying to avoid being apprehended for the commission of a crime. Whitfield moved to dismiss this charge and argued that it was unconstitutionally vague and that the prosecution was required to prove that he intentionally caused Parnell's death. The district court denied the motion. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Whitfield guilty of the additional charge, it only needed to find that his actions were the proximate cause of Parnell's death, and it did not include a minimum limit on the degree of accompaniment necessary. Whitfield objected to the instruction and the court overruled the objection. Whitfield was found guilty, but on the additional charge he was found guilty of forcing Parnell to accompany him, not of killing her. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Whitfield's conviction and remanded the case for rehearing on the issue of whether or not the district court constructively amended the indictment in its jury instructions. On remand, the district court again found Whitfield guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56124:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56124:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56124:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that forced accompaniment occurs when a person requires another to \"go with\" him, even when that movement occurs over a short distance such as within the same building. While the word \"accompany\" indicates movement over distance, that distance needs only be from one place to another, and therefore can be relatively short. The Court held that a plain reading of the word \"accompany\" does not connote movement over a substantial distance, and the statute should not be read in such a manner.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56124:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56126:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56126:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard Sharif and others entered into distributorship contracts with Wellness International Network (WIN) for the sale of health and wellness products. Sharif and others later sued WIN and claimed that WIN was running a pyramid scheme. The district court granted summary judgment for WIN and awarded $655,596.13 in attorney's fees as a sanction against Sharif and his co-plaintiffs for ignoring some of WIN's discovery requests. WIN attempted to discover Sharif's assets, but Sharif ignored all attempts until he was held in civil contempt for discovery violations and arrested. In 2009, Sharif filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. WIN filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court and claimed that Sharif had continuously concealed property and information pertaining to his assets. The bankruptcy court found in favor of WIN and ordered Sharif to pay WIN's attorney's fees along with other sanctions.\nSharif appealed to federal district court, but before he filed his first brief, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, which held that a bankruptcy court lacked the authority to enter a final judgment on a state-law counterclaim against a creditor. Sharif subsequently attempted to advance an argument based on Stern, but the district court did not allow it. Instead, the district court held that such an objection can be waived and that Sharif's failure to bring up to argument earlier constituted an implied waiver. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The Court of Appeals held that an objection based on Stern cannot be waived and that the bankruptcy court only had the authority to enter a final judgment on some of WIN's claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56126:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56126:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56126:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, and Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, as long as the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent, Article III of the Constitution allows bankruptcy courts (which Congress created pursuant to Article I) to adjudicate claims that would normally be heard by an Article III court. Because Congress created the bankruptcy courts for a limited purpose and gave them limited power subject to the control of the judiciary, there is no separation of powers problem with the bankruptcy courts exercising the powers Congress delegated to them, which include the ability to adjudicate non-bankruptcy claims when the parties consent. The Court also held that judicial history regarding the right to an Article III judge clearly states that the right can be waived; therefore a bankruptcy judge can adjudicate the type of state law claim at issue in this case as long as Article III courts retain supervision. Additionally, nothing in the Constitution requires that the waiver of the right to an Article III judge be express. As long as the litigant is aware of the right to an Article III judge, voluntarily trying the case before a non-Article III judge constitutes a waiver.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the majority opinion did not need to decide the issue of whether consent to non-Article III adjudication may be implied by actions.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion should have decided this case solely based on the fact that a bankruptcy court has the authority to adjudicate the state law claims at issue here because they deal with determining what assets constitute the bankruptcy estate, which is the necessary starting point of any bankruptcy case. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that a litigant cannot consent to adjudication outside of what Article III allows because to do so would violate the constitutional separation of powers. Despite the practicality of allowing more issues to be adjudicated outside of Article III courts, the constitutional protections of the power of the judiciary must be respected. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that, while an individual can waive constitutional rights, an individual cannot consent to violations of the Constitution. Therefore, an individual can waive the right to have a claim heard before an Article III court only if the claim in question is within the jurisdiction of a non-Article III court. Because the state law claims in this case do not fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, an individual cannot consent to have them adjudicated outside of an Article III court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56126:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56129:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56129:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTelecommunications service provider T-mobile South, LLC (T-mobile) submitted an application to construct a 108–foot cell tower resembling a man-made tree (monopine) in Roswell, Georgia. The location of the site, though planned inside a vacant lot, would be in an area zoned for single-family residences within a well-established residential neighborhood. Following an outpouring of public opposition to the tower, Roswell's Planning and Zoning Division recommended that the Mayor and city council, who ultimately approve applications after a public hearing, impose certain conditions before approving the application. Specifically, the Planning and Zoning Division recommended that T-Mobile should relocate the site to another part of the property, erect a fence around the tower, and plant pine trees to shield it from residential owners' view. At the public hearing, city council members voted to deny the application.\nTwo days later, Roswell sent T-Mobile a letter notifying the company that the application was denied and referred the company to the minutes of the public hearing. T-Mobile sued Roswell and claimed that the city had not provided substantial evidence that would support a denial of the application. T-Mobile also alleged that, by prohibiting T-Mobile from building the structure, Roswell violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA). The district court did not rule on the substantial evidence question and instead held that Roswell had not met the \"in writing\" component of the TCA, which required the government to state the reason(s) for denying an application. The district court ordered Roswell to grant the permit, and Roswell appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Roswell had met the \"in writing\" requirement by issuing a written denial and referring to the minutes of the hearing for the reasoning.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56129:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56129:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56129:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 does not require localities to provide reasons for their denial of construction applications in the written denial notification as long as the reasons appear in some other sufficiently clear written record. While the language of the Act requires localities to provide reasons for the denial of an application, it does not specify how those reasons should be presented. However, the reasons for denial must be made available at essentially the same time as the notice of denial. Because the reasons for denial in this case were issued 26 days after the date of the written denial, the Court held that the City of Roswell did not comply with the requirements of the Telecommunications Act.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that a court should be able to uphold a decision as long as the locality's logic can be reasonably followed, even if all of the reasons are not explicitly stated. If a locality has erred, a court should uphold its decision if the error was harmless, and it should generally remand the case to be reconsidered by the locality.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the City of Roswell fully complied with every requirement of the Telecommunications Act: it issued its decision in writing and provided reasons for that decision in a written record. The majority opinion's timing requirement does not exist in the text of the statute and therefore should not be valid. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent to express his concern that the majority opinion created a requirement that does not exist in the text of the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56129:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56130:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56130:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnthony Elonis was convicted under 18 U. S. C. §875(c), which criminalizes the transmission of threats in interstate commerce, for posting threats to injure his coworkers, his wife, the police, a kindergarten class, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent on Facebook. The district court instructed the jury that a \"true threat,\" which falls outside the scope of First Amendment speech protections, requires an objective intent to threaten. Elonis appealed and argued that \"true threats\" require a subjective intent to threaten. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Elonis' conviction and held that a subjective intent standard would fail to protect individuals from the fear of violence which the \"true threat\" exception was created to prevent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56130:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56130:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56130:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the prosecution needed to show that Elonis intended the posts to be threats, and therefore that there was a subjective intent to threaten . An objective reasonable person standard does not go far enough to separate innocent, accidental conduct from purposeful, wrongful acts. The Court held that, in this case, an objective standard would risk punishing an innocent actor because the crucial element that makes this behavior criminal is the threat, not merely the posting.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed that the prosecution only needed to prove negligence, but he argued that the majority opinion should have addressed what the proper instruction should be. By leaving out what the prosecution did need to show, attorneys and judges are left to guess whether knowledge or recklessness is the appropriate standard. Justice Alito also argued that recklessness should be the standard because a higher standard would effectively change the law rather than clarify it.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that nine of the eleven circuit courts of appeals had already addressed this issue and resolved it with a general intent standard. The majority opinion not only overturns their rulings but also leaves the courts uncertain as to whether an intent to threaten is required or whether recklessness will suffice. Justice Thomas also argued that knowledge of posting the relevant threats is enough to establish the intent element because knowledge of those facts is required to make the actions illegal; ignorance of those actions being illegal should not provide shelter from the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56130:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56132:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56132:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 27, 2012, a Nebraska K-9 police officer pulled over a vehicle driven by Dennys Rodriguez after his vehicle veered onto the shoulder of the highway. The officer issued a written warning and then asked if he could walk the K-9 dog around Rodriguez's vehicle. Rodriguez refused, but the officer instructed him to exit the vehicle and then walked the dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and a large bag of methamphetamine was found.\nRodriguez moved to suppress the evidence found in the search, claiming the dog search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the search was constitutional because the brief delay before employing the dog did not unreasonably prolong the otherwise lawful stop.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56132:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56132:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56132:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the use of a K-9 unit after the completion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop exceeded the time reasonably required to handle the matter and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Because the mission of the stop determines its allowable duration, the authority for the stop ends when the mission has been accomplished. The Court held that a seizure unrelated to the reason for the stop is lawful only so long as it does not measurably extend the stop’s duration. Although the use of a K-9 unit may cause only a small extension of the stop, it is not fairly characterized as connected to the mission of an ordinary traffic stop and is therefore unlawful.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the use of a K-9 unit at the conclusion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as it was conducted reasonably, which this one was. Justice Thomas also argued that the rule announced in the majority’s opinion would result in arbitrary enforcement of Fourth Amendment protections and created artificial lines between common police practices at traffic stops. Additionally, there was no Fourth Amendment violation in this case because the police officer had a reasonable suspicion to continue to hold Rodriguez and use the K-9 unit. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that the appellate court did not address the issue of whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to use the K-9 unit, and that court should be allowed to do so. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion’s analysis was arbitrary because it relied on the order in which the officer conducted his inquiries.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56132:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56135:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56135:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBaker Botts, LLP, along with Jordan, Hyden, Womber, Culbreth & Holzer, PC, was awarded about $120 million in fees for representing Asarco, LLC in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, from which Asarco had emerged in 2009 with a reorganization plan that would pay its creditors in full. Baker Botts then filed for a final fee request, which Asarco contested. The bankruptcy court awarded Baker Botts more than $117 million to cover the fees in addition to $5 million for expenses incurred defending the fee claims. The district court affirmed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code did not allow the firms to recover $5 million spent defending the fee request against Asarco's opposition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56135:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56135:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56135:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the American rule of attorney fee structure—that each litigant pays for his own attorney’s fees—can only be altered through an explicit statutory provision. The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly depart from this rule; instead it allows for “reasonable compensation” for services rendered, which cannot be properly construed as including litigation regarding a contested fee request. Additionally, the established policy that, absent express statutory language, no attorneys receive compensation for costs incurred litigating fee challenges means that this reading of the statute creates no unfairness in the profession. Therefore, the American rule should still be assumed in force in cases such as this one.\nIn her opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that, because the statutory language is clear in this case, the majority opinion should not have considered the policy argument.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Bankruptcy Code grants courts a great deal of discretion in determining how to award “reasonable compensation” for services rendered, and therefore the courts can consider situations such as the costs of fee-related litigation in making such a determination. Because the costs of litigating fee challenges can be so high, factoring those costs into fee determinations can be the only way to ensure that the compensation is “reasonable” as the Bankruptcy Code requires. The American rule can only remain in force if not overridden by statute, and the Bankruptcy Code provides a sufficient statutory exception. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56135:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56136:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56136:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care. The ACA required each state to establish an \"exchange\" through which people could purchase health care coverage, and if a state elected not to do so, the federal government would establish one through the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The ACA also required people to obtain the minimum essential coverage or pay a tax penalty unless they fell within an unaffordability exemption for low-income individuals. To limit the number of people that would fall into such an exemption, the ACA provided for tax credits that are calculated based on the health plan in which an individual enrolls through the exchange. Although the legislative language of the ACA pertaining to the tax credits only referred to the exchanges established by the states, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) created a regulation that made the tax credits available to those enrolled in plans through federal as well as state exchanges.\nVirginia declined to establish a state-run exchange and has one operated by the federal government. The plaintiffs are a group of Virginia residents who, without the tax credits, would fall under the unaffordability exception and be exempt from having to purchase health insurance. They sued and argued that the IRS regulation exceeded the agency's statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is contrary to the law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56136:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56136:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56136:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that Congress did not delegate the authority to determine whether the tax credits are available through both state-created and federally created exchanges to the Internal Revenue Service, but the language of the statute clearly indicates that Congress intended the tax credits to be available through both types of exchanges. When the plain language of the section in question is considered in the context of the statute as a whole, it is evident that the federally-created exchanges are not meaningfully different from those the states created, and therefore federally-created exchanges are not excluded from the language referring to exchanges created by the states. This reading is also in line with the Congressional intent of covering as many qualified individuals as possible, as the alternative would mean that federally-created exchanges do not contain qualified individuals and operate entirely differently from the state-created ones.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that that the plain language of the statute clearly limits the tax credits to state-created exchanges. The majority opinion’s attempt to use context to justify a more expansive reading that is at odds with the clear meaning of the text distorts statutory interpretation and amounts to rewriting the statute. Justice Scalia also argued that reading the language of the section in question to refer to both state-created and federally-created exchanges fails to give effect to the times when Congress explicitly chose to conflate the two types of exchanges as opposed to the times it did not. The reading that some parts of the statute refer to both types of exchanges and other parts do not is more consistent with the statute as a whole and gives better effect to Congress’ intent in enacting it. The majority opinion’s use of Congressional intent to support its holding errs by focusing only on one of the goals of the legislation to the exclusion of others, and in doing so oversteps the bounds of its judicial authority. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56136:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56137:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56137:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLouis Bullard borrowed $387,000 from Hyde Park Savings to buy his property in Massachusetts. In December 2010, he filed for Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and proposed a plan in which he offered to pay the bank back the value of the property in a loan that was secured by the actual property and then put the rest of the home loan into a pool with other debts that would be paid at a different rate. The bankruptcy court rejected this plan because it believed this hybrid plan was inconsistent with certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy appellate panel agreed but stated the order was appealable because Bullard could simply propose another plan. Bullard petitioned for an appeal but the bankruptcy appellate panel denied the petition because the petitioner had already filed his notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction, as courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over \"final decisions, judgments, orders and decrees.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56137:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56137:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56137:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice John G. Roberts delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that a bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of a proposed repayment plan is not a “final” order for the purposes of immediate appeal. The Court noted that, because bankruptcy cases typically involve many controversies that could stand on their own, an order is appealable if it finally disposes of a concrete dispute within the larger case. Because denial of confirmation of a plan indicates that a plan needs further consideration, it is not a final disposition of a concrete issue, unless it results in dismissal of the case. The Court held that the asymmetry of allowing confirmation to be a final order, but not denial of a confirmation, is acceptable because only confirmation alters the legal relationships between the parties by allowing the bankruptcy proceedings to proceed. Additionally, there are other safeguards in place, such as interlocutory appeals, to ensure the system is not unfair to debtors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56137:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56138:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56138:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn August 2009, the Texas division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (Texas SCV), a non-profit organization that works to preserve the memory and reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War, applied to have a new specialty license plate issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV). The proposed license plate had two confederate flags on it: one in the organization's logo, and one faintly making up the background of the plate. The TDMV had a policy stating that it \"may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the design might be offensive to any member of the public.\" The board in charge of approving new specialty plates received multiple negative comments from the public regarding this plate and ultimately voted to deny Texas SCV's application.\nTexas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The TDMV argued that the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this case because license plates are a form of government speech; therefore, they were within their rights to choose which messages and views they wanted to express on the plates. The district court disagreed and held that the plates were private, non-governmental speech, and that the TDMV's denial was a reasonable, content-based restriction of speech in a non-public forum. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that TDMV's denial was a form of viewpoint discrimination that \"discriminated against Texas SCV's view that the Confederate flag is a symbol of sacrifice, independence, and Southern heritage.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56138:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56138:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56138:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the government choosing the content of its speech is not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because that expression is the product of the democratic electoral process. Based on the analysis from Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Texas’s specialty license plate is an example of such government speech (as opposed to a forum open for private expression) because Texas and other states have long used license plates to convey messages. Moreover, the public associates license plates with the State. Finally, Texas maintains direct control over the messages on its specialty plates from design to final approval.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote a dissent in which he argued that, with over 350 varieties of specialty plates, an observer would think that the plates were the expression of the individual drivers, not Texas. Because the specialty license plates are a limited public forum for private expression, Texas rejecting the confederate flag design because it might be offensive is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56138:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56141:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56141:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe federal Medicaid Act requires that state Medicaid plans contain procedures to ensure that reimbursement rates for healthcare providers \"are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers\" to meet the need for care and services in the geographic area. Ninth Circuit precedent also requires that reimbursement rates bear a reasonable relationship to Medicaid provider costs, and where rates do not \"substantially reimburse providers their costs,\" a state cannot justify its rates with \"purely budgetary reasons.\" Richard Armstrong, the Director of Idaho's Department of Health and Welfare, and others (the Directors) conducted provider cost studies and recommended increasing reimbursement rates but ultimately did not increase rates for budgetary reasons.\nA group of Idaho Medicaid providers (the Providers) sued the Directors and claimed that, based on the new cost information, the Department's failure to raise rates was not consistent with the Ninth Circuit's requirements. The Directors argued that the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution does not give providers a private right of action and that the existing rates were consistent with the Medicaid Act's requirements of efficiency, economy, and quality of care. The district court granted the Providers' motion for summary judgment and held that the failure to increase rates led to a failure to substantially reimburse providers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56141:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56141:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56141:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Supremacy Clause instructs courts to defer to federal law when federal and state law contradict each other, but it does not create a private right of action. If the Supremacy Clause were interpreted to include a private right of action, it would mean that the Constitution would require Congress to allow private actors to implement its laws, which would curtail Congress’ ability to guide implementation of federal laws. Although judicial precedent allows for suits to prevent state and federal officers from violating federal laws, that precedent stems from a long history of the jurisprudence of the courts of equity, not the Supremacy Clause. The Court also held that the Idaho Medicaid Providers could not circumvent Congress’ exclusion of a private right of action under the Medicaid Act.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that federal courts may not grant injunctive relief against state officers who violate federal law when the relevant statute does not provide for that kind of relief. In this case, the Medicaid Act does not do so because such relief could result in increased litigation, inconsistent results, and the disorderly administration of complex federal programs, which Congress could not have intended.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that suits to restrain state officials from executing laws contrary to the Constitution have such a long history in American jurisprudence that there needs to be substantial evidence of congressional intent to restrict such suits in a statute, and the language of the Medicaid Act does not provide such evidence. Because such suits argue that state law contravenes federal law, they are essentially constitutional in nature and stem from the Supremacy Clause. Therefore, even if there is no implied right of action in the Supremacy Clause, it can still be the basis for suits similar to the one in this case. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56141:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56142:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56142:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid Caulkett’s property was subject to two mortgage liens when he filed for bankruptcy. Because the debt owed on the first mortgage exceeded the value of the property, the second mortgage, which Bank of America held, was considered “underwater.” When Caulkett filed for bankruptcy, he moved the bankruptcy court to void Bank of America’s lien on the second mortgage and argued that Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allowed a debtor filing for bankruptcy to void a second mortgage when the debt owed on the first mortgage exceeded the value of the collateral property. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, and both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.\nThis case was consolidated with a similar case, Bank of America v. Toledo-Cardona, which had substantially the same facts and an identical procedural history.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56142:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56142:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56142:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court, which held that Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to void a mortgage “[t]o the extent that [the] lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim.” Although a straightforward reading of this provision appears to favor the debtors, in Dewsnup v. Timm, the Court held that a “secured claim” is one supported by a security interest in property, regardless of whether the value of that property would be sufficient to cover the claim. Thus, even if the second mortgage is underwater, the debtor cannot void that mortgage in bankruptcy proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56142:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56143:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56143:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNoel Reyes Mata, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of assaulting a woman he was dating; he was deported in 2010. His appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was dismissed after his attorney failed to file an appellate brief. Mata subsequently moved to reopen his case based on ineffective assistance of counsel, but the BIA denied Mata's motion as untimely because it was filed well after the 90 days allowed. Mata appealed the BIA's denial of his motion to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and argued that the BIA should not have enforced the filing period limitation because his attorney's failure to file a brief deprived him of his due process rights. The appellate court held that such a motion was subject to the complete discretion of the BIA, and thus the appellate court lacked the jurisdiction to review the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56143:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56143:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56143:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that precedent establishes that circuit courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review an alien’s appeal of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision to deny a motion to reopen proceedings. Although Congress has limited the appellate courts’ authority over BIA decisions in other ways, this authority has remained in place. Additionally, while the appellate courts may lack the jurisdiction to decide the merits of whether the case should be reopened, the lack of jurisdiction over that issue does not affect the appellate court’s jurisdiction over the BIA’s decision to deny the motion.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, prior to determining whether it had jurisdiction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit should have construed the ambiguous motion in question as either invoking statutory relief or requesting that the BIA assert its inherent authority to reopen the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56143:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56145:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56145:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1949 the U.S. Department of Agriculture implemented the Marketing Order Regulating the Handling of Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California (Marketing Order). The Marketing Order authorized the federal government to reserve a percentage of the yearly California raisin crop to stabilize the supply, and thus the price, of California raisins. Under the Marketing Order, farmers are entitled to a share of the proceeds acquired when, or if, the government sells the reserved raisins. Marvin Horne, a farmer and raisin producer, attempted to skirt the Marketing Order by processing his own raisins, which he claimed exempted his raisins from the Marketing Order's reserve requirement. The Department of Agriculture claimed Horne's raisins were still subject to the Market Order, and following administrative proceedings, Horne was fined nearly $700,000.\nHorne sued the Department of Agriculture and claimed that the Marketing Order violated his Fifth Amendment rights against uncompensated takings. The district court found in favor of the Department of Agriculture. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked standing to address Horne's claim, because Fifth Amendment takings claims are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The United States Supreme Court held that the appellate court did have jurisdiction and remanded the case. On remand, the appellate court found for the Department of Agriculture by holding that the reserve requirement did not act as a per se taking because Horne's raisins constituted personal property rather than real property. The appellate court also held that the Marketing Order did not constitute a taking because there was a sufficient nexus, and rough proportionality, between the reserve requirement and the specific interest the government seeks to protect, which in this case is the government's interest in stabilizing raisin prices.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56145:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56145:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56145:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no, yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies with equal force to personal as well as real property; therefore the Marketing Order’s reserve requirement constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment because it deprives the owners of their property rights to “possess, use, and dispose of” the raisins. Because a physical taking has occurred, returning the net proceeds of the sale of the raisins to the owners does not exempt the government from paying just compensation for the taking itself. The Court also held that making the reserve requirement a condition on legally participating in the raisin market effects a per se taking because it cannot be properly characterized as a voluntary exchange for a governmental benefit. Therefore, the government should pay a just compensation for the taking, which the government has already calculated in its attempt to fine the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins at issue, by rescinding the fine it had imposed.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that the Takings Clause only requires the government to pay just compensation when the taking results in a public legal right to the property. Because it is not clear that such a right is being granted when the government enforces the reserve requirement, there is no reason to calculate what such “just compensation” would be in this case.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the Court should remand the case to the appellate court to calculate what “just compensation” should be in this case. If the Marketing Order is determined to afford just compensation, when taking into account the benefit to the market that the reserve requirement confers, then the reserve requirement does not violate the Takings Clause. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that a per se taking only occurs when the government deprives an individual of every property right regarding the property in question. Because the reserve requirement allows the owner to retain interest in the property in the form of the net proceeds from the disposition of the raisins, the Marketing Order does not deprive the individual of all property rights and therefore is not a per se taking. Justice Sotomayor also argued that precedent establishes that the government may require an individual to give up some property rights as a condition of engaging in regulated commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56145:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56146:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56146:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nStephen McFadden sold overstocked products on the Internet to augment his income. In 2011, McFadden noticed that a lot of businesses where he lived were selling a product known as \"bath salts,\" an aromatherapy product that emits a stimulating vapor when burned. After confirming that bath salts were not illegal, McFadden began selling them like his other products. He continued to sell them until he learned they had been placed on the list of substances that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) prohibited.\nThe government prosecuted McFadden under the Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986, which allows substances not listed as \"controlled\" to be treated as illegal if the analogue has effects and a chemical make-up that are \"substantially similar\" to those listed in the CSA. At trial, McFadden argued that the state needed to prove that he was aware, or actively resisted finding out, that the bath salts were substantially similar to a controlled substance and constituted an analogue. Instead, the district court held that the state only needed to prove that the petitioner knew \"the products were intended for human consumption.\" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56146:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56146:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56146:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that, in order to fulfill the intent element, the defendant may either know that the substance in question is a controlled substance without knowing what the substance is, or may know what the substance is but not know that it is controlled. In either scenario, the defendant is aware of all he needs to know to fulfill the knowledge element. A complete and thorough knowledge of the law surrounding controlled substances is not necessary to fulfill the knowledge requirement, and even in a case where the defendant does not know of the Analogue Act, he may be found guilty because ignorance of the law is no excuse.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that knowledge of the identity of the substance fell short of satisfying the knowledge element. In this instance, ignorance of the law could be a defense because the individual could lack knowledge of the legal element: the fact that the substance is controlled.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56146:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56147:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56147:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn February 2010, Charles Harris filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The approved plan instructed Harris to make monthly payments to the trustee Mary Viegelahn for sixty months, as well as monthly payments directly to Chase, which held his mortgage. After the mortgage and secured creditors debts were paid off, the payments would go to Harris' unsecured creditors. In October 2010, Chase moved to lift the automatic stay of Harris' home for his failure to make the mortgage payments, and Harris moved out of his house when the stay was lifted in November 2010. At that point, Viegelahn held the portion of the monthly payments intended to go to Chase. After Harris voluntarily converted his bankruptcy case to Chapter 7, Viegelahn distributed those funds to Harris' creditors. Harris sued for that money and argued that Viegelahn had no authority to disburse funds after conversion of the case. The bankruptcy court issued an order compelling the return of the funds and the district court affirmed. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the undistributed payments that the Chapter 13 trustee holds at the time of the case's conversion to Chapter 7 must be distributed to creditors pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56147:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56147:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56147:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe undistributed funds should be returned to the debtor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy only affects the debtor’s assets from prior to the filing. Assets the debtor acquired after filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, as were the assets in this case, remain the property of the debtor. The Court held that Congress intended to allow a debtor to make a “fresh start” by converting a Chapter 13 bankruptcy to Chapter 7 in good faith, and therefore no penalty should be exacted in the form of requiring the disbursement of assets acquired after the filing date. Therefore, once a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is converted to a Chapter 7 one, unless the conversion is in bad faith, any assets acquired after the filing of the Chapter 13 petition revert back to the debtor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56147:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56148:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56148:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act require that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulate electric utility steam generating units (EGUs) if it finds that such regulation was \"appropriate and necessary\" after conducting a utility study. In December 2000, the EPA issued a notice that such regulation was necessary based on the results of the utility study, which showed that the mercury emissions from EGUs were a threat to public health. In 2005, the EPA reversed its findings and determined that it was not \"appropriate and necessary\" to regulate coal-and oil-fired EGUs. States and other groups petitioned for review, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the EPA's attempt to reverse its findings was unlawful because it could not remove pollutant sources from the regulation list once they were on it. In 2012, the EPA confirmed that EGU regulation was necessary and promulgated emission standards. State, industry, and labor groups petitioned the appellate court for review of the EPA's interpretation of the \"appropriate and necessary\" requirement with respect to these regulations. The appellate court denied the petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56148:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56148:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56148:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that federal administrative agencies must engage in “reasoned decisionmaking,” which requires the agency to consider all relevant factors. Because the cost to power plants is certainly a relevant factor when deciding whether to regulate electric utility steam generating units (EGUs), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), should have considered the cost to power plants in making its decision. The EPA erred in interpreting the “appropriate and necessary” requirement of the Clean Air Act because it was unreasonable to interpret the phrase as not requiring the EPA to consider all relevant factors, including cost to power plants.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that, although precedent established that the courts grant agencies a great deal of deference when agencies interpret statutes that Congress left ambiguous, such deference might result in courts allowing an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.\nJustice Elena Kagan wrote a dissent in which she argued that the EPA’s decision was reasonable because it fully intended to consider the cost-benefit analysis at a later stage in its decisionmaking process and in fact did so. Therefore, the majority opinion essentially finds the EPA’s decision unreasonable because the EPA did not conduct a thorough cost-benefit analysis as the initial step of its decisionmaking. Because it is reasonable for the EPA to decide to consider costs after determining that regulation was “appropriate and necessary,” the courts cannot interfere in the agency’s regulatory decisions. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56148:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56149:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56149:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGroups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56149:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56149:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56149:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56149:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "56149:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56149:Conclusion:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\ncouplesequalprotectionunderthelaw.MarriagerightshavetraditionallybeenaddressedthroughbothpartsoftheFourteenthAmendment,andthesameinterrelatedprinciplesoflibertyandequalityapplywithequalforcetothesecases;therefore,theConstitutionprotectsthefundamentalrightofsame-sexcouplestomarry.TheCourtalsoheldthattheFirstAmendmentprotectstherightsofreligiousorganizationstoadheretotheirprinciples,butitdoesnotallowstatestodenysame-sexcouplestherighttomarryonthesametermsasthoseforopposite-sexcouples.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court’s authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature to determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56149:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "56150:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56150:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn May 2010, Michael Kingsley, who was being held as a pretrial detainee in Monroe County Jail, was ordered to take down a piece of paper covering the light above his cell bed but refused to do so. After Sergeant Stan Hendrickson ordered Kingsley to take down the paper several times and each time was met with refusal, Lieutenant Robert Conroy, the jail administrator, ordered the jail staff to take down the paper and transfer Kingsley to another cell. During the transfer, Kingsley refused to act as ordered, so the officers pulled him to his feet in such a manner that his feet hit the bedframe, which caused pain and made him unable to walk or stand. In the new cell, when Kingsley resisted the officers' attempts to remove the handcuffs, Hendrickson put his knee in Kingsley's back and Kingsley yelled at him. Kingsley also claimed that Hendrickson smashed his head into the concrete bunk. After further verbal exchange, another officer applied a taser to Kingsley's back.\nKingsley sued Hendrickson and other jail staff members and claimed that their actions violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The jury found the defendants not guilty. Kingsley appealed and argued that the jury was wrongly instructed on the standards for judging excessive force and intent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56150:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56150:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56150:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, in a claim regarding whether an officer used excessive force against a pretrial detainee, the plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant thought the force was excessive but that the force was excessive based on an objective standard. Therefore, the court must determine whether, from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time, the use of force in question was excessive. The Court held that the objective standard is in line with existing precedent that holds that the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from excessive force that amounts to punishment, which can be shown through evidence that proves that the force in question was not reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of holding detainees for trial. The objective standard also protects an officer who acts in good faith by taking into account the situation as the officer was aware of it at the time. The Court also noted that the use of force in question must be deliberate in order to give rise to an excessive force claim.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, while the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from conditions that amount to punishment, objectively unreasonable force does not rise to the level of intentional punishment that the Due Process Clause prohibits. Because punitive intent cannot be inferred simply from the fact that an officer used more force than was objectively necessary, simply showing that the force in question was objectively unreasonable does not violate a pretrial detainees rights under the Due Process Clause. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Court should have dismissed this case as improvidently granted because such a case should be examined under Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis before the Court addresses the due process claims brought here.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56150:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56153:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56153:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 29, 2014, Oklahoma executed Clayton Lockett using a three-drug lethal injection procedure. The procedure went poorly; Lockett awoke after the injection of the drugs that were supposed to render him unconscious and did not die until about 40 minutes later. Oklahoma suspended all subsequent executions until the incident could be investigated and subsequently adopted a new protocol that placed a higher emphasis on making sure the injection was done properly. The new protocol also allowed for four alternative drug combinations, one of which used midazolam as the initial drug, as did the protocol used in the Lockett execution.\nCharles Warner and 20 other death row inmates sued various state officials and argued that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Warner and three other plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Oklahoma from moving forward with their executions. A federal district court denied the injunction and held that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence that they would prevail on the merits of their claims and that they had failed to identify a \"known and available\" alternative to the drug in question. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.\nOn January 15, 2015, the Supreme Court declined to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, and Charles Warner was subsequently executed. Richard E. Glossip and the other two death row inmates petitioned the Court again.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56153:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56153:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56153:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that there was insufficient evidence that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol entailed a substantial risk of severe pain, compared to known and available alternatives, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because capital punishment has been held to be constitutional and some risk of pain is inherent in execution, the Eighth Amendment does not require that a constitutional method of execution be free of any risk of pain. Instead, a successful Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claim must identify a reasonable alternative that presents a significantly lower risk of pain, which the petitioners in this case were unable to do. Because the district court is entitled to a high degree of deference in its determination, the petitioners would have to prove that the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous in order for the Court to overturn the ruling. In this case, the medical testimony supports the district court’s determination that the use of midazolam did not create a substantial risk of severe pain, particularly in light of the safeguards the state imposed on the process.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Constitution expressly contemplates the death penalty when it considers the possibility that someone may be “deprived of life,” and therefore capital punishment cannot be unconstitutional. The arguments that it is arbitrary and unreliable, and therefore cruel, deal with the concerns about conviction, not the punishment itself, and are dangers inherent in the jury trial process. The decision of whether to impose the death penalty encompasses the type of moral calculus that should remain in the hands of the jury, as the Constitution provides. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate concurrence in which he argued that the studies cited in support of the arbitrariness of the imposition of the death penalty are themselves unreliable because they require that the moral reasons to execute someone be reduced to a metric by academics who were not present at trial. Justice Scalia joined in the concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56153:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "56153:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56153:Conclusion:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\ntoimposethedeathpenaltyencompassesthetypeofmoralcalculusthatshouldremaininthehandsofthejury,astheConstitutionprovides.JusticeClarenceThomasjoinedintheconcurrence.JusticeThomasalsowroteaseparateconcurrenceinwhichhearguedthatthestudiescitedinsupportofthearbitrarinessoftheimpositionofthedeathpenaltyarethemselvesunreliablebecausetheyrequirethatthemoralreasonstoexecutesomeonebereducedtoametricbyacademicswhowerenotpresentattrial.JusticeScaliajoinedintheconcurringopinion.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that the constitutionality of a punishment must be evaluated based on currently prevailing social and legal standards; therefore, the death penalty is no longer constitutional. Justice Breyer pointed to studies that show that the exoneration rate is disproportionately high with capital crimes, which reflects both cases in which the defendant was actually innocent and cases in which there was procedural error; therefore, the death penalty is not reliably applied to cases in which the defendant has been properly convicted of crimes that society harshly condemns. Additionally, studies have shown that factors other than the egregiousness of the crime—such as the races and genders of the defendant and the victim, the location of the crime, and political pressures—influence the imposition of the death penalty, and such arbitrariness results in the punishment being unconstitutionally cruel. Because the imposition of the death penalty requires additional procedural safeguards, there are often long delays between sentencing and execution, if the execution happens at all, which is cruel in and of itself and also divorces the punishment from its punitive purposes of deterrence and retribution. Justice Breyer also argued that the nation has consistently been moving away from the use of the death penalty, to the point that it is used so rarely as to be considered “unusual” for the purpose of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the district court erred in holding that the use of midazolam did not create a substantial risk of severe pain. Instead, the scientific evidence supports the view that, while midazolam can induce unconsciousness, it is not sufficient to maintain unconsciousness through the effects of the rest of the execution cocktail. Because the petitioners sufficiently demonstrated that the risk of severe pain was substantial and that the state’s safeguards do not appropriately mitigate that risk, the use of midazolam violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Sotomayor also argued that there is no requirement that petitioners for relief under the Eighth Amendment provide a reasonable alternative, because a cruel method of execution does not become constitutional simply due to a lack of alternatives. Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56153:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "56154:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56154:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAbercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie) is a national chain of clothing stores that requires its employees to comply with a \"Look Policy\" that reflects the store's style and forbids black clothing and caps, though the meaning of the term cap is not defined in the policy. If a question arises about the Look Policy during the interview or an applicant requests a deviation, the interviewer is instructed to contact the corporate Human Resources department, which will determine whether or not an accommodation will be granted.\nIn 2008, Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, applied for a position at an Abercrombie store. She wore a headscarf, or hijab, every day, and did so in her interview. Elauf did not mention her headscarf during her interview and did not indicate that she would need an accommodation from the Look Policy. Her interviewer likewise did not mention the headscarf, though she contacted her district manager, who told her to lower Elauf's rating on the appearance section of the application, which lowered her overall score and prevented her from being hired.\nThe Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Abercrombie on Elauf's behalf and claimed that the company had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to hire Elauf because of her headscarf. Abercrombie argued that Elauf had a duty to inform the interviewer that she required an accommodation from the Look Policy and that the headscarf was not the expression of a sincerely held religious belief. The district court granted summary judgment for the EEOC. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and held that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Abercrombie because there is no genuine issue of fact that Elauf did not notify her interviewer that she had a conflict with the Look Policy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56154:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56154:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56154:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, to hold an employer liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an applicant for a position must only show that her need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision not to hire her. The disparate-treatment provision of Title VII does not contain a knowledge requirement but rather forbids certain motives, regardless of the employer’s knowledge about the applicant. If the applicant can show that the employer’s decision not to hire an applicant was based on a desire to avoid having to accommodate a religious practice, then the employer has violated Title VII. The Court also held that Title VII does not demand mere neutrality; instead it creates an affirmative duty to accommodate religious practices.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that, while the applicant has to show that the employer had knowledge of the applicant’s religious practice, the applicant does not have a duty to notify the employer. Justice Alito argued that the statutory language would not make sense without any knowledge requirement because such a reading would allow an employer to be held liable without fault.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the application of a neutral policy cannot constitute intentional discrimination that violates Title VII. Although the strict application of the employer’s policy may have disproportionately affected those who wear headscarves for religious reasons, the policy still treated all potential applicants in the same manner, and therefore an applicant who was denied a position because of her religious headscarf did not suffer from disparate treatment. Additionally, Title VII disparate-treatment precedent does not hold that a failure to accommodate is intentional discrimination. Justice Thomas also argued that the statutory language should be construed narrowly so as to only punish employers who act with a discriminatory motive.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56154:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56172:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56172:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during-- political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill sometimes referred to as BCRA). Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted (\"soft money\") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of \"issue ads\" or \"coordinated expenditures\").\nThe campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56172:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56172:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56172:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWith a few exceptions, the Court answered \"no\" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision written by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens. Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls, not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing \"both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and... the appearance of corruption\" that might result from those contributions.\nIn response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions), the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that \"money, like water, will always find an outlet\" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits.\nThe Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections.\n[In total, the Court addressed 21 sections of federal law. We have distilled these disparate components into 12 separate votes which we detail at the end of this document.]", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56172:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56176:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56176:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTimothy Lee Hurst was charged and convicted of first-degree murder for killing his co-worker, Cynthia Harrison, during a robbery of the Popeye’s restaurant where they both worked. He was sentenced to death and appealed. On appeal, Hurst was granted a new sentencing trial because the Supreme Court of Florida found that his counsel should have investigated and presented evidence of Hurst’s borderline intelligence and possible organic brain damage. At his new sentencing trial, Hurst was prevented from presenting mental retardation evidence as an absolute bar to the imposition of the death penalty, though he was allowed to present it as mitigating evidence. The jury again sentenced Hurst to the death penalty by a vote of seven to five, and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.\nIn 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Ring v. Arizona, in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment required that the presence of aggravating factors, which Arizona’s death penalty sentencing scheme viewed as essentially elements of a larger offense, be determined by the jury. The Supreme Court of Florida had previously held that the decision in Ring v. Arizona did not apply to Florida’s death penalty sentencing scheme generally and specifically did not require that a jury’s recommendation of the death penalty be unanimous or that a jury determine the factual issue of a defendant’s potential mental retardation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56176:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56176:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56176:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nFlorida’s death sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each element necessary to impose the death sentence. Although the Florida sentencing scheme required that the jury recommend a death sentence in order to impose the death penalty, the judge was only required to take the jury recommendation under consideration. Because the Supreme Court held in Ring v. Arizona that the Sixth Amendment required that a jury make all the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty, the Florida sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment in the same way the Arizona one did in Ring. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the Eighth Amendment required jury sentencing in capital cases.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that that the Sixth Amendment did not require that a jury make the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the death penalty. The Florida sentencing scheme is different from the one the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona because in the Arizona scheme the jury did not make any recommendation about the death penalty at all. Although the judge could choose not to follow the jury’s recommendation, no Florida court has done so for more than 15 years. Justice Alito also argues that, if there was error, the error was harmless in this case because the jury recommended that Hurst be sentenced to death.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56176:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56177:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56177:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1963, Henry Montgomery was found guilty and received the death penalty for the murder of Charles Hunt, which Montgomery committed less than two weeks after he turned 17. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and his conviction was overturned because of community prejudice. At his new trial, Montgomery was again convicted, but he was sentenced to life without parole.\nIn 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, in which the Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes requiring children convicted of homicide to be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole violate the Eighth Amendment. In light of that decision, Montgomery filed a motion in state district court to correct what he argued was now an illegal sentence. The trial court denied Montgomery’s motion, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Montgomery’s application by holding that the decision in Miller does not apply retroactively.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56177:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56177:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56177:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits sentencing schemes that impose a punishment of mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide, applied retroactively. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, when the Court establishes a substantive constitutional rule, that rule must apply retroactively because such a rule provides for constitutional rights that go beyond procedural guarantees. When a state court fails to give effect to a substantive rule, that decision is reviewable because failure to apply a substantive rule always results in the violation of a constitutional right, while failure to apply a procedural rule might or might not result in an illegitimate verdict. The Court held that Miller established a substantive rule because it prohibited the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders. The Court’s analysis in that case was based on precedent that established that the Constitution treats children as different from adults for the purposes of sentencing. Therefore, the rule the Court announced in Miller made life without parole an unconstitutional punishment for a class of defendants based on their status as juveniles, and such a rule is substantive rather than procedural.\nIn his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Court did not have jurisdiction to decide this case. Because Supreme Court precedent treated cases on collateral review from state court decisions differently from those on direct review from federal courts, the principle of finality of decisions dictates that whether new constitutional rule will be applied to a final state court conviction is entirely a matter of state choice. Therefore, a state court need only apply the constitutional rule that existed at the time of the conviction, and the Court does not have the jurisdiction to review that decision. Justice Scalia argued that the precedent the majority relied on for its conclusion was not binding and did not directly apply to the case at hand. Additionally, the language of Miller itself stated that it did not create a substantive rule but instead established a process that required courts to consider a juvenile offender’s age before imposing a particular penalty. Crucially, Miller still allowed for the imposition of life without parole on a juvenile offender if the crime(s) in question reflect “permanent incorrigibility.” Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to decide this case. The question of whether a constitutional right is retroactive asks whether there is an appropriate remedy, not whether the right was violated in the first place. Because the Supreme Court cannot force state courts to apply constitutional rules that did not exist at the time of the conviction, there is no constitutional mechanism to provide a remedy that would make the constitutional right in question apply retroactively.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56177:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56178:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56178:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn September 7, 2008, Amy Imburgia filed a class action lawsuit against DIRECTV, Inc. (DIRECTV), and argued that DIRECTV had improperly charged early termination fees to its customers. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, in which the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California precedent that had previously held that, in certain circumstances, arbitration clauses in customer agreements were unenforceable. Less than one month after that decision, DIRECTV moved to stay or dismiss the plaintiffs’ case and compel arbitration, which DIRECTV argued it had not done previously because it thought the arbitration clause in its customer agreement was void under California precedent. The trial court denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed by holding that the language of the customer agreement subjected the arbitration clause to state law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56178:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56178:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56178:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law, so the court has to enforce the arbitration agreement. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that requiring contract enforcement under California state law that the Supreme Court had held was invalid under AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion would conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act. Absent any indication that the language of the contract is meant to refer to invalid state law, it should be construed as only referring to valid state law, which is consistent with California state law. The Court also noted that there was no indication that a California court would apply state law that has been held to be invalid because it conflicts with federal law to any other context. Even in the canon of cases that determine that ambiguous language in a contract should be construed against the party that drafted the language, there is no case that goes so far as to apply invalid state law.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply to state courts and therefore did not require the court to order arbitration in this case. In her separate dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the provision should be construed against the drafting party so as to give the consumer the ability to pursue class-based litigation. Because the relevant question should be whether both parties agreed to be bound by relevant state law as framed by the state legislature without considering the preemptive effect of federal law, the California state court’s decision should control this case. Although the Federal Arbitration Act contains a presumption in favor of arbitration, the presumption only applies when the express agreement to arbitrate was validly formed, which is not the case when consumers lack bargaining power in the creation of such contracts. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56178:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56180:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56180:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn late 2008, Robert Montanile was involved in a car accident that resulted in significant injuries. Montanile was covered by an employee welfare benefit plan administered by the Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industrial Health Benefit Plan (Plan). After Montanile’s accident, the Plan dispersed over $120,000 to cover Montanile’s medical expenses. Montanile later sued the driver of the other car involved in the accident, eventually obtaining a $500,000 settlement. Per its terms, the Plan then requested that Montanile reimburse the initial $120,000 disbursement. When Montanile and the Plan were unable to reach an agreement, the Plan sued Montanile.\nThe Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which allows plan administrators to recover overpayment from a beneficiary when the recovery would constitute “appropriate equitable relief”. The trial court held that the terms of the Plan required Montanile to repay the initial $120,000, and that this repayment was appropriate equitable relief in part because the Plan was able to identify a source of funds within Montanile’s possession—the $500,000 settlement. Montanile appealed and claimed that the repayment would not be equitable relief because the settlement had been spent or disbursed to other parties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that, because the Plan had a right to reimbursement, the Plan’s lien against Montanile’s $500,000 settlement attached before Montanile spent or disbursed the funds. Therefore, Montanile could not evade the repayment by claiming the settlement funds had been spent or disbursed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56180:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56180:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56180:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIf a third party asset has been wholly disbursed on non-traceable items (such as services), ERISA does not allow for a suit to recover reimbursement of that asset. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that, while the Plan had a claim under ERISA to the settlement fund when it was in Montanile’s possession, the claim does not extend beyond the dissipation of the fund in question. When the fund is completely dissipated on non-traceable items, such as services, there is no fund to which the Plan would have a claim, and the Board may not then seek to attach the claim to the plan-beneficiary’s general assets. The Court also held that its precedent on “appropriate equitable relief” does not dictate a different result.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that allowing a plan-beneficiary to escape his reimbursement obligation by disbursing his settlement fund on non-traceable items would undo nearly forty years of Supreme Court precedent regarding “appropriate equitable relief.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56180:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56181:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "56181:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn December 2000, brothers Jonathan and Reginald Carr committed a series of crimes in Wichita, Kansas, known as “The Wichita Massacre,” which included assault, robbery, rape, and the murder of five people. The Carrs were prosecuted jointly. They moved to sever their cases and argued that being tried jointly would be prejudicial because they intended to mount antagonistic defenses and introduce evidence that would be admissible or non-prejudicial only in separate trials. The trial judge denied the motion, and the Carrs were later jointly convicted on numerous counts and sentenced to death. The jury instructions at the sentencing trial did not state that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\nOn appeal, the Carrs argued that their Eighth Amendment rights to individualized sentencing were violated both by the trial judge’s refusal to sever their cases and the failure to affirmatively instruct the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed the death sentences by holding that the trial judge failed to do the necessary analysis and carefully consider the severance issue. The court also held that the jurors may have been prevented from giving meaningful effect to mitigating evidence because they were not instructed that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIn the consolidated case, Kansas v. Gleason, Gleason was convicted of capital murder for the killings of several people in connection with a robbery. He was also convicted of pre-meditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm. The jury sentenced Gleason to death for the capital murder charge and a consecutive sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years for the other charges. Gleason appealed his convictions, and the Kansas Supreme Court vacated his conviction of life imprisonment because it was multiplicitous with his death sentence and vacated his death sentence because the jury was not properly instructed on how to consider mitigating circumstances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "56181:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "56181:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "56181:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Eighth Amendment does not require that a jury be affirmatively instructed that mitigating circumstances do not need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, nor does the Eighth Amendment require that the sentencing phase of a joint trial be severed. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that death penalty case law does not require a court to give the jury express instructions on how to consider mitigating evidence, and no reasonable juror would have understood the instructions as requiring that defense counsel prove the existence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also held that the Eighth Amendment does not govern procedural issues, such as the claim that each defendant was prejudiced by evidence relating to the other during the joint sentencing phase at issue. Instead, such claims are governed by the Due Process Clause. Moreover, in this case, there is no evidence that the jury was impermissibly prejudiced by the presentation of evidence during a joint sentencing phase for both defendants.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the Kansas state courts had not violated any federal constitutional right, and therefore there was no reason for the Supreme Court to intervene. Because this case turns on a question about a state sentencing scheme, it is unlikely to apply to other states. By granting certiorari in such a case and determining that no constitutional right was violated, as the majority did in this case, the Court creates a risk that such decisions will discourage states from adopting additional procedural protections via state law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "56181:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59176:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59176:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Thompson suffered a head injury aboard the SS. Rosina Marron after an attack by a fellow crewmember. After several months of recuperation, Thompson signed an agreement releasing Costal Oil Company from liability in exchange for $4000. Later, Thompson discovered the damage from his injury was much more extensive than originally thought. Thomson sued to recover damages from his injury. The district court upheld the release, noting that Thompson adamantly refused to consult an attorney, although he had many opportunities to do so, and freely entered into the agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59176:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59176:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59176:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit opinion. Justice John M. Harlan concurred, but would have remanded the case to determine whether the vessel was unseaworthy. Justice Stanley Reed, Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice Harold Burton, and Justice Sherman Minton dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59176:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59177:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59177:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNelson, a member of the Communist Party, was convicted of violating the Pennsylvania Sedition Act. This Act was implemented prior to Congress's adoption of the Smith Act of 1940 (amended in 1948) which prohibited the same conduct as Pennsylvania's law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59177:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59177:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59177:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that Pennsylvania's law was unenforceable and was superseded by the federal act. Chief Justice Warren argued that the scheme of federal regulation of seditious activities was \"pervasive\" and \"left no room for the states to supplement it.\" Furthermore, the federal act dealt with an issue of primary importance to the national government which made any enforcement of similar state laws potentially harmful to the smooth execution of national statutes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59177:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59203:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59203:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York City municipal charter provision §903 required discharge of any municipal employee who invokes the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in a legally authorized inquiry into that employee’s official conduct. Harry Slochower, a tenured professor at Brooklyn College, invoked this privilege in a congressional committee investigation into his past Communist Party membership. Despite his tenured status, which required notice and a hearing before termination, the city terminated him immediately. The state trial court dismissed a motion to review the discharge and the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59203:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59203:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59203:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Tom C. Clark, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that dismissal of the review motion was improper. §903 is unconstitutional as applied in this case because it denies due process of law. The Court emphasized that invoking the Fifth Amendment does not amount to an admission of guilt. Justices Hugo L. Black and William O. Douglas concurred, writing that they also adhered to the views in their dissents in Garner v. Board of Public Works, Adler v. Board of Education, and their concurrence in Weiman v. Updegraff\nJustice Stanley Reed dissented, expressing that New York City had a reasonable ground to require employees to give information about their official conduct or give up their positions. Justices Sherman Minton and Harold Burton joined in the dissent. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a separate dissent, stating that no Due Process violation occurred in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59203:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59241:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59241:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Food and Drug Administration (\"FDA\") fired Kendrick Cole when it determined that his employment was not \"clearly consistent with the interests of national security.\" Mr. Cole was a food and drug inspector and a \"preference-eligible veteran,\" but was charged with having \"a close association with individuals reliably reported to be Communists.\" Mr. Cole appealed his discharge to the Civil Service Commission, which denied his appeal, finding that the Veterans' Preference Act did not afford Mr. Cole a right of appeal under the circumstances. Mr. Cole brought an action seeking declaratory judgment in the District of Columbia federal district court alleging that his discharge was invalid and that the Civil Service Commission improperly denied his appeal. The district court dismissed the case and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59241:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59241:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59241:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, holding that the discharge of an employee without determination that his position was one in which he could adversely affect national security was unauthorized by the Veterans' Preference Act. With Justice John Marshall Harlan II writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the Act's use of \"national security\" only relates to the nation's safety, and not the general welfare. Moreover, there was no determination that Mr. Cole's position within the FDA affected national security as the term is used in the Act. Therefore, the Court concluded, Mr. Cole's discharge was invalid.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59241:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59267:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59267:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMrs. Covert killed her husband on an airbase in England. Pursuant to a “status-of-forces” executive agreement with England, she was tried and convicted by US court-martial without a jury trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). She petitioned a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the conviction violated her Fifth & Sixth Amendment rights to be tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59267:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59267:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59267:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nU.S. citizen civilians outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States cannot be tried by U.S. military tribunal, but instead retain the protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution.\nIn a decision authored by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that U.S. citizen civilians abroad have the right to Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment constitutional protections. The Court agreed with the petitioners, concluding that as United States citizens they were entitled to the protections of the Bill of Rights, notwithstanding that they committed crimes on foreign soil. Justice Black declared: \"The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our government.\"\nWhile a majority of the Court agreed with the ultimate result, they did so for different reasons. Concurring in the decision, Justice Felix Frankfurter rejected the idea that the Necessary and Proper Clause could prevent Congress from mandating the court martial of civilians in all cases. He opposed what he termed a \"recourse to the literal words\" of the Constitution. Merely to hold that Mrs. Covert could not stand trial before a military tribunal since she was not a member of the armed forces signified too narrow a review. In his opinion, that determination required the Court to assess the Constitution in its entirety and not simply the single provision granting Congress the power to regulate the nation's land and naval forces. He advocated a balancing test that would require a court to weigh \"all the factors involved...in order to decide whether [military dependents] are so closely related to what Congress may allowably deem essential for the effective...regulation of the land and naval forces that they may be subjected to court-martial jurisdiction in...capital cases, when the consequence is loss of [their constitutional] protections.\"\nAlso concurring in the judgment, Justice John Marshall Harlan II essentially agreed with Frankfurter. Accordingly, he saw the determination as \"analogous to issues of due process.\" Having first determined that military dependents overseas bear a rational connection to the armed forces such that they could be validly subjected to court martial, he then asserted that the analysis turned on a question of what process was due a military dependent under the \"particular circumstances of a particular case.\" While capital cases such as this one certainly necessitated a full Article III trial, most petty offenses committed by military dependents almost certainly would not. He thus advocated a case-by-case approach, rejecting the sweeping conclusion set forth by the plurality. Since Harlan had originally voted with the majority in the initial decision of this case, his concurrence on rehearing was narrow but significant. Perhaps as a consequence of his earlier vote in the previous term, his opinion on rehearing was considerably less at odds with the arguments set forth in the dissent written by Justice Tom C. Clark and joined by Justice Harold Burton.\nIn that staunch dissent, Clark gave substantial weight to historical practice. He asserted that the \"military has always exercised jurisdiction by court-martial over civilians accompanying armies in time of war,\" and that for explicit reasons of policy concerning military morale and discipline, none of the Court's relevant precedents had ever questioned that authority. He pointed out several troublesome and practical consequences of the Court's holding. Not least among these were the vast distances between the United States and its various military instillations around the world. By setting forth an overly broad standard, the plurality, argued Clark, had opened the door to a myriad of petty offenses to be tried in the federal court system, thus incurring needless cost, delay, and disruption.\nJustice Charles Whitaker took no part in the decision.\nHistorical Note", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59267:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "59267:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59267:Conclusion:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\neverquestionedthatauthority.HepointedoutseveraltroublesomeandpracticalconsequencesoftheCourt'sholding.NotleastamongthesewerethevastdistancesbetweentheUnitedStatesanditsvariousmilitaryinstillationsaroundtheworld.Bysettingforthanoverlybroadstandard,theplurality,arguedClark,hadopenedthedoortoamyriadofpettyoffensestobetriedinthefederalcourtsystem,thusincurringneedlesscost,delay,anddisruption.JusticeCharlesWhitakertooknopartinthedecision.HistoricalNote\nReid v. Covert has the distinction of being the only case in the history of the Supreme Court in which the Court reversed itself on rehearing. In successfully persuading the Court to do so, Mrs. Covert's lawyer, Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener, secured for himself a seat among the giants of the legal profession. A seasoned veteran of Supreme Court litigation, Colonel Wiener considered his triumph in Reid v. Covert to be among his greatest professional accomplishments. His oral argument in the case has attained legendary status and remains a preeminent exemplar in the art of persuasion and appellate advocacy.\nMatthew Lognion contributed this abstract.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59267:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "59280:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59280:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJudson Griffin and James Crenshaw were indicted for armed robbery in Cook County, Illinois. Following their conviction, in preparation for filling for an appeal, Griffin and Crenshaw requested a transcript of their trial proceedings without cost, on the basis that they could not afford the standard fee for the transcript. The lower court dismissed the petition without hearing evidence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59280:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59280:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59280:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court reasoned that there is \"no meaningful distinction\" between denying indigent defendants the right to appeal and denying them a trial. Because Illinois conceded that Griffin and Crenshaw could not file for appeal without a transcript, the Court found that their rights to due process and equal protection had been denied.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59280:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59307:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59307:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Oklahoma law prohibited persons who were not licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists to fit lenses for eyeglasses. Non-licensed individuals were also prohibited from duplicating optical instruments without written prescriptions from licensed ophthalmologists. The Lee Optical Company challenged the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59307:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59307:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59307:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision authored by William Orville Douglas, the Court held that while the law may have been \"needless\" and \"wasteful,\" it was the duty of the legislature, not the courts, \"to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.\" That is, Courts should not be able to invalidate state economic regulations on the grounds that they disagree with the theories supporting them. Even if the state law imposes burdens or waste, the legislature has the sole authority over weighing its benefits against its costs. In sum, the opticians could not prove that the law had no rational relationship to legitimate state objectives.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59307:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59326:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59326:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter its decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I), which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced constitutional principle. The cases stemmed from many different regions of the United States with distinctive conditions and problems.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59326:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59326:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59326:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Brown I decision shall be implemented \"with all deliberate speed.\"\nThe Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were ordered to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them \"with all deliberate speed.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59326:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59345:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59345:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York state law authorized the legal counsel for a municipality to seek an injunction against and the destruction of material deemed by the courts to be obscene. Peter Campbell Brown, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, sought such an injunction against several bookstores. The process of review that followed was a civil, rather than criminal procedure, and the courts ultimately granted the injunction and sought to destroy the obscene material.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59345:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59345:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59345:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5–4 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court concluded that the civil procedure complied with the requirements of due process. Justice Frankfurter noted that the procedural safeguards were not significantly different from many state criminal misdemeanor procedures, nor were the penalties any more severe. The opinion also reaffirmed the existing notion that the constitutional protection of speech does not extend to obscene material.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59345:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59359:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59359:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn H. Griffin’s book The Devil Rides Outside traces the spiritual development of an unnamed American musician as he vacillates between choosing a life in a Benedictine monastery and the lustfulness of the outside world. When Alfred Butler, the Detroit district sales manager of Pocket Books, sold a copy of the book to a police officer, he was arrested and charged with violating a Michigan obscenity statute. At trial, the judge held that the book contained obscene language that could lead to the corruption of minors and that the passages in question lacked redeeming literary value. Butler was convicted and fined $100. Butler appealed and argued that the statute violated his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied Butler’s application for leave to appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59359:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59359:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59359:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Felix Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Michigan statute unduly restricted the freedom of speech because it took only a single trial judge’s determination that the material could potentially corrupt minors to prohibit its dissemination. The Court noted that, although the State may attempt to protect juvenile innocence as part of its power to promote general welfare, the restrictions should be reasonably related to the evils of obscene material.\nJustice Hugo L. Black concurred without writing a separate opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59359:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59366:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59366:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNot Available.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59366:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59366:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59366:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNot Available.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59366:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59374:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59374:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nClinton Jencks, a union leader, was charged with falsely filing an Affidavit of Non-Communist Union Officer with the National Labor Relations Board. Two undercover informants for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified against Jencks, and reported that he had been seen at Communist Party events and working with Communist Party members. The evidence provided against Jencks was entirely circumstantial, and the prosecution's evidence rested largely on the testimonies and reports of the undercover informants. Jencks requested the testimony of the informants to review their credibility and admissibility in court. The trial court denied his request without stating the reasons, and Jencks was found guilty on two counts of communist activity and sentenced to five years imprisonment for each offense. Jencks appealed the lower court's decision on the grounds that the informants' reports should have been provided for review to determine their use in the trial and on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed on the definitions of political party membership. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59374:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59374:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59374:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the government's reports should have been produced for review for their admission in court. A concern for national security must be weighed against prosecuting criminal action if the criminal action prosecution relies on documents that, if released, would threaten national security. Based on this weighing test, the documents should have been provided for review of admissibility in a new trial. Criminal action must be dismissed if the government refuses to release information as a matter of national security.\nJustice Harold Burton wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed that the accused had the right to review the documents as evidence against him but argued that the disclosure of the documents should not guarantee a new trial. Rather, the documents should be reviewed and, if found to contain information that discredited the FBI informants’ testimony, then there should be a new trial. However, in this case Justice Burton agreed there should be a new trial on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed on the requirements of membership to a political party. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Tom C. Clark dissented and argued that, if information containing national secrets and issues of national security were available for the accused in criminal prosecutions, then national security would be greatly compromised. Justice Clark also wrote that the jury was properly instructed on the definition of membership to a political party.\nJustice Charles E. Whittaker did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59374:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59380:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59380:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn December 1938, Thomas Leiter conveyed approximately 8,711 acres of land in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana to the United States. The deed contained a mineral reservation under which Leiter retained the right to mine and remove all valuable minerals until April 1, 1945. The deed allowed for the extension of this reservation for an additional five years so long as operations were conducted profitably during the previous five years for an average of fifty days a year. If at the end of the original term or an additional extended term the operation had not carried on for fifty days a year, Leiter’s right to mine would terminate, and complete title would become vested in the United States. No mineral operations were conducted on the land in question during the original term.\nOn March 1, 1949, the United States conveyed the operating rights under lease to Frank J. and Albert Lobrano, who then conveyed those rights to The California Company. The California Company drilled and completed eighty wells, producing $3,500,000 in royalties for the United States. Leiter Minerals, Inc. then filed an action in state court against Allen L. Lobrano and The California Company based on a Louisiana law allegedly making a reservation of mineral rights to the United States “imprescriptible”. The United States was not a party to the suit. Leiter Minerals claimed that it was the fee simple owner of all the oil, gas and mineral rights in or on the land acquired by the United States from Thomas Leiter.\nThe United States then brought an action in district court; it sought to quiet Leiter Minerals’ title and rights and to enjoin Leiter Minerals from further asserting any claims in state court. The United States argued in part that irreparable injury in the form of lost royalties would result from any dispossession to its lessees. The district court granted the injunction, holding that the action could only be tried in federal court because the United States was not a party to the state court action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59380:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59380:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59380:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court held that the district court properly granted the injunction. Justice Frankfurter first looked to federal law, which specified that a court of the United States may not enjoin state court proceedings except 1) as expressly authorized by congress, 2) to aid its jurisdiction, or 3) to protect or effectuate its judgments. He also looked to the Court’s past interpretations of the Norris-La Guardia Act, where it determined that statutes generally divesting persons of pre-existing rights and privileges only divest the United States of those rights and privileges when there are expressed words to that effect.\nJustice Frankfurter then turned to the purpose behind the restriction of the federal courts’ injunction power, arguing that the interest in restricting this power was strongest when the state court litigation was between private parties. Here, in contrast, the United States was arguably attempting to prevent injury to the national interest. Justice Frankfurter also emphasized that the United States was not a party to the state court action, and that the United States’ position in its claim was essentially defensive. The Court remanded the case to the state court, directing it to interpret and apply the Louisiana statute in question.\nJustice William Douglas dissented in part, questioning the majority’s decision to remand the case to Louisiana state court. He argued that Congress tasked the federal courts with deciding mixed questions of state and federal law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59380:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59382:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59382:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1954, John Watkins, a labor organizer, was called upon to testify in hearings conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Watkins agreed to describe his alleged connections with the Communist Party and to identify current members of the Party. Watkins refused to give information concerning individuals who had left the Communist Party. Watkins argued that such questions were beyond the authority of the Committee.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59382:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59382:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59382:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that the activities of the House Committee were beyond the scope of congressional power. The Court held that both the authorizing resolution of the Committee and the specific statements made by the Committee to Watkins failed to limit the Committee's power. The Court found that because Watkins had not been given sufficient information describing the pertinency of the questions to the subjects under inquiry, he had not been accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment thus invalidated Watkins' conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59382:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59428:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59428:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn February 1, 1951, Virgil Herdman, a train conductor, was in charge of a freight train traveling from Indiana to Ohio. While passing through Dayton, Ohio, the train braked abruptly to avoid hitting a car stopped on a railroad crossing. Herdman fell and was injured as the train came to a stop.\nHerdman sued the railroad company for negligence and claimed that the company was responsible for his fall under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Courts typically apply this doctrine when negligence can be inferred, without actual direct evidence, from the very nature of the accident. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the railroad on the basis that Herdman did not provide enough facts to support his negligence claim, even under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Herdman appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59428:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59428:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59428:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 decision by Justice William J. Brennan, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. To effectively present a negligence claim under res ipsa loquitur Herdman should have shown that sudden stops, like the one that caused his injury, are unusual or extraordinary. Herdman failed to present any such evidence. Justice Felix Frankfurter dissented, stating that the Court should not grant certiorari just to reevaluate the facts of certain cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59428:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59431:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59431:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 52.39, no convicted felon could stay in the city for more than five days without registering. Lambert, a convicted felon, stayed in Los Angeles for seven years without registering and was convicted of violating the ordinance. On appeal, she argued that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required the ordinance to include some mental state element, and she was not aware of it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59431:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59431:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59431:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-4 opinion written by Justice William Douglas, the Court held that the prosecution would need to provide circumstantial evidence showing that the defendant should have been aware of the possibility that registration was required. The Court reasoned that due process requires notice unless the defendant has actual knowledge of the ordinance that has been violated. As there was no circumstantial evidence showing Lambert should have been aware of the ordinance, the Court concluded her due process rights were violated. The Court further held that because the ordinance that forced convicted felons to register was not accompanied by any action, nor were there circumstances that would lead a felon to be aware of his or her duty to register, the ordinance was unconstitutional.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter dissented, joined by Justices Harlan and Whittaker, arguing that mistake of law is usually not a defense to a crime. For example, a person may be convicted of drug possession even if he or she did not know that the particular substance was illegal.\nJustice Harold Burton also dissented in a separate opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59431:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59437:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59437:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBeginning on October 23, 1950, Lion Oil Company and Oil Workers International Union CIO entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing in detail the wages, hours and conditions for employees of the company. The agreement provided the means to amend its terms: Either party must notify the other in writing of its desire to amend the agreement, after which the company and the union should attempt to agree on the desired amendments. If no agreement was reached within sixty days, either party may terminate the agreement.\nOn August 24, 1951, the union transmitted a letter to the company notifying the company of its desire to modify the agreement. Representatives of the company and the union first met on August 29, 1951 to discuss the proposed amendments. The two groups held 37 more meetings between that date and April 30, 1952, but no agreement was reached. On April 30, employees of the company went on strike, demanding wage increases and other benefits. Neither the company nor the union notified the other that it intended to terminate the contract. On June 21, 1952, the union offered to return all striking employees to work unconditionally, but the company refused this offer.\nThe company distributed a letter to the union explaining that there would be no reinstatement of workers unless the employees agreed to work for a period of at least one year without work stoppage. After June 21, the company interviewed individual employees and rehired only those who assured the company that they would continue to work daily throughout the strike. On August 3, 1952, a new agreement was executed between the company and the union; employees were reinstated the next day.\nThe National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provided that where there is a collective bargaining contract, employees may not go on strike until sixty days after either party provides written notice of its intent to terminate or modify the contract or until the contract expires, whichever occurs later. Employees who go on strike before this point lose the protection of the NLRA.\nDuring the negotiations for the new agreement, the union filed a charge of unfair labor practices against the company with the National Labor Relations Board, based on the company’s response to the employees’ offer to return to work. The five member Board held in a split decision that the company was guilty of unfair labor practices under the NLRA, rejecting the company’s defense that the strikers lost the protection of the act because the contract was still in effect. The company appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which set aside the Board’s ruling. The Eighth Circuit held that a strike would violate the terms of the contract until the contract expired or was cancelled in the manner provided for in the NLRA. As the contract had not expired when the employees went on strike, those employees violated the terms of the NLRA and lost its protection.\nWhile the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Lion Oil Company was merged into Monsanto Chemical Company. By order of the Court, Monsanto was made a party in the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59437:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59437:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59437:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the union did not violate the terms of the National Labor Relations Act by going on strike. Chief Justice Warren rejected the Eighth Circuit’s narrower, more literal interpretation of the Act. He looked to the legislative history of the NLRA and concluded that while Congress recognized a duty to bargain over modifications when the contract itself contemplates such bargaining, it would make little sense to deprive unions’ of the threat of strike, a force depended upon to facilitate settlements with companies.\nChief Justice Warren investigated the relevant language of the NLRA, determining that Congress intended “expiration date” to encompass both notice of a party’s desire to terminate or modify the contract and the date when the contract would normally expire. Hence, the union was not obligated to wait to strike until the contract’s actual expiration date. This conclusion was based in part on the Court’s ruling in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board. There, the Court recognized a dual purpose in the Act: to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare and to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted activities -- like strikes -- for their own benefit. Otherwise, the Chief Justice argued, unions would be wary of entering into long-term contracts at all. Chief Justice Warren thus concluded that the notice and waiting requirements of the Act were fully satisfied, as the strike did not occur until long after the union delivered notice of proposed amendments to the company.\nChief Justice Warren also rejected the company’s contention that the strike was a breach of contract, holding that where a contract does not contain an express waiver of the right to strike, that waiver cannot be inferred.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter concurred in part and dissented in part, taking issue only with the majority’s breach of contract ruling. He noted that the Eighth Circuit did not reach that issue because of its decision to set aside the Board’s ruling, and that the Board did not raise the issue on appeal.\nJustice John Harlan also concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority’s construction of the Act, but took issue with the majority’s ruling on the unfair labor practice charge. He also noted that the issue was not taken up by the Eighth Circuit, and strongly objected to the Court ruling on issues not decided by lower courts.\nJustice William Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59437:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59438:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59438:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles Rowoldt, a German citizen living in the United States, received an order of deportation under the Internal Security Act of 1950 because of his membership in the Communist Party. Rowoldt admitted to joining the Party for about a year and working at a Communist bookstore. However, he contended that he should not be deported because he joined the Party to \"fight for his daily needs\" and get \"something to eat and something to crawl into.\" The Internal Security Act contained an exception for those who joined the Party to obtain food, employment, or other necessities of living. Rowolt also indicated that he was not aware that anyone in the Party supported violent overthrow of the government. Rowoldt sought a writ of habeas corpus from the District Court for the District of Minnesota, but his writ was denied because there was enough evidence to support his membership in the Party. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59438:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59438:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59438:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, Felix Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the court, holding that Rowoldt did not have a \"meaningful relationship\" with the Communist Party as required by the Internal Security Act. The record was insufficient to support the order of deportation and the Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision. Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented stating that he believed the record indicated that Rowoldt joined the Party knowing of its active political nature, regardless of whether he believed in violent overthrow of the government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59438:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59441:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59441:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFederal criminal information was filed in district court against Ludenia Howard, representing Stokes Fish Company, for violating the Federal Black Bass Act. The Act forbids any person to transport black bass or other fish across state lines if doing so is prohibited by the laws of the state. In Florida, such issues are governed by the regulations of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. The district court held that the regulations were not “laws” of Florida under the meaning of the Black Bass Act and quashed the information. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59441:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59441:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59441:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Stanley Reed delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that precedent has established that rulings of state administrative agencies should be considered laws of the state. In the case of fish and game legislation, the majority of state legislatures vest regulatory authority in commissions. The Court held that the congressional intent behind the Black Bass Act was to enforce the fishing regulations of individual states regardless of whether those regulations came from commissions or state legislatures.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59441:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59442:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59442:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAndrew Mallory was arrested by federal officers on charges of rape. Upon arresting Mallory, the officers questioned him until he confessed roughly seven hours later. After the confession, the police officers sought to reach a United States Commissioner for the purpose of arraigning Mallory.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59442:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59442:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59442:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that the arraignment of Mallory was not accomplished \"without unnecessary delay,\" violating the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court noted that Mallory was not told of his rights to counsel or to a preliminary examination before a magistrate, nor of his right to remain silent. \"Not until he had confessed, when any judicial caution had lost its purpose, did the police arraign him.\" The Court held that it was not the function of the police to arrest people at large and interrogate them at police headquarters in order to determine whom they should charge before approaching a commissioner.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59442:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59443:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59443:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 24, 1953 in Selma, Alabama, an intruder broke into the apartment of the daughter of the city mayor. The daughter and the intruder struggled through several rooms until she was able to seize his knife, and he fled. The assailant had a towel over his head, so the victim could not identify the defendant during the trial. The police apprehended William Earl Fikes on the basis of a call from a private citizen and held him “on an open charge of investigation.” The police questioned Fikes for hours, placed him in jail, and limited his access to anyone familiar. After nearly a week of this treatment, Fikes confessed in the form of answers to the interrogator’s leading questions. Five days later, Fikes confessed under questioning a second time. When these confessions were admitted into the trial as evidence, Fikes did not testify regarding the events surrounding his interrogation because the judge had ruled he would be subjected to unlimited cross-examination. The jury convicted Fikes and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59443:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59443:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59443:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the circumstances surrounding Fikes’ confession were coercive and unduly influenced him. Because the confessions were gained through coercion, their use in trial constituted a denial of due process.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that mental and emotional coercion achieve the same result as physical coercion and should be considered equally detrimental to the interests of justice. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the questioning that led to the confessions was not definitively coercive. He also argued that, without evidence that shows the questioning was unconstitutional, the majority opinion overstepped the Court’s bounds by reversing the decision. Justice Stanley Reed and Justice Harold Burton joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59443:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59447:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59447:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) required union officers to file non-communist affidavits to gain the protections of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRA also made filing a false affidavit a crime. The NLRB found that an officer of the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelt workers had filed a false affidavit. The NLRB issued a decompliance order ceasing all protections. The union sued to enjoin the order. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59447:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59447:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59447:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the criminal penalty imposed by NLRA is the only valid remedy for filing false affidavits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59447:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59448:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59448:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice arrested Leon Carroll and Daniel Stewart on warrants for violating local lottery laws and conspiring to run a lottery. Each filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence found at the time of arrest. The district court granted the motions, citing a lack of probable cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the order for suppression of evidence was appealable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59448:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59448:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59448:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion, reversing the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the United States had no right to appeal the suppression order. The order was sufficiently separate from the criminal trial to be final and not appealable under statutes relating to criminal cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59448:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59449:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59449:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 12, 1954, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (\"FBN\") and the Chicago Police Department met twice with Albert Roviaro near the intersection of 75th Street and Prairie Avenue in Chicago. According to Agent Norris Durham of the FBN, after the second meeting, Detective Byson of the Chicago police climbed into the trunk of a Cadillac sedan owned and driven by \"John Doe,\" an informant for the government. The trunk was propped open slightly to preserve Byson's line of sight. John Doe drove the car to 74th Street and St. Lawrence Avenue, where Alberto Roviaro got out of a Pontiac sedan. Roviaro entered the Cadillac sedan and took a seat next to the driver, John Doe.\nDurham followed the Cadillac, which took a circuitous rote to Champlain Avenue and 74th Street. He observed Roviaro leave the Cadillac and walk to a nearby tree, where he picked up a small package. Byson confirmed this from his vantage point in the Cadillac's trunk. Roviaro then walked to the car's open right front door and motioned as if he was leaving the package inside. A chemist working for the United States later identified the package's contents as heroin.\nThe government charged Roviaro with trafficking heroin, in violation of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act. He was convicted, and the district court denied his motion for a new trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the ruling. Judge Walter Lindley, writing for a unanimous court, held that because John Doe was not a participant in Roviaro's actual possession of heroin, Roviaro is not entitled to full disclosure of his identity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59449:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59449:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59449:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harold Burton, writing for a majority in a 6-1 decision, held that Roviaro's interest in preparing his defense outweighed the public interest in protecting John Doe's identity. The Court focused on the fundamental requirements of fairness, reasoning that where the identity of an informant or the contents of an informant's communications are relevant and helpful to a defense, the government's privilege must give way. Justice Burton also noted that the charge in question required more than mere possession of heroin; Roviaro had the burden of justifying this possession, which underlined his need for access to material witnesses. John Doe was his only material witness.\nJustice Thomas Clark dissented. He wrote that the majority's decision jeopardizes the government's privilege in cases involving informants, especially in drug cases where informants are often necessary to the proper administration and prosecution of narcotic laws. He also suggested that Roviaro was attempting to win on a technicality --as he likely already knew the informant's identity-- rather than on the merits of the case.\nJustices Hugo Black and Charles Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59449:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59450:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59450:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Roth's case was combined with Alberts v. California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts after his similar conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene advertisements for his products.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59450:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59450:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59450:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that obscenity was not \"within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.\" The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were \"utterly without redeeming social importance.\" The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was \"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.\" The Court held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California (1973).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59450:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59454:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59454:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFourteen leaders of the Communist Party in the state of California were tried and convicted under the Smith Act. That Act prohibited willfully and knowingly conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force. This case was decided in conjunction with Richmond v. United States and Schneiderman v. United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59454:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59454:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59454:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-1 decision, the Court reversed the convictions and remanded the cases to a District Court for retrial. The Court interpreted the Smith Act in the following manner: First, the term \"organize\" was construed to mean the creation of a new organization, making the Act inapplicable to subsequent organizational acts. Second, the Court drew a distinction between the \"advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle\" and the \"advocacy and teaching of concrete action for the forcible overthrow of the Government.\" The Court recognized that instances of speech that amounted to \"advocacy of action\" were \"few and far between.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59454:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59464:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59464:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1944, United States Army private Albert Trop escaped from a military stockade at Casablanca, Morocco, following his confinement for a disciplinary violation. A day later, Trop willingly surrendered to an army truck headed back to Casablanca. Despite testifying that he \"decided to return to the stockade\" when he was picked up, a general court martial convicted Trop of desertion and sentenced him to three years at hard labor, loss of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. In 1952, Trop applied for a passport. His application was rejected under Section 401(g) of the amended 1940 Nationality Act, on the ground that he lost his citizenship due to his conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion. After failing to obtain a declaratory judgment that he was a US citizen, from both a district and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Trop appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59464:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59464:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59464:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. After finding that Section 401(g) of the amended Act was penal in nature, since it punished convicted deserters with denationalization, the Court held that expatriation was barred by the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual penal remedy. Citizenship, the Court stated, is not a license that expires upon misbehavior. Rather, it can only be voluntarily renounced by express language and, or, conduct. Since Trop did not involve himself in any way with a foreign state, so as to demonstrate disloyalty to the United States, his court martial conviction of desertion did not justify his expatriation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59464:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59478:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59478:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nShotwell Manufacturing, along with several employees, was convicted of evading income taxes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction because the district court had denied Shotwell’s motion to suppress evidence of certain disclosures. Shotwell allegedly made these disclosures in good faith, thinking they would shield them from liability. After the government petitioned for certiorari, they moved to remand the case to the district court in light of new evidence. If true, this new evidence could prove Shotwell lied while testifying about making the disclosures in good faith.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59478:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59478:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59478:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority, vacating the court of appeals' decision and remanding the case to the district court. The Supreme Court would not review the case with a record challenged as being “tainted with perjury and fraud”. Because Shotwell, et al. were found guilty, there was no double jeopardy issue. The district court was the proper venue for the remand because there were questions about the integrity of the record.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent, stating that the Court should have denied certiorari and let the case take its regular course back to the district court for a new trial based on the decision by the court of appeals. Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59478:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59492:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59492:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) passed an order making intrastate passenger fares for the Milwaukee Road’s Chicago suburban commuter line higher than the fares the state commission had authorized. The state of Illinois, the Illinois Commerce Commission, and the Milwaukee Road Commuters’ Association sued the ICC in district court and sought to enjoin the enforcement of the order. The district court held that the ICC had failed to show that the fares authorized by the state commission caused undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate commerce, and therefore the order was not justified. The ICC appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59492:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59492:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59492:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that there must be clear justification for an agency of the federal government to interfere in states’ interests. In this case, the ICC interfered based on a single line of a commuter train system running at a deficit, which does not provide justification to require alteration of the rates throughout the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59492:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59511:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59511:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring police interrogation for a murder, Cicenia and his counsel repeatedly requested to see one another but they were refused their requests. By the time Cicenia saw his attorney, he had made and signed a written confession to the murder. Cicenia moved the state trial court for an order requiring the state to produce his written confession. The trial court denied the motion and the state supreme court affirmed the decision. Cicenia commenced a federal habeas corpus proceeding and the lower court discharged the writ, holding that Cicenia had failed to establish the involuntariness of his confession and that the state's refusal to permit petitioner to communicate with counsel during the inquiry did not deprive him of due process. The appellate court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59511:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59511:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59511:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan II, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court reasoned that Cicenia had failed to substantiate the charge that his confession was coerced. The Court also found that Cicenia did not have a constitutional right to confer with counsel during police questioning and, therefore, there was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The Court also found that in the absence of a showing of prejudice to Cicenia, it was not a due process violation for the state to deny counsel the opportunity to inspect the confession before trial.\nJustice Douglas, joined by Justices Warren and Black, dissented, arguing that the majority ruling was out of line with the constitutional requirement of fair criminal proceedings against a citizen.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59511:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59512:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59512:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn July 5, 1955, John Russell Crooker was arrested for the murder of his boss with whom he had been having an illicit relationship. For the next fourteen hours, Crooker was sporadically questioned and interrogated in his home and in the West Los Angeles Police Station; he repeatedly asked to meet with an attorney and was told that he could call only after the investigation was over. After fourteen hours of detainment and periodic interrogation, Crooker wrote a full confession to the murder. The next morning, Crooker was asked to orally repeat his confession, but he refused and again asked to speak with an attorney. Crooker was permitted to call his attorney at that point, and from then forward, he was represented by his counsel.\nAt trial, Crooker argued that his confession was obtained in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because his confession was coerced by state authorities, and even if it was given voluntarily, he was denied the right to counsel. The issue of whether Crooker’s confession was voluntary was presented to the jury, which resolved the question against Crooker and convicted him. The Supreme Court of California affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59512:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59512:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59512:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Tom C. Clark delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the coercion that might occur from a denial of a specific request for counsel can be negated by factors such as the defendant’s age, intelligence, and education. In this case, Crooker had knowledge of his rights based on the fact that he was a law student and that he refused to answer some questions during interrogation. Additionally, Crooker was informed by the police officer that he didn’t have to answer anything he didn’t want to. Therefore, Crooker’s confession was not coerced. The Court also held that, although Crooker’s confession was made without counsel being present, his awareness of his rights meant that the absence of counsel did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nJustice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the repeated denial of counsel to Crooker was a violation of his Due Process right. Justice Black also argued that the preservation of Due Process should also be applied to pre-trial investigation and therefore that the accused who wants counsel should have one at any time after the arrest. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Black Hugo L. Black, and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59512:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59523:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59523:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn July 18, 1951 the International Automobile Union called a strike against Wolverine Tube, Inc., a subsidiary of the Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company, located in Decatur, AL. As a result of this strike, Mr. Paul Russell, a non-union employee at the plant, was prevented from working when members of the picket line made violent threats against him and physically blocked the only entrance into the plant. The strike lasted until August 22, 1951.\nRussell sued the union in Alabama state court, claiming that the union unlawfully invaded his right to engage in a lawful occupation free from unlawful interference. The Union argued that the Labor Management Act of 1947 removed jurisdiction from the state court to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). When the trial court decided for the union, Russell appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for trial.\nAt trial, a jury returned a $10,000.00 verdict for Russell. The union appealed, arguing that the jury verdict was excessive and reiterating its argument that the state court had no jurisdiction to hear this case. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59523:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59523:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59523:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. Justice Harold Burton, writing for a 6-2 majority, reiterated the Supreme Court’s decision in United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., which held that Congress did not give the National Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction over a common-law tort for damages. Justice Burton noted that, although the National Labor Relations Board had the authority to award back pay to Russell, that authority did not remove Russell’s right to sue the union for damages in state court. The Court held that cutting off an employee’s right to sue a union would, in effect, grant unions substantial immunity from any consequences resulting from mass picketing or coercion. Finally, the Court held that the $10,000.00 verdict was not excessive in this case.\nChief Justice Earl Warren dissented, stating that, when Congress passed the Labor Management Act, it was attempting to balance the competing interests of employees, unions, and management. By allowing additional remedies, Justice Warren argued that the Supreme Court upset that balance. Justice William O. Douglas joined in this dissent. Justice Hugo Black did not participate in this decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59523:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59542:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59542:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile the Spanish ship S.S. Guadalupe was docked in Hoboken, NJ, a cable struck Francisco Romero and seriously him. He sued for negligence under the Jones act and maritime law. The Jones Act provides jurisdiction for claims under the Constitution and treaties of the U.S. for persons of diverse citizenship. Both Romero and his employer were aliens, so there was no diversity of citizenship. Also, the maritime laws did not arise from the Constitution or treaties of the U.S.. The district court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction. The district court also held that Romero could receive adequate remedies under Spanish law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59542:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59542:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59542:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion vacating the judgment below and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the district court confused jurisdiction with stating a valid cause of action. The district court had jurisdiction to determine whether Romero had stated a valid cause of action under the Jones Act and pendant jurisdiction joins the general maritime law claims. The Court also found that U.S. maritime law does not apply as a matter of law.\nJustice William J. Brennan wrote a partial dissent, stating that he could not agree with the majority that the court did not have independent jurisdiction over maritime law. Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the partial dissent. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent, expressing that maritime laws are independently within the jurisdiction of the federal courts and that the Jones Act does apply. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59542:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59559:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59559:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are two consolidated cases concerning property tax exemption under the California Constitution and California Revenue and Taxation Code (CRTC) for real property and buildings used solely for religious worship. The California Constitution requires denial of tax exemption to any person or organization who advocates the overthrow of the U.S. Government or the State of California by violent or unlawful means. To enforce this, a provision of the CRTC requires those applying for tax exemption to sign an oath declaring that they do not engage in that prohibited activity.\nIn both cases, the Los Angeles assessor denied tax exemption because the churches refused to agree to the oath. The churches paid their taxes under protest and sued the County of Los Angeles for a refund. The churches argued that requiring them to agree to the oath violated the U.S. Constitution. In 382, the trial court upheld the oath and the Supreme Court of California affirmed. In 385, the court upheld the oath under the U.S. Constitution, but held that it violated the California Constitution because it excluded householders from the requirement. The Supreme Court of California reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59559:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59559:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59559:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court judgments. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for a four justice plurality, followed the same reasoning from his opinion in Speiser v. Randall, a companion case. In that opinion he held that the oath provision denied freedom of speech without due process because it placed the burden of proof of eligibility for tax exemption on the taxpayer.\nJustice Hugo L. Black concurred, using his opinion from Speiser where he argued that the First Amendment barred California for imposing what he saw as a tax on belief and expression. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the concurrence. Justice Douglas concurred separately, following his opinion from Speiser, and adding that the oath provision violated the First Amendment freedom of religion. Justice Black joined in the concurrence. Justice Harold Burton concurred in the result.\nJustice Tom C. Clark dissented, arguing that signing the oath or not does not alone decide tax exempt eligibility, so the burden of proof is not on the tax payer. Chief Justice Earl Warren did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59559:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59586:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59586:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRose Staub was convicted and fined for attempting to organize a branch of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union at Hazlehurst Manufacturing Company. She violated an ordinance in the neighboring town of Baxley, where many of the Manufacturing Co. workers lived. That ordinance required anyone soliciting members for a union to apply for a permit from the mayor and city council. The mayor and city council had unlimited discretion to grant or deny the permits for any reason. Staub argued that the ordinance violated her constitutional right to free speech. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the conviction, but did not consider the constitutional question because Staub did not attempt to comply with the ordinance. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59586:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59586:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59586:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote the majority opinion reversing the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated free speech because it made the enjoyment of speech contingent on the will of the mayor and city council. The mayor and city council had too much discretion in granting or denying permits. Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent, stating that case should be left to the Georgia Courts. Justice Tom C. Clark joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59586:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59587:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59587:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRockwell Kent applied for and was refused a passport to visit England. In addition to informing him that his application refusal rested on his Communist Party affiliations, the Passport Office Director told Kent that in order for a passport to be issued a hearing would be necessary. The Director instructed Kent to submit an affidavit as to whether he was a current or past Communist. Upon the advice of counsel, Kent refused to sign the affidavit but did participate in a hearing at which he was once more asked to sign an affidavit concerning his Communist affiliations. When he refused the affidavit, the Passport Department advised Kent that no further action would be taken on his passport request until he satisfied the affidavit requirement. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Kent certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59587:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59587:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59587:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the right to travel is an inherent element of \"liberty\" that cannot be denied to American citizens. Although the Executive may regulate the travel practices of citizens, by requiring them to obtain valid passports, it may not condition the fulfillment of such requirements with the imposition of rules that abridge basic constitutional notions of liberty, assembly, association, and personal autonomy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59587:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59597:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59597:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBy the War Claims Act of 1948, Congress established the War Claims Commission for the purpose of adjudicating claims for compensating internees, prisoners of war, and religious organizations. Wiener was confirmed as a member of the Commission by President Truman in 1950. In 1953, when President Eisenhower requested Wiener's resignation, Wiener refused. Eisenhower subsequently appointed a substitute to Wiener's post. The Commission was abolished in 1954, and Wiener brought a claim to recover his salary from the time of his removal to the last day of the Commission's existence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59597:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59597:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59597:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to remove individuals from the War Claims Commission at will. The Court found that Congress had intended to create a body that was \"'entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,' of either the Executive or the Congress.\" The \"intrinsic judicial character\" of the Commission's duties required that it be able to adjudicate claims solely on the merits of each claim free of external Executive pressure.\" Congress did not wish to have hand over the Commission the Damocles' sword of removal by the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission men of his own choosing.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59597:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59609:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59609:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nByrd, a resident of North Carolina, was employed by a subcontractor of Blue Ridge Electric, a South Carolina company. When he was hurt during his work on power lines, Byrd sued Blue Ridge for negligence in a federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. Blue Ridge defended against his claim based on a South Carolina law providing that employees of sub-contractors should be considered employees of contractors for which the sub-contractor provided work. South Carolina law further provided that the immunity defense needed to be determined by a judge rather than a jury. Byrd contended that his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial should trump that provision of the state law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59609:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59609:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59609:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn diversity cases where the Erie doctrine applies, federal courts must balance their respect for the substance of state laws with the need to preserve the essential characteristics and functions of the federal courts. The Seventh Amendment jury function is one of those essential functions.\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Willian Brennan, the Court held that South Carolina law was essentially a procedural rule because it determined how immunity should be enforced, rather than affecting the substantive rights and obligations created by the state. The federal court should typically follow this type of rule. In the instant case, however, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was an essential factor in the federal court process, and therefore the amendment prevailed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59609:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59614:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59614:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1938, the Interstate Commerce Commission authorized Rock Island Motor Transit, a subsidiary of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, to purchase the property and rights of the White Line Motor Freight Company between Silvis, Illinois and Omaha, Nebraska. The certificate limited motor operations to service to or from points on the Rock Island Railroad, subject to any restrictions the commission might impose under the Interstate Commerce Act to insure that the service was auxiliary or supplementary to train service. The Act authorized consolidation, merger, acquisition, or lease of common carriers if the commission deemed it to be “consistent with the public interest.” In a separate section, Congress directed the commission not to certify a railroad corporation seeking to operate motor carriers unless it also found that the railroad would use motor vehicle service to public advantage in its operations and would not unduly restrain competition.\nIn 1944, Rock Island purchased the Frederickson Lines, covering routes between Atlantic, Iowa and Omaha, Nebraska. Rock Island filed for permission to provide motor service to points along the Frederickson Lines. The commission granted Rock Island permission, but placed five conditions on motor service for both the White and Frederickson routes. Rock Island challenged the conditions in district court and won, but on appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the commission’s power to impose the conditions.\nRock Island then filed for permission to provide unrestricted motor service to points along the White and Frederickson lines. In 1954, the application was substantially granted. American Trucking Associations, Inc., nine other motor carriers, a group of railway trade unions, and several other organizations intervened, arguing that 1) the commission was required to limit motor service by a rail-owned motor carrier to auxiliary or supplementary service, and 2) the evidence was not sufficient to support the commission’s certification order. The district court upheld the certificate as granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59614:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59614:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59614:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Thomas Clark, the Court held that the “public interest” section of the Act did not prohibit the commission from allowing Rock Island to operate unrestricted motor service along the White and Frederickson lines. Justice Clark noted that Rock Island applied for its broader application under the public interest section of the Act, which did not contain 1) statutory language limiting the provision of motor service by railroad companies or 2) language suggesting that service must be auxiliary or supplementary. He looked to the legislative history of the act, and determined that while congress considered adding an absolute “auxiliary or supplemental” requirement to the public interest section, it did not do so.\nJustice Clark then held that there was sufficient evidence to show that Rock Island’s motor transit service along the approved routes served the public interest. Although the evidence did not suggest that allowing Rock Island to provide motor service was the only way to serve public convenience and necessity, Justice Clark reasoned that the generally more profitable motor service helped to pay for the costlier rail service, securing the public’s access to both. He also noted that the commission could impose restrictions or conditions if Rock Island’s unrestricted motor operations became clearly destructive of competition in the future.\nJustice William Douglas dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59614:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59620:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59620:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 25, 1952, Herman A. Beilan, a teacher in the Philadelphia school system for the previous 22 years, presented himself in the Superintendent’s office at the latter’s request. The Superintendent asked if Beilan had been the Press Director of the Professional Section of the Communist Political Association in 1944. Beilan requested to speak with counsel before answering, and he was allowed to do so. After speaking with counsel, Beilan informed the Superintendent that he would not answer that question or other similar ones. The Superintendent informed Beilan that refusal to answer such questions could lead to his dismissal. On November 25, 1953, the Board of Public Education initiated dismissal proceedings against Beilan and cited Beilan’s failure to answer the Superintendent’s question regarding his 1944 activities as evidence of “incompetency.” There was a formal hearing, at which Beilan did not testify. The charge of incompetency was sustained and Beilan was fired. The administrative appeal upheld the decision of the local Board. Beilan appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which set aside Beilan’s discharge. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59620:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59620:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59620:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harold Burton delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that public officials such as teachers can be questioned about issues that are relevant to their fitness and suitability for public service. There is no requirement that states that a teacher’s fitness is solely determined by performance in the classroom. By refusing to answer the question, Beilan showed himself to be insubordinate and lacking in frankness, which gave the Board grounds to fire him for incompetency. The Court also held that Beilan was not denied due process because he was given sufficient warning of the consequences of his refusal to answer the question.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that it is not a denial of due process when a state appropriately acts in a way that could be seen as unwise. He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against improper state action, and it is not the role of the Supreme Court to censor state action that falls within the bounds of the Constitution.\nChief Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Board’s decision to dismiss Beilan was the result of Beilan being called before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and therefore invalid. In his separate dissent, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the only evidence against Beilan was his refusal to answer a question regarding his membership in an organization that espouses certain ideals. To punish him without any evidence of wrongdoing runs counter to the entire basis of American jurisprudence. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the state action in this case essentially branded a citizen as disloyal, which could have enormously detrimental effects on his life. Because this charge was not properly addressed by a court of law, Justice Brennan argued that Beilan was denied his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59620:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59664:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59664:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are two consolidated cases involving several individuals involved in a tax evasion scheme. The petitioners were indicted and testified before a grand jury without being warned of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. For this reason, the district court dismissed the indictment. The appeals court affirmed the dismissal. While the appeal was pending, the United States initiated a new grand jury proceeding and, at a trial by jury, the petitioners were found guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The petitioners suspected that prosecutors used privileged information gained in the first indictment to aid in the second proceeding, violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59664:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59664:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59664:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote the majority opinion, affirming the convictions. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' Due Process claims because they laid no foundation for holding a hearing on the issue. The Court also held that a copy of a cancelled check obtained at the first indictment did not violate Due Process when prosecutors introduced it into evidence at the second proceeding. The petitioner’s counsel had explicitly waived any objection to that evidence at trial.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, stating that the record does not show that petitioner’s counsel waived their objection to entering the cancelled check into evidence. Justices Felix Frankfurter and William J. Brennan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59664:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59666:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59666:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlabama sought to prevent the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from conducting further business in the state. After the circuit court issued a restraining order, the state issued a subpoena for various records, including the NAACP's membership lists.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59666:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59666:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59666:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan II, a unanimous Court decided in favor of the petitioners, holding that \"Immunity from state scrutiny of petitioner's membership lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.\" Further, the Court held that freedom to associate with organizations dedicated to the \"advancement of beliefs and ideas\" is an inseparable part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan concluded that the state's obtaining the names of the Association's membership would likely interfere with the free association of its members, so the state's interest in obtaining the records was superseded by the constitutional rights of the petitioners.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59666:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59690:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59690:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Smith Act's membership clause prohibited membership in organizations advocating the violent or forceful overthrow of the United States government. Junius Scales was criminally charged with membership in the Communist Party of the United States (\"Party\") because it advocated the overthrow of the government \"as speedily as circumstances would permit.\" Challenging his felony charge, Scales claimed that the Internal Security Act of 1950 (\"Security Act\") stated that membership in a Communist organization shall not constitute a per se violation of any criminal statute. After failing in both a district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59690:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59690:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59690:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Security Act protects \"per se\" members of an organization from criminal prosecution. The Smith Act, by contrast, goes beyond \"per se\" participation by targeting those whose membership in an organization entails their knowing and deliberate participation in criminal activity. In light of this distinction, the Court noted, the two Acts are not conflicted. Since Scales, at the very least, knew, encouraged, and provoked illegal Party activities over the course of his eight year membership, he was guilty under the Smith Act of complicity in the commission of criminal activity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59690:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59699:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59699:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was authorized under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of 1946 to insure mortgages for projects that provide housing to war veterans. The Darlington, Inc., a corporation formed in 1949, obtained FHA mortgage insurance for a building in Charleston, South Carolina. Although The Darlington, Inc. submitted the required reports of its monthly rental rates for each of the units, the reports never mentioned the fact that an affiliate of the corporation was renting fully furnished rooms on a daily basis. The affiliate continued to rent these transient apartments after an amendment to the Act specifically excluded such units from eligibility for federal mortgage insurance. The FHA stopped insuring the mortgages because The Darlington, Inc. violated the terms of the Act. The Darlington, Inc. sued the FHA for a declaratory judgment and claimed to still be eligible as long as the building was used for “principally” residential purposes. The district court granted relief. On appeal, the Court remanded the case to a three-judge panel. The panel affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59699:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59699:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59699:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the intent of the Act was to provide housing for veterans, which implies a degree of permanency. Previous interpretation by the FHA also understood the Act to exclude transient occupancy. The Court also held that the addition of the exclusion to the Act after the FHA contracted to ensure the mortgages was not unfair to The Darlington, Inc.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent arguing that the majority’s opinion constituted an “unconstitutional retroactive application” of the new exclusions in the Act. He also argued that there was no language in the Act that expressly prohibited The Darlington, Inc. from renting to transients, so the corporation’s actions violated neither the letter nor the intent of the Act. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Charles E. Whittaker joined in the dissent.\nIn a separate dissent, Justice Felix Frankfurter argued that the later changes to the Act did not negate the rights of mortgage companies to rent to transients that existed under the previous construction of the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59699:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59703:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59703:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Marsh, a federal narcotics agent, was stationed in Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver and was dealing drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago to pick up heroin and would be returning by train on either the morning of September 8 or 9. Hereford also provided a detailed description of Draper and the bag he would likely be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and a Denver police agent saw a person exactly matching that description exit a train from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped him and arrested him. In his pocket they found two envelopes containing heroin, and they found a syringe in his bag.\nBefore his trial, Draper moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs and the syringe as having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court dismissed the motion after finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Draper without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit of a lawful search. Draper was tried and convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59703:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59703:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59703:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Charles E. Whittaker delivered the opinion of the 6-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that evidence required to show probable cause is not held to the same standard as evidence required to prove guilt in trial. Despite the fact that information Marsh gained from Hereford would be inadmissible at trial as hearsay, it may still be relied on as probable cause for a search and arrest. The Court also held that, because Marsh was able to personally verify the description Hereford had given, he had “reasonable grounds” to believe that the information regarding the heroin was also correct.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that an arrest made on the word of an informant violates the spirit of the Fourth Amendment because it allows the police latitude to arrest innocent people without sufficient proof. He argued that an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to allow arrests based on suspicion goes against the entire history of American jurisprudence and the intentions of the framers of the Constitution.\nChief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Felix Frankfurter did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59703:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59724:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59724:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRudolf Ivanovich Abel maintained an artist’s studio in Brooklyn Heights, New York while living in New York at various inexpensive lodgings. In early May of 1957, Reino Hayhanen informed the American Embassy in Paris that he had been acting as a secret agent for the Soviet Union in the United States since 1952. He also informed the embassy that he had assisted a Soviet agent he only knew as “Mark”, whom he identified as a resident agent in the United States with the military rank of colonel. Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents began a long investigation of Abel, but did not seek to obtain a warrant of arrest or a search warrant relating to Abel.\nFBI agents gave three agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) a report on Abel as a suspected spy; the FBI agents also asked them to prepare an Immigration detention warrant. On June 21, 1957, FBI agents found Abel at the Latham Hotel in Manhattan and questioned him unsuccessfully for a half hour. A short time later, INS agents who were waiting outside packed up all of Abel’s personal effects in the room. They seized over two hundred items but found no weapons or evidence of alienage; the FBI also seized several items after an agent checked Abel out of the hotel, including three items contested at trial.\nTwo INS agents flew Abel to a maximum security camp in McAllen, Texas, where FBI and INS agents interrogated him for four weeks. On the third day, he admitted he was in the United States illegally. A criminal warrant for Abel’s arrest was issued on August 7, 1957 while Abel was in his Texas cell; he also learned that same day that he was indicted for espionage. Agents brought Abel back to New York, where the district court tried and convicted him of espionage. The prosecution introduced seven items seized before the government obtained a search warrant. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed Abel’s conviction, holding that INS agents could search Abel’s hotel room incident to his valid arrest and pursuant to a deportation arrest warrant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59724:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59724:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59724:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court held that the INS properly arrested Abel even though the FBI suspected him of espionage. Justice Frankfurter noted that the INS was simultaneously investigating Abel’s status in the United States and that it indeed commenced deportation proceedings against him. While acknowledging both that the INS delayed its arrest of Abel and that the FBI searched Abel’s room immediately after INS agents’ search, he did not consider this to be sufficient evidence of unreasonable “bad faith” cooperation between the INS and FBI. He argued that the government had two available ways of dealing with a criminally suspect deportable alien and simply chose to detain Abel for potential deportation first.\nJustice Frankfurter also held that the items seized by both the INS and the FBI were properly introduced into evidence at trial. He could discern no constitutional reason to limit the search for materials proving the deportability of a validly arrested alien more than the Constitution limits the search for materials probative of a crime. Noting that INS agents had to apply to the District Director of the INS for a warrant, Justice Frankfurter argued that the differences in procedural protection between criminal and deportation arrests were not of constitutional significance.\nJustice William Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Hugo Black. He warned against allowing administrative officers such as INS agents to enter people’s homes without warrants, especially when the invasion is a front for a criminal investigation. Justice Douglas argued that the FBI were clearly the moving force behind Abel’s arrest and the search of his hotel room, noting that the FBI made no effort during the investigation to obtain a search warrant despite having plenty of time to do so.\nJustice William Brennan dissented, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo Black, and Justice William Douglas. While acknowledging that Congress’ power over aliens may be great and that deportation may be described as a civil remedy, he rejected the majority’s notion that the fruits of a deportation warrant may be used in a criminal trial. He noted that there was no independent inquiry over the circumstances of the arrest and seizure, given that only a superior INS officer approved the deportation warrant. Justice Brennan argued that such an administrative search can never be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59724:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59737:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59737:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe radio and television station WDAY, Inc. broadcast the speech of A.C. Townley, a legally qualified candidate in the 1956 United States Senate race in North Dakota. The speech was broadcast uncensored as a reply to previous speeches made by two other Senate candidates. Townley’s speech accused the other candidates and the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America of conspiring to establish “a Communist Farmers Union Soviet.” Farmers Union sued Townley and WDAY, Inc for libel in district court. The court dismissed the complaint against WDAY, Inc. and held that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 granted the station immunity from liability for such defamation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59737:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59737:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59737:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the censorship prohibited by the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was defined broadly and included the removal of objectionable material from a political speech. Permitting broadcasting stations to engage in this type of censorship would undermine the purpose the Act was meant to serve. The Court also held that holding the station liable for any defamatory statement made during the broadcast of a political speech would allow liability for conduct that the statute requires. While Congress did not explicitly include station immunity in the Act, the Federal Communications Commission, the body in charge of administering the Act, has long upheld the doctrine of station immunity.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter dissented and argued that, unless Congress explicitly granted stations immunity from state libel laws, state law trumps any implied federal immunity. Since Congress has not granted any explicit immunity, and the legislative history does not indicate that they intended to do so, the state laws stand. He also argued that the precedent set by the Court supports the state unless federal laws explicitly intercede. Justice John M. Harlan, Justice Charles E. Whittaker, and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59737:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59766:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59766:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Lloyd Barenblatt, a university professor, refused to answer questions concerning his political and religious beliefs along with his associational activities. He was found in contempt of Congress for failing to cooperate with the committee investigation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59766:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59766:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59766:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe divided Court found that the Committee's actions did not violate the First Amendment and, thus, upheld Barenblatt's conviction for contempt of Congress. Justice Harlan noted that the First Amendment does not protect a witness from all lines of questioning. As long as the Congressional inquiry is pursued to \"aid the legislative process\" and to protect important government interests, then it is legitimate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59766:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59767:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59767:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLinda Matteo and John Madigan created a plan for utilizing $2.6 million in funds from the Office of Housing Expediter. The Office’s commission was coming to an end, and the plan involved firing and rehiring employees on a temporary basis until the life of the Office was extended or ended. William G. Barr, general manager of the Office, vehemently opposed the plan, and several Senators attacked the plan on the Senate floor. Barr decided to suspend Matteo and Madigan. He issued a press release explaining his reasons. Matteo and Madigan sued for libel based on the statements in the press release.\n In certain circumstances, government officials are protected from civil suits for actions done in the scope of their official duties though absolute or qualified privilege. The district court ruled in favor of Matteo and Madigan, rejecting Barr’s claim that his statements were protected by privilege. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, considering only absolute privilege. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded so the court of appeals could consider qualified privilege. On remand, the court of appeals held that qualified privilege existed, but was defeated due to Barr’s malice. The court remanded the case to district court for a new trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59767:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59767:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59767:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the judgement of the court, reversing the court of appeals. The plurality argued that the statements from the press release were absolutely privileged. Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice Tom C. Clark, and Justice Charles E. Whittaker joined in the plurality. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the reversal, writing that that the press release was not unauthorized or beyond the scope of Barr’s official business.\nChief Justice Earl Warren dissented, arguing that absolute privilege should not extend to lower level officials like Barr, and qualified privilege should only apply to statements to the public. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also dissented, arguing that only qualified privilege applied. Justice Potter Stewart dissented, writing that Barr acted beyond the scope of his job duties when he issued the press release, so privilege did not apply.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59767:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59777:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59777:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA non-Native American merchant ran a general store on a Navajo reservation. The merchant filed a collection action against petitioners, Native American customers, for goods sold on credit at the store. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the trial court's judgment that the state courts had jurisdiction. The Native American customers sought review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59777:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59777:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59777:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that the Arizona state court improperly exercised jurisdiction, because states lack power to regulate Native American affairs on a reservation. The Court reasoned that the Navajo Courts of Indian Offenses exercised broad criminal and civil jurisdiction that covered suits by outsiders against Native American defendants. Federal law granted states the power to assume jurisdiction over reservation matters if the state legislature or the people affirmatively accepted the responsibility, and Arizona expressly disclaimed such jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the Navajo Treaty of 1868 controlled, and civil jurisdiction resided with the reservation's courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59777:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59782:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59782:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEmanuel Brown was a witness at a federal grand jury investigation into possible violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Act (FMCA). Brown refused to answer questions asked by the grand jury, invoking the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The district judge ordered Brown to answer the questions, telling him that the FMCA provided immunity against any prosecution that might arise from Brown’s testimony. Brown still refused to answer. After several failed attempts to make Brown answer the questions, the judge held him in contempt of court and sentenced him to 15 months in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59782:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59782:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59782:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the FMCA clearly provided Brown with immunity from prosecution based on his testimony. Because he could not possibly incriminate himself, he could not invoke the Fifth Amendment. There was no statutory cap on sentencing, so 15 months was not an abuse of discretion.\nChief Justice Earl Warren dissented, arguing that the district judge denied Brown due process by following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) instead of 49(b). Under 49(b) Brown would be sentenced to prison until he agreed to answer the questions instead of a fixed 15 month sentence. Justice Hugo L. Black, Justice William O. Douglas, and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59782:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59795:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59795:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFox West Coast Theatres held various contracts for \"first-run\" rights of movies in San Bernardino, CA. Beacon Theatre opened a drive-in theater in the area and threatened to sue Fox West Coast over their \"first-run\" contracts claiming they violated antitrust laws, in particular the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act. Fox West Coast filed an injunction against Beacon taking legal action, and Beacon counterclaimed.\nThe lower court denied Beacon a trial by jury because the suit involved both matters of law and equitable damages. Beacon appealed this decision on the grounds that the alleged competition between Beacon and Fox West Coast was a matter of fact to be decided by a jury pursuant to the Seventh Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. Beacon responded by seeking a writ of mandamus.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59795:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59795:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59795:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that a case involving both equitable and legal claims must be tried by jury before the equitable damages can be accessed. Therefore, Beacon Theatre had a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Fox West Coast’s injunction for permanent relief from Beacon could be assessed after the jury verdict.\nJustice Potter Stewart (joined by Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Charles E. Whittaker) wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court should have denied the writ of mandamus because the issues of this case were questions of law rather than fact, and that the trial judge should be granted deference.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59795:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59808:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59808:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn February of 1955, Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 began an effort to organize employees at resort hotels in Miami and Miami Beach, Florida; these hotels wholly occupied a stretch of land from Collins Avenue to the Atlantic Ocean. The National Labor Relations Board, however, had a stated policy of refusing jurisdiction over hotel employees. Hence, the union did not petition the board for an election or certification.\nIn March, the union tried to establish a procedure to collectively bargain for the employees of the various hotels. It could not reach an agreement between the employee representatives from each hotel, so it addressed a letter to the Miami Beach Hotel Association requesting a conference. It also sent copies to each hotel and published copies in local newspapers. The Association -- which was not specifically authorized to bargain for its members -- did not answer the union’s request. In response, on April 13, 1955, the union began a strike at nine hotels, including the Sherry Frontenac.\nThe hotels filed for an injunction against the picketers. Of the nine cases, the district court tried seven separately, with each judge retaining jurisdiction over his particular case. In each of the seven cases, the trial judge held that there was not enough evidence of violence to justify enjoining the picketing on that basis. Before each court could address whether the unions were coercing hotel employees to unionize, however, the Florida Supreme Court intervened. On the basis of the hotels’ complaint, it held that the real purpose of the strike was indeed to coerce hotel employees to join the union, in violation of Florida law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59808:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59808:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59808:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Florida Supreme Court did not properly enjoin the union employees from picketing the resort hotels. The Court held that the strike's status under the National Labor Relations Act did not control the case. Instead, the Court looked to whether or not any violence resulted from the picketers’ activities. It held that none of the district courts made any finding of violence sufficient to merit an injunction from the Florida Supreme Court. The Court determined that it was not necessary to consider whether interstate commerce was involved in the Florida resort hotel industry.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59808:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59823:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59823:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Dick was a 47-year-old farmer and experienced hunter who lived with his wife Blanche on a farm near Englevale, North Dakota. William had two life insurance policies issued by the New York Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, payable to his wife. Each contained a double indemnity clause preventing payment if William's death resulted from “self-destruction, whether sane or insane.” On January 20, 1955, between 10:30 and 11:00 am, Blanche entered the farm’s silage shed and found her husband lying on his back. She saw a wound on his head and knew he was dead; William's double-barreled shotgun was lying near his body.\nThe county sheriff later determined that the shotgun was held about eighteen inches from William's body with the stock toward the feet and the barrel along the body when it was fired. He also determined that the gun likely did not fire from a person jarring, pounding, or dropping it, although there was also evidence that the gun had occasionally discharged accidentally in the past. Dr. Veitch, the county coroner, found another wound in William's chest, but determined that it was the wound to William's head that caused his immediate death; the chest wound likely only resulted in a great deal of pain. Dr. Veitch, who was also William's personal physician, testified that William had mild to moderate non-specific prostatitis, which left him tired but did not prevent him from doing farm work. William did not apparently leave a suicide note or mention suicide to his relatives or friends. In connection with Blanche's later claim for benefits, however, Dr. Veitch listed the cause of death as “suicide.”\nNew York Life Insurance filed an action in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, claiming that William committed suicide. Under North Dakota law, proof of insurance coverage and death by gunshot wound shifted the burden to the insurer to prove that the death was not accidental. The jury found for Blanche Dick and awarded $7,500 in damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reviewed the evidence and determined that the shotgun could not have fired unless someone or something pushed or pulled one of the triggers. It further concluded that the evidence could not be reconciled with any reasonable theory that the shooting was accidental, given William's experience as a hunter and the multiple gunshot wounds on his body.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59823:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59823:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59823:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-2 decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the Fourth Circuit erred in reversing the judgment of the district court. Chief Justice Warren argued that the jury could have determined that William Dick's death was accidental from the evidence Blanche Dick presented at trial, emphasizing that the evidence apparently did not suggest that William had either the motive or intention to commit suicide. He also noted that William was in the middle of his chores when he died, which the jury could have reasonably concluded to be improbable timing for a suicide attempt.\nChief Justice Warren declined to answer whether a state or federal evidentiary standard is proper when jurisdiction is based on the diversity of the parties because both parties assumed the North Dakota standard was proper in their briefs and arguments.\nJustice Potter Stewart concurred, agreeing that the district court properly applied North Dakota’s evidentiary standard. Justice Stewart noted that he was not a member of the court when the case was granted a writ of certiorari, and thus refrained from expressing an opinion on whether the Court granted the writ appropriately.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter, joined by Justice Charles Whittaker, dissented. He argued that the Court improperly granted a writ of certiorari to Blanche Dick’s case. Justice Frankfurter outlined the history of diversity jurisdiction cases in the circuit courts, emphasizing that congress intended the Court to use its certiorari power sparingly in such cases. He argued that the Eighth Circuit properly applied North Dakota’s evidentiary standard and concluded that Blanche's claim fell short of the North Dakota requirements for submission to a jury.\nJustice John Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59823:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59825:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59825:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 27, 1957, Vincent Joseph Spano was involved in a bar fight with Frank Palermo, Jr. Palermo knocked Spano to the ground and kicked him in the head multiple times. Later that night, Spano acquired a gun, found Palermo, and killed him. On February 1, 1957, a grand jury indicted Spano for first-degree murder and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Two days later, Spano called Gaspar Bruno, a longtime friend of his who was enrolled in the police academy. During that conversation, Spano told Bruno that Palermo had been beaten up in a fight, he was dazed, and he shot at Palermo. The next day, Spano turned himself in but refused to answer officers’ questions. The police questioned him for several hours before they brought in Spano’s friend Bruno to play on their friendship in order to convince Spano to confess, which he eventually did.\nThe confession was admitted into evidence at trial, and the jury was instructed to consider it only if it was found to be voluntary. The jury found Spano guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59825:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59825:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59825:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the interrogation tactics the police used -- such as questioning Spano for hours without a break and using a childhood friend to manipulate him -- were coercive and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the confession was involuntary, it should not have been admitted into evidence in trial.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the interrogation was also unconstitutional because the police denied Spano access to his lawyer. He wrote that a defendant who has been charged with a crime is entitled to representation by counsel, and that right extends beyond the trial. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a concurrence in which he argued that the judgment should be reversed solely due to the fact that the defendant was denied access to counsel during his interrogation. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59825:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59838:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59838:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the midst of a labor strike against Southern Bell Telephone Company, Louis Joseph Abbate, Michael Louis Falcone, and Norman McLeod met with James Shelby, a union official, in a Chicago tavern. Shelby requested the others’ assistance in carrying out plans to bomb certain Southern Bell facilities in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee. Abbate and Falcone did not go through with the plan and instead informed Chicago police when McLeod obtained dynamite and traveled to Mississippi. The State of Illinois subsequently charged all four with the crime of conspiring to destroy the property of another. Abbate and Falcone pled guilty and were sentenced to three months in prison each. Because several of the targeted facilities were used exclusively by the military and federal agencies, federal prosecutors subsequently charged Abbate, Falcone, and Shelby with conspiring to destroy property essential to the U.S. communications systems. At trial in federal district court, McLeod testified against his former co-conspirators, and the jury found them guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgments against Abbate and Falcone on appeal. In their petition to the Supreme Court, Abbate and Falcone argued that the federal prosecution subsequent to their convictions under Illinois law violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prevents someone from being tried more than once for the same crime.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59838:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59838:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59838:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to a federal prosecution that follows a state prosecution of the same person for the same actions. Rather, the separate prosecutions reflect the concurrent power of the state and federal governments to enforce their separate statutes. Moreover, the Court held that allowing the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar subsequent prosecutions by the other level of government would hinder the law enforcement capability of that entity.\nIn a separate opinion, Justice Brennan commented on the federal government’s argument in favor of affirming the convictions. He found the implications disturbing as the argument potentially allowed successive prosecutions of the same person by the same level of government. Justice Brennan reiterated that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the notion that individuals should only have to spend money and time defending themselves once for a single crime.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he argued that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, Abbate and Falcone’s subsequent federal prosecution was just as troubling as Illinois imprisoning them twice for their role in the conspiracy. Expressing skepticism towards the concurrent powers theory relied on by the Court, Justice Black noted that foreign nations, unlike state and federal governments, are completely distinct sovereigns, yet many nations refuse to prosecute an individual following a prosecution in another country for the same acts. Additionally, the legislative history of the Double Jeopardy clause showed that language that would have restricted the clause to prohibit only successive prosecutions by the same government had been rejected. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas concurred in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59838:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59854:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59854:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are two consolidated cases concerning the tax consequences of importing goods from foreign countries that are then used for manufacturing in the United States.\nIn 9, Youngstown Steel and Tube Co. imported ores for manufacturing, which were stored at its plant in Ohio. Under the U.S. Constitution, imports are not taxed. Youngstown took the ore needed for each day of manufacturing from the storage piles to stock bins. The state of Ohio assessed property tax on the ore because Youngstown had changed the ore from an import to a manufacturing supply. Youngstown argued that the ore kept in storage bins was not taxable because it was held for storage only. Youngstown also argued that the tax violated equal protection because it applied to residents of Ohio, but not to non-residents who had property in the state. After exhausting administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the tax.\nIn 44, Plywood Corp. imported lumber and veneers for manufacturing. Plywood piled the lumber in a yard in Algoma, Wisconsin for storage and drying. The City of Algoma taxed half of the stored supplies on the theory that at least that amount was destined for manufacturing. Plywood paid the tax and sued for a refund. The trial court and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the tax.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59854:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59854:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59854:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-2 decision, Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that because the imported goods became supplies needed for manufacturing, the goods changed their status as imports. It did not matter that the goods were stored away from other taxable property before us. The court also deferred to the Supreme Court of Ohio and rejected Youngstown’s claim that the Ohio tax violated equal protection.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter wrote a partial dissent, agreeing with the majority about Youngstown, but disagreeing about Plywood. He found that Plywood’s main purpose for storing the lumber was drying, so it remained an import. Justice Potter Stewart did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59854:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59858:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59858:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Illinois law required that trucks and trailers on its highways use a contoured mudguard, while Arkansas required them to have a straight mudguard. All of the other states required one type or the other. Arguing that the Illinois law unduly burdened interstate commerce, Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. prevailed in the lower court, which issued an injunction preventing Bibb from enforcing the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59858:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59858:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59858:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by William O. Douglas, the Court held that the Illinois requirement placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. While writing that safety measures \"carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged,\" Justice Douglas nevertheless affirmed that if the effect of such measures are \"slight or problematical,\" then the interests of commerce should prevail. No clear benefits of using contoured mudguards could be identified, and they might even lead to additional hazards. Thus, the presumption of validity could be overcome.\nJustices Harlan and Stewart concurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59858:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59863:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59863:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA general contractor defaulted on federal tax payments and payments to subcontractors. Under the Internal Revenue Code, the U.S. government claimed priority over the lien on the “property rights to the property” of the general contractor. The subcontractors also claimed priority, because the amounts owed to them were large enough that they constituted “trust funds” under a New York tax law. The subcontractors were the beneficiaries of these “trust funds” so the general contractor had no property rights. The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, granted the subcontractor’s motion to for summary judgment and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals of New York ruled in favor of the United States", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59863:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59863:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59863:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-2 decision Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion vacating the judgment below. The Supreme Court held that state law controlled the answer to the question presented, while federal law controlled the priority of the competing liens. The Court remanded the case to the New York Court of Appeals to determine the nature of the property rights under state law.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, stating that the majority’s decision was inconsistent with prior case law. Justice Hugo L Black joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59863:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59900:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59900:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSpecialist Second Class James W. Dial of the United States Army and his wife, Joanna Dial, were charged with involuntary manslaughter for the death of their one-year-old child while stationed in Germany. James Dial was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, sentenced to three years in prison, and dishonorably discharged. His wife was not an active member of the military, but because she was a dependent of an active military member, she was tried in military court in Germany. She moved to challenge the jurisdiction of the military court over her case, but the motion was denied. She pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.\nMrs. Dial's mother, Alberta Singleton, filed a writ of habeas corpus on her daughter's behalf and argued that civilian dependents of military personnel cannot be tried in a military court. The circuit court judge stated he did not want to grant the writ of habeas corpus but was bound by the Supreme Court case Reid v. Covert, in which the Court held that non-military personnel cannot be court martialed for capital offenses. Nina Kinsella, the warden where Mrs. Dial was serving her time, appealed the writ and argued that the defendant in Reid v. Covert was on trial for a capital offense, whereas Mrs. Dial was on a trial for a non-capital offense. Therefore, the court was not bound by that case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59900:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59900:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59900:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Tom C. Clark delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that civilian dependents of active service members can only be court martialed for capital offenses. The Constitution does not allow for the extension of military power to have jurisdiction over civilians. Therefore, James Dial’s wife had a right to trial in a court protecting her rights as outlined under Article III of the Constitution and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.\nJustice Charles E. Whittaker wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that non-military personnel employed by the military overseas may be under military jurisdiction during peace times. However, Joanna Dial was a dependent of an active military member, and she was not employed by the military, so she should not have been court martialed. Justice Potter Stewart joined the opinion.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the interpretation of military “status” should not automatically exclude non-military personnel. One’s status as non-military personnel should only be a factor while determining jurisdiction, and the relationship of non-military personnel with the military establishment should also be examined. The Constitution allows the Court to consider these factors in determining appropriate jurisdiction. Justice Felix Frankfurter joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59900:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59916:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59916:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEllen Goett sought recovery for her husband’s death under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act. Her husband, Marvin Paul Goett, drowned while repairing a barge owned by Union Carbide Corp. Marvin worked for Amherst Barge Corp. as a sand blaster. Ellen argued that Union Carbide was negligent when it delivered the barge to Amherst for repairs without any rescue equipment. The district court ruled in favor of the Goetts, finding that the barge was unseaworthy and Union Carbide was negligent. The court awarded the maximum amount of damages based on negligence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Union Carbide did not owe a duty of seaworthiness to Amherst employees. The court also held that the barge was not unseaworthy but did not indicate whether the Goetts could recover damages if it were.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59916:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59916:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59916:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo answer. In a per curiam opinion, the court vacated the lower judgment and remanded to determine whether the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act uses the state law or maritime law concept of negligence. On remand, the court of appeals should also consider whether the Act incorporates the doctrine of unseaworthiness. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo L. Black, Justice William O. Douglas, and Justice William J. Brennan wrote in a footnote that they voted with the majority only because of the Court’s recent ruling on this issue in The Tungus v Skovgaard, although he disagreed with that ruling.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, stating that there was no reason to remand the case. Justice Felix Frankfurter joined in the dissent. Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote a dissent, stating that he would affirm the lower court. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent also agreeing with the lower court decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59916:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59945:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59945:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral labor unions entered into a union shop agreement that authorized spending union funds to support political causes. Many union employees opposed those causes and sued to enjoin enforcement of the union shop agreement. The employees argued that forcing union members to fund political activities they disagree with unconstitutionally restrained free speech. The Superior Court of Bibb County granted the injunction and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59945:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59945:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59945:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-2 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote for a four-judge plurality reversing the lower judgment. The Supreme Court held that the lower court did not need to decide the constitutionality of the union shop agreement. The Court remanded the case with suggestions for possible remedies. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence noting reservations about the suggested remedies. Justice Charles E. Whitaker concurred in part, but dissented to the suggestion of remedies.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent, stating that the statute authorizing union expenditures over the objection of its members violated the First Amendment. Justice Felix Frankfurter also wrote a dissent, expressing that the union members were still free to exercise their First Amendment rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59945:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59974:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59974:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLocated on the Columbia River between the states of Oregon and Washington, the Bonneville Dam consisted of several facilities including a spillway dam with eighteen numbered bays separated by fifty-foot gates. On the bed of the river was a concrete structure called a baffle deck, which extended the width of the dam. This deck was lined with concrete blocks called ‘baffles’, designed to reduce the downstream velocity of the river. Over the years, the flow of water eroded the baffles. To restore them to their original condition, the United States contracted with Larson Construction Company, an independent contractor. The United States retained the right to inspect Larson’s work, but did not have direct control over it.\nOn August 20, 1954, Larson’s tug ‘Muleduzer’ set out from Bradford Island pushing Larson’s barge. As the tug and barge approached bay nine, the Columbia River’s flow was clearly turbulent; despite this, Larson proceeded with its work. The barge veered north when it reached bay nine and the port bow struck a pier. Water flooded a hole in the bow, and the barge and tug were swamped and sunk. Most of the crew drowned, including George William Graham; Graham was a member of the sounding party aboard the tug. The crew died in navigable Oregon waters.\nUnder Oregon’s Employers’ Liability Law (ELL), employers were liable for failure to use every device, care and precaution practicable for the protection and safety of life and limb. Oregon’s Wrongful Death Act (WDA), however, only permitted recovery for deaths caused by a wrongful act or omission, and set contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery. Henry Hess, the administrator of Graham’s estate, filed an action against the United States under both the ELL and the WDA. The district court entered judgment for the United States, holding that the United States was not liable under either statute. It ruled that the ELL did not apply to Hess’ case in part because the ELL imposed a higher standard of duty than federal maritime law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that only the WDA applied to Hess’ claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59974:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59974:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59974:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that there was no constitutional impediment to applying Oregon’s Employers’ Liability Law to Hess’ claim through maritime law. Justice Stewart cited precedent that wrongful deaths in state territorial waters were not judged under maritime law’s standards of duty, but rather under the substantive standards of state law. He argued that it would be an anomaly to allow states to create a right of action for death, but not to allow them to determine the circumstances under which that right exists. Justice Stewart refused to answer whether a state wrongful death act might offend traditional principles of maritime law, noting that the ELL was in some ways more in consonance with general maritime law principles than the WDA.\nChief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo Black, Justice William Douglas and Justice William Brennan concurred. They argued for the evenhanded application of the Court’s recent ruling in Tungus v. Skovgaard, but took issue with that case’s holding that the federal maritime wrongful death duty depended on the substantive law of a given state.\nJustice John Harlan dissented, joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter. Justice Harlan noted that Oregon imposed a higher standard of duty for wrongful deaths on its navigable waters, but that the normal lesser maritime duty applied to injuries short of death. He argued that the Court should not impose a state standard of duty higher than the general maritime duty unless that state explicitly required it.\nJustice Charles Whittaker also dissented, joining Justice Harlan’s dissent except for its implication that wrongful deaths on the navigable waters of a state are ever governed by the general substantive tort laws of that state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59974:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59985:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59985:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEphram Nestor immigrated to the United States from Bulgaria in 1913 and became eligible for old-age benefits in 1955. In 1956, he was deported for having been a member of the Communist Party in the 1930s. When he was deported, his old-age benefits were terminated and notice was given to his wife, who remained in the country and was eligible to receive his benefits. Nestor sued in district court and argued that the termination of his benefits violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in that it deprived him of an accrued property right. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Nestor, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare directly appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59985:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59985:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59985:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Social Security system was meant to be a form of long-term social insurance that has to constantly adapt to the demands of a changing workforce, which prevents it from fitting within the framework of the right to accrued property. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only bars government action that is arbitrary or lacking in rational justification, neither of which is true in this case. The Court also held that the termination of benefits was not punitive but rather the “denial of a non-contractual government benefit.”\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that, because Nestor had been paying into the Social Security fund before he began receiving benefits, the government’s termination of his benefits was effectively depriving him of his property without just compensation. He also argued that both the deportation and termination of Nestor’s benefits, based solely on the fact that he was a member of the Communist Party 20 years previously when it was not illegal to do so, imposes an ex post facto law on him. In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas argued that receiving Social Security benefits is a right earned by years of working and paying into the system, which Nestor did. The deprivation of those rights is a punishment that should only be reserved for those convicted of a crime. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the deprivation of Social Security benefits for certain offenses constituted a punishment without judicial trial in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59985:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59989:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59989:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRepublic Steel Corporation, International Harvester Company, and Interlake Iron Corporation operated steel mills on the banks on the Calumet River. Their manufacturing processes produced industrial waste. Water containing waste was recycled back into the river. Most of the solid waste was separated and disposed of, but liquid and small particles were dumped into the river. Over time, these small particles reduced the river depth from 21 feet to less than 9 feet in some places. The Rivers and Waters Act prohibits the “creation of any obstruction....to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.” The statue does allow for certain exceptions authorized by the Secretary of the Army. The United States sued the steel companies for creating an obstruction by dumping their industrial waste. The district court granted an injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the waste deposits did not constitute an “obstruction” under the Act and even if it did, an injunction was not permitted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59989:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59989:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59989:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the deposits were an obstruction within the meaning of the act and were not exempt. The Court also held that the district court was authorized to issue an injunction against the steel companies.\nJustice John M. Harlan dissented, arguing that the majority incorrectly interpreted the Rivers and Waters Act. He argued that “obstruction” only referred to certain kinds of obstruction, not including industrial waste. Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice Charles E. Whittaker, and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59989:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59992:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "59992:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn April of 1953, Daniel J. Sentilles, an engineer specializing in marine refrigeration, left the port of Santa Mara, Colombia, aboard the S.S. Montego to assist the ship in transporting bananas to Miami, Florida. The ship experienced rough waters during the journey, and on one occasion, Sentilles was knocked off his feet and washed across the deck by a large wave. The next day he developed a cough and other flu-like symptoms that persisted for several days. From Miami, he traveled to New Orleans, where he was treated for an acute case of pulmonary tuberculosis. Sentilles sued the owner of the S.S. Montego, the Inter-Shipping Corporation (“Shipping”), in federal district court under the Jones Act, which regulates U.S. shipowners. Sentilles argued that the accident aboard the S.S. Montego activated or aggravated a dormant tuberculosis infection. At trial, three medical specialists suggested that the accident could have caused the tuberculosis flare-up. A jury found in favor of Sentilles and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On appeal, Shipping argued that the evidence did not justify the jury’s conclusion. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted Shipping’s argument and reversed the judgment. Sentilles argued that the appellate court applied an improper standard of review by failing to consider the reasonableness of the judgment reached by the jury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "59992:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "59992:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "59992:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the testimony of the medical specialists supported the reasonableness of the judgment in favor of Sentilles. The Court noted that the role of the appellate court is not to independently review the evidence, but rather is limited to considering the reasonableness of decisions reached in the lower tribunal.\nJustice John M. Harlan concurred in the Court’s opinion. Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote a concurring opinion in which he noted that the record contained evidence that the accident actually caused the tuberculosis. In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Potter Stewart disagreed with the Court’s standard of review and instead reversed the appellate court upon an independent examination of the record. He also argued that the Court should not grant certiorari to cases in which the sufficiency of the evidence is the sole question before the Court.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent in which he agreed with Justice Stewart’s conclusion that the Court should not hear these types of cases. Rather than deciding the case, Justice Frankfurter argued that the Court should have dismissed its writ of certiorari after the parties’ oral arguments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "59992:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60043:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60043:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe owners and a majority of the patrons of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which forbids shopping on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown on Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously been open for business on Sundays, on which it conducted about one- third of its weekly business. In 1962, the Massachusetts’ Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open and doing any labor, business, or work on Sunday. The Crown Kosher Super Market argued this provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it does not respect their religious practices. The federal district court held that this provision is unconstitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the provision does not prohibit the free exercise of religion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60043:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60043:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60043:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The court held that statutes requiring stores to stay closed on Sundays do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the statute in question does not prohibit the free exercise of religion. A statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause simply because in practice it results in some inequality. The Court also concluded the statute was not for religious purposes, as the defendants contested.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered a dissenting opinion arguing the Sunday closing statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because one religion is economically disadvantaged by it. In his separate dissent, Justice Potter Stewart agreed with Justice Brennan’s dissent and added that making a citizen chose between his faith and economic survival is a cruel choice as well as unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60043:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60053:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60053:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1943, Peter Meyer took out life insurance policies in his own name worth $50,000. He pledged his insurance policies to Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Ohio as collateral security for a loan. This gave the bank the right to satisfy its claim out of the 'net proceeds of the policy when it becomes a claim by death.' After Peter Meyer pledged the policies to the bank, the United States determined that he owed $6,159.09 plus interest in unpaid taxes. The United States filed notice of tax lien on July 11, 1955.\nPeter Meyer died on December 28, 1955, owing $26,844.66 to Huntington National Bank. Ethel Meyer, the petitioner and Peter Meyer's widow, was named executrix of his estate and received $441.21, representing the remainder of the full cash surrender from Peter Meyer's insurance policies after payment to the bank.\nThe United States brought suit against Ethel Meyer under 26 U.S.C.A. 6321 and 6322, arguing that it should be compensated for the full tax lien by marshalling the funds already paid to Huntington National Bank. At trial, Ethel Meyer argued that she owed nothing to the government because she was not personally liable for Peter Meyer's tax lien. She also argued that the tax lien did not and could not attach to the net proceeds of the cash surrender because those proceeds would be exempt under New York Insurance Law.\nDistrict court Judge Edmund Palmieri held that the government was entitled to recover the full tax lien through the insurance policy's full cash surrender. The court relied on United States v. Behrens, where the court ordered a defendant to pay both a bank lien and tax lien from the same cash surrender. Although most of Peter Meyer's cash surrender was pledged to the bank for the payment of loans, this did not preclude the government from collecting on its full tax lien first. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed in a per curiam ruling. The court agreed that Behrens controlled the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60053:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60053:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60053:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Thomas Whittaker, writing for the majority in a 6-3 decision, held that New York state law controlled the case; New York exempted the net proceeds of insurance policy cash surrenders from attaching to tax liens. There was not clear guidance in federal law on this matter, whereas New York law protected the cash surrender in question. As the priority of liens is then determined by \"first in time first in right,\" the United States did not have a right to marshal the cash surrender to recover its tax lien because the bank's debt had priority.\nJustice Byron White, joined by Justices John Harlan and Potter Stewart, dissented. He argued that federal law should control the case to avoid inconsistent results in different states; once a tax lien has attached to a taxpayer's interests, federal law then determines the priority of liens. He also disputed the majority's interpretation of New York law, and did not find a clear, consistent policy of protecting the net proceeds of insurance policies' cash surrenders from creditors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60053:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60060:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60060:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn August 1958 William H. Burton, an African American, entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority, and was denied service solely because of his race. The Parking Authority is a tax-exempt, private corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating the city's parking facilities, and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions from the city. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and maintained the premises at its own expense. Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60060:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60060:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60060:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court concluded that the restaurant, as a recipient of assistance by the parking authority, benefited from the city's aid and constituted an financially integral and indispensable part of the state. As such, the Court found that the restaurant and the parking authority were so physically and financially intertwined that the private entity's conduct could be imputed to the government. Thus, it’s discrimination could be considered state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nJustice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment.\nJustice Harlan, joined by Justice Whittaker, dissented. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60060:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60076:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60076:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nConvertible Top Replacement Co., Inc. obtained a patent for a “convertible folding top with automatic seal at rear quarter.” The folding top included a flexible top fabric, supporting structure, and a sealing mechanism. None of those parts were individually patented. Convertible Top sued Aro Manufacturing Co., Inc. for direct and contributory patent infringement for manufacturing and selling replacement fabric designed to fit the patented device. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of Convertible Top and enjoined Aro from further manufacture or distribution of the fabric replacements. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60076:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60076:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60076:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Charles E. Whittaker, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that because Convertible Top did not patent the fabric top individually, there was no direct patent infringement. With no direct infringement, there could be no contributory infringement. The patent only covered the combination of parts that made up the folding top, not each individual part that made up that top. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred, writing that the other concurring opinion and the dissenting opinion were unnecessarily confusing.\nJustice William J. Brennan concurred in the result, arguing that there was no infringement because the cost of the replacement top in comparison with the device as a whole was so small made replacing the top a permissible repair instead of a reconstruction. Justice John M. Harlan dissented, arguing that the replacement of an unpatented part in a patented device is a forbidden reconstruction of the device. This constitutes direct patent infringement. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60076:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60079:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60079:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPeter Chaunt, a Hungarian native, came to the United States in 1921 at the age of 22. He became a U.S. citizen in 1940, one year after filing a petition for naturalization with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). In 1953, the Government filed a complaint, which alleged that Chaunt had concealed and misrepresented his arrest record in his application for citizenship, and sought to revoke his naturalization. The district court held that Chaunt had concealed his membership in the Communist Party and three arrests in Connecticut for distributing handbills, violating park regulations, and committing a breach of the peace. All of the arrests occurred more than ten years prior to Chaunt’s naturalization. The district court cancelled the order granting citizenship to Chaunt, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60079:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60079:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60079:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Government failed to show by “clear, unequivocal and convincing” evidence that Chaunt either concealed facts warranting a denial of citizenship or that their disclosure would have led to the discovery of other facts warranting a denial of citizenship. The arrests did not justify revocation of Chaunt’s citizenship because each arrest occurred outside the statutory requirement of demonstrated good moral character for five years prior to a petition for naturalization, and the charges did not involve moral turpitude. Noting Chaunt’s disclosure of his employment with the International Workers’ Order, an organization purportedly controlled by Communists, the Court declined to find that disclosure of the arrests might have led the INS to discover that Chaunt once served as a district organizer of the Communist Party in Connecticut.\nJustice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act only requires that the Government prove that Chaunt’s conduct blocked an investigation that might have resulted in the rejection of his application. He argued that the Government satisfied this test by showing that Chaunt intentionally concealed his arrest record because the INS could have rejected his application if it had discovered this misconduct prior to the court’s naturalization order. Justice Charles E. Whittaker and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60079:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60081:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60081:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKnetsch purchased annuity savings bonds from Sam Houston Life Insurance Company. In return, the company gave Knetsch loans and an annuity contract that would produce monthly annuity payments upon maturity. However, Knetsch kept borrowing from the insurance company in amounts that kept the net cash value of the annuity so low that it could produce no financial benefit other than tax deductions. Knetsch claimed payments to the insurance company as interest paid on indebtedness. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions and determined a deficiency amount for each of the two years in question. After paying the deficiency, Knetsch brought suit to obtain a refund in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The court ruled in favor of United States, holding that the transaction was a sham because it did not create \"indebtedness\" and, therefore, there was \"no commercial economic substance\" beyond the tax deductions. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60081:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60081:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60081:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote for the majority affirming the lower court's decision that the transaction was a sham. The loans the insurance company gave Knetsch were essentially rebates for a substantial portion of the interest payments and the small amount kept by the company was its fee for providing a \"façade of loans\" to be used to provide tax deductions. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, saying that as long as a transaction is allowed within the limits of insurance policies it should be recognized by the Internal Revenue Service, and any remedy should be left to the legislature.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60081:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60083:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60083:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60083:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60083:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60083:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the majority brushed aside First Amendment issues and declared that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.\nJustices Black and Douglas concurred.\nJustice Stewart concurred in the judgment but agreed fully with Part I of Justice Harlan's dissent and expressed no view as to the merits of the constitutional issue.\nJustice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, wrote a dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60083:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60103:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60103:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn act of the Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty-eight sided figure. The effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and place them in a district where no whites lived.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60103:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60103:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60103:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA state violates the Fifteenth Amendment when it constructs boundary lines between electoral districts for the purpose of denying equal representation to African Americans.\nThe unanimous Court held that the Alabama legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter admitted that states are insulated from judicial review when they exercise power \"wholly within the domain of state interest.\" However, in this case, Alabama's representatives were unable to identify \"any countervailing municipal function\" the act was designed to serve. The Court believed that the irregularly shaped district was drawn with only one purpose in mind: to deprive blacks of political power.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60103:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60118:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60118:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrank Wilkinson was summoned to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for questioning before a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The subcommittee was investigating Communist propaganda in the southern United States. Wilkinson refused to answer any questions, including whether he was a member of the Communist Party. He did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and argued instead that the subcommittee had no authority to interrogate him. Wilkinson also argued that he was only called before the subcommittee because of his public opposition to the Un-American Activities Committee. Wilkinson was incited and convicted for contempt of Congress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60118:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60118:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60118:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, Yes. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 5-4 majority affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the subcommittee’s investigation was clearly authorized by Congress. The question of whether Wilkin was a member of the Communist Party was relevant to the inquiry so Wilkinson was obligated to answer. The reasons why Wilkinson was called before the committee were irrelevant to the decision.\nJustice Hugo L. Black dissented, arguing that an investigation of those who criticize the Un-American Activities Committee is unconstitutional. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent. Justice Douglas dissented separately, arguing that Congress did not authorize the type of investigation that took place. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black joined in the dissent. Justice William J. Brennan dissented, arguing that the primary purpose of questioning Wilkinson was to expose him for the sake of exposure, rather than to aid lawmaking. Justice Douglas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60118:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60119:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60119:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoy R. Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland, but he could not receive his commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God as the Maryland Constitution required. He sued for his commission in the Maryland Circuit Court on the grounds that the requirement violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court rejected his claims and the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60119:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60119:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60119:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that such a requirement places the state of Maryland firmly on the side of those people who believe in God and are willing to state their belief. With this requirement, Maryland effectively aids religions that profess a belief in God at the expense of any other form of belief or disbelief. The First Amendment expressly prohibits a state from taking this position. Although the candidate has the option of not pursuing public office rather than declaring a belief in God, the test is an unconstitutional encroachment on the freedom of religion. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60119:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60123:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60123:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 29, 1958, thirteen police officers, including Frank Pape, arrived at James Monroe's Chicago apartment at 5:45 A.M. The officers broke down the door, forced Monroe and his wife to stand naked in their living room, and ransacked the apartment. Afterwards, James Monroe was escorted to police quarters and held for ten hours on \"open\" charges while he was interrogated about a murder. The police did not have a warrant for the search or the arrest, and refused Monroe permission to call his attorney.\nMonroe brought a complaint against each of the Chicago police officers individually and against the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not liable under the Civil Rights Act nor for acts committed in performance of governmental functions. All defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that there was no cause of action under the Civil Rights Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60123:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60123:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60123:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and No. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that the city police officers, in conducting an unreasonable search and seizure, had committed an action which was under the color of law, and that the police could be held liable individually under the Civil Rights Act. However, the majority further held that a municipality could not be liable under the Civil Rights Act. So, the court reversed the lower court's opinion insofar as it dismissed the Civil Rights Act claim against the police officers.\nJustice John Marshall Harlan II wrote a concurring opinion which Justice Potter Stewart joined. In his opinion, Justice Harlan discussed the difficulties in explaining the distinction between authorized or unauthorized deprivations of constitutional rights.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent arguing that a police officer who acts outside the law loses his authority under the law, making a state tort claim against individual officers more appropriate than a claim under the Civil Rights Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60123:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60141:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60141:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1944, Congress authorized the construction of a dam on the Roanoke River and for that purpose sought to acquire a 1,840-acre easement from the 7,400-acre estate surrounding the Dan River, a tributary of the Roanoke River. The Virginia Electric Company owned 1,540 acres of the property in question that had been purchased from the estate owner in 1907 and would be part of the government’s easement. In 1951, the government reached an agreement with the estate owner to purchase the easement for one dollar and to officially acquire the land through a condemnation proceeding. The Virginia Electric Company, whose land was about to be taken in the easement, intervened to contest the issue of just compensation.\nThe district court awarded a substantial compensation to the Virginia Electric Company, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the decision in United States v. Twin City Power Company that held that the amount of compensation should not take into account the value of the land for water power purposes. On remand, the district court appointed commissioners to evaluate the value of the land and awarded $65,520 in compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60141:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60141:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60141:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the land the government was taking for easement had market value, and the Fifth Amendment prevents the government from taking private property without compensation. The Court also held that the district court’s method of determining the value of the land was correct, but the determination of how much of that compensation is due to the Virginia Electric Company was not correct. The district court granted compensation based on the maximum possible value rather than the actual value based on land use.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the owner of the easement did not have rights to anything that gained value from the flow of the stream. However, the owner did have the rights to anything that was considered “property” under the Fifth Amendment and deserved to be justly compensated when the government takes that.\nJustice Charles E. Whittaker wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that compensation should be based on the value the land the owner had at the time the government took it. Because the Virginia Electric Company only owned that land in the hope that it would gain permission from the government to build a dam, the land had no value to the company when it was taken. He argued that the Fifth Amendment required compensation only based on what value the owner had lost rather than what the government has gained. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60141:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60162:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60162:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60162:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60162:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60162:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion which explored the nature of \"political questions\" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan provided past examples in which the Court had intervened to correct constitutional violations in matters pertaining to state administration and the officers through whom state affairs are conducted. Brennan concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and others raised in this case merited judicial evaluation.\nJustices Douglas, Clark, and Stewart filed separate concurring opinions.\nJustice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60162:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60163:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60163:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPaul and Pauline Poe, a married couple, decided to use contraceptives to prevent a fourth pregnancy after their first three children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought to obtain access to contraceptives in order to forestall a second pregnancy that could be life-threatening. Since the late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited the distribution and use of medical advice on contraceptives, although these laws were not regularly forced.. The Poes and Doe argued that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60163:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60163:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60163:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe plurality opinion, authored by Justice Frankfurter, chose to dismiss the case because it involved the threatened and not actual application of the Connecticut law. Since there was no immediate injury, there was no standing to confer jurisdiction.\nIn his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the plaintiffs should not be forced to break the law to get this vital information, even though the statutes are not regularly enforced. Courts should not require an actual arrest or prosecution before they review the constitutional rights at issue.\nJustices Harlan II, Stewart, and Black all dissented in separate opinions.\nJustice Brennan concurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60163:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60168:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60168:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAbraham Braunfeld owned a retail clothing and home furnishing store in Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was prohibited by his faith from working on Saturday, the Sabbath. The Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open for business on Sundays. Braunfeld's store was not one of those types allowed to be open. He challenged the law as a violation of the religious liberty clauses because he needed to be open six days a week for economic reasons and was prohibited from doing so by a tenet of his faith and the blue law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60168:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60168:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60168:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania blue law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute; however, the freedom to act (even in accordance with religious convictions) is not totally free from government restrictions. The Court found that the Sunday Closing Law had a secular basis and did not make any religious practices unlawful. The blue law is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the state can accomplish its secular goal of providing a uniform day of rest for all through other means. That an indirect burden, such as economic sacrifice, may be a result of the statute, does not make the blue law unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60168:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60178:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60178:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBruce Boynton, an African American law student, bought a Trailways bus ticket from Washington, D.C. to Montgomery, Alabama. The bus route went through Richmond, Virginia, where there was a 40-minute stop scheduled. Boynton entered the segregated restaurant in the bus station and sat on the side reserved for white customers. Both a waitress and a manager requested that Boynton move to the other side of the restaurant, and he explained that he was an interstate bus passenger and refused. A police officer arrived and arrested Boynton. He was tried, convicted, and fined for unlawfully remaining on the premises after being forbidden to do so.\nBoynton appealed his conviction to the Hustings Court in Richmond where he filed a motion to dismiss and argued that his constitutional rights were violated. The Hustings Court denied the motion. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60178:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60178:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60178:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 should be interpreted to ban all forms of segregation by race in any type of public transportation.\nWriting for the 7-2 majority, Justice Hugo L. Black concluded that, because the bus carrier provides the services of the terminal and its restaurant to the interstate passengers, these services must be subject to the same discrimination prohibitions as the transportation itself. Since the Interstate Commerce Act prohibits racial discrimination during travel, the same restrictions apply in the stations during stops.\nJustice Charles E. Whittaker, joined by Justice Tom C. Clark, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the restaurant was owned and operated by a private owner unaffiliated with the bus company. Without evidence that the bus company had control over the operation of the restaurant, there was no reason to hold the restaurant to the discrimination prohibitions laid out by the Interstate Commerce Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60178:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60188:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60188:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral employes of a discount department store sold a few items, such as floor wax and loose-leaf notebooks, to customers on a Sunday. By doing so, they violated Maryland's blue laws which only allow certain items, such as drugs, tobacco, newspapers and some foodstuffs, to be sold on Sundays.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60188:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60188:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60188:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court found that the blue laws did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the employees allege only economic injury and not infringement on their own religious practices. The Court also found that the blue laws did not violate the division between church and state. Sunday closing laws started out to facilitate church attendance in colonial America; however, the present Maryland laws are based on secular rather than religious state interests. The laws are to improve the \"health, safety, recreation, and general well-being\" of citizens. The present purpose of the laws is to provide a uniform day of rest for all. The fact that this day is of particular significance for various Christian sects does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60188:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60218:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60218:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn June, 1957, a Utah court entered a judgment against Harold Kesler for negligently operating a motor vehicle. When Kesler failed to pay the judgment for over sixty days, the judgment’s creditors, following Utah’s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (UMVSRA), filed the unpaid judgments with Utah’s Department of Public Safety. As a result, the Department suspended Kesler’s driver’s license and vehicle registration until he paid his judgment.\nIn December, 1959 Kesler, who had still failed to pay the judgment, filed for bankruptcy in federal bankruptcy court. Although this released him from his judgment debts, the Department refused to restore his driver’s license and vehicle registration. The Department claimed that, under the UMVSRA, a bankruptcy proceeding will not release debts for negligently operating a motor vehicle.\nThe United States District Court for the District of Utah, affirmed the law and refused to both restore his license and to invalidate Utah’s law. A direct appeal to the United States’ Supreme Court followed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60218:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60218:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60218:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the Court held that Utah’s law did not violate the Supremacy Clause. First, Justice Frankfurter noted that the states had compelling interests in promoting highway safety within their jurisdictions, citing to various measures taken to encourage safe driving throughout the United States. He also noted that most of these statutes did not allow drivers to discharge judgments against them for driving violations in bankruptcy. Justice Frankfurter held that, although the Bankruptcy Act relieved an individual’s obligations to pay certain debts, it did not remove the negative consequences that a state may place on those debts. To that end, a state may decide that, in order to promote safe driving, a judgment must be paid before an individual may regain driving privileges. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in part, but felt that the appeal was not properly before the Court. Chief Justice Earl Warren, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the initial three-judge panel at the District Court was improper and that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Finally, Justice Hugo L. Black, in his dissenting opinion argued that Utah’s statute took away rights conferred to all United State’s citizens under the Bankruptcy Act and, therefore, violated the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60218:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60222:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60222:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWestern Union Telegraph Company, headquartered and incorporated in New York, processed money orders between people living in different states. This case concerns money orders between payors in Pennsylvania and payees in other states. Over the years, Western Union accumulated a large sum of money from payees who never claimed the money sent to them. Pennsylvania law states that when property goes unclaimed for seven years and the whereabouts of the owner are unknown, that property escheats to the state. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania started proceedings to escheat the unclaimed money. Western Union argued that Pennsylvania provided insufficient service of process, and had no power to protect Western Union from other states who might attempt to escheat the same money. The Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60222:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60222:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60222:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No answer. In a unanimous decision, Justice Hugo L. Black wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the lower judgment violated due process because Pennsylvania had no power to protect Western Union from other states making similar claims over the same money. In fact, the state of New York had already done just that. The Court also held that the U.S. Supreme Court is authorized by Article 3, §2 of the Constitution to resolve dispute between states. The Court stated that the service question was irrelevant because Pennsylvania didn’t have the power to enforce the judgment anyway.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a concurrence, disagreeing with the Court’s reasoning, and stating the New York was clearly entitled to the property involved.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60222:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60223:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60223:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn early December of 1957, Mark Coppedge broke into a pharmacy and stole property, including a check writer and a batch of blank money orders that he filled in, forged, and cashed. He was tried and convicted in district court a year later, but he appealed his conviction based on information that corrupted the jury. A newspaper published an article regarding a witness who was too afraid of Coppedge to testify, which was information relayed to the judge while the jury was out of the room, and the jury should not have known. Coppedge petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for permission to appeal in forma pauperis, which would free him from the obligation to pay court costs. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60223:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60223:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60223:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-2 majority. The Court held that, since the Constitution guarantees the right to an appeal, the indigent petitioner must be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis if there is evidence of a legitimate issue to be considered on appeal. Additionally, the Court held that it is the responsibility of the legal system to ensure fair and speedy justice, which can often be difficult for poor defendants to access. Granting the in forma pauperis petition eliminates some of the hearings necessary for the case of a poor defendant to make it through the system and allows for increased efficiency.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the American justice system considers criminal appeals to be a right, and therefore the in forma pauperis provisions are not meant to be an extra obstacle to the appeals process. He also argued that, at times, the arguments to determine whether an appeal is frivolous could lead courts to make a determination on the merits before the appropriate time, which truncated the appeals process. He suggested that petitions for in forma pauperis appeals be accepted “as a matter of course” to remove such confusion. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent where he argued that the majority’s decision essentially overturned previous rulings by placing the burden on the government to prove the frivolity of the defendant’s appeal. He argued that the majority’s decision overstepped its bounds by remanding the case to the lower court, because the lower court had already found the case to be frivolous and dismissed the appeal. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Byron R. White did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60223:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60237:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60237:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDon Gilmore was the primary owner and managing officer of three different franchises of General Motors in California. In 1955, Don Gilmore and his wife, Dixie Gilmore, divorced. The trial court determined that the divorce was absolute without alimony for Dixie, which meant that Don successfully protected his assets from Dixie's claims that his assets were community property. Don's legal expenses totaled about $40,000 for the taxable years of 1953 and 1954. The Internal Revenue Code allows deductions from gross income for \"ordinary and necessary expenses incurred during the taxable year for the conservation of property held for the production of income.\"\nGilmore sued in the Court of Claims to recover alleged overpayment of income taxes related to the legal expenses incurred during the divorce. The Court of Claims held that the legal expenses were attributable to Gilmore's successful resistance of his wife's claims to certain assets and were therefore deductible for federal income tax purposes. However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that these expenditures were personal or family expenses and therefore not deductible. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question in the administration of the tax laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60237:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60237:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60237:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Marshall Harlan delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the origin and character of a claim with respect to expense incurred, rather than its potential consequences for the taxpayer, controls the basic test of whether an expense is classified as business or personal; therefore legal expenses are deductible as expenses incurred for conservation of property held for production of income. Dixie Gilmore's claims stemmed from the marital relationship and not from income-producing activity; therefore the claims in this case were personal, rather than business, expenses.\nIn their dissenting opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the majority opinion based its analysis on an unjustly narrow interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code. They argued that the legal expenses in this specific case should be considered business expenses.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60237:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60247:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60247:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOlga Zdanok and other individual employees of Glidden Company(Glidden) sought to recover damages for breach of collective bargaining agreement in New York state court, and then Glidden removed the case to federal district court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Judge J. Warren Madden, an active judge on the Court of Claims at the time, granted the employees damages. Glidden argued that the guarantee in Article III of the Constitution that judges should hold their offices during good behavior meant that Judge Madden displayed a lack of appropriate judicial independence.\nPrevious judicial precedent had established that the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the United States Court of Claims were neither confined in jurisdiction nor protected in independence by Article III of the Constitution, but that there were created by other powers Congress possessed under Article I. Congress had since enacted statutes explicitly including the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Article III of the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60247:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60247:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60247:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-2 majority. The Court held that the judges, including retired judges, of the United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are constitutionally protected in tenure and compensation under Article III of the Constitution. Congressional declarations made it clear that those judges are protected under Article III, although such clarification was relatively recent. The Court held that it was not strictly bound to follow past precedent but was able to reconsider cases in which Congressional declarations have negated the previous holdings.\nJustice Byron R. White and Justice Felix Frankfurter did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60247:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60250:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60250:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn a number of consolidated cases from Louisiana, several defendants were convicted of disturbing the peace by sitting at lunch counters that were reserved for patrons of a different race and refusing to leave. Defendants alleged that their convictions were based upon no evidence of guilt and, therefore, denied them of due process of the law. Defendants were denied post-conviction relief in the state courts, and the Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60250:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60250:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60250:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnder the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, a state cannot apply its criminal statutes on disturbing the peace to non-violent protestors staging a sit-in to express opposition to segregation by race.\nIn an opinion authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the convictions violated defendants' rights to due process of law guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court found no evidence that defendants' quiet, peaceable sitting at the counter that would have supported a finding that their conduct would have foreseeably disturbed the public. The Court acknowledged that the state courts might have construed the statute more broadly to permit a finding of imminent public commotion caused by peaceful and orderly conduct. Nonetheless, the Court found no evidence to support a finding of disturbing the peace.\nJustice William O. Douglas concurred on the ground that restaurants operating under a public license, though private enterprises, were public facilities in which a state may not constitutionally enforce a policy of racial segregation.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter concurred in the judgment on the ground that the records in the present cases contained no evidence of disturbance or alarm in the behavior of the public.\nJustice John M. Harlan concurred in the judgment on the grounds that the defendants' conduct, insofar as it occurred with the implied consent of the management, was a form of expression within the range of protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment which could in no event be punished by the state under a general breach of the peace statute; and that, in any event, the Louisiana statute, as applied, was unconstitutionally vague and uncertain.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60250:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60260:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60260:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrancisco Mendoza-Martinez (Martinez) was an American by birth with dual Mexican citizenship. Martinez admitted that to avoid the draft, in 1942, he left the United States for Mexico and did not return until November, 1946. As a result of his deliberate absence, Martinez entered a guilty plea in 1947 to violating Section 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (the \"Act\") and served 366 days in prison. Five years after his release, Martinez was issued an arrest and deportation warrant premised on a violation of Section 401(j) of the Act which divested draft dodgers of their U.S. citizenship. Following a dismissal of his appeal from the Attorney General's special inquiry decision stripping him of his U.S. citizenship, Martinez challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(j) in District Court but was defeated. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding the district court decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. This case was decided together with Rusk v. Cort.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60260:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60260:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60260:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court began by sustaining the validity of the Government's second action against Martinez since it addressed his lost of citizenship rather than revisiting his self-confessed draft evasion. The Court added, however, that although citizenship duties entail military service, the Government cannot divest citizens of their citizenship as a result of draft evasion alone. The imposition of such a drastic penalty, in the context of a reflexive statutory scheme, violates constitutional due process by denying subjects procedural safeguards such as the opportunity to experience a more incremental penal structure.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60260:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60261:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60261:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe State of Alaska threatened to enforce its anti-fish trapping law against two local Native American tribes. The federal government had not designated a reservation for the tribes. The tribes depended on the salmon they trapped for survival and received permits to use the traps from the Army Corps of Engineers and the United States Forest Service, as well as favorable regulations from the Secretary of the Interior. The president of the Kake Village Council was arrested while trying to moor a trap. The tribes sued to enjoin Alaska from enforcing the anti-trapping law. The district court dismissed the suit and the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60261:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60261:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60261:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 8-1 decision Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote for the majority affirming the Alaska court. The Supreme Court held that there was no statutory authority granting the Secretary of the Interior the power to regulate contrary to state law. In addition, the permits did not trump state law. In order to prevent undue hardship, the Court ordered that the Native American tribes be allowed to continue using the traps through the end of the 1962 fishing season. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a partial dissent, agreeing that the Alaska law should prevail, but disagreeing with allowing the tribes to continue to use traps through the end of the 1962 season.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60261:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60266:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60266:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Florida statute automatically exempted women from jury duty and did not place women on jury lists. Women could, however, volunteer and register for jury duty. After an all-male jury convicted Mrs. Hoyt for murdering her husband, she appealed the decision to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Court upheld the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60266:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60266:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60266:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that the statute was based on a reasonable classification and was therefore constitutional. Noting that women were \"still regarded as the center of home and family life,\" the Court found that the states could relieve them from the civic responsibility of jury duty unless they themselves determined that such service was consistent with their own \"special responsibilities.\" The Court held that the case was distinct from other cases involving racial discrimination in jury selection, and that male-female disproportions on jury lists carried no constitutional significance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60266:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60271:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60271:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe general maritime law of the United States has long obliged ship owners to indemnify seamen against expenses of injury or illness suffered while on the job aboard ship. An ill or injured seaman is entitled to \"maintenance and cure,\" that is, to compensation by his employer for the expenses of his medical treatment and subsistence (i.e., room and board) while convalescing ashore. (Until 1982, a seaman could obtain free medical attention from the US Public Health Service. In such a case, the USPHS effectively relieved the seaman's employer of the duty of cure.)\nAt discharge, after two voyages on S.S. National Liberty, seaman Clifford Vaughan got a hospitalization certificate from the master, N.J. Atkinson. Vaughan then spent three months in a USPHS hospital and two years as an outpatient undergoing treatment for tuberculosis. The ship owner ignored Vaughan's request for maintenance as an outpatient. For a while before obtaining clearance to return to duty, Vaughan worked ashore as a cab driver. Later, he sued unsuccessfully in federal district court for maintenance and for damages from the ship owner's failure to promptly pay, including his attorney's fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60271:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60271:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60271:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a 5-2 opinion for the Court, Justice William O. Douglas held that allowing offset would encourage callous ship owners to refuse maintenance and cure. Moreover, courts in admiralty have adequate equity power to treat attorney's fees as damages from failure to pay maintenance (and cure) when it was a willful breach of duty.\nJustice Potter Stewart, joined by Justice John Marshall Harlan II, dissented. While there should be no duty to mitigate, wages should be offset when actually earned. The duty to pay maintenance and cure was created to make the seaman whole, not afford him a windfall.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60271:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60274:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60274:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Douglas and Bennie Will Meyes, two indigent men, were arrested and charged with thirteen felonies, including armed robbery and assault with intent to commit murder. A single public defender represented both defendants. The public defender asked the trial court for a continuance because he was unprepared, there was a conflict of interest between the two defendants, and Douglas requested a new attorney. The judge denied the request for a continuance. The defendants then requested that the public defender be removed from the case. The judge granted that request but denied their request to appoint a new attorney. The defendants completed the trial without any representation. A jury found the defendants guilty of all thirteen felonies.\nThe defendants appealed. The Second District Court of Appeals for California’s Third District did not appoint counsel to represent the defendants, because, based on their review of the record, appointing counsel would add no benefit to the defendants’ case. Following this decision, that court affirmed the trial court’s decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60274:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60274:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60274:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, the trial court’s refusal violated the defendants’ equal protection rights. Justice William Douglas delivered the opinion of a 6-3 majority. The Court held that California’s treatment of defendants changed depending on whether the defendant could afford counsel. Indigent defendants, potentially with “hidden merit” in their appeals, could not meaningfully appeal convictions when courts conducted reviews without input from the defendant’s attorney. When indigent defendants, unable to afford attorneys, were forced to show preliminarily merit for their appeal before a court appoints counsel, they were denied due process. Instead, California’s practice amounted to rich v. poor discrimination.\nJustice Tom C. Clark dissented and argued that, because over 96% of prison appeals frivolously clog the court systems, California’s procedure balances defendants’ rights with state needs. Justice John M. Harlan, joined by Justice Potter Stewart, wrote a separate dissent. They argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause, should have governed this issue. Because California adequately balanced state and defendant rights, the state did not violate the Due Process Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60274:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60280:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60280:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice arrested Hom Way for possession of heroin. While under arrest, Way told police that a man named “Blackie Toy” once sold him an ounce of heroin at his laundry on Leavenworth St. Later that day, police found a laundry run by James Wah Toy. Nothing on the record identified Toy as “Blackie Toy”, but police arrested him anyway. Police then went to Toy’s house where they arrested Johnny Yee and found several tubes containing less than one ounce of heroin. Police also arrested Wong Sun. Police interrogated the men and wrote statements in English for them to sign. Both men refused, citing errors in the statements. At trial in U.S. District Court, Toy and Sun were convicted on federal narcotics charges. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60280:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60280:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60280:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court and remanding for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the police did not have probable cause to justify the arrests. With regard to Toy, the court should exclude all evidence found during the search because they are the “fruits” of an unlawful search. The unsigned statement was not corroborated, so it gave no basis for conviction. Sun’s unsigned confession and evidence against him were admissible.\nJustice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent, stating that the arrests were lawful and there was no reason to grant Sun a new trial. Justices James M. Harlan, Potter Stewart, and Byron R. White joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60280:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60287:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60287:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Brown Shoe Company bought Kinney Company Inc., the United States sued Brown for antitrust violations of the Clayton Act. The United States argued that the merger would substantially lessen competition in the shoe manufacturing and sales industries. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ruled in favor of the United States. The court ordered Brown to divest itself of all Kinney stock and assets and to operate Kinney as separately as possible pending complete divestiture. The court gave Brown 90 days to come up with a plan for complete divestiture. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal under the Expediting Act, which allows direct appeal of final district court judgments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60287:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60287:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60287:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the unanimous opinion of the court affirming the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s judgment was final, despite the pending plan for divestiture. The Court also held that the district court's findings on the effect of the merger on competition were correct. Justice Tom C. Harlan wrote a concurrence, stating that the effect of the merger was much broader than the district court found. Justice John M. Harlan dissented in part, concurring in the judgment, but finding that the district court’s judgment was not final, so direct appeal was not proper. Justices Byron R. White and Felix Frankfurter did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60287:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60291:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60291:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Federal Tobacco Inspection Act provides uniform standards for classification and inspection of tobacco. The regulations under the Act require sellers to identify type 14 tobacco with a blue tag. The Georgia Tobacco Identification Act requires sellers to mark the same type of tobacco with a white tag. Several owners and operators of tobacco warehouses in Georgia sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia to enjoin enforcement of the Georgia law. The three judge court granted the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60291:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60291:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60291:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Court held that Congress had the power to regulate tobacco sales through the Commerce Clause. By enacting the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act, Congress preempted the states from regulating in that area of commerce, so the identification provision of the Georgia Tobacco Identification Act is invalid. Justice Hugo L. Black dissented, writing that Congress did not intend to preclude this area of regulation with the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act. The Georgia statute was valid because it did not conflict with the federal act. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60291:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60292:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60292:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 24, 1954, William Link sued Wabash Railroad company over injuries he received when his car ran into a Wabash Railroad train at a crossing. After six years of motions, a pretrial hearing was set for October 12, 1960. On October 11, 1960, Link’s attorney contacted the Wabash Railroad attorney to inform him that he was doing work in Indianapolis and would miss a deposition that was set to happen before the hearing. The next morning, Link’s lawyer called the courthouse to notify the judge that he was detained in Indianapolis filing papers for a case before the Iowa Supreme Court. He said he could not make it to court that day but was available both of the next two days. Two hours after the pretrial was supposed to start, the court found that Link’s lawyer had not provided a sufficient reason for missing the hearing and dismissed the case “for failure to prosecute the action.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60292:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60292:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60292:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the decision of the 4-3 majority. The Court held that a court has the right to clear its calendar of cases that have been dormant because of inaction on the part of the plaintiff without any motion from the defense. This right has long been understood as one of the inherent powers of the court and no law explicitly restricts it. The Court also held that there are circumstances where a lack of a chance for argument does not violate the right to due process. In this case, the plaintiff voluntarily chose a lawyer with potential time conflicts, and both sides had plenty of notice about the hearing.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent where he argued that the majority’s decision essentially punished the plaintiff by forcing him to accept the loss of his property without due process. He found that the court’s decision relied solely on the lawyer’s failure to appear, rather than any other want of prosecution in the history of the case. Instead, the lawyer’s attempts to contact the court and reschedule the hearing clearly indicated a desire to continue the prosecution of the case. He also argued that to punish the client for the sins of the lawyer placed an enormous and unfair burden on the client to oversee the work of his attorney. Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the dissent.\nJustice William O. Douglas also dissented.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Byron R. White did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60292:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60296:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60296:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company were both large distributors of milk products based in Chicago, Illinois. Each company sold dairy products to retail stores under a plan that gave independent stores discounts on the list prices based on the volume of the independent stores' purchases, up to a specified maximum discount. The dairies granted grocery chain stores a flat discount, without reference to the volume of their purchases, at a rate substantially higher than the maximum discount available to independent grocery stores.\nThe government brought a Section 2(a) Clayton Act suit against The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company, seeking an injunction against selling milk products at prices which discriminated between the independent groceries and the chain groceries. Each company conducted its own cost study in an attempt to demonstrate that the differences in pricing between independent groceries and chain groceries were due to actual cost differences. The cost studies demonstrated that it was less costly on average to sell to chain stores. So, the dairy companies argued that the price discrimination was justified by the cost justification proviso of the Clayton Act.\nThe United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the Government's suit, concluding that the cost differences demonstrated by the two companies' cost studies were sufficient to justify the price discrimination. The United States appealed the District Court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60296:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60296:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60296:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Justice Tom C. Clark, wrote the opinion of the Court reversing and remanding the lower court's decision. Writing for himself and five other justices, Clark maintained that the cost studies submitted by the two dairy companies did not satisfy their burden of showing that their respective discriminatory pricing plans reflected only a due allowance for cost differences. Clark recognized that eliminating class pricing would be impractical, but emphasized that customer classifications could not be arbitrary and that members of a class must have such similarity as to make the averaging of the cost of dealing with the class a valid and reasonable indication of the cost of dealing with any specific member of the class. Since Borden and Bowman did not show sufficient homogeneity within the class of chain groceries or within the class of independent groceries, the price discrimination between the two classes was illegal under the Clayton Act.\nJustice William O. Douglas voted with the majority and wrote a concurring opinion, which emphasized the purpose of the anti-trust acts. Douglas stated that the Clayton Act should be read in a way that preserves as much of traditional free enterprise as possible, by controlling practices such as unfair discounting, which could lead to unfair competitive advantage and monopoly.\nJustice Marshall Harlan dissented. Harlan stated that the cost studies submitted to the district court were adequate under the accepted principles of the law in this field. He agreed with the District Court's conclusion that the studies were conscientiously prepared and appeared to justify the price discrimination arising from the discount practices. As such, Harlan would have affirmed the lower court's opinion.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter took no part in this decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60296:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60301:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60301:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMaurice A. Hutcheson, a president of a labor union, refused to answer eighteen questions before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. Although Hutcheson appeared to be concerned about the state using his words against him in a pending state criminal trial, he specifically waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, he argued that the Committee only wanted to expose his wrongful acts, and that this exposure would violate his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the Committee's questions acted as a \"pretrial\" of the state charges.\nThe United States District Court for the District of Columbia found the union president guilty of contempt of Congress. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment. Hutcheson appealed the appellate court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60301:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60301:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60301:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 4-2 decision Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority and concluded that the Committee's questions were not outside the scope of the Senate investigation, nor were the Committee's questions asked simply to expose the union president's criminal acts. The fact that state prosecutors could have used the answers to the questions in a pending state criminal trial did not violate Due Process. The Court did not allow the union president to attempt to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because he had explicitly waived it in the Committee hearing.\nJustice Earl Warren wrote a dissent stating that the opinion forced the union president to choose between invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, answering the questions truthfully and aiding state prosecutors, committing perjury, or refusing to answer and face contempt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60301:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60303:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60303:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe New York State Board of Regents authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. A group of organizations joined forces in challenging the prayer, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected their arguments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60303:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60303:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60303:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe state cannot hold prayers in public schools, even if participation is not required and the prayer is not tied to a particular religion.\nIn an opinion authored by Hugo L. Black, the Court held that respondent's decision to use its school system to facilitate recitation of the official prayer violated the Establishment Clause. Specifically, the policy breached the constitutional wall of separation between church and state. The Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition of laws establishing religion meant that government had no business drafting formal prayers for any segment of its population to repeat in a government-sponsored religious program. The Court held that respondent's provision of the contested daily prayer was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.\nJustice Douglas concurred in the judgment on the ground that the state's financing a religious exercise violated the First Amendment.\nJustice Stewart dissented, arguing that no \"official religion\" was established by permitting those who want to say a prayer to say it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60303:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60312:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60312:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe NAACP was prosecuted for violating a Virginia statute which banned \"the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60312:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60312:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60312:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the activities of the NAACP amounted to \"modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit.\" NAACP-initiated litigation was \"a form of political expression\" and not \"a technique of resolving private differences,\" argued Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who authored the majority opinion. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented, joined by Justices Potter Stewart and Tom Clark.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60312:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60320:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60320:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA jury found defendant guilty under a California statute that criminalized being addicted to narcotics. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant sought further review from the United States Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60320:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60320:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60320:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-2 decision authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that laws imprisoning persons afflicted with the \"illness\" of narcotic addiction inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court likened the law to one making it a criminal offense \"to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease,\" and argued that the state could not punish persons merely because of their \"status\" of addiction. The Court noted that the law was not aimed at the purchase, sale, or possession of illegal drugs.\nWhile joining the Court's opinion, Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion, elaborated the reasons why the statute was regarded as imposing a cruel and unusual punishment.\nJustice Harlan concurred on the ground that the trial court's instruction permitted the jury to find defendant guilty on no more proof than that he was present in California while he was addicted to narcotics, and hence authorized punishment for a bare desire to commit a criminal act.\nJustice Clark dissented, primarily on the ground that, properly construed, the statute provided a treatment rather than a punishment.\nJustice White also dissented, expressing the view that it was within the power of the state to confine the defendant by criminal proceedings for the use of narcotics or for regular use amounting to habitual use.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60320:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60324:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60324:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 30, 1956, the Chicago Police Department arrested John E. Hodges on charges of armed robbery. On May 2, 1956, two members of the District of Columbia Police Department traveled to Chicago and interrogated Hodges for about an hour before producing a written statement. Hodges was returned to Washington, D.C., indicted, and pled guilty. Hodges later withdrew his plea and entered a plea of not guilty. On April 15, 1957, Hodges went to trial and was found guilty. He did not appeal.\nThree months later, Hodges filed a motion in district court to vacate his sentence, arguing that his confession was coerced and should not have been admitted into evidence at trial. The motion was denied without a hearing. Hodges appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60324:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60324:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60324:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a per curiam opinion, the Court determined that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted. The Court held that the district court was not required to hold a hearing because Hodges was not entitled to relief.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent and argued that the petitioner has a right to relief because he was essentially denied his right to appeal within the 10-day period following his conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60324:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60327:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60327:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) received much criticism from state legislators as it pushed ahead with litigation to combat segregation. The State of Florida, in 1959, established a Legislative Investigation Committee to study what were called \"subversive organizations.\" Gibson, president of the Miami branch of the NAACP, was subpoenaed before the committee and asked to produce a membership list of his organization. He refused and was found in contempt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60327:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60327:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60327:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a close decision, the Court found that Gibson's rights had been violated. In his opinion, Justice Goldberg recognized the important right of states to inform themselves on \"legitimate and vital interests.\" However, even though inquiring about the actions of a group such as the Communist Party may have been one of these legitimate interests, argued Goldberg, Florida did not prove that a \"substantial connection\" between the Miami NAACP and Communist Party activities existed. Thus, a \"compelling and subordinating governmental interest\" would not have been served by forcing Gibson to disclose his group's membership list.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60327:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60337:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60337:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nStandard Oil Co. and two employees, Fong Foo and Robert Knupp were tried for conspiracy and concealing material facts within the jurisdiction of a governmental agency. The group allegedly falsified tests on goods manufactured at Standard Oil’s plant. Before the government finished presenting their case, the district court judge directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal for all parties on all counts. He then entered formal judgments of acquittal on the grounds of improper conduct by the Assistant U.S. States Attorney and a lack of credibility in the testimony of government witnesses. The United States filed for a writ of mandamus from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, asking the court of vacate the judgments and order a new trial. The court granted the writ, holding that the district court did not have the power to direct the judgment of acquittal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60337:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60337:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60337:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Court held that vacating the acquittal and granting a new trial violated petitioners’ constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Justice John M. Harlan concurred, agreeing that double jeopardy barred a second trial, because the trial court did not base its decision solely on the Assistant U.S. Attorney’s misconduct. Justice Tom C. Clark dissented, arguing that the district court had no power to direct a verdict of acquittal. Justice Charles E. Whittaker did not participate", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60337:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60346:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60346:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Joseph Killian was an employee at the Allen-Bradley Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a member of Local 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America. From October of 1952 to February 28, 1953, Killian served as an officer of Local 1111. On December 9, 1952, the president of Local 1111 ordered all officers to come to the union office to execute affidavits stating that they were not members of the Communist Party, in accordance with the Taft-Hartley Act.\nAs early as the fall of 1949, Killian was a member of the Communist party group on the campus of the University of Wisconsin and in the city of Madison, Wisconsin. Killian held a number of the group’s meetings in his home. Government witness Sullivan transferred his Communist Party membership to Madison in October 1949; Killian contacted him in his role assigning individuals to Communist Party groups or cells. In November of 1951, Killian and others formed a Communist Party cell to operate within the Allen-Bradley plant. Killian suggested to a government witness and co-worker, Ondrejka, that both should become stewards of Local 1111 to advance party aims within the union; both subsequently became officers and participated in union meetings.\nKillian was charged with making false statements in an affidavit. At trial, both Sullivan and Onrejka testified that they joined the Communist Party at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On cross-examination, Sullivan and Ondrejka testified that the FBI paid them monthly amounts for their services, and were reimbursed for expenses incurred in Communist Party activities. Killian moved for production of all statements given by Sullivan and Ondrejka to the FBI, with a particular focus on reports made by Ondrejka of his reimbursable expenses and receipts signed by Ondrejka; Killian requested this evidence to impeach the witnesses’ testimony. Killian also moved to strike both Sullivan and Ondrejka’s testimony. The government instead offered to produce a list showing the dates and amounts of payments to Ondrejka and whether each payment was for services or expenses. Killian refused this substituted evidence, and the district court denied Killian’s motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Killian's conviction, holding that the district judge properly excluded the requested reports and receipts because they were not related to the direct testimony of the witnesses.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60346:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60346:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60346:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes, and yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Charles E. Whittaker, the Court held that the district court must determine whether the documents requested by Killian were destroyed in good faith and in accord with normal practice, as suggested by the United States. If so, Killian would not be entitled to a new trial, because this would suggest that the information contained on the receipts was finally recorded elsewhere and already in evidence. The United States claimed that only two of Ondrejka’s receipts related to his testimony and that this information was contained in Ondrejka’s narrative statements; Justice Whittaker instructed the district court to make a final judgment for the government if it finds that this claim was true.\nJustice Whittaker rejected Killian’s objection to the jury instruction’s subjective definition of membership in the Communist Party. He reasoned that the very nature of claimed membership in a secret or underground organization precludes the existence of objective proof of membership. Justice Whittaker also rejected Killian’s argument that the Communist Control Act (CCA) -- from which the jury instructions were largely drawn -- was unconstitutional. He noted that Killian was charged with lying about being a Communist in an affidavit, not with being a member of the Communist Party, the status prohibited by the CCA.\nJustice Whittaker held that the district court properly defined “affiliation” for its jury instruction. He cited several decisions in the circuit courts using similar definitions of \"affiliation\" with the Communist Party. He rejected Killian’s narrow definition of “affiliation”, wherein the government would have to show that Killian was a member of an organization working with the Communist Party. He held that the district court’s definition was reasonable and properly outlined, vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the district court.\nJustice Hugo Black dissented. He argued that compelling union officers to swear they are not Communists violated the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of belief and political association. He noted that test oaths are historic weapons against religious and political minority.\nJustice William O. Douglas dissented, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Black. Justice Douglas argued that the jury could find Killian guilty only if he committed illegal acts in connection with his role in the Communist Party. As the record contained no evidence of Killian committing an illegal act, his conviction should have been reversed.\nJustice William J. Brennan dissented. He took issue with the majority’s interpretation of “membership”, and would have required evidence of some objective act of association and admission, understood as such by the party and by Killian.\n\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60346:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60356:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60356:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHerbert Goldblatt owned 38 acres of land within the Town of Hempstead (town) and often used the land for his business of mining sand and gravel. During excavation, water filled the crater, which widened and deepened. The town expanded around the excavation and later enacted a series of ordinances to regulate mining excavation within its limits. In 1958, the town amended an ordinance to prohibit excavation below the water table and impose a duty refill any excavation currently below the level. In 1959, the town sued Goldblatt for not complying with the ordinance. Goldblatt argued the ordinance is unconstitutional because it was not regulatory but rather represented the town confiscating his property without compensation. The Court of Appeals of New York held for the Town of Hempstead, allowing them to enforce the prohibition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60356:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60356:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60356:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Thomas C. Clark delivered the opinion of the 7-0 majority. The court held that regulation ordinances that take property previously used for personal profit are constitutional if the regulations are reasonable within due process of the law. The ordinance in this case was a valid exercise of the town’s police powers since it was passed as a safety measure to protect the general public of the town; therefore, the regulations are reasonable and do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Byron R. White took no part in the decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60356:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60359:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60359:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn accordance with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the Secretary of Agriculture promoted milk-marketing orders in the New York/New Jersey region that included compensatory payment provisions. The provisions in question required those who buy milk elsewhere and bring it into the region to pay the farmers who supply that region a “compensatory payment.” The petitioners were milk processing plant operators in Pennsylvania who challenged the validity of the “compensatory payment” provisions by arguing that they failed notice requirements and conflicted with other provisions of the Act that required uniform prices. The district court held these provisions to be invalid, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and upheld the validity of the provisions as authorized by the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60359:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60359:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60359:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe compensatory payment provisions were invalid as inconsistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the Agricultural Market Agreement Act of 1937. Justice John M. Harlan, II delivered the opinion of the 6-1 majority. The Court held the Secretary of Agriculture exceeded his authority by creating the “compensatory payment” provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937. The provisions essentially forced non-regional milk producers to subsidize regional milk producers, which interfered with the competitive advantage the the cheaper, non-regional milk producers would naturally have. The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended it to prevent this type of creation of economic barriers to protect the prices of regional products. Therefore, the provisions conflicted with Congress’ intent and were invalid.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court should have affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding the Secretary of Agriculture. Black explained that the Secretary did not overreach, and he should be given the authority to impose the provisions at issue in order to protect farmers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60359:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60360:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60360:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSix individuals were indicted and convicted for refusing to answer pertinent questions before a grand jury. Each of the individuals moved to squash the conviction because they were not told what the subject of the inquiry was, so had no basis for determining what questions were pertinent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60360:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60360:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60360:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-2 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the majority reversing the lower court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the convictions could not stand because the grand jury failed to identify the subject of the inquiry at the time the individuals refused to answer questions. Justice William J. Brennan did not participate in the decision with respect to #10.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence stating that the investigation was to determine Communist infiltration in the press and that that investigation was unconstitutional. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent stating that the indictments were valid. Justice John C. Clark joined in Justice Harlan’s dissent and wrote a separate dissent criticizing this decision as a departure from previous law. Justices Byron R. White and Felix Frankfurter did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60360:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60371:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60371:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Chicago police arrested and detained Frank Townsend, a drug addict, in connection with a murder. After several hours of questioning, Townsend began going into withdrawal and asked for a doctor. A doctor gave him a medicine Townsend alleges was a \"truth serum.\" While under the influence of the medication, Townsend confessed to the murder. Townsend alleged that the medicine caused his confession and, therefore, was not admissible at trial. Defendants disputed most of the facts surrounding the confession. The Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois admitted the confession at a trial by jury. The jury found Townsend guilty and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction.\nTownsend subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The District Court denied the writ without a hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the District Court's inquiry should be limited to undisputed portions of the record.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60371:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60371:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60371:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, when the facts are in dispute and the petitioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in state court. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Earl Warren wrote for the majority. At the state level, several crucial facts, such as whether or not the medicine given to Townsend was a \"truth serum,\" were not determined. The record did not provide sufficient information to make an accurate determination. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court was careful to note that it did not rule on the truth of the allegations in the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that the District Court had made sufficient factual determinations and a new hearing was unnecessary. Justice Tom C. Clark, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60371:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60390:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60390:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Kansas statute made it a misdemeanor to enter into contracts for \"debt adjusting\" (a practice in which a debtor agrees to pay a monthly fee to an adjustor who then makes payments to the debtor's creditor). Skrupa was in business as a \"Credit Advisor\" and engaged in this practice. A lower court held that the Kansas statute was an \"unreasonable regulation of a lawful business\" and struck it down.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60390:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60390:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60390:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court and affirmed Kansas's right to regulate debt adjusting. The unanimous decision held that the question of whether the law was wise or reasonable was a legislative and not a judicial one. Justice Black argued that the lower court's ruling relied on old law; the Court had moved out of the business of using the \"vague contours\" of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down laws which it had deemed economically unwise. Those were issues for state and national legislatures to address and not the courts. As long as state regulations do not offend a \"specific federal constitutional prohibition\" or a \"valid federal law,\" they are legitimate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60390:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60391:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60391:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince the beginning of the 20th century, the State of Georgia used a county unit system for counting votes in primary elections. Under this system, the candidate who received the highest number of votes in a county would receive all of that county's unit votes. The overall winning candidate would then have to receive a majority of the county unit votes statewide. This system ended up giving rural counties a majority of the unit votes, even though rural counties made up only about a third of the population as of the 1960s.\nIn 1962, James O'Hear Sanders, a voter in Georgia's most populous county, brought suit against several representatives of the Georgia State Democratic Executive Committee and the Secretary of State of Georgia. Sanders claimed that the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Seventeenth Amendment. As a voter within one of the urban counties, Sanders claimed his vote had less of an influence on the nomination of candidates than that of a rural voter. A special three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with Sanders and held that the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause. However, the district court did not outlaw the county unit system entirely. The State appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60391:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60391:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60391:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William O. Douglas, in an 8-1 majority opinion, vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case with directions. The Court held that the weighing of votes through the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by giving more voting power to residents of particularly small rural counties. Unlike the district court, the majority held that the county unit system was impermissible in its entirety. The Court reasoned that the longstanding concept of political equality requires elections to be governed by the rule of \"one person, one vote.\" Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented, arguing that the case should be sent back for trial to establish a fully developed record for the Court to review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60391:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60395:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60395:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nS. H. Kress and Company operated a general variety store on Main Street in Durham, North Carolina. On the first floor, Kress had a stand-up counter where it served food and drinks to both black and white customers. On the basement floor, however, Kress operated a luncheonette department with signs posted stating that it was for employees and invited guests only.\nOn May 6, 1960, seven students tried to seat themselves at the luncheonette counter. Five, including John Thomas Avent, were black students at North Carolina College for Negroes in Durham. The other two were white students at Duke University. All seven were involved with civil rights student organizations to varying degrees. Before each sat down, the store’s manager W. K. Boger spoke with the students individually. He told them that the luncheonette department was for employees and invited guests only, and asked them to leave. Both white students, however, were only asked to leave when it became clear they were sitting with one or more black customers. When the students refused to leave, Boger called an officer of the Durham police department, who arrested the students and charged them with trespassing.\nAt trial, Boger testified that it was Kress’ policy to refuse service to black customers at the luncheonette department, and to refuse service to white people in the company of black people. The district court convicted all seven defendants of trespassing. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the ruling. Noting that North Carolina had no laws mandating the separation of white and black customers in restaurants, the court upheld proprietors’ common law right to exclude individuals on the basis of race.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60395:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60395:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60395:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the North Carolina Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decisions in Peterson v. City of Greenville and Patterson v. Alabama In Peterson, the Court held that states cannot use trespass laws to enforce discrimination mandated by a segregation ordinance. In Patterson, the Court held that it is bound to consider changes in law which supervene after a judgment is entered.\nJustice John Harlan dissented in part. He pointed out that the City of Durham had a restaurant segregation ordinance in effect, but that the North Carolina Supreme Court proceeded under the assumption that no such ordinance existed. He would have instead remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this fact.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60395:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60406:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60406:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Pennsylvania law, public schools were required to read from the bible at the opening of each school day. The school district sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The district court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, even after the statute had been amended to permit a student to excuse himself.\nThe Court consolidated this case with one involving Maryland atheists who challenged a city rule that provided for opening exercises in the public schools that consisted primarily of reading a chapter from the bible and the Lord's Prayer. The state's highest court held the exercise did not violate the First Amendment. The religious character of the exercise was admitted by the state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60406:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60406:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60406:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nPublic schools cannot sponsor Bible readings and recitations of the Lord’s Prayer under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Clark, the majority concluded that, in both cases, the laws required religious exercises and such exercises directly violated the First Amendment. The Court affirmed the Pennsylvania decision, and reversed and remanded the Maryland decision because the mandatory reading from the bible before school each day was found to be unconstitutional.\nJustice Stewart dissented, expressing the view that on the records it could not be said that the Establishment Clause had necessarily been violated. He would remand both cases for further hearings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60406:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60408:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60408:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn the evening of December 19, 1957, Spokane police officers arrested Raymond L. Haynes near a gas station that had just been robbed. Haynes admitted to the robbery as officers drove him to the police station, and he signed a written confession after he was told that he could not call his wife until he signed it. At trial, Haynes argued that the confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary and coerced. The judge admitted the confession into evidence, and the jury found Haynes guilty. Haynes appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60408:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60408:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60408:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Spokane police officers extracted an involuntary confession from Haynes by threatening to hold him without allowing him to contact his family. The Court also held that such tactics were unnecessary because the police had sufficient evidence to charge Haynes with robbery even without the confession.\nJustice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent in which he distinguished the officers’ refusal to allow Haynes to call his wife from the voluntariness of the confession. The oral confession that Haynes made within the first ninety minutes of his arrest bolstered Justice Clark’s view that the signed written confession was also voluntary. Justice Clark argued that the officers’ treatment of Haynes did not amount to threats or inducements and that Haynes was an unlikely candidate for coercion given his age, intelligence, and prior criminal record. Justice John M. Harlan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60408:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60411:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60411:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nClarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony breaking and entering. When he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60411:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60411:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60411:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a right to assistance of counsel applies to criminal defendants in state court by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court held that it was consistent with the Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own. The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is a fundamental and essential right made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions and requires courts to provide counsel for defendants unable to hire counsel unless the right was competently and intelligently waived.\nJustice Douglas, while joining the Court's opinion, elaborated, in a separate opinion, the relation between the Bill of Rights and the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nJustices Clark and Harlan concurred in separate decisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60411:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60433:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60433:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 31, 1961, Internal Revenue Agent Roger S. Davis visited Clauson’s Inn, located in North Falmouth, Massachusetts, as part of an investigation into possible tax evasion. He spoke with German S. Lopez, who operated the inn, to determine whether there was any dancing or other form of evening entertainment. Lopez denied it, but when Davis returned later that night, he saw dancing in the lounge and bar. On October 21, Davis returned to tell Lopez that the Inn might owe a cabaret tax and requested the Inn’s financial records. Lopez suggested that the two could reach an “agreement” and offered Davis $420 with a promise of more money if he dropped the issue. In Lopez’s version of the events, the money was for Davis to prepare the paperwork and put the Inn’s books in order. Lopez agreed to file paperwork for the current quarter and asked Davis to come back on October 24. Davis reported the meeting and turned the money over to his superior. When he returned on October 24, Davis wore a recording device. As they discussed Lopez’s tax liability, Lopez emphasized that he wanted Davis “on [his] side” and gave him more money.\nLopez was charged with four counts of attempted bribery of an internal revenue agent. Prior to trial, Lopez filed a motion to suppress the recorded evidence, and the motion was denied. He was convicted on three of the counts in district court. Although the defense did not focus on entrapment, the trial court judge provided jury instructions on the issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60433:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60433:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60433:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that entrapment only occurs when law enforcement professionals purposefully induce the commission of a crime. The petitioner’s offers of bribery happened before the agent responded in any favorable way, so the agent did not entrap the petitioner. Since the petitioner did not object to the jury instruction on entrapment at the time, he could not retroactively object. The Court also held that the wire recordings did not result from Davis misrepresenting himself. Lopez knew that Davis could use his statements against him if he chose to do so. The device only served to reliably record a conversation in which a government agent was a legal participant.\nIn his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the advances in recording technology required the Court to be vigilant about monitoring the constitutionality of their usage. In this case, he held that the recording only corroborated the legal testimony of the agent and was therefore admissible.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he stated that this case followed in the vein of On Lee v. United States, and both cases were wrongly decided. He argued that the recording was not merely a corroboration of earlier evidence but “independent third-party evidence.” He argued that the use of electronic recording devices revived the evils of the general warrant, which the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were written to prevent. He also argued that, in a conversation, the speaker assumes the risk that the other participant might repeat the conversation, but a wire recording adds a third party and another risk to the speaker’s privacy that he did not assume. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Arthur J. Goldberg joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60433:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60480:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60480:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCalifornia prohibited the sale or transportation within its borders of avocados that did not meet a certain standard of maturity, which was defined according to oil content in its Agricultural Code. The federal Secretary of Agriculture used a different system for determining the maturity of avocados that were grown in Florida. Oil content was not a factor in these standards. Florida avocado growers tried to prevent the enforcement of the California law against them with regard to avocados that met the federal standard for maturity but did not have the oil level required by the California law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60480:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60480:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60480:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nPreemption does not arise if there is no direct conflict between federal and state laws, meaning that it is possible to comply with both of them simultaneously, and if the state law does not frustrate the purpose of the federal law.\nIn an opinion authored by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that federal law will preempt a state law if it is physically impossible to comply with both laws. In this situation, it would be possible to comply with both laws, since the Florida growers could have met the California standard if they had allowed their avocados more time to grow. This means that there was no inherent conflict between the two laws.\nJustices White, Black, Douglas, and Clark dissented on the ground that the California statute was invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60480:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60488:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60488:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1959, Tennessee Gas Transmission Company filed a 7% proposed rate increase across all six of its zones with the Federal Power Commission. The rate increase was based on the expected cost of service and rate of return. The Commission imposed a five-month suspension period while hearings were conducted to determine whether the rate increase was reasonable. At the end of five months, the new rates would be applied, but they were subject to refund if the hearings found a reasonable rate lower than 7%. On August 9, 1960, the Commission found that only a 6 1/8% increase was reasonable and that Tennessee Gas must provide refunds.\nTennessee Gas challenged the ruling by arguing that requiring a refund prior to a final determination of cost made the company unable to recoup its 6 1/8%. Because Tennessee Gas spreads its rates differently across the different zones, there are certain zones in which the refund would be greater than the value of the new rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of Tennessee Gas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60488:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60488:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60488:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Tom C. Clark delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that it is the company’s responsibility to determine a rate schedule that is “just and reasonable” in order to prevent the Commission from ordering a change. Additionally, since the company cannot expect to be able to recoup the losses it accrues during the five-month suspension period, it should not expect to recoup the losses during the readjustment period either. The Court also held that the Commission acted properly in order to protect consumers from excessive rates and charges, because Tennessee Gas was attempting to collect on an illegally high rate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60488:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60489:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60489:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfrican American students in District 187 sued the school under the Civil Rights Act, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the school district contained an almost identical number of Caucasian and African American students, the petitioners alleged that the two races were taught in separate parts of the building and were compelled to use separate entrances and exits. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure exhaust administrative the remedies available under an Illinois law prohibiting segregation public schools. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60489:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60489:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60489:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for an 8-1 majority, reversed the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court held that exhausting state remedies was not a prerequisite to bringing a suit under the Civil Rights Act. It was also unclear that the Illinois law provided an adequate administrative remedy to preclude a suit in federal court. Justice John M. Harlan dissented, arguing that the Illinois law provided an adequate remedy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60489:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60494:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60494:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Maryland jury found John Brady and Charles Boblit guilty of first-degree murder in the state Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County. Brady maintained that he participated in the preceding robbery, but not in the killing. At sentencing, both men received the death penalty. After trial, Brady learned that Boblit previously confessed to the murder, but the prosecution suppressed that evidence for Brady’s trial. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that suppression of the confession denied Brady due process and remanded the case to reconsider the question of punishment only.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60494:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60494:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60494:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No. In a 7-2 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion affirming the state court. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's suppression of evidence violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that according the Maryland state law, the confession would not exonerate Brady, so a remand only for reconsidering his punishment was proper.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60494:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60507:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60507:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn order to gain immediate possession of public land needed to build a dam, the United States sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Northern Division to condemn any outstanding mining claims on the land. The complaint asked the court to allow the United States to have the validity of any claims determined through administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior. Respondents sued to enjoin the administrative proceedings, but the District Court granted the United States summary judgment, holding that the court should wait for the administrative determination before proceeding with any mining claim. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that because the United States initiated the condemnation suit in District Court, the validity of mining claims must be left to the judiciary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60507:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60507:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60507:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote for a unanimous court holding that the administrative proceedings were proper. Instituting the condemnation suit in District Court was an appropriate way to obtain possession and was not inconsistent with the administrative proceedings. The District Court was right to wait for the administrative determination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60507:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60509:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60509:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAdeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The Employment Security Commission ruled that she could not receive unemployment benefits because her refusal to work on Saturday constituted a failure without good cause to accept available work. Under South Carolina law, employers were not allowed to require employees to work on Sunday.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60509:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60509:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60509:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from setting unemployment benefits eligibility requirements such that a person cannot properly observe key religious principles.\nIn a majority opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court held that the state's eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her faith. Furthermore, there was no compelling state interest which justified such a substantial burden on this basic First Amendment right.\nJustices Douglas and Stewart concurred in separate opinions.\nJustice Harlan, joined by Justice White, dissented on the ground that Seventh-Day Adventist was unavailable for Saturday work just as anyone who refuses Saturday work for personal reasons is unavailable, and that the effect of the Court's decision was to require South Carolina to make an exception in favor of those whose unavailability for work stems from religious convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60509:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60521:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60521:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 30, 1960, several white and black people picketed the private Glen Echo Amusement Park in Montgomery County, Maryland. The demonstrators protested against the park's policy \"not to have colored people on the rides, or in the park.\" During the demonstration, William Griffin and four other Negroes entered the park to test its management's resolve. A state deputy, who worked as a security staff member in the park, soon observed them. After informing them of the park's racial policy, the deputy asked them to leave. When Griffin and his friends refused, they were arrested and later convicted for criminal trespass. State appellate courts affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60521:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60521:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60521:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the arresting deputy, despite working as a private park employee at the time, possessed and acted under state authority, imputing responsibility for his actions to Maryland. Therefore, to the extent that he sought to enforce a private policy of racial discrimination, the state of Maryland must be charged with racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60521:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60566:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60566:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n187 black students were convicted in a magistrate's court of breach of the peace for peacefully assembling at the South Carolina State Government. Their purpose was to submit a protest of grievances to the citizens of South Carolina, and to the legislative bodies of South Carolina. During the course of the peaceful demonstration the police arrested the students after they did not obey an order to disperse. The students were convicted of breach of the peace. After their convictions were affirmed by the state supreme court, the students sought further review. They contended that there was a complete absence of any evidence of the commission of the offense and that they were thus denied due process of law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60566:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60566:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60566:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows the Free Petition Clause to extend to the states as well as the federal government.\nIn an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court reversed the criminal convictions of the black students. It was clear to the Court that in arresting, convicting, and punishing the students under the circumstances disclosed by the record, the state infringed the students' constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.\nJustice Clark dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60566:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60612:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60612:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWilliam Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in 1959 by Hartford, Connecticut police. After pleading guilty to pool selling, a misdemeanor, he was sentenced to one year in jail and fined $500, but the sentence was suspended after 90 days and Malloy was placed on two years probation. Some 16 months following his plea, a Superior Court appointed referee ordered Malloy to testify about gambling and other criminal activities in Hartford County. When Malloy refused, \"on grounds it may tend to incriminate [him]\" he was imprisoned for contempt and held until willing to answer questions. Malloy filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement. On appeal from the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors ruling, upholding an adverse Superior Court denial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60612:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60612:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60612:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a state. When determining if state officers properly obtained a confession, one must focus on whether the statements were made freely and voluntarily without any direct or implied promised or improper influence. Noting that the American judicial system is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment secures defendants against self-incrimination and compels state and federal officials to establish guilt by evidence that is free and independent of a suspect's or witnesses' statements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60612:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60623:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60623:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of 15-20 African-American students entered Hooper's restaurant in Baltimore to engage in a sit-in to protest the restaurant's refusal to serve African-American patrons. They refused to leave when requested to do so by the hostess on behalf of Mr. Hooper, the president of the corporation that owned the restaurant. Mr. Hooper called the police, who told him that they needed a warrant to be able to do anything. After Mr. Hooper swore out a warrant, the students were arrested for violating a Maryland statute prohibiting trespassing. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60623:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60623:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60623:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, since the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions on January 9, 1962, Maryland had passed state and local laws that criminalized the conduct of Hooper's restaurant employees in refusing to serve the students because of their race. Under these statutes, the students' actions would not be illegal and their right to obtain service in the restaurant would be protected. The Court held that these laws supervened in this case because, although the convictions were affirmed in the Maryland Court of Appeals, the judgment was still not final as the case was before the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the ruling and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the new laws.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion should have reversed the judgment and directed the dismissal of the indictment. He wrote that the case should be decided on the merits and argued that policies allowing people to be refused service based on their race creates a second class of citizens, which the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were enacted to prevent. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg partially joined in the concurrence. In his separate concurrence, Justice Goldberg wrote that the Constitution guarantees all Americans the right to be treated equally with respect to public accommodations. He argued that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments have the express purpose of preventing any group from being treated as second-class citizens due to their race. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Douglas joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the application of a state's trespass laws in this case. He wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a state from prosecuting crimes against a person or person's property, as in the case of a trespass. Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel a private business owner to trade with anyone against his will, it does not prohibit a business owner from establishing rules regarding which customers he will or will not serve. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60623:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60630:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60630:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFarr, Whitlock & Co. contracted to buy sugar from a Cuban corporation. The corporation loaded the sugar on to the S.S. Hornfels, but in response to President Eisenhower reducing the Cuban sugar quota, Cuba issued a decree taking possession of the sugar. The Cuban government would only allow the sugar to leave Cuba if Farr, Whitlock entered into a new contract with Banco Nacional de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban government. After the sugar left Cuba, Farr, Whitlock refused to pay Banco Nacional. Banco Nacional sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover payment. The court granted summary judgment for Far, Whitlock, holding that Cuba’s taking of the sugar violated international law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60630:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60630:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60630:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 decision, Justice John M. Harlan wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that it will not decide the validity of a decree by a foreign government absent a treaty or other agreement. It did not matter that the taking violated customary international law. The majority noted that a judicial decision on this issue without a treaty would strain U.S.-Cuba relations. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that he would decide the case on the merits, absent any specific objection to examining Cuba’s law under international law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60630:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60634:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60634:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama, John M. Patterson, filed suit against the NAACP, a New York corporation advocating for equal rights for black Americans. He filed the action as an attempt to oust the association from the state. The claim alleged that the NAACP failed to comply with Alabama statutes requiring foreign corporations to register with the Alabama Secretary of State, along with other acts more clearly related to the NAACP’s political mission. That same day, the Attorney General obtained a restraining order barring the NAACP from conducting business in the state or attempting to comply with the statutory requirements in question. Before the case was heard on the merits, the court found the NAACP to be in contempt, in part for failing to comply with a court order requiring the NAACP to produce records.\nThe Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the NAACP’s petition for a writ of certiorari. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held that requiring the NAACP to produce records including names and addresses of its members was a violation of those members’ freedom of association. The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, again affirmed the judgment of contempt, arguing that the Supreme Court’s judgment rested on the mistaken premise that Alabama had incorrectly interpreted its own procedural rules. The Supreme Court of the United States again remanded the case in a per curiam opinion, holding that the NAACP had satisfied the district court’s order even though the NAACP did not produce the membership lists.\nThe NAACP then filed an action in federal court, alleging that the Alabama courts were depriving the organization of its constitutional rights and seeking to enjoin enforcement of the trial court’s restraining order. The district court dismissed the action, but the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court, instructing the district court to retain jurisdiction only if Alabama state courts did not promptly try the NAACP’s case. The Supreme Court of the United States then ordered the district court to try the NAACP’s case unless the State of Alabama gave the NAACP a hearing before January 2, 1962. In December 1961, an Alabama circuit court decreed that the NAACP continued its activities in Alabama in violation of the laws and constitution of Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60634:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60634:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60634:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion written by Justice John Harlan, the Court held that the form of the NAACP’s brief should not prevent it from obtaining a hearing in Alabama courts. Justice Harlan first determined whether the form of the NAACP's brief was a state question barring federal review. He noted that the Court had already ruled that most of the formal requirements deprived the NAACP of its federal constitutional rights. Justice Harlan cited the Court’s prior reasoning on the NAACP’s claim, confirming that novelty in state procedural requirements cannot prevent parties from seeking to vindicate their federal constitutional rights in state courts.\nJustice Harlan also held that Alabama improperly applied the state registration requirements. He looked to the language of the statute, noting that the stated penalty for failure to comply was a forfeiture of one thousand dollars for each offense; there was no mention of permanent ouster in the statutory language. Justice Harlan determined that the purpose of the requirements was simply to ensure that foreign corporations would be amenable to suit in Alabama, and confirmed this interpretation through a brief overview of Alabama case law.\nTurning to Alabama’s other allegations, Justice Harlan held that the vast majority of the NAACP’s actions did not violate any particular Alabama law, and all of its actions were constitutionally protected or controllable by other, more appropriate public remedies. Justice Harlan rejected Alabama’s contentions that the NAACP illegally 1) paid for two black students to attend the University of Alabama, 2) failed to disclose membership information, 3) made false allegations against state officials, 4) violated Alabama’s injunction, and 5) breached the peace, along with several other allegations. He argued that these activities were more related to the NAACP’s members’ freedom to associate for the collective advocacy of their ideas than to the NAACP’s privilege to do business in Alabama.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60634:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60636:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60636:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1955, Tennessee amended a statute that was based on the Atomic Energy Act and allowed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its contractors to operate without paying sales tax. Under the amended statute, contractors must pay a contractor’s tax, regardless of the source or destination of the product. Union Carbide Corp, H.K. Ferguson Co. — both of which hold AEC contracts — and the AEC sued Tennessee to recover the sales and contractor’s tax.\nThe trial court dismissed the suit due to the existing statute, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld state’s right to collect a contractor’s tax, but found that the companies should be reimbursed for the sales tax.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60636:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60636:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60636:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Constitution creates immunity from state taxes for the federal government and its properties, but that protection does not extend to federal contractors. Although a contractor may provide goods only to the federal government, the company still enters into a contract that results in financial compensation. Therefore, the contractor always stands to benefit financially and should not be immune from taxation. In this case, the Atomic Energy Commission chose to contract to separate companies rather than hire its own employees, so it may not confer tax immunities onto those contractors.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that this case might have been a good opportunity to reconsider the issue of federal immunity from state taxes. However, given the legislative history surrounding this case, he concurred in the judgment of the court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60636:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60637:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60637:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA jury convicted Harold Fahy and William Arnold of willful injury to public property, for painting black swastikas on the Beth Israel Synagogue in Norwalk, Connecticut. The judge admitted a can of black paint and a paintbrush into evidence. A police officer obtained these items during a warrantless search of Fahy’s garage. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut found that the brush and paint were products of an illegal search and should not have been admitted. The court affirmed the convictions, however, holding that the error in admitting the evidence was harmless.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60637:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60637:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60637:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the convictions, holding that the error was prejudicial. The evidence itself was incriminating and the prosecution used it to corroborate opinion testimony that the brush matched the markings on the synagogue. Justice John M. Harlan dissented, expressing that the U.S. Supreme Court should not interfere with state court findings on harmless errors. Justice Tom C. Clark, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Byron R. White joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60637:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60638:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60638:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter Winston Massiah was indicted on federal narcotics charges, he retained counsel, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. While on bail, Massiah had a conversation with one of his codefendants in the absence of counsel. Unknown to Massiah, the codefendant became a government informer and allowed police to install a radio transmitter under the seat of his car. A nearby government agent listened to the entire conversation by way of this transmitter. Massiah made several incriminating statements. At trial, the agent who listened to the conversation testified to the incriminating statements over Massiah’s objection. The codefendant never testified. A jury convicted Massiah and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60638:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60638:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60638:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that incriminating statements deliberately elicited by federal agents in the absence of counsel after the proceeding has begun violate the Sixth Amendment. The prosecution could not use these statements as evidence against Massiah. Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the statements should be admitted because they were voluntarily made and not coerced. The absence of counsel was only one factor among many the court should consider in this situation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60638:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60639:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60639:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe WMCA, acting on behalf of several New York City registered voters, challenged the constitutionality of Article III, Sections 2-5 of the New York State constitution alleging that its apportionment formula resulted in unfair weighting of both state legislature houses by favoring lesser populated rural areas over densely populated urban centers. On appeal from a dismissal of their complaint by a three-judge district court, the Supreme Court granted the WMCA certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60639:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60639:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60639:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-3 decision, the Court began by noting that this case was property before it since no other political relief was available to the WMCA. The Court then held that New York's apportionment formula violated the Equal Protection Clause since it did not apportion the state's senate and assembly substantially on a population basis. Consequently, New York's legislative apportionment scheme significantly undervalued the weight of urban area voters as compared with their rural and less densely populated counterparts. This practice constituted a form of geographical discrimination that violated notions of equal protection.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60639:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60646:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60646:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames P. Wesberry resided in a Georgia congressional district with a population two to three times greater than that of other congressional districts in the state. He asserted that because there was only one congressman for each district, his vote was debased as a result of the state apportionment statute and the state's failure to realign the congressional districts. Wesberry sought to invalidate the apportionment statute and enjoin defendants, the Governor and Secretary of State, from conducting elections under it. The district court dismissed the complaint for non-justiciability and want of equity. Wesberry appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60646:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60646:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60646:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nCongressional districts must have roughly equal populations if this is feasible.\nIn an opinion authored by Hugo L. Black, the 6-3 majority held that the district court had jurisdiction because debasement of the right to vote as a result of a state congressional apportionment law was justiciable and not subject to dismissal for \"want of equity.\" The Court further held that the apportionment statute was invalid because it abridged the requirement of Article 1, section 2 of the Constitution that The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.\nJustice Clark concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the trial court erred in dismissing the case for nonjusticiability and want of equity, but stated further that Article 1, section 2, does not forbid disproportionate congressional districts and that the case should be remanded for a hearing to determine whether the apportionment statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nJustice Harlan dissented on the ground that the Constitution expressly provides that state legislatures and Congress have exclusive jurisdiction over problems of congressional apportionment of the type involved in the case.\nJustice Stewart stated that he joined with Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent except insofar as there might be implied in that dissent the view that the issues were not justiciable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60646:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60650:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60650:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1961, M.O. Sims, David J. Vann (of Vann v. Baggett), John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett), and other voters from Jefferson County, Alabama, challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. Lines dividing electoral districts had resulted in dramatic population discrepancies among the districts. The state constitution required at least one representative per county and senatorial district. However, the district in Jefferson County, which is near Birmingham, contained 41 times as many eligible voters as those in another district of the state. Sims and the other voters argued that this lack of proportionality prevented them from effectively participating in a republican form of government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60650:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60650:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60650:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nEqual protection requires that state legislative districts should be comprised of roughly equal populations if possible.\nIn an 8-to-1 decision authored by Justice Earl Warren, the Court upheld the challenge to the Alabama system, holding that Equal Protection Clause demanded \"no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens....\" Noting that the right to direct representation was \"a bedrock of our political system,\" the Court held that both houses of bicameral state legislatures had to be apportioned on a population basis. States were required to \"honest and good faith\" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal population as practicable.\nJustice Stewart concurred, agreeing with Warren that the Court could intervene to address egregious situations of misapportionment, Stewart sought to limit the application of this decision to clear violations of equal protection. He felt wary of imposing specific guidelines on states for how to redraw the district lines or setting a certain range of ratios that would be acceptable.\nJustice Harlan dissented, applying an originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which in his opinion had not been meant by the drafters to protect voting rights. He suggested that the Court was intruding on federalism principles protecting the states in their control of local matters.\nJustice Clark concurred in a separate opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60650:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60662:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60662:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder its 1867 Constitution, the State of Maryland's Senate has 29 seats, one for each of 23 counties and six for the City of Baltimore's legislative districts. The State's five most populous political subdivisions with over three-fourths of the 1960 population are represented by only slightly over one-third of the Senate's membership. In the House of Delegates, after temporary legislation in 1962, there existed a maximum population-variance ratio of almost 6-to-1. A group of residents, taxpayers, and voters brought suit, alleging that the legislative malapportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, the circuit court held that as to certain counties there was invidious discrimination in the apportionment of the House and that the senatorial apportionment was constitutional. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60662:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60662:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60662:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 opinion deliver by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that neither house of the Maryland Legislature is apportioned sufficiently on a population basis to be constitutionally sustainable, based on the Court's ruling in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Finding that the validity of the apportionment of both houses of the Maryland legislature were before it, the Court found that neither house could be sustained under the Equal Protection Clause because of the gross disparities from population-based representation in the apportionment of Senate seats. \"Maryland's plan is plainly insufficient under the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause as spelled out in our opinion in Reynolds,\" wrote Chief Justice Warren. Justice John M. Harlan dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60662:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60669:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60669:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186) Richard Sincock and several other New Castle County residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters, challenged the constitutionality of Delaware's apportionment scheme. The suit alleged that under Delaware's 1897 state constitution, no provisions existed for reapportionment that would reflect the changing demographic face of New Castle County and the City of Wilmington. On a appeal from a three-judge district court ruling against the state of Delaware, the Supreme Court granted Mabel Roman, Delaware's elections clerk, certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60669:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60669:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60669:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-to-1 decision the Court held that Delaware's apportionment practices, as codified in its state constitution both before and after a 1963 amendment, violated the Due Process Clause. Delaware's system of having one upper house apportioned on a geographical basis and one lower house apportioned on population basis was unconstitutional since population is the only permissible guide to apportionment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60669:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60695:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60695:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the New York Times published an ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law.\nWhen the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel action against the Times and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the Times appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60695:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60695:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60695:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nTo sustain a claim of defamation or libel, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant knew that a statement was false or was reckless in deciding to publish the information without investigating whether it was accurate.\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled for the Times. When a statement concerns a public figure, the Court held, it is not enough to show that it is false for the press to be liable for libel. Instead, the target of the statement must show that it was made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity. Brennan used the term \"actual malice\" to summarize this standard, although he did not intend the usual meaning of a malicious purpose. In libel law, “malice” had meant knowledge or gross recklessness rather than intent, since courts found it difficult to imagine that someone would knowingly disseminate false information without a bad intent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60695:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60698:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60698:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 2, 1962, Jim Garrison, the District Attorney for the Parish of New Orleans, held a press conference in which he issued a statement disparaging the judicial conduct of the eight judges of the Parish’s Criminal District Court. He attributed the backlog of pending cases to the judges’ inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations. Based on these statements, Garrison was tried and convicted of defamation under the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Garrison appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and argued that the statute impermissibly infringed on his First Amendment rights to freedom of expression.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60698:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60698:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60698:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a criminal libel statute should conform to the same restrictions as civil libel statutes to protect the freedom of expression under the First Amendment. Therefore, such statutes may only criminalize statements that are knowingly false or made with a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. This limitation on libel statutes is in line with the precedent the Court established in New York Times v. Sullivan, and there is no reason that the freedom of speech protections should apply differently to a civil libel statute than to a criminal one. Based on this standard, the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute is unconstitutionally broad and infringes on the First Amendment’s protections of free speech.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black wrote that the First Amendment protects citizens from being punished by the government for expressing an opinion, and therefore there should be no law permitting criminal punishment for libel. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the concurrence. Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he argued that that the standard the majority opinion seeks to apply to criminal libel statutes does not adequately protect the freedom of speech. Justice Black joined in the concurring opinion. In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Arthur J. Goldberg wrote that the Constitution protects the absolute right of citizens and the press to criticize official conduct.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60698:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60720:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60720:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, granted an order to arrest debtor, Morris Gotthilf. Gotthilf appealed the decision, arguing that the statute authorizing arrest to enforce collection of debts violated the New York State and U.S. Constitutions. The Supreme Court of New York dismissed the appeal, because the original order was not final. Gotthilf did not file for leave to appeal certified questions before appealing the the U.S. Supreme Court as is required by New York law for non-final orders.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60720:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60720:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60720:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo answer. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The Court explained that it did not have jurisdiction because the original order was not a final judgment. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, writing that the majority’s result was unexpected and causes irreparable injury to Gotthilf because it is too late for him to appeal through the proper channels.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60720:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60723:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60723:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nActing on behalf of several voters in the Denver area, Andres Lucas sued various officials connected with Colorado's elections challenging the apportionment of seats in both houses of the Colorado General Assembly. Under Colorado's apportionment plan, the House of Representatives was apportioned on the basis of population but the apportionment of the Senate was based on a combination of population and other factors (geography, compactness and contiguity, accessibility, natural boundaries, and conformity to historical divisions). Consequently, counties with only about one-third of the State's total population would elect a majority of the Senate; the maximum population-variance ratio would be about 3.6-to-1; and the chief metropolitan areas, with over two-thirds of the State's population, could elect only a bare majority of the Senate. When a three-judge District Court upheld the plan, stressing its recent approval by the electorate, the Supreme Court granted Lucas certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60723:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60723:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60723:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires all districts to be substantially apportioned on a population bases. While noting that some deviation from strict population considerations may be permitted to offset minor underrepresentations of one group or another, the wholesale neglect of population considerations is unconstitutional. The Court added that although a majority of the Colorado electorate approved its apportionment scheme, this cannot override even a single individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote. The apportionment of Colorado's Senate rendered population considerations virtually insignificant, and was therefore unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60723:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60743:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60743:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1951, a group of African American students in Prince Edward County, Virginia filed a complaint in district court alleging that the Virginia laws requiring segregated schools denied them their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law. When the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, this case and others like it were remanded to the lower courts to order desegregation. Prince Edward County resisted desegregation by refusing to levy and collect the school taxes for the 1959-1960 school year, which forced the public schools in the county to close. The Prince Edward School Foundation formed to ensure private education for the white students. African American students did not receive formal education from 1959 until 1963, when federal, state, and county authorities collaborated to hold desegregated classes in county-owned buildings. In 1960, the Prince Edward Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance providing tuition grants for the children attending the private schools of the Prince Edward School Foundation.\nIn 1961, the petitioners amended their original complaint to include new respondents and the elements of failing to provide public free schools in the county and using public funds to pay for segregated private schools. The district court held that the county could not pay the tuition grants as long as the public school remained closed, but the court refrained from making a decision regarding the closed public schools until the Virginia courts ruled on the issue. Later, without waiting for the decision of the Virginia courts, the district court held that the public schools must reopen. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decisions on the grounds that the district court should have waited until the state courts determined the validity of the tuition grants and the closing of the public schools.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60743:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60743:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60743:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Hugo L. Black authored the opinion of the 7-2 majority, in which the Court held that the closing of the county’s schools denied the African American children an education that was available to their white peers. Although the closing of public schools is not unconstitutional in itself, when schools are closed for the express purpose of denying education to a group of children based on race, the action violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the district court had the power to order the county to collect the necessary taxes and to reopen the public schools.\nIn a jointly filed dissenting opinion, Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice John M. Harlan disagreed with the holding that the district court could order the county to reopen the public schools.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60743:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60747:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60747:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDanny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder. Escobedo appealed the affirmation of his conviction of murder by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which held that petitioner's confession had been admissible even though it was obtained after he had requested and been denied the assistance of counsel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60747:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60747:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60747:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAs soon as someone is in the custody of law enforcement, he or she has a Sixth Amendment right to speak to an attorney.\nIn a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Goldberg, the Court ruled that Escobedo’s Sixth Amendment rights had been violated. The Court reasoned that the period between arrest and indictment was a critical stage at which an accused needed the advice of counsel perhaps more than at any other. A suspect who was being interrogated by police while in custody, who had not been warned of his right to remain silent, and who had requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, had been denied the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Any statement elicited under such circumstances could not be used against him at a criminal trial. The Court therefore reversed Escobedo’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.\nJustice Harlan dissented, opining that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois should be affirmed because the majority's conclusion would unjustifiably fetter legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement.\nJustice Stewart dissented on the grounds that the right to assistance of counsel should not attach until the formal institution of proceedings by indictment, information, or arraignment, and that the majority's holding would have an unfortunate impact on the fair administration of criminal justice.\nJustice White, joined by Clark and Stewart, dissented on the grounds that the majority's decision will be applicable whenever the accused becomes a suspect, rendering admissions to the police inadmissible unless the accused waives his right to counsel and rendering the task of law enforcement more difficult.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60747:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60748:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60748:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 14, 1960 at around 1 a.m., Nathan Jackson and Nora Elliot entered a Brooklyn hotel and registered for a room. Jackson drew a gun and took money from the clerk, then ordered the clerk and others upstairs before leaving the hotel. Outside, Jackson encountered a policeman. Both men drew their guns, and in the ensuing altercation, the policeman was fatally wounded and Jackson was shot twice. When a police detective questioned Jackson at the hospital around 2 a.m., he admitted to the robbery and to shooting the police officer. Jackson received pain medication and was questioned again around 4 a.m. He again admitted to the robbery and the shooting. An hour later, Jackson was taken into the operating room.\nJackson and Elliot were indicted and tried together. His two confessions were admitted into evidence without objection. In his testimony, Jackson testified to being pressured into answering questions in the hospital, which the state denied. Consistent with New York practice, the question of the validity of the confession was submitted to the jury along with the other issues. The jury found Jackson guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.\nJackson submitted a petition for habeas corpus alleging that the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of confession was unconstitutional and that his statement was involuntary. The district court denied the petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60748:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60748:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60748:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the New York procedure did not allow for a reliable determination of whether or not the confessions were voluntary. Because the judge does not rule on the issue and the jury only reports on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, there is no way to determine whether the jury found he confession voluntary. Without this information, there is no way to ensure that the defendant’s rights are protected. The Court also held that, in cases where there is insufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty without the confession, the jury will take the defendant’s guilt into account when considering the voluntariness of the confession. Because there are issues of fact in question, the Court remanded the case to that state courts, rather than the federal court.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that the question of whether a confession is voluntary should remain in the hands of the jury, per the New York procedure. Allowing the judge to rule on the voluntariness of the statement prior to the jury could only distort the jury’s findings and downgrade the value of the trial by jury. He agreed with the majority that the statements in this case were involuntary. Justice Tom C. Clark joined in the opinion concurring part and dissenting in part.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice Tom C. Clark argued that the New York procedure was not in question because no objection was raised when the evidence was introduced in trial. Because this objection was not raised, it was improper for the majority to rule on the issue. He also argued that the question of voluntariness of a statement is an issue for the jury to consider, not a trial judge.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent and argued that issues such as the voluntariness of a confession should be decided by the jury, as the jury trial is the cornerstone of the US judicial system. He also argued that the majority’s opinion was inconsistent with previous rulings that upheld that primacy of the jury. Additionally, Justice Harlan wrote that limits should only be placed on the states’ ability to prevent criminal conduct when their actions infringe on “rights fundamental to a decent society,” which he argues this issue does not. Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60748:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60760:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60760:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nActing on behalf of residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters in Arlington and Fairfax County, Virginia, Harrison Mann challenged Virginia's 1962 amended statutory apportionment scheme as unrepresentative. Harrison called for a redistribution of legislative representation among the counties and independent cities of the state \"substantially in proportion to their respective populations.\" When Levin Davis appealed an adverse three-judge district court ruling on behalf of Virginia's Secretary and State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60760:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60760:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60760:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court noted that under the Fourteenth Amendment all bicameral state legislatures must substantially apportion both seats of their houses on a population basis. In Virginia's case, neither of its legislative houses was apportioned on a population basis. Virginia's claim that the underrepresented counties were composed primarily of military personnel and their families, who often only resided in the state for relatively short periods of time, did not constitute a defense to its actions. Instead, this amounted to discrimination against a class of individuals merely because of the nature of their employment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60760:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60797:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60797:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Taylor Street Pharmacy in Columbia, South Carolina, allowed both black and white customers to buy goods and purchase food, but only the white customers were allowed to sit and eat at the lunch counter. On March 15, 1960, the petitioners, five black college students, sat at the counter and waited to be served. The previous day, the store manager arranged for police officers to be present in case of such a situation. After announcing that he would not serve the students and requesting that they leave, the store manager and one of the officers spoke individually to each petitioner. When they would not leave, the petitioners were arrested and charged criminal trespass and breach of the peace. The Recorder’s Court convicted the petitioners, and the County Court affirmed, as did the Supreme Court of South Carolina.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60797:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60797:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60797:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that there was no evidence that the petitioners’ conduct was anything other than polite and could not be construed as a breach of the peace. Given that the only evidence for a potential breach of peace was in the actions of hostile onlookers, there was no reason to arrest and convict the petitioners.\nJustice William O. Douglas concurred and cited the reasons stated in his opinion in Bell v. Maryland. In his opinion in that case, Justice Douglas argued that the segregation of public places drastically and negatively affects the lives of black Americans. It is a relic of slavery and second-class citizenship that is antithetical to the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg concurred and cited the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in Bell v. Maryland. Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the concurrence.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black argued that the conviction for trespassing should stand, as the police acted correctly in removing the petitioners from the property after they had been asked to leave. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Byron R. White joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60797:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60849:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60849:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter a car accident in South Carolina, Hanna brought a claim against Plumer, the executor of the estate of the driver who hit him. Since Hanna was a resident of Ohio, and Plumer was a resident of Massachusetts, the case was heard by a federal court in Massachusetts sitting in diversity jurisdiction. Plumer was served by leaving copies of the summons with his wife, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Plumer successfully sought summary judgment at trial because Massachusetts law requires service to be delivered by hand.\nThe parties argued on appeal over how the Erie doctrine applied to this case. Plumer asserted that it would find a question to be substantive rather than procedural under the outcome-determinative test when applying federal law would alter the outcome of the case. He pointed out that applying federal law would change the outcome of the case, which otherwise would be dismissed, so the state procedural requirements and the grant of summary judgment should be upheld.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60849:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60849:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60849:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn cases when it is rationally possible to classify a law as either substantive or procedural, the federal courts have the authority to control their own practice and pleading procedures.\nIn a unanimous decision authored by Justice Warren, the Court ruled for Hanna. To raise the Erie doctrine, the Court reasoned, the effect of a procedural rule on the outcome of a case must abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive law. There was no change to a substantive right here because the plaintiff simply could refile the case or serve the defendant personally. This issue thus related only to procedural requirements, so applying the outcome-determinative test was not appropriate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60849:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60855:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60855:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 7, 1960, Arthur Hamm, Jr. and Reverend C. A. Ivory, both black, entered McCrory’s Five and Ten Cent Store in Rock Hill, South Carolina. They made several purchases, then tried unsuccessfully to purchase food at the lunch counter. The store manager asked Hamm and Ivory to leave, but they refused to do so. The manager called the police, who again asked Hamm and Ivory to leave before finally arresting them.\nThe city of Rock Hill charged Hamm with willfully and unlawfully trespassing at McCrory’s, in violation of city and state laws. He was tried in district court without a jury, found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of one hundred dollars or serve thirty days in jail. The Court of General Sessions and the Supreme Court of South Carolina both affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court of South Carolina cited other South Carolina cases involving sit-down demonstrations, noting that those defendants consistently and unsuccessfully invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections.\nThe Civil Rights Act, passed in 1964 while his appeal was pending, declared that all persons should be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60855:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60855:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60855:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court held in a combined case that sit-in demonstrations could not be the subject of federal or state trespass prosecutions, and that any such convictions on appeal must be reversed. Justice Clark noted that the Court historically gave weight to the common law doctrine of abatement, which applied changes in law that occur after a trial court’s judgment but before the decision of an appellate court to the original judgment. He explained that this rule did not depend on the explicit intention of Congress. As the Civil Rights Act clearly prevented the federal prosecution of individuals for attempting to make use of public accommodations, Justice Clark held that it must also prevent state prosecutions through the supremacy clause. He declined to answer the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment alone prevented similar prosecutions at the state or federal level.\nJustices William O. Douglas and Arthur J. Goldberg concurred. Justice Douglas characterized the Civil Rights Act as a means of enforcing protections already enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, there was no real issue with applying it retroactively to already unconstitutional state prosecutions.\nJustice Hugo Black dissented. He read nothing in the Civil Rights Act to suggest that Congress intended to reverse sit-in trespassing convictions that occurred before the act took effect.\nJustice John Harlan dissented. He rejected the majority’s assumption that the doctrine of abatement required courts to apply a federal change in law to Hamm’s state conviction through the supremacy clause.\nJustice Potter Stewart dissented. He argued that a state’s abatement policy was determined by that state, not by federal courts.\nJustice Byron White dissented. He could not discern any constitutional problem with Hamm’s state court conviction, and was confident that Congress did not intent to abate similar existing convictions through the Civil Rights Act. He noted Congress’ silence on the issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60855:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60863:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60863:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn December 14, 1961, the Baton Rouge police arrested 23 members of the Congress of Racial Equality (\"CORE\") on a charge of illegal picketing. In response B. Elton Cox, a leading member of CORE, and others planned to march through parts of Baton Rouge, LA, ending with a demonstration at the courthouse. An estimated 1,500 to 3,800 protesters demonstrated during the hearings of the 23 jailed members.\nBaton Rouge Police Chief Wingate White confronted the protestors when they arrived at the courthouse, telling them that they must confine the demonstration \"to the west side of the street\" within a designated period of time. After the group began their demonstration, a sheriff ordered them to disperse. Officers then forcibly dispersed the demonstration and arrested several demonstrators, including Cox.\nCox was charged with four offenses under Louisiana law: criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse. He was acquitted of criminal conspiracy but convicted of the other three offenses. In accordance with Louisiana procedure, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed his \"disturbing the peace\" and \"obstructing public passages\" convictions on certiorari, and the \"courthouse picketing\" conviction on appeal, and the court affirmed all three convictions. Cox appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that all three statutes were unconstitutionally vague. This case (No. 24) addresses the \"disturbing the peace\" and \"obstructing public passages\" statutes, while the second case (No. 49) addresses the \"courthouse picketing\" statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60863:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60863:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60863:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Louisiana's \"disturbing the peace\" statute is unconstitutional on its face because it is vague in its overly broad scope, and the policy of Baton Rouge law enforcement of giving officers complete discretion in enforcing the \"obstructing public passages\" statute deprives Cox of his constitutional rights to freedom of speech and assembly. In a decision authored by Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, the Court was unanimous in finding the \"disturbing the peace\" statute unconstitutionally vague, and a majority of the Court (7-2) found that Cox's conviction for \"obstructing public passages\" violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Justices Hugo L. Black and Tom C. Clark each filed concurring opinions as to the \"disturbing the peace\" statute. Justices Black and Clark also concurred as to the \"obstructing public passages\" conviction, with Justice Byron R. White, joined by Justice John M. Harlan, dissenting as to that issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60863:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60895:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60895:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince the late 19th century, Texas sold land to facilitate settlement in the state and construction of schools. If, however, a purchaser missed an interest payment on the property, the land was immediately forfeited back to the state unless the owner made the payment before the land could be re-sold. Under this program, Greenbury Simmons purchased and then forfeited some land in 1947. Just over five years later he offered to pay the interest to re-acquire the property. The state refused to comply with his wishes citing a 1941 amendment to its law which gave individuals five years to claim their forfeited land. Simmons's land was sold to the City of El Paso in 1955.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60895:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60895:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60895:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWhile the Court agreed that the power of a state to modify the obligation of a contract is not limitless, it found that the 1941 amendment was not offensive to the Contract Clause. Justice White reasoned that the amendment was enacted with the intent of restoring \"confidence in the stability and integrity of land titles\" and to rectify difficulties that mineral speculators were creating for the state as it attempted to implement its land sale program. White argued that the five-year limit provided \"purchasers with a bona fide interest in their lands\" plenty of time to rescue their property while it served an important state interest of encouraging defaulting purchasers to comply with their contractual obligations to Texas.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60895:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60898:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60898:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSection 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 forbids any member of the Communist Party from serving as an executive officer of a labor union, with the goal of preventing politically-motivated strikes that would pose a danger to the national economy. Archie Brown, a San Francisco longshoreman and admitted member of the Communist Party, was three times elected to the executive board of the local International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union from 1959 through 1961. On May 24, 1961, Brown was charged with violating section 504 of the LMRDA. No evidence was presented at trial suggesting that Brown was involved in any other illegal activity or plotting a political strike. Brown was found guilty and sentenced to six months in prison. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the conviction and found that section 504 violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. In response to appeal by the United States to the Supreme Court, Brown also argued that section 504 constitutes a bill of attainder, a law that targets a single individual or group, and therefore violates Article I, Section 9.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60898:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60898:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60898:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, section 504 violates Article I of the Constitution. In 5-4 opinion authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court found that section 504 was indeed a bill of attainder. Section 504, the Chief Justice argued, \"plainly\" constituted a bill of attainder, defined in the opinion as \"legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups,\" by designating \"in no uncertain terms the persons who posses the feared characteristics.\" After finding that section 504 violated the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Court found no need to address questions pertaining to the First and Fifth Amendments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60898:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60919:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60919:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60919:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60919:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60919:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights, and this right prevents states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal.\nIn a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Douglas, the Court ruled that the Constitution did in fact protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on contraception. While the Court explained that the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicted with the exercise of this right and was therefore held null and void.\nJustice Goldberg, joined by Justices Warren and Brennan, concurred. Rather than finding that the right to privacy was contained in imaginary penumbras, Goldberg located it in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.\nJustice Harlan concurred, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to privacy.\nJustice White concurred, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was the proper basis for the decision.\nJustice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Unpersuaded by the loose reasoning of the majority, Black felt that there was no way to infer that the Constitution contained a right to privacy. He also dismissed the views of the concurrences that it could be found in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.\nJustice Stewart, joined by Justice Black, filed a separate dissenting opinion. Stewart argued that despite his personal view that the law was \"uncommonly silly,\" he felt that the Court had no choice but to find it constitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60919:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60920:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60920:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeeger was convicted for refusing to be inducted into the armed forces. He argued that he was subject to the exemption under Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which provides that conscientious objectors need not serve in the armed forces if they have a specific religious training or belief that is related to a Supreme Being. Seeger was a genuine pacifist who made his objection in good faith, but he was denied the exemption because he did not believe in a Supreme Being, since he was agnostic about the existence of God. On the other hand, the root of his objection was based on religious study and faith rather than his personal morals. He argued that the provision containing the exemption was unconstitutional because it required proof of a belief in a Supreme Being.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60920:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60920:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60920:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA person can have conscientious objector status based on a belief that has a similar position in that person's life to the belief in God.\nIn a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clark, the Court ruled that the statute was constitutional. Since there are over 250 religious groups in the United States, the Court reasoned, Congress could not be expected to specifically cover each of them in this federal law. In general, a conscientious objection is based on a religious belief rather than political, sociological, or philosophical views. The term \"Supreme Being\" should be interpreted to cover all types of faith, and the defendant's belief system fell within them, so it qualified for the exemption. However, the statute was held to be constitutional on its face.\nJustice Douglas concurred.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60920:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60923:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60923:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTitle II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans. The government sought to enjoin the motel from discriminating on the basis of race under Title II.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60923:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60923:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60923:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Commerce Clause extends the anti-discrimination provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to hotels that host travelers from outside the state.\nIn a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clark, the Court held the government could enjoin the motel from discriminating on the basis of race under the Commerce Clause. Since the motel was positioned near Interstates 75 and 85 and received most of its business from outside Georgia, this showed that it had an impact on interstate commerce, which is all that is needed to justify Congress in exercising the Commerce Clause power.\nJustices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg concurred in a separate opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60923:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60928:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60928:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOllie McClung argued that his restaurant could not be prohibited from discriminating against African Americans because Congress did not have power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His restaurant, Ollie's Barbecue, was located on a major road in Birmingham, Alabama and was close to an interstate highway. Half of its food came from outside Alabama, although its suppliers were local. It served a meaningful number of customers from outside the state.\nHe argued that his business was small and had no impact on interstate commerce, and that he did provide limited services to African Americans. McClung prevailed in federal district court and received an injunction barring the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act against Ollie's Barbecue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60928:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60928:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60928:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nFederal laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply not only to restaurants that serve interstate travelers, but also to restaurants that use food that has traveled in interstate commerce, which must provide fully equal access to African Americans.\nIn a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clark, the Court held McClung could be barred from discriminating against African Americans under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court reasoned that discrimination in restaurants posed significant burdens on \"the interstate flow of food and upon the movement on products generally.\" Furthermore, discrimination also posed restrictions on blacks who traveled from state to state. The Court concluded that the Civil Rights Act was a rational way to protect interstate commerce because it could be expected to reduce the discrimination that undermined it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60928:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60933:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60933:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn the night of June 16, 1962, a man later identified by a witness as Bob Granville Pointer entered a 7-11 Food Store and robbed the manager, Kenneth W. Phillips, of more than $300. The man then fled the store, and Phillips observed him talking to another man at a nearby intersection. A police dog led officers across the street from the 7-11 store to the front yard of a nearby residence, where Pointer was standing. A search of Pointer's person revealed eighty-one dollars in his billfold, and a later search revealed sixty-five dollars hidden in a discarded shoe.\nThe police arrested Pointer and Lloyd Earl Dillard and took them before a state judge for a preliminary hearing; the state charged them with robbing Phillips of $375 by assault, violence, or by putting in fear of life or bodily injury, in violation of Texas law. An assistant attorney general conducted the prosecution and examined witnesses, but neither of the defendants had a lawyer. Dillard tried to cross-examine Phillips, but Pointer did not.\nPointer was indicted on the robbery charge. At trial, Pointer testified on his own behalf, denying his alleged role in the robbery and swearing he had never been in the 7-11 store. The state offered a transcript of Phillips' testimony as evidence because Phillips had since moved out of Texas and did not intend to return. The defense objected to the use of the transcript as a denial of Pointer's right to confront a witness. The trial judge overruled because Pointer was present at the preliminary hearing, and Pointer was convicted. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction, rejecting Pointer's claim that the use of the transcript violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60933:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60933:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60933:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation required Texas to allow Pointer an opportunity to confront Dillard through counsel. Justice Black declined to answer whether the Sixth Amendment required Texas to appoint counsel to represent Pointer at a preliminary hearing. Justice Black described the history of the Sixth Amendment in the Court, writing that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed the right to counsel on the states. He emphasized the importance of a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him and described it as a fundamental right.\nJustice John Marshall Harlan II concurred in the result, rejecting the majority's assumption that Sixth Amendment rights were incorporated and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, he argued that a right of confrontation was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.\nJustice Potter Stewart concurred in the result, also disagreeing that the states were limited by the Sixth Amendment. He characterized the right to cross-examine as one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial.\nJustice Arthur Goldberg concurred. He emphasized that the Court largely agreed that certain basic rights were fundamental and not to be denied by either state or federal governments under the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60933:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60940:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60940:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn United States v. California (1947), the Court ruled that the federal government owned rights to the undersea land off the California coast, an area with rich oil and mineral deposits. The Court held that California's rights were limited to low and inland waters and appointed a special master to better define the limits of California's land rights. In a report filed in 1952, the special master based his definition on the one used by the federal government in foreign relations. In 1953, before the Court considered the special master's report, Congress passed the Submerged Land Act, granting to the states' ownership of underwater land within their borders \"as they existed at the time such State became a member of the Union.\" The act limited states' seaward rights, however, to no more than three miles from the coastline. The act also acknowledged states' ownership of land beneath inland waters. The act gave no specific definition of either \"coastline\" or \"inland waters\" and did not address bodies of water adjoining the sea, such as bays.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60940:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60940:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60940:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe rights belong to the federal government. In a 5-2 decision authored by Justice John M. Harlan, the Court adopted the approach used by the special master and applied the definition used by the United States in foreign relations. Justice Harlan noted that no consensus on the definition of \"inland waters\" seemed to exist, and thus chose to establish a reliable, tenable definition, rather than one that could be easily amended by an act of Congress. \"'Freezing' the meaning of 'inland waters'...serves to fulfill the requirements of definiteness and stability which should attend any congressional grant of property rights belonging to the United States.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60940:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60941:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60941:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring Aaron Henry’s trial for disturbing the peace, the State of Mississippi introduced testimony of a police officer who conducted an unlawful search of Henry’s car. Henry allegedly made indecent proposals and offensive contact when he gave a ride to a hitchhiker. Henry’s counsel failed to object to the testimony when it was entered into evidence as required by local rules. Henry’s counsel later objected to the testimony in a motion for directed verdict, but the court denied the motion and the jury found him guilty. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the testimony was improperly admitted, and excused Henry’s lack of objection because he was represented by out-of-state counsel, who were unfamiliar with the local rules of criminal procedure. After this judgment, Mississippi filed a Suggestion of Error pointing out that Henry was represented by competent in state counsel as well as out of state counsel. As a result, the Mississippi Supreme Court withdrew its first opinion and affirmed the conviction, holding that even honest mistakes are binding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60941:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60941:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60941:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion, vacating the lower judgment and remanding the case. The Supreme Court held that the Mississippi rule requiring contemporaneous objection to evidence serves a legitimate state interest, but the motion for directed verdict may also serve the same interest. The Court remanded the case to consider whether Henry had knowingly waived his objection to the officer’s testimony.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent, stating that the Supreme Court should decide the issue of waiver instead of remanding. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, expressing that the Supreme Court should dismiss the case because the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled on adequate state law grounds to preclude the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing the case. Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice Potter Stewart joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60941:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60954:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60954:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Attorney General on behalf of the United States sued Louisiana in a Louisiana federal district court alleging that the state had denied and would continue to deny African-Americans the right to vote. In 1898 Louisiana adopted a constitutional amendment that imposed burdensome requirements for voter registration, but which had a clause exempting those people registered to vote as of January 1, 1867 and the son or grandson of such people. African- Americans were not entitled to vote as of January 1, 1867. The district court agreed with the United States and held that Louisiana's requirements were unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60954:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60954:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60954:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Supreme Court held that the Louisiana constitution's voter registration requirements are unconstitutional. With Justice Hugo L. Black writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the registration provisions stood in conflict with the Fifteenth Amendment's and 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)'s prohibitions against discrimination in voting because of race.\nJustice John Marshall Harlan II disagreed that 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) was applicable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60954:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60955:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60955:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMaryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60955:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60955:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60955:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court decision reflected a concern that the statute provides the danger of \"unduly suppressing protected expression.\" The board was allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory provisions for judicial participation in the the procedure to prohibit a film. The Court established three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect against the \"undue inhibition of protected expression.\" These guidelines are to: (1) place the burden of proving the film is unprotected expression on the censors, (2) require judicial determination to impose a valid determination, and (3) require prompt determination \"within a specified time period.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60955:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60974:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60974:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1961, the city of Montgomery, Alabama, was under martial law as a result of the riots that started when groups of Freedom Riders arrived at the Greyhound Bus Station. On May 25, 1961, a military convoy escorted Ralph D. Abernathy, an African-American pastor from Montgomery, and 10 others (both African-American and white) to the bus terminal. The group purchased tickets, and all 11 went to sit at the lunch counter. There were at least 30 people in the station and several hundred people outside who could see through the plate-glass windows to the lunch counter. Given the tense atmosphere in the city and particularly at the bus station, Colonel Poarch of the National Guard directed the Sheriff of Montgomery County to arrest the eleven men. In his opinion, their actions seemed “calculated to provoke a breach of the peace.”\nAbernathy was convicted in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County on charges of disturbing the peace and unlawful assembly. He appealed the case and argued that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Court of Appeals of the State of Alabama affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60974:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60974:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60974:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals of Alabama.\nJustice Hugo L. Black and Justice Byron R. White did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60974:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60978:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60978:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVictor Linkletter was convicted in state court on evidence illegally obtained by police prior to the Supreme Court decision concerning the Fourth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio. Mapp applied the exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings, denying the use of illegally obtained evidence at trial. Linkletter argued for a retrial based on the Mapp decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60978:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60978:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60978:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Constitution neither prohibited nor required \"an absolute rule of retroaction.\" Only a case-by-case examination of the rules in question was required. The Court reasoned that police misconduct prior to Mapp had already occurred and would not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved. The Court also argued that applying the Mapp decision retroactively to all cases would threaten the \"delicate state-federal relationship\" and would \"tax the administration of justice to the utmost.\" Only cases on direct review at the time of the Mapp ruling or later cases would be subject to retroactive consideration.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60978:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60994:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60994:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter a flood, the Small Business Administration made a disaster loan to Ethel May Yazzel and her husband to cover damages to their shop. The mortgage securing the loan referred to Texas law. When the Yazzel's defaulted on the loan, the U.S. Government sued to collect the balance due. Mrs. Yazzel moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Texas law of coverture meant the contract was not enforceable against her personally. Under the law of coverture, a woman's legal rights are subsumed by her husband upon marriage. The Government argued that federal law, which would not recognize coverture, applied because there was an overwhelming federal interest. The district court granted summary judgment and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60994:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60994:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60994:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nTexas law. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Abe Fortas wrote for the majority holding that there was no overwhelming federal interest. The Government had voluntarily negotiated the contract knowing of the references to Texas law. The Court also noted there was no federal law, regulation, or contractual provision that allowed for application of federal law in this case.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a special concurrence stating that Texas law applied whether the contract referred to Texas law or not because the state interest in family property arrangement was greater than the federal interest. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent stating that federal law should apply because the loan was from the federal government and is, therefore, a federal matter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60994:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60996:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "60996:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMorris A. Kent Jr., a 16-year-old boy, was detained and interrogated by the police in connection with several incidents involving robbery and rape. After Kent admitted some involvement, the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction. This allowed Kent to be tried as an adult. Kent was indicted in district court. Kent moved to dismiss the indictment because the juvenile court did not conduct a \"full investigation\" before waiving jurisdiction, as required by the Juvenile Court Act. A jury found Kent guilty and sentenced him to serve 30-90 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, although it noted that the juvenile court judge provided no reason for the waiver.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "60996:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "60996:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "60996:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Abe Fortas wrote for the majority. The Supreme Court determined there was not a sufficient investigation prior to the juvenile court waiver of jurisdiction. Kent did not receive a hearing, access to counsel, or access to his record prior to the waiver. The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the waiver was proper. Because Kent was 21 years old at the time of this decision, the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction if the waiver was proper. In light of this, the Court ordered that the conviction be vacated if the waiver was improper and sustained if proper.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent stating he would vacate the judgment and remand the case for reconsideration in light of two recent decisions by the court of appeals. Justice Hugo L. Black, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "60996:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61000:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61000:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGraham v. John Deere Co. was a suit for the infringement of a patent that consisted of a combination of old mechanical elements for a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil in order to prevent damage to the plow. In 1955, the Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, ruling that a combination is patentable when it produces an \"old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way.\" Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit held that, since there was no new result in the combination, the patent was invalid. The parties in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. 37) and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. 43) sought a declaration of invalidity and noninfringement of a patent on finger-operated sprayers with a \"hold-down\" cap issued to Cook Chemical. The District Court and the Court of Appeals sustained the patent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61000:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61000:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61000:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court held that the Patent Act of 1952 did not lower the standards required for the patentability of an invention by adding an inquiry into obviousness to the statutory requirements of novelty and utility. The Court found that section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act Congress added the statutory nonobvious subject matter requirement, the determination of which is made after establishing the scope and content of prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. The Court concluded that the patents do not meet the test of the \"nonobvious\" nature of the \"subject matter sought to be patented\" to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art and were therefore invalid. This affirmed the decision in Graham v. John Deere Co. and reversed the other two.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61000:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61024:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61024:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn the night of October 10, 1960, Internal Revenue Service agents, along with a state patrol officer, went to the site of the \"Apinook Mill\" in Jarrett City, Connecticut. Agents gained entrance to the grounds, smelled the distinctive odor of ground mash indicating the presence of a still, and visually confirmed the presence of a column still in building 9A. The federal agents then applied for a warrant, after noting that the Treasury Department had not registered the still in question. The warrant was granted on October 11th.\nOn October 13th, federal agents entered building 9A by force after demanding entry and hearing no reply. They discovered an operating still inside, and found Frank Romano and John Ottiano standing nearby. Ottiano had the key to the facility on his person. Romano stated that he had been at the site for four days and claimed not to know how long the operation had existed.\nSection 5601(b)(1) of the Excise Tax Technical Changes Act of 1958 (\"ETTCA\"), established a presumption of guilt for anyone shown to be at the place or site of an unregistered still. Section 5601(b)(1) was an amendment to Section 5601(a)(1), which defines the crime of possessing an unregistered still.\nThe United States charged Romano and Ottiano with three counts: possession of an illegal still, the illegal production of distilled spirits, and conspiracy to produce distilled spirits. Judge T. Emmet Clarie instructed the jury with a verbatim reading of the relevant provisions of the ETTCA. The jury found both men guilty of all counts. The court sentenced Romano and Ottiano to concurrent sentences on all three counts and fined them for possession of the unregistered still.\nChief Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed the sentences for possession and illegal production of spirits. He held that the trial court's application of Section 5601(b)(1) was an unconstitutional violation of Romano and Ottiano's Fifth Amendment due process rights. He reasoned that the inference of possession did not necessarily follow from a defendant's presence, given that the defendant could be a purchaser of the product or simply a visitor to the site.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61024:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61024:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61024:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and yes. Writing for a unanimous court with three concurrences, Justice Byron White held that the jury could not simply infer possession from Romano and Ottiano's presence at the still. Romano and Ottiano's presence near the still created a rebuttable presumption; hence, the jury was improperly instructed that presence necessarily required a finding of guilt. Justice White rejected the government's argument that the amendment signified Congress' intention to overrule Section 5601(a)(1), effectively equating presence with possession. He found no evidence of this intention in the legislative history and noted that the government presented no cases where possession of a substance was proven solely by a defendant's presence near that substance.\nThe Court did not rule on Romano and Ottiano's charge for production of distilled spirits because its sentence was concurrent with the conspiracy charge, which was not at issue. Justice Hugo Black concurred. Referring to his dissent in United States v. Gainey, he held that the statute itself was an unconstitutional violation of Romano and Ottiano's Fifth Amendment right to due process, right against self-incrimination, and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury because the statute compels defendants to testify in order to rebut a presumption of guilt.\nJustice William Douglas also concurred. He referred to his own dissent in Gainey, where he interpreted Section 5601(b)(1) as a description of a rule of evidence allowing but not mandating a jury to infer possession from a defendant's presence near an unregistered still.\nJustice Abraham Fortas concurred without comment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61024:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61029:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61029:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1952, three escaped convicts took James Hill, his wife, and their five children hostage in their Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, home. After nineteen hours, the family was released unharmed. The convicts were later apprehended in a violent clash with police during which two of them were killed. In 1953, Joseph Hays' published a novel based on the Hill family's ordeal. When the novel was subsequently made into a play, Life Magazine (\"Life\") printed an article about the play that mirrored many of its inaccuracies concerning the Hill family's experience. Alleging that it deliberately misrepresented his story, Hill sought damages against Life. On appeal from an adverse ruling, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court remanded for a new trial where a reduced adverse ruling was imposed on Life. Following an unsuccessful appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted Life's owner, Time Inc. (\"Time\") certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61029:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61029:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61029:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court set aside the Appellate ruling against Time because the lower court failed to instruct the jury that Time's liability was contingent upon a showing that it knowingly and recklessly published false statements about the Hill family. The Court explained that absent a finding of such malicious intent on the part of a publisher, press statements are protected under the First Amendment even if they are otherwise false or inaccurate. The Court remanded for retrial under the new jury instruction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61029:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61030:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61030:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented states from using a \"test or device\" (such as literacy tests) to deny citizens the right to vote. Under the Attorney General's jurisdiction, federal examiners were empowered to intervene to investigate election irregularities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61030:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61030:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61030:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Fifteenth Amendment is a valid constitutional basis for the Voting Rights Act of 1965.\nIn an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Warren, the Court upheld the Act as constitutional. Noting that the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress \"full remedial powers\" to prevent racial discrimination in voting, the Act was a \"legitimate response\" to the \"insidious and pervasive evil\" which had denied blacks the right to vote since the Fifteenth Amendment's adoption in 1870.\nJustice Black dissented in part. He argued that while he would have upheld most of the Act, he would have struck down certain provisions as beyond the scope of Congress’s power.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61030:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61041:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61041:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nClarence Ewell and Ronald K. Dennis were indicted on federal narcotics charges in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The men pleaded guilty and were sentenced, but the court vacated the convictions based on an unrelated Seventh Circuit decision that held that an indictment that does not allege the drug purchasers name is invalid. A few months later Ewell and Dennis were rearrested and reindicted on new complaints. The complaints contained the same allegations from the original indictment, but named the drug purchasers. Ewell and Dennis moved to dismiss, arguing that their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and their Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy were violated. The district court rejected the double jeopardy argument, but granted dismissal based on the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61041:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61041:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61041:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that the new indictment was not barred by the Sixth or Fifth Amendment. The right to speedy trial depends on the circumstances of the case. The Court also held that Ewell and Dennis were not prejudiced by the new indictments. Justice William J. Brennan concurred in the result, but expressed his disapproval at the government’s actions.\nJustice Abe Fortas dissented, arguing that due process prevents the government from indicting an individual after vacation of that individual’s conviction arising out of the same transaction. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61041:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61042:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61042:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nStandard Oil of Kentucky was charged with violating the Rivers and Harbors Act after discharging 100-octane aviation gasoline into the St. Johns River. The gasoline was commercially valuable and was discharged into the St. Johns River because a dockside shut-off valve had been accidentally left open. Standard Oil moved for dismissal by arguing that the word “refuse” meant “rejected matter,” which the accidentally discharged gasoline was not. The district court agreed and granted dismissal. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61042:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61042:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61042:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the statute was meant to prevent pollution, and therefore must be read in a broader sense. The effect of the oil on the waterway is the same whether it was useable or not, so it should be treated the same way under the statute. The Court also held that there was legislative precedent for not creating a distinction between valuable and valueless substances deposited in waterways.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent where he argued that the determination of whether or not the statute should encompass all pollutants is a decision for Congress, not the courts. He argued that the majority’s opinion misconstrued the wording of the statute, which, based on legislative history, was meant to refer to obstructions to navigation rather than pollution. He further argued that when there is doubt as to the exact meaning of a statute, the courts should err on the side of a narrow reading. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61042:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61043:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61043:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 22, 1950, the Attorney General petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board for an order requiring the Communist Party to register under Section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act (SACA) as a Communist-action organization. The Court sustained this order in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board. On May 31, 1962, the Attorney General separately required William Albertson and Roscoe Quincy Proctor, as alleged members of the Communist Party, to fill out two registration forms each. Neither registration form was specifically mandated by the SACA.\nAlbertson and Proctor did not provide personal information required by the forms, instead asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before the board and denying that the Communist Party was a Communist-action organization. The Attorney General presented the testimony of paid Federal Bureau of Investigation informers that Albertson and Proctor participated in meetings of the Party and had been elected to Party offices. The board took official note of the proceedings and issued a final order stipulating that petitioners had not properly registered as members of the Communist Party. On appeal, the court held that Albertson and Proctor’s claims of privilege were premature in part because they had not yet been prosecuted for a criminal activity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61043:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61043:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61043:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held both that the petitioners’ claim of self-incrimination was ripe for decision and that SACA’s registration requirement for individuals violated the Fifth Amendment. Justice Brennan noted that SACA clearly implied a duty to file registration, in this case the specific form crafted by the Attorney General. He rejected the government’s argument that individuals could choose to incompletely fill out the form, asserting privilege as to some of the questions but not others. Justice Brennan reasoned that such a possibility might be constitutionally adequate if the registration was neutral on its face, but here Albertson and Proctor would be admitting to an element of a crime. Justice Brennan also rejected the government’s assertion that SACA’s immunity provision protected Albertson and Proctor from self-incrimination. He noted that SACA only provided that registration shall not constitute per se evidence of criminal guilt; thus, registration could still be used as evidence of guilt. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and set aside the Board’s orders.\nJustice Byron White concurred. He noted his previous objection to SACA’s registration provisions while serving as Attorney General. Justice White previously cautioned that SACA likely violated individuals’ freedom of speech, of assembly, and the privilege against self-incrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61043:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61052:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61052:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA special provision of Massachusetts law allowed the Attorney General to initiate legal proceedings against an \"obscene\" book, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure. The book, also known as Fanny Hill, was written by John Cleland in about 1750. Massachusetts courts, despite the defenses put forward by the book's publisher and copyright holder, judged the work to be obscene.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61052:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61052:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61052:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the Massachusetts courts erred in finding Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure to be obscene. The Court, applying the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States, held that the book was not \"utterly without redeeming social value.\" The Court reaffirmed that books could not be deemed obscene unless they were unqualifiedly worthless, even if the books possessed prurient appeal and were \"patently offensive.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61052:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61055:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61055:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrank Baer sued Alfred Rosenblatt for libel based on allegedly defamatory statements Rosenblatt made in his editorial for the Laconia Evening Citizen regarding Baer’s performance as Supervisor of the Belknap County Recreation Area. The article questioned the ways that Baer, and the County Commissioners to whom he reported, failed to develop the Area to its full potential. A jury in New Hampshire Superior Court awarded Baer damages. In the time between the outcome of the trial and Rosenblatt’s appeal, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, where it held that a state cannot award damages to a public official for a defamatory falsehood unless the official proves that there was actual malice—knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. The New Hampshire Supreme affirmed the award and found that New York Times v. Sullivan had no impact.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61055:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61055:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61055:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that there must be evidence that the libelous statements are directed specifically at the public official in question, and not the governmental body in general. Since the trial judge permitted the jury to award damages based on the finding that Baer was one member of a governmental organization that was libeled, the Court held that the jury instructions were erroneous, and the judgment should be overturned. The Court also held that the public official must establish the statements were made with actual malice, according to the definition set out in New York Times v. Sullivan.\nJustice Tom C. Clark concurred in the decision.\nJustice William O. Douglas concurred and argued that the term “public official” is not one that appears in the Constitution and therefore does not need to be as narrowly defined as the Court makes it. He also argued that the First Amendment should bar Congress from enacting any federal libel laws, so the discussion should be surrounding public issues rather than public officials.\nIn his concurrence, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the Constitution prevents state defamation laws from being converted into laws against seditious libel. He argued that the ruling protects a private individual’s reputation while upholding a high standard of proof for a public official’s defamation suit.\nJustice Black concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that the First Amendment protects speech that is critical of the government and argued that the majority’s opinion in both New York Times v. Sullivan and this case did not go far enough in protecting that right. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice John M. Harlan argued that the majority opinion’s rule that the jury cannot convert “impersonal” libel to “personal” libel misconstrues tort law. Under conventional tort law, there may be recovery if the group is specific enough to be understood to apply to a specific individual.\nJustice Abe Fortas wrote a jurisdictional dissent and argued that certiorari was improvidently granted. He wrote that, because the original trial and decision occurred before the Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, that ruling should have no effect on this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61055:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61060:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61060:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Clayton Antitrust Act (\"Clayton Act\") was enacted by Congress in 1914 to prevent anticompetitive practices in business. Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act halted the running of the statute of limitations on pending claims arising from the act. It also specified a four-year statute of limitations for these causes of action.\nOn September 28, 1956, Marc D Leh brought an action against General Petroleum Corportation and five other petroleum manufacturers alleging injury to his business caused by a conspiracy or combination to exclude Leh from engaging in wholesale distribution of gasoline in Southern California. He alleged that this conspiracy began in 1948; all parties agreed that Leh's right to initiate a cause of action began in February of 1954. Leh anticipated a statute of limitations problem under California law, as California's Code of Civil Procedure specified a one-year statute of limitations for penal causes of action, in contrast to the Clayton Act's four-year limit. Hence, Leh cited to United States v. Standard Oil, in which the United States alleged a conspiracy to control prices among a nearly identical set of defendants and successfully applied the Clayton Act's longer limit.\nDistrict court Judge William Mathes ruled in favor of General Petroleum, holding that the tripling of damages was a penalty, and was thus barred by the statute of limitations under California law. The court also held that the Clayton Act did not apply to the claim --distinguishing on the facts from Standard Oil -- primarily because Leh did not allege that the defendants combined to control prices, did not name the same set of defendants, and did not allege a similar period of conspiracy. Judge Stanley Barnes of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. Judge Barnes affirmed the lower court's interpretation of California law, and that the application of the Clayton Act used in Standard Oil did not apply here because the facts were not similar enough to justify collateral estoppel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61060:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61060:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61060:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. Justice Thomas White, writing for a unanimous Court, held that Leh is not required to allege equivalent means, objectives and conspiracy to rely on Standard Oil. Relying on the Court's 1965 decision in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., Justice White emphasized giving effect to the broad terms of the Clayton Act and Congress' belief that antitrust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of antitrust laws. He noted that six of the seven defendants were named in both Leh's claim and the United States' in Standard Oil, and that the United States similarly alleged an intention to eliminate the competition of independent refiners. Thus, Leh's pending case halted the tolling of the statute of limitations under the Clayton Act, and his claim was still valid.\nJustices John Harlan and Abraham Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61060:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61063:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61063:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Audubon Regional library operated three branches and two bookmobiles. Blacks were not allowed to enter any of the branch libraries. The bookmobiles were segregated: a red one served only whites and a blue one served blacks. Brown was a black man who entered a library branch with four other blacks and requested a book, The Story of the Negro. The librarian informed Brown that the book was not available, but that she would request it through the state library, and he could pick it up or have it mailed to him. After the conversation, the men sat down (making no noise or disturbance) and refused to leave. They were arrested \"for not leaving a public building when asked to do so by an officer.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61063:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61063:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61063:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe divided Court found that the actions of the police violated the Constitution. Justice Fortas argued that states may only regulate the use of public facilities in a \"reasonably nondiscriminatory manner, equally applicable to all.\" Maintaining separate library facilities clearly violated this principle. Fortas also reasoned that the demonstration did not disturb the peace of other library patrons or disrupt the library's activities; the time and method of the sit-in were carefully chosen and executed. Justice Black dissented, joined by three other justices. He argued that the First Amendment \"does not guarantee to any person the right to use someone else's property, even that owned by government and dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61063:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61066:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61066:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRalph Ginzburg and several of his associates were charged with violating a federal obscenity statute for mailing circulars about how and where three different obscene publications could be obtained. Ginzburg challenged his conviction as unconstitutional since the circulars themselves were not obscene. On appeal from an adverse ruling by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding an unfavorable lower court finding, the Supreme Court granted Ginzburg certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61066:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61066:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61066:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that although circulars themselves may not be obscene, their public mailing offends the federal obscenity statute if they advertise obscene materials. The Court reasoned that where the sole emphasis of an advertisement is the commercial exploitation of erotica for prurient appeal, it shall be deemed \"pornographic\" communication that lies beyond the scope of First Amendment speech protections. The Court cautioned, however, that the distribution of materials containing sexuality in the context of art, literature, or science is not per se prohibited under the obscenity statute if it can be shown to advance human knowledge or understanding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61066:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61080:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61080:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVirginia resident Annie Harper could not pay the state-imposed poll tax of $1.50. She filed suit, alleging the poll tax deprived indigent Virginia residents of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal district court dismissed her claim, based in part on a 1937 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that had ruled poll taxes to be within the powers of the states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61080:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61080:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61080:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6–3 decision authored by Justice William Douglas, the Court held the poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause. Overruling its own precedent in Breedlove v. Suttles (1937), the majority reasoned that the eligibility to vote has no rational connection to the wealth of an individual. Thus, the poll tax could not meet the heightened standard of review applied to restrictions on voting, which is a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is important to note that there was no textual basis for this stark reversal, since the Twenty-fourth Amendment applied only to federal elections. This was an example of a situation in which the changing membership of the Court and changing attitudes in society propelled a change in the law.\nJustice John Marshall Harlan II dissented, arguing that the poll tax did pass the rational basis test. Harlan found that the state had a legitimate interest in collecting revenue. He felt that it was reasonable to think that people who were willing to pay to vote would have a greater interest in directing the course of state policy. According to Harlan, this type of classification was no less rational than the literacy test that the Court had upheld in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections (1959).\nJustice Hugo Black also dissented, arguing for a stricter adherence to precedent and the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. He articulated a more traditional understanding of the Constitution as susceptible to extension only by the legislative process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61080:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61082:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61082:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn December 29, 1959, New York City police officers entered the Publishers Outlet, where they seized a number of books and magazines. On January 12, 1960, the police raided the basement below a printing shop belonging to Norman Levenberg. The police discovered, through Levenberg, that a number of books were kept for Edward Mishkin in a storage room. Also that day, officers entered Midget Book Shop, where they seized an additional number of books and magazines. On February 10, 1960, the police confiscated three books from the Main Stern Book Store. Levenberg later testified that Mishkin controlled all of the books, and that he operated both the Publishers’ Outlet and the Main Stern Book Store; officers indeed encountered Mishkin at both stores. In all, the police seized fifty books allegedly possessed by Mishkin.\nThe seized books were paper-bound “pulps,” and most had jackets with illustrations relating to the fictional subject matter within. The covers of nineteen of the books displayed illustrations of women being whipped, beaten, tortured or abused. Most of the book jackets depicted symbols associated with fetishism, such as leather boots, excessively tight clothing, black gloves, whips, masks and corsets. Some presented incidents of sexual seduction, transvestism, sodomy, rape and masturbation.\nThe state of New York charged Mishkin with multiple counts of possessing obscene books, of hiring others to prepare obscene books, and of publishing obscene books. At trial, authors who worked under Mishkin for several years testified that he instructed them to fill the books with strong sexual material. Mishkin was convicted before a three-judge panel of the Court of Special Sessions. He was sentenced to a three-year prison term and ordered to pay $12,000 in fines. The appellate court affirmed Mishkin’s sentence, modifying the judgment to remove charges related to Mishkin’s failure to print the name and address of the publisher or printer on the books; the court held the statute requiring this action to be unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the judgment, holding that the New York law forbidding obscene material itself did not violate Mishkin’s constitutional rights and was not unconstitutionally vague.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61082:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61082:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61082:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes, and yes. The Court upheld Mishkin’s conviction, in a 6-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Justice Brennan rejected Mishkin’s argument that the New York statute’s use of the terms “sadistic” and “masochistic” was impermissibly vague, because the state’s definition was narrower than used by the Court in Roth v. United States. The Court also rejected Mishkin’s argument that the material did not meet the Roth test’s prurient-appeal requirement in that it did not appeal to the prurient interests of the average person. The Court held that the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant theme of material appeals to the prurient interests of members of a sexual subgroup. It pointed to evidence that Mishkin instructed the books to be specifically conceived and marketed to appeal to “sexually deviant groups”.\nThe Court also rejected Mishkin’s argument that there was insufficient proof that he knew the material was obscene. The Court noted Mishkin’s instructions to his artists and writers, his efforts to disguise his role in the enterprise by publishing the books anonymously, and the sheer volume of material. According to the Court, this evidence showed Mishkin was aware of the character of the material.\nJustice Hugo Black dissented, arguing that the Court and lower federal courts are without power to censor obscene material regardless of its subject matter.\nJustice Potter Stewart dissented, arguing that the material in question was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.\nJustice William O. Douglas dissented, in a combined response to the majorities of Mishkin and Ginzburg v. United States. He referenced testimony at trial indicating that several of the books in question have redeeming social value. He also questioned New York's right to limit publishers' ability to cater to nonconformist groups.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61082:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61083:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61083:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife, Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. Sheppard, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. When Sheppard appealed again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61083:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61083:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61083:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an 8-to-1 decision the Court found that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial. Noting that although freedom of expression should be given great latitude, the Court held that it must not be so broad as to divert the trial away from its primary purpose: adjudicating both criminal and civil matters in an objective, calm, and solemn courtroom setting. The Cleveland television media's repeated broadcasts of Sheppard confessing in detail to crimes he was later charged with, the blatant and hostile trial coverage by Cleveland's radio and print media, and the physical arrangement of the courtroom itself - which facilitated collaboration between the prosecution and present media - all combined to so inflame the jurors' minds against Sheppard as to deny him a fair trial. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have either postponed the proceedings or transferred them to a different venue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61083:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61084:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61084:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 4, 1962, black citizens of Birmingham, Alabama were engaged in a boycott of downtown department stores; the Birmingham police -- including Patrolman Byars -- were aware of the boycott. At about 10:30 A.M., Byars observed a group of four to six people including noted activist Fred L. Shuttlesworth walking toward the intersection of 19th Street and Second Avenue, the location of the front entrance of Newberry’s Department Store. Byars walked through Newberry’s and through the front entrance, where he observed a group of ten or twelve people congregated in one area. They were standing and talking with Shuttlesworth apparently at the center of the conversation.\nByars observed the group for a minute or so from inside Newberry’s, then left the store and told the group to move on and clear the sidewalk. Some of the group began to leave. Byars repeated his command, and Shuttlesworth asked, “You mean to say we can’t stand here on the sidewalk?” Three more officers arrived on the scene, and Byars told the group that they would have to clear the sidewalk or he would arrest them for obstructing its use. By this point, only Shuttlesworth remained at the scene. Shuttlesworth repeated his question, and Byars told him he was under arrest. Shuttlesworth then attempted to walk into Newberry’s, but Byars followed him in and arrested him. Shuttlesworth offered no resistence.\nOn April 5, Shuttlesworth was tried in the recorder’s court of the city of Birmingham. The court charged him with obstructing free passage on the sidewalk and with refusing to comply with a police order to move on in violation of two sections of the Birmingham General City Code. He was sentenced to 180 days of hard labor and $100 fine and costs. He appealed for a trial de novo in the district court. Byars’ initially testified that the group’s presence impeded pedestrian traffic, but on cross-examination he testified that the group only blocked off about half the sidewalk. The court affirmed Shuttlesworth’s conviction, rejecting his assertions that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, that the prosecution’s case was not supported by evidence, and that Shuttleworth’s conduct was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed Shuttlesworth’s conviction, holding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Shuttlesworth’s applications for certiorari and rehearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61084:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61084:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61084:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Potter Stewart held that while both portions of the statute were facially constitutional, the trial court unconstitutionally applied the “obstructing free passage” portion of the ordinance. Justice Stewart noted that in Phifer v. City of Birmingham, the Alabama Court of Appeals later interpreted the statute to apply only when a person who obstructs free passage on a sidewalk also refuses to obey a request by an officer to move on. The trial court did not have this interpretation available to it, and it made no findings of fact and rendered no opinion. Justice Stewart inferred from this that the trial court may have applied an unconstitutionally literal interpretation of the statute, where either obstructing free passage on the sidewalk or disobeying a police order to move on would be sufficient for a finding of guilt.\nJustice Stewart also held that the trial court unconstitutionally applied the \"move on\" portion of the ordinance to Shuttlesworth. Justice Stewart again referred to Phifer, where the Court held that the police order in question must be related to directing vehicular traffic because that section of the Birmingham General City Code was related to regulating vehicular traffic. In contrast, the record for Shuttlesworth’s case did not contain any evidence that Patrolman Byars was directing vehicular traffic.\nJustice William Douglas concurred. He reasoned that Shuttlesworth could not have been blocking traffic when he was arrested because all other members of his group had left by that point.\nJustice Abraham Fortas also concurred, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren. Justice Fortas would have finally reversed the conviction. While agreeing that the statute is constitutional on its face, he argued that there was no way the facts could be construed to show that Shuttlesworth and his group were actually obstructing the sidewalk. He accused Birmingham of using the statute as a pretext to lock up a notorious civil rights activist.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61084:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61086:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61086:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRaymond Dennis and others were members of the Communist Party; they were also officers and members of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. They filed false affidavits between 1949 and 1955 to satisfy the stipulations of 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which required all union officers to submit non-Communist affidavits. The union officials retained their Communist Party affiliations, filed the affidavits, and enabled the union to use the services of the National Labor Relations Board. The union officers were indicted by the United States District Court for conspiracy to fraudulently obtain the services of the National Labor Relations Board.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61086:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61086:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61086:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, not addressed, and yes. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the indictment properly charged a conspiracy to defraud the United States Government under 18 U.S.C. 371. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Abe Fortas, argued that the conspiracy of filing the false affidavits was intentional and that the events of filing the affidavits and using the NLRB facilities together were a \"concert of action\" with the purpose of defrauding the Government. The Court refused to hear the question of the constitutionality of 9(h) as the union officers' attempt was to circumvent the law. The relevant standard, according to Fortas, is that the Court will not hear a constitutionality claim to supplant a \"voluntary, deliberate, and calculated course of fraud and deceit,\" as conspiracy to defraud is not an appropriate way to challenge acts of government. The Court also held that the defense should have been allowed access to the grand jury minutes containing the prosecution witnesses' testimonies with an opportunity to question the witnesses regarding their statements. The majority opinion maintained that the union officers exceeded the particularized need standard that is used to evaluate access to grand jury testimony, and thus access should have been granted to the defense, especially as an evaluation is best made by a defense advocate and not a trial judge during in-camera inspection. Justices William O. Douglas and Hugo L. Black joined this part of the majority opinion but dissented from the remainder. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61086:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61099:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61099:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 21, 1964 Cecil Ray Price, a sheriff’s deputy, detained three civil rights workers, Michael Henry Schwerner, James Earl Chaney, and Andrew Goodman, in the Neshoba County Jail, in Philadelphia, Mississippi. That night, Price released all three men from custody, and then drove his police cruiser to intercept them on Mississippi Highway 19. Price accosted the three men, placed them in his police car, and then drove them down an unpaved road. There Price and seventeen other men, including both local citizens and members of the Philadelphia, Mississippi Police Department, executed the three men and dumped their bodies in a construction site. All eighteen defendants were subsequently arrested and were indicted by a Grand Jury on January 15, 1965 for violating federal statutes. The first statute, 18 U.S.C.S. 241, dealt with criminal conspiracies. The second statute, 18 U.S.C.S. 242, criminalized anyone acting under the color of law from depriving any of the rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the charges for violating 18 U.S.C.S. 242 against the non-police officer defendants, claiming that the indictment did not state an actual offense against the United States. This appeal followed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61099:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61099:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61099:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, Justice Abe Fortas reinstated the indictment against all defendants. First, Justice Fortas addressed 18 U.S. C.S. 242 as applied to the non-police officers. Here, he noted that private citizens can act under the color of law where they are joining state officials in engaging in prohibited actions, as they did in this case. Therefore, the “color of law” indictments should be reinstated against all of the defendants, not merely the police officers. Next, Justice Fortas addressed the alleged violation of 18 U.S.C.S. 241, the criminal conspiracy statute. Here, Justice Fortas stated that a criminal conspiracy, perpetrated in part by state officials, constitutes a state action and therefore falls under the United States’ authority granted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Fortas then addressed the history of this statute, and the Fourteenth Amendment. To him, this history, including the civil war, racial violence, Klu Klux Klan, and voter intimidation, solidified his conclusion that the conspiracy statute was designed to be read against the backdrop of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in this decision, noting some disagreement with the majority’s use of the case of United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58; United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70; and Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 70. This case also inspired the 1988 film, Mississippi Burning.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61099:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61104:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61104:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAl Harris refused to answer questions before a grand jury on grounds of self-incrimination. Harris and the grand jury went before the District Court for the Southern District of New York where the judge told Harris he would receive immunity from prosecution that might arise from his statements. Harris again refused to answer, citing privilege. The judge then held Harris guilty of criminal contempt committed in the court's presence under rule 42(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61104:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61104:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61104:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote for the majority and held that Harris' conduct did not rise to the level of contempt covered under 42(a). The rule is reserved for acts such as threatening the judge or disrupting a hearing. The Court also felt the \"real contempt\" occurred before the grand jury, not the district court. Because Harris' conduct was not covered, he should be given notice of and a separate hearing for criminal contempt as provided by Rule 42(b). With this decision the court overruled Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959). Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent stating that the issue was resolved in Brown and there is no reason to overrule that decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61104:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61106:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61106:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn his will, U.S. Senator Augustus Bacon left a piece of real estate to the city of Macon in Georgia. He intended the land to be used as a park that only whites could access. The city, as the named trustee, created a board of managers to operate the park, and it eventually allowed African Americans to use it. Trying to effectuate the Senator's will, individual managers of the park sued to remove the city as trustee because it was constitutionally unable to enforce the racially restrictive component of the will. After the city complied and resigned as trustee, private trustees appointed by a state court resumed excluding African Americans. A group of African Americans then brought an action on the grounds that the racial exclusion still violated equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The state courts upheld the appointment of the private trustees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61106:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61106:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61106:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA private park operator is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment if the park is municipal in character.\nWriting for the 6-3 majority, Justice William O. Douglas held that racial discrimination is prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment in any state-sponsored situation. In this situation, the city maintained and managed the park, which had become an integral part of the city. This makes the operation of the park a public function, despite the fact that it was managed by private trustees. A park provides municipal services, such as mass recreation, so equal protection should apply.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the city’s resignation was based on the false understanding that the city cannot enforce the dictates of the trust but that the private trustees can. Since racial discrimination regarding the use of public property is unconstitutional, the private trustees could not enforce the will any more than the city could.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court unnecessarily overstepped its bounds by hearing a case that should be decided solely according to interpretation of state law by the state courts. Since there is no constitutional reason to prevent a municipality from resigning a trusteeship, the issue is one for the states to decide individually.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan argued that the Court should have dismissed the writ of certiorari because the case had no federal implications.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61106:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61112:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61112:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn July 11, 1964 Lt. Col. Lemuel Penn was shot and killed by three members of the Ku Klux Klan while driving home from Washington, D.C. The alleged shooters, James Lackey, Cecil Myers, and Howard Sims, were indicted but acquitted by an all-white jury. Following the acquittal, the three defendants were indicted on charges of conspiracy to threaten, abuse, and kill African Americans. Three alleged co-conspirators, Denver Phillips, George Turner, and Herbert Guest, were also charged. The U.S. Code defines criminal conspiracy as two or more individuals conspiring to \"injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.\" The indictment filed against the six alleged conspirators accused them of acting to deny African Americans full and equal enjoyment and utilization of goods and services, including access to state highways and free travel to and from Georgia on public streets. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it did not allege a specific denial of rights under U.S. law. The district court agreed, and dismissed the indictment. The prosecution appealed, arguing that the indictment alleged, in part, a denial of rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61112:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61112:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61112:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIf a state participates at all in a conspiracy it has violated the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to any individuals whose rights are infringed, based on the constitutional right to travel.\nIn an 8-1 opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that a criminal conspiracy affecting an individual's right of free interstate passage violated the law. The Court reasoned that the indictment contained an express allegation of state involvement sufficient at least to require denial of a motion to dismiss. If the predominate purpose of the conspiracy is to prevent the exercise of the right of travel, or to oppress a person of that right, as was the case here, then whether or not motivated by racial discrimination, the conspiracy becomes a proper object of federal law under which the indictment was brought. Therefore, the federal indictment was based on an offense under the laws of the United States.\nJustice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, concurred.\nJustice Harlan dissented in part and concurred in part.\nJustice Brannan, joined by Justices Warrant and Douglas, dissented in part and concurred in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61112:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61116:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61116:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSchmerber had been arrested for drunk driving while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital. During his treatment, a police officer ordered a doctor to take a blood sample which indicated that Schmerber had been drunk while driving. The blood test was introduced as evidence in court and Schmerber was convicted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61116:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61116:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61116:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Brennan argued for a 5-4 majority that the protection against self-incrimination applied specifically to compelled communications or testimony. Since the results of the blood test were neither \"testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61116:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61125:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61125:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHanna Mining Company owned and operated a fleet of cargo vessels. While in negotiations for a new collecting bargaining agreement, several Hanna marine engineers expressed that they no longer wanted their union to represent them. Negotiations broke down, and the union picketed one of Hanna's ships. This made it impossible for workers to unload the ship. Hanna petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to stop the picketing. The NLRB dismissed the petition because the engineers were \"supervisors\" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and could therefore not be \"employees.\" The NLRA does not protect supervisors. Hanna then filed charges with the NLRB under the NLRA, alleging that the union induced a work stoppage through improper secondary pressure and engaged in improper organizational picketing. The NLRB dismissed the charges because the NLRA did not apply to unions that represent supervisors, and the union's conduct did not exceed the bounds of lawful picketing.\nHanna sybsequently filed suit in the Wisconsin Circuit Court for Douglas County, requesting injunctive relief against further picketing and against any attempts by the union to force representation on Hanna's engineers. The Circuit Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision because that while the picketing was illegal under Wisconsin State law, it arguably violated the NLRA and so fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61125:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61125:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61125:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 9-0 decision Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority. While a state may not regulate conduct arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA, the Supreme Court found that Hanna's engineers were supervisors, not employees, and were not covered under the Act. The NLRA did not preempt Wisconsin's authority in this situation. The Court reversed the lower court decision and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61125:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61130:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61130:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case represents the consolidation of four cases, in each of which the defendant confessed guilt after being subjected to a variety of interrogation techniques without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights during an interrogation.\nOn March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the police station where he was questioned by police officers in connection with a kidnapping and rape. After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda. The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial despite the objection of the defense attorney and the fact that the police officers admitted that they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. The jury found Miranda guilty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61130:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61130:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61130:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police custody.\nChief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority, concluding that defendant’s interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment. To protect the privilege, the Court reasoned, procedural safeguards were required. A defendant was required to be warned before questioning that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he said can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant was required to be told that he had the right to an attorney, and if he could not afford an attorney, one was to be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. After these warnings were given, a defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation was not to be used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived.\nJustice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion created an unnecessarily strict interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that curtails the ability of the police to effectively execute their duties. He wrote that the state should have the burden to prove that the suspect was aware of his rights during the interrogation, but that statements resulting from interrogation should not be automatically excluded if the suspect was not explicitly informed of his rights. In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that the judicial precedent and legislative history surrounding the Fifth Amendment does not support the view that the Fifth Amendment prohibits all pressure on the suspect. He also argued that there was no legal precedent to support the requirement to specifically inform suspects of their rights. Justices Potter Stewart and Byron R. White joined in the dissent.\nJustice White wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Fifth Amendment only protects defendants from giving self-incriminating testimony if explicitly compelled to do so. He argued that custodial interrogation was not inherently coercive and did not require such a broad interpretation of the protections of the Fifth Amendment. Such an interpretation harms the criminal process by destroying the credibility of confessions. Justices Harlan and Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61130:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61133:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61133:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHuck Manufacturing Company owned the patent for a certain type of lock bolt. Huck granted a license to Townsend Company to manufacture the lock bolt on the condition that Townsend sell those bolts at a price set by Huck. Huck granted no other licenses to manufacture its lock bolt patents. The United States filed a complaint against Huck and Townsend, alleging Sherman Act violations of conspiracy to unreasonably restrain trade and monopolize interstate commerce in lock bolts. The district court ruled in favor of Huck and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61133:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61133:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61133:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo answer. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision by an equally divided court. Justice Abe Fortas did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61133:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61139:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61139:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew York voters sought declaratory judgment in a New York federal district court to prevent compliance with Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That section provided that no person who successfully completed the sixth grade in a school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of his inability to read or write English. The plaintiffs argued that Section 4(e) prevented the enforcement of New York election laws which required an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. A three-judge panel of the district court granted declaratory judgment and prevented enforcement of Section 4(e). It held that Congress exceeded its constitutionally designated powers in enacting Section 4(e) and usurped the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61139:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61139:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61139:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Supreme Court held that Section 4(e) is a proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress. With Justice William J. Brennan writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that Congress exercised its powers consistent with those afforded it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court then concluded that the Supremacy Clause prevented the enforcement of the New York English literacy requirement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61139:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61163:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61163:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe State of North Carolina charged Peter Klopfer with criminal trespass when he participated in a civil rights demonstration at a restaurant. At trial, the jury could not reach a verdict. The Superior Court judge continued the case twice when the state moved for a nolle prosequi with leave. This would allow the state to suspend their prosecution indefinitely and return the case to the docket in the future. Klopfer objected, arguing that the motion violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, but the judge granted the state’s request. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, holding that the right to a speedy trial does not include the right to compel the state to prosecute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61163:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61163:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61163:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that indefinitely suspending a trial violates a defendant’s right to a speedy trial. The Court also held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Sixth Amendment to the states. The Court noted that almost every state has rejected the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s reasoning. Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result, but argued that incorporating the Sixth Amendment is not necessary. He based his decision solely on the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Potter Stewart also concurred in the result.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61163:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61171:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61171:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHarry Keyishian and other faculty of the University of Buffalo became state employees in 1962, when the University of Buffalo was merged into the State University of New York system. As state employees, Keyishian and the other faculty members were subject to statutes and administrative regulations meant to prevent the appointment and continued employment of “subversive persons.” Because the appellants refused to sign a statement declaring that they were not Communists and had never been Communists, they were subject to dismissal and/or non-renewal of contract. The appellants sued for declaratory and injunctive relief and argued that the program of statutes and regulations violate the Constitution. A three-judge federal court upheld the constitutionality of the program.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61171:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61171:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61171:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the provisions of the New York plan were defined in such uncertain terms that they infringed upon the constitutional rights of public servants. Because the country had an interest in protecting the First Amendment rights of teachers in order for the educational system to be as free and open as possible, such overly broad and vague requirements both violated the teachers’ rights and were detrimental to the profession. The Court held that the government could only regulate First Amendment rights with “narrow specificity.” The Court also held that specific provisions of the Civil Service Law and Educational Service Law were too overly broad because they prohibit membership in the Communist Party without determining whether or not there was any specific intent to overthrow the United States government.\nJustice Tom C. Clark dissented and argued that the duties of a public servant allow the government to inquire into the employee’s fitness to serve in a particular position. He also argued that the provisions in question are specific to actions that “advocate, advise, or teach” the overthrow of the United States government and are not unconstitutionally vague. Justice John M. Harlan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61171:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61179:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61179:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral American railroad companies delivered 131 cars of potash from New Mexico to Canada Packers’ plants in Canada. Canada Packers agreed to, and paid, a joint through international rate for the shipment. Later, Canada Packers’ sued the railroads for reparations citing the international rate as unreasonable. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered the railroads to pay reparations to make up for the unreasonably low original payment. The railroads refused to pay for the part of the journey that took place in Canada, arguing that the ICC had no authority to regulate shipping rates outside the U.S.A. The district court ruled in favor of Canada Packers and the court of appeals reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61179:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61179:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61179:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) authorizes the ICC to determine reasonable rates where a carrier has entered into a joint through international rate covering transportation in the United States and abroad. Consequently, the ICC had the authority to order reparations. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent citing the ICA, which states the ICC can only regulate “insofar as such transportation...takes place within the United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61179:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61185:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61185:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGerald Francis Gault, fifteen years old, was taken into custody for allegedly making an obscene phone call. Gault had previously been placed on probation. The police did not leave notice with Gault's parents, who were at work, when the youth was arrested. After proceedings before a juvenile court judge, Gault was committed to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61185:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61185:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61185:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The proceedings of the Juvenile Court failed to comply with the Constitution. The Court held that the proceedings for juveniles had to comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. These requirements included adequate notice of charges, notification of both the parents and the child of the juvenile's right to counsel, opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination at the hearings, and adequate safeguards against self-incrimination. The Court found that the procedures used in Gault's case met none of these requirements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61185:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61194:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61194:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the Attorney General to investigate alleged irregularities in the handling of cases in the municipal courts of certain boroughs. As part of that investigation, police officers were brought in for questioning. They were told that anything they said might be used against them in a state criminal proceeding and that they could refuse to answer, but such refusal might be grounds for dismissal. The appellants represent a group of police officers who answered the questions and were charged with conspiracy to obstruct the administration of traffic laws. The appellants were convicted and they appealed by arguing that their statements were coerced by the threat of the loss of employment. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61194:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61194:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61194:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the threat of the loss of employment placed the interviewee in the bind of being forced to choose between self-incrimination and the loss of livelihood. In such a situation, there is no chance for the interviewee to reach a free and rational decision. The Court also held that policemen and other public servants are entitled to the same constitutional rights as other citizens, and that there was precedent to establish threat of a loss of employment as a violation of the Fifth Amendment.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that there should not be an inflexible rule regarding coercion, but rather that each case should be decided based on its individual facts. He argued that the government had a valid interest in ensuring the integrity of its police officers and other public servants, and that the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the state from discharging an employee who refuses to answer questions regarding his job performance and conditions for future employment.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that there was no evidence that the admissions were involuntary, given the fact that all the officers were informed of their rights and had counsel present at their interviews. There is no reason to suspect that they were subject to mental coercion based on any of the techniques that were present in previous coercion cases. He also argued that the statements were admissible as a matter of law because it is constitutionally permissible for a state to establish reasonable qualifications and standards of conduct for its employees. There was no constitutional reason for an employer to be unable to expect an employee to provide information pertinent to his employment. Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61194:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61210:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61210:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHarriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and the state and local policies of racial segregation which included segregation in jails. Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of \"trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent\" for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61210:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61210:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61210:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. The language of the Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, argued Justice Black, which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. Furthermore, since the sheriff acted to maintain access to the jail house and not because he \"objected to what was being sung . . . or disagreed with the objectives of the protest,\" there were no First Amendment violations. Black concluded that the state does have the power to control its own property for lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61210:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61219:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61219:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJesse James Gilbert was charged with armed robbery and the murder of a police officer in Alhambra, California. Gilbert refused to answer questions about the robbery charge without the advice of counsel, but later answered questions about a robbery in which the robber, allegedly Gilbert, used a handwritten note demanding the money. He gave the police handwriting exemplars, which were later admitted into evidence. The police also had eyewitnesses identify Gilbert in a line-up that was conducted without notice to his counsel. During the trial, several witnesses identified Gilbert in the courtroom as being a part of multiple robberies, including the Alhambra robbery. No distinction was made as to whether the in-court identifications were independent of the illegal line-ups that occurred before the trial. The jury rendered a guilty verdict and imposed the death penalty. The California Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61219:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61219:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61219:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that taking the handwriting exemplars was constitutional. While the Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination, a handwriting exemplar simply identifies a physical characteristic and is therefore outside of its protection. Also, taking exemplars without counsel present would not affect the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Court held that the admission of the in-court identifications without determining them to be impartial violates the Constitution. Since the identification line-up was the result of an illegal procedure, the state must establish that the in-court identifications are independent of those conducted illegally.\nJustice Hugo L. Black delivered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the admission of the writing exemplars violated Gilbert’s constitutional rights because his counsel was not present at the time this evidence was obtained. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the general search for evidence did not violate the Constitution.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that there was no need to establish that the in-court identifications were independent from the illegal identification line-up. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61219:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61226:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61226:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCivil rights activists who planned to march on Good Friday and Easter were denied parade permits from the city. When they indicated their intention to march anyway, Birmingham obtained an injunction from a state court which ordered them to refrain from demonstrating. Marchers who defied the order, including Martin Luther King, Jr. and Ralph Abernathy, were arrested.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61226:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61226:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61226:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court upheld the arrests since Walker failed to use proper judicial procedures to test the injunction's validity. Even though, Justice Stewart admitted, the injunction seemed broad and vague, and the marchers may not have enjoyed due process when applying for the permit originally, simply disobeying the injunction was illegitimate as \"no man can be judge in his own case . . . however righteous his motives.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61226:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61227:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61227:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe United States brought an antitrust action against Arnold, Schwinn & Co. and its distributor Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association. Arnold only allowed distributors to sell its products to approved dealers. The United States complaint attached this practice as an unlawful restraint on trade. The district court held that this practice was unlawful as to sales from distributors to dealers, but allowed for sales directly from Arnold to dealers. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61227:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61227:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61227:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSometimes. In a 5-2 decision, Justice Abe Fortas wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that it is unreasonable for a manufacturer to restrict where its products are sold after it has transferred title and responsibility for loss. In situations where Arnold retains title, and the dealer acts as an agent or salesperson, those restrictions are not a restraint on trade. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a partial dissent, expressing disagreement with the majority’s argument that Arnold’s practices become illegal when carried out through a distributor. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the partial dissent. Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice Byron R. White did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61227:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61231:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61231:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 23, 1961, Dr. Paul Berheldt was stabbed to death in the kitchen of his home. His wife was also injured in the attack. The next day, Theodore Stovall was arrested for the murder and promptly arraigned, but he did not yet have counsel. On August 25, although Stovall had still not retained counsel, police brought him to the hospital room where Mrs. Berheldt’s was recovering from surgery to see if she could identify him. Stovall was the only African-American man in the room and was handcuffed to a police officer. Mrs. Berheldt positively identified him after he was directed to say a few words for voice identification purposes. The prosecution used this identification as evidence in the trial, and Mrs. Berheldt again identified Stovall in court.\nStovall was convicted, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Stovall sought habeas corpus relief in district court on the grounds that Mrs. Berheldt’s identification was inadmissible. The district court dismissed after hearing argument on an unrelated issue. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.\nIn 1967, the Court issued rulings in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California that excluded identification evidence from trial when identification came from a tainted lineup — one at which the defendants did not have counsel present.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61231:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61231:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61231:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the decision to retroactively apply rulings of criminal procedure depended on the potential impact of that ruling on the fact-finding at trial. In this case, the identification, while a crucial stage of the investigation and trial, could be conducted well or poorly regardless of the presence of counsel. The Court held that the circumstances of this case were such that, given the uncertainty of Mrs. Berheldt’s medical status, the identification could not have been conducted any other way. Also, the retroactive application of the rulings in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California would greatly disrupt the justice system.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the identification in the hospital room was not constitutionally improper. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the concurrence.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent and argued that the right to have counsel present at an identification should be granted retroactively.\nJustice Abe Fortas wrote a dissent and argued that the State’s use of the hospital identification in the trial was prejudicial and violated Stovall’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.\nIn his dissent, Justice Hugo L. Black argued that people put in prison by evidence that is later found unconstitutional should not be denied the benefit of those rulings. He also argued that the Court’s case-by-case determination of due process granted the Court too much power and failed to give the government a solid constitutional standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61231:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61235:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61235:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt attorney Z.T. Osborn’s trial for attempting to bribe a juror in a federal criminal trial, the judge admitted a tape recording of an incriminating conversation between Osborn and a local police officer. The officer recorded the conversation secretly under authorization of the court. Osborn argued that the recording violated his right to privacy and he was entrapped. A jury convicted Osborn and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61235:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61235:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61235:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No, No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 7-1 majority, affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that using the secret recording did not violate Osborn’s rights. The recording was also properly admitted as evidence. The trial court properly left the question of entrapment to the jury. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that recording the conversation violated Osborn’s constitutional right to privacy. Justice Byron R. White did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61235:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61236:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61236:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert Redrup was a newsstand clerk at Times Square in New York, New York. In 1965, he sold copies of two pulp sex novels to a plainclothes police officer. New York City's criminal court tried and convicted Redrup for selling obscene material under New York Penal Law. The Supreme Court of New York affirmed. Harlan Publishing, the producers of the allegedly obscene material, supported Redrup throughout his appeal.\nWilliam Austin owned a retail bookstore and newsstand in Paducah, Kentucky. A woman purchased two magazines from a salesperson in Austin's store, asking for them by name –High Heels and Spree. Austin was tried and convicted of distributing obscene materials under Kentucky law. In a per curiam decision with one dissent, the Kentucky Court of Appeals overruled Austin's appeal, finding no error in the trial.\nGent, Swank, Modern Man, Bachelor, Cavalcade, Gentleman, Ace and Sir, were allegedly obscene magazines distributed by W.E. Burnham in Jefferson County, Arkansas. The Jefferson chancery court found the magazines to be obscene under an Arkansas anti-obscenity law and enjoined their distribution. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld this ruling despite admitting error in jury selection and instruction. Writing for the majority with two dissents, Chief Justice Carleton Harris argued that the magazines violated the contemporary community values of Jefferson County, but that one magazine was entitled to appeal the ruling.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61236:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61236:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61236:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam decision, the court reversed the judgments of the respective lower courts, holding that while members of the majority advocated a variety of legal approaches to obscenity cases, the judgments at hand did not withstand scrutiny under any of the available approaches. The court specified that two of its members argue that the court has no authority to control publications on obscenity grounds, a third member limits the state's authority to a specific and readily identifiable class of material, and other members limit the state's authority to prurient material that is offensive to the specific community and has no redeeming social value. Yet another justice did not view social value as an independent factor. The court held that the judgments failed all of these tests.\nJustice John Harlan, joined by Justice Thomas Clark, dissented, noting that Redrup v. New York and Austin v. Kentucky originally raised questions regarding the scienter requirement in obscenity prosecutions; Gent v. Arkansas was granted review to answer questions of vagueness and prior restraint under an Arkansas anti-obscenity statute. He argued that the majority decided a question that was not before it and in doing so avoided the questions of scienter, vagueness and prior restraint actually raised by the cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61236:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61241:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61241:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are several consolidated cases involving similar circumstances. In the lead case, a district court in Tennessee tried and convicted James Hoffa, the president of a labor union, for attempting to bribe members of a jury in an earlier trial. A paid government informer provided substantial evidence in the bribery trial. The informer was another local union officer who met with Hoffa on several occasions during the first trial. At that time, the government had not hired the officer as an informant. Hoffa alleged that the evidence gathered from this informer violated his Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61241:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61241:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61241:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a plurality opinion for four members of the court affirming the court of appeals. The plurality held that the government did not procure the evidence deceptively. Use of the evidence did not violate Hoffa’s Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure or his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.\nJustice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent, stating that the writs should be dismissed as improvidently granted. Justice William O. Douglas joined in this dissent. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissent, expressing that this holding strayed from the standards of justice in the federal system.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61241:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61244:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61244:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBilly Joe Wade was arrested and indicted for robbing a federally-insured bank. Without giving notice to Wade’s counsel, an FBI officer set up a lineup for two bank employees including Wade and several other prisoners. The officer had each prisoner put strips of tape on their face and say, “Put the money in the bag,” like the robbers did. The employees identified Wade as the robber. At trial, the employees identified him again. Wade’s counsel moved to strike the identifications because the lineup violated Wade’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lineup without counsel violated the Sixth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61244:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61244:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61244:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nMaybe. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Brennan vacated the lower judgment and remanded to determine whether the employees based their trial identifications solely on the lineup. The Supreme Court affirmed that the lineup did not violate Wade’s privilege against self-incrimination. To decide the Sixth Amendment issue, courts must decide whether counsel’s presence at a pre-trial confrontation of the accused will preserve the accused’s right to a fair trial. In this case, Wade was entitled to counsel at the lineup. The Court held that the identifications should not be excluded if they were based on observations other than the lineup.\nJustice Hugo L. Black dissented in part and concurred in part, expressing that the lineup violated Wade's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Justice Black would affirm the conviction, though, because the prosecution did not use evidence of the lineup at trial. Justice Byron R. White dissented in part and concurred in part, stating that Wade was not entitled to counsel at the lineup. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the opinion. Justice Abe Fortas concurred in part and dissented in part, stating that the lineup violated Wade’s privilege against self-incrimination. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61244:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61251:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61251:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was made \"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.\" These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul \"Bear\" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of an African-American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61251:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61251:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61251:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-4 decision authored by Justice John M. Harlan, the Court noted significant differences between the circumstances of these cases and those of New York Times. In particular, criticism of Butts or Walker, unlike a government official, could not be conflated with criticism of public policy. Thus, the Court reasoned that public figures who are not public officials may recover damages for libel stemming from false reports based on \"highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.\" The Court concluded that Curtis' investigation of its allegations against Butts failed to meet this standard. The company printed a questionably reliable source's allegations without any attempt to verify his claims, and the story in question was not a pressing event or immediately newsworthy. The Court thus affirmed the lower courts' denial of a retrial. The situation in Butts contrasted with Walker, where the AP relied on a correspondent on the scene of an event that was immediately newsworthy. The Court thus denied Walker's claims to damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61251:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61257:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61257:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (\"FFDCA\") to require manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the \"established name\" of the drug \"prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such drug,\" on labels and other printed material. The purpose of this amendment was to alert doctors and patients about identical drugs that sold under separate names at different prices.\nThe act delegated authority to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to publish proposed regulations designed to implement the statute. The Commissioner, George P. Larrick, published regulations mandating that drug manufacturers print the established drug name every time its corresponding proprietary name is used.\nAbbott Laboratories brought suit against Anthony J. Celebrezze, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and Larrick under the Declaratory Judgment Act (\"DJA\") and the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\"). Abbott Laboratories argued that the \"every time\" rule was outside of the scope of the authority given to the commissioner by Congress.\nChief Judge Caleb M. Wright of the district court granted the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Abbott Labs, finding that the FFDCA did not permit the Commissioner's \"every time\" interpretation. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reversed without touching upon the interpretation question. District court Judge Weber, writing for a unanimous court, held that Abbott Labs could not challenge the commissioner's rule under the DJA or APA. Abbott Laboratories and 37 other drug manufacturers appealed the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61257:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61257:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61257:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Writing for the majority in a 5-3 decision, Justice John Harlan wrote that where the legal issue is fit for judicial resolution and a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in plaintiffs' conduct with potentially serious penalties, the law permits access to the courts under the APA and the DJA. The Court found that congress did not intend to forbid pre-enforcement review of regulations like the \"every time\" rule. The legislature designed the statute's specific review provisions to provide additional remedies for parties in Abbott Laboratories' position, not to cut down traditional channels of review. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals.\nJustice Abraham Fortas dissented, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Thomas Clark. He wrote that courts have jurisdiction over challenges to administrative action only when there is a specific statutory provision, when the agency acts unconstitutionally, or when it acts without jurisdiction. Justice Fortas feared that the majority's ruling would give federal district judges a \"roving commission to halt the regulatory process.\" He reviewed the legislative history of the FFDCA and found that congress had consistently reserved judicial review for specific situations not including the present case.\nJustice Clark wrote a separate dissent arguing that the commissioner was right to prevent drug manufacturers from misleading the public about the content of their proprietary drugs.\nJustice William Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61257:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61259:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61259:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61259:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61259:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61259:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally \"odious to a free people\" and were subject to \"the most rigid scrutiny\" under the Equal Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose \"independent of invidious racial discrimination.\" The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial classifications were not subject to a \"rational purpose\" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. \"Under our Constitution,\" wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, \"the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61259:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61261:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61261:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn an antitrust suit, the U.S. Supreme Court directed the district court to order El Paso National Gas Co. to divest itself of all Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. stock. Several competing gas companies attempted to intervene under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the district court denied the motions. The district court approved El Paso’s divestiture plan, under which El Paso would create a new company to receive all of the Pacific Northwest assets. The gas companies again attempted to intervene, arguing that the divestiture plan would not create a valid competitor. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61261:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61261:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61261:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-2 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion reversing the district court. The Supreme Court held that the gas companies had the right to intervene. The Court also gave guidelines for the district court to follow in its new order for divestiture. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that private parties do not have the right to intervene in government antitrust suits. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent. Justice Byron R. White and Justice Abe Fortas did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61261:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61270:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61270:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter immigrating to the United States from Poland in 1912, Beys Afroyim became a naturalized American citizen in 1926. In 1950, Afroyim went to Israel where he voted in that country's 1951 governmental elections. In 1960, Afroyim applied for renewal a of his American passport. The State Department informed him that he had forfeited his American citizenship by virtue of Section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act which stipulates that citizens of the United States shall \"lose\" their citizenship upon voting in a foreign state's political elections. Afroyim challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(e). On appeal from a district court's summary judgment favoring Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Afroyim certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61270:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61270:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61270:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-4 decision, overruling Perez v. Brownell (356 US 44), the Court held that Congress has no general power to revoke American citizenship without consent. Noting the special bond between Americans and their government, a bond that protects every citizen against all manner of destruction of their rights, the Court held that only citizens themselves may voluntarily relinquish their citizenship. This sacred principle applies equally to natural and naturalized citizens. As such, Section 401(e) violated both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61270:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61277:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61277:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAround 8 a.m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber took $363 from the premises of the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland and fled on foot. Two cab drivers were attracted by the yelling and followed the suspect onto Cocoa Lane. One of the cab drivers radioed the company dispatcher a description of the suspect including clothes, which the dispatcher passed on to the police. When the police arrived at the Hayden residence, Mrs. Hayden allowed them to search the house without a warrant. The police found Bennie Joe Hayden in an upstairs bedroom and no one else in the house. They also found a set of clothes matching the description given by the cab driver in the washing machine, as well as a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank. Ammunition for both weapons was discovered in Hayden’s room.\nHayden was charged with armed robbery and tried in front of a court sitting without a jury. The clothing and the weapons were admitted into evidence at trial without objection, and Hayden was convicted. Hayden sought habeas corpus relief in district court, which was denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas corpus and held that the search was valid but that the clothing had “evidential value only” and was improperly admitted into evidence at trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61277:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61277:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61277:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the language and purpose of the Fourth Amendment does not support such a distinction. Because the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect the privacy of citizens from being violated by the government, the type of property that is the subject of the search is irrelevant to the protection provided. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment.\nJustice Abe Fortas wrote a partial concurrence in which he argued that the Fourth Amendment limits the scope of searches to those items which can be directly tied to the commission of a crime. He also argued that the protection against general searches is a fundamental aspect of the Fourth Amendment, and the majority’s opinion damages that protection. Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the partial concurrence.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the Fourth Amendment provides protection of both privacy and property. He argued that not all evidence discovered in a lawful search is admissible, particularly if it serves a testimonial purpose that would violate the Fifth Amendment rights of the defendant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61277:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61299:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61299:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe New York Bar charged Samuel Spevack, an attorney from New York, with professional misconduct because he refused to produce financial records and testify at a judicial inquiry. In his defense, Spevack claimed his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and stated that the records and testimony would tend to incriminate him. The New York appellate court rejected Spevack's defense and ordered Spevack disbarred, holding that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not available to attorneys against states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61299:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61299:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61299:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote the plurality opinion of the Court reversing the lower court's decision. Writing for himself and three other justices, Douglas maintained that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable against states because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from interfering with the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, including the right to remain silent without suffering a penalty. This protection extends to lawyers, and Spevack should have been able to assert his right against self-incrimination without being penalized by the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of his livelihood.\nJustice Abe Fortas voted with the majority but wrote a special concurrence distinguishing between a lawyer's right to remain silent, which he acknowledged, and that of a public employee, who could be questioned about his official duties without the self-incrimination protection.\nJustice John Marshall Harlan II dissented, joined by Justices Tom Clark and Potter Stewart. Harlan wrote that the State of New York had the authority to impose valid conditions on the authority to practice law and to assess qualifications for continued practice. He concluded that the plurality improperly invalidated New York's rules by reversing Spevack's disbarment and determined that protection from disbarment for failure to provide information to a judicial inquiry went beyond the scope of the right against self-incrimination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61299:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61308:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61308:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing a jury trial, Jackie Washington was convicted of murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. At trial, Washington alleged that Charles Fuller, already convicted for the same murder, actually shot the victim while Washington attempted to stop the shooting. Washington claimed that Fuller would testify to these facts, but the prosecution objected based on a state statute that prevented persons charged in the same crime from testifying on behalf of one another. Washington argued that refusing to allow Fuller to testify violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining a witness in his favor. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61308:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61308:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61308:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for eight members of the court, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is so fundamental that it is incorporated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington was denied that right in this case. Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result, writing that Washington’s right to due process was violated, but the compulsory process clause played no role in his decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61308:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61312:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61312:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKalman Berenyi applied for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. After a hearing, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the application, finding that Berenyi gave false testimony to facilitate his naturalization, so he was not a person of “good moral character.” In Berenyi’s application, he denied membership in the Communist Party, but two witnesses testified that Berenyi often spoke of his Party membership and lead a study group on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Berenyi appealed, arguing that the government failed to show that he had a “meaningful association” with the Communist Party. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61312:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61312:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61312:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the First Circuit. The Supreme Court held that it could not review a factual finding by two lower courts without an obvious and exceptional showing of error. The record gave no indication that the district court or the court of appeals made such an error. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous based on other evidence presented at the naturalization hearing. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61312:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61315:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61315:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis is a companion case to United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475. Helen Travis was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California of traveling to Cuba on two occasions without a valid passport in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. While Travis’ passport admittedly was not endorsed for travel to Cuba, the U.S. government did not allege, or provide proof, that she did not have a valid passport for general international travel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61315:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61315:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61315:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Abe Fortas, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that area restrictions on an otherwise valid passport are not criminally enforceable under the Immigration and Nationality Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61315:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61334:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61334:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he remained an employee at the Todd Pacific Shipyards. Under the Act, it was illegal for a member of the Party to remain employed at a location that the Secretary of Defense names as a “defense facility”. The district court dismissed the indictment because it did not allege that Robel was an active member of the Communist Party. The district court felt that this provision of the Act violated the First Amendment right to association if it applied to inactive Party members. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the case for direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61334:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61334:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61334:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-2 decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the majority holding that the “defense facility” employment provision was an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association even if it applied only to active Party members. The Supreme Court held that the provision was overbroad and the war power does not give Congress a blank slate to do whatever it wants. Justice William J. Brennan concurred in the judgment, writing that Congress’ delegation of authority in designating defense facilities to the Secretary of Defense was unconstitutional because they provided no meaningful standards for the Secretary to follow.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the Communist Party’s goal of government overthrow justified the ban on employment in defense facilities. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61334:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61336:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61336:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn May 19, 1961, the Multnomah County Circuit Court convicted Lee E. A. Parker of second-degree murder and sentenced him to the Oregon State Penitentiary for a potential maximum of the remainder of his life. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed his conviction, and denied a rehearing on October 8, 1963. During the trial, the bailiff stated to Mrs. Gattman, an alternate juror, “Oh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty.” Misses Inwards and Drake, both regular jurors, overheard this statement. Parker was not aware of these statements during the trial, and consequently did not bring them to the attention of the court.\nAfter the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, Parker gave his wife a tape recording and asked her to contact members of the jury to find new grounds for setting aside his conviction. Mrs. Parker secured the names of the jurors and contacted three, Misses Inwards, Drake and Gattman. Mrs. Gattman was an alternate juror who expressed her displeasure with the verdict to Mrs. Parker. Mrs. Inwards gave conflicting testimony in an affidavit; she initially testified that the bailiffs’ statements did not influence her testimony, but later stated that the remarks could have affected her decision. Mrs. Gattman was the only juror who was sure of the bailiffs’ statements, and later admitted that she was disturbed by the verdict. Mrs. Drake gave an account of the bailiff’s statements that conflicted with Mrs. Gattman’s.\nParker filed for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction trial court held that the trial court would have granted a new trial if it had been aware of the bailiff’s statements. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erroneously applied the statutory standard for judging a motion for a new trial under the Oregon Post Conviction Act. It also held that the bailiff’s statements did not violate Parker’s state or federal constitutional rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61336:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61336:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61336:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam decision with one dissent, the Court held that the bailiff's statements violated Parker’s right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to trial by an impartial jury. The Court noted that there was no dispute over what the bailiff said, nor any dispute over whether he was subjected to confrontation, cross-examination or other constitutional safeguards. The Court held that the bailiff’s speech was private talk tending to reach the jury by outside influence. The Court rejected the government’s argument that no prejudice was shown because ten members of the jury testified that they did not hear the bailiff’s statement, pointing to one juror’s testimony that she was prejudiced by the bailiff’s statements. The Court also noted the official character of the bailiff's role with the court.\nJustice John Harlan dissented, disagreeing that the Sixth Amendment was directly applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. He rejected the Court’s assumption that jurors must be absolutely insulated from all expressions of opinion on the merits of cases, citing cases where the Court refused to overthrow a verdict despite jury contact with outside information. He also questioned the evidence of Mrs. Inwards’ prejudice, ascribing her claims of prejudicial influence to post-conviction guilt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61336:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61345:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61345:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUntil about 1920, the Sealy Mattress Company was the sole manufacturer of Sealy products at its four factories in the Midwest and Southwest. By 1923, however, some 19 independent factories operated under Sealy licenses. Soon thereafter, these licensees and new owner E. E. Edwards formed the Sealy Corporation. Sealy continued to license the use of the Sealy mark to independent stock-holding bedding manufacturers.\nIn 1925, the licensees agreed on a system of allocating exclusive territories to market Sealy products. Each manufacturer had an exclusive territory in his license contract; this contract prohibited each manufacturer from selling outside of that territory. Around this time, the licensee-stockholders and Sealy began collaborating to fix and police the minimum and maximum prices charged by retailers of Sealy products, the advertised prices of Sealy products, and the means of inducing retailers to adhere to these prices. In 1933, Sealy Corporation reorganized into Sealy, Incorporated. Sealy, Inc. made a new provision that any new manufacturers coming into the organization must purchase Sealy stock. In the 1940’s, Sealy’s business increased and many new licensees joined to cover previously open territories.\nThe Sherman Act provided that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce was illegal. The United States brought a civil action against Sealy, Inc. charging that it violated the Sherman Act by setting minimum retail prices and by forcing retailers to adhere to those prices. It also alleged that Sealy, Inc.’s exclusive territorial arrangements violated the Sherman Act. The district court held that Sealy, Inc.’s price fixing violated the Sherman Act, but that its territorial arrangements did not. The United States appealed the district court’s ruling on the legality of Sealy, Inc.’s licensing structure.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61345:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61345:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61345:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-1 decision written by Justice Abraham Fortas, the Court held that Sealy’s licensing structure was a horizontal restraint of trade, a per se violation of the Sherman Act. He noted that the licensees controlled the day-to-day business of Sealy through the board of directors and the executive committee, including the grant, assignment, reassignment, and termination of exclusive territorial licenses. Justice Fortas held that Sealy’s behavior was an aggregation of trade restraints, reasoning that Sealy’s territorial restraints were a part of its admittedly unlawful price fixing scheme. While acknowledging that the territorial limitations served other purposes, he reasoned that their connection to price fixing was enough to require they be condemned as an unlawful restraint of trade.\nJustice John Harlan dissented. He argued that Sealy’s territorial licensing structure was a vertical arrangement not prohibited by the Sherman Act. He described the main purpose of Sealy’s licensing structure as the proper exploitation of the Sealy name and trademarks by licensed bedding manufacturers. Justice Harlan argued that the territorial restrictions were secondary or ancillary to that purpose. He rejected the majority’s theory that Sealy’s actions were an aggregation of trade restraints, noting that the district court did not address the reasonableness of Sealy’s territorial arrangements.\nJustices Tom Clark and Byron White took no part in the decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61345:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61347:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61347:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn inspector from the Department of Public Health of San Francisco asked Roland Camara to be allowed to search his residence. The inspector claimed that the occupancy permit for the property did not allow residential use of the first floor. The search was a routine annual inspection. Camara refused to let the inspector enter the building without a warrant. The inspector returned two more times without a warrant, and Camara turned him away. About a month after the first visit, Camara was arrested and charged with violation of the San Francisco Housing Code (SFHC) for refusing to allow the inspection. Camara sought a writ of prohibition, arguing that the section of the SFHC that authorized the inspection violated Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Superior Court of California denied the writ, the District Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61347:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61347:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61347:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 6-3 majority, vacated the lower judgment. The Supreme Court held that Camara had a constitutional right to insist that the inspector obtain a warrant before searching his home. He also cannot be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. This decision overruled Frank v. Maryland\nJustice Tom C. Clark dissented, arguing that Frank v. Maryland settled the question and must be followed. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61347:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61351:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61351:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 17, 1962, Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale registered at a motel in Fresno, California. At approximately 2:00 A.M. the following day, Chapman and Teale appeared at the Spot Club in Lodi. The only persons at the bar were Teale, Chapman, and the club’s bartender, Billy Dean Adcock. A short time later, a witness observed three persons in front of the Spot Club: a woman of Chapman’s general description and Adcock stood in front of the club’s door, while a man resembling Teale stood behind Adcock while he apparently locked the door.\nThe next day, the Spot Club’s owner found the club in disarray; someone had broken into the cash register and approximately $260 was missing. Routine housekeeping tasks normally performed by Adcock were left undone. Later, Adcock body’s was found in a remote area north of Lodi, half buried in an open roadside ditch. The time of death was approximately 3:00 AM on October 18th. Adcock was shot three times in the head. The bullets were fired from a .22 caliber weapon similar to one purchased by Chapman while with Teale in Reno, Nevada, six days before the killing. The gun was not found.\nOfficers arrested Teale in New Orleans on November 2, 1962. He carried a gun purchased the same day as Chapman’s .22 caliber weapon. An agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Chapman in St. Joseph, Missouri on October 26, 1962. She gave conflicting accounts of her whereabouts on October 17 and 18, but a registration card from October 18 for occupancy of a motel room in Woodland, California was made out in her handwriting.\nChapman and Teale were charged with the first degree murder of Adcock. A prisoner locked up with Teale testified that Teale did not plan on killing Adcock, but when Chapman and Teale released Adcock from their car outside of Lodi, Chapman shot him once in the back of the head and twice more when he was on the ground. Neither defendant appeared as a witness, but Chapman’s conflicting testimony was introduced by direct examination of the FBI agent. The trial court instructed the jury that they could draw adverse conclusions from the defendants’ failure to testify. The jury convicted both defendants of first degree murder. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. State of California that California’s practice of allowing prosecutors to use defendants’ silence against them violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, however, the California Supreme Court held that the unconstitutional jury instruction was a harmless error because it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61351:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61351:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61351:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Hugo Black, the Court affirmed that there may be some constitutional errors so unimportant and insignificant that they are harmless. Justice Black noted that all fifty states have harmless error statutes or rules, and that Congress established a longstanding rule for federal courts that judgments should not be reversed for errors that do not affect parties’ substantial rights.\nJustice Black determined that federal law must govern the application of a state harmless error rule; the Court cannot leave the formulation of rules protecting individuals from invasion by the states to those very same states. Justice Black then cited the holding from Fahy v. State of Connecticut, where the Court determined that an error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Here, the prosecution repeatedly told the jury that by their silence Chapman and Teale had served as irrefutable witnesses against themselves; absent these comments, reasonable jurors might well have returned a not-guilty verdict. Thus, the state had not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutions’ comments did not contribute to Chapman and Teale’s conviction, and the error was harmful.\nJustice Potter Stewart concurred, noting that the Court previously reversed all convictions of guilt when defendants had given involuntary confessions at trial. Justice Stewart rejected the notion that such constitutional violations could ever be harmless.\nJustice John Harlan dissented, arguing that the state appellate court reasonably applied California’s harmless error rule to sustain Chapman and Teale’s conviction, and that California’s harmless error rule was consistent with the guarantee of fundamental fairness in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice Harlan rejected the majority’s assumption of a general supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues, finding no source for that power in the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61351:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61379:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61379:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWitherspoon was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a jury in Illinois. An Illinois statute provides grounds for the dismissal of any juror with \"conscientious scruples\" against capital punishment. At Witherspoon's trial, the prosecution eliminated nearly half of the prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment. The prosecution did not find out if most of the jurors dismissed would necessarily vote against capital punishment.\nWitherspoon appealed, alleging that the dismissal of prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment violated his Sixth Amendment right to an \"impartial jury\" and 14th Amendment right to due process. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that no constitutional violation took place.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61379:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61379:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61379:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held 6-3 that Witherspoon's death sentence was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that a jury composed after the dismissal of all who oppose the death sentence was biased in favor the death sentence; such a jury was not impartial and thus violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that while jurors who say they will not impose the death sentence can be dismissed, jurors who simply oppose the death sentence as a personal belief may not. Justice William Douglas, concurring, argued that it also unconstitutional to dismiss prospective jurors who say they will never impose the death sentence.\nJustice Hugo Black, with whom Justices John Harlan and Byron White joined, dissented. Douglas argued that the Constitution allows the dismissal of all jurors who oppose the death penalty personally, because they will be necessarily biased against the death penalty. In a separate dissent, White argued that the Illinois legislature was allowed to exclude \"those with doubts\" about \"one of the punishments among which the legislature sought to have them choose....\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61379:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61380:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61380:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWayne Darnell Bumper was investigated and eventually arrested on charges of rape and felonious assault. During the investigation, police officials searched the home of Mrs. Hattie Leath, Bumper’s grandmother, with whom he was living at the time. Leath consented to a search of her home, but only after the police officials informed her they had a warrant, which they did not actually have. The officers found a rifle that was later introduced into evidence at Bumper’s trial. The trial court allowed the rifle to be entered into evidence because it held that Leath had consented to the search. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61380:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61380:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61380:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, for a search to be lawful under the Fourth Amendment, the consent must have been freely and voluntarily given. A search that relies on a warrant cannot be justified on the basis of consent if the warrant turns out to be faulty, regardless of the police officer’s knowledge of the faultiness of the warrant. Therefore, the evidence obtained during the search in this case should not have been admitted into evidence.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that, because the introduction of the rifle into evidence was not harmless error in the sense that Bumper’s guilt was not adjudicated based solely on constitutionally admissible evidence, not in the sense that he was improperly convicted.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he highlighted the fact that Leath testified that her consent “was all [her] own free will.” The fact that the police did not have a warrant does not negate the fact that Mrs. Leath wanted the police to search her premises to show her innocence; therefore, her consent was freely and voluntarily given. Justice Black also argued that, while all evidence found in the illegal search must be thrown out, Bumper should still have been found guilty without a mandatory retrial. In his separate dissent, Justice White dissented and argued that not every search conditionally consented to must be deemed invalid. The fact that the evidence was discovered illegally and without a warrant does not mean that the evidence should not be deemed legal if a valid warrant is eventually presented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61380:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61398:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61398:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 12, 1964, Wainwright, a student at Tulane University Law School, was out walking around midnight. Two New Orleans Police Department officers stopped him because, in their opinion, he fitted the description of a man suspected of murder. Wainwright told the officers he had identification at home, but not on his person. The officers then asked Wainwright to remove this jacket so that they could search him for a tattoo that the suspected murdered had on his left arm. Wainwright ultimately refused to do so after trying to walk away and some mild verbal sparing. The officers then arrested him on a charge of vagrancy by loitering and frisked him. After Wainwright continued to refuse to remove his jacket at the police station, officers used force to remove it and discovered that he had no tattoo.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61398:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61398:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61398:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61398:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61401:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61401:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe petitioners were convicted of illegally passing national defense information to the Soviet Union; their cases were affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a petition for rehearing, the petitioners claimed that the government had relied on illegally obtained eavesdropping evidence to convict. The Court granted a rehearing and in a per curiam opinion vacated the appellate court judgment and remanded the case to the federal trial court for a rehearing.\nThe United States sought to modify the Supreme Court's order, urging that the eavesdropping evidence should be reviewed in camera by the trial judge who would then transmit only relevant evidence to the parties. The petitioners argued their opposition to the motion in the 1967 Term. The matter was reargued in the 1968 Term.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61401:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61401:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61401:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and Yes. In a majority opinion speaking for himself and four other members of the Court, Justice Byron R. White held that \"conversations as well as property are excludable from the criminal trial when they are found to be the fruits of an illegal invasion of the home.\" Moreover, continued White, \"surveillance records as to which any petitioner has standing to object should be turned over to him without being screened in camera by the trial judge.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61401:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61410:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61410:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJerry Douglas Mempa pleaded guilty to joyriding, and he was placed on probation for two years and the imposition of his sentence was deferred. Four months later, the county prosecutor moved to revoke Mempa’s probation based on his involvement in a burglary. During the revocation hearing, Mempa was not represented by counsel, nor was he asked if he wished to have counsel appointed for him. Mempa pled guilty to the burglary charge, and the court revoked Mempa’s probation and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Mempa petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus and claimed that he was denied his right to counsel during the proceedings revoking his probation. The Washington Supreme Court denied his petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61410:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61410:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61410:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the legal right to counsel that the Sixth Amendment guarantees, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, extends to the post-trial proceeding for revocation of probation and deferred sentencing. The right of counsel at this stage ensures that the conviction and sentence are read correctly without misinterpretation of record. Counsel also assists the defendant in asserting his rights, such as the right to appeal, at the deferred sentencing stage.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61410:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61422:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61422:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Connecticut district court convicted James Marchetti of willfully failing to register and pay an occupational tax for accepting wagers. Gambling and accepting wagers was illegal in Connecticut. Marchetti unsuccessfully attempted to arrest the judgment. He argued that the requirements to register and pay the tax violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61422:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61422:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61422:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 7-1 decision, Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority reversing the lower court opinion. The Supreme Court held that the registration and occupational tax provisions were constitutional, but using the related information to prosecute someone did violate privilege. Marchetti’s claim of privilege was a proper defense and should have been sufficient to avoid conviction. Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissent stating that this decision frustrates the purpose of the tax and opens the door to many other similar challenges.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61422:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61428:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61428:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGerald Waldron filed an anti-trust action against Cities Service Co. and six other large oil companies. Waldron sought treble damages alleging a conspiracy by the oil companies to boycott Iranian oil. The trial judge limited Waldron’s discovery to depositions of certain Cities employees. After an extended period of depositions, the trial judge granted Cities summary judgment because there was no material evidence that Cities took any part in the conspiracy. The court denied Waldron’s motion of additional discovery because the court felt it would be a fishing expedition and constitute harassment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61428:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61428:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61428:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Yes. In a 5-3 decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for the opinion affirming the lower court decision. The Supreme Court held that Waldron failed to show that the additional discovery would have been fruitful, so he was not prejudiced by the limitations. Also, on the facts shown, summary judgment was proper. Waldron failed to produce any facts that raised a genuine issue for trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61428:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61429:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61429:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid O'Brien burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61429:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61429:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61429:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The 7-to-1 majority, speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, established a test to determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. The formula examines whether the regulation is unrelated to content and narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest. \"[W]e think it clear,\" wrote Warren,\" that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidential restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61429:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61451:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61451:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames A. Watts, a schoolteacher in Alaska, held private conversations with other teachers to obtain their support to remove the superintendent from his position. His further language included words to the effect of ‘we are unable to get rid of the superintendent, so let’s get rid of the school board.’ The Seward School Board considered Watts' conduct to be “immoral,” defined as “conduct of the person tending to bring the individual concerned or the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect” under the relevant Alaska statute, so Watts was dismissed from his teaching job.\nWatts' dismissal was upheld in both the Alaska Superior Court and the Alaska Supreme Court. The Alaska Supreme Court held that Watts' conduct “had a tendency to bring the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect.” Watts then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and argued that his dismissal violated his First Amendment right because the school board was attempting to limit his freedom of political speech. He also argued a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right because he should have the same equal protection for expression as any other private individual. After Watts filed his petition, Alaska amended the relevant state statute to reflect the rights of teachers to comment and criticize school administrators just as any private individual would have the right to do. Under the amended statute, Watts would not have been dismissed from his job.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61451:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61451:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61451:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam decision, the eight-justice majority held that the change in Alaska’s statute was directly relevant to this case. Therefore, it was necessary that the case be reversed and remanded to the Supreme Court of Alaska for further consideration.\nWhile Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Hugo L. Black concurred with the reverse and remand decision in this case, they said they would have reversed the decision outright for reasons Justice Douglas stated in his concurring opinion in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District. In that case, a teacher was dismissed from his job for sending a letter to a local newspaper criticizing financial decisions of the board and the superintendent of his school. In his opinion, Justice Douglas highlighted that it is not reason enough to limit free speech because words are “malicious” or have a “reckless disregard for the truth.”\nJustice White dissented without writing a separate opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61451:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61459:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61459:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nActing on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61459:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61459:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61459:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. \"The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,\" wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61459:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61470:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61470:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDixie Power and Light Company provided service to several locations in Claiborne County, Tennesee, including the towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell. Kentucky Utilities Company (KU) held a non-exclusive county franchise to occupy county roads. In 1954, Dixie Power and Light transferred its assets to KU and dissolved, giving KU control over the vast majority of the market in Tazewell and New Tazewell.\nThe Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as amended in 1959, barred the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) from expanding its sales outside the area for which the TVA or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957. On that date, the area of Claiborne County had 3,564 users of TVA power compared to 1,839 users of KU power; the towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell, however, had 28 TVA users and 561 KU users. KU’s retail rates for electricity in the towns were approximately two-and-one-half times higher than those offered by TVA. Citizens in Tazewell and New Tazewell responded to this rate disparity by demanding access to the TVA’s cheaper power. After three years of complaints, planning and consultations, the towns’ governments contracted to hook up a new municipal system to TVA’s power grid.\nKU filed suit against TVA, the mayors of Tazewell and New Tazewell, and the Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, a TVA distributor. KU charged the defendants with conspiracy to destroy its business in Tazewell and asked the court to enjoin TVA from supplying power to the new municipal system. Shortly before trial, the TVA Board of Directors determined that TVA was the primary source of power for Claiborne County on July 1, 1957, and that Claiborne County was the relevant area for the purposes of the act. The district court upheld the board’s decision, but the Sixth Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed. Comparing the number of customers served by KU and TVA in Tazewell and New Tazewell, the Sixth Circuit held that the two towns and KU’s original county road corridor were an ‘area’ for the purposes of the act and that TVA was barred from extending its service to that area.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61470:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61470:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61470:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In a 6-1 decision written by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that Kentucky Utilities Company had standing to sue because one legislative purpose of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act was to protect private power suppliers’ competitive interests. He noted that the petitioners conceded this point, and that congress was only able to secure funding for the TVA by agreeing to limit its territorial expansion, thereby also limiting unfair competition with private suppliers.\nJustice Black further held that the courts should only set aside the TVA’s area determinations if those determinations lacked reasonable support in relation to the statutory purpose of controlling the TVA’s territorial expansion. Hence, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit should have upheld the TVA Board’s determination that Claiborne County was the relevant area under the act. Justice Black rejected KU’s argument that the act prohibited the TVA from extending its services to privately-served customers, noting that the act did not make the existence of a private supplier in an area an automatic bar to TVA expansion in that area. He also emphasized that Tazewell and New Tazewell were practically surrounded by areas already served by the TVA.\nFinally, Justice Black rejected KU’s argument that the act prohibited the TVA from providing service to the area in question because KU was the primary supplier on July 1, 1957. Justice Black noted that the act only made the existence of a private supplier an absolute bar to TVA activity if the TVA’s activities extended up to five miles beyond the area it originally served. Given the TVA Board’s ruling that Tazewell and New Tazewell fell within TVA’s primary service area, this restriction did not apply.\nJustice John Harlan dissented. He argued that Congress intended the TVA to limit the TVA Board’s discretion as to the expansion of its area of service. He noted that neither the statute nor the legislative history provided a formula for the precise measurement of the TVA’s service area, and that the Sixth Circuit’s emphasis on the number of customers served by TVA and KU in the villages on July 1, 1957 was a sensible and practical standard.\nJustices William O. Douglas and Thurgood Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the case", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61470:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61472:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61472:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice arrested Leroy Powell for public intoxication. He was tried, convicted, and fined $20 in the Corporation Court of Austin Texas. On appeal, Powell argued that criminal punishment for public intoxication is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, because he had chronic alcoholism. Under this theory, he appeared in public drunk as a compulsive symptom of the disease, not his own choice. The County court of Travis County held that alcoholism is not a defense to the charge and affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61472:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61472:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61472:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a four justice plurality, affirmed the lower court. The plurality found that the record did not prove that alcoholics were totally unable to control their alcohol consumption. The law prohibiting public intoxication did not punish Powell for his alcoholism, but for his being drunk in a public location. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo L. Black, and Justice John M. Harlan joined in the plurality.\nJustice Hugo L. Black concurred, writing that the Eighth Amendment does not require states to decide what part of a defendant’s personality is responsible for their actions. Justice John M. Harlan joined in this concurrence. Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment, writing that he would not punish a chronic alcoholic just for being drunk, but supports the punishment for being drunk in public. The record did not support the argument that Powell had no control over being in public.\nJustice Abe Fortas dissented, writing that criminal penalties are not proper for people with conditions that they have no power to change. The record showed that Powell could not control the constant excessive consumption of alcohol and did not appear in public of his own volition. Justice William O. Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan, and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61472:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61473:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61473:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSam Umans was a certified public accountant. Between 1959 and 1961, the Internal Revenue Service audited six couples represented by Umans. According to Louis R. Deitsch, an IRS employee, Umans approached Deitsch before each audit to “work something out together on it”. They agreed upon a disallowance for each audit and Umans gave Deitsch an envelope containing $50 for each case. Five other IRS employees described similar transactions between the years 1961 and 1963, wherein smaller disallowances were given during audits followed by cash payments to the auditing IRS employees.\nUmans and the six IRS employees, including Deitsch, were indicted in August 1964. Umans was charged with aiding and abetting IRS employees in receiving illegal fees. He was also charged with giving money to government officials. On March 25, 1965, Umans and the six IRS employees were re-indicted. The grand jury additionally charged Umans with giving money to government officials with the intent to influence their actions. The evidence before the grand jury consisted solely of an IRS agent summarizing statements made by witnesses who would later testify at Umans’ trial. At trial, Umans requested access to statements made by the IRS employees that they took bribes from persons other than Umans; the court denied this request and sealed the documents in question. The government’s case was based almost entirely on the testimonies of three of the IRS employees, including that of Deitsch.\nJudge Sterry R. Waterman, writing for a unanimous United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of Umans’ charge for aiding and abetting IRS employees, but that this instruction was not in plain error. He held that the instruction was not sufficiently prejudicial, noting that it was not objected to at trial. Judge Waterman did, however, reverse the sentence for giving money to officials, holding that this sentence could not be concurrent with the sentence for giving money to officials with intent to influence their actions. He noted that the charges were identical but for the higher requirement of proof in the latter charge. Looking to the statute itself, Judge Waterman determined that Congress intended to make the charge for giving money to officials a lesser, included offense.\nJudge Waterman held that the trial court properly excluded the IRS employees’ statements about taking bribes from other persons from the record. He reasoned that it would have been within the court’s discretion to prevent Umans from cross-examining the IRS employees on this subject for impeachment purposes, as the government did not broach the subject during the employees’ direct examination. Judge Waterman also held that the government properly indicted Umans with hearsay evidence, holding that this evidence was competent. He dismissed Umans’ concerns about inconsistencies between the evidence presented to the grand jury and evidence presented at trial. He noted that Umans had access to affadavits used by the government to indict him; thus, he could have objected to any inconsistencies at trial, but did not do so.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61473:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61473:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61473:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the United States’ writ of certiorari as improvidently granted without further comment.\nJustice John Harlan would have granted certiorari to affirm the court of appeals' judgment for the reasons given by Judge Waterman in his opinion.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn December 18, 1967, the Court denied Umans petition for a rehearing, with Justice Marshall again taking no part in the consideration or decision of the petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61473:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61474:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61474:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGary Duncan, a black teenager in Louisiana, was found guilty of assaulting a white youth by allegedly slapping him on the elbow. Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and fined $150. Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61474:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61474:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61474:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases was \"fundamental to the American scheme of justice,\" and that the states were obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide such trials. Petty crimes, defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine, were not subject to the jury trial provision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61474:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61475:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61475:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFlorence Flast and a group of taxpayers challenged federal legislation that financed the purchase of secular textbooks for use in religious schools. Flast argued that such use of tax money violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. A district court held that the federal courts should defer when confronted with taxpayer suits directed against federal spending programs.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61475:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61475:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61475:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an 8-to-1 decision, the Court rejected the government's argument that the constitutional scheme of separation of powers barred taxpayer suits against federal taxing and spending programs. In order to prove a \"requisite personal stake\" in such cases, taxpayers had to 1) establish a logical link between their status as taxpayers and the type of legislative enactment attacked, and 2) show the challenged enactment exceeded specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of Congressional taxing and spending power. The Court held that Flast had met both parts of the test.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61475:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61483:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61483:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSam Ginsberg and his wife operated “Sam’s Stationary and Luncheonette” in Bellmore on Long Island in New York. They had a lunch counter that sold magazines, including some so-called “girlie” magazines. On October 18, 1965, a sixteen-year-old boy entered the store and purchased copies of “Sir” and “Mr. Annual”; the purchase was instigated by the boy’s parents to lay the grounds for Ginsberg’s prosecution. On October 26, 1965, Ginsberg sold the same minor copies of “Man to Man” and “Escapade” at the instigation of a police officer. All of the magazines in question contained pictures of nudes, and “Escapade” and “Mr. Annual” contained verbal descriptions and narrative accounts of sexual excitement and sexual conduct.\nSection 484-h of New York’s Penal Law prohibited the sale to persons under seventeen years of age of 1) pictures of nudity or sexual conduct or 2) literature containing narrative accounts or sexual excitement, if these materials were “harmful to minors.” It defined “harmful to minors” as that quality of any description or representation of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse that 1) predominantly appealed to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, 2) was patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what was suitable material for minors, and 3) was utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.\nGinsberg was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on two counts of violating Section 484-h. The Appellate Term, Second Department of the New York Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61483:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61483:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61483:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that Section 484-h did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a restriction on expression. Justice Brennan wrote that obscenity was not within the area of protected speech or press. He acknowledged that the magazines were not obscene for adults, but emphasized that Section 484-h did not prohibit Ginsberg from selling the magazines in question to persons seventeen years of age or older.\nJustice Brennan focused on Ginsberg’s argument that the scope of the constitutional freedom to read material concerned with sex did not depend upon whether that person was an adult or a minor. He rejected Ginsberg’s contention that Section 484-h was a violation of minors’ constitutionally protected freedoms, characterizing Section 484-h as New York’s attempt to adjust the assessment of obscenity in terms of the sexual interests of minors. Justice Brennan wrote that New York had an interest in the well-being of its children, and that this subject was within New York’s constitutional power of regulation.\nJustice Brennan also held that Section 484-h was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness. He rejected Ginsberg’s argument that Section 484-h failed to give adequate notice of what was prohibited. The New York Court of Appeals previously read Section 484-h to prohibit knowingly selling obscene material to minors, and the Court also read a knowledge requirement into other similar state statutes. Justice Brennan also rejected Ginsberg’s argument that the statute was impermissibly vague, as Section 484-h expressly stated that a defendant must be acquitted if he proved that he made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor in question.\nJustice Potter Stewart concurred. He argued that while the First Amendment protected men’s freedom to decide what they will read and listen to, government regulation could extend to settings where a person lacked the capacity to make a choice. New York was free to determine that children were not possessed of a full capacity for individual choice.\nJustice William Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Hugo Black. He acknowledged that the act was not a violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but disagreed that obscene material was excluded from First Amendment protection.\nJustice Abraham Fortas dissented, arguing that the majority avoided the essence of the case’s problem by failing to define obscenity for the purposes of the censorship of material sold to minors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61483:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61496:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61496:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarvin Pickering, a school teacher, wrote a letter to the editor at the Lockport Herald complaining about a recently defeated school board proposal to increase school taxes. The letter complained about the board’s handling of past proposals and allocation of funds favoring athletics over academics. The school board felt the letter was “detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools” and opted to terminate Pickering’s employment. Pickering sued in the Circuit Court of Will County alleging his letter was speech protected under the First Amendment. The court ruled in favor of the school board and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61496:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61496:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61496:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the 8-1 majority opinion holding that Pickering’s dismissal violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The Supreme Court noted that similar speech is not protected if it contains false statements knowingly or recklessly made. There was no evidence that Pickering’s statements were knowingly false or reckless.\nJustice William O. Douglas concurred, but took an even broader view of protected free speech. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the concurrence. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, agreeing that the letter may be protected speech, but preferring to remand the case for further proceedings to decide whether the statements in the letter were knowingly or recklessly false.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61496:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61498:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61498:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 27, 1962, Phil St. Amant, a candidate for public office, made a television speech in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. During this speech, St. Amant accused his political opponent of being a Communist and of being involved in criminal activities with the head of the local Teamsters Union. Finally, St. Amant implicated Herman Thompson, an East Baton Rouge deputy sheriff, in a scheme to move money between the Teamsters Union and St. Amant’s political opponent.\nThompson successfully sued St. Amant for defamation. Louisiana’s First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Thompson did not show St. Amant acted with “malice.” Thompson then appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. That court held that, although public figures forfeit some of their First Amendment protection from defamation, St. Amant accused Thompson of a crime with utter disregard of whether the remarks were true. Finally, that court held that the First Amendment protects uninhibited, robust debate, rather than an open season to shoot down the good name of anyone who happens to be a public servant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61498:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61498:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61498:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White wrote for an 8-1 majority. First, he reiterated the test established in New York Times v. Sullivan. That test required public officials bringing a defamation lawsuit to show that the statement in question was made with “malice” -- that is, with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. Here, although the statements were false, Thompson did not present evidence that St. Amant ever entertained “serious doubts” about the truth of his statement. Without evidence of either knowledge or such serious doubts, a public official could not succeed on a defamation claim.\nJustice Hugo L. Black and Justice William O. Douglas each concurred by reiterating their concurring opinions in New York Times v. Sullivan and Garrison v. Louisiana . In those concurring opinions, Justices Black and Douglas argued that defamation laws threaten robust speech and debate about public officials and public issues. Unless an individual engages in unprotected speech, such as obscenity or fighting words, neither the federal nor state governments should restrict speech.\nJustice Abe Fortas dissented and argued that St. Amant acted with reckless disregard for the truth of his statements. He wrote that the First Amendment does not create a shelter for character assassination of public officials. Because St. Amant did not perform a good-faith check on the truth of his statement, Justice Fortas argued that the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court should be affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61498:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61520:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61520:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter following Nelson Sibron for several hours, and observing him talking with several narcotics addicts, NYC police officer Anthony Martinez stopped Sibron and questioned him. When Martinez said: \"You know what I am after,\" Sibron began reaching into his pocket. Simultaneously, Martinez thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and pulled out several heroin envelopes. Following his arrest for drug trafficking, Sibron sought to suppress the heroin evidence as the product of an unconstitutional stop-and-frisk search. When the Criminal Court of New York City denied his motion, Sibron appealed but suffered adverse rulings in the New York State appellate courts. On appeal, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard Sibron's case together with a related case, Peters v. New York. John Peters appealed his arrest and conviction for intent to commit burglary after a stop-and-frisk search of his person revealed burglary tools.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61520:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61520:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61520:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an 8-to-1 decision, the Court began by noting that although states may grant police officers great latitude in making arrests, all search and seizures are subject to constitutional limitations. In Sibron's case, the Court noted that officer Martinez never actually heard any of the conversations between Sibron and the narcotics addicts. As such, the inference that Sibron engaged in narcotics trafficking merely because he spoke with drug addicts did not constitute probably cause for a warrantless search. Moreover, Martinez's actions could not be justified as a self-protective search for weapons since he admitted that he had no reason to suspect Sibron of concealment. With respect to Peters, the Court upheld his conviction since it flowed from a lawful stop-and-frisk search. The arresting officer observed Peters prowling furtively in a building hallway and had to chase him down before capture. Such suspicious conduct justified the ensuing stop-and-frisk search of Peter's person that, in turn, revealed the incriminating burglar tools.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61520:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61526:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61526:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJones, a black man, charged that a real estate company in Missouri's St. Louis County refused to sell him a home in a particular neighborhood on account of his race.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61526:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61526:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61526:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court sided with Jones and held that Section 1982 of the congressional act was intended to prohibit all discrimination against blacks in the sale and rental of property, including governmental and private discrimination. Furthermore, the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement section empowered Congress to eliminate racial barriers to the acquisition of property since those barriers constituted \"badges and incidents of slavery.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61526:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61532:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61532:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince 1958, Sunkist Growers, Inc. organized as an agricultural collective, and about 12,000 growers of citrus fruit belonged to this collective. Sunkist grouped these growers into local associations, each with a designated packing house for preparing fruit for market. Most of these associations were comprised entirely of fruit growers operating under a cooperative structure, but about five percent were corporate growers with their own packing houses. An additional fifteen percent of the associations were private for-profit corporations and partnerships; these associations operated by marketing contracts, not by the cooperative structure.\nSunkist controlled approximately seventy percent of all oranges produced in Southern California and Arizona. This control manifested in several ways. Each grower in a cooperative local association agreed to market all fruit through his association, to appoint the association as the marketing agent for all his fruit, and to contract with one packing house. While each association reserved the right to decide its prices and markets, Sunkist had sole discretion to pool products for exports, and could set maximum supplies for a given area.\nThe Capper-Volstead Act privileged collective activity in processing and marketing in the production of agricultural products. It was enacted to provide an exception to the Sherman Act’s prohibition against combinations in restraint of trade. Case-Swayne manufactured orange juice and other blended juices as an independent operator. It alleged that the Sunkist system was a conspiracy of trade in violation of the Sherman Act and sought treble-damages under the Clayton Act. The district court granted Sunkist’s motion for a directed verdict. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed in part. It held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Sunkist engaged in monopolistic practices, but also held that the participation of non-producers in Sunkist’s system did not destroy its exempt status under the Capper-Volstead Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61532:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61532:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61532:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that non-producers cannot legally participate in an agricultural collective organized under the Capper-Volstead Act. Justice Marshall looked to the legislative history of the act. While acknowledging that Congress’ principal concern was to prohibit predatory middlemen from participating in agricultural collectives, he noted that the act makes no mention of non-producers except with respect to cooperatives issuing capital stock. He rejected Sunkist’s argument that non-producers’ participation in the collective had no economic significance, pointing to the non-producers’ role in the control and policy making of Sunkist. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.\nJustice John Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. While agreeing that congress did not intend that non-stock organizations with non-producer members should qualify for a Capper-Volstead antitrust exemption, he feared the possible effects of subjecting Sunkist to broad antitrust liability. He noted that the record contained no evidence that Sunkist intended to evade the act’s mandate. Justice Harlan would have held that Sunkist was not liable under the Sherman Act for past acts.\nJustice Byron White concurred, joined by Justice Potter Stewart. He agreed that the scope of Capper-Volstead’s exemption was limited to the cooperative efforts of producers, but argued that Sunkist did not lose its antitrust immunity completely. He noted that the bulk of Sunkist’s local associations appear to qualify as exempt organizations, and that the improperly organized associations had no direct authority to conduct Sunkist’s affairs.\nJustice William Douglas issued a dissenting opinion. He argued that the nature and extent of the non-producers’ participation in Sunkist had not been fully explored; thus, Justice Douglas would have reserved questions of the scope of Sunkist’s immunity for a later date.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61532:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61533:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61533:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required public school boards to lend textbooks to elementary and secondary school students enrolled in private and parochial schools. The Board of Education for New York Central School District No. 1, contending that the law violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of Education, requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute. The trial court agreed with the board and found the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the ruling, finding that the boards lacked standing. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the boards did have standing, but also found that, because the law's purpose was to benefit all students regardless of the type of school they attended, the law did not violate the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61533:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61533:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61533:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court applied the test constructed in Abington School District v. Schempp and found that, because the stated legislative purpose and necessary effects of the statute did not advance any one religion or religion in general, the law did not violate the First Amendment. Because the books were given to the students, rather than the parochial schools themselves, the Court reasoned, \"the financial benefit is to parents and children, not schools.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61533:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61535:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61535:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTerry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be \"casing a job, a stick-up.\" The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61535:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61535:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61535:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a \"hunch\" and that \"a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior.\" The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61535:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61542:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61542:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew Kent County had two schools that taught students elementary through high school. Prior to 1965, New Kent school taught all white students, while George W. Watkins school taught all African American students. After Brown v. Board of Education, the school district implemented a “freedom of choice” plan, where all students could choose which school they wanted to attend. While the school district did not prevent anyone from attending the school they wanted to, only a few African American students transferred to New Kent and no white students transferred to George W. Watkins. Several students and parents from the school district brought this action against the school district, arguing that the plan did not adequately integrate the school system. The district court upheld the plan. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case for a more specific order concerning desegregation of teachers.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61542:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61542:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61542:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for a unanimous court, reversed the court of appeals to the extent it affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court held that the “freedom of choice” plan was not a sufficient step to bring about a desegregated unitary school system. While the freedom of choice plan may work in some situations, school districts must provide a plan that works to dismantle the segregated system in their district.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61542:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61550:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61550:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGeorge William Bruton and William James Evans were tried together for robbing a jewelry store that also operated as a U.S. Postal Service contract station. At trial, the judge admitted in to evidence Evans’ confessions, made to the postal inspector and later to police. In the confession, Evans names Bruton as his accomplice. The judge instructed the jury to consider the confession for Evans’ guilt or innocence, but to disregard it as inadmissible hearsay for Bruton’s charges. The jury convicted both men. Evans and Bruton appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court set aside Evans’ conviction, finding that the confession to the postal inspector should not have been received into evidence. The court upheld Bruton’s conviction because the district court properly instructed the jury not to use the confession when considering Bruton’s charges.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61550:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61550:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61550:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for a 6-2 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that Bruton was substantially prejudiced against because of the high risk that the jury considered Evans’ confession when deciding Bruton’s guilt. Admitting Evans’ confession into evidence violated Bruton’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination. This decision expressly overruled Delli Paoli v. United States. Justice Potter Stewart concurred, expressing that certain kinds of hearsay are so damaging that jurors cannot be trusted to give that evidence the minimal weight it deserves. Justice Hugo L. Black also concurred, writing that a jury instruction to use a confession as evidence against one defendant but not the other in the same trial is ineffective.\nJustice Byron R. White dissented, stating that juries can be reasonably relied upon to follow jury instructions and disregard certain evidence. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61550:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61557:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61557:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act) requires every employer to pay each of his employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce a minimum hourly wage and a higher rate for exceeding a maximum number of hours per week. The Act excluded the federal government or any state government or political subdivision from the definition of \"employer.\" In 1961, the Act was amended to include employees of any enterprise engaged in commerce or production of commerce, such as the operation of a hospital or any place that cares for the sick, a school, or an institution of higher education. The Act also removed the exemption for the state governments and their political subdivisions.\nThe state of Maryland and twenty-seven other states sued W. Willard Wirtz, the Secretary of Labor, to prevent the enforcement of the Act as it applied to schools and hospitals operated by states or their subdivisions. The states argued this expansion of the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause and conflicted with the Eleventh Amendment's protection of states' sovereign immunity. A three-judge district court held that the extension of the Act's coverage to commercial enterprise and state institutions did not exceed Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause because it did not transgress the sovereignty of the states. However, the court declined to consider the Eleventh Amendment issue. Maryland appealed directly to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61557:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61557:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61557:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice John Marshall Harlan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the inclusion of commercial enterprises is constitutional because otherwise commercial enterprises that utilize substandard wages and excessive hours would have an advantage over other companies. Substandard labor conditions also lead to labor disputes and strikes, which Congress wanted to avoid. Furthermore, the Court held that the Act did not interfere with states' sovereignty by telling them how to perform medical and educational functions; rather it subjected a state that employs people performing such functions to the same restrictions as other employers whose activities affect commerce. Therefore, the Court held that minimum wage amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act extending to non-professional, non-executive and non-administrative employers of state public schools, hospitals, and related institutions was also constitutional.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that bringing employees of state-owned enterprises under the auspices of the Fair Labor Standards Act was an invasion of state sovereignty. Requiring states to pay employees minimum wage would force them to increase taxes, lower the standard of services in these institutions, reduce services in other government activities, and refrain from entering into new governmental fields needed for social change. The Act therefore affected the states fiscally and was a clear invasion of state sovereignty. Justice Potter Stewart joined the dissent.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61557:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61591:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61591:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThompson was a pregnant, nineteen-year-old mother of one child who applied for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in Connecticut after having recently moved there from Massachusetts. Connecticut denied her aid since she did not satisfy the state's one-year residency requirement. This case was decided together with Washington v. Legrant and Reynolds v. Smith. In Washington, three people applied for and were denied AFDC aid on the ground that they had not resided in the District of Columbia for one year immediately preceding the filing of their application In Reynolds, two appellees, Smith and Foster, were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania for at least a year prior to their applications as required by a Pennsylvania Welfare Code.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61591:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61591:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61591:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that since the regulation touched \"on the fundamental right of interstate movement,\" it must promote a compelling state interest. Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Washington DC, all failed to advance any compelling administrative or social reasons for their requirements. The goal of simply preventing indigents from moving to these states was constitutionally impermissible, argued Justice Brennan, given the value the United States has historically placed on the freedom to travel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61591:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61637:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61637:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 3, 1961 William L. Maxwell was arrested and charged with raping a woman in Hot Springs, Arkansas. The jury convicted him of rape but did not render a verdict of life imprisonment. Accordingly, the trial court imposed the death penalty, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. Maxwell sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court and claimed that his conviction and punishment were unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the jury had determined the guilt and the penalty in a single proceeding. Additionally, he argued that the jury was not given any standards or direction regarding the imposition of the death penalty or life imprisonment. The district court denied the writ, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61637:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61637:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61637:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. In a per curiam opinion, the 7-1 majority held that the case should be remanded to the district court for consideration of whether the defendant's due process rights were violated. The Court compared the treatment of the jurors in this case to that in Witherspoon v. Illinois , a case in which the Court held the jury selection process violated the right to due process because some potential jurors were excluded from the jury simply for voicing general objections to, or religious beliefs against the death penalty. A potential jury member must have the ability to follow the instructions of the trial judge and consider all possible penalties. The Court held that further hearing on this matter was necessary before any further action could be taken, and that a local court would be better equipped to handle these issues.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that potential jury members who are opposed to capital punishment may be properly disqualified from the jury in a capital case.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61637:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61643:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61643:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAdam Clayton Powell pecked at his fellow representatives from his unassailable perch in New York's Harlem. Powell had been embroiled in controversy inside and outside Washington. When Powell failed to heed civil proceedings against him in New York, a judge held him in criminal contempt. His problems were only beginning. He won reelection in 1966 but the House of Representatives voted to exclude him.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61643:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61643:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61643:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court noted that the proceedings against Powell were intended to exclude and not expel him from the chamber. That is an important distinction to recognize since the House does have the power under Article I, Section 5 to expel members. However, expulsion was not the purpose of the proceedings in this case. After analyzing the Framers' debates on this issue, Chief Justice Warren concluded that since Powell had been lawfully elected by his constituents and since he met the constitutional requirements for membership in the House, that the chamber was powerless to exclude him.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61643:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61644:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61644:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company operated in the “Official territory,” along with several other railroad companies (Northern lines). Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company and several other railroad companies (Southern lines) operated within the “Southern territory.\" Beginning on July 17, 1947, the Northern lines tried to obtain new divisions of the freight rates that applied between the Official territory and Southern territory from the Interstate Commerce Commission. These proposed divisions would be based on actual, relative costs of service.\nThe Commission determined that the existing divisions violated the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), which directed the Commission to set aside inequitable divisions of joint rates and to prescribe equitable divisions. In determining the relative costs that controlled the divisional formula, the Commission frequently relied on unadjusted average costs incurred by the railroads on the average of all traffic in their territories, and not on actual costs incurred by the Northern and Southern lines. The Commission found that the existing divisions violated the ICA because they allocated a lesser share of revenues to the Northern lines based on relative costs.\nThe Administrative Procedure Act required that courts set aside agency findings that are unsupported by substantial evidence. On appeal from the Commission’s decision, the district court set aside the Commission’s decision. It held that the Northern lines failed to prove that the Commission relied on substantial evidence about the relative costs of handling north-south freight traffic, noting that the burden of proof lay with the Northern lines. It also rejected the Commission’s finding that the divisions required adjustment due to the greater revenue needs of the Northern lines.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61644:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61644:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61644:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court held that the district court properly set aside the Commission’s ruling due to a lack of substantial evidence. Justice Douglas argued that deferring to the Commission’s decision -- despite the lack of solid evidence on record regarding North-South traffic -- would in effect give final deference to the Commission’s expertise and allow no room for review. He explored the Commission’s findings of fact, questioning the Commission’s seemingly contradictory conclusions about the effect of suburban passenger operations on freight service costs. Justice Douglas rejected the petitioners’ argument that these costs must be considered to keep railroads solvent because the present question was about costs, not revenue.\nJustice Douglas acknowledged that the Northern lines generally return more empty shuttle boxcars per year than the Southern lines, and that Detroit requires shipments of 800,000 carloads of automobile parts each year. He pointed, however, to the Commission’s failure to clearly connect the costs associated with returning empty cars with this higher volume of traffic.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61644:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61655:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61655:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Secretary of the Interior is responsible for the maintenance of national parks and for providing the facilities necessary to allow the public to enjoy them. In the performance of this duty, the Office of the Secretary of the Interior contracted Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp (UISC) to provide guided tours of the National Mall on minibuses that visitors may board and disembark at various sites. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (WMATC) sued to enjoin UISC from conducting tours without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity from the WMATC. The district court dismissed the suit, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed without opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61655:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61655:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61655:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that Congress granted sole authority over contracts for services at national parks to the Secretary of the Interior. Any alternative interpretation of the statute would require a dual authority scheme that has no evidence of congressional intent.\nIn his dissent, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the Supreme Court should not interfere in matters of local law in the District of Columbia. He argued that this case did not present a constitutional issue but rather an issue of local law that should not have been reviewed by the Supreme Court. Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61655:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61660:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61660:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCalifornia's Criminal Syndicalism Act prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime or unlawful acts of violence or terrorism. John Harris, a socialist, was indicted under the statute. Harris claimed the law had a \"chilling effect\" on his freedom of speech. After a California state court upheld Harris' conviction, a federal district court struck down the Act because of vagueness and overbreadth.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61660:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61660:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61660:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that \"settled doctrines\" of federalism narrowly confined the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions. Specifically, the Court found that a federal court could not properly enjoin enforcement of a statute \"solely on the basis of showing that the statute 'on its face' abridges First Amendment rights.\" The Court referred to \"the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence,\" under which federal courts were required to show proper respect for state functions and notions of comity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61660:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61661:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61661:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJoyce Thorpe, a tenant at the federally subsidized McDougald Terrace, was evicted after being elected president of the building’s Parents Club. The Housing Authority gave no reason for the eviction. When Thorpe attempted to learn the reason, her requests went unanswered. The Housing Authority of the City of Durham obtained a court order to force Thorpe’s eviction. Thorpe argued that she was evicted because of her activity with the Parents Club, in violation of her First Amendment rights, but the state appeals court and the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the eviction.\nWhile the case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a circular which stated that all evicted tenants should be informed of the reason for their eviction. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for a ruling in accordance with the circular. The North Carolina court refused to apply the circular on the ground that it was to be applied prospectively. Throughout these proceedings, Thorpe remained in her apartment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61661:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61661:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61661:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the unanimous majority, holding that the Housing Authority must follow the HUD circular procedure in Thorpe’s eviction. Since Thorpe had not physically been evicted from her apartment, the court saw no distinction between eviction proceedings that began after the circular was issued and Thorpe’s case. The Court also decided that the circular was mandatory, not advisory, and it was not an unconstitutional impairment of the Housing Authorities lease agreement. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a special concurrence stating that because the Housing Authority admitted to following the circular nothing needed to be decided other than that the circular applied in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61661:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61663:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61663:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBenton was charged with burglary and larceny in a Maryland court. A jury found him not guilty of larceny but guilty of burglary. He was sentenced to ten years in prison. He won his appeal on the grounds that the grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him were selected unconstitutionally. The case was remanded and Benton chose to confront a new grand jury. It indicted him for larceny and burglary; the petit jury found him guilty of both charges. Benton then appealed arguing that that re-indicting him on the larceny charge after he had been acquitted amounted to double jeopardy. The Maryland Supreme Court affirmed, following the U.S. Supreme Court's Palko decision, which held that the double-jeopardy clause did not apply to state court criminal proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61663:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61663:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61663:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court -- in a 7-2 decision -- overruled Palko, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states is an element of liberty protected by Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, Benton's larceny conviction was overturned. Justice Thurgood Marshall authored the majority opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61663:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61665:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61665:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest.\nThrough their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61665:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61665:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61665:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the armbands represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must be able to prove that the conduct in question would \"materially and substantially interfere\" with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district's actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that children are not necessarily guaranteed the full extent of First Amendment rights. Justice Byron R. White wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that the majority's opinion relies on a distinction between communication through words and communication through action.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment does not provide the right to express any opinion at any time. Because the appearance of the armbands distracted students from their work, they detracted from the ability of the school officials to perform their duties, so the school district was well within its rights to discipline the students. In his separate dissent, Justice John M. Harlan argued that school officials should be afforded wide authority to maintain order unless their actions can be proven to stem from a motivation other than a legitimate school interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61665:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61674:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61674:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSection 2012 of the New York Education Law permitted school districts to limit eligible voters in school district elections to citizens owning or leasing taxable real property and parents of children enrolled in public schools. Union School District No. 15 applied these restrictions. On April 25, 1965, Morris H. Kramer, a resident of district 15 who resided with his parents and had no children, attempted to register for the local school district elections. His application was rejected for failure to comply with the restrictions. Kramer filed a class-action suit against the school board in federal court, claiming his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated. The district court initially declined to hear his constitutional claims, but, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed the district court to hear Kramer's claim. On hearing the complaint, the court found no constitutional violation and denied Kramer's claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61674:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61674:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61674:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court accepted Kramer's argument that all district residents share substantial interest in school meeting decisions. While the statute purported to limit voting rights to those who were \"primarily interested\" in the election's outcome, the Court found the structure of the law too broad to achieve this goal. The Court concluded that such restrictions must be tailored to achieve the stated goal, and the current classifications \"permit inclusion of many persons who have, at best, a remote and indirect interest in school affairs and, on the other hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61674:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61679:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61679:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter World War II, the United States made funds available through the ‘Marshall Plan’ to many countries to pay for commodities sold by American companies and shipped from the United States and other free-world sources. Congress made foreign aid funds available to bring commodities to the Republic of Korea, beginning with the Mutual Security Act of 1954.\nIn 1961, the Concentrated Phosphate Export Association (CPEA) organized to act as an export-selling agency for the concentrated phosphate products of its member corporations. CPEA organized under the Webb-Pomerene Act, which Congress passed to help American firms compete with foreign cartels. The process began when Congress allocated funds to various Agency for International Development (AID) programs. The United States thus directly financed the purchase of commodities allocated to Korea, approved via a complicated, tightly regulated application procedure. The United States assigned two of the CPEA contracts, and the Republic of Korea assigned the other nine, subject to detailed regulation by AID. The contracts only circulated in the United States.\nThe United States filed an action to enjoin price fixing and business allocation activities among the CPEA’s five major member corporations. The district court held that CPEA’s sales were ‘export trade’ for the purposes of the Sherman Act; hence, although CPEA conceded that its members were coordinating their sales actions, CPEA did not violate the Sherman Act. On January 1, 1967, the State Department amended its regulations to preclude Webb-Pomerene associations from bidding on contracts where the procurement was limited to United States suppliers; in response, the CPEA dissolved on December 28, 1967, despite the district court’s favorable ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61679:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61679:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61679:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the case was not moot. Although CPEA itself was no longer in operation in that form, the government sought injunctive relief against each of its individual members as well. Justice Marshall also noted that the new AID regulations did not apply to all contracts that the former members of CPEA might bid on. Moreover, the Court could not simply rely on the appellees’ statement that joint operations would no longer be economically advantageous.\nJustice Marshall also held that the CPEA did not fall within the Webb-Pomerene Act’s ‘export trade’ exemption. He looked to the legislative history of the Act, noting that the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and the Act’s two main sponsors specified that the Webb-Pomerene Act was not intended to injure American consumers. Hence, Congress did not mean its exemption to insulate transactions initiated, controlled, and financed by the American government. Justice Marshall rejected the CPEA’s argument that they competed for contracts with foreign suppliers, noting that the governing statute required a preference for American procurement and that none of the major trading nations were allowed to compete for contracts.\nJustice Byron White dissented, joined by Justice Potter Stewart. He argued that the goods sold by the CPEA were exported from the United States in any ordinary sense of the word ‘export’. He noted that AID regulations referred to receiving countries as ‘importers’ and to the transactions as ‘exports’.\nJustice John Harlan took no part in the decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61679:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61681:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61681:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLaw enforcement officers, under the authority of a warrant, searched Stanley's home pursuant to an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities. During the search, the officers found three reels of eight-millimeter film. The officers viewed the films, concluded they were obscene, and seized them. Stanley was then tried and convicted under a Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61681:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61681:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61681:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited making private possession of obscene materials a crime. In his majority opinion, Justice Marshall noted that the rights to receive information and to personal privacy were fundamental to a free society. Marshall then found that \"[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.\" The Court distinguished between the mere private possession of obscene materials and the production and distribution of such materials. The latter, the Court held, could be regulated by the states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61681:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61684:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61684:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVoters and candidates in Mississippi and Virginia filed four separate cases seeking judgments that certain amendments to their states' election laws and procedures were subject to the pre-approval requirements of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and hence were not enforceable until the state complied with the requirements. The district courts found that the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the voting changes in the four cases and dismissed the complaints. The voters and candidates filed direct appeals, and the cases were consolidated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61684:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61684:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61684:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, Yes, Yes. And Yes. The Supreme Court held that § 5 authorized a private right of action based on the remedial aims of the Voting Rights Act. The Court also interpreted the Act to provide that litigants bring these suits in their local district courts, and that three-judge district courts be convened (as was true at that time in constitutional challenges).\nAs to the substantive issue in the case, Chief Justice Earl Warren explained that the Voting Rights Act was \"aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.\" Therefore, the Court concluded that Congress intended that \"all changes, no matter how small, be subjected to §5 scrutiny.\" The judgments were reversed, and all four cases were remanded to the district courts with instructions to issue injunctions restraining further enforcement of the enactments until such time as the states adequately demonstrated compliance with the approval requirements of the Act.\nJustice John Marshall Harlan II, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that the language of § 5 referred only to laws by which voters registered to vote and had their ballots counted, and he therefore agreed that several of the disputed voting changes at issue were covered by the Act but disagreed as to several others. Justice Hugo Black dissented on the ground that § 5, in his view, is unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61684:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61700:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61700:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPlaintiffs, several African American residents of Chicago, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a number of Officials of Cook County and Chicago for the enforcement of a number of Illinois Statutes and Chicago ordinances prohibiting mob action, resisting arrest, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and intimidation. Plaintiffs contended that the officials violated Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free speech by threatening enforcement of the statutes for the sole purpose of harassing and intimidating Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed the case in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A three-judge court upheld all of the statutes except for one subsection that prohibited \"the assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act\" and one subsection a statute that prohibited intimidating a person by threats to commit any criminal offense. The court enjoined the officials from enforcing these two subsections. Defendants appealed the decision as to the intimidation statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61700:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61700:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61700:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an 8-1 decision, Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court held that Plaintiffs were not in danger of any irreparable injury from threatened use of the statute in question. The plaintiffs had never been arrested, prosecuted, or charged under the statute in question. Furthermore, the complaint did not mention any specific threats made by Defendant. It looked as though Plaintiffs had searched state statutes and city ordinances in order to pick out the ones that police could potentially use in bad-faith prosecutions. Justice Black held that it is not proper to block state criminal prosecutions based on speculation about the future. Justice Byron White and Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the result. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, saying that although the plaintiffs had not been prosecuted under the statute, officials were using it to harass the plaintiffs, causing irreparable injury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61700:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61721:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61721:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBrandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating \"crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform,\" as well as assembling \"with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61721:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61721:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61721:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court's Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is \"directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action\" and (2) it is \"likely to incite or produce such action.\" The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61721:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61723:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61723:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSidney Street was a black veteran of World War II and a recipient of the Bronze Star. He held a position with the New York City Transit Authority and had no prior criminal record. On June 6, 1966, Street was in his Brooklyn apartment listening to the radio when he heard a news announcement that civil rights activist James Meredith had been shot by a sniper during his march through Mississippi.\nStreet went to a bureau drawer and removed an old 48-star American flag. He carried the flag to the intersection of Lafayette Avenue and St. James Place, one block from his residence. He laid a piece of paper on the sidewalk. Then, keeping the flag properly folded, he set it on fire with a match. He held the burning flag in hand as long as he could, then laid it on the paper so that it would not touch the sidewalk. When a police officer arrived, he found Street standing over the burning flag and talking to a small group of people. Street admitted that he burned the flag. The officer later testified that he heard Street shout, \"If they did that to Meredith, we don't need an American flag.\"\nThe New York City Criminal Court charged Street with malicious mischief for willfully and unlawfully defiling, casting contempt upon, and burning an American flag. The allegation included Street's words at the scene of the flag burning. At trial, Street moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that Street engaged in a constitutionally protected act because the flag burning was a form of protest protected by the First Amendment. The court dismissed this motion; Street was convicted and given a suspended sentence. On appeal, the court affirmed Street's conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, holding that the flag burning was an act of incitement fraught with danger to the public peace.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61723:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61723:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61723:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice John Harlan, the Court held that the record lacked sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the trial court constitutionally convicted Street of flag burning. Justice Harlan first held that Street properly raised the issue of the constitutionality of the allegation's reference to Street's words. He applied the rule in Stromberg v. California, where the Court held that a conviction must be set aside if it could have been based on constitutionally protected speech; here, Justice Harlan could not determine from the record that Street's words were not an independent cause of his conviction.\nJustice Harlan rejected the Court of Appeals' characterization of the flag burning as an act of incitement, holding instead that Street's conviction furthered no government interest. He declined to rule on the broader issue of the constitutionality of New York's flag burning statute. The Court reversed and remanded Street's case.\nChief Justice Earl Warren dissented. He rejected the majority's characterization of the allegation against Street, noting that New York made no attempt to prove that the crowd heard Street's words. He argued that Street was convicted for his act, not his words, and that the state only introduced evidence of his words to show his intent.\nJustice Hugo Black dissented. He agreed with the Court of Appeals that Street's conviction rested entirely on the act of burning an American flag, and that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not bar the states from prohibiting this act.\nJustice Byron White dissented. He rejected both the majority's assumption that Street could have been convicted for speech alone and its proposition that the entire conviction must be reversed if the speech conviction was unconstitutional. He regarded the allegation as one that provided several means for conviction, and reasoned that there was sufficient evidence of Street's unlawful act on record.\nJustice Abraham Fortas dissented. He focused on the unique legal history of the American flag, noting the peculiar obligations and restrictions wrapped up with ownership of an American flag.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61723:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61726:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61726:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring his trial for armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association, Harold Kaufman admitted to the crime but unsuccessfully claimed insanity. He was convicted and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Kaufman then filed a post-conviction motion in district court challenging the evidence that proved his sanity. He alleged that the evidence was unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied relief, holding that unlawful search and seizure was not an available attack in post-conviction proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61726:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61726:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61726:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William J. Brennan, writing for a 5-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that Kaufman could challenge unlawfully seized evidence in a post-conviction proceeding. There was no need to show special circumstances. The fact that Kaufman admitted to the crime was irrelevant because he claimed an affirmative defense.\nJustice Hugo L. Black dissented, arguing that prisoners can only challenge evidence post-conviction in special circumstances. The prisoner should have to cast some shadow of doubt on his guilt. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a separate dissent, writing that Kaufman did not show special circumstances, so should not be allowed to challenge the evidence post conviction. Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61726:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61729:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61729:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTo be placed on the ballot in a presidential election, Ohio law required a new political party obtain voter signatures totaling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. Both the American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party sought ballot access in Ohio for the 1968 presidential election. The American Independent Party, formed by supporters of George C. Wallace, obtained the requisite number of signatures but failed to file its petition for ballot access prior to the February 7, 1968 deadline. The Socialist Labor Party, which until 1948 had been on the ballot, failed to collect enough signatures and was also kept off the ballot. The parties filed separate suits in U.S. District Court against several state officials, including Governor James A. Rhodes, contending that being kept off the ballot violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases were consolidated, and the court ruled that each party must be given write-in access but did not require the state to print the parties' candidates' names on the ballot. The American Independent Party requested and was granted an injunction forcing the state to add the party's candidates to the ballot while the case was on appeal. The Socialist Labor Party filed a similar request, but did so much later, and was denied primarily to avoid confusion in requiring the reprinting of another set of ballots.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61729:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61729:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61729:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court found that Ohio failed to show a compelling interest in limiting the parties' ballot access. The Court concluded that Ohio's restrictions gave the two major parties a \"total monopoly\" and imposed a significant, unequal burden on minority groups. Given this fact, and the particular importance of the right to vote, Ohio's arguments that its restrictive policies maintained an orderly process and ensured an electoral victor would have at least 50% of the vote failed to meet the necessary standard of a compelling state interest. The Court struck down the Ohio restrictions and granted the American Independent Party full ballot access. To avoid confusion and a last-minute reorganization of the ballot, however, it denied the Socialist Labor Party such access for the 1968 election, in accordance with the injunctive order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61729:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61740:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61740:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA white supremacist organization held a public rally near a courthouse in Princess Anne, Maryland. During the rally, members of the organization made racist and derogatory speeches amplified over a public address system. Officials of Princess Anne and Somerset County obtained a restraining order to prevent the organization from reconvening the next day. The order was ex parte, so no notice was given to the organization. The order restrained the organization from holding rallies in the county for 10 days. At trial, the Circuit Court issued an injunction for another 10 months. On appeal the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the 10 day order, but reversed the 10 month injunction because the period of time was unreasonable and arbitrary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61740:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61740:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61740:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Yes. In a unanimous decision, Justice Abe Fortas wrote the majority opinion. The Supreme Court held that the case was not moot because the 10-day order still plays a role in the white supremacist organization's continued efforts in the county. The order was set aside because there was no notice given to the organization and they were not given the opportunity to participate in the adversary proceeding. The Court did note that there may be a case where ex parte orders are allowed when one party can show that the other is unavailable or impossible to serve. The Court did not address the 10 month injunction because it had been reversed by the appeals court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61740:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61751:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61751:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the spring of 1966, a series of armed robberies were committed in Mobile, Alabama. In two instances a gun was fired, and one person was injured when the bullet ricocheted off the floor. The petitioner, 27-year-old Edward Boykin, Jr., was arrested on five counts of robbery. He was provided with court-appointed counsel and pled guilty on all five counts. The judge did not ask Boykin whether he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, nor does the record show that Boykin was aware of his rights to trial by jury and to confront his accusers.\nPursuant to Alabama law, a jury trial determined Boykin’s punishment. Boykin did not testify and offered no evidence regarding his character. There was no evidence of a prior criminal record. The jury sentenced the petitioner to death on all five counts. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the death sentence, but three justices dissented on the grounds that the record did not show the petitioner entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61751:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61751:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61751:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that a guilty plea is a confession, and the admissibility of a confession is contingent on the confirmation that it was made voluntarily. The waiver of several constitutional rights is involved in a guilty plea. A defendant’s silence is insufficient to show that he understood these rights and chose to waive them.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the Court wrongly and inconsistently followed a precedent that subjects state courts to a federal rule of evidence concerning guilty pleas; and that this rule has no basis in the Constitution. He also argued that the question was irrelevant, because the petitioner never claimed that his plea was made unknowingly or involuntarily. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61751:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61756:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61756:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Democratic Party of Alabama (NDPA) sought to place the names of minority candidates on the ballot for local and state-wide offices. Alabama election officials denied the NDPA request under the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act. The NDPA then brought suit in a special three-judge U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama claiming constitutional violations. NDPA lost and appealed directly to the Supreme Court.\nInitially, the Court heard arguments on October 18 in support of a temporary restraining order which it had granted on October 14. The day after oral argument, the Court granted the order and subsequently addressed the merits of the controversy on March 25.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61756:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61756:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61756:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes and yes. In an opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court acknowledged that \"the regulation of corrupt practices in state and federal elections is an important governmental function, [but] we refuse to accept a reading of an Act which gives such a loose meaning to words and such discretionary authority to election officials as to cause Fifteenth and First Amendment rights to be subject to disparate treatment.\"\nJustice Byron R. White, joined by Justice Potter Stewart, dissented in part, arguing that the district court should have had the opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the Corrupt Practices Act.\nJustice Hugo L. Black took no part in the consideration or decision in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61756:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61763:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61763:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGeorge Samuels and several other defendants were indicted in state court on criminal anarchy charges, in violation of New York state law. The defendants filed for an injunction in federal court to prevent continuation of their case. They argued that the New York laws violated due process, First Amendment freedoms, and equal protection. The district court found the laws constitutional and refused to grant the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61763:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61763:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61763:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo decision. Justice Hugo L. Black, writing for the unanimous Court, affirmed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the defendants would not suffer irreparable damages if the state trial continued. The Court also held that the district court should not have evaluated the case on the merits because of the pending statute court proceedings. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, writing that the New York laws were not obviously unconstitutional, so it was up to the state court to evaluate the matter. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a separate concurrence, emphasizing that the majority decision dealt only with the proper procedure for a federal court to follow when a criminal prosecution is pending in state court. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the concurrence. Justice William J. Brennan concurred in the result, stating that the defendants did not allege bad-faith harassment by the prosecution, so an injunction would be improper.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61763:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61766:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61766:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe general Presbyterian Church (general church), and two local churches, Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church (Hull Church) and Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, were in dispute over the control of properties used by the local churches in Savannah, Georgia. The local churches withdrew from the general church due to these conflicting views. In response, the general church took over the local churches’ property. Each of the local churches sued the general church for trespass on the disputed property. The general church argued that the civil courts don't have the power to determine whether the general church had departed from its faith and practice. The district court disagreed and concluded that, under Georgia law, the implied trust of local church property for the benefit of the general church was terminated because of the general church’s substantial departure from its doctrines. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision by agreeing with the general church that the First Amendment prevents civil courts from ruling on church doctrine issues.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61766:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61766:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61766:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The court held that civil courts do not have the authority to award property on the basis of the interpretation and significance that the civil courts have assigned to aspects of the church doctrine. Therefore, the Court held that the Georgia courts have violated the First Amendment.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented civil courts from enforcing agreements that limit any religious organization’s use of property granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61766:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61777:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61777:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLocal police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. Upon serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts upheld the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61777:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61777:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61777:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-2 decision, the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches \"incident to arrest\" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person, they were prohibited from rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks against government abuse.\nJustice Abe Fortas participated in oral argument but retired before the Court rendered its decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61777:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61783:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61783:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMembers of the University Committee to End the War in Viet Nam (Protestors) were protesting at a speech by President Lyndon B. Johnson at Central Texas College in Killeen, Texas. After being attacked by the gathered crowd, the Protestors were arrested and charged with disturbing the peace. The Protestors sued and asked that a three-judge panel be convened in the district court to overrule the disturbing-the-peace statute since it violated their First Amendment rights. That court found the statute unconstitutional but stayed the injunction that would prevent enforcement of the statute until the next session of the Texas legislature, so that the legislature might enact a constitutionally permissible statute. However, the Texas legislature did not enact a new statute at its next session, and the court took no further action. Lester Gunn, the local sheriff, appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Gunn based his appeal on the Three-Judge Court Act, which allows direct appeals to the Supreme Court from orders granting or denying an injunction by a federal court of three judges.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61783:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61783:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61783:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart wrote the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that, since a clear and specific injunction is vital when a federal court is asked to nullify a law enacted by a state, it is also vital for direct Supreme Court jurisdiction under the Three-Judge Court Act. Without a specific order granting or denying an injunction, it is impossible to know with certainty what a district had decided, and thus the Court’s jurisdiction must be narrowly construed.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the opinion of the district court should be considered a declaratory judgment invalidating the Texas statute. While he agreed that the Three-Judge Court Act did not provide jurisdiction, Justice White noted that Gunn was still entitled to have the opinion reviewed by an appellate court. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined the concurrence.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun took no part in the decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61783:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61784:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61784:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Arkansas legislature passed a law prohibiting teachers in public or state-supported schools from teaching, or using textbooks that teach, human evolution. Epperson, a public school teacher, sued, claiming the law violated her First Amendment right to free speech as well as the Establishment Clause. The State Chancery Court ruled that it violated her free speech rights; the State Supreme Court reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61784:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61784:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61784:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Seven members of the Court held that the statute violated the Establishment clause. Writing for the Court, Justice Abe Fortas stated that the law had been based solely on the beliefs of fundamentalist Christians, who felt that evolutionary theories directly contradicted the biblical account of Creation. This use of state power to prohibit the teaching of material objectionable to a particular sect ammounted to an unconstitutional Establishment of religion. Justice Fortas wrote, \"The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment.\" The two other members of the Court concurred in the result, writing that it violated either the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (because it was unconstitutionally vague) or the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61784:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61785:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61785:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAgents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) applied for, and were issued, a search warrant to assist in uncovering evidence of defendant William Spinelli conducting illegal gambling activities. In the affidavit required for the warrant application, the FBI agents stated the defendant was known to \"local law enforcement officials as a bookmaker.\" The FBI related in the affidavit that agents had tracked defendant Spinelli for five days, and that on four of the days, Spinelli was seen crossing into St. Louis, MO, entering an apartment at 1108 Indian Circle Drive. Finally, the agents offered that they \"had been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61785:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61785:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61785:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The informant's tip, even when corroborated with the FBI's observations from their surveillance, was not sufficient to provide a basis for a finding probable cause when using the two-pronged test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). (Abstract prepared by Blaine Schmidt.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61785:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61796:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61796:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are two consolidated cases involving the same Respondents. William Johnson and Jonathan Klosek (husband of Julia Klosek) were employed by Nacirema Operating Company as longshoremen and Albert Avery was employed by Old Dominion Stevedoring Company. Johnson and Avery were injured and Klosek was killed during separate accidents that occurred while on the dock unloading a ship. The Deputy Commissioners of the United States Department of Labor denied claims by the men and their families under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (the Act) because the injuries did not occur “upon the navigable waters of the United States” as required under the Act. The district court upheld those decisions and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61796:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61796:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61796:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 5-3 majority, reversed the Fourth Circuit. The Act’s language determines coverage by the location of the injury, navigable waters, rather than rather than an individual’s status as a longshoreman performing maritime contracts. While the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act extends admiralty tort jurisdiction to ship related injuries on a pier, it does not extend the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.\nJustice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the Act was status oriented and covered all injuries sustained by longshoremen in the course of their employment. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61796:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61819:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61819:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA jury convicted Alex Evans of murder. The prosecution presented 20 witnesses who described Evans’ participation in the murder. A prison inmate testified that one of Evans’ conspirators in the murder said “we wouldn’t be in this now” if it weren’t for Evans. Evans’ counsel questioned the inmate, but still argued that Evans’ right to confrontation was violated because they could not confront the conspirator. The judge overruled Evans’ objection citing a Georgia statute that allows admission of conspirator’s statements against co-conspirators. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction.\nEvans filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Georgia statute violates Evans right to confrontation because it is broader than the rule used in federal conspiracy trials. The court found no “cogent reasons” for the Georgia hearsay exception.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61819:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61819:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61819:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a four justice plurality, delivered the judgment of the court. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia hearsay exception did not violate the confrontation clause merely because it was slightly different from the federal rule. The accomplice’s statement was not crucial in light of the other evidence, and Evans’ counsel had full opportunity to cross-examine all of the prosecution’s witnesses. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, adding that admission of the accomplice’s statement was a harmless error if it was an error at all. Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result, writing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper standard for reviewing rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing that admitting the accomplice’s statement denied Evans his right to cross-examine all witnesses against him. Even if the statement fell within a genuine hearsay exception, it should not be introduced unless the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Justices Hugo L. Black, William O. Douglas, and William J. Brennan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61819:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61827:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61827:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of federal agents entered Colonnade Catering’s (Colonnade) New York premises to search for resealed liquor bottles, possession of which is a violation of federal tax law. After searching for some time, the agents asked Colonnade’s president, Salvatore E. Rozzo, to unlock a locked liquor storeroom. Rozzo refused and asked the agents if they had a search warrant. The agents responded that they did not need one. When Rozzo continued to refuse to unlock the storeroom, the agents broke the lock, entered the storeroom, and seized 53 bottles of liquor and two funnels.\nAt trial, Colonnade moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search and argued that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision and held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless administrative inspections. Therefore, the statutes, which authorize federal agents to enter any building or place where objects subject to a liquor tax are kept “so far as it may be necessary” in order to examine them during the day or business hours, do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court also found that the statutory provisions were equivalent to a warrant given their clarity and narrow scope.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61827:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61827:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61827:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court argued that business owners have a constitutional right to go about their business without unreasonable official entries onto their property. However, emphasizing a long history of liquor industry regulation, the Court stated that Congress has broad powers to fashion standards for reasonable searches of licensee’s businesses. The Court did not find the statute unconstitutional, but interpreted the statute’s imposition of a $500 fine on licensed liquor dealers who refuse to permit federal agents to inspect their liquor to mean that the fine was the only remedy available to the government upon a licensee’s refusal to grant entry.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the term “so far as it may be necessary” authorized the search and that the statutory penalty was enacted merely to encourage compliance by licensed liquor dealers. Because Congress could not have intended to allow licensed liquor to avoid confiscation of their liquor for a relatively small $500 fine, the fine does not mean that liquor dealers can opt out of the statutory inspection. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Hugo L. Black wrote that the statutes do not expressly declare forcible search and seizure illegal and thus implicitly authorized the seizure in this case. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the separate dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61827:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61828:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61828:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWillie E. Williams was convicted for theft of credit cards, checks, and papers worth less than $150. He received the maximum sentence for petty theft in Illinois: one year of imprisonment and a $500 fine. If Williams was unable to pay the fine (and an additional $5 in court costs) at the end of his sentence, he would remain in jail to “work off” the fine at a rate of $5 per day.\nWhile in jail, Williams petitioned the trial court to vacate the “work off” provision of his sentence. Williams argued that he did not have any money or property with which to pay the money portion of his sentence, but he would pay if released after one year and allowed to get a job. The trial court held that Williams’ ability to pay might change by the end of his sentence and dismissed his petition. Williams appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois and argued that the denial of his petition violated his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that there was no Fourteenth Amendment violation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61828:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61828:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61828:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Illinois law was impermissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause because the latter ruling would place a substantial burden on states to create a system of individualized fines. Additionally, the Equal Protection clause allowed judges to substitute their opinions for those of the legislature, while the Due Process Clause placed legislation that deprives an individual of his right to remain free under higher judicial scrutiny. Justice Harlan determined that the state interests in forcing someone without assets to “work off” their fines as opposed to using a payment plan or other alternative are administrative convenience and better crime deterrence, but that these interests cannot justify depriving poor individuals of their liberty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61828:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61840:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61840:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA government informant, Harvey Jackson, wore a concealed radio transmitter and engaged in four conversations with defendant White at three different locations: Jackson's house, a restaurant, and Jackson's automobile. Government agents listened to each of the radio transmissions, thereby overhearing defendant White make self-incriminating remarks regarding his involvement in multiple narcotics transactions. Jackson was unavailable during the trial, so the prosecution offered the testimony of the agents who had conducted the electronic surveillance as evidence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61840:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61840:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61840:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The testimony of government agents, relating conversations between a defendant and an undercover informant, overheard via electronic surveillance, is admissible, despite the informant's unavailability at trial. This case expanded the principle announced in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). (Abstract prepared by Blaine Schmidt.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61840:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61841:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61841:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, established by the Social Security Act of 1935 and jointly funded by the state and federal governments, provides financial assistance to children of families with little or no income. Under the program, each state computes a \"standard of need\" for each family. In Maryland, the standard of need increased with each additional member of the family, but became incrementally smaller, with an upper limit of $250 per month. Linda Williams, a single mother, and Junius and Jeanette Gary, husband and wife, were Baltimore residents and parents of eight children each. They objected to Maryland's means of calculating standard of need on the ground that it discriminated against larger families, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They also argued that the calculation conflicted with the stated purpose of the program as laid out by the Social Security Act. They filed suit against Edmund P. Dandridge, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare, and several other state officials. A U.S. District Court originally ruled the Maryland regulation violated both the Social Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause. On reconsideration, the court altered its ruling and based its judgment entirely on constitutional grounds but nonetheless struck down the provision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61841:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61841:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61841:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-3 opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court concluded that the Maryland provision violated neither the Social Security Act nor the Equal Protection Clause. Relying on the precedent set in King v. Smith (1968), which described the program as \"a scheme of cooperative federalism\" and gave the state \"undisputed power\" to calculate standard of need, the Court concluded that \"nothing in the federal statute...forbids a State to balance the stresses that uniform insufficiency of payments would impose on all families against the greater ability of large families...to accommodate their needs to diminished per capita payments.\" Similarly, the Court rejected the families' equal protection claim, noting, \"[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.\" Thus, because Maryland's provision was \"rationally based and free from invidious discrimination,\" it was constitutionally valid. Justice Stewart took care to note that while \"claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every measure,\" the Court could rule a provision invalid based only on its constitutionality, not on its wisdom.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61841:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61844:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61844:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrederick Walz, the owner of real estate in Richmond County, New York, brought suit against the New York City Tax Commission, challenging property tax exemptions for churches. Walz alleged that the exemptions forced him, as a taxpayer, to indirectly contribute to those churches.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61844:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61844:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61844:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the exemptions did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that the purpose of the exemptions was to neither advance nor inhibit religion; no one particular church or religious group had been singled out to receive tax exempt status. Unlike direct subsidies, which would have unduly entangled the state with religion, tax exemptions created only \"minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches.\" The Court noted that \"benevolent neutrality\" toward churches and religions was \"deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61844:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61849:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61849:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMae Wheeler was a 75-year-old widow who lived solely on her welfare check and monthly Social Security payment. On August 30, 1967, the San Francisco Department of Social Services learned that Wheeler had received the proceeds from her late son's veteran insurance policy. After a county welfare supervisor called Wheeler, the Welfare Department began withholding Wheeler's welfare check pending an investigation. Wheeler requested a hearing and for the restoration of her payments until her cause could be heard. Wheeler did not get the restoration of her payments, but she ultimately prevailed in her claim and had benefits restored several months later.\nWheeler along with other similarly-situated people were granted class action status, and the class claimed that California welfare termination provisions deprived the class members of their constitutional due process rights by terminating welfare benefits before having a full and adequate hearing. A three-judge District Court for the Northern District of California held that the California procedure for pre-termination review satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court reviewed the California court's opinion", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61849:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61849:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61849:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court held that the California welfare termination regulations did not satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause because they did not afford recipients an evidentiary hearing or allow the recipients to offer evidence or confront opposing witnesses. The Court reversed the lower court's opinion.\nChief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Black. In his opinion, the justice stated that the administrative regulations regarding welfare was in an early stage of development and that the Court should allow the administrative processes to develop before burdening them with a heavy-handed constitutional ruling.\nJustice Stewart also filed a dissenting opinion, where he stated that the procedures the state followed for terminating welfare payments did not violate the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61849:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61854:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61854:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNorth Carolina charged Henry Alford with first-degree murder. That charge carried a possible sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty. Alford agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a second-degree murder conviction. When Alford took the stand, he testified that he was innocent and pled guilty to avoid the death penalty. The judge ensured that Alford made his decision freely after consulting counsel. Alford maintained his guilty plea, and after receiving evidence of Alford’s extensive criminal history, the judge sentenced Alford to the maximum 30-year sentence.\nAfter unsuccessfully attempting to obtain post-conviction relief, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied relief on the grounds that Alford’s guilty plea was entirely voluntary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the plea was involuntary because its primary motivation was the fear of death.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61854:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61854:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61854:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional violation where the defendant concluded based on competent counsel that it was in his best interest to plead guilty. The court saw no difference between a defendant who maintains his innocence with a plea bargain and one who admits to the crime.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a concurrence, agreeing with the majority, but expressing a belief that United States v Jackson was wrongly decided. Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that the threat of the death penalty should be a factor considered when determining whether a plea was voluntary. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61854:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61855:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61855:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSara Baird graduated from law school at Stanford University in 1967 and passed the bar examination in Arizona. Among the questions asked by the Arizona Bar Committee, she answered Question 25, which requested that she list all of the organizations to which she has belonged since the age of 16. She declined to answer Question 27, which asked whether she “had ever been a member of the Communist party or any organization ‘that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.’” Because she did not answer that question, the Committee did not process her application any further. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Baird’s petition for the Bar Committee to show cause why she should be denied admittance to the State Bar of Arizona.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61855:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61855:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61855:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the First Amendment protection of freedom of association prevents a state from denying a person access to a profession based on the exercise of that right. In order for a state to investigate a person’s beliefs for the sake of employment, the state must show the inquiry is necessary “to protect a legitimate state interest.” The Court held that the petitioner had already provided the Bar Committee with enough relevant information about her membership in associations.\nJustice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that such a state inquiry must distinguish between being a member of an organization and actively supporting the actions of an anti-governmental group. He also held that the question on the State Bar Application was unconstitutional because it was clearly used to deny admission to the Bar based on objectionable beliefs.\nJustice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion. He argued that the First Amendment allows a state to make inquiries into the beliefs that will directly impact a professional’s ability to perform the duties of the job. Because a lawyer is an officer of the court, beliefs regarding the government are relevant to the Bar Committee’s inquiry. He wrote that, although being a lawyer is a privilege and not a right, nothing indicated that the Bar Committee would have refused Baird admission to the Bar had she answered the question in the affirmative. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that state Bars had a legitimate interest in preventing applicants who wish to overthrow the United States government from practicing law. He argued that there was no constitutional basis to prevent a state from making relevant inquiries into beliefs that could influence an applicant’s performance of his/her duties.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61855:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61859:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61859:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA juvenile court judge declared 17-year-old Clarence DeBacker a “delinquent child” and ordered him committed to the Boys’ Training School for forging his father’s signature on a check and attempting to pass it off as legitimate. Before the hearing, DeBacker had requested a jury trial, but the judge denied the request. The Nebraska Juvenile Court Act denies juveniles a trial by jury. Instead of seeking review of his sentence, DeBacker flied for state habeas corpus, arguing that the juvenile court violated the Sixth Amendment when it denied him a jury trial. The Nebraska District Court dismissed the petition and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. On appeal, DeBacker argued that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Duncan v Louisiana and Bloom v Illinois entitle him to a jury trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61859:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61859:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61859:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo answer. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted. DeBacker’s hearing took place before the Court decided Duncan and Bloom. Those cases only applied prospectively, so they did not apply to DeBacker. The Court could not answer DeBacker’s second question because he had not objected to the standard during the criminal hearing. DeBacker also failed to show that the judge would have ruled differently under a different standard\nJustice William O. Douglas dissented, expressing that the Duncan and Bloom decisions should apply retroactively. Justice Hugo L. Black also dissented, writing that the “prospective only application” of constitutional decisions amounted to a judicial amendment to the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61859:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61863:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61863:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMartin Robert Stolar was admitted to the New York Bar in 1968. In his application, he answered several questions about his social, religious and political affiliations. When Stolar applied to the Ohio Bar in 1969 he supplied the Ohio Bar Association with all of the information from his New York Bar application. The Ohio Bar also subjected Stolar to an oral interrogation where they asked questions relating to whether he was associated with any organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the government. Stolar refused to answer those questions and the interrogation committee recommended that he be denied admission to the Bar. Stolar had nothing in his record, other than refusal to answer the questions, that showed that he did not have the necessary good character for admission to the Ohio Bar. The Ohio Supreme Court approved the committee’s recommendation without opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61863:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61863:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61863:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Though they could not agree on an opinion, five members of the court agreed that the Ohio Bar’s questions violated the First Amendment. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the judgment of the court, holding that the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of association and prohibition against a state penalizing a person for their membership in a particular organization made the Ohio Bar questions improper. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment, writing that the questions were improper under prior Supreme Court precedent.\nJustice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the Constitution did not require a state to admit someone to practice law who believed in violence. The Ohio Bar questions were properly designed to discover whether an applicant expected to actively support illegal violence. Justice Harry A. Blackmun also dissented, stating that the judgment should be affirmed based on Stolar’s refusal to answer the questions. Chief Justice Warren Burger, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent. Justice John M. Harlan separately dissented, arguing that the Constitution does prevent a state bar association from denying admission based on theoretical beliefs in a right of revolution, but it does not require admission of someone who seeks entry for the purpose of doing away with the orderly process of law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61863:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61878:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61878:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJoseph Waller stole a mural from the St. Petersburg City Hall. The city charged and convicted him in municipal court with two ordinance violations. Based on the same acts, Waller was prosecuted and convicted in the Circuit Court of Florida for grand larceny. On appeal, Waller argued that the municipal court and subsequent circuit court prosecutions put him in double jeopardy. The District Court of Appeal of Florida rejected this argument and upheld the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61878:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61878:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61878:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous court, vacated the circuit court conviction. The Supreme Court held that Waller was put twice in jeopardy because the circuit court charges were based on the same acts as the municipal court charges. State and municipal courts are part of one sovereign judicial system. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred, but noted that state and federal governments should not be considered separate sovereignties for double jeopardy purposes. Justice William J. Brennan also concurred, writing that double jeopardy bars a second trial for charges arising out of the same acts unless the case falls within an exception to the “same transaction” rule.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61878:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61886:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61886:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGladys Boddie was a married resident of Connecticut receiving welfare benefits. She filed for a divorce in New Haven County Superior Court. However, Boddie was not given a hearing because she had not paid the filing fee under Section 52-259 of the Connecticut General Statutes. Given her welfare status, she was unable to pay the fee. Her requests for fee waivers were also denied. Boddie and others who were denied divorces under Section 52-259 challenged the fee requirement in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. They alleged that the fee requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court upheld the requirement. Boddie appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61886:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61886:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61886:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the District Court and held the fee requirement unconstitutional. In a majority opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan, the Court recognized the importance of \"access to the courts\" for Boddie, as state court was the only method of obtaining a divorce in Connecticut. While the Court acknowledged Connecticut's interest in conserving limited resources and preventing \"frivolous litigation,\" this interest was not a \"sufficient countervailing justification.\" Therefore, Connecticut's refusal to allow Boddie to proceed with her divorce was \"a denial of due process\" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas concurred in the result. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61886:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61887:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61887:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert M. Brady pleaded not guilty to kidnapping. After learning that his codefendant confessed and would be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty. The crime had a maximum penalty of death, but a U.S. statute allowed the death penalty only if the verdict of a jury recommends. The judge sentenced him to 50 years in prison. The sentence was later reduced to 30 years. 8 years later, Brady sought relief in U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming his guilty plea was not voluntarily given because the possibility of the death penalty coerced his plea. The district court denied relief and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, finding that Brady changed his plea because of the codefendants actions. The court held that an intervening decision United States v. Jackson, which held the death penalty unconstitutional because it imposes an impermissible burden on an accused’s Fifth Amendment right to not plead guilty and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, did not apply.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61887:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61887:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61887:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for five members of the court, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that United States v. Jackson does not require every guilty plea to be overturned when fear of death was a factor in the plea. The voluntariness of the plea is determined by considering all of the relevant circumstances. While Brady may have been partially motivated by a desire to avoid the death penalty, the guilty plea was voluntarily made with the advice of competent counsel. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment and substantially all of the opinion, but expressed his belief that United States v. Jackson was wrongly decided. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the result, because there was no evidence that fear of the death penalty played a substantial role in Brady’s decision. Justice Brennan also expressed that the court’s method of analysis was unclear. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61887:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61891:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61891:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company filed applications with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for a proposed merger of themselves and three subsidiaries. The ICC decided that the merger would result in savings, improved service, and more efficient use of the railroad’s facilities. These benefits were outweighed, however, by the potential loss of jobs and lessening of competition. The ICC later reopened its investigation, focusing on the amount of savings the merger would produce. This time, the ICC approved the merger, concluding that the proposed savings were more important. Several railroads filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the ICC failed to give proper weight to the decrease in competition the merger would produce. The district court affirmed the ICC decision. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61891:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61891:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61891:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the ICC’s decision. The savings, service improvements, and conditions agreed to by the merging railroads far outweighed the loss of competition. The court also upheld the ICC’s decision on the ratio for the exchange of stock that would take place during the merger. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61891:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61894:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61894:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfrican-American citizens of Greene County Alabama filed a class action against the Greene County, Alabama Jury Commission, alleging racial discrimination in the selection of potential jurors, and the Governor of Alabama, for appointing an all-white jury commission in a predominantly African-American county. The class members alleged that they were qualified for jury service but never summoned. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief declaring that the Alabama statute governing jury selection was unconstitutional and enjoining future enforcement of the statute. The Alabama statute provided that potential jurors should be “generally reputed to be honest and intelligent” and “esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound judgment.” The district court held that the Jury Commission did not follow the Alabama statute and systematically discriminated in preparing jury lists. The court ordered a new list created in compliance with the Alabama statute and constitutional principles. The court declined to invalidate the statue or compel the Governor to appoint African-Americans to the jury commission. This case was heard on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61894:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61894:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61894:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court held that, while the jury commission itself discriminated against African-Americans, the Alabama statute did not. The statute made no mention of race and was capable of being applied in a non-discriminatory way. Seven justices agreed that the Governor did not need to appoint African-American jury commissioners because the class failed to prove discrimination in the selection of the existing commissioners. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment and the opinion, but noted that the majority opinion does not imply that the U.S. Supreme Court had the power to vacate the Governor’s jury commission appointments or order him to appoint African-American commissioners.\nJustice William O. Douglas dissented in part, arguing that, while he would not order the Governor to appoint African-American jury commissioners, the jury commission system should be struck down because it did not provide for proportional representation of the races.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61894:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61922:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61922:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThrough several treaties, the United States granted the Choctaw and Cherokee Nations several million acres of land in what is now Oklahoma. The Cherokee Nation sued the State of Oklahoma and several corporations for leasing gas, oil, and mineral rights to the river beds of the Arkansas River within that land. The Choctaw Nation was allowed to intervene to claim that the riverbeds of Arkansas River within their land grant belonged to them. The district court ruled against the Indian Nations, holding that the land grant did not convey rights to the river beds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61922:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61922:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61922:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a 4-3 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the United States granted the Indian Nations rights to the riverbed of the Arkansas River where it was completely within the boundaries of the granted land and where it formed the border. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, writing that only the continuation of discrimination would justify denying the Indian Nations their claim.\nJustice Byron R. White dissented, stating that the United States had a policy against conveying rights to the beds of rivers, and had expressed no intention to go against that policy. Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent. Justice John M. Harlan did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61922:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61946:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61946:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1911, U.S. Senator A. O. Bacon conveyed land to the city of Macon, Georgia through a testamentary trust for the purpose of providing a park for white persons only. The city operated the park in that manner, but after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, people of all races were permitted to use the park. The managers of the park attempted to have the city removed as the trustee because it could no longer legally enforce racial segregation. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of African American citizens who intervened, holding that the public nature of the park required that it be treated as a public institution subject to the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of who owned the park. The trustees of Bacon’s estate then moved for a ruling that the trust was unenforceable, because racial segregation was no longer permitted, so the property should revert to Bacon’s heirs. The trial court granted the motion, holding that racial segregation was an integral part of the trust, so the court could not simply amend the trust. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61946:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61946:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61946:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Lewis F. Black, writing for a 5-2 majority, affirmed the Georgia court. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia court did no more than apply well-settled principles of Georgia law. The court had no alternative but to end the trust under Georgia’s racially neutral trust laws. There was no indication that the Georgia judges had any discriminatory intent. The fact that the park managers and heirs may have had a discriminatory motivation in pursuing the dissolution of the trust did not create an Equal Protection Clause violation.\nJustice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that Bacon’s will left all remainders and reversions to the city, not his heirs and the purpose of the will was to dedicate the land for municipal use. Amending the trust to allow the park to be used by everyone would carry out that purpose better than allowing the land to revert to Bacon’s heirs who would close the park. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also dissented, arguing that closing a public facility because the public authority that owned it could not keep it segregated violated the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61946:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61949:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61949:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Kelly, acting on behalf of New York residents receiving financial assistance either under the federally-assisted program for Families with Dependent Children or under New York State's home relief program, challenged the constitutionality of procedures for notice and termination of such aid. Although originally offering no official notice or opportunity for hearings to those whose aid was scheduled for termination, the State of New York implemented a hearing procedure after commencement of Kelly's litigation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61949:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61949:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61949:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that states must afford public aid recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing before discontinuing their aid. Noting that welfare benefits are statutory entitlements, rather than \"privileges,\" the Court weighed welfare recipients' need for procedural due process against the competing considerations of the possible harm they might suffer from discontinuation and the government's interest in summary adjudication. The Court concluded that state interests in conserving administrative costs are not sufficient to override public aid recipients' interest in procedural due process. With respect to New York's newly implemented hearings, the Court found them deficient insofar as they did not permit recipients to present evidence, be heard orally in person or through counsel, or cross-examine adverse witnesses.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61949:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61953:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61953:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nW.M. Webb and other commercial fishing companies owned fishing boats that, according to established custom, were manned by independently contracted captains and crew. The company that owned each vessel was responsible for equipping it and hiring a captain, who then hired a crew. At the completion of each shipping expedition, the boat docked at a fish-processing plant, where the captain and crew were paid based on the volume of their catch. There was no guarantee that they would be paid if they did not catch fish. The commercial fishing companies determined at which plants the boats would dock and generally in what areas they would fish. The captain and the crew were responsible for the day-to-day running of the boats and expeditions.\nThe commercial fishing companies paid employers’ taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and claimed refunds for the taxes due on the earnings of the captains and crews. They then sued for the refunds in district court, which held that the companies were entitled to the refunds. The district court held that the captains and crews were not “employees” for the purposes of the statutes because the amount of control the companies exercised over the boats was not enough to create an employer-employee relationship. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61953:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61953:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61953:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no indication in the language of the statutes that Congress intended to hold maritime activities to a land-based common law standard. Rather, resorting to the common understanding of maritime jurisprudence minimizes the uncertainly in trying to apply common law to maritime practices. Under maritime standards, employees typically have much broader discretion than land-based employees, so the type of control the commercial fishing companies exercised over their boats can still constitute the type of legal relationship the statutes require.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61953:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61954:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61954:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, ordered school districts across the country to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.” However, nearly fifteen years after this order, many school districts, including schools in Holmes County, Mississippi, were either still segregated or saddled with laws making it very difficult for full integration to take place. In the summer of 1969, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi entered an order allowing the schools in Mississippi to continue using “freedom of choice” laws, which allowed parents to choose which school their children attended. The petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on July 23, 1969. That court, in a per curiam decision, reversed the lower court, but required the school districts to create and submit alternate plans by August 27, 1969. The petitioners then appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61954:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61954:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61954:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court held that it was the obligation of every school district to immediately terminate any and all segregated school systems and to only operate integrated schools. Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals should not have allowed any more motions for additional time to desegregate because, in the Court’s opinion, the standard of allowing “all deliberate speed” for desegregation was no longer constitutionally permissible.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61954:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61967:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61967:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Henry Coleman and Otis Stephens were convicted of assault with intent to murder. The primary evidence against them was the identification by the victim, Casey Reynolds. He identified the pair in a police lineup at the Birmingham City Jail. During this lineup, the police had Coleman and Stephens say certain phrases that Reynolds remembered his attackers saying. Coleman and Stephens also did not have counsel at their preliminary hearing. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, rejecting augments that the lineup was so suggestive that it likely caused a misidentification, and that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage of prosecution where the defendants were entitled to the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61967:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61967:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61967:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No. In a 5-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion vacating the convictions. The Supreme Court held that Reynolds' identification of Coleman and Stephens did not stem from a prejudicial police lineup. The Court also held that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage, so the defendants were constitutionally entitled to counsel. The Court remanded the case to determine whether denying counsel created an unfair prejudice against the defendants.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a concurrence, expressing that the right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than on the basis of holding a fair trial. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence, also expressing that the right to counsel is guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurrence, stating that requiring counsel for preliminary hearings might induce courts to eliminate preliminary hearings all together.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a partial dissent, stating that the convictions should not be overturned unless Coleman and Stephens can show that they lost favorable testimony during the preliminary hearing that otherwise would be preserved. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissent, expressing that the Constitution does not guarantee assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a separate dissent, also stating that defendants are not entitled to counsel at a preliminary hearing. Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61967:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61969:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61969:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNew Orleans police officers had a warrant to arrest Donald J. Vale on narcotics charges. While staking out Vale’s home, the officers saw Vale come out of the house and do what they thought was a drug deal. The officers arrested Vale outside his home and told him they were going to search the house. The officers did not have a search warrant. During the search, the officers found narcotics in a back bedroom. This evidence was admitted at Vale’s trial where he was convicted. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The court rejected Vale’s argument that the narcotics evidence was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61969:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61969:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61969:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-2 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the house was not “incident to the arrest” because the arrest took place outside. The State also failed to show evidence of an exceptional situation where a warrantless search would be acceptable. Admitting the narcotics evidence was in error because they were the fruits of an illegal search.\nJustice Hugo L. Black dissented, arguing that a search is proper when officers reasonably believe that someone might destroy the narcotics evidence if the search were postponed to obtain a warrant. Chief Justice Warren Burger joined in the dissent. Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61969:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61976:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61976:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 27, 1964, Elliot Ashton Welsh II was ordered by the Selective Service to report for physical examination after having been classified I-A and available for military service. Walsh requested and filed application for conscientious objector status. On his form, Welsh specifically indicated that his objection was not rooted in religious belief; he responded \"No\" where the questionnaire asked if he believed in a supreme being. An appeal board rejected his application. Welsh refused to appear for induction and, on June 1, 1966, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court ruled in United States v. Seeger (1965) that conscientious objector status was not reserved to individuals of a traditional religious background. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that because Welsh denied any religious foundation for his beliefs, whereas Seeger had characterized his pacifist beliefs as \"religious,\" Welsh's conviction was valid.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61976:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61976:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61976:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-3 plurality opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court declared a registrant's characterization of his beliefs as nonreligious to be \"a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption.\" According to Justice Black, the term \"religious\" is broadly scoped, and denying conscientious objector status because of a refusal to use the term \"places undue emphasis on the registrant's interpretation of his own beliefs.\" The Court therefore reasoned that conscientious objector status applies to \"all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61976:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61978:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61978:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAt age twelve, Samuel Winship was arrested and charged as a juvenile delinquent for breaking into a woman's locker and stealing $112 from her pocketbook. The charge also alleged that had Winship's act been done by an adult, it would constitute larceny. Relying on Section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provided that determinations of juvenile's guilt be based on a preponderance of the evidence, a Family Court found Winship guilty, despite acknowledging that the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship's appeal of the court's use of the lower \"preponderance of the evidence\" burden of proof, was rejected in both the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and in the New York Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61978:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61978:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61978:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court found that when establishing guilt of criminal charges the strict \"reasonable-doubt\" standard must be applied to both adults and juveniles alike. The Court noted that by establishing guilt based only on a \"preponderance of the evidence,\" as is customary in civil cases, courts were denying criminal defendants a fundamental constitutional safeguard against the possibility that their fate be incorrectly decided due to fact-finding errors. The Court concluded that mere variations in age among criminal defendants will not suffice to warrant the use of different burdens of proof so long as they all face loss of liberty as a possible sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61978:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61987:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61987:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSerafim Karalexis owned and operated a movie theater in Boston that was showing a movie entitled “I am Curious (Yellow).” The film was produced in Sweden and is about a girl’s search for identity and her relationship to the contemporary social and political problems of the time. During the course of the film, she takes a lover, and the film shows their explicit sex scenes, including scenes of oral sex. Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett H. Byrne determined that the film was obscene because it appealed to a “prurient interest in sex,” was offensive to community moral standards, and had no redeeming social value. He charged Karalexis with violating a state statute that prohibits the exhibition of obscene films.\nKaralexis sought an injunction in district court in order to prevent this prosecution and future ones under a law that he argued violated the First Amendment protection afforded to such films..The district court held that the law was likely unconstitutional and granted the injunction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61987:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61987:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61987:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a per curiam opinion that represented a 5-justice majority, the Court held that the law did not represent a threat to any constitutional rights that could not be defended in an individual court case.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented. He argued that it was appropriate for Karalexis to seek federal relief from the law after he was already convicted on the obscenity charges, because clearly the trial did not defend his constitutional rights. He also argued that the district court erred by granting an injunction before the film was determined to be obscene. Justice Byron R. White and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.\nJustice William O. Douglas did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61987:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61995:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "61995:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe United States sued to condemn over 250 acres of W.G. and Mary Reynolds land for use in the Nolin Reservoir Project. The Fifth Amendment authorized this type of taking as long as the government provided “just compensation”. The Reynolds’ claimed that the original project did not contain 78 of the acres the United States tried to claim. A jury awarded the Reynolds’ $20,000 as compensation for all the land taken. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury instructions referred to matters disclosed outside the jury’s presence. Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected the United States’ argument that the “scope of the project” issue was a question for the judge to decide, not the jury.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "61995:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "61995:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "61995:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe judge should decide; general area. In a 6-2 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion vacating the lower judgment and remanding to the district court. The Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71A(h) provides that the jury is limited to deciding amount of just compensation. The trial judge should decide all other issues. The Court also briefly confirmed that the scope of the project includes any land that will likely be used according to early plans. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, stating that there is no reason to prevent the jury from deciding issues of fact, such as the scope of the project, on which its verdict will rely. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "61995:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62000:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62000:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1967, the state of Florida passed legislation to allow six-member juries in criminal cases. Johnny Williams was tried and convicted for robbery by such a jury. Williams, lost in a Florida appellate court; he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62000:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62000:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62000:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that \"the 12-man [jury] requirement cannot be regarded as an indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment.\" The Court found that the purpose of the jury trial was \"to prevent oppression by the Government,\" and that the performance of this role was not dependent on the particular number of people on the jury. The Court concluded that \"the fact that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance 'except to mystics.'\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62000:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62019:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62019:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn November 1961, the Civil Rights Commission released the fifth volume of its report for the year. One section of it focused on police brutality and made reference to the Supreme Court case Monroe v. Pape. The case was based on allegations that Detective Pape and other officers broke into the Monroe apartment, assaulted the Monroes, and took Mr. Monroe to the police station where he was held for ten hours without being charged or advised of his procedural rights. A week after the report was released, Time Magazine published an article that quoted extensively from the report’s coverage of the allegations without ever explicitly stating that they were allegations rather than findings.\nPape sued Time, Inc. for libel in district court and Time moved for dismissal. The district court granted the motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. In the intervening time, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, which stated that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his or her official conduct unless there is evidence the statements were made with actual malice. This decision became the basis for the district court granting summary judgment for Time, Inc. The Court of Appeals again reversed, and held that a jury must decide whether actual malice was present. After the third trial, the district court granted Time, Inc.’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed for a third time and held that the issue of actual malice was one for the jury to decide.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62019:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62019:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62019:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Time article was reporting on the Commission’s description of the allegations Monroe made against Pape, of which there was no inherent truth value. By not including the word “alleged” or a synonym, Time adopted one of multiple available interpretations, which is not enough to create a jury issue of “malice” under New York Times v. Sullivan. The Court held that the Time article reflected an error in judgment, not a reckless disregard of the truth, and the statements are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that the Supreme Court’s judgment of the specific facts of this case is unwarranted. He argued that, if the Court were to treat each case in this way, it would quickly become ineffective as a judicial body. He also argued that doing so would result in an overreach of the Court’s power that would infringe on the states’ rights to regulate defamation laws.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62019:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62026:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62026:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWillie Griggs filed a class action, on behalf of several fellow African- American employees, against his employer Duke Power Company . Griggs challenged Duke's \"inside\" transfer policy, requiring employees who want to work in all but the company's lowest paying Labor Department to register a minimum score on two separate aptitude tests in addition to having a high school education. Griggs claimed that Duke's policy discriminated against African-American employees in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. On appeal from a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Court of Appeals found no discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62026:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62026:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62026:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. After noting that Title VII of the Act intended to achieve equality of employment opportunities, the Court held that Duke's standardized testing requirement prevented a disproportionate number of African-American employees from being hired by, and advancing to higher-paying departments within, the company. Neither the high school graduation requirement nor the two aptitude tests was directed or intended to measure an employee's ability to learn or perform a particular job or category of jobs within the company. The Court concluded that the subtle, illegal, purpose of these requirements was to safeguard Duke's long-standing policy of giving job preferences to its white employees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62026:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62033:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62033:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA group of black Mississippi citizens filed for damages against two white Mississippi citizens pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section 1985 subsection 3 which protects against conspirators interfering with the civil rights of others. R.G. Grady, a citizen of Tennessee, was driving the plaintiffs in the suit along a public highway, when the defendants, acting under the misconception that Grady worked for the organization Civil Rights for Negroes, allegedly pulled their truck into the path of Grady's car, causing him to stop. The defendants were accused of forcing Grady and his passengers to step out of the car and preventing their escape. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant James Calvin Breckenridge proceeded to beat Grady and the plaintiffs in the head with a club, injuring them. The defendants also threatened the plaintiffs verbally and pointed firearms at them. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, basing their decision on a previous case, Collins v. Hardyman. This case limited section 1985 subsection 3 to apply only to conspiracies somehow related to state laws or state officials, to avoid possible conflict with the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62033:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62033:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62033:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court concluded that section 1985 subsection 3 covers conspiracy among private parties, uninvolved in official government business because three indicators pointed to that conclusion: the actual text of the law, the law in relation to the parent law upon which it was based, and the way in which the law had been interpreted in the past. The Court found that the conspirators must intend to deprive someone from a particular demographic group of equal rights to be in violation of section 1985 subsection 3. When these requirements are met, Congress can punish conspirators while acting in compliance with section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment without the limitations of Collins v. Hardyman. Finally, the Court ruled that, in the civil suit, the defendants did conspire to commit the assault with the purpose of infringing on the plaintiffs' legal rights because of their race. And, the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries as a result. Thus, the previous judgment is reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62033:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62035:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62035:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided construction grants to church-sponsored higher educational institutions. The grants were to be used for the construction of non-religious school facilities. The Act also stipulated that twenty years after the grant had been given, schools were free to use the buildings for any purpose.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62035:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62035:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62035:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing that subsidizing the construction of facilities used for non-secular purposes would have the effect of advancing religion. The Court held that the church-related institutions in question had not used their federally-funded facilities for religious activities, and that the facilities were \"indistinguishable from a typical state university facility.\" The Court also held that the Act did not excessively entangle the government with religion, noting that college students were less susceptible to religious indoctrination, that the aid was of \"nonideological character,\" and that one-time grants did not require constant state surveillance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62035:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62042:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62042:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn what became known as the \"Pentagon Papers Case,\" the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62042:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62042:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62042:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the \"heavy presumption against\" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word \"security\" should not be used \"to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.\" Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62042:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62047:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62047:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHarris was arrested for making two sales of heroin to an undercover police officer. Before receiving the Miranda warnings, Harris said that he had made both sales at the request of the officer. This statement was not admitted into evidence at the trial. However, Harris later testified in Court that he did not make the first sale and in the second sale he merely sold the officer baking powder. Harris' initial statement was then used by the prosecution in an attempt to impeach his credibility.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62047:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62047:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62047:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Miranda decision did not mandate that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case must be barred for all purposes from the trial. The Court reasoned that the shield provided by Miranda could not be \"perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\" The Court found that the speculative possibility that police misconduct could be encouraged was outweighed by the value of admitting the statement into the impeachment process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62047:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62050:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62050:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62050:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62050:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62050:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district courts' equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness, and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate \"starting points\" for solutions; 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts; 3) non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim corrective measures, were within the courts' remedial powers; and 4) no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to particular schools.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62050:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62053:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62053:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with \"FUCK THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR\" The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged under a California statute that prohibits \"maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct.\" Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62053:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62053:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62053:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In an opinion by Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides, there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. Harlan recognized that \"one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.\" In doing so, the Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62053:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62054:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62054:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA judge issued a warrant to search Roosevelt Harris’ residence based on a federal tax investigator's affidavit. The affidavit stated that Harris had a reputation with the investigator for being a trafficker in illegal liquor, and a local constable located illegal whiskey on Harris’ property. The constable had purchased whiskey from Harris in the past and feared for his life if his name were revealed. When police searched Harris’ residence, they discovered illegal non-tax paid liquor. At trial, the district court admitted the evidence obtained during the search, and Harris was convicted of possession of non-tax paid liquor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the investigators affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search. This made the search illegal and any evidence obtained during the search inadmissible at trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62054:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62054:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62054:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a 5-4 majority, delivered the opinion of the court. The Supreme Court held that the affidavit provided enough probable cause to issue a search warrant. In Part I, Chief Justice Burger expressed that the affidavit provided a factual basis for the search because of the investigator's personal knowledge of Harris. In Part II, Chief Justice Burger wrote that the investigator's knowledge of Harris’ reputation provided reliability for the constable’s information. In Part III expressed that the constable’s statements could be trusted because they were against his penal interest. Justices Hugo L. Black and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the entirety of the majority opinion and concurred, writing that they would overrule the cases the Sixth Circuit relied on. Justice Potter Stewart joined in Part I, and concurred in the judgment. Justice Byron R White joined in Part III, and concurred in the judgment.\nJustice John M. Harlan dissented, writing that the investigator’s affidavit did not provide probable cause to issue a search warrant. Justices William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62054:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62056:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62056:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1965, six agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics forced their way into Webster Bivens’ home without a warrant and searched the premises. The agents handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and children and arrested him on narcotics charges. Later, the agents interrogated Bivens and subjected him to a visual strip search. Bivens sued the agents for $15,000 in damages each for humiliation and mental suffering. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62056:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62056:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62056:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No answer. Justice William J. Brennan Jr., writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the Second Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that Bivens does have a cause of action for damages arising from the federal agents Fourth Amendment violations. Bivens must provide proof of his injuries in order to recover. The Court did not reach the privilege question because the Court of Appeals did not consider the question. Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the judgment, writing that federal courts have the power to award damages for constitutional violations.\nChief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that the doctrine of separation of powers is better served by leaving the question to Congress. He also argued that the doctrine of suppressing evidence obtained in illegal searches is insufficient to deter law enforcement. Justice Hugo L. Black also dissented, arguing that Congress could create the cause of action Bivens stated, but has not, so the majority’s decision is an unconstitutional extension of judicial power. Justice Harry A. Blackmun dissented, supporting the idea that the question in this case is better left to Congress.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62056:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62058:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62058:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese cases involve juveniles brought to trial without a jury. The first involves Joseph McKeiver and Edward Terry, fifteen and sixteen year old boys charged with acts of robbery, theft, assault, and escape. At trial before the Juvenile Court of Philadelphia, each was denied a request for a jury trial. A Superior Court affirmed the order, and, after consolidation of their cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did likewise, saying there was no constitutional right to a jury trial for juveniles. In re Burrus concerns the consolidated cases of more than forty juveniles ranging in age from eleven to fifteen. Most of the juveniles faced misdemeanor charges stemming from protests of school consolidations that took place in November and December, 1968 during which, on six different occasions, they blocked traffic and refused to clear the roadway. Additionally, one sixteen-year-old juvenile faced charges of disorderly conduct for an incident that occurred at the local school. In each case, the judge denied a request for a jury trial. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of North Carolina both affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no constitutional requirement for a jury trial for juvenile defendants.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62058:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62058:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62058:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 plurality opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court concluded that the previous application of other criminal rights to juveniles, like rights to counsel and cross-examination, was done out of an emphasis on factfinding. \"But one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding.\" Additionally, the Court noted that, because juvenile prosecution is not considered either civil or criminal, the whole of the Sixth Amendment does not necessarily apply. As such, there is no requirement for a jury trial in juvenile cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62058:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62059:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62059:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the wake of a \"particularly brutal\" murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, the New Hampshire Attorney General took charge of police activities relating to the murder. When the police applied for a warrant to search suspect Edward Coolidge's automobile, the Attorney General, acting as a justice of the peace, authorized it. Additionally, local police had taken items from Coolidge's home during the course of an interview with the suspect's wife. Coolidge was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62059:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62059:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62059:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a decision in which a number of justices chose to concur in part and dissent in part, the Court held that the searches and seizures of Coolidge's property were unconstitutional. Justice Stewart's opinion held that the warrant authorizing the seizure of Coolidge's automobile was invalid because it was not issued by a \"neutral and detatched magistrate.\" Stewart also rejected New Hampshire's arguments in favor of making an exception to the warrant requirement. Stewart held that neither the \"incident to arrest\" doctrine nor the \"plain view\" doctrine justified the search, and that an \"automobile exception\" was inapplicable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62059:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62078:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62078:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1970, Congress passed Voting Right Act Amendments that lowered the voting age in state and federal elections from 21 to 18, forbade the use of literacy tests at the polls, and forbade states from disqualifying voters in presidential and vice presidential elections based on state residency requirements. The states of Oregon, Arizona, Idaho, and Texas sued, and argued that these Amendments infringe on rights the Constitution reserves for the states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62078:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62078:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62078:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes in part and no in part. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress had the power to enact the amendments that changed the voting age for federal elections, abolish literary tests at the polling station, and abolish state residency requirements for presidential and vice presidential election. However, the Court held that lowering the voting age for state and local election was beyond Congressional purview.\nThe Court held that the Framers intended for Article I Section 4 of the Constitution and the Necessary and Proper Clause to grant the States the power to make the laws that govern elections and for Congress to have the power to alter the laws if necessary. The Court also held that the legislative history surrounding the enactment and enforcement of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments support the role that Congress plays in preventing racial discrimination in the electorate without denying the states their rights. Without evidence that the states use the 21-year-old voting requirement to discriminate based on race in state and local elections, Congress does not have the right to intervene. The Court held that the literacy test bans were constitutional under the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.\nJustice William O. Douglas concurred in part and dissented in part. He disagreed with the majority’s ruling in regards to reducing the voting age in state and local elections. He argued that, because voting is a “fundamental right,” which Congress ensures under the Equal Protection Clause, Congress could legislate voting age at the state level as well as the federal.\nJustice John M. Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress could prohibit literacy tests but disagreed on the issue of Congress’ ability to impose regulations on voting age and state residency requirements. He argued that the legislative history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment supported the preeminence of the right of the states to legislate voting. Since the Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress the right to legislate voting requirements, the right is reserved to the states. Without evidence that people between 18 and 21 and people who do not meet state residency requirements are being unconstitutionally discriminated against, Congress cannot intervene.\nJustice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Byron R. White, and Justice Thurgood Marshall authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. They disagreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress cannot legislate voting age in state and local elections. They argued that, while the states have the right to determine qualifications for voting, Congress has the right to legislate the exercise of this power under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since 18-year-olds are treated as full adults under other aspects of the law, there is evidence that 18- to 21-year-olds are being denied voting rights to which they are entitled, and Congress has every right to intervene.\nJustice Potter Stewart also wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He disagreed with the majority’s opinion that Congress could legislate voting laws in federal elections. He wrote that the Framers clearly intended the right to legislate voting to be reserved for the states and that the Constitution does not allow Congress to supersede that right without a compelling interest. He argued that the age qualification did not represent a compelling interest to allow Congress to enact legislation on the issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62078:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62079:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62079:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1959, Veron Atchley was convicted of murdering his wife by shooting her six times. The star witness at trial was Atchley’s insurance agent. The agent met with Atchley after his arrest to talk about the life insurance policy on his wife. During this conversation Atchley admitted to lying in wait for his wife with a gun, but said that the shooting was an accident. After notifying police, the insurance agent returned with a hidden recording device. Atchley made the same admission. Over Atchley’s objection the tape was admitted at trial. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction.\nAtchley then sought habeus corpus relief in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that the tape was an unconstitutional involuntary confession. The district court agreed, ordering a new hearing on the issue of voluntariness. The district court held that the trial could not have reliably determined whether the confession was voluntary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62079:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62079:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62079:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Potter Stewart, writing for eight members of the court, delivered the majority opinion. The Supreme Court held that an applicant for habeus corpus is not entitled to a new hearing on voluntariness unless he can show that his version of events, if true, would require the conclusion that the confession was involuntary. In this case, Atchley did not do that. He merely pointed to shortcomings in the trial court procedures. The trial court had given full consideration to the issue of voluntariness and applied the correct constitutional standard.\nJustice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment and substantially all of the opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62079:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62080:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62080:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPlaintiffs, a group of parents of children in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District, sued the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (Board) in state court and argued that the state court should issue an injunction to prevent the Board from implementing a plan to assign children to public schools based on race. The plaintiffs claimed that this plan violated the children’s constitutional rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education as well as a North Carolina state statute that prohibited districts from assigning children to schools based on race. The state court issued the injunction, and the defendants moved the case to federal court by arguing that, because the issues in the case dealt with the U.S. Constitution, the federal court had jurisdiction. The district court heard arguments in this case with a similar one, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, and subsequently struck down the state court injunction by holding that the state statute was unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62080:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62080:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62080:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because, at oral arguments, both litigants argued that the state statute forbidding the assignment of children to schools based on race was constitutional. Because the parties agreed, there was no actual case or controversy and therefore the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62080:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62084:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62084:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe requirements to be eligible for admission to the Bar in New York included that the applicant must be a citizen of the United States, have lived in the state of New York for six months, and passed a written examination. In addition, the Bar required the creation of Committees on Character and Fitness to determine whether an applicant “possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.” The Committees required two affidavits in support of the applicant and a questionnaire filled out by the applicant. The petitioners were organizations and individuals representing a class of law students and recent law school graduates who sued two of the Committees by claiming that the vague and overbroad questions violated the applicants’ First Amendment rights. The questions related to the applicants’ political beliefs, membership in political association, and loyalty to the United States Constitution. A three-judge panel of the district court granted partial relief with respect to specific questions but sustained the validity of the New York system as a whole.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62084:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62084:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62084:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the character and fitness requirement has long been understood to refer to conduct which would be dishonorable in a legal setting and therefore is not overbroad. The Court also held that there was no burden of proof placed on the applicant, and there was no evidence of any intent to penalize political beliefs.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that a state had every right to refuse entrance to the bar to any applicant who professed a desire to overthrow the government or belonged to a group with those goals. While the First Amendment protects the applicants from being refused admission based on unpopular beliefs, it does not prevent them from being questioned about relevant issues.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that, when depriving an applicant of her right to practice law, a State must be held to a higher standard than when the state wishes to deprive someone of property. Because a state would never ask the same questions of a potential homeowner, the questions are not appropriate in a legal professional context either. Justice Black argued that, even if an applicant were to profess allegiance to a group that wishes to overthrow the government, those beliefs are protected by the First Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.\nIn his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the techniques the New York Committees use are intended to weed out political undesirables. He also argued that past practice illustrates that the understanding of the phrase is not narrow enough to prevent First Amendment violations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62084:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62085:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62085:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFollowing a desegregation case that began in 1965, on February 5, 1970, the district court ordered the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system to implement a court-approved desegregation plan. Prior to this order, a suit had been filed in state court that sought an order enjoining the use of public funds for the transportation of students for desegregation purposes. In the midst of the extensive litigation, the North Carolina legislature enacted an anti-busing bill. Swann and other plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the statute, and a three-judge panel was convened to consider the issue. The three-judge panel declared the statute unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62085:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62085:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62085:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that, while state officials have a great deal of discretion in formulating school policy, that discretion does not override federal constitutional guarantees. The anti-busing statute flies in the face of the Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of Education and the requirement to provide desegregated education. The Court also held that the anti-busing statute would actively prevent government authorities from remedying the constitutional violations that stem from segregation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62085:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62109:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62109:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAugust Ledesma and several others were arrested and charged with violating both a Louisiana statute and a parish ordinance prohibiting display of obscene material for sale. The arresting officers seized the material in question. While the state court proceedings were underway, Perez, and the others arrested, sued in federal district court for a declaration that the statute and the ordinance were unconstitutional. A three-judge court convened and upheld the Louisiana statute, but found the arrests and seizure of materials invalid. The court prohibited use of the seized materials in the state criminal proceedings. The court noted that it had no jurisdiction to consider the ordinance, but expressed that it was probably invalid. A single federal judge later ruled the ordinance invalid. Local law enforcement officers directly appealed the district court decisions to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62109:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62109:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62109:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Hugo L. Black, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed in part and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s ruling on the validity of the arrests and seizure constituted improper federal interference with state criminal proceedings. The Court reversed that judgment. The Court also held that it had no jurisdiction to review the order declaring the ordinance invalid on direct appeal. Justice Potter Stewart concurred, citing several cases in support of his decision. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.\nJustice William O. Douglas dissented in part, agreeing that the court had no jurisdiction to review the ordinance, but disagreeing on the district court’s arrest and seizure ruling. Justice William J. Brennan also dissented in part, agreeing with the majority on reversing the three-judge court, but disagreeing about the Supreme Court’s ability to review the decision on the ordinance. Justice Byron R. White and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in this dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62109:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62112:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62112:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe state of Arizona restricts the distribution of welfare benefits to individuals who are either United States citizens or aliens who have lived in the country for at least 15 years. In 1969, Carmen Richardson, a resident alien of Arizona who met all requirements for welfare eligibility except the residency requirement, filed a class action lawsuit against the Commissioner of the State's Department of Public Welfare questioning the constitutionality of that requirement. The three-judge court in the District of Arizona found in favor of Richardson, but the Commissioner appealed. In the same year, a similar class action suit was filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In this case, resident aliens of Pennsylvania challenged state law which dictated that if a Pennsylvania resident did not qualify for federal aid then he or she could only receive welfare benefits from the state if he or she were a citizen or had applied for citizenship. This three-judge court also found in favor of the resident aliens. However, one judge disagreed, and the defendants, namely the Executive Director of the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance and the Secretary of the Commonwealth's Department of Public Welfare, appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62112:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62112:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62112:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court asserted that to classify state residents solely based on alienage was inherently questionable, because aliens constitute a minority, separate from the rest of the population. The Court conceded that there had been instances in which state laws could treat citizens and non-citizens differently. However, it maintained that a state's aim to conserve welfare benefits for citizens would not legitimize the denial of welfare benefits to aliens. Their justification was that the aliens pay taxes and, consequently, contribute to the pool of money from which welfare benefits are drawn. As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the welfare benefit restrictions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62112:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62119:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62119:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGeorge Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use the words “allegedly” or “reportedly” in during one broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and other similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and “smut distributors”. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges.\nRosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district court held that the First Amendment standard, which allowed recovery of damages only for knowingly and recklessly false statements, did not apply because Rosenbloom was not a public official or figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award damages where Metromedia did not use reasonable care to discern the truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom general and punitive damages, although the district court reduced the punitive damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62119:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62119:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62119:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, No. In a 5-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the judgment of the court affirming the Third Circuit decision. The Supreme Court held that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied because the story was a matter of public concern. It did not matter that Rosenbloom was a private citizen. The Court also held that the evidence in the case did not support the damages award under the proper constitutional standard.\nJustice Hugo L. Black wrote a special concurrence, stating that the First Amendment protected the news media from libel judgments even where the broadcaster knows their statements were false. Justice Byron R. White also wrote a special concurrence, asserting that the press have the privilege to comment on official actions of public servants, such as the police, in full detail.\nJustice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, expressing that states should be free to impose a duty of reasonable care in defamation actions involving private citizens. He would remand the case for further consideration of whether Rosenbloom sustained actual harm and whether Metromedia acted with actual malice. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote a dissent, stating that the court should limit damages in libel actions by private citizens to actual losses. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62119:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62120:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62120:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBarbara James and her son Maurice lived in the Bronx, New York City. Shortly after Maurice's birth, Barbara James applied for assistance under New York State's Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). James began receiving assistance after a caseworker visited her apartment. Two years later, James was scheduled to be visited again by a caseworker. This visit was required under New York State law and would affect her benefits under AFDC. She refused to allow this visit. In a procedural hearing, she continued her refusal, and her AFDC assistance was terminated by New York State as a result. James then filed suit under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the caseworker visit was a search and would violate her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court ruled in her favor. New York appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62120:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62120:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62120:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court held that a caseworker visit was not a \"search\" under the Fourth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Harry A. Blackmun reasoned that \"the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled,\" and as a result, \"there is no entry of the home and there is no search.\" Even if the caseworker visit \"does possess some of the characteristics of a search in the traditional sense,\" the visit still would not violate the Fourth Amendment, under the unreasonableness standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio. The Court concluded that the caseworker visit was not unreasonable, as the visit allowed the state to focus on the child and to ensure that its welfare funds were being used properly. Moreover, the visit was not confrontational and James' refusal did not lead to criminal prosecution. Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62120:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62121:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62121:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Louisiana State Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure allowed less-than-unanimous juries to convict defendants in criminal cases in which hard labor is considered as punishment. Nine of twelve jury members were needed to return a guilty verdict. Johnson was convicted of armed robbery by a jury split nine to three.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62121:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62121:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62121:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that less-than-unanimous convictions did not violate the reasonable doubt standard embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Justice White argued that a minority opposing conviction does not prevent the other jurors from reaching their decisions beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the presence of dissenting jurors does not indicate that the state failed to uphold this standard. Finally, allowing less-than-unanimous decisions in certain cases serves a rational state purpose, not offensive to the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62121:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62122:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62122:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nApodaca and two other defendants were convicted of assault, burglary, and grand larceny before three separate juries, all of which returned verdicts which were less than unanimous. Two of the cases were 11-1 and the other was 10-2 in favor of conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62122:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62122:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62122:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a close decision the Court found that the accused's right to a jury trial does not require that juries return unanimous decisions in order to convict. After reviewing the history and function of juries in American society, the Court held that the most important function of the jury is to provide \"commonsense judgment\" in evaluating the respective arguments of accused and accuser. Requiring unanimity would not necessarily contribute to this function. A distinction was drawn, however, between capital and non-capital crimes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62122:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62127:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62127:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1966 Martin Marietta Corp. (Martin) informed Ida Phillips that it was not accepting job applications from women with preschool-age children; however, at this time, Martin employed men with preschool-age children. Phillips sued and alleged she had been denied employment because of her sex in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment by holding that, because seventy-five to eighty percent of the applicants hired for the position for which Phillips applied were women, there was insufficient evidence that there was bias against women. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62127:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62127:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62127:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn the absence of evidence that having preschool-age children is demonstrably more relevant to female job performance than to male job performance, refusal to hire women with preschool-age children violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required that persons with similar qualifications be given equal employment opportunities regardless of their sex. Because there was inadequate evidence to determine whether having preschool-age children was actually relevant to the business qualifications of the female candidates, the Court held that summary judgment was inappropriate in this case.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires uniform minimum qualifications for both male and female candidates. The exception for qualifications that may be different based on actual business necessity was only intended to apply to jobs that require specific physical characteristics; it was not intended to justify stereotypical characterizations of traditional gender roles.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62127:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62133:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62133:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order increasing freight rates on several commodities, including bituminous coal. The increases were issued at the request of several railroads because of a need for revenue to offset increased operating costs. Seven public utilities, who use large amounts of bituminous coal, sued to enjoin and set aside the order, claiming that the rates were unreasonable and the ICC’s order deprived them of due process of law. Several state departments of agriculture intervened as parties plaintiff, and several railroads intervened in support of the ICC. The district court granted the ICC’s motion to dismiss, holding that the utilities failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available under the Interstate Commerce Act. This case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on direct appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62133:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62133:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62133:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice William O. Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62133:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62135:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62135:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBoard No. 47, Louisville, Kentucky, denied the application of Cassius Clay, also known as Muhammad Ali, for classification as a conscientious objector. Clay then took an administrative appeal to the Kentucky Appeal Board, which tentatively classified him I-A, or eligible for unrestricted military service, and referred his file to the Justice Department for an advisory recommendation. The Justice Department concluded, contrary to a hearing officer's recommendation, that Clay's claim should be denied. The Department wrote that Clay did not meet any of the three basic tests for conscientious objector status; that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form, that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief, and that this objection is sincere. Subsequently, the Appeal Board denied Clay's claim, but without stating its reasons. When Clay refused to report for induction, he was tried and convicted of willful refusal to submit to induction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62135:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62135:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62135:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that since the Appeal Board gave no reason for the denial of a conscientious objector exemption to Clay, and that it was impossible to determine on which of the three grounds offered in the Justice Department's letter that board relied, Clay's conviction must be reversed. The Court reasoned that Clay satisfied the first two tests of conscientious objection. Regarding the third test, the Court concluded that whether or not Clay met the test of conscientious objection to war in any form, it was not clear that the Appeal Board relied on some legitimate ground in denying the claim, and therefore the conviction could not stand. In separate opinions, Justices William O. Douglas and John M. Harlan concurred. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62135:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62137:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62137:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nStella Connell applied for a teaching position with the Orange County school system, where James Higginbotham was the superintendent of the Board of Public Instruction. Connell was employed as a substitute teacher, and later dismissed from her position for refusing to sign the loyalty oath required of all Florida public employees. The oath stated that the employees “will support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida” and “do not believe in the overthrow of the government of the United States or of the State of Florida by force or violence.” The district court held that the provision of the oath that employees will support the Constitution is valid, but the provision not to overthrow the government is unconstitutional. Connell appealed directly to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62137:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62137:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62137:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that requiring all employee applicants to pledge to support the federal Constitution and that of the state was valid because it demands no more than what is required of all state and federal employees. However, the Court held the dismissal from public employment for refusing to sign the oath without hearing or inquiry violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated the “overthrow” clause of the oath was invalid because the state could not show that an applicant believed in an overthrow. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence. Justice Potter Stewart wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed the with the validity of the section of the oath that required support of the federal and state Constitutions. However, Justice Stewart would remand the case to discover the state’s meaning behind the “overthrow” clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62137:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62139:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62139:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter refusing to renew a patent licensing agreement, Zenith Radio Corp., a radio and television manufacturer, was sued by Hazeltine Research, Inc., for patent infringement in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Zenith counterclaimed, alleging anti-trust violations, misuse of patents, and a conspiracy to restrain trade in Canada, England, and Australia. Zenith asked for treble damages and injunctive relief. Zenith contended that Hazeltine's license forced them to pay for use of unpatented products and that Hazeltine had illegally conspired with foreign patent pools to prevent Zenith from expanding into those markets.\nBefore trial, Zenith had stipulated that Hazeltine and its parent corporation were one entity for the purposes of litigation. The District Court entered judgment against Hazeltine and its parent corporation, awarding Zenith treble damages and injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the damages award, but otherwise reversed the District Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals vacated all judgments against Hazeltine's parent corporation because Zenith's pretrial stipulation did not properly designate the parent corporation as a party to the litigation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62139:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62139:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62139:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Yes as to Canada. In a 7-1 decision Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the court, affirming the Court of Appeals decision to vacate the judgments against Hazeltine's parent corporation. The Supreme Court also held that damages were only proper with respect to the Canadian market because it was the only market in which Zenith had sustained injury. The Supreme Court reinstated the District Court's injunction against Hazeltine's conspiracy to restrict trade in foreign markets. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether Hazeltine conditioned the grant of its licenses on the payment of royalties for unpatented products.\nJustice John M. Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part, objecting to the majority's apparent double standard that royalties provisions that measure royalties by a percentage of the licensees sales is lawful if included for the convenience of both parties, but unlawful if insisted on by the patentee.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62139:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62140:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62140:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThese are two consolidated cases. In 81, Clarence Williams was arrested in his house in 1967. Police searched the house for an hour and 45 minutes, discovering heroin on a shelf in a bedroom. The heroin was admitted at trial and Williams was convicted of concealing illegally imported heroin. Williams appealed, arguing that the search of his house was illegal under Chimel v. California, a case decided on June 23, 1969 that narrowed the permissible scope of searches incidental to an arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Chimel did not apply retroactively, and the search was valid under pre-Chimel standards.\nIn 82, Joseph Elkanich was convicted on three counts of selling narcotics in 1962. At trial, evidence included marked bills planted by a federal narcotics agent. The bills were seized during a search of Elkanich’s apartment after his arrest. The arrest and search were upheld at trial and on appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Elkanich then unsuccessfully applied for post-conviction relief in the district court. While the appeal of that decision was pending, Chimel was decided. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62140:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62140:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62140:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Though not agreeing on an opinion, six members of the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit in both cases. Justice Byron R. White delivered the judgment of the Court, holding that Chimel did not apply retroactively whether a conviction is challenged on direct review, as in 81, or in collateral proceedings, as in 82. Justice Potter Stewart concurred, writing that he would affirm 82 because the question presented was not permitted in post-conviction relief proceedings. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the result, agreeing that Chimel did not apply to searches conducted before June 23, 1969 following the three-factor analysis from Stoval v. Denno. Justice Hugo L. Black, concurred in the result, stating that Chimel was wrongly decided.\nJustice John. M. Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part, writing that he would affirm the conviction on 82, but would reverse on 81 because Chimel could apply retroactively to a direct review. Justice Thurgood Marshall also concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62140:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62145:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62145:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe District of Columbia had an abortion statute that prohibits abortion unless “necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or health.” Milan Vuitch, a licensed physician, was indicted in federal district court for performing abortions that violated this statute. The district court held the abortion statute was unconstitutionally vague. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62145:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62145:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62145:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, no. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to determine if the District of Columbia’s abortion statute is unconstitutionally vague because, although the law only applies to the District of Columbia, the law was enacted by both Houses of Congress and signed into law by the President. The Court also held that the word “health” in the statute refers to the state of being in body or mind and includes psychological wellbeing; therefore, the abortion law is not unconstitutionally vague.\nJustice William O. Douglas wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case. However the statute leaves the physician too much discretion to determine what is necessary for the preservation for the mother’s health. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in par in which he argued that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over this case because the statute only applies to the District of Columbia. Justice William J. Brennan Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Potter Stewart agreed that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction but argued that the physicians who performed abortions should be wholly immune from being charged with criminal offenses under this law if they performed abortions in order to preserve the mother’s life or health.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62145:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62150:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62150:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBoth Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers’ annual salaries.\nThe appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state officials’ motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62150:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62150:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62150:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority as to the Pennsylvania statute and 8-1 as to the Rhode Island statute. The Court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither promotes nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court held that both the state statutes in question had secular legislative purposes because they reflected the desire of the states to ensure minimum secular education requirements were being met in the non-public schools. The Court did not reach a holding regarding the second prong of the test, but it did find that the statutes constituted an excessive government entanglement with religion. In the Rhode Island program, the amount of oversight of teachers and curricula required to ensure that there is no unnecessary injection of religion into secular topics would require the government to become excessively involved in the nuances of religious education. The same danger holds true for the Pennsylvania statute, which additionally provides state funding directly to a church-related organization. Government financial involvement in such institutions inevitably leads to “an intimate and continuing relationship” between church and state. The Court also noted the potential political implications of public funding, as there is a risk of religious issues becoming politically divisive.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the intrusion of the government into the running of non-public schools through grants and other funding creates the entanglement that the Establishment Clause prohibits. He also argued that non-secular schools are so thoroughly governed by religious ideologies that any amount of public funding supports those doctrines, which the Framers of the Constitution dictated the government must not do. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the concurrence, and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the parts relating to case numbers 569 and 570. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate concurrence in which he argued that the danger was not only that religion would infiltrate the government, but also that the government would push secularization onto religious creeds. An analysis of the statutes in question shows that they impermissible involve the government in “essentially religious activities,” which the Establishment Clause is meant to prevent. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the majority opinion goes too far and, in restricting the use of state funds in non-secular schools, creates an obstacle to the use of public funds for secular education. He argued that there was no proof that religion would invade secular education or that the government oversight of the use of public funds would be so extensive as to constitute entanglement.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the discussion or decision of case number 89.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62150:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62164:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62164:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSpokeo, Inc. (Spokeo) operated a website that provided information about individuals such as contact data, marital status, age, occupation, and certain types of economic information. Thomas Robins sued Spokeo and claimed that the company willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by publishing false information about him on the website. However, Robins was unable to allege any “actual or imminent harm,” so the district court granted Spokeo’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and Robins’ lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Robins then filed an amended complaint in which he alleged that he suffered actual harm to his employment prospects due to the website falsely claiming that he was wealthy. The district court originally denied Spokeo’s motion to dismiss but later reconsidered its order and dismissed the complaint for failure to state an injury in fact. Robins appealed and argued that the district court could not reconsider its previous decision and that he had sufficiently alleged an injury in fact to qualify for Article III standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, although the district court could reconsider its ruling, the allegation of a violation of a statutory right is sufficient injury to qualify for standing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62164:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62164:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62164:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nBecause the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not properly address whether all the elements of standing were met, the Court vacated the case for reconsideration of whether the plaintiff alleged an injury in fact that was “concrete and particularized.” Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority, which held that, in order to have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision in court. The injury-in-fact element is met when the plaintiff shows that he suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest and that the injury was concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent. The Court held that the standing principles of Article III mean that a plaintiff cannot bring a claim that alleges a bare procedural violation, but in determining whether the plaintiff proved that an injury in fact existed, the lower court must examine the elements of injury-in-fact analysis. Because the appellate court in this case failed to do so, the Court remanded the case for further consideration.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the standing doctrine applies to both private citizens seeking to vindicate private rights as well as those who alleged violations of public rights. These limitations stem from how the common-law courts traditionally handled the two different types of claims. Therefore, Congress cannot create a new private right of action for the enforcement of public rights without such suits being subject to standing doctrine analysis.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that it was not necessary to remand the case because the evidence presented was sufficient to prove that the injury at issue was concrete, and the particularity requirement does not need to be considered separately. In this case, the plaintiff was not alleging a general harm but rather an injury that he suffered individually, so because it meets the concreteness requirement, it does not need to meet a separate particularity one, and there is nothing for the lower court to consider on remand. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62164:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62165:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62165:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarvin Green began working for the United States Postal Service in 1973. In 2002, he became the postmaster at the Englewood, Colorado, post office. In 2008, a postmaster position opened in Boulder, and Green applied but did not receive the position. He filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) charge regarding the denial of his application, and the charge was settled. In 2009, Green filed an informal EEO charge and alleged that his supervisor and supervisor’s replacement had been retaliating against him for his prior EEO activity. Throughout that year, Green was subject to internal Postal Service investigations including a threat of criminal prosecution. He ultimately signed an agreement that he would immediately give up his position and either retire or accept a much lower paying position. Green chose to retire and filed subsequent charges with the EEO Office, which dismissed his claim. Green then sued in district court and alleged, among other claims, that he had been constructively discharged. The district court held that Green’s constructive discharge claim was barred because he did not contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of signing the agreement, which was the last allegedly discriminatory act, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62165:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62165:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62165:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnder federal employment discrimination law, the filing period for a constructive discharge claim begins to run only after the employee resigns. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the statutory language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act clearly states that the 45-day statutory limitation period begins to run on the “date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.” Although the text does not clearly define the “matter alleged to be discriminatory,” the default rule that a limitations period begins when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action applies here. To state a complete and present claim for constructive discharge, a plaintiff must prove both that his employer discriminated against him to the point where a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign and that he actually resigned. Because resignation is part of a complete and present cause of action of a constructive discharge claim, the 45-day period should begin when the employee resigns.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that judicial precedent establishes that Title VII claims require that the statutory discrimination period begin with the employer’s discriminatory act. In the case of a constructive discharge claim, if the employer intended for the employee to resign, then the employee’s resignation is tantamount to an intentional termination by the employer and gives rise a a new limitations period. Justice Alito also expressed the concern that the rule the majority opinion announced would disincentivize reporting of potential Title VII violations at the earliest possible opportunity based on the underlying acts of discrimination.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that only an employer’s discriminatory action can constitute a “matter alleged to be discriminatory” under the meaning of Title VII. If the employer’s actions took place more than 45 days before the plaintiff contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the claim must be considered untimely. The majority’s opinion expanded the constructive discharge doctrine by allowing it to have a different limitation period than other Title VII claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62165:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62167:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62167:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn May 11, 2006, Jose Gomez received an unsolicited text message advertising the U.S. Navy. The text message was the result of a partnership between the Navy and the Campbell-Ewald Company, a marketing consultant that the Navy hired to help with a recruiting campaign. The compilation of the list of targeted phone numbers and the actual sending of the message was outsourced to a company called Mindmatics.\nGomez sued and argued that that Campbell-Ewald violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by instructing or allowing a third-party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on the behalf of a client. After Campbell-Ewald’s motion to dismiss was denied, the company offered Gomez a settlement, which Gomez rejected. Campbell-Ewald again moved to dismiss the case and argued that Gomez’s rejection of the settlement offer made the claim moot. The district court denied the motion, and Campbell-Ewald moved for summary judgment based on the argument that the company had derivative sovereign immunity because it was acting on behalf of the government. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Campbell-Ewald was not entitled to the derivative sovereign immunity defense because the defense had only ever been applied in the context of property damage resulting from public works projects.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62167:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62167:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62167:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAn unaccepted settlement offer does not make a plaintiff’s claim moot, and a federal contractor does not have derivative sovereign liability from a suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an unaccepted settlement offer has no force and does not affect whether the case presents an actual case or controversy over which a court has jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution. Like unaccepted offers in other areas of law, such as contracts, an offer has no force and creates no obligation if it is not accepted. As long as the parties continue to have a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation at hand, the case is not moot. The Court also held that government contractors only obtain immunity for actions they take pursuant to their contractual undertakings. When a contractor violates both federal law and the government’s express instructions, as occurred in this case, there is no immunity. In his concurrence in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that, because the common law of tendering offers dictates that an unaccepted offer, without more, is not binding and Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stemmed from this common law history, the majority opinion did not need to examine contract law to reach this conclusion.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, once relief for the plaintiffs’ claims is available, the plaintiffs no longer have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, and there is no longer an actual case or controversy for the federal courts to adjudicate. Justice Roberts also argued that there was Supreme Court precedent establishing that the plaintiff’s acceptance of the offer was not required to moot the case. The fact that failure to accept an offer makes the offer null in contract law has no bearing on the analysis of whether the case remains an actual case or controversy under Article III. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that a case is moot when there is no dispute as to whether the defendant would “make good” on the settlement offer if the case were dismissed. Because there was no such dispute in this case, the case was moot.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62167:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62168:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62168:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Texas Constitution requires that the state legislature reapportion its senate districts during the first regular session after every federal census. After the 2010 census, the legislature created a redistricting plan that was signed into law. However, a three-judge panel of the federal district court found that there was a substantial claim that this redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act and issued an interim plan for the 2012 primary elections that was subsequently adopted and signed into law.\nPlaintiffs Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenniger are registered Texas voters who sued and claimed that the interim plan that was adopted and signed into law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that the new districts do not adhere to the 'one person, one vote' principle, which the Supreme Court had previously held exists in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they were apportioned based on total population rather than registered voter population, and while the new districts are relatively equal in terms of total population, they vary wildly in relation to total voter population. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim based on Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, which allows total population to be the basis for district apportionment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on the appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62168:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62168:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62168:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause allows a state to design its legislative districts based on total population. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the unanimous decision and the opinion for the six-justice majority. The Court held that constitutional history, judicial precedent, and consistent state practice all demonstrate that apportioning legislative districts based on total population is permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. Based on the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment and the legislative debates surrounding its adoption, the legislature at the time clearly intended for representation to be apportioned in the House based on total population, and it would be illogical to prohibit the states from doing the same within their own legislatures. In cases in which the Court has evaluated whether districting maps violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has consistently looked at total population figures to determine whether the maps impermissibly deviate from perfect population equality. Additionally, the total population approach has been used by all states and many local jurisdictions, and there is no reason to upset this accepted practice.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence has not established a single theory for how states should uphold the “one person, one vote” principle. Similarly, Justice Thomas argued that the Constitution does not prescribe a theory for states to use when apportioning representation. Although there is some preference for majoritarian rule, the Constitution also reflects concern about the tyranny of the majority by including counter-democratic checks. Given these conflicting theories present in the Constitution and the fact that the Constitution lets the states determine their own methods of apportioning representation, the Court should not impose a singular theory on the states. Because the total population method is a permissible method for states to use in creating legislative districts, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority, but noted that this was not the only permissible method. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that neither the text nor the legislative history of constitutional apportionment for legislative districts endorses one theory over another. Therefore, while the total population theory is permissible, it is not the only one. Justice Thomas joined in the concurrence in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62168:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62174:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62174:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPlain Dealer Publishing challenged the constitutionality of a Lakewood city ordinance that authorized its mayor to grant or deny applications, made by publishers, seeking permission to place newsracks on public property. The ordinance merely required Lakewood's mayor to provide an explanation, in the event of a permit denial, while empowering him to subject all permit approvals to whatever \"terms and conditions\" which he \"deemed necessary and reasonable.\" On appeal from a district court ruling that found the ordinance constitutional, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted Lakewood's request for certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62174:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62174:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62174:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the licensing ordinance was facially invalid since it gave Lakewood's mayor unbridled discretion to discriminate against permit seekers, based on the content of their publications and viewpoints. This, in turn, promoted self-censorship by publishers and other speakers who sought to curry favor with the mayor's officer in order to secure the approval of their licensing requests. The Court added that while cities may require the periodic licensing of newsracks on public property, even subjecting such procedures to reasonable restrictions, they may not use language which is so open-ended as to give city officials unlimited subjective discretion over permit approvals.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62174:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62178:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62178:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a \"parody\" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62178:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62178:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62178:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with \"actual malice.\" The Court added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state's interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62178:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62189:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62189:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn December 19, 1984, Michael Mose Chesternut saw a police car approach him while one a routine patrol, so he ran. After the police caught up with him and drove alongside him for a short distance, they observed him discarding a number of packets. Assuming the packets contained cocaine, the police arrested Chesternut and, after a search of his person, discovered heroin and a hypodermic needle. Chesternut was charged with possession of controlled substances in violation of Michigan law. The trial court dismissed the charge and concluded that Chesternut was unlawfully seized during the police pursuit preceding his disposal of the packets. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed and held that Chesternut’s freedom was restricted as soon as the officers began their pursuit. Michigan appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62189:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62189:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62189:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held the officers’ pursuit of Chesternut did not constitute a seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment; therefore the charges against him were improperly dropped. The test of whether a seizure violates the Fourth Amendment is based off whether a reasonable man would have concluded that the police had restrained his liberty so that he was not free to leave. Under the reasonable man standard, Chesternut was not seized before he discarded the drugs because a reasonable person would not conclude the police attempted to chase Chesternut simply by accelerating to catch up with him, followed by a short drive alongside him.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62189:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62195:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62195:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBasic, Inc. (Basic) was a publicly-traded company engaged in manufacturing related to the steel industry. Combustion, Inc. (Combustion), a similar company, had expressed interest in merging with Basic but had not done so because of antitrust concerns. Beginning in 1976, Combustion representatives had conversations with Basic representatives regarding the possibility of a merger. Throughout 1977 and 1978, Basic made several public statements denying rumors that these conversations were taking place. On December 18, 1978, Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading of its stocks because it had been approached about a merger, and on December 19 Basic’s board approved the offer from Combustion.\nThe respondents in this case are former Basic stockholders who sold their stock after Basic’s first denial of merger conversations. They sued Basic and its director for making false or misleading statements in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which has to do with material facts relating to the purchase or sale of stocks. The plaintiffs argued that these statements artificially depressed the market for Basic’s stock, which injured the sellers. The district court certified the plaintiffs as a class and granted summary judgment for the company. The court held that the statements were immaterial because the conversations were not necessarily destined to become a merger agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that a company cannot disclose misleading information and that the conversations, although they might not have been material on their own, became so because they made the company’s statements untrue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62195:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62195:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62195:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 4-2 plurality. The Supreme Court held that there was no reason to artificially exclude merger conversations from the definition of materiality simply because they do not include specific prices. Instead, the materiality of a fact depends on its significance to “the reasonable investor.” The Court also held that it was impractical to require individuals to show a specific reliance on misleading information within an impersonal market. Therefore, it is reasonable for courts to use a presumption of reliance for the purpose of adjudicating such cases, though the presumption can be rebutted.\nJustice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the majority opinion’s support for the presumption of reliance, or “fraud-on-the-market” theory, represented the Court taking a stance on economic policies that were beyond its purview. He also argued that, because Congress has not addressed the issue, the majority opinion should have refrained from doing so. Additionally, the facts of the case in question make it a poor candidate for such analysis because they indicate that the plaintiffs did not believe the supposedly misleading statements. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nChief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Anthony Kennedy did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62195:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62197:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62197:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nR. Foster Winans wrote a column for the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) entitled Heard on the Street (Heard) in which he reported on up-and-coming stocks. In 1983, Winans entered into a scheme that entailed him sending information about the stocks to be featured in Heard to two friends who worked at a brokerage firm. When Heard featured a stock, it generally affected the actual price and quantity of the stock in the market. Over a four-month period, the brokers used Winans’ information regarding stocks yet to be featured in Heard to make trades that resulted in profits of around $690,000. When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation, Winans and his co-conspirator Carpenter confessed.\nThe district court found that Winans had breached the duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and found him and his co-conspirators guilty of mail and wire fraud as well as securities violations. The petitioners appealed and argued that, because the WSJ—the only alleged victim of the mail and wire fraud charges—had no interest in the stocks being traded, the conviction should be overturned. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the petitioners’ misappropriation of the upcoming publication schedule was sufficient to establish a case for mail and wire fraud. The Circuit court reasoned that the use of mail and wire services had a sufficient nexus to Winans' knowing breach of his duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and that this breach harmed the WSJ.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62197:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62197:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62197:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court was evenly divided as to whether or not the Wall Street Journal’s lack of interest in the securities traded cleared petitioners of the charged crimes, and because of that split, the Court deferred to the appellate court’s judgment. The Court unanimously rejected petitioners’ arguments that they did not obtain any money or property from the WSJ and therefore that the state did not prove the required elements of the mail and wire fraud statutes. The Court held that the publication schedule and the contents of the column while being intangible, were still property sufficient to warrant a conviction. In addition, the Court rejected petitioners’ arguments that Winans’ actions were simply a violation of workplace rules and could amount to defrauding. The Court determined that the dissemination of the column via mail and wire was an essential part of petitioners’ scheme, which satisfied the final element of the mail and wire fraud statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62197:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62209:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62209:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNorth Dakota was a sparsely populated state, and as late as the mid-20th century some children were educated in crowded one-room schools. Since 1947, the legislature encouraged thinly populated school districts to reorganize themselves into larger districts; once reorganized, districts could only charge for transportation provisions with voter approval. Dickinson Public Schools chose not to participate in the reorganization. In 1973, the district began charging a fee for door-to-door bus service; about thirteen percent of students rode the bus, and the district charged their parents ninety-seven dollars a year for one child or one hundred fifty dollars a year for two children. In 1979, North Dakota enacted legislation expressly indicating that non-reorganized school districts could charge fees for transporting students.\nSarita Kadrmas, her mother Paula, and the rest of her family lived about sixteen miles from Sarita’s school. In September 1985, the family’s annual income was at or near the poverty level. Until 1985, the Kadrmas family agreed each year to pay the busing fee for Sarita, but they refused to sign a contract for the 1985 school year and the bus no longer stopped for Sarita. The Kadrmas family then used private transportation, but the costs exceeded $1,000 per school year.\nIn September 1985, Paula Kadrmas and other parents in the district filed an action in state court seeking to enjoin the Dickinson Public Schools and various school district officials from collecting any bus service fees. The district court rejected their action on the merits. On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, rejected Kadrmas’ argument that the busing fee violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It characterized the statute as purely economic legislation, concluding that the charges authorized by the statute were rationally related to the legitimate government objective of allocating limited resources. In the spring of 1987, while her appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was pending, the Kadrmas family signed a busing contract for the remainder of the 1986 school year and paid part of the fee. They also signed a contract for the 1987 school year.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62209:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62209:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62209:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, no, and no. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Court held that North Dakota’s statute allowing non-reorganized schools to charge busing fees did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice O’Connor first rejected the district’s contention that Kadrmas’ was barred from appeal because her daughter was enjoying the benefits of the district’s bus service. She noted that the legislature authorized bus service through a different statute, and characterized the fee as a burden to Kadrmas, not a benefit. She also held that the case was not moot, in part because a decision in Kadrmas’ favor would relieve them from future assessments for bus service.\nJustice O’Connor interpreted Kadrmas’ argument to mean that the busing fee unconstitutionally placed a greater obstacle to education on poorer families. Justice O’Connor disagreed that the Court must subject the statute to heightened scrutiny, in part because the government did not penalize Sarita for her parents’ conduct. Justice O’Connor also rejected Kadrmas’ argument that North Dakota was constitutionally barred from withholding bus services from those unable to pay because those services were especially important. Unlike court access and court remedies, North Dakota did not maintain a legal or practical monopoly on the means of transporting children to school. Moreover, the Kadrmas family could and did find a private alternative to the public school bus service.\nJustice O’Connor also held that the statute did not violate equal protection by only allowing fees for bus service in non-reorganized schools. She wrote that Kadrmas failed to demonstrate that the statute was both arbitrary and irrational. The purpose of the statute was to encourage reorganization through the expansion of districts’ tax bases, and the fees existed to encourage voters to approve school district reorganization. She noted that voters in reorganized districts could approve bus service fees as well.\nJustice Thurgood Marshall dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He characterized the majority’s ruling as a retreat from the promise of equal education opportunity. He argued that North Dakota’s actions placed a special burden on poor families in their pursuit of education and discriminated on the basis of economic status.\nJustice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Harry Blackmun. He argued that once voters in a district decided whether or not to reorganize, there was no longer a rational basis for denying free bus transportation to students in that particular district.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62209:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62212:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62212:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA provision in the District of Columbia Code prohibited the display of signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy which tended to \"bring that government into public odium or public disrepute.\" Congregations of three or more persons within the 500 feet limit were prohibited as well. Boos and others were denied permission to display signs criticizing the Soviet Union in front of that country's embassy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62212:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62212:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62212:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that the Code's restriction on sign displays violated the First Amendment while the ban on congregations did not. First, Justice O'Connor argued that the prohibition on signs failed to meet the high standards that the Court uses when evaluating the content-based regulation of political speech in a public forum. The \"dignity\" standard that the Code used was similar to the \"outrageousness\" standard which the Court found unconstitutional in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988) because it was too subjective. Second, O'Connor reasoned that since the language of the ban on congregations was narrowly drawn and could only be acted upon by the police in situations where a threat to security or peace were present, it did not prohibit peaceful gatherings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62212:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62221:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62221:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRichard Shapero submitted a client solicitation letter to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval. Shapero directed the letter at individuals who were about to lose their houses to foreclosure. The Commission found nothing false or misleading with the letter, but denied approval under a Kentucky Supreme Court rule, which prohibited direct mail advertisements “precipitated by a specific event” such as foreclosure. Shapero then sought an advisory opinion from the Kentucky Bar Association’s Committee on Legal Ethics. The committee upheld the Advertising Commission’s ruling. On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62221:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62221:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62221:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion, holding the Kentucky Supreme Court rule unconstitutional. The Supreme Court did not decide whether Shapero’s letter required First Amendment protections. The Court remanded the case for further consideration of that issue. Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurrence, stating that the question of whether Shapero’s letter required First Amendment protections should be left to state courts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62221:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62222:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62222:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSandra Schultz and Robert Braun both strongly opposed abortion and gathered like-minded citizens together to picket in front of the home of a local doctor who performed abortions. In response, the city of Brookfield, Wisconsin passed a law against all picketing in front of residential homes except for labor disputes. Following the advice of the town attorney, the city amended the law to ban labor picketing as well. The stated purpose of the law was \"the protection and preservation of the home.\" When enacted, Schultz and Braun stopped picketing and filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the law violated the First Amendment. The court declared it would issue a permanent injunction against the law unless it was narrowed in scope. The United States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the law violated the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62222:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62222:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62222:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court held that since the street constituted a traditional public forum, the ban must satisfy strict standards in order to remain. Since the ban is \"content neutral,\" \"leaves open ample alternative channels of communication,\" and serves a \"significant government interest,\" the Court ruled that it passed the strict standards and could remain. The city government had a legitimate purpose in protecting the homes of its residents, and did so without favoring one idea over another or eliminating the ability to communicate an idea.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62222:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62227:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62227:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 16, 1985, Ronald William Roberson was arrested at the scene of a burglary. The arresting officer read him his Miranda rights, and Roberson asked to see an attorney before answering any questions. On April 19, while Roberson was still in custody on the burglary charge, a different officer, who was unaware that Roberson had requested counsel, interrogated him regarding a robbery that happened on April 15. During this questioning, Roberson gave an incriminating statement. At trial, the trial court suppressed the statement and held that his interrogation without his attorney present after he had requested one violated his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62227:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62227:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62227:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that, once a suspect has requested counsel, police cannot interrogate him unless he initiates the contact. The Fifth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s previous rulings on it are meant to serve as a bright-line rule for police officers. The Court also held that Roberson’s request for counsel was because of his discomfort with answering the police’s questions, and there is no reason to assume that discomfort would be case-specific.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy argued that a suspect does not need to be made aware of his Miranda rights more than once. When he has been told that he has the right to an attorney, he can choose whether or not to invoke that right in any investigation. Justice Kennedy argued that the majority created an unnecessary dichotomy between always allowing such statements or always excluding them, when in fact there should be a balance that depends on the situations in each case. This approach would protect law enforcement’s ability to investigate and the suspect’s rights. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.\nJustice Sandra Day O’Connor did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62227:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62229:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62229:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMyrna Friedman, a resident of Maryland, was hired at a law firm located in the state of Virginia. Virginia law made permanent residency a requirement for admission to the Virginia bar without taking the bar examination. After Friedman's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was turned down, her claim was upheld in federal district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62229:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62229:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62229:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Virginia's residency requirement was unconstitutional. The Court held that \"'one of the privileges which the Clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State,'\" and that the practice of law was sufficiently basic to the economy to be deemed a privilege protected by the Clause. The Court found that the regulation discriminated among otherwise equally qualified applicants solely on the basis of residency, failing to bear a close relation to a substantial state interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62229:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62237:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62237:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Pennsylvania law required illegitimate children to prove paternity before seeking support from their fathers. The statute of limitations on suits seeking to establish paternity was six years from the birth of the illegitimate child. However, the state allowed legitimate children to seek support from their parents at any time. Cherlyn Clark sought child support from Gene Jeter, whom she claimed was the father of her daughter, Tiffany. Blood tests indicated that there was a 99.3% probability that Jeter indeed was Tiffany's father. A state court dismissed Clark's suit because it was initiated after the statute of limitations had expired.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62237:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62237:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62237:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that the statute violated the Constitution. Citing the test which the Court developed in Mills v. Habluetzel (1982) to evaluate equal protection challenges to statutes of limitations in paternity suits, Justice O'Connor held that the Pennsylvania law did not \"provide a reasonable opportunity to assert a claim on behalf of an illegitimate child.\" Furthermore, since, in some circumstances, Pennsylvania permitted paternity suits involving illegitimate children to be initiated after six years, there was no reason why the law in question was necessary to deter the litigation of \"stale or fraudulent claims,\" a legitimate state interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62237:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62240:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62240:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBetween April 11 and April 15, 1985, a trailer containing 32,000 blank videocassette tapes was stolen from an Overnight Express yard in South Holland, Illinois. On April 17, 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston contacted a business owner in Michigan and offered to sell her a large number of blank videocassette tapes for significantly under market value. Huddleston was later charged with possessing and selling stolen videocassette tapes across state lines. At trial, the government presented evidence that Huddleston had previously trafficked in stolen goods. In response, Huddleston argued that he had not known any of the goods were stolen. The district court then instructed the jury that the evidence of prior bad acts could only be used to establish Huddleston’s knowledge, not to prove his character. The jury convicted Huddleston for possession of stolen goods.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially reversed the conviction and held that the government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the goods in the prior instances were in fact stolen. The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing and subsequently affirmed the conviction, holding that the government only needs to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62240:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62240:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62240:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the unanimous court. The Supreme Court held that requiring the trial court to make a preliminary ruling before admitting character evidence is contrary to Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Character evidence must meet the relevancy requirements of Rules 401-403. To add additional limitations would unnecessarily increase the burden on the prosecution and conflict with the legislative intent behind the rule.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62240:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62243:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62243:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Indiana law gave a tax credit against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold by fuel dealers, provided that the ethanol was produced in Ohio or in a state that grants similar tax advantages as the Ohio scheme.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62243:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62243:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62243:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The unanimous Court held that the law's primary purpose was to confer favorable tax treatment on Ohio-produced ethanol which imposed \"an economic disadvantage upon out-of-state sellers.\" Ohio was unable to advance a legitimate local purpose for the law", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62243:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62245:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62245:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). The statute removed the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term bonds issued by state and local governments unless they were issued in registered form. South Carolina declared that both bearer and registered bonds issued by states and municipalities had been free from taxation since Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co (1895). The federal government claimed that the Act did not eliminate the state's power to issue bonds free from taxation; rather it regulated the types of bonds to be exempt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62245:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62245:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62245:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that its subsequent decisions overruled Pollock so that state bond interest is not immune from a nondiscriminatory federal tax. Therefore, the owners of state bonds have no constitutional authority to exempt taxes on the earned income. TEFRA imposes no direct tax on the states; it is only collected from bondholders. The Act is nondiscriminatory because the regulations are imposed on the federal government as well as the state governments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62245:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62252:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62252:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 5, 2004, Stephen Law filed for bankruptcy. He claimed that there were two liens on his property consuming all of the property's value beyond a homestead exemption. A homestead exemption protects equity in a house when filing for bankruptcy. One of these liens turned out to be a fictional construction involving a woman in China. Alfred Siegel (the Trustee) claimed that, in exposing the false lien, he incurred $465,000 in attorney fees. Because these costs resulted from Law's misconduct and misrepresentation, the Bankruptcy Court added a surcharge equal to the full amount of Law's homestead exemption to offset the Trustee's costs.\nLaw appealed the decision to the Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (BAP). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, federal appeals courts may create panels of judges to hear appeals from Bankruptcy Court. The BAP affirmed the order and held that the surcharge was necessary to protect the Bankruptcy Court's integrity. Law appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the BAP decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62252:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62252:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62252:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that, while a Bankruptcy Court has the authority to issue any order, process, or judgment necessary to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it may not contravene specific statutory provisions. In this case, the Bankruptcy Court exceeded the limits of its authority by awarding the Law’s homestead exemption to Siegel. Although the statute does not require a debtor to establish a homestead exemption, once he has done so the Bankruptcy Court may not refuse to honor that exemption. Even in the case that a debtor is dishonest, the Bankruptcy Court may not impose sanctions that would violate the terms of the Bankruptcy Code, such as the debtor’s ability to establish a homestead exemption.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62252:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62254:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62254:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPom Wonderful, LLC (Pom Wonderful), a California-based beverage company, sold various types of juice, including a pomegranate blueberry juice blend. In 2007, Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) announced its own version of a pomegranate blueberry juice. In 2008, Pom Wonderful sued Coca-Cola in federal district court and argued that Coca-Cola misled consumers into believing that Coca-Cola's product contained pomegranate and blueberry juices when it actually contained 99% apple and grape juices and only 0.5% pomegranate and blueberry juice. Specifically, Pom Wonderful claimed that Coca-Cola violated provisions of the Lanham Act, a federal law prohibiting false advertising, as well as California's false advertising and unfair competition laws. The lawsuit challenged the name, labeling, marketing, and advertising of Coca-Cola's product.\nThe district court held that Pom Wonderful's claims regarding the name and label of the juice were barred by a separate law, the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA). The FDCA allows the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate the labels on, among other items, juices. Because the FDA has exclusive authority to file claims for violations of the FDCA, the court feared that a decision under the Lanham Act would undercut the FDA's authority to regulate juice labels. After both parties gathered evidence, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Coca-Cola on the name and label issues. Although the court gave Pom Wonderful the opportunity to proceed to trial on the remaining issues, Pom Wonderful conceded that it could not win without the name and label issues. Pom Wonderful appealed.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to bar Pom Wonderful's claim with respect to the name and labeling of Coca-Cola's juice. It vacated the lower court's ruling in favor of Coca-Cola, instead allowing Pom Wonderful's case to proceed on the remaining claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62254:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62254:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62254:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that, while it is the duty of the courts to harmonize statutes, the best way to do that in this case does not entail barring POM Wonderful's Lanham Act claims. Neither the Lanham Act nor the FDCA explicitly forbids or limits Lanham Act claims on labels that the FDCA regulates. The Court held that, because the Lanham Act and the FDCA have coexisted since the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946 without Congress addressing the issue, Congress has evidently not seen a problem with their potential interferences. Therefore, holding that the FDCA precludes the operation of the Lanham Act would represent a disregard for the legislative intent of having the two statutes complement one another.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer did not take part in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62254:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62255:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62255:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the late 1990s, two professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Tom Leighton and Daniel Lewin, began to research techniques to provide stable internet services during periods of high traffic. These men eventually founded Akamai Technologies, Inc. (Akamai) to capitalize on this research. Akamai is an internet content delivery company that owns and maintains thousands of servers around the United States and contracts with internet service providers. By contracting with these companies, Akamai can deliver stable, fast internet to far-reaching customers with less danger of internet slowdown or failure. On July 14, 1998, the two men filed a patent through MIT for a method designed to alleviate Internet congestion by delivering content from multiple available servers. MIT then licensed this patent to Akamai.\nShortly thereafter, several other internet companies filed patent applications for internet content delivery systems. This led to a series of litigations that spanned from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. In 2004, in the midst of these court battles, Akamai entered into negotiations to purchase Limelight Networks, Inc. (Limelight). In 2006, however, Limelight informed Akamai that it no longer wished to be purchased. Akamai subsequently sued Limelight in district court for violating 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and § 271(b), federal laws prohibiting patent infringement. Specifically, § 271(a) prohibits general patent infringement and § 271(b) prohibits inducing patent infringement.\nThe case proceeded to trial and a jury awarded Akamai a $41.5 million verdict based on lost profit, lost royalties, interest, and price erosion damages. After a series of post-trial motions, the district court ultimately ruled in favor of Limelight and held that, although Akamai's patent was violated, much of the violation occurred when Limelight's customers took the key steps to violate the patent. Although Limelight allowed these steps to occur, it did not control its customers' actions and therefore was not liable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that an entity accused of patent infringement must either perform all of the steps of the claimed method, either personally or through its direct control.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62255:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62255:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62255:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that liability for inducement can only be found when there is direct patent infringement. Because patent rights extend only to the claimed combination of steps, there is no direct patent infringement unless all the steps are carried out. The Court also held that conduct that would be infringing in altered circumstances cannot be the basis of liability for inducement. The Court declined to rule on the merits of the Federal Circuit's rule for direct patent infringement, which states that a single party must perform or exercise \"control or direction\" over each step of the patented process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62255:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62256:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62256:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring an economic crisis in 2001, the Republic of Argentina (Argentina) failed to make payments on bonds owned by foreign investors. One such bondholder, NML Capital, Ltd. (NML), later prevailed in several actions it filed against Argentina in federal district court, which entered judgments totaling more than US$2 billion in NML's favor. In order to execute the judgments against Argentina, NML served subpoenas on two banks requesting information about Argentina's assets held worldwide. Argentina moved to quash the subpoenas and argued that they violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) by requiring the disclosure of assets that are immune from collection by NML. The district court ordered the banks to comply with the subpoena requests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the FSIA did not apply to the subpoena because it was a discovery order directed at commercial entities that did not have a claim to sovereign immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62256:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62256:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62256:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that, under the FSIA, property held within the United States by foreign nations cannot be attached to a civil claim except under a narrow exemption, which requires the property to be used for a commercial activity as well as satisfying one additional condition such as the foreign nation waiving its immunity from attachment. However, the fact that some property may be immune from attachment does not mean the property is also immune from discovery. While NML and Argentina may disagree as to whether property within the United States is covered by the FSIA's immunity, the level of immunity given to a foreign nation's property held outside the United States may be different in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Because the FSIA only grants immunity to property held within the United States, NML may be able to find foreign property held outside the United States that is attachable under the law of the foreign jurisdiction but that would be immune from attachment if held in the United States.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority should not assume that foreign jurisdictions may allow the attachment of property which could not be attached under United States law. Therefore, based on the FSIA, Justice Ginsburg wrote that the discovery request should have been limited to property used in connection with commercial activity, which is a necessary requirement under U.S. law for attachment.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor took no part in the decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62256:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62257:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62257:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBenjamin Robers was involved in a mortgage fraud scheme. His role was to pose as a legitimate buyer of houses, make fraudulent loan applications⎯by misrepresenting his income and his intention to live in the house and repay the mortgage⎯then allow the loan to default by not paying it. Eventually, the bank foreclosed on the houses and then sold them to pay back the lenders. Robers was able to secure two houses under this guise.\nAfter government officials discovered the scheme but prior to indictment, Robers pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud because the funds for the fraudulent loans were disbursed electronically (wired) by lenders. A federal district court sentenced him to three years of probation and ordered him to pay restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) in the amount of $218,952.18 for both incidents. The amount was calculated by finding the difference between each loan and the resale amount of each house that was foreclosed (the offset value). Robers appealed the restitution award and argued that the wrong offset value was used in the calculation; instead, the fair market price at the time of foreclosure should have been used. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in part, vacated attorney fees and \"other expenses\" from the restitution sum, and remanded the case back to the district court to draw a new order with the corrected sum.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62257:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62257:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62257:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that the word “property” in the MVRA refers to the money lent by the banks and not to the houses the banks received as collateral for the fraudulent loans. Therefore, the district court properly calculated the restitution amount because the property (money) was not returned to the banks until the date on which the homes were actually sold.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which she emphasized that, in her view, the Court’s ruling applied only to cases in which the victim intended to sell the collateral but encountered a reasonable delay in doing so. She noted that, in other cases, a defendant might be able to show that a victim intended to hold onto the collateral as an investment rather than reduce it to cash right away and should consequently bear the loss of any decline in value. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the concurring opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62257:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62258:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62258:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration tags. Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, to protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband. During the search, police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm.\nBefore trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62258:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62258:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62258:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a \"Faraday bag.\" The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using \"cloud computing\" is not even \"on the arrestee's person.\" Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can be reasonably searched following an arrest.\nLearn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62258:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62259:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62259:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPrior to the 2010 general election, Susan B. Anthony List (SBA List), a nonprofit, pro-life organization, announced that it intended to put up a billboard in the district of then-Congressman Steven Driehaus. The planned billboard would have asserted that Driehaus's vote in favor of the Affordable Care Act amounted to a vote in favor of taxpayer-funded abortion. Citing threats of legal action by Driehaus's counsel, the company that owned the billboard space refused to put up the ad. Driehaus filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that SBA List violated Ohio's campaign laws by making false statements about his voting record. SBA List filed an action in federal district court arguing that the Ohio statutes infringed upon its rights to free speech and association under the First Amendment. Driehaus withdrew his complaint upon losing his bid for re-election and subsequently moved to Swaziland for an assignment with the Peace Corps. The district court dismissed the suit by SBA List for lack of standing and ripeness. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62259:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62259:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62259:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that pre-enforcement challenges are justiciable when circumstances indicate that threatened enforcement of the statute is sufficiently imminent. If the threatened enforcement is sufficiently imminent, the petitioners have alleged sufficient injury for Article III standing and justiciability. In this case, the petitioners' political speech focused on the issue of support for the Affordable Care Act, not simply on Driehaus, and thus was likely to continue despite Driehaus' departure. The Court determined that there was a threat of future enforcement even though petitioners maintained their statements were true. Moreover, because the respondents did not disavow enforcement if petitioners carried out their speech in the future, the Court held that the prospect of enforcement was not \"imaginary or speculative\" and that petitioners had shown sufficient injury for pre-enforcement review. The Court also held that the petitioners' suit was prudentially ripe because their challenge was purely legal, the issue would not be clarified by future factual development, and denying prompt judicial review would force them to choose between refraining from political speech or risking burdensome Commission proceedings and criminal prosecution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62259:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62260:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62260:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAlice Corporation (Alice) is an Australian company that owns the '479, '510, '720, and '375 patents, all of which have to do with a computerized trading platform that deals with financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between two others so as to settlement eliminate risk. Settlement risk is the risk to each party in an exchange that only one party will pay its obligation. Alice's patents address that risk by using the third party as the guarantor.\nOn May 24, 2007, CLS Bank International (CLS) sued Alice and sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the '479, '510, and '720 patents. Alice countersued and claimed infringement. CLS moved for summary judgment by arguing that any possible infringement could not have occurred in the United States and that Alice's claims were drawn from ineligible subject matter. Alice filed crossmotions, and the district court denied both motions. In the meantime, the '375 patent processed, and Alice amended its complaint to include this patent. Both parties renewed their crossmotions. For the purposes of these motions, the district court assumed that all asserted patent claims required electronic implementation and granted summary judgment in favor of CLS. The district court held that Alice's patents were invalid because they were directed at an abstract idea and that those claims could preempt the use of the abstract concept of a neutral intermediary to facilitate exchange and eliminate risk. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62260:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62260:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62260:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that patent law should not restrain abstract ideas that are the \"building blocks of human ingenuity\" and held all of Alice's claims ineligible for patent protection. Because using a third party to eliminate settlement risk is a fundamental and prevalent practice, it is essentially a building block of the modern economy. The Court held that Alice's claims did no more than require a generic computer to implement this abstract idea of intermediated settlement by performing generic computer functions, which is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.\nJustice Sonia M. Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that any claim that merely describes a method of doing business should not be patentable. In this case, Justice Sotomayor agreed that the method claims at issue pertained to an abstract idea. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62260:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62261:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62261:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2001, Heidi Heffron-Clark inherited a $300,000 individual retirement account (IRA) from her mother's estate. The U.S. tax code provides special rules for IRAs that are inherited by someone other than the spouse of the deceased. These rules prohibit additional contributions to the inherited account and require the beneficiary to withdraw, and pay taxes on, a minimum amount from the account each year. Heidi and her husband (the \"Clarks\"), filed for bankruptcy in 2010 and claimed the inherited IRA was exempt from creditor claims. A bankruptcy judge ruled that retirement funds must be held for the current owner's retirement in order to qualify as an exempt retirement fund under Section 522 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Because the Clarks were required to withdraw money from the inherited IRA before their retirement, the judge held that the account was subject to creditor claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. The federal district court reversed and held that Heidi's inheritance of the IRA did not change its status as a protected retirement fund. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62261:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62261:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62261:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that an inherited IRA account did not qualify as a retirement fund for the purposes of exemption under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Since the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define the term \"retirement fund,\" the Court held that it should retain its ordinary meaning—a fund that is set aside for an individual's retirement. Inherited IRAs do not fit this definition because the individual cannot invest more money in the account and is required to draw money from the account regardless of how far the individual is from retirement. The Court held that allowing an inherited IRA to be exempt from creditor claims would undermine the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62261:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62262:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62262:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) served five summonses to top officers of the Dynamo Holdings Limited Partnership (Dynamo) during its investigation into the company's tax liabilities. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted enforcement of the summonses. Dynamo opposed the summonses by arguing that it was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the summonses were proper. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the decision that allowed the summonses to be enforced and remanded the case back to the district court for a hearing on whether the investigation was launched under an improper purpose, which would render enforcement of the summonses unlawful.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62262:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62262:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62262:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that a simple allegation of improper purpose was not sufficient to entitle a taxpayer to examine IRS officials; however, the taxpayer does have the right to such an examination if the taxpayer can point to specific facts or circumstances that could plausibly result from bad faith on the part of the IRS. Because the summons stage is necessarily a preliminary one, the taxpayer does not need to present a fully fleshed-out case, but neither should a summons dispute turn into a search for wrongdoing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62262:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62263:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62263:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1980, in response to concerns about the repercussions of toxic waste dumping, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which was designed to establish a comprehensive response mechanism and to shift the cost of the clean-up to the parties responsible. In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by adding a section stating that, if a state statute of limitations allows the period in which action may be brought to begin before the plaintiff has knowledge of the harm, CERCLA preempts the state statute and allows the period to begin only from the point at which the plaintiff has knowledge.\nCTS Corporation (CTS) manufactures and disposes of electronics and electronic parts. From 1959 to 1985, CTS operated the Mills Gap Road Facility (Facility) in Asheville, North Carolina, where notable quantities of carcinogenic solvents were stored. In 1987, CTS sold the Facility and promised the realtors that the property was environmentally safe and clean. Subsequently, the land was sold to David Bradley, Renee Richardson, and others (landowners), who learned that the land was contaminated and that their well water contained concentrated levels of carcinogenic solvents in 2009. The landowners sued CTS in federal district court and argued that CTS should be required to remove the toxic contaminants as well as pay monetary damages. CTS moved to dismiss the case by arguing that North Carolina's ten-year statute of limitations on real property actions resulting from physical damage to a claimant's property prevented the suit from going forward. Although the landowners argued that CERCLA preempted the limitation, the district court held that the ten-year limitation was actually a statute of repose, which limits legal action to a particular timeframe regardless of when the harm becomes apparent. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that CERCLA's preemption applied to both statutes of repose, in which a plaintiff's knowledge of the harm is not relevant to when the time period begins, as well as to statutes of limitation, in which a plaintiff's knowledge of the harm is relevant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62263:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62263:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62263:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court explained the differences between statutes of limitations, which begin to run when the injury was discovered, and statutes of repose, which place an absolute bar on lawsuits regardless of whether any injury has been discovered. The Court held that statutes of limitations reflect a policy of encouraging a plaintiff to pursue his or her rights diligently and may be paused if an extraordinary circumstance prevents a plaintiff from bringing his or her claim. Statutes of repose, however, reflect a policy of freeing defendants from potential liability and generally cannot be paused even in extraordinary circumstances. Although the Court recognized that Congress has used the terms interchangeably in the past, in CERCLA Congress only used the term \"statute of limitations\" despite the Study Group Report's use of both terms. Given Congress' awareness of the distinction, the Court held that CERCLA could not be extended to pre-empt \"statutes of repose.\"\nIn Part II-D of the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy argued that when a pre-emption clause is open to more than one plausible reading, courts tend to disfavor pre-emption and interpret the clause narrowly, especially when the law covers subject matter that is traditionally covered by state law. Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor and Justice Elena Kagan joined in Part II-D. Justice Antonin G. Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion with respect to Part II-D and argued that pre-emption clauses should be interpreted simply by applying their ordinary meaning. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined the separate concurrence.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the statute of repose was essentially a statute of limitations and should be pre-empted by CERCLA because CERCLA's purpose would be defeated if it did not pre-empt statutes of repose as well as statutes of limitations. Justice Ginsburg also wrote that the majority decision gave contaminators an incentive to conceal the hazards they have created. Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62263:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62264:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62264:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBiosig Instruments, Inc. (Biosig) holds the '753 Patent, which refers to a heart rate monitor associated with exercise equipment and procedures. Biosig sued Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus) in federal district court and alleged that Nautilus infringed on several claims of the patent. Nautilus moved for summary judgment on two issues: whether there was infringement, and whether the patent was invalid due to its vagueness. The district court denied Nautilus' motion as far as the issue of infringement due to lack of discovery and granted the motion as it related to the patent's invalidity because of its vagueness. Biosig appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that a patent claim could only be considered legally indefinite when it is \"insolubly ambiguous,\" or not possible for a person of ordinary skill in the area to understand and resolve.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62264:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62264:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62264:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, unanswered. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court first held that determining whether a patent claim is sufficiently definite must be done by evaluating the patent with the perspective of an individual learned in the relevant field, a standard that accepts a certain amount of ambiguity in the patent claim. However, because patents serve a public service function, patent claims must be definite enough to appraise the public at large as to what has or has not been patented yet. In attempting to balance these interests, the Court held that a patent is sufficiently definite when the patent taken as a whole which includes the patent application, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's response, and any amendments made by the applicant informs those learned in the relevant field of the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty. The Court then remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit to reevaluate Nautilus's claim in light of this newly articulated standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62264:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62265:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62265:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAereo, Inc. (Aereo) provides a service that allows its subscribers to watch programs that are currently airing on network television or record programs that will air in the future over the Internet. By allowing subscribers to watch live television as well as record and watch shows on Internet-enabled devices including mobile phones, Aereo serves three functions: that of a regular television antenna, a recording device, and an application that makes these services work on devices other than televisions and computers. Aereo is currently only available to subscribers in the New York City area and offers only New York City local channels. Aereo does not have a license from the copyright holders of the programs to record or transmit their programs.\nTwo groups of plaintiffs filed separate copyright infringement suits against Aereo and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Aereo from transmitting programs to its subscribers while the programs were still being broadcast. The plaintiffs claimed that the transmission of the programs violated their right to \"publicly perform\" their copyrighted works. The district court denied the motion and held that Aereo's system was not substantially different from another that had been determined non-violative of the rights of copyright holders and that, while the injunction might prevent harm for the plaintiffs' businesses, it would irreparably harm Aereo's. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling to deny the motion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62265:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62265:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62265:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, because Aereo is functionally similar to community antenna television (CATV), which Congress specifically amended the Copyright Act to cover, the Copyright Act regulates Aereo's actions in a similar manner. Under the definitions Congress established in the Copyright Act, Aereo performs work because it shows images in sequence with the accompanying audio, and it does so publicly because those images and sounds are received beyond the place from where they were sent by a large number of unrelated people. Therefore, Aereo, like CATV, is not just an equipment provider but rather a broadcaster.\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that Aereo merely provides a platform for the customer to use as he sees fit. Because Aereo plays no role in the selection of content, it does not \"perform\" in any meaningful sense and cannot be held liable for the customer's choice of transmission content. Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion was based on the faulty assumption that Aereo's services resembled CATV, which creates a rule so broad as to be useless. Instead, Justice Scalia argued that the question of volitional conduct is the appropriate bright-line test to use in such cases. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62265:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62270:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62270:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMinnesota's Constitution provides for the selection of all state judges by popular election. The announcement clause of the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. While running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal filed suit, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. Wersal alleged that he was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point where he declined response to questions put to him by the press and public, out of concern that he might run afoul of the announce clause. The District Court found that the announcement clause did not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62270:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62270:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62270:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the announce clause violates the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the announce clause prohibits speech based on its content and burdens a category of speech that is at the core of First Amendment freedoms - speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office. Moreover, the Court concluded that the clause did not serve to preserve the state judiciary's impartiality, its argued compelling state interest. \"There is an obvious tension between the article of Minnesota's popularly approved Constitution which provides that judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's announce clause which places most subjects of interest to the voters off limits,\" wrote Justice Scalia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62270:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62272:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62272:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA public hospital fired an obstetrics nurse, Cheryl Churchill, for insubordination after she allegedly complained about her superiors to a nurse trainee during a dinner break in the hospital's obstetrics unit. Churchill claimed that the hospital fired her because she opposed its policy of nurse cross-training and said it was leaving certain units understaffed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62272:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62272:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62272:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes, but the Court was unable to forge a majority opinion. A four-justice plurality held that government workers cannot be dismissed or otherwise punished for their words unless the employer has a reasonable basis for believing that the speech either was disruptive or involved a matter of purely private concern, outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection. The hospital need not conduct a full-scale investigation, but it must have some reasonable, factual basis for its actions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62272:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62273:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62273:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the 2000 census caused Mississippi to lose one congressional seat, the State legislature failed to pass a new redistricting plan. Subsequently, lawsuits were filed in both the Mississippi State Chancery Court and the Federal District Court, asking that each court issue its own redistricting plan. While the federal court stayed its hand, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to issue a redistricting plan. The Chancery Court adopted such a plan, which was submitted for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Meanwhile, the Federal District Court promulgated a plan that would fix the State's congressional districts for the 2002 elections should the state-court plan not be precleared by the state-law deadline. Ultimately, the District Court enjoined the State from using the state-court plan and ordered that its own plan be used in 2002 until the State produced a precleared, constitutional plan. The State did not appeal and no determination was made on the preclearance submission because the District Court's injunction rendered the state-court plan incapable of administration.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62273:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62273:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62273:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held, 9-0, that the District Court properly enjoined enforcement of the state- court plan that lacked the required timely preclearance. The Court also held, 7-2, that the federal court properly fashioned its own congressional reapportionment plan, which drew the requisite single-member districts rather than directing at-large elections, under 2 USC section 2c. Regarding the second holding, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, reasoned that the provision for at-large elections under 2 USC section 2a(c) was subject to the requirement under section 2c that single-member districts must be drawn whenever possible. Justice John Paul Stevens, with whom Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer joined, concluded that section 2c impliedly repealed section 2a(c). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, with whom Justice Clarence Thomas joined, disagreed with the plurality's interpretations of section 2c.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62273:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62274:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62274:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKansas and Colorado disputed ownership of the Arkansas River. In 1949 Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact, which set out to resolve the states' dispute. In 1986 Kansas alleged Colorado violated the Compact. The U.S. Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to investigate the dispute and in 1994 the Special Master said Colorado violated the Compact. The Court agreed with the Special Master. Kansas later took issue with the Special Master's fourth set of recommendations. Kansas said it was entitled to interest from 1985 onward - before the Court's ruling against Colorado - for damages from Colorado's violations of the Compact from 1950 to 1985. Kansas also requested a \"river master\" to resolve a dispute over computer modeling of the river.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62274:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62274:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62274:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo and no. In an 8-1 judgment delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court denied Kansas' request to appoint a river master to decide various technical disputes between the states. A river master was inappropriate because the nature of the disputes was legal, not purely technical, and the appointment of a river master would make it easier to continue litigation. The Court also rejected Kansas' claim to all interest from 1985 forward for damages, because that would contradict the Court's ruling in an earlier dispute between the states (Kansas III). In that ruling, the Court had endorsed an equitable approach that yielded a post-1985 interest calculation based on late damages only.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62274:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62275:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62275:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the Housing Act of 1949, the Farmers Home Administration makes direct loans to private, nonprofit entities to develop and/or construct rural housing for the elderly and low-or middle-income individuals and families. Franconia Associates is a property owner that entered into such loans before December 21, 1979. The promissory notes Franconia executed authorized \"prepaymen[t] of scheduled installments, or any portion thereof...at any time at the option of Borrower.\" In 1988, Congress enacted the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 (ELIHPA), which amended the Housing Act of 1949 to impose permanent restrictions upon prepayment of mortgages entered into before December 21, 1979. In 1997, Franconia filed suit, charging that ELIHPA abridged the absolute prepayment right set forth in their promissory notes and thereby effected a repudiation of their contracts. In dismissing Franconia's contract claims as untimely, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the claims first accrued on the ELIHPA regulations' effective date. In affirming on statute of limitations grounds, the Federal Circuit ruled that, if the Government's continuing duty to allow Franconia to prepay their loans was breached, the breach occurred immediately upon ELIHPA's enactment date.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62275:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62275:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62275:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that because ELIHPA's enactment qualified as a repudiation of the parties' bargain, not a present breach of the loan agreements, breach would occur, and the six-year limitations period would commence to run, when a borrower tenders prepayment and the Government then dishonors its obligation to accept the tender and release its control over use of the property securing the loan. The Court reasoned that the government's pledged performance was properly comprehended as an obligation to accept prepayment, not an obligation to allow borrowers to have the right to prepay. Therefore, the borrowers' repudiation claims were not time-barred, because the cause of action would not accrue until the government dishonors its obligation to accept the prepayment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62275:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62286:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62286:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine requires radio and television broadcasters to present a balanced and fair discussion of public issues on the airwaves. The doctrine is composed of two primary requirements concerning personal attacks in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing. The FCC conditioned its renewal of broadcast licenses on compliance with its regulations. Red Lion Broadcasting challenged the application of the fairness doctrine with respect to a particular broadcast. In a companion case (United States v. Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA)), the fairness doctrine's requirements concerning any broadcast were challenged.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62286:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62286:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62286:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that the fairness doctrine was consistent with the First Amendment. Writing for the Court, Justice White argued that spectrum scarcity made it \"idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.\" The Court held that the FCC's fairness doctrine regulations enhanced rather than infringed the freedoms of speech protected under the First Amendment. With respect to the regulation of personal attacks made in the context of public issue debates, the FCC's requirement that the subject of the attack be provided with a tape, transcript, or broadcast summary, as well as an opportunity to respond without having to prove an inability to pay for the \"air-time,\" insured a balanced and open discussion of contested issues. The requirement that political editorializing be presented for and against both sides of the debated issues also contributed to the balanced discussion of public concerns.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62286:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62301:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62301:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA federal grand jury indicted Sila Luis for her alleged role in a Medicare fraud scheme that involved giving kickbacks to patients who enrolled with her home healthcare companies. Because federal law allows the government to file a pretrial motion to restrain the assets of defendants accused of particular types of fraud, including substitute assets not directly related to the fraud, the government did so in this case. Luis objected to the motion and argued that she needed those funds in order to pay for her criminal defense lawyer, and therefore granting the motion would violate her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The district court granted the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62301:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62301:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62301:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe pretrial restraint of assets untainted by the crime that are needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered an opinion for the four-justice plurality, which held that the fundamental nature of the right in question prohibits the government from undermining the defendant’s ability to be represented by the counsel of his choice that he can afford. While it is important that the defendant’s assets be available to pay penalties, the assets in question are untainted by the crime, which means that they remain firmly in the lawful possession of the defendant. The government does not have a sufficiently substantial interest to provide the legal authority to restrain them. Because the defendant’s interest in being able to afford counsel of his or her choice outweighs any interest the government may have in ensuring the defendant has assets to pay criminal penalties, the government’s pretrial restraint of assets untainted by the crime that are needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment. The Court held that this decision was in line with Sixth Amendment and forfeiture jurisprudence, and creates a workable line between tainted and untainted assets.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the text of the Sixth Amendment clearly implies the right to use lawful property to pay for counsel of choice. Without that implication, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be meaningless, and constitutional rights must also protect related acts necessary to their exercise. Additionally, common law has historically limited the pretrial restraint of assets to those tainted by the crime, which further supports this reading of the Sixth Amendment and provides an easily administrable line. Justice Thomas also argued that the plurality’s balancing test was unnecessary to reach this conclusion.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court’s holding allows defendants to protect assets that might be needed to provide the victim with adequate restitution. Especially in cases that involve fungible assets, it is important to allow the government to restrain such assets, in the same manner that it may be important to restrain the defendant. In holding otherwise, the Court goes against forfeiture precedent and asserts a Sixth Amendment right to spend forfeitable assets that lacks a firm basis in precedent. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that, according to precedent, as long as the government has established probable cause to believe that it will eventually recover the assets, the defendant cannot use those assets to pay for counsel of choice. The distinction between tainted and untainted assets is meaningless prior to a judgment of guilt, and therefore the government has the same right to restrain either type.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62301:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62302:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62302:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2011, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a redistricting plan based on the results of the 2010 census. Several of the districts consisted of de-facto non-contiguous segments—discrete segments that would be wholly unconnected but for one or two narrow strips connecting the two—often with largely inconsistent demographics between the two large segments. The plaintiffs were a group of citizens who sued the Chair of the Maryland State Board of Elections (Board) and the State Administrator of the Board and argued that the new districting plan violated their rights to political association and equal representation under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires that a complaint be plausible on its face and enable the court to draw a reasonable inference of misconduct. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and held that the complaint did no more than imply the mere possibility of misconduct. Therefore, the case did not go before a three-judge panel, as the Three-Judge Court Act requires for cases dealing with congressional districts unless the claim is determined to be insubstantial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62302:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62302:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62302:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that a claim covered by the Three-Judge Court Act must be heard by a three-judge panel. The text of the Act requires that any covered claim be heard by a three-judge panel and does not grant an individual district court judge the discretion to decide otherwise. A district court judge may only decide whether the claim is one that the Three-Judge Court Act covers and may not make any judgments on the merit of the case. The Court also held that the question of whether a claim is “insubstantial” is a jurisdictional one addressing whether the district court can hear the case, and not a question of whether the lawsuit failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Especially for constitutional claims, the “insubstantial” barrier is a high one, and the claim in this case should not have been dismissed as insubstantial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62302:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62306:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62306:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDollar General Corporation (Dollar General) operates a store on land held in trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (Tribe). The store operates pursuant to a lease and business license agreement with the Tribe. In the spring of 2003, John Doe, a 13-year-old member of the Tribe alleged that he was sexually molested by the store manager, Dale Townsend, while he was working at the store as part of an internship program that the Tribe runs and in which the Townsend agreed to participate.\nIn 2005, Doe sued Townsend and Dollar General in tribal court. Both defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the tribal court denied the motions. The Choctaw Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motions by finding that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Montana v. United States, which allowed a tribe to regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter into a consensual arrangement with the tribe, applied in this case. The defendants then sued the Tribe in federal district court and sought injunctions to stop the suit in tribal court. The district court granted the injunction for Townsend but not for Dollar General because the company had failed to carry its burden to show that the Montana decision did not apply in this case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62306:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62306:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62306:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an unsigned per curiam opinion, the equally divided Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62306:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62307:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62307:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral prisoners housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU) of the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, which is for gang-affiliated and other disruptive inmates, sued Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials and claimed that SMUs violated the Eighth Amendment. Because SMUs housed gang-affiliated prisoners, the petitioners argued that the SMUs were unconstitutionally violent and dangerous because the BOP officials did not separate members of rival gangs. The prisoners moved to proceed in forma pauperis, which would allow them to waive filing fees. The parties then engaged in extensive back-and-forth filings regarding the collection of filing fees and the ability of other prisoners to join in the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act prevented the prisoners from completely waiving filing fees, and that they instead must pay a percentage of their monthly income to cover filing fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62307:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62307:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62307:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe filing fee requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) is assessed on a per-case, rather than per-prisoner, basis. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that, for each case a prisoner filed, the PLRA requires simultaneous payment of filing fees. Because the PLRA generally refers to cases individually and provides instructions for each case, the per-case approach is a better reading of the statute that also comports with the PLRA’s goal of deterring frivolous claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62307:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62308:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62308:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Federal Power Act (FPA) grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) the authority to regulate the wholesale interstate transmission and sale of electric power. In 2011, FERC promulgated a rule that established uniform compensation levels for suppliers of demand-side resources that meet certain conditions, including cost-effectiveness as measured by a net benefits test. The rule’s stated purpose was to incentivize retail customers to reduce electricity consumption when it was economically efficient to do so. Various state regulatory agencies, trade associations, publicly owned utilities, transmission owners, and other industry groups requested a rehearing on the rule and argued that it conflicted with FERC’s efforts to promote a competitive market as well as FERC’s statutory mandate to avoid unjust and discriminatory rates. FERC confirmed the rule, and the industry groups petitioned for review in federal court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC did not have the statutory authority to directly regulate the retail market and that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because FERC did not adequately consider and respond to the arguments made in opposition to the rule.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62308:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62308:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62308:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Federal Power Act (FPA) grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) the authority to regulate wholesale market operators’ compensation for reduction in electricity consumption, and the rule in question was not arbitrary and capricious. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the rule in question regulates wholesale market operators’ payments for demand response commitments, which affects the wholesale market at large and is therefore within FERC’s authority pursuant to the FPA. The rule does not regulate retail markets, which the FPA reserves for the states to regulate. The contrary view would prevent FERC from effectively regulating the wholesale market, which would contradict the express purpose of the FPA. The Court also held that, because FERC examined all the the relevant considerations, articulated a satisfactory reason for its decision, and there was a rational connection between the facts and the choice made, the rule it implemented was not arbitrary and capricious. FERC also responded to the reasonable alternatives that were advanced and offered explanations for why those alternatives were not chosen. Therefore, FERC met its duty of “reasoned judgment.”\nJustice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the rule at issue falls outside of the authority the FPA grants to FERC. The plain language of the FPA only allows FERC to regulate wholesale activity. Because the demand-response bidders that the rule in question regulates do not resell energy to other customers, they are not wholesalers and therefore the FPA does not allow FERC to regulate them. Additionally, the rule in fact interferes with retail prices in a manner that the FPA expressly forbids. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62308:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62309:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62309:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAbigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas but was denied. She did not qualify for Texas' Top Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to the top ten percent of every in-state graduating high school class. For the remaining spots, the university considers many factors, including race. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the University’s admissions process was constitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the Supreme Court, which held that the appellate court erred by not applying the strict scrutiny standard to the University’s admission policies. The case was remanded, and the appellate court reaffirmed the lower court’s decision by holding that the University of Texas’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process was sufficiently narrowly tailored to the legitimate interest of promoting educational diversity and therefore satisfied strict scrutiny.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62309:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62309:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62309:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe University of Texas’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 4-3 majority. The Court held that the University of Texas’ use of race as a factor in the holistic review used to fill the spots remaining after the Top Ten Percent Plan was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Previous precedent had established that educational diversity is a compelling interest as long as it is expressed as a concrete and precise goal that is neither a quota of minority students nor an amorphous idea of diversity. In this case, the Court determined that the University of Texas sufficiently expressed a series of concrete goals along with a reasoned explanation for its decision to pursue these goals along with a thoughtful consideration of why previous attempts to achieve the goals had not been successful. The University of Texas’ plan is also narrowly tailored to serve this compelling interest because there are no other available and workable alternatives for doing so.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment categorically prohibits the use of race as a consideration in a higher education admissions process. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that majority’s decision was too deferential to the University of Texas’ determination that its use of race in the admissions process was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest and that the majority failed to properly apply strict scrutiny. Because the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was enacted at least in part to prevent the government from treating individuals as merely components of racial class, race-based classifications, regardless of their purpose must be subject to the strictest level of constitutional scrutiny. In this case, the University of Texas’ use of race in its admissions policy cannot withstand strict scrutiny because the University’s interest is not sufficiently clearly defined and therefore judicial review to determine whether the policy is narrowly tailored is impossible. Even if it were, the goal of demographic diversity could only feasibly be achieved using impermissible quotas for racial balancing that are based on stereotypes. Justice Alito also argued that the use of racial preferences is unnecessary to achieve the goal of diversity because the admissions process could use a race-neutral holistic review based on life experiences that would achieve the same effect. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.\nJustice Elena Kagan did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62309:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62310:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62310:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1986, Timothy Tyrone Foster, an 18-year-old black man, was charged with murdering Queen White, an elderly white woman. At the trial, the prosecution used peremptory strikes against all four of the qualified black jurors. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits the use of peremptory strikes on the basis of race, the defense objected to those strikes, and the burden shifted to the prosecution to prove that there were race-neutral explanation for the strikes. The prosecution provided reasons, and the trial court held that the reasons were sufficient. An all-white jury convicted Foster of murder and imposed the death penalty.\nFoster filed a motion for post-judgment discovery regarding the prosecution’s notes during jury selection and a motion for a new trial, both of which the trial court denied. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Foster petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Butts County Superior Court and submitted a new Batson challenge based on the prosecutor's notes obtained through the Georgia Open Records Act. The court denied Foster's petition. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the writ. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62310:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62310:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62310:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe evidence was sufficient to establish that there was purposeful discrimination of the type that Batson v. Kentucky prohibits in the jury selection process of Foster’s trial. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the third step of a Batson challenge, which requires the defendant to show that the strikes of prospective jurors based on race was purposeful discrimination, was clearly met in this case, and the state court erred in finding otherwise. Although the prosecutor offered a long list of reasons those jurors were struck, the evidence from the prosecution’s notes that Foster obtained through the Georgia Open Records Act shows that the first five names on the prosecution’s “definite NOs” list were of five black jurors, all of whom were eventually struck. Therefore, the evidence shows that the prosecution was never seriously considering allowing the prospective jurors in question to serve, and the reasons for striking them were likely pretextual. Further, the fact that several white jurors with the same traits as the black jurors in question were allowed to serve on the jury, the prosecution’s explanations for striking the jurors in question shifted over time, there were misrepresentations of the record to support the strikes, and the prosecution notes continually highlighted race lend credible support to Foster’s argument that he suffered purposeful discrimination.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Georgia courts’ decisions to deny Foster’s Batson challenge was likely based on state law restricting the opportunity to relitigate previously rejected claims. Because the U.S. Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to review state court decisions on state law claims, the proper course of action in a case like this one would be for the Court to decide the relevant question of federal law that influenced the state court’s decision and remand the case to allow the state court to decide the issue in light of the Supreme Court’s clarification.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Supreme Court likely did not have proper jurisdiction over this case because the state courts seemed to base their decisions on issues of procedural state law. Therefore, the Court should have vacated the lower decision and remanded for clarification regarding whether the state court’s decision implicated an issue of federal law before deciding this case. Justice Thomas also argued that, because the trial court’s decision was essentially a credibility determination, the majority should have granted more deference to that decision, which the new evidence did not invalidate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62310:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62313:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62313:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLiberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) operates a self-insured employee health plan through a third-party administrator. Vermont state law requires that all health plans, including self-insured plans, file reports containing claims data and other information with the state. The statute specifies what type of information is required and how it is transmitted. When Vermont subpoenaed claims data from the third-party administrator, Liberty Mutual sued the state and argued that the reporting requirements of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted the Vermont statute. The district court found in favor of the state and held that ERISA did not preempt the Vermont statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that ERISA preempted the state statute because the state statute’s requirements were connected to the ERISA requirements and therefore were preempted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62313:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62313:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62313:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe reporting requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempt a Vermont state statute regarding reporting requirements as applied to a self-insured employee health plan. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the preemption clause of ERISA was meant to be construed broadly, and precedent has established that ERISA preempts a state law when the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the operation of the state law or when the state law interferes with nationally uniform plan administration. Because ERISA contains various recordkeeping, disclosing, and reporting requirements that are integral aspects of ERISA, the Vermont state statute interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that, while the majority’s opinion follows precedent regarding ERISA preemption, that preemption jurisprudence is possibly becoming impermissibly broad. In future cases, the Court may have to address the question of whether the Constitution allows such broad federal preemption of state laws. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he emphasized that ERISA preemption avoids the potential of having different reporting requirements in each state. However, if a state needs information beyond what ERISA requires, it can request authorization through the Secretary of Labor.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that Vermont’s statute serves a different purpose than the ERISA reporting requirements and therefore should not be preempted. While ERISA’s reporting requirements allow the Secretary of Labor to examine plan management and solvency, the Vermont statute is concerned with how residents obtain health care and how effective it is. Because the state statute does not impose burdens on plan management that effectively dictate the plans’ administration, preemption is not required. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62313:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62314:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62314:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCalifornia law allows unions to become the exclusive bargaining representative for the public school employees of that district and therefore have a great deal of influence over a wide range of conditions of employment. Once a union is the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district, it may establish an “agency shop” arrangement, which means that a school district may require a public school employee to either join the union or pay the equivalent of dues to the union in the form of a “fair share service fee.” Because the First Amendment prohibits unions from compelling nonmembers to support activities that are not exclusively devoted to negotiations, contract administration, and other duties as an exclusive bargaining representative, unions must send notices to all nonmembers laying out the breakdown of the chargeable and nonchargeable portions of the fee. To avoid paying for the nonchargeable portion of the fee, a nonmember must affirmatively opt out each year.\nPetitioners are a group of public school employees who sued the California Teachers Association and other similar organizations as well as school districts and argued that the agency shop arrangement and the opt-out requirement violated the First Amendment. The district court held that precedent upholding those practices precluded its judgment on the issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62314:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62314:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62314:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an unsigned per curiam opinion, the equally divided Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62314:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62315:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62315:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2012, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for the state legislative districts based on the results of the 2010 census. Wesley Harris and other individual voters sued the Commission and alleged that the newly redrawn districts were under-populated in Democratic-leaning districts and over-populated in Republican-leaning ones, and therefore that the Commission had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commission argued that the population deviations were the result of attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The district court found in favor of the Commission and held that the redrawn districts represented a good faith effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62315:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62315:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62315:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAlthough the desire to gain advantage for one political party over another does not justify deviating from absolute equality of districts, doing so for “legitimate considerations,” such as to achieve compliance with the Voting Rights Act, does not violate the “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the Constitution permits deviations from the baseline “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they are based on “legitimate considerations” intended to effectuate “rational state policy.” Such considerations include, but are not limited to, traditional interests in compactness and contiguity, as well as maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions and the competing balance among political parties. In previous decisions, some members of the Court have also expressed the view that complying with the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits redistricting plans that effectively disenfranchise minorities, is a legitimate consideration. Precedent has also established that, while deviations of more than 10% may be presumed to represent invidious discrimination, deviations of less than 10% must be shown to be the result of illegitimate considerations, and such evidence was not present in this case. Instead, the evidence shows that the deviations resulted from the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission’s good faith effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act, which was in effect at the time the plan was created.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62315:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62316:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62316:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVarious policies, regulations, and statutes of the federal government are intended to promote small businesses, especially those run by veterans. Although agencies generally have wide discretion to decide what method of contracting to use, a 2003 amendment to the Small Business Act established a goal of awarding three percent of government contracts to service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses, and the Veterans Act of 2006 expanded the reach of the relevant provisions.\nKingdomware Technologies is a small business owned and controlled by a service-disabled veteran and has been certified as such by the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA). In 2012, Kingdomware filed a bid for a project, but the VA awarded the contract to a company that was not a veteran-owned business. Kingdomware filed a bid protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and argued that the contract award was illegal. The GAO issued a recommendation that the VA cancel the contract and re-solicit bids. The VA refused to accept the recommendation, and Kingdomware sued in U.S. Court of Federal Claims, which held that there was sufficient ambiguity in the relevant statute and that the VA’s interpretation was reasonable, so therefore the contract award should stand. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62316:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62316:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62316:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court had jurisdiction to address the merits of the case even if the contracts had already been performed, and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ “set-aside” for veteran-owned businesses is mandatory. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that, while a case would generally be moot when there is no actual controversy that a court can resolve by granting relief, there is an exception for controversies that are capable of repetition but evade review. Such controversies are those that are often so short in duration that they are difficult to litigate and there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action. Because this case presents such a controversy, the Court can examine the merits of the case. On the merits, the Court held that the Department of Veterans Affairs must award a contract to a veteran-owned small business when there is a reasonable expectation that two or more such businesses will offer reasonable bids for the contract, even when the Department will otherwise meet its minimum contracting goals for the year. The plain language of the relevant text of the Veterans Act of 2006, which established guidelines for contracting with veteran-owned businesses, makes it clear that this rule for contracting is mandatory, not discretionary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62316:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62317:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62317:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn June 2010, undercover federal agents conducted an operation in which Avondale Lockhart ordered a number of videos containing child pornography. When the agents ostensibly delivered the ordered videos, they executed a search warrant and discovered over 15,000 images and at least nine videos depicting child pornography on Lockhart’s computer. Lockhart was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography, and he pled guilty. Lockhart had previously been convicted in state court of first-degree sexual abuse due to an incident involving his adult girlfriend. Based on this previous conviction, the pre-sentencing report for Lockhart’s child pornography sentencing recommended that Lockhart be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. Lockhart argued that the mandatory minimum did not apply to him because the previous sexual offense did not involve a minor. The district court rejected Lockhart’s argument and held that the mandatory minimum sentence applied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62317:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62317:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62317:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA prior conviction of “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse” may trigger a mandatory minimum sentence even when the prior conviction did not involve a minor. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the “last antecedent rule” of statutory interpretation dictates that a limiting clause following a list of terms or phrases only modifies the one that directly precedes it. Although that presumption may be overcome, there is no indication that the presumption is meant to be overcome in this case. The context of the mandatory minimum sentencing section indicates that Congress intended to mirror the language of Chapter 109A of the Federal Criminal Code, the subdivisions of which map onto the language in question with only the third of the group being limited to sexual abuse involving a minor. Additionally, when ambiguity can be resolved through basic grammatical analysis, there is no reason to apply other canons of statutory construction.\nJustice Elena Kagan wrote a dissent in which she argued that an ordinary understanding of language dictates that, unless the elements of a series are so disparate that the modifier would not make sense if applied to all of them, a modifier of a series should be applied to all parts of the series. Because there is a “straightforward, parallel construction” that neatly encompasses all parts of the sentence and comports with common usage, that interpretation should override the last antecedent rule. Justice Kagan also argued that the legislative history supported the reading of the text as being limited to sexual abuse involving minors, and even if there were no clear indications of what Congress intended, the rule of lenity states that the Court should side with the defendant when the canons of construction do not resolve the ambiguity. Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62317:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62318:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62318:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBetween 1995 and 2004, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (Menominee Tribe) provided healthcare services to members of the tribe pursuant to a self-determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). The self-determination contract states that the federal government will pay the participating tribe the amount that the government would have paid the Department of the Interior and HHS if those agencies were administering the program. The tribe and the government negotiate those costs in annual funding agreements.\nIn 2005, the Menominee Tribe filed administrative claims with the HHS’s Indian Health Service to recover contract support costs for the years 1995 through 2004. The claims were denied for the years 1996 through 1998 as untimely because the six-year statute of limitations had run. The Menominee Tribe challenged that decision in federal district court and argued that the statute of limitations should not have been running. The district court rejected the Menominee Tribe’s argument. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for further consideration, and the district court again held that the statute of limitations had run. The appellate court affirmed and held that there were no extraordinary circumstances that should have prevented the statute of limitations from running.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62318:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62318:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62318:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThere were no extraordinary circumstances in this case that would have prevented the statute of limitations from running. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that, because the Menominee Tribe was unable to prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances to prevent the statute of limitations from running, the appellate court properly affirmed the lower court’s ruling. In order to qualify for tolling of the statute of limitations, the Menominee Tribe must show that the circumstances delaying its actions were extraordinary and out of its control. The Court found that the Menominee Tribe did not file a claim because it was operating under the presumption that it need not file a claim at that point, which was a mistake rather than an extraordinary circumstance.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62318:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62319:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62319:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe plaintiffs are shareholders in Escala Group, Inc. (Escala), and the defendants are a group of financial institutions that engage in equity trading. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in state court and alleged that the defendants participated in the short selling of Escala stock, which increased the pool of tradeable shares by electronically manufacturing counterfeit shares, thereby causing the plaintiffs’ shares to decline in value and dilute their voting rights. The plaintiffs’ claims were based on state law, but the Amended Complaint repeatedly mentioned a 2004 regulation that was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and no parties dispute the fact that the claims included violations of federal law. The defendants sought to remove the case from state court to federal court based on the question of whether the federal court has jurisdiction over the state law issues. The plaintiffs sought to bring the case back to state court, and the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the plaintiffs’ motion. The district court disagreed, and the issue went to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court held that the case should properly be heard in state court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62319:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62319:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62319:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 creates the same test for establishing federal jurisdiction as the general test for whether a federal court has jurisdiction: Whether the case “arises under” federal law. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the text of the Securities Exchange Act that relates to jurisdiction should be interpreted as conferring the same jurisdiction as the general federal question statute because both the relevant language and judicial precedent support that reading. Although the language of the statutes are not identical, there is no indication that Congress intended for the courts to use a different test than the one that already existed. Additionally, the Court had previously rejected the more expansive reading for which the petitioners advocated and has traditionally read statutory grants of jurisdiction as not altering the usual balance of jurisdiction between state and federal courts.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the express language of the Securities Exchange Act provides the appropriate test. Under that Act, a suit that is “brought to enforce” Exchange Act requirements may be heard in federal court; therefore, if a claim depends on a breach of a statutory requirement, the Act grants federal jurisdiction. Applying this test in this case, Justice Thomas argued that the case was properly within state court jurisdiction rather than federal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62319:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62320:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62320:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Musacchio was the president of Exel Transportation Services (ETS), a transportation brokerage company that arranges freight shipments for business clients, until his resignation in 2004. In 2005, Musacchio founded Total Transportation Services (TTS), a competing company, and several ETS agents moved to the new company with him. Around the same time, the new president of ETS became suspicious when potential new agents were unexpectedly familiar with the terms of ETS contracts. He discovered that Musacchio and other TTS agents had been accessing ETS servers, so ETS sued TTS and the parties settled for $10 million.\nIn 2010, the government indicted Musacchio and other TTS agents on counts of conspiracy and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At trial, the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that the government had to prove more stringent elements than the statute actually requires, and the government did not object. After he was convicted, Musacchio appealed and argued that, by not objecting, the government acceded to the higher burden and failed to meet it. Musacchio also argued that one of the counts was barred by a statute of limitations, but he had not raised this defense at trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s instructional error did not become the law of the case when the government failed to object and that Musacchio waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it at trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62320:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62320:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62320:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe sufficiency of evidence should be measured against the elements of the statute rather than the elements laid out in the jury instructions, and a statute of limitations defense that is not raised at trial is not reviewable on appeal. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that the additional element added to the jury instruction did not affect the prosecution’s burden of proof because the sufficiency of evidence should be weighed against the elements of the charged crime, not the “erroneously” added element. Furthermore, the Court held that a statute of limitations objection cannot be raised during the appeal unless there is a clear error as to why it was not raised earlier in the trial. The Court held that no such error existed in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62320:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62321:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62321:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1999, Jorge Luna Torres, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of violating a New York state arson statute. In 2007, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued a notice charging Luna Torres with inadmissibility because he was an “alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.” Luna Torres applied for a cancellation of the removal order and the immigration judge held that Luna Torres was both removable as charged and ineligible for a cancellation of the removal order because he was a permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had previously held that a conviction under the New York state arson statute constituted an aggravated felony. Luna Torres appealed to the BIA and argued that the previous ruling should be reexamined. The BIA dismissed Luna Torres’ appeal, and Luna Torres petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to the oral argument before the appellate court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the BIA’s ruling and concluded that violation of the New York state arson statute did not constitute an aggravated felony because the state statute lacked the federal statute’s interstate commerce element. That decision conflicted with the interpretations of other circuit courts of appeals, and the appellate court in this case upheld the denial of Torres’ petition for cancellation of the removal order.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62321:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62321:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62321:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA state offense may constitute an aggravated felony for the purpose of the removal of a permanent resident when it includes all the elements of the federal statute, with the exception of the interstate commerce element. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the absence of a jurisdictional element is not material in determining whether the elements of a state crime correspond to those of a federal offense. Because the federal government can only punish felonies through one of its constitutionally enumerated powers, the jurisdictional element of a federal crime simply ties the substantive offense to Congress’ authority to punish it. State legislatures, however, do not need to do so. The relevant text of the Immigration and Naturalization Act clearly indicated that Congress intended for both federal and state offenses -- that lack the jurisdictional element -- to constitute aggravated felonies for the purpose of removal. Additionally, courts have traditionally treated the jurisdictional element of a crime as wholly distinct from the elements that make up the substantive offense. When courts determine whether a state offense is sufficiently similar to a federal one, the presumption is that Congress meant for the jurisdictional element of the federal offense to be set aside. In this case, because the only difference between the New York arson statute and the federal one is the jurisdictional element, the state statute was properly treated as an aggravated felony for the purpose of removal.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that, because there was an additional limiting element in the federal offense that was not a part of the state offense, the two were not the same for the purpose of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The plain language of the Act is specific to offenses described in the federal criminal code, and the defendant in this case was not convicted under such an offense. Justice Sotomayor also argued that the courts do not always consider the jurisdictional element of an offense as separate from the substantive ones, and therefore that was not the “well-settled approach” that the majority opinion argued it was. Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62321:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62322:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62322:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPeg Bouaphakeo and the rest of the plaintiff class are current and former employees of Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson) at the company’s meat-processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa. The employees worked on a “gang-time” system, which means they were paid only for time they were at their working stations and the production line was moving. The employees sued Tyson and argued that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law by not paying appropriate compensation for the time spent putting on and taking off protective clothing at the beginning and end of the work day and lunch break. The district court certified the class, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages of several million dollars.\nTyson appealed and argued that the district court erred in certifying the plaintiff class because factual differences among the plaintiffs made class certification improper. Tyson also argued that the class should be decertified because evidence presented at trial showed that some members of the class were not injured by the company’s actions and therefore had no right to damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification of the plaintiff class.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62322:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62322:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62322:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nDespite differences among class members, the class action was based under one question and therefore the class was properly certified. Additionally, although some class members who had not been injured would have no right to damages, the award had not yet been dispersed, so the district court can review the disbursement on remand. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the 6-2 majority, which held that the class members were joined under one common question, and that satisfies the requirements for a class action suit despite differences among the members. The case was remanded for the lower court to consider of the proper disbursement of the award.\nIn his concurring opinion, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote that the district court would be unable to appropriately distribute the $2.9 million award among the class members. The jury did not allocate the direct calculation of damages to unpaid overtime compensation and each plaintiff spent different amounts of time doffing and donning the protective clothing, so it would be extremely difficult to determine which plaintiffs are excluded from the award for lack of damages and the amount of the damages the other plaintiffs should receive. Justice Samuel A. Alito joined in the part of the concurrence that addressed the problems of allocating damages.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the district court erred in certifying the class action because the amount of time individual plaintiffs spent dealing with the protective clothing varied significantly. Some plaintiffs may not have been pushed over 40 hours a week and would not be owed damages. The awarded $2.9 million will be difficult to distribute among the 3344-members of the class action suit, and the district court should not have certified the class action suit. Justice Alito joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62322:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62323:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62323:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOBB Personenverkehr AG (OBB) is owned by OBB Holding Group, a joint-stock company created by the Republic of Austria to operate rail service within Austria. OBB is a member of the Eurail Group, an association organized under Luxembourg law to provide rail pass to non-European residents.\nIn March 2007, Carol Sachs purchased a four-day Eurail Pass from the Rail Pass Experts (RPE) website for travel in Austria and the Czech Republic. RPE is located in Massachusetts, and the pass Sachs purchased listed a series of disclaimers, including that the “issuing office is merely an intermediary of the carriers in Europe and assumes no liability resulting from the transport.” In April 2007, Sachs used her Eurail Pass in Innsbruck, Austria. While boarding the train, Sachs fell between the tracks, and her legs were crushed by the moving train; they had to be amputated above the knee. Sachs sued OBB in district court in California. OBB moved to dismiss and argued that it was entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), or alternatively, that there was a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on foreign-sovereign-immunity grounds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit originally affirmed but, upon rehearing en banc, later reversed and held that the commercial-activity exception of FSIA applied in this case because OBB was a common carrier owned by a foreign state that acted through a domestic agent to sell tickets to U.S. citizens and residents. Therefore, the district court did have subject-matter jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62323:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62323:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62323:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that a tort claim for personal injuries suffered in connection with travel outside of the United States was not “based upon” the sale of the ticket in the United States. Therefore, the lawsuit fell outside of the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and sovereign immunity barred the suit. According to the Court’s decision in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, the fact that the relevant commercial activity would establish a single element of the claim in question was not sufficient to prove that the claim was “based upon” the commercial activity. In this case, the conduct that gave rise to the lawsuit occurred entirely abroad and therefore was not “based upon” commercial activity in the United States sufficient to satisfy the commercial activity exception.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62323:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62324:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62324:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nValerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson’s husbands are the two members of PHC Development, LLC (PHC). Between 2005 and 2008, Community Bank of Raymore (Community) made four loans totaling more than $2,000,000 to PHC for the development of a residential subdivision. The Hawkins and Pattersons each executed personal guaranties to secure the loans. In April 2012, PHC failed to make the payments due under the loan agreements, and Community declared the loans to be in default, accelerated the loans, and demanded payment.\nHawkins and Patterson sued Community seeking damages and an order declaring their guaranties void and unenforceable. They argued that they had only been required to execute their guaranties because they were married to their respective husbands, which constituted discrimination based on their marital status in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). Community moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion by holding that the wives, in joining their husbands’ loans, did not apply to a lender and therefore did not qualify as applicants that gain the protections of the ECOA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62324:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62324:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62324:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an unsigned per curiam opinion, the equally divided Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62324:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62325:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62325:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSamuel Ocasio was a police officer of the Baltimore Police Department who was indicted in connection with a kickback scheme involving payments to police officers in exchange for referrals to Majestic Auto Repair Shop (Majestic). The indictment charged Ocasio with conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by agreeing to unlawfully obtain money or property under color of right from Majestic. The jury convicted Ocasio, and he appealed by arguing that he cannot be guilty of conspiring to commit extortion with the owners of Majestic because they were also the victims of the conspiracy, and the victim of a Hobbes Act conspiracy must be a person outside of the alleged conspiracy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ocasio’s conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62325:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62325:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62325:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA conspiracy to commit extortion can involve the purported victims of the extortion as members of the conspiracy. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that, under longstanding principles of conspiracy law, a defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof that he was conspiring to obtain property from another conspirator under color of law. Although conspirators have to be pursuing the same criminal objective, an individual conspirator need not agree to facilitate every element of the crime; the intent to agree that the substantive offense be committed is all that is necessary. The Court also held that this reading of the Hobbs Act is not overly broad because it still focused on the intent to commit the conspiracy.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the Supreme Court’s decision in Evans v. United States makes it difficult to draw a distinction between the involuntary action of paying a bribe and the voluntary behavior of joining a conspiracy.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court’s decision in Evans v. United States wrongly conflated bribery with extortion and that the majority’s opinion in this case continued that error. Under the Hobbs Act definition of extortion, people cannot conspire to extort one of their own because all those involved would know that the person accepting the money is not entitled to it. In her separate dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the majority opinion endorses an unnatural reading of the Hobbs Act, which clearly criminalizes extortion “from another.” Therefore, a conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act must still focus on a victim that is “other” than the conspiratorial group. This reading is also consistent with the Court’s conspiracy precedent, which focuses on the criminal behavior of the conspiratorial group as a whole. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62325:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62331:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62331:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Before Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, which created new courts, added judges, and gave the president more control over appointment of judges. The Act was essentially an attempt by Adams and his party to frustrate his successor, as he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new justices of the peace. The appointees were approved by the Senate, but they would not be valid until their commissions were delivered by the Secretary of State.\nWilliam Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, but his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the new Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents. Marbury, joined by three other similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the delivery of the commissions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62331:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62331:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62331:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court found that Madison’s refusal to deliver the commission was illegal, but did not order Madison to hand over Marbury’s commission via writ of mandamus. Instead, the Court held that the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 enabling Marbury to bring his claim to the Supreme Court was itself unconstitutional, since it purported to extend the Court’s original jurisdiction beyond that which Article III, Section 2, established.\nMarshall expanded that a writ of mandamus was the proper way to seek a remedy, but concluded the Court could not issue it. Marshall reasoned that the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution. Congress did not have power to modify the Constitution through regular legislation because Supremacy Clause places the Constitution before the laws.\nIn so holding, Marshall established the principle of judicial review, i.e., the power to declare a law unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62331:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62333:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62333:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1795, the Georgia legislature passed an act granting approximately 35 million acres of land in present-day Alabama and Mississippi to four companies, including the Georgia Company, for $500,000. The grant was procured through widespread bribery of legislators, with company representatives promising legislators shares in the land if they voted for the bill. In 1796, a newly elected Georgia legislature, responding to public outrage over the corruption, passed an act rescinding the 1795 grant, declaring it null and void, and directing that all records of the original act be expunged. However, before the rescinding act, innocent third parties had already purchased portions of the land. Robert Fletcher purchased 15,000 acres from John Peck in 1803, with Peck's deed containing covenants that Georgia had authority to sell the land and that the title had not been constitutionally impaired by any subsequent act of the legislature.\nFletcher subsequently sued Peck in the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging breach of these covenants based on the corruption in the original grant and Georgia's 1796 rescinding act. The circuit court ruled in favor of Peck on all counts, finding that the pleas were sufficient and that Georgia was seised in fee simple of the lands at the time of the original grant. Fletcher brought a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62333:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62333:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62333:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA state legislature cannot rescind a land grant made by a previous legislature, even if the original grant was obtained through corruption, because such a rescission would violate the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Chief Justice John Marshall authored the unanimous 4-2 majority opinion of the Court.\nThe Contract Clause prohibits states from passing any law \"impairing the Obligation of Contracts,\" and a land grant from a state to private purchasers constitutes a binding contract that vests absolute property rights in the grantees. Once Georgia conveyed the land through the 1795 act, it created a contract that transferred complete ownership to the purchasers, and the state's rights to the property were entirely extinguished. The fact that the original grant may have been procured through bribery or corruption does not change this constitutional protection, as innocent third-party purchasers who bought the land without knowledge of the corruption have legitimate vested rights that cannot be destroyed by subsequent legislative action.\nFurthermore, the Constitution's Contract Clause applies to contracts made by states themselves, not just private contracts, and states cannot exempt themselves from this constitutional limitation by claiming sovereign authority. While legislatures generally have broad powers to repeal their own acts, they cannot undo a completed contract that has already conveyed property rights, as this would retroactively destroy vested interests in violation of fundamental principles of law and the constitutional protection of contracts. The 1796 rescinding act was therefore void as an unconstitutional impairment of contract obligations.\nJustice William Johnson authored a concurring opinion, agreeing with the result but basing his reasoning on general principles of law rather than specifically on the Contract Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62333:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62335:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62335:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring the American Revolution, Virginia created laws allowing the state to seize property of Loyalists. In 1781, Denny Martin, a British subject, inherited land from his uncle, a Loyalist. The following year, the Virginia legislature voided the land grant and transferred the land back to Virginia. Virginia granted a portion of this land to David Hunter. A federal treaty dictated that Lord Fairfax was entitled to the property.\nThe Virginia Supreme Court upheld Virginia's law permitting the confiscation of property, even though it conflicted with the federal treaty. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the treaty superseded state law under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. On remand, the Virginia Court of Appeals declined to follow the ruling and argued that the law granting the Supreme Court appellate review over state court decisions, section 25 of the Judiciary Act (the Act), was unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62335:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62335:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62335:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Article VI of the US Constitution (the Supremacy Clause), combined with the grant of appellate jurisdiction in Article III, gives federal courts the power to review state court decisions that interpret federal law or the Constitution.\nThe Court rejected the claim that Virginia and the national government were equal sovereigns. Relying on the Supremacy Clause, Justice Story held that federal interpretations of federal law should supersede state interpretations. He reasoned that there should be uniform and predictable outcomes across all states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62335:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62336:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62336:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. The state appeals court held that the Second Bank was unconstitutional because the Constitution did not provide a textual commitment for the federal government to charter a bank.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62336:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62336:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62336:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to incorporate the bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the national government employed in the execution of constitutional powers.\nPursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause (Art. I, Section 8), Chief Justice Marshall noted that Congress possessed powers not explicitly outlined in the U.S. Constitution. Marshall redefined “necessary” to mean “appropriate and legitimate,” covering all methods for furthering objectives covered by the enumerated powers. Marshall also held that while the states retained the power of taxation, the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme and cannot be controlled by the states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62336:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62337:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62337:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College-- a privately funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed suit against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62337:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62337:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62337:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Contract Clause (Art 1, Section 10, Clause 1) prohibits states from violating contracts with private or public corporations. In a 5-to-1 decision, the Court concluded that the Contract Clause applies to private as well as public corporations. The Court held that the College's corporate charter qualified as a contract between private parties, with which the legislature could not interfere. The fact that the government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term \"contract\" referred to transactions involving individual property rights, not to \"the political relations between the government and its citizens.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62337:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62339:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62339:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final arbiters of disputes between the states and the national government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62339:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62339:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62339:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review state criminal proceedings. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Court was bound to hear all cases that involved constitutional questions, and that this jurisdiction was not dependent on the identity of the parties in the cases. Marshall argued that state laws and constitutions, when repugnant to the Constitution and federal laws, were \"absolutely void.\" After establishing the Court's jurisdiction, Marshall declared the lottery ordinance a local matter and concluded that the Virginia court was correct to fine the Cohens brothers for violating Virginia law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62339:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62345:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62345:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn September 1831, Samuel A. Worcester and others, all non-Native Americans, were indicted in the supreme court for the county of Gwinnett in the state of Georgia for \"residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation without a license\" and \"without having taken the oath to support and defend the constitution and laws of the state of Georgia.\" They were indicted under an 1830 act of the Georgia legislature entitled \"an act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power by all persons, under pretext of authority from the Cherokee Indians.\" Among other things, Worcester argued that the state could not maintain the prosecution because the statute violated the Constitution, treaties between the United States and the Cherokee nation, and an act of Congress entitled \"an act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes.\" Worcester was convicted and sentenced to \"hard labour in the penitentiary for four years.\" The U.S. Supreme Court received the case on a writ of error.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62345:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62345:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62345:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court held that the Georgia act, under which Worcester was prosecuted, violated the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States. Noting that the \"treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union,\" Chief Justice Marshall argued, \"The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory in which the laws of Georgia can have no force. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.\" The Georgia act thus interfered with the federal government's authority and was unconstitutional. Justice Henry Baldwin dissented for procedural reasons and on the merits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62345:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62346:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62346:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBaltimore wharf owner John Barron alleged that construction by the city had diverted water flow in the harbor area. He argued that sand accumulations in the harbor deprived Barron of deep waters, which reduced his profits. He sued the city to recover a portion of his financial losses. The trial court awarded him $4,500 in damages, which the state appellate court struck down.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62346:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62346:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62346:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWriting for the unanimous Court, Chief Justice Marshall found that the limitations on government articulated in the Fifth Amendment were specifically intended to limit the powers of the national government. Citing the intent of the framers and the development of the Bill of Rights (the first 10 amendments) as an exclusive check on the federal government, Marshall reasoned that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in this case since the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to the states. This meant that Barron was not entitled to damages for his property loss from the city under the Fifth Amendment provision on just compensation for a government taking.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62346:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62349:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62349:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1785, the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Charles River Bridge Company to construct a bridge and collect tolls. In 1828, the legislature established the Warren Bridge Company to build a free bridge nearby. Unsurprisingly, the new bridge deprived the old one of traffic and tolls. The Charles River Bridge Company filed suit, claiming the legislature had defaulted on its initial contract.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62349:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62349:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62349:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-2 decision, the Court held that the state had not entered a contract that prohibited the construction of another bridge on the river at a later date. The Court held that the legislature neither gave exclusive control over the waters of the river nor invaded corporate privilege by interfering with the company's profit-making ability. In balancing the rights of private property against the need for economic development, the Court found that the community interest in creating new channels of travel and trade had priority.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62349:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62357:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62357:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott filed suit in Missouri court for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. After losing, Scott brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no “negro” or descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62357:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62357:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62357:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe majority held that “a negro, whose ancestors were imported into [the U.S.], and sold as slaves,” whether enslaved or free, could not be an American citizen and therefore did not have standing to sue in federal court. Because the Court lacked jurisdiction, Taney dismissed the case on procedural grounds.\nTaney further held that the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was unconstitutional and foreclose Congress from freeing slaves within Federal territories. The opinion showed deference to the Missouri courts, which held that moving to a free state did not render Scott emancipated. Finally, Taney ruled that slaves were property under the Fifth Amendment, and that any law that would deprive a slave owner of that property was unconstitutional.\nIn dissent, Benjamin Robbins Curtis criticized Taney for addressing the claim’s substance after finding the Court lacked jurisdiction. He pointed out that invalidating the Missouri Compromise was not necessary to resolve the case, and cast doubt on Taney’s position that the Founders categorically opposed anti-slavery laws.\nJohn McLean echoed Curtis, finding the majority improperly reviewed the claim’s substance when its holding should have been limited to procedure. He also argued that men of African descent could be citizens because they already had the right to vote in five states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62357:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62362:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62362:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLambden P. Milligan was sentenced to death by a military commission in Indiana during the Civil War for engaging in acts of disloyalty. Milligan sought release through habeas corpus from a federal court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62362:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62362:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62362:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWriting for the Court, Justice David Davis held that trials of civilians by presidentially created military commissions are unconstitutional. Specifically, it is unconstitutional to try civilians by military tribunals unless there is no civilian court available. The military commission therefore did not have jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan, and he was entitled to discharge.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62362:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62370:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62370:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLouisiana passed a law that restricted slaughterhouse operations in New Orleans to a single corporation. Pursuant to the law, the Crescent City Live-stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company received a charter to run a slaughterhouse downstream from the city. No other areas around the city were permitted for slaughtering animals over the next 25 years, and existing slaughterhouses would be closed. A group of butchers argued that they would lose their right to practice their trade and earn a livelihood under the monopoly. Specifically, they argued the monopoly created involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and abridged privileges or immunities, denied equal protection of the laws, and deprived them of liberty and property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62370:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62370:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62370:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the monopoly violated neither the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, reasoning that these amendments were passed with the narrow intent to grant full equality to former slaves. Thus, to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment only banned the states from depriving blacks of equal rights; it did not guarantee that all citizens, regardless of race, should receive equal economic privileges by the state. Any rights guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause were limited to areas controlled by the federal government, such as access to ports and waterways, the right to run for federal office, and certain rights affecting safety on the seas. Moreover, the Court held that the butchers bringing suit were not deprived of their property without due process of law because they could still earn a legal living in the area by slaughtering on the Crescent City Company grounds. Thus, the Court concluded that the Louisiana law was constitutional.\nJustice Stephen Johnson Field’s dissent argued that the Fourteenth Amendment could not be construed as only protecting former slaves. Rather, he believed that it incorporated strands of common-law doctrine and needed to be interpreted outside the Civil War context. This position would later become widely accepted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62370:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62372:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62372:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIllinois regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing maximum rates for their use.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62372:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62372:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62372:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo on both counts. Waite, for the Court, took a broad view of the state's police power. He argued that the states may regulate the use of private property \"when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good.\" Waite resurrected an ancient legal doctrine to support his view: \"When property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62372:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62373:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62373:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGeorge Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was charged with bigamy under the federal Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his previous wife. Reynolds argued that the law was unconstitutional. He reasoned that his religion required him to marry multiple women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62373:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62373:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62373:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court upheld Reynolds's conviction and Congress’s power to prohibit polygamy. The Court held that while Congress could not outlaw a belief in the correctness of polygamy, it could outlaw the practice thereof. The majority reasoned that while marriage is a “sacred obligation,” it is nevertheless “usually regulated by law” in “most civilized nations.” Finally, the Court held that people cannot avoid a law due to their religion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62373:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62377:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62377:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Civil Rights Act of 1875 affirmed the equality of all persons in the enjoyment of transportation facilities, in hotels and inns, and in theaters and places of public amusement. Though privately owned, these businesses were like public utilities, exercising public functions for the benefit of the public and, thus, subject to public regulation. In five separate cases, a black person was denied the same accommodations as a white person in violation of the 1875 Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62377:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62377:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62377:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nDifferentiating between state and private action, the majority ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not permit the federal government to prohibit discriminatory behavior by private parties. Thus, Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were unconstitutional because they exceeded Congress's authority under the Fourteenth Amendment by purporting to regulate the conduct of private individuals. The Court held the Act likewise exceeded Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment, which bars involuntary servitude and is restricted to prohibiting ownership of slaves, not other forms of discriminatory conduct.\nJustice Harlan advocated for a broader interpretation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. He pointed to the public function that these private places of accommodation serve. Harlan argued the line between state and private action is often blurred, such as how private railroads provide the government function of facilitating travel. He suggested that restrictions on the right to travel might violate the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude, and argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may also be implicated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62377:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62391:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62391:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant corporations controlling transportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed \"every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade\" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62391:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62391:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62391:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Act was constitutional but it did not apply to manufacturing. Manufacturing was not commerce, declared Fuller for the majority; the law did not reach the admitted monopolization of manufacturing (in this case, refining sugar). Although American Sugar had monopolized manufacturing, the Court found no violation of the Sherman Act because the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries involved intrastate commerce. The trust did not lead to control of interstate commerce and so \"affects it only incidentally and indirectly.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62391:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62394:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62394:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLouisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy – who was seven-eighths Caucasian – agreed to participate in a test to challenge the Act. He was solicited by the Comite des Citoyens (Committee of Citizens), a group of New Orleans residents who sought to repeal the Act. They asked Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a \"whites only\" car of a Louisiana train.\nThe railroad cooperated because it thought the Act imposed unnecessary costs via the purchase of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the whites-only car, he refused and was arrested.\nAt trial, Plessy’s lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62394:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62394:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62394:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the state law was constitutional. In an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, the majority upheld state-imposed racial segregation. Justice Brown conceded that the 14th Amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law, but held that separate treatment did not imply the inferiority of African Americans.\nIn short, segregation did not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination.\nIn dissent, John Marshall Harlan argued that the Constitution was color-blind and that the United States had no class system. Accordingly, all citizens should have equal access to civil rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62394:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62404:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62404:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe state of New York enacted a statute known as the Bakeshop Act, which forbid bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Lochner was accused of permitting an employee to work more than 60 hours in one week. The first charge resulted in a fine of $25, and a second charge a few years later resulted in a fine of $50. While Lochner did not challenge his first conviction, he appealed the second, but was denied in state court. Before the Supreme Court, he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should have been interpreted to contain the freedom to contract among the rights encompassed by substantive due process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62404:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62404:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62404:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court invalidated the New York law. The majority maintained that the statute interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court further held that the New York law failed the rational basis test for determining whether government action is constitutional. The majority reasoned that the Bakeshop Act had no rational basis because long working hours did not dramatically undermine the health of employees, and baking is not particularly dangerous.\nBroadly interpreting state authority to regulate under its police powers, Justice Harlan in his dissent articulated reasoning that would inform later decisions in the post-Lochner era. Rather than requiring the government to prove that a law had a rational basis, he would require the party challenging the law to prove that the test was not met. (This is the current rule.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62404:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62406:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62406:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOregon enacted a law that limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries. The owner of a laundry business, Curt Muller, was fined $10 when he violated the law. Muller appealed the conviction. The state supreme court upheld the law’s constitutionality.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62406:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62406:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62406:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court unanimously upheld the Oregon regulation. The Court distinguished Lochner v. New York, which invalidated a similar law restricting the hours of bakers, on the basis of the “difference between the sexes.” The Court reasoned that the child-bearing nature and social role of women provided a strong state interest in reducing their working hours.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62406:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62414:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62414:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice entered the home of Fremont Weeks and seized papers which were used to convict him of transporting lottery tickets through the mail. This was done without a search warrant. Weeks took action against the police and petitioned for the return of his private possessions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62414:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62414:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62414:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that the seizure of items from Weeks' residence directly violated his constitutional rights. The Court also held that the government's refusal to return Weeks' possessions violated the Fourth Amendment. To allow private documents to be seized and then held as evidence against citizens would have meant that the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring the right to be secure against such searches and seizures would be of no value whatsoever. This was the first application of what eventually became known as the \"exclusionary rule.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62414:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62420:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62420:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father -- Roland -- had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62420:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62420:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62420:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nDay spoke for the Court majority and found two grounds to invalidate the law. Production was not commerce, and thus outside the power of Congress to regulate. And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states. Day wrote that \"the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are reserved\" to the states and to the people. In his wording, Day revised the Constitution slightly and changed the intent of the framers: The Tenth Amendment does not say \"expressly.\" The framers purposely left the word expressly out of the amendment because they believed they could not possibly specify every power that might be needed in the future to run the government.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62420:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62423:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62423:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. The leaflets urged the public to disobey the draft, but advised only peaceful action. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating this law and appealed on the grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62423:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62423:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62423:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the Espionage Act did not violate the First Amendment and was an appropriate exercise of Congress’ wartime authority. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concluded that courts owed greater deference to the government during wartime, even when constitutional rights were at stake. Articulating for the first time the “clear and present danger test,” Holmes concluded that the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent. Holmes reasoned that the widespread dissemination of the leaflets was sufficiently likely to disrupt the conscription process. Famously, he compared the leaflets to falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theatre, which is not permitted under the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62423:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62424:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62424:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1918, the United States participated in a military operation on Russian soil against Germany after the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated literature calling for a general strike in ammunition plants to undermine the US war effort. The defendants were convicted for two leaflets thrown from a New York City window. One denounced the sending of American troops to Russia, and the second denounced the war and advocated for the cessation of the production of weapons to be used against \"Workers Soviets of Russia\". They were sentenced to 20 years in prison.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62424:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62424:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62424:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that in calling for a general strike and the curtailment of munitions production, the leaflets violated the Espionage Act. Congress’ determination that all such propaganda posed a danger to the war effort was sufficient to meet the standard set in Schenck v. United States for prosecuting attempted crimes. As in Schenck, the Court emphasized that protections on speech are lower during wartime.\nIn a dissenting opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that the First Amendment protects the right to dissent from the government’s viewpoints and objectives. Protections on speech, he continued, should not be curtailed unless there is a present danger of immediate evil, or the defendant intends to create such a danger. The evidence in this case consisted of two leaflets, which he concluded did not meet the “clear and present danger” test.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62424:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62435:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62435:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62435:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62435:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62435:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The unanimous Court held that \"the fundamental liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62435:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62436:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62436:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1919 for distributing a “Left Wing Manifesto\" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under New York’s Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterances without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The appellate division affirmed his conviction, as did the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in that state.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62436:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62436:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62436:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Edward Sanford, the Court concluded that New York could prohibit advocating violent efforts to overthrow the government under the Criminal Anarchy Law. Citing Schenck and Abrams, the Court reasoned the government could punish speech that threatens its basic existence because of the national security implications. Despite the small scale of Gitlow’s actions, the majority was not persuaded that they were too insignificant to have an impact.\nThe Supreme Court previously held, in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), that the Constitution's Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government. Gitlow partly reversed that precedent and established that while the Bill of Rights was designed to limit the power of the federal government, the incorporation principle allows it to be applied to states.\nIn dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held that Gitlow had not violated the clear and present danger test used in Schenck. Since Gitlow’s call to action was abstract and would not resonate with a large number of people, Holmes concluded that there was not sufficient imminence to warrant punishing the speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62436:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62445:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62445:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoy Olmstead was a suspected bootlegger. Without judicial approval, federal agents installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead's building (where he maintained an office) and in the streets near his home. Olmstead was convicted with evidence obtained from the wiretaps. This case was decided along with Green v. United States, in which Green and several other defendants were similarly convicted, based on illegally obtained wire-tapped conversations, for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, and selling illegal liquors. This case was also decided with McInnis v. United States.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62445:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62445:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62445:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. The Court held that neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment rights of the recorded parties were violated. The use of wiretapped conversations as incriminating evidence did not violate their Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination because they were not forcibly or illegally made to conduct those conversations. Instead, the conversations were voluntarily made between the parties and their associates. Moreover, the parties' Fourth Amendment rights were not infringed because mere wiretapping does not constitute a search and seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. These terms refer to an actual physical examination of one's person, papers, tangible material effects, or home - not their conversations. Finally, the Court added that while wiretapping may be unethical no court may exclude evidence solely for moral reasons. When criticized for his opinion, Justice Taft mocked his foes as he wrote to a friend: \"If they think we are going to be frightened in our effort to stand by the law and give the public a chance to punish criminals, they are mistaken, even though we are condemned for lack of high ideals.\" This case was reversed by Katz v. U.S. (1967).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62445:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62447:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62447:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford accused local officials of being implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. The law provided that any person \"engaged in the business\" of regularly publishing or circulating an \"obscene, lewd, and lascivious\" or a \"malicious, scandalous and defamatory\" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually issued from the trial court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62447:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62447:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62447:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion authored by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, the Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was facially unconstitutional, meaning the decision was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not the specific context of this case. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. (The majority used the incorporation doctrine to apply the rights granted under the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.) The Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. In some situations, such as when speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets, the government might be able to justify a prior restraint.\nJustices Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland dissented in an opinion written by Justice Butler.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62447:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62449:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62449:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNine black youths -- described as, \"young, ignorant, and illiterate\" -- were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. This case was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62449:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62449:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62449:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. Though Justice George Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, he repeatedly implicated that guarantee. This case was an early example of national constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62449:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62457:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62457:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress allowed the President to regulate certain industries by distributing authority to develop codes of conduct among business groups and boards in those industries. The Act did not provide standards for the President or the business groups in implementing its objectives. When Schechter Poultry Corp. was indicted for violating a business code governing the poultry industry in New York City, it argued that the law was an unconstitutional violation of the non-delegation doctrine.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62457:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62457:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62457:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion authored by Chief Justice Hughes, the unanimous Court held that the Act was \"without precedent\" and was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The President cannot be allowed to have unbridled control to make whatever laws he believes to be necessary to achieve a certain goal. The law did not establish rules or standards to evaluate industrial activity, meaning Congress failed to provide the necessary guidelines for the implementation of this functionally legislative process.\nJustice Cardozo wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Stone.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62457:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62459:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62459:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under. Authority to determine which crops would be affected was granted to the Secretary of Agriculture. He decided that one of the crops should be cotton, and Butler received a tax claim as a receivers of the Hoosal Mills Corp., a cotton processor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62459:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62459:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62459:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion written by Justice Roberts, the majority declared the Act unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate and control agricultural production, an arena reserved to the states. Congress’ Spending Power (Article I, Section 8) is restricted to situations in which it is being used for the general welfare of the people. Agricultural production historically lies beyond the authority of the federal government to regulate. Although Congress does have the power to tax and appropriate funds, in this case those activities were \"but means to an unconstitutional end.” That is, Congress was using the spending power as an enforcement mechanism to control activity that was completely within the authority of the states. Thus, the Act violated the Constitution.\nJustice Stone wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62459:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62463:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62463:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, a weapons manufacturer, sold fighter planes and bombers to Bolivia during the Chaco War, during which Paraguay and Bolivia contested control of a semi-arid region. This violated a Joint Resolution of Congress and a proclamation issued by President Roosevelt, which banned U.S. weapons manufacturers from aiding either side of the war. Challenging its indictment, Curtiss-Wright argued that Congress had violated the non-delegation doctrine in allowing the executive branch to make decisions that were properly left to the legislature.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62463:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62463:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62463:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, the majority upheld the Joint Resolution. The Court reasoned that the federal government could not exceed its enumerated powers regarding internal issues but had a much broader scope of discretion in foreign affairs. Because \"the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation,\" Congress may provide the President with a special degree of discretion in external matters which would not be afforded domestically. Roosevelt thus had the discretion to determine what impact a certain policy might have on foreign affairs and make decisions accordingly, even had Congress not authorized him.\nJustice McReynolds authored a dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62463:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62465:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62465:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry set a minimum wage of $14.50 for each work week of 48 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received an amount less than this wage. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law. In ruling for the hotel, the lower court relied on Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923), in which the Court struck down a minimum wage law for working women.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62465:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62465:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62465:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Court held that the establishment of minimum wages for women was constitutional. Echoing Muller v. Oregon (1908), the majority ruled that the state may use its police power to restrict the individual freedom to contract. The decision overruled Adkins and marked the Court's departure from the expansive view of the freedom to contract. The decision is generally regarded as having ended the Lochner era, a period in American legal history in which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legislation aimed at regulating business.\nWhile Justice Hughes wrote the opinion, the stark doctrinal shift resulted from Justice Owen Josephus Roberts changing his perspective on this issue. According to Hughes, President Franklin Roosevelt's reelection in 1936 and the impressive achievements of the New Deal caused Roberts to abandon his affiliation with the Court's conservative justices.\nIn dissent, Justice George Sutherland implicitly criticized Roberts for changing sides and argued that politics and public opinion should not impact the Court’s understanding of the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62465:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62466:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62466:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWith the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, Congress determined that labor-management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and, thus, could be regulated by the national government. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. the country’s fourth largest steel producer, with discriminating against employees who were union members.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62466:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62466:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62466:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion written by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the majority found that companies cannot discriminate against employees for exercising their fundamental right to unionize. The Court upheld the Act, reasoning that it was narrowly constructed so as to regulate industrial activities which had the potential to restrict interstate commerce. The majority stated that any significant effect (direct or indirect) on interstate commerce allows Congress to regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause. While the manufacturing process or relationships between labor and management may not have a direct impact on the flow of goods, they have an aggregate impact on commerce. In this case, the potential secession of manufacturing activity due to conflicts between management and labor could potentially impede interstate commerce. However, Hughes carefully limited the opinion to exclude situations in which an activity had such an inconsequential or remote impact on interstate commerce that it exclusively impacted local matters.\nIn dissent, Justice McReynolds questioned Congress's enhanced power under the Commerce Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62466:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62469:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62469:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrank Palko had been charged with first-degree murder. He was convicted instead of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won a new trial; this time the court found Palko guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62469:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62469:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62469:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court upheld Palko's second conviction. In his majority opinion, Cardozo formulated principles that were to direct the Court's actions for the next three decades. He noted that some Bill of Rights guarantees--such as freedom of thought and speech--are fundamental, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause absorbed these fundamental rights and applied them to the states. Protection against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right. Palko died in Connecticut's electric chair on April 12, 1938.\nIn Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Court expressly overruled its decision in Palko.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62469:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62475:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62475:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAn Arkansas federal district court charged Jack Miller and Frank Layton with violating the National Firearms Act of 1934 (\"NFA\") when they transported a sawed-off double-barrel 12-gauge shotgun in interstate commerce. Miller and Layton argued that the NFA violated their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62475:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62475:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62475:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual the right to keep and bear a sawed-off double-barrel shotgun. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice James Clark McReynolds reasoned that because possessing a sawed-off double barrel shotgun does not have a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of such an instrument.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62475:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62480:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62480:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNewton Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door-to-door and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti-Catholic message. Cantwell and his sons were arrested and charged with: (1) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the public, and (2) inciting a common-law breach of the peace.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62480:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62480:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62480:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held the Cantwells’ actions were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for the Court, Justice Owen Roberts reasoned that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of \"free communication of views.\" The Cantwells' message, while offensive to many, did not threaten \"bodily harm\" and was protected religious speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62480:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62481:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62481:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1935, Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from Pennsylvania public schools for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses and believed that saluting the flag was forbidden by the Bible. They argued the expulsions violated their First Amendment rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62481:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62481:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62481:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an 8-to-1 decision, the Court upheld the mandatory flag salute. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter he relied primarily on the \"secular regulation\" rule, which weighs the secular purpose of a nonreligious government regulation against the religious practice it makes illegal or otherwise burdens the exercise of religion. The Court held that the state's interest in \"national cohesion\" was \"inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values,\" and that national unity was \"the basis of national security.\" Frankfurter wrote that the school district's interest in creating national unity was enough to allow them to require students to salute the flag.\nThe Court declined to make itself “the school board for the country.”\nJustice Harlan Stone dissented, writing that the “very essence of the liberty” guaranteed by the Constitution “is the freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say.” Stone’s position soon became the majority; the decision was reversed in 1943 in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62481:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62483:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62483:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to regulate many aspects of employment, including minimum wages, maximum weekly hours, and child labor. When a lumber manufacturer, Darby, shipped lumber out of state, he was arrested for violating the FLSA. His charges were dismissed because the federal district court found that FLSA was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the FLSA’s potential effects on intrastate activities violated the Commerce Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62483:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62483:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62483:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe unanimous Court upheld the FLSA. Relying heavily on the Court's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Justice Stone affirmed the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, which \"can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power.\" The Court held that the purpose of the FLSA was to prevent states from using substandard labor practices to their own economic advantage by interstate commerce. Congress acted with proper authority in outlawing substandard labor conditions since they have a significant impact on interstate commerce.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62483:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62489:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62489:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn a public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing literature that supported his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness and attacked more conventional forms of religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal \"a God-damned racketeer\" and \"a damned Fascist.\" He was arrested and convicted under a state law that prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is lawfully in a street or public area. On appeal, Chaplinsky argued that the law violated the First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62489:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62489:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62489:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWriting for a unanimous Court, Justice Frank Murphy upheld Chaplinsky’s conviction. The Court identified certain categorical exceptions to First Amendment protections, including obscenities, certain profane and slanderous speech, and \"fighting words.\" He found that Chaplinsky's insults were “fighting words” since they caused a direct harm to their target and could be construed to advocate an immediate breach of the peace. Thus, they lacked the social value of disseminating ideas to the public that lay behind the rights granted by the First Amendment. A state can use its police power, the Court reasoned, to curb their expression in the interests of maintaining order and morality.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62489:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62490:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62490:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBetts was indicted for robbery in Maryland. He was unable to afford counsel and requested one be appointed for him. The judge in the case denied the request, and Betts subsequently pled not guilty. He was convicted of robbery, which he eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued he was wrongfully denied his right to counsel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62490:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62490:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62490:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Owen Roberts, the majority ruled Betts did not have a constitutional right to counsel. The Court reasoned that while the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits an unfair trial, the amendment does not embody “an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.” The majority opinion concluded that indigent defendants need only be provided with a lawyer under special circumstances.\nJustice Black dissented, arguing that denial of counsel based on financial stability makes it so that those in poverty have an increased chance of conviction, which violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.\nThis decision was overruled in 1963 in Gideon v. Wainwright.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62490:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62493:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62493:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFilburn was a small farmer in Ohio who harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Filburn was penalized under the Act. He argued that the extra wheat that he had produced in violation of the law had been used for his own use and thus had no effect on interstate commerce, since it never had been on the market. In his view, this meant that he had not violated the law because the additional wheat was not subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62493:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62493:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62493:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA unanimous Court upheld the law. In an opinion authored by Justice Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate prices in the industry, and this law was rationally related to that legitimate goal. The Court reasoned that Congress could regulate activity within a single state under the Commerce Clause, even if each individual activity had a trivial effect on interstate commerce, as long as the intrastate activity viewed in the aggregate would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. To this extent, the opinion went against prior decisions that had analyzed whether an activity was local, or whether its effects were direct or indirect.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62493:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62497:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62497:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school activities. The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform the salute and were sent home from school for non-compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools used for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62497:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62497:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62497:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. In an opinion written by Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the First Amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion on any topic, and national symbols like the flag should not receive a level of deference that trumps constitutional protections. He argued that curtailing or eliminating dissent was an improper and ineffective way of generating unity.\nJustices Black and Douglas concurred to repudiate their earlier opinions in First Amendment decisions.\nJustice Frankfurter dissented. He believed the Court was exceeding the scope of the judicial role and was taking on a legislative function in striking down the law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62497:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62500:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62500:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1942, Congress enacted the Emergency Price Control Act to control commodity prices and prevent inflation during wartime. This case is the consolidation of two cases in which the defendants were tried and convicted in district court on several counts of selling wholesale cuts of beef at prices above the maximum prices set by the Revised Maximum Price Regulation under the Act. During the trial, the district court overruled all motions regarding the validity of the Regulation and the Act, including questions of whether the Act deprived the defendants of their Fifth Amendment rights to due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62500:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62500:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62500:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, yes. Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that Congress sufficiently regulated the powers of the Administrator of the Act in such a way as to be a constitutional delegation of legislative power to obtain a particular objective. The Constitution grants Congress the necessary flexibility to perform its legislative function in a variety of ways. Because the regulations and standards are specific enough to ensure that the enforcement of the Act is conforming to the congressional intent behind it, it is constitutional. The Court also held that, because the Act establishes a procedure for redress for those who feel they have been wronged by the Act, it does not violate due process.\nJustice Owen J. Roberts wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Act unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Administrator of the Act. Because the standards set by the Act leave many decisions up to the judgment of the Administrator, they cannot be sufficiently overseen by Congress. He also argued that the standard for review of the regulations relies too heavily on the Administrator to be impartial, as it is the Administrator who sets the regulations in the first place. In his dissent, Justice Wiley B. Rutledge argued that the way in which Congress conferred jurisdiction over the Act onto state and federal courts while creating a separate system for the redress of wrongs was unconstitutional. He wrote that Congress cannot require a court to enforce regulations without allowing the court to consider their constitutional validity. Such a piecemeal approach to due process denies the defendants their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Justice Frank Murphy joined in the dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62500:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62502:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62502:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, the U.S. government decided to require Japanese-Americans to move into relocation camps as a matter of national security. President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, two months after Pearl Harbor. A Japanese-American man living in San Leandro, Fred Korematsu, chose to stay at his residence rather than obey the order to relocate. Korematsu was arrested and convicted of violating the order. He responded by arguing that Executive Order 9066 violated the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Korematsu's conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62502:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62502:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62502:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion written by Justice Black, the Court ruled that the evacuation order violated by Korematsu was valid. The majority found that the Executive Order did not show racial prejudice but rather responded to the strategic imperative of keeping the U.S. and particularly the West Coast (the region nearest Japan) secure from invasion. The Court relied heavily on a 1943 decision, Hirabayashi v. U.S., which addressed similar issues. Black argued that the validation of the military's decision by Congress merited even more deference.\nJustice Frankfurter concurred, writing that the “martial necessity arising from the danger of espionage and sabotage” warranted the military’s evacuation order.\nJustice Jackson dissented, arguing that the exclusion order legitimized racism that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62502:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62511:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62511:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools. 96% of the private schools who benefitted from this law were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62511:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62511:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62511:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. Justice Black reasoned that the law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was rather enacted to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school.\nJustices Jackson, Frankfurter, Rutledge, and Burton dissented.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62511:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62515:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62515:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe case tested the principle of \"released time\", where public schools set aside class time for religious instruction. The Champaign County Board of Education authorized a program in which outside religious teachers hired by private third parties provided weekly religious instruction in public schools. The classes were not mandatory. McCollum, an atheist, complained that her son was ostracized for not attending the classes. McCollum eventually sued the school board in 1945, arguing that the religious instruction in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62515:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62515:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62515:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion written by Justice Black, the majority held that program violated the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council violated the constitutionally-required separation of church and state. Because pupils were required to attend school and were released in part from this legal duty if they attended the religious classes, the Court found that the Champaign system was \"beyond question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups and to spread the faith.\"\nIn his lone dissent, Justice Stanley Forman Reed objected to the majority’s broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62515:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62517:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62517:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1911, a St. Louis, Missouri neighborhood enacted a racially restrictive covenant designed to prevent African-Americans and Asian-Americans from living in the area. In 1945, an African-American family (the Shelleys) moved into the neighborhood. Louis Kraemer brought suit to enforce the covenant and prevent the Shelleys from moving into their house. A similar lawsuit arose in Detroit, Michigan. Both state supreme courts enforced the covenants because they were private rather than state action. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62517:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62517:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62517:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Fred Vinson, the Court held that standing alone, racially restrictive covenants do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Private parties may abide by the terms of such a covenant, but they may not seek judicial enforcement of such a covenant, as that would be a state action. Thus, the enforcements of the racially restrictive covenants in state court violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62517:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62524:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62524:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJulius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, and Betty Fulton were charged with conspiracy to perform an abortion. At trial, Wolf objected to evidence material and admissible as to his co-defendants would be inadmissible if he were tried separately. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all three convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a federal court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62524:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62524:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62524:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the states to specific limitations and that illegally obtained evidence did not have to be excluded from trials in all cases. The Court reasoned that while the exclusion of evidence may have been an effective way to deter unreasonable searches, other methods could be equally effective and would not fall below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause. Civil remedies, such as \"the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion,\" were sufficient.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62524:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62527:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62527:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. State law restricted access to the university to blacks, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62527:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62527:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62527:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. The Court found that the \"law school for Negroes,\" which was to have opened in 1947, would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. The Court argued that the separate school would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty, course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62527:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62531:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62531:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating the violent overthrow of the US government and for the violation of several points of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist reforms claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights. Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62531:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62531:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62531:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-2 decision, the Court upheld the convictions of the Communist Party leaders and found that the Smith Act did not \"inherently\" violate the First Amendment. In the plurality opinion, the Court held that there was a distinction between the mere teaching of communist philosophies and active advocacy of those ideas. Such advocacy created a \"clear and present danger\" that threatened the government. Given the gravity of the consequences, the Court held that success or probability of success was not necessary to justify restrictions on the freedom of speech.\nJustices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in separate opinions.\nJustices Black and Douglas dissented in separate opinions. Justice Black stressed that the petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the Government or any overt acts designed to overthrow the Government. They were not even charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date. “No matter how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62531:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62535:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62535:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn April of 1952, during the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills. This was done in order to avert the expected effects of a strike by the United Steelworkers of America.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62535:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62535:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62535:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the President to take possession of private property. The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that \"the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62535:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62547:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62547:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPete Hernandez, an agricultural worker, was indicted for the murder of Joe Espinoza by an all-Anglo (white) grand jury in Jackson County, Texas. Claiming that Mexican-Americans were barred from the jury commission that selected juries, and from petit juries, Hernandez' attorneys tried to quash the indictment. Moreover, Hernandez tried to quash the petit jury panel called for service, because persons of Mexican descent were excluded from jury service in this case. A Mexican-American had not served on a jury in Jackson County in over 25 years and thus, Hernandez claimed that Mexican ancestry citizens were discriminated against as a special class in Jackson County. The trial court denied the motions. Hernandez was found guilty of murder and sentenced by the all-Anglo jury to life in prison. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that \"Mexicans are...members of and within the classification of the white race as distinguished from members of the Negro Race\" and rejected the petitioners' argument that they were a \"special class\" under the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the court pointed out that \"so far as we are advised, no member of the Mexican nationality\" challenged this classification as white or Caucasian.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62547:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62547:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62547:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects those beyond the two classes of white or Negro, and extends to other racial groups in communities depending upon whether it can be factually established that such a group exists within a community. In reversing, the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment \"is not directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory'\" but in this case covers those of Mexican ancestry. This was established by the fact that the distinction between whites and Mexican ancestry individuals was made clear at the Jackson County Courthouse itself where \"there were two men's toilets, one unmarked, and the other marked 'Colored Men and 'Hombres Aqui' ('Men Here'),\" and by the fact that no Mexican ancestry person had served on a jury in 25 years. Mexican Americans were a \"special class\" entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.\nAbstract submitted by Professor Marc S. Rodriguez", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62547:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62548:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62548:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case was the consolidation of cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington D.C. relating to the segregation of public schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They argued that such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief in the lower courts based on Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that racially segregated public facilities were legal so long as the facilities for blacks and whites were equal. (This was known as the “separate but equal” doctrine.)", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62548:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62548:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62548:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSeparate but equal educational facilities for racial minorities is inherently unequal, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nChief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that “separate but equal” facilities are inherently unequal and violate the protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the segregation of public education based on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the education and personal growth of African American children. Warren based much of his opinion on information from social science studies rather than court precedent. The decision also used language that was relatively accessible to non-lawyers because Warren felt it was necessary for all Americans to understand its logic.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62548:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62549:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62549:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe D.C. Board of Education denied a petition by a group of parents in Anacostia to racially integrate John Phillip Sousa Junior High School. The following year, in 1950, the parents sought admission to the all-white school for 11 African-American children. When the request was again denied by the Board, a Howard University law professor brought a lawsuit. The claim was dismissed by the trial court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62549:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62549:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62549:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Fifth Amendment's guarantee of \"liberty\" protected by due process also guaranteed racial equality in public education in the District of Columbia.\nIn a unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court found that racial discrimination in the public schools of Washington, DC, denied blacks due process of law as protected by the Fifth Amendment. Noting the legal peculiarities of DC, Justice Warren recognized that the Fifth Amendment (which applied to the District) did not contain an Equal Protection Clause, while the Fourteenth Amendment. Lacking an equal protection standard to invalidate the District's segregation, Warren creatively relied on the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of \"liberty\" to find the segregation of the Washington, DC, schools unconstitutional.\nThe Supreme Court decided this case on the same day as Brown v. Board of Education, which overshadowed it. Its most important legacy is the concept of reverse incorporation and the application of the same anti-discrimination principles to state and federal governments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62549:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62577:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62577:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJack Abbott and other prisoners were denied access to publications that Richard Thornburgh, the U.S. Attorney General at the time, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP) deemed to be detrimental to penological interests. FBP regulations allow publications that may pose a threat to the security and discipline of prisons or that promote criminal activity to be rejected. Material cannot be rejected based on its political, philosophical, or distasteful nature, and prison officials have the burden of showing why the restriction was necessary and how the denied material was detrimental to penological interests. Abbott and others sued and argued that the restriction on certain publications violated their First Amendment rights. The district court held that prisons had a right to deny access to certain publications and that prison wardens must be given broad discretion in their duties to maintain the security of the prison, but their discretion must not limit the prisoners’ First Amendment right more than what is necessary to protect the government’s penological interests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the prison officials had the burden of showing how the denied material is detrimental to penological interests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62577:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62577:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62577:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that there is a substantial penological interest in denying access to certain publications because it is necessary to maintain the security and order of the prison. However, the limitation on the prisoners’ First Amendment rights must be no greater than what is necessary to the preserve the penological interest. Therefore, the Federal Bureau of Prisons may deny access to publications that include threats to security of the prison or may incite violence among prisoners.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that, while “penological interests” may be highly ambiguous, prison officials often require broad discretion to “prevent internal disorder.” Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62577:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62579:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62579:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District, which was already majority African-American, and increased the percentage of African-American voters in the district. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the plan was submitted to the Department of Justice for preclearance, which was granted. On October 2, 2013, plaintiffs sued the defendants in their official capacities and argued that Virginia’s Third Congressional District was racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ruled that the districting plan was unconstitutional because its use of race as a factor was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.\nThe defendant Commonwealth of Virginia did not appeal; instead, ten members of Congress, who had intervened in the case at the trial level, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. In that case, the Court held that the Voting Rights Act does not require a legislature to maintain a particular minority number percentage in creating a districting plan, but rather it requires that the legislature maintain a minority’s ability to elect a candidate of choice. In considering whether a districting plan is unconstitutional, courts must examine whether racial considerations predominated over nonracial ones in determining which voters to place in which district. On remand, the district court again determined that the Third Congressional District was unconstitutional because racial considerations predominated in creating the plan.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62579:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62579:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62579:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe appellants did not have standing to appeal this case to the Supreme Court under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the appellants in this case, ten members of Congress who had intervened in the case at the trial level, did not have standing to appeal because they do not meet the requirements for standing under Article III -- an injury in fact that is directly traceable to the conduct at issue and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Although ten members of Congress initially intervened, by the time the case reached oral argument at the Supreme Court, only three claimed to have standing. Of those, one determined that he would run for office regardless of the new plan, and therefore did not suffer an injury in fact. The other two appellants were unable to produce evidence that their chances of reelection would be significantly impaired by the new districting plan and therefore did not meet their burden to establish that they suffered an injury sufficient to have standing under Article III.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62579:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62580:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62580:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDavid Anthony Taylor was a member of the “Southwest Goonz,” a group of robbers based in Roanoke, Virginia, that focused on robbing drug dealers, who typically have drug proceeds in their home and are reluctant to report crime. Taylor was indicted on two counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce. At Taylor’s second trial, after his first resulted in a hung jury, the government moved to prevent Taylor from offering evidence that robbing a drug dealer who grows marijuana outside of state lines does not affect interstate commerce and therefore cannot violate the Hobbs Act. The district court granted the government’s motion, and Taylor was subsequently convicted of both counts under the Hobbs Act. Taylor moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the government did not present sufficient evidence that his actions affected interstate commerce. The district court denied Taylor’s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62580:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62580:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62580:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a prosecution for robbery under the Hobbs Act, the commerce element is satisfied when the government shows that the defendant robbed a drug dealer of drugs or drug proceeds. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that “commerce” under the Hobbs Act is defined broadly as all interstate commerce over which the federal government has jurisdiction. Precedent has established that the federal government can regulate intrastate economic activity that has substantial effects on interstate commerce, and although the sale of drugs is illegal under federal law, it is still an economic activity; therefore Congress can regulate purely intrastate drug theft. The government does not need to prove that the defendant’s specific action affected interstate commerce as long as the affected activity does so in the aggregate.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority’s opinion went too far in expanding Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Because Congress does not have the power to regulate robbery by itself, it can only do so when such regulation is “necessary and proper” to carrying out one of Congress’ enumerated powers, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce. Commerce Clause jurisprudence has established that Congress may also regulate activities that bear an “obvious, simple, and direct” relationship to regulating interstate commerce. While a robbery might fit this criteria, not every robbery would. Therefore, in order to regulate robbery under the Hobbs Act, the government must prove that the robbery in question affected interstate commerce. To hold otherwise would rid the government of its burden in a criminal case to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62580:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62581:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62581:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSaul Molina-Martinez pleaded guilty to being in the United States illegally following deportation proceedings that stemmed from his felony convictions. The district court accordingly sentenced Molina-Martinez to 77 months in prison, pursuant to the sentencing range established in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for his criminal history category. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, prior sentences are counted as a single sentence if they were imposed on the same day unless the offenses in question were separated by an intervening arrest. Molina-Martinez’s prior offenses were not separated by an intervening arrest, so when his probation officer calculated his criminal history points and concluded that they placed him in category VI, he erred; Molina-Martinez should properly have been placed in category V, which carries a lower sentencing range of 70-87 months. Molina-Martinez appealed his sentence on the grounds that the district court erred in sentencing him based on the incorrect criminal history category. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, despite the error in calculation, Molina-Martinez failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights and therefore affirmed his conviction and sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62581:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62581:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62581:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIf a defendant shows that the court mistakenly applied a higher sentencing range to his sentence, his substantial rights are affected. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the unanimous court. The Court held that, when appellate courts review errors in the application of the Sentencing Guidelines, the defendant is not required to identify “additional evidence” to show that he received an incorrect sentence. Nothing in the Guidelines themselves, the relevant precedent, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governing appellate review of such an error requires that a defendant make a showing of prejudice beyond showing that the error occurred. By requiring more from the defendant, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit failed to properly account for the crucial rule the Guidelines play in the sentencing process and the dynamics of sentencing, which often leaves the defendant without any of the evidence the Fifth Circuit would require.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that, while a court’s use of an incorrect Sentencing Guideline range is sufficient evidence that the defendant’s substantial rights were affected, Guideline error issues should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Justice Alito argued that the majority opinion should not have speculated about the future effects of Guideline errors. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62581:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62582:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62582:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) and alleged that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering enterprise in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. The European Community claimed that Colombian and Russian criminal organizations imported illegal drugs into European countries, where they produced revenue in euros that was then laundered back into the currency of the criminal organizations’ home countries while the euros were sold to cigarette importers at a discounted rate to purchase RJR’s cigarettes. The lawsuit alleged that RJR controlled this operation and in the course of executing it committed various violations of the RICO statute as well as violations of New York state law. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion based on the presumption the U.S. statutes did not apply extraterritorially absent express Congressional intent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that claims under the RICO statute can apply extraterritorially when the RICO claim is a violation of a predicate statute that Congress clearly intended to apply extraterritorially.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62582:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62582:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62582:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSections of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute can apply extraterritorially because they rebutted the presumption against extraterritoriality and expressed a clear indication that Congress intended them to apply extraterritorially. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-0 majority. The Court held that some of the relevant substantive provisions of RICO applied extraterritorially because the text clearly defined certain racketeering offenses as ones that can occur outside of the United States. Therefore, the presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted for the RICO provisions that are based on predicate offenses that are explicitly extraterritorial. However, not every foreign enterprise would qualify; the foreign enterprise must affect or directly affect commerce involving the United States for RICO to apply. The four-justice majority also held that RICO’s private right of action did not rebut the presumption of extraterritorially, and therefore a plaintiff must allege that there was a domestic injury in order for the lawsuit to proceed. In this case, because the plaintiffs waived their damages claims for domestic injuries, their remaining claims were based on injuries suffered abroad and should be dismissed.\nIn her opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting in the judgment, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that Congress’ intent for RICO to apply extraterritorially was clear because the text of the statute explicitly included offenses that encompass activities that could occur abroad. However, Justice Ginsburg also argued the private right of action was not limited to domestic injuries. RICO clearly allowed the government to sue based on injuries that occurred abroad, and there was no reason to read the private right of action differently. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting in the judgment. Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting in the judgment in which he argued that the U.S. government’s stance that allowing for recovery in U.S. courts for injuries that occurred abroad would create international friction did not hold up against the opposite argument from the European Community and its 26 member states.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62582:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62583:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62583:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRamon Nelson was riding his bike when he suffered a lethal blow to the back of his head with a baseball bat. After two eyewitnesses identified Lawrence Owens from an array of photos and then a lineup, he was tried and convicted for Nelson’s death. Because Nelson was carrying cocaine and crack cocaine potentially for distribution, the judge at Owens’ bench trial ruled that Owens was probably also a drug dealer and was trying to “knock [Nelson] off.” Owens was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years in prison.\nOwens filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that his constitutional right to due process was violated during the trial. He argued that the eyewitness identification should have been inadmissible based on unreliability and that the judge impermissibly inferred a motive when a motive was not an element of the offense. The district court denied the writ of habeas corpus, and Owens appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial and held that the trial judge’s inference about Owens’s motive violated his right to have his guilt adjudicated solely based on the evidence presented at trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62583:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62583:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62583:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAfter arguments, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62583:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62585:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62585:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUtah Detective Douglas Fackrell received an anonymous tip about drug sales in a South Salt Lake residence, so he surveyed the area over a short period of time and speculated there was drug activity taking place. Fackrell saw Edward Joseph Strieff, Jr. leaving the residence and stopped him for questioning. During the stop, Fackrell discovered Strieff had an outstanding warrant and arrested him. During the lawful search after his arrest, Fackrell found methamphetamine and a drug pipe on Strieff’s person. The district court ruled that, although Fackrell did not have enough evidence to conduct an investigatory stop, the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia obtained during the lawful search incident to arrest justified the admission of that evidence for trial. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that the evidence should have been suppressed because the warrant that was the basis for the arrest was discovered during an unlawful investigatory stop.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62585:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62585:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62585:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn the absence of flagrant police misconduct, the discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant attenuated (weakened) the connection between the unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence seized incident to the lawful arrest, which allowed the evidence to be used against the defendant. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protections should not be excluded from evidence when the costs of its exclusion outweighs its benefits. Exclusion is not justified when the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovered evidence is too attenuated. To determine whether the connection is attenuated, courts must examine the temporal proximity of the discovery of the evidence to the unconstitutional conduct, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the police misconduct. Based on the analysis of those factors, when a valid warrant is discovered after an unconstitutional investigatory stop, the connection between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence incident to a lawful arrest based on the warrant is sufficiently attenuated.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule was intended to prevent police officers from taking advantage of their own unconstitutional conduct, which was the case here. Because the initial unconstitutional stop was clearly calculated to procure further evidence, it was not an intervening circumstance that attenuated the connection between the misconduct and the discovery of evidence. Justice Sotomayor also argued that allowing the police such free rein essentially created a group of second-class citizens that could be subjected to police invasion of constitutional rights at a whim. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in all but the last portion of the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that the discovery of the evidence was too closely connected to the unconstitutional investigatory stop for the valid warrant to attenuate the connection. Because the two events were closely connected in time, the warrant itself was not an intervening circumstance, and the police conduct was purposeful and flagrant, the exclusionary rule should apply in cases like this one. Justice Ginsburg joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62585:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62586:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62586:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe plaintiffs, food distributors including Conagra Foods Inc. and Kraft Foodservice, sued Americold Logistics LLC and Americold Realty Trust (Americold) in state court for a breach of contract stemming from a dispute regarding liability for a warehouse fire. Americold sought to remove the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction because of the diversity of the trust’s board. No party challenged the propriety of the removal, and the district court addressed the case solely on its merits. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court found in favor of the defendant.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit raised the issue of potentially improper removal and asked the parties to submit briefs addressing the issue. The appellate court held that Americold did not meet its burden to demonstrate that diversity jurisdiction was appropriate because the inquiry must extend to the trust’s beneficiaries (who are its shareholders), not just the trustees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62586:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62586:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62586:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nFor the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of a trust is based on the citizenship of its members, which includes the shareholder-beneficiaries as well as the trustees. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, although precedent and statute allow corporations to be considered a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated for the purposes of jurisdiction, the same exception does not exist for other artificial legal entities. For those entities, the general rule has been that their citizenship is defined by that of their members. In a trust, the term “members” includes the beneficiaries of that trust as well as the trustees, and in Maryland, a real estate investment trust is an “unincorporated business trust or association” in which property is held and managed “for the benefit and profit of any person who may become a shareholder.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62586:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62587:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62587:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOmaha Tribal members attempted to enforce liquor licenses and taxes on local venders and clubs selling alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the owners of clubs and venues that sold alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska, joined by the state of Nebraska, sued for injunctive relief and argued that they are not located on federally-recognized Indian reservation land and therefore were not under the jurisdiction of the Omaha Tribe. The plaintiffs and defendants cross-filed for summary judgment, and the trial court found in favor of the defendants. The trial court held that Pender, Nebraska, was under the jurisdiction of tribal law because the U.S. Senate’s passage of an 1882 Act that allowed the Omaha tribe to sell allotments of its tribal land did not diminish the tribal boundaries of jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62587:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62587:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62587:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe passage of the 1882 Act did not diminish the Omaha Indian Reservation boundaries. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that only the clear intent of Congress can determine when tribal land is diminished. Because the 1882 Act only allowed for the tribe to sell plots of tribal lands to non-tribal members and there was no clear indication that Congress intended to diminish the reservation, the Omaha Tribe’s boundaries had not been diminished.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62587:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62588:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62588:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDeborah Peterson and a group of other plaintiffs were seeking to obtain judgments for injury or wrongful death during acts of terrorism by Iran. The Iran Central Bank (Bank Markazi) owned nearly $2 billion worth of bonds that were held in an account in New York City. Based on the Uniform Commercial Code, these assets were not considered assets of Bank Markazi, and therefore could not be attached by the plaintiffs and were immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.\nWhile this case was pending, Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 of which stated, “[T]he financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., shall be subject to execution...in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death caused by an act of [terrorism].” The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based on Section 8772. Bank Markazi argued that Section 8772 violated the United States’ separation of powers because the law was solely directed at this specific case. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and ordered the turnover of the assets. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62588:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62588:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62588:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA statute that effectively directs a particular result in a single pending case does not violate the separation of powers. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that Section 8772 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 did not violate the separation of powers by directing the distribution of funds to terrorist victims. The fact that Congress passed the act during litigation did not tread onto judiciary “turf”; instead, it only supplied a new law to be applied to undisputed facts. Rather than telling the judiciary branch what to do, Congress passed a law for the judiciary to interpret during the case itself, and therefore did not intrude on the judicial powers of Article III.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that Congress violated Article III by passing the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 because Congress is not allowed to “pick” the winners of court cases by applying statutes directed at those court cases during litigation. It is a violation of Article III for legislators to determine the outcome of judicial decisions. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62588:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62589:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62589:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Sturgeon regularly hunted on the Yukon-Charley River National Preserve (Yukon-Charley), which is part of the National Park Service (NPS), in Alaska. Sturgeon used a hovercraft to hunt. During one of his hunting trips, he was approached by three NPS enforcement employees and told that NPS regulations prohibited the operation of hovercrafts within all national parks, and therefore he was prohibited from using his hovercraft within the Yukon-Charley boundaries. Sturgeon insisted that the NPS did not have jurisdiction in the area because it was a state-owned river and subsequently sued Bert Frost, the director of the NPS for Alaska. Sturgeon claimed the NPS violated Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA) as applied to his use of hovercrafts on state-owned lands and waters because ANILCA limited the applicability of NPS regulations on land that is not federally owned.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62589:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62589:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62589:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 does not allow the National Park Service to regulate all land physically within the boundaries of the National Park System in Alaska. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of ANILCA would lead to inconsistent Park practices. The result of this interpretation would be that the Park Service may regulate “non-public” lands with national regulations, but it may not regulate Alaska-specific regulations to those lands.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62589:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62595:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62595:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJeffrey Heffernan was a police officer for the City of Paterson, New Jersey. A fellow police officer observed Heffernan picking up a campaign sign for the mayoral candidate running against the incumbent. When a supervisor confronted him, Heffernan claimed that he was not politically involved, could not vote in the city of Paterson, and was picking up the sign on behalf of his mother. Heffernan was demoted to a walking post because his actions were considered to be “overt involvement in political activities.” Heffernan sued the city of Paterson and claimed that the city had violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The city filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that, since Heffernan had not actually engaged in constitutionally protected speech, the City’s actions had not violated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment because there was no evidence Heffernan associated himself with the political candidate at issue. Heffernan admitted himself that he was not associated with the candidate, and therefore there is no evidence of a violation of his right to freedom of association. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62595:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62595:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62595:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA government employee who is demoted because of perceived involvement in protected political activity is entitled to challenge his demotion under the First Amendment even if the demotion was based on a factual mistake. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, although there was no First Amendment case that specifically addressed this issue, there was at least one precedential case in which the employer’s motive was what determined whether the action violated the employee’s First Amendment rights. Therefore, when an employer demotes an employee out of a desire the prevent or punish the employee for engaging in protected speech, that action violates the First Amendment, even if the employer made a factual mistake and no protected speech occurred. The Court also held that this rule tracks the language of the First Amendment because it focuses on the harm the government actor committed, which is the same whether or not the employer made a factual mistake, and does not alter the burden that an employee claiming a First Amendment violation must meet, which is to prove that the defendant had an improper motive.\nIn his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Constitution does not provide a cause of action when a plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated. The question of whether or not the employee engaged in constitutionally protected speech is the threshold question to determining whether the employer violated the employee’s constitutional rights by demoting the employee based on that speech. If the employee did not exercise his First Amendment rights, he has no claim based on the employer’s reaction to that speech. Even if the plaintiff is able to establish that the employer attempted to interfere with his constitutional right to speech, a factually impossible attempt does not establish liability. The plaintiff still has to prove that his First Amendment rights were actually violated, which the plaintiff in this case cannot do because everyone agreed that he never exercised his First Amendment rights in this case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62595:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62596:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62596:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTerrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence, and he filed three petitions under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, all of which were denied and the denials affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Williams also petitioned for federal habeas relief, which was denied. On his fourth petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, the state court determined that Williams had sufficiently demonstrated that there was governmental interference in his trial and granted the relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and lifted the stay of execution.\nThe Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at that point was Ronald Castille, who had been the District Attorney for Philadelphia throughout Williams’ trial, sentencing, and appeal, and who had personally authorized his office to seek the death penalty in this case. Prior to having his case heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Williams moved to have Chief Justice Castille recuse himself from this case. Chief Justice Castille refused to do so and ultimately joined the opinion that reversed the lower court’s grant of habeas relief and lifted the stay of execution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62596:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62596:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62596:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when a judge who was previously involved in the case as a prosecutor declined to recuse himself, regardless of whether that judge’s decision as part of a multi-member tribunal was dispositive. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that there was an impermissible of risk of bias that violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when a judge was previously involved in the case as a prosecutor who participated in crucial decisions about the case. Especially in the case of a former prosecutor, who likely made critical strategy decisions, the risk of improper, even if inadvertent, bias toward the position the prosecutor advocated for as a member of the adversarial process is so serious as to be unconstitutional. In this case, there is no doubt that the judge was involved in a critical decision as a prosecutor because he played a vital role in deciding to seek the death penalty, which is one of the most significant decisions a prosecutor can make. Additionally, because the deliberations of an appellate panel are confidential, it does not matter whether the potentially biased judge’s decision was dispositive, because it can be assumed that it at the very least influenced the outcome. Even the appearance of such influence undermines the crucial neutrality of the tribunal.\nIn his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote that the Due Process Clause is only violated when the judge is actually biased by his previous involvement in the case. In this case, there was no evidence that the judge in question had actually been involved in, or formed a decision on, the decision about whether the seek the death penalty, and therefore there was no “objective risk of actual bias” such that it was fundamentally unfair for him to hear the case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the rule in question should be less strict when the matter before the judge was different from what the judge worked on when he was involved in the case. In this case, the criminal conviction was not at issue; instead, the matter is a question of post-conviction relief, which is wholly different from what the judge was involved with as a prosecutor on the case. Justice Thomas argued that historical practice and precedent construe judicial disqualification narrowly and therefore did not require a judge who was involved in a criminal case to recuse himself from the post-conviction proceedings, which are a separate civil matter. Justice Thomas also noted that any concerns about potential bias should be addressed by state legislatures, not the Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62596:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62598:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62598:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2008, Luis M. Sanchez Valle was charged in federal for illegally trafficking in weapons and ammunition in interstate commerce and, on substantially the same facts, was charged with several violations of the Puerto Rico Weapons Act. After Sanchez Valle was convicted in federal court, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims under Puerto Rican law and argued that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy meant that he could not be prosecuted in Puerto Rico for the same offenses for which the federal court had already convicted him. The prosecution argued that, pursuant to the precedent the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico established in Puerto Rico v. Castro García, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico derive their authority from different sources and therefore can punish substantially the same offenses without implicating the constitutional protections against double jeopardy.\nThe trial court dismissed the charges against Sanchez Valle and held that he could not be indicted twice for the same offenses by the same sovereign entity, and because Puerto Rico and the United States both derive their authority from the United States Constitution, they are the same sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals consolidated this case with several others presenting the same question and held that, under current law, a person could punished for the same offenses in both federal and Puerto Rican court without implicating the protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed and held that the U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding double jeopardy was binding on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and therefore the Puerto Rico v. Castro García precedent was incorrect and the Puerto Rican charges against Sanchez Valle should be dismissed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62598:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62598:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62598:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe U.S. federal government and the Puerto Rican government are the “same sovereign” for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the concept of “sovereignty” as used in the Double Jeopardy Clause did not have its ordinary meaning, but rather deals with the question of whether the entities in question derive their authority from different sources. Based on this historical analysis, the Court determined that, while the states derived their sovereign power from a separate source than the federal government, territories do not. Although in many ways Puerto Rico functioned as a separate sovereign because the federal government had delegated much of its power to the people of Puerto Rico, the delegation further emphasizes the fact that historically the authority to govern Puerto Rico derived from the U.S. Constitution.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the double jeopardy protection should perhaps not be limited to prosecutions by the same sovereign and argued that the question of the extent of double jeopardy protections warranted further examination. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he disagreed with the Court’s approach to the sovereignty of Indian tribes.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority’s view of the U.S. Constitution as the source of Puerto Rico’s power to self-govern was an overly simplistic view of the role the Constitution played in creating the sovereignty of other entities, such as the states that were originally territories. Based on a more complex framework that takes into account customs, actions, and attitudes of different governmental entities, Puerto Rico was a separate sovereign entity for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62598:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62599:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62599:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Federal Power Act (FPA) was passed in 1935 to regulate interstate electricity sales. The FPA vested the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with authority over the transmission of electrical energy in interstate commerce and the wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. To this end, FERC has created regional transmission organizations, such as PJM Interconnection, LLC, (PJM) which regulates a large regional market that includes Maryland and the District of Columbia. Maryland became concerned that FERC actions were failing to adequately incentivize the construction of new plants, so the Maryland Public Service Commission began soliciting proposals for the construction of a new plant and instituted a Generation Order to regulate how the company that won the bid would interact with the rest of the energy market. Commercial Power Ventures Maryland, LLC, (CPV) won the bid. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, (PPL) and other existing power plants sued and argued that the Generation Order unconstitutionally interfered with the PJM-regulated market. The district court held that the Generation Order was preempted by the federal regulation of the energy markets pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. This case was consolidated with CPV’s suit against PPL and the other existing power plants.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62599:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62599:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62599:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Federal Power Act preempts state regulation that interferes with the national energy market, as the Generation Order does. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that federal law preempts state law when the state law is in an area that Congress has already extensively legislated or when the state law is an obstacle to the objectives of the federal law. In this case, the program at issue invades the regulatory space that Congress has granted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Although states may regulate in areas incident to FERC’s domain, states may not do so when their regulations intrude on FERC’s ability to regulate interstate wholesale rates. Because the program at issue in this case does so, federal law preempts it.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that preemption analysis in areas in which both the federal government and states collaboratively regulate must examine the purpose of the regulations at issue rather than “talismanic vocabulary.” Because the majority opinion properly looked to the purpose of the Federal Power Act and how the Maryland program interfered with it, Justice Sotomayor joined the majority’s opinion in full. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the issue of preemption in this case should be decided solely by examining the relevant text of the statutes in question rather than by looking at the broader doctrine of implied preemption, as the majority opinion did.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62599:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62601:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62601:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA jury found Fowler guilty of murder in the first degree. The trial judge imposed the mandatory sentence of death in the state's gas chamber. Fowler appealed his conviction and sentence. Both were affirmed. Fowler then attacked the mandatory imposition of his sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certioriari.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62601:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62601:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62601:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court deferred action in Fowler's case until it resolved the question of mandatory death sentences in five cases heard and decided in the 1975 Term. One of these cases was Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), which held that the mandatory imposition of the death sentence violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment prohibition of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following Woodson, the Court by memorandum vacated Fowler's mandatory death sentence and returned the case to the North Carolina for further proceedings. Fowler was resentenced to life in prison.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62601:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62603:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62603:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHalo Electronics, Inc. (Halo) and Pulse Electronics, Inc. (Pulse) are both suppliers of electronic components. Halo owns three patents regarding surface mount electronic packages; Pulse designs and sells surface mount electronic packages and does its manufacturing in Asia. In 2002, Halo unsuccessfully attempted to license their patents to Pulse. In 2007, Halo sued Pulse for patent infringement. The district court held that Pulse infringed on Halo’s patents with products shipped into the United States, had induced others to infringe on products delivered outside of the U.S. but ultimately imported into the U.S. as finished products, and found that it was highly probable that Pulse’s infringement was willful. The court later found that Pulse’s infringement was not willful. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that there was no “willful infringement.” In determining that there was no willful infringement, the appellate court applied a rigid two-part test established in In re Seagate that required that willfulness be proven on both an objective and subjective basis. In this case, the appellate court held that the objective prong was not met. This two-part test is similar to one the Supreme Court struck down last term in Octane Fitness, LLc v. ICON Health & Fitness, which dealt with a test for awarding attorneys fees.\nIn the consolidated case, Stryker Corporation (Stryker) sued Zimmer, Inc. (Zimmer) over patent infringement of medical equipment. Stryker and Zimmer are both competitors in the market for pulsed lavage devices, which deliver pressurized irrigation for certain medical procedures in orthopedic medicine. Stryker holds three patents for pulsed lavage devices that it claimed Zimmer had infringed. The district court found Zimmer liable for patent infringement. The jury awarded Stryker treble damages as allowed under 35 U.S.C. § 284 on the grounds that Zimmer intentionally violated Stryker’s patents. Zimmer appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which requires that the patent-holder prove the infringement was willful to be eligible for treble damages. Therefore, the appellate court overturned the award for treble damages on the grounds that Zimmer did not intentionally violate Stryker’s patents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62603:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62603:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62603:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe rigid two-part test is not necessary for determining whether a patentee is eligible for enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C §284. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The plain language of Section 284 simply stated that courts “may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” There is no language that creates the kind of test that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit applied, and precedent had established that the word “may” connotes judicial discretion. While it’s true that the award is typically only granted in extreme cases, the two-part test was overly rigid and could insulate some of worst patent infringers from liability for enhanced damages. Because the language of the section is discretionary, courts should take into account a variety of factors and should not be limited by a rigid test.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the language of Section 284 encompasses limitations on the use of a court’s discretion to award enhanced damages. Generally, enhanced damages are reserved for particularly egregious cases. Additionally, whether or not the infringer consults counsel should not be relevant to the award decision, nor should the award be used to compensate for the costs of the litigation. Justice Breyer argued that, while enhanced damages served an important purpose, its use must be limited. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62603:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62604:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62604:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThroughout the 1990s, inventor Gilbert P. Hyatt was involved in litigation with the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) based on the FTB’s audits of his 1991 and 1992 tax returns. The FTB claimed that Hyatt had falsified his tax forms by manufacturing a move to Nevada that did not occur until later and therefore failing to file state taxes for time that he was actually living in California. Hyatt protested that the FTB acted in bad faith and eventually sued the FTB in Nevada alleging negligence along with several intentional torts and seeking damages. Before the case went to trial, the FTB argued that it should be immune from the lawsuit based on California law that granted it sovereign immunity. The case eventually went before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that Nevada courts were not bound to grant the FTB full immunity.\nAt trial, the jury found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him over $300 million in damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which held that the FTB is not immune from the suit because in Nevada governmental entities are not immune from claims for intentional torts. However, because Nevada law does not allow punitive damages against governmental entities, the punitive damage award in this case should be reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62604:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62604:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62604:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Constitution does not allow Nevada to refuse to extend to other states haled into Nevada courts the same immunities Nevada would receive in those courts. The Court was equally divided on the question of whether Nevada v. Hall should be overruled and therefore affirmed the lower court’s exercise of jurisdiction over California. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution prohibits a state from adopting a “policy of hostility” towards another state. Because the Nevada rule that does not extend Nevada’s governmental immunity to governmental entities from other states is essentially a “policy of hostility” towards other states, it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred in the judgment without writing a separate opinion.\nIn his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote that a “policy of hostility” under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is one that has “no sufficient policy considerations” to support it. In this case, Nevada’s application of its own immunity law, which does not protect other states’ governmental entities, is supported by the policy interest in ensuring appropriate redress for its citizens. Nevada is not required to presume that other states are equally committed to the protection of Nevada citizens. Therefore, Nevada’s rule is not an unconstitutional “policy of hostility” towards other states. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62604:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62611:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62611:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman (with whom he was in a domestic relationship) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.\nWilliam Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend’s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.\nVoisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes do not constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “recklessness” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “physical force” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine’s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62611:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62611:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62611:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA reckless domestic violence assault qualifies as misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9). Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the relevant statutory text -- “us[ing] force” -- does not rule out an interpretation that encompasses an act of force carried out recklessly, or with a conscious disregard of the substantial risk of causing harm. Although the statutory language does not apply to true accidents, it certainly does to reckless conduct. The legislative history of the statute also supports this reading, because Congress expressly intended for the statute to prevent those convicted of misdemeanors of domestic assault from being able to purchase firearms. In many states, such misdemeanor offenses are defined as only requiring reckless intent; if these were not included in the statutory prohibition, the statute would not be effective in a majority of jurisdictions.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that term “use of force” required intentional conduct to trigger the statutory firearm prohibition. The Court has traditionally interpreted “use” in ways that make it clear that the conduct must be intentional, which is consistent with its use elsewhere in the statute. In holding otherwise, Justice Thomas argued that the majority opinion conflated recklessly causing force with recklessly causing harm through the intentional use of force. Because the Maine domestic violence statute emcompasses reckless conduct while the federal statute does not, a conviction under the Maine statute should not trigger the firearm prohibition. The majority opinion also extended the sweep of the statute into unconstitutional territory by denying those convicted of a reckless misdemeanor of domestic violence their Second Amendment rights. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent, though not in the part that addressed the Second Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62611:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62616:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62616:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, Lester Nichols was charged with intent to engage in sex with a minor. In 2006, the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was passed, and the Attorney General issued a rule in 2007 that SORNA applied retroactively to convicted sex offenders. Under this rule, Nichols was required to register with SORNA and update his residency. In 2012, Nichols flew from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his location pursuant to SORNA. Authorities in the Philippines took Nichols into custody and returned him to the United States where he was charged with noncompliance with SORNA regulations regarding updating his residency. Nichols filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the Philippines are outside U.S. jurisdiction, so he was not required to update his location. The trial court dismissed his motion, and Nichols plead guilty. He then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed his conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62616:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62616:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62616:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA convicted sexual offender is not required to notify the state under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) when he moves outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that SORNA requires that sexual offenders notify states to which they move or reside. The Court interpreted the present tense of “reside” in the statute to mean that an offender must currently be living in a U.S. jurisdiction for the requirement to take effect. Therefore, a registered sex offender does not violate SORNA by failing to update his registration when he moves from a U.S. jurisdiction to a non-U.S. jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62616:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62619:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62619:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHusky International Electronics, Inc. (Husky) sold and delivered electronic equipment to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. (Chrysalis), headed by Daniel Ritz. Chrysalis owed Husky $163,999.38 in purchases between 2003 and 2007. In 2007, Ritz started transferring funds from Chrysalis to various other ventures in which he owned stock. In 2009 Husky sued Ritz for payment of his outstanding debt, and Ritz then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In 2011, Husky filed a complaint against the discharge of Ritz’s debt and argued that Ritz had fraudulently moved funds from Chrysalis to other accounts in order to file for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found that Ritz had not fraudulently filed for bankruptcy and that it could not “pierce the veil” to go after Ritz’s personal finances for the debt Chrysalis owed.\nHusky appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination and found that Ritz had not committed “actual fraud” by false representation and that Husky had not proven that Ritz acted “maliciously and willfully.” The United States Appeals Court for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to discharge Ritz’s debt.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62619:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62619:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62619:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “actual fraud” language of the bankruptcy statute encompasses traditional forms of fraud and is not limited to fraudulent representation. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that “actual fraud” is fraud that is committed with wrongful intent, and that “fraud” has traditionally been defined as any transfer of assets that impairs a creditor’s ability to collect on the debt. In the common law, such fraudulent conveyances did not require that the debtor make a false representation to the creditor. Therefore, historically, false representation has never been a requirement of “actual fraud” and should not be treated as one in the wording of the relevant section of the Bankruptcy Code. This reading maintains meaningful distinctions throughout the code and does not make the language redundant.\nIn his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that “actual fraud” as used in the relevant section of the bankruptcy statute does not encompass fraudulent transfer schemes. Despite the fact that the common law meaning of actual fraud is expansive, this case is one of statutory interpretation, not common law, and therefore the common law definition cannot be dispositive when it does not fit with the relevant language of the statute. The relevant language in this case limits “actual fraud” to situations in which fraud induced the creditor to enter into a transaction with the debtor. Justice Thomas argued that the majority opinion’s reading of the phrase is overbroad and second-guesses Congress’ intent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62619:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62620:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62620:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which requires group health plans and health insurance issuers offering health plans to provide preventative care and screenings for women pursuant to the guidelines established by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These guidelines include “approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” The regulations include an exemption from contraceptive coverage for the group health plan of a religious employer. The exemption does not mean that such services are not covered, but that they are not covered through a cost-sharing mechanism.\nThe petitioners are religious organizations that argue that the contraceptive coverage mandate of the ACA violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which Congress enacted in 1993, because the mandate requires these organizations to “facilitate” the provision of insurance coverage for contraceptive services that they oppose on religious grounds. In several separate cases, the relevant district courts issued injunctions against the government, and the relevant Courts of Appeals reversed. The appellate courts held that the religious organizations were unable to show that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the exercise of their religious freedom.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62620:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62620:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62620:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAfter determining through supplemental briefing that insurance companies could provide contraceptive coverage to employees of organizations that object to such coverage on religious grounds without the organizations needing to provide notification, the Court vacated the case for further consideration by the lower courts in light of this agreement from the parties. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that it reached no decision on the merits of the case, and nothing in the opinion should be construed as affecting the ability of the government to ensure that employees covered by the insurance plans at issue receive full contraceptive coverage. Given the importance of the issues involved in this case, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts to afford the parties the opportunity to determine how to proceed in a manner that grants employees full contraceptive coverage while also respecting the organizations’ religious exercise.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that nothing in the majority opinion should be construed as signaling to lower courts where the Supreme Court stands on the merits of the case. Remanding the case allows the lower courts to consider whether the existing or modified regulations may properly balance the interests at issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62620:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62621:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62621:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which contained several provisions related to abortions. One such provision required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion was performed, and another provision required that all abortion clinics comply with standards for ambulatory surgical centers. The petitioners are a group of abortion providers who sued the State of Texas seeking to invalidate those provisions in H.B. 2 as they relate to facilities in McAllen and El Paso. The petitioners argued that H.B. 2 denied equal protection, unlawfully delegated lawmaking authority, and constituted arbitrary and unreasonable state action. The district court dismissed the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the two contested provisions of H.B. 2. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and partially reversed the injunctions because the plaintiffs failed to show that they placed a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62621:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62621:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62621:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn applying the substantial burden test, courts must weigh the extent to which the laws in question actually serve the stated government interest against the burden they impose. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority, which held that the provisions of H.B. 2 at issue do not confer medical benefits that are sufficient to justify the burdens they impose on women seeking to exercise their constitutional right to an abortion. Therefore, the provisions unconstitutionally impose an undue burden. The Court held that the judicial review of such statutes need not be wholly deferential to the legislative fact-finding, especially when the factual record before the district court contradicted it. In this case, the evidence presented before the district court showed that the admitting privileges requirement of H.B. 2 did not advance the state’s interest in protecting women’s health but did place a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion by forcing about half of the state’s abortion clinics to close. This additional layer of regulation provided no further protections than those already in place. Similarly, the requirement that abortion clinics meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers did not appreciably lower the risks of abortions compared to those performed in non-surgical centers. These requirements were so tangentially related to the actual procedures involved in an abortion that they were essentially arbitrary. If these requirements took effect, only seven or eight facilities in the entire state would be able to function, which is in and of itself a substantial burden on women seeking abortions because those remaining facilities would not be able to meet the demand. The Court also held that the petitioners were not precluded from challenging the provisions as they were applied despite previous litigation on whether the provisions were unconstitutional on their face, especially given the evidence about how their enforcement had actually affected abortion access across the state.\nIn her concurrence, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that modern abortions are so safe relative to other medical procedures, including childbirth itself, that any law that made accessing abortions more difficult in the name of safety could not pass judicial review.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion bent the rules of judicial scrutiny and misinterpreted precedent to reach its conclusion. He argued that this case should never have made it to the Supreme Court because the Court normally did not allow suits by third parties to vindicate the rights of others. Additionally, the majority opinion misconstrued the undue burden test as requiring courts to apply a standard of review similar to strict scrutiny in assessing laws that regulate abortions, despite the fact that there was no precedential support for that level of scrutiny in these cases. By adding further tiers to the levels of judicial scrutiny, the majority created a test that was a “meaningless formalism” and that provided little guidance to lower courts because the result is based on whether a right is favored instead of being actually enumerated in the Constitution. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Court should not have reached the substantive issues of this case because the claims should have been barred as already litigated based on the outcome of the facial challenges to the provisions, which arose from the same set of operative facts. If the lower court’s decision was wrong as a matter of law, the petitioners could have appealed on that basis, but the strategic decision not to do so had consequences, and the majority opinion should have properly applied the well-established doctrine of claim preclusion. Even if the claims were not precluded, the petitioners did not meet their burden to show that the provisions in question affect a large fraction of Texan women. The fact that some clinics closed is evidence of a correlation with the provisions, not causation. Additionally, the petitioners did not prove that the closure of some clinics would actually affect the number of women able to access abortions, especially since many abortion clinics operated below capacity. Even if those provisions were problematic, the majority erred in declaring them completely unconstitutional when they could and should be upheld in any area in which they did not impose an undue burden. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62621:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "62621:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62621:Conclusion:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nofacorrelationwiththeprovisions,notcausation.Additionally,thepetitionersdidnotprovethattheclosureofsomeclinicswouldactuallyaffectthenumberofwomenabletoaccessabortions,especiallysincemanyabortionclinicsoperatedbelowcapacity.Evenifthoseprovisionswereproblematic,themajorityerredindeclaringthemcompletelyunconstitutionalwhentheycouldandshouldbeupheldinanyareainwhichtheydidnotimposeanundueburden.ChiefJusticeJohnG.Roberts,Jr.andJusticeThomasjoinedinthedissent.\nLearn more about the Supreme Court and abortion law in Body Politic, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62621:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "62622:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62622:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWalter Himmelreich is a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. In 2008, he was attacked by another prisoner. Himmelreich filed a complaint against multiple defendants alleging many causes of action, including a claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was placed in administrative detention after filing a claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) and a claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the prison officials failed to protect him from being assaulted by another inmate. The district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of the First and Eighth Amendment claims.\nOn remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants by holding that Himmelreich had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on the claims and that the prison officials were subject to the discretionary exception to the FTCA, which triggered the judgment bar of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §2676, that prohibits “any action by the same claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act of omission gave rise to the claim.” The appellate court again vacated and remanded the lower court’s judgment. It held that Himmelreich’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies should be excused because he had been intimidated and threatened by prison officials to not pursue a grievance process against them. The appellate court also found that the dismissal of Himmelreich’s claim based on discretionary exception to the FTCA as applied by the district court does not necessarily trigger a judgment bar of 28 U.S.C §2676.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62622:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62622:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62622:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe judgment bar of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not apply to claims dismissed for falling under the exceptions to the FTCA. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the FTCA explicitly exempts coverage from certain categories of claims. Because the judgment bar is part of the FTCA, if the FTCA does not apply to a claim, then the judgment bar does not either. In the absence of Congressional intent to the contrary, the plain reading of the language of the statute -- that the FTCA, including the judgment bar, does not cover cases that are exempt -- should control the analysis. In this case, because Himmelreich’s first claim fell under the discretionary action exception to the FTCA, the judgment bar did not apply to his second claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62622:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62631:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62631:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBrandon Thomas Betterman failed to appear in court on December 8, 2011, on charges of partner or family member assault, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On February 9, 2012, Betterman turned himself in and stated that he knew he was supposed to appear in court but claimed he had neither money nor transportation to get to the courthouse that day. He was convicted on March 15, 2012, and sentenced to five years. On April 19, 2012, he pled guilty to the charges of jumping bail. His sentence hearing did not occur until January 17, 2013, when he filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that he was denied a speedy and fair trial due to the amount of time that had lapsed between his guilty plea and sentencing hearing. On April 29, 2013, his motion was denied, and on June 27, 2013, Betterman was sentenced to seven years for his bail-jumping charge. The Supreme Court of Montana held that the delay between Betterman’s plea and sentencing was unacceptably long but had not violated his rights to fair and speedy trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62631:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62631:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62631:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial does not extend past a guilty verdict or guilty plea. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that, although a defendant may have other recourse for an inordinate delay in sentencing, the Sixth Amendment does not apply to post-conviction, pre-sentencing delays. This reading of the Sixth Amendment is in line with the historical understanding of what the right protects: The right of the accused to have a speedy trial. Because “the accused” is different from “the convicted,” extending the Sixth Amendment right to post-conviction procedures would change the nature of the right. The manner in which legislatures and courts have interpreted the right, as well as the remedies available for a violation of the right, are also in line with the time-limited reading. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as many states’ rules of criminal procedure, provide some protections against undue delays in sentencing, but the Sixth Amendment does not.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Court’s opinion leaves open the question of whether an undue sentencing delay would violate a defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that it’s not clear what test the Court would use in adjudicating such a case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she emphasized that the question of when an undue delay in sentencing violated the Due Process Clause was an open one. Justice Sotomayor argued that a possible test would be based on an analysis of four factors: The length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62631:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62632:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62632:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnlike states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not authorize its municipalities, including utilities, to declare bankruptcy and seek relief under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In June 2014, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (Recovery Act), which expressly provided different protections for creditors than Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.\nThe plaintiffs in this case are a group of investors who collectively hold nearly two billion dollars in bonds issued by one of Puerto Rico’s public utilities, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), which could potentially file for bankruptcy under the Recovery Act. The plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico in district court and argued that Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits state municipal debt restructuring laws from binding creditors without their consent, preempts the Recovery Act. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the enforcement of the Recovery Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62632:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62632:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62632:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nChapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code preempted the Puerto Rico statute that allowed public utilities to restructure their debt. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 5-2 majority. The Court held that Puerto Rico is a “state” within the meaning of the preemption provision of Chapter 9. When the Bankruptcy Code was originally enacted, it included territories, such as Puerto Rico, in the definition of “states” to which the Code applied. Since then, Congress had amended the definition of “state” to exclude Puerto Rico for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under a specific provision of Chapter 9, but that narrowing of the definition did not apply to the preemption provision. The plain language of the preemption clause did not contain any language that excluded Puerto Rico; in contrast, the amended definition of state specifically excluded Puerto Rico for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor and went no further. Without further language from Congress, the text should not be interpreted to reflect a Congressional intent for which there is no textual evidence.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that each of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code must be read within the context of the whole Code. Because the language of the preemption provision presupposed that it applied to states who could be considered debtors, that provision did not apply to Puerto Rico. Crucially, the language of the Code also meant that the only ways to solve Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis were for Puerto Rico to pass the kind of statute that it did or wait for direct Congressional action. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62632:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62633:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62633:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUniversal Health Services, Inc. (UHS) owns and operates Arbour Counseling Services (Arbour), a mental health services provider in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Arbour participates in the state Medicaid program, MassHealth, and the state has promulgated regulations for such “satellite” facilities.\nJulio Escobar and Carmen Correa are the parents of Yarushka Rivera, a teenager with behavioral issues who began seeing a counselor at Arbour. These counselors were not licensed, and Escobar and Correa became concerned that they were not being properly supervised as the regulations of satellite facilities required. Rivera was eventually diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed a medicine by a “doctor” who was later discovered to be a nurse under the supervision of a non-board-certified psychiatrist. Rivera soon had an adverse reaction to the medicine and called Arbour for guidance but was unable to speak with anyone. A few days later, she had a seizure and was hospitalized. A few months later, she suffered a fatal seizure.\nEscobar and Correa filed complaints with several state agencies and eventually sued UHS under both the federal and state False Claims Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint and held that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead the elements of falsity that claims under the False Claims Act require. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed and held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pled the elements of falsity by applying an “implied certification” test, which states that falsity has been sufficiently pled when there is evidence that the defendant did not comply with a condition of payment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62633:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62633:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62633:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe implied certification test could be a valid basis for False Claims Act liability, and the conditions of payment with which the defendant allegedly failed to comply did not need to be explicitly stated. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that the implied certification theory could be a basis for liability under certain circumstances. When the defendant submitted a claim for payment that made specific representations about goods or services provided but knowingly did not disclose noncompliance with statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements, liability could attach if the omission made those representations misleading. However, liability did not depend on whether the requirements were expressly designated as conditions of payment; instead the determining factor was whether the misrepresentation about compliance was material under the traditional common law meaning of the term. Because the materiality standard and the “knowingly” part of the liability test are strict, the requirements of payment need not be expressly stated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62633:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62634:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62634:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a sexual harassment suit on behalf of approximately 270 female employees against CRST Van Expedited (CRST). Two years after filing the suit, the EEOC failed to identify the 270 women, and the district court ordered the EEOC to amend its list of 270 women to include only the women who wished to continue with the suit and to ensure that those women be available for deposition. The EEOC complied with the first court order and failed to fulfill the second before the deadline. CRST had filed seven motions to dismiss, and the district granted (or granted in part) six of the motions. CRST subsequently filed a bill of costs against the EEOC for $4,560,285.11, and the district court granted the fee award. The EEOC appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the fee award. The appellate court held that the EEOC’s pre-suit obligations were not elements of the claim and did not constitute a ruling on the merits that was eligible for fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62634:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62634:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62634:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe defendant may be a “prevailing party” for the purpose of the award of fees even without a ruling on the merits. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the determination of whether a particular party has “prevailed” for the purpose of fee-shifting statutes is whether there has been a material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties. Because the defendant can obtain its objective by preventing the plaintiff from altering the legal relationship in its favor, the defendant can prevail without judgment on the merits of the case. In this case, the defendant prevailed because the plaintiffs did not satisfy their pre-suit obligations and therefore were unable to alter the legal relationship between the parties. There is no indication that Congress, in drafting the statutory language, intended to limit the opportunity to collect fees to parties that prevailed on the merits, especially as doing so would prevent parties from obtaining fees on claims that were dismissed as frivolous.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the Court’s opinion and argued that previous precedent suggesting that a district court must make a separate finding before determining that a defendant is eligible for a fee award should not be extended further.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62634:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62635:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62635:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1977, Congress enacted the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in an effort to combat abusive debt collection practices, which were particularly problematic with third party or independent debt collectors, who are unlikely to have contact with the consumer and therefore have little incentive to act fairly. One of the issues that the FDCPA addressed was independent debt collectors representing themselves as government officials. Therefore, the FDCPA targeted these “debt collectors” while exempting government officials from that definition. The statutory language of the exemption was specific to “any officer or employee of ... any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.”\nThe Ohio Revised Code contains a provision that unpaid debts owed to a state entity get “certified” to the Ohio Attorney General, who is then responsible for collecting the debt or disposing of it by other means. The Attorney General may enlist “special counsel” to collect debts on the Attorney General’s behalf. To do so, the special counsel and the Attorney General enter into a retention agreement that, among other terms, allows the special counsel to use the Attorney General’s letterhead in connection with claims arising out of the tax debts the special counsel is authorized to collect.\nThe plaintiffs in this case are individuals who received debt collection letters that used the seal of the Ohio Attorney General from the defendants, who became special counsel to the Attorney General in 2013. The plaintiffs sued and argued that the defendants violated the FDCPA by using the Ohio Attorney General letterhead. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and held that special counsel are not “debt collectors” under the meaning of the FDCPA because they are officers of the state for the purposes of debt collection, and therefore the use of the Ohio Attorney General letterhead was not false or misleading. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and held that special counsel are “debt collectors” under the meaning of the FDCPA and do not fall under the exemption, and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the use of Ohio Attorney General’s seal on debt collection letters was misleading.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62635:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62635:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62635:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nEven if special counsel appointed by the state Attorney General to collect debts are not “state officers” under the meaning of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), use of the Attorney General Letterhead is not materially misleading. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that, regardless of whether the special counsel are “state officers” under the FDCPA, their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead was not materially misleading because it accurately conveyed that the special counsel was tasked with collecting debts on the Attorney General’s behalf. The use of the Attorney General’s letterhead was in fact required when the special was sending debt collection communications, because that explained on whose authority the special counsel was writing to the debtor. The Court also noted that to interpret these actions as violating the FDCPA would raise a federalism concern, because the manner in which states collect debts is a matter of state government in which the federal government should not interfere.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62635:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62636:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62636:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 21, 2007, Lieutenants Michael Ross and James Madigan were escorting Shaidon Blake from his cell when Madigan shoved Blake several times. The incident escalated to Madigan punching Blake in the face several times with a key ring wrapped around his fingers while Ross held him. Blake was then taken to the medical unit and later diagnosed with nerve damage. Blake reported the incident to senior corrections officers, and the Internal Investigative Unit of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services conducted an investigation and issued a formal report. The formal report determined that Madigan had used excessive force against Blake and that Blake was not at fault in any way. Blake subsequently sued Ross and Madigan in addition to two supervisors and three government entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and argued that they violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force.\nNearly two years after Blake initially filed the suit, Ross filed an amended answer to the complaint that alleged that Blake had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required. Ross also moved for summary judgment based on the same argument, and the district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the “special circumstances” exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement was met in this case. Because the internal investigation provided the correction officials time and opportunity to address the complaints internally and Blake reasonably believed that he had exhausted his administrative remedies by participating in an internal investigation, the requirements for the “special circumstances” exception to the PLRA were met.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62636:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62636:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62636:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Prison Litigation Reform Act’s requirement to exhaust administrative remedies does not have a “special circumstances” exception. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the plain text of the statute clearly does not include any sort of special circumstances exception. Because no such exception exists, courts may not excuse a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, regardless of what “special circumstances” might exist. Judicial precedent interpreting the PLRA’s exhaustion provision has continually taken this strict approach to construing the provision. Additionally, the precursor to the PLRA had a relatively weak exhaustion provision, so the PLRA is best interpreted as a stronger response to what came before it. However, the Court also noted that the PLRA’s exhaustion scheme hinges on the “availability” of remedies, and that there might be cases in which administrative remedies were not available. Because this case might be one in which remedies were not “available” within the meaning of the PLRA, the Court remanded the case.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the majority opinion impermissibly considered the existence of documents that were not properly before the Court because they were not part of the appellate record. In his separate opinion concurring in part, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the term “exhaustion” should be given the meaning it traditionally has in administrative law. Therefore, the term should include “well-established” exceptions to exhaustion, though none were relevant to the disposition of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62636:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62638:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62638:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDanny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County, North Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both the field sobriety tests and the breath test. He was arrested, but he refused to consent to a chemical test. Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical test in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the charge and claimed that the state law violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul boat launch where three men were attempting to pull their boat out of the water and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking and had the truck keys in his hands, but he denied driving the truck and refused to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI) and taken to the police station, where he refused to consent to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged with two counts of first-degree test refusal pursuant to state law. In a separate incident, Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota to refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was over the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving under the influence.\nAll three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when there was no probable cause that would support a warrant for the test. Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62638:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62638:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62638:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA state statute may not criminalize the refusal to submit to a blood test in the absence of a warrant because, while the Fourth Amendment allows for warrantless breath tests incident to an arrest for drunk driving, warrantless blood tests incident to an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that warrantless breath tests are permissible under the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because they do not implicate significant privacy concerns. They involve minimal physical intrusion to capture something that is routinely exposed to the public, reveal a limited amount of information, and do not enhance any embarrassment beyond what the arrest itself causes. Blood tests, however, implicate privacy interests because they are much more physically invasive -- they require the piercing of the skin -- and they produce a sample that can be preserved and used to obtain further information beyond the subject’s blood alcohol level at the time of the test. The Court also determined that criminalizing refusal to submit to a breath test is designed to serve the government’s interest in preventing drunk driving, which is greater than merely keeping currently drunk drivers off the roads, and does so better than other alternatives. However, the same rationale did not apply to criminalizing refusal to submit to a blood test because of the greater degree of intrusion and the available alternative of the breath test.\nIn her partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless searches should apply to breath tests unless exigent circumstances justify one in a particular case. In establishing exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Court has routinely examined whether a legitimate government interest justified the search in light of the individual’s privacy interest and whether that determination should be made based on a case-by-case analysis or a categorical rule. Based on this analysis, Justice Sotomayor argued that a categorical rule allowing warrantless breath tests incident to arrest was unnecessary to protect the government interest of preventing drunk driving because at that point the driver is off the road and a warrant could be obtained if necessary. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nIn his separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement should apply categorically to all blood alcohol tests, including blood tests. By drawing an arbitrary line between blood tests and breath tests, the majority destabilized the law of exceptions to the warrant requirement and made the jobs of both police officers and lower courts more difficult.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62638:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62639:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62639:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHawkes Co., Inc. (Hawkes) was interested in purchasing a piece of land in northern Minnesota to mine high-quality peat. Hawkes applied to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources for a permit to begin extracting peat from the land once they purchased the property in October 2010. The Corps informed Hawkes that the permit process would be very costly and would take a long time and so urged Hawkes not to purchase the property. The Corps then submitted an Approved Jurisdictional Determination to derail Hawkes’ plan to purchase and mine the property by arguing that the land was a wetland connecting to “waters of the United States,” which are protected under the Clean Water Act. Hawkes challenged the jurisdictional determination and filed an action for immediate judicial review. The trial court dismissed the action and held that the jurisdictional determination was not a “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore it was not subject to judicial review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the jurisdictional determination was a final agency action and remanded the action for judicial review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62639:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62639:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62639:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Army Corps of Engineers’ jurisdictional determination that the property in question constituted “water of the United States” was a final agency action subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that two conditions must be satisfied for an agency action to be considered “final” under the APA: The action must be the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process and it must determine rights or obligations that create legal consequences. Because a jurisdictional determination is typically not revisited and marks the end of an extensive fact-finding process, it is the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process and satisfies the first condition. Similarly, the jurisdictional determination binds the two governmental agencies authorized to sue to enforce the Clean Water Act and therefore creates legal consequences, which satisfies the second condition.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the reach of the Clean Water Act remains unclear, and that the majority opinion is important to place a limit on some of the government’s power through the Act. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence. Justice Elena Kagan wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she argued that the fact that jurisdictional determinations are binding on both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency is essential to the disposition of the case. Because the jurisdictional determination binds those agencies in subsequent litigation, it creates a legal consequence.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which she argued that the fact that the jurisdictional determination is binding on the Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency is not essential to the disposition of the case. Because the jurisdictional determination is definitive and creates an immediate and practical impact, that alone satisfies both of the conditions necessary for an agency action to be considered final for the purpose of APA review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62639:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62640:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62640:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn June 2011, Michael Bryant, Jr. was convicted of two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 117(a), a federal law that criminalizes domestic assault by any person who has been convicted of at least two domestic violence offenses in federal, state, or Indian tribal court. For the predicate offenses, the prosecution relied on Bryant’s previous domestic abuse convictions in Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court. Bryant moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that the use of the tribal court convictions as predicate convictions for the charge violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because he was not afforded counsel in the tribal court proceedings, so his convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment if they had occurred in state or federal court. The district court denied the motion, and Bryant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that an uncounseled conviction that violated the Sixth Amendment could not be used as a predicate offense for the purpose of a charge under Section 117(a).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62640:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62640:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62640:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe use of an uncounseled conviction in tribal court proceedings that complied with the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. 117(a) did not violate the Sixth Amendment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that, although the Sixth Amendment does not apply in tribal court proceedings, ICRA contains procedural safeguards that are similar to those in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. As long as prior convictions were valid under ICRA when they were entered, they can be used as predicate offenses to enhance a sentence under 18 U.S.C. 117(a), even if they would not have been valid in state or federal court. The Court determined that this decision was consistent with precedent and avoided the creation of a hybrid tribal court conviction that was valid on its own but not for enhanced sentencing purposes. Additionally, ICRA allows for federal habeas review in cases that do raise constitutional violation concerns.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the fact that this case was before the Court illustrated that the Court has used two conflicting views of Indian tribal sovereignty. On the one hand, the Court has established that the Sixth Amendment did not apply because the tribes are sovereign; however, the federal government has the power to subject members of the tribes to federal criminal prosecution because Congress has power over tribal sovereignty. Justice Thomas argued that the Court should reconsider its precedents that relate to Indian tribal sovereignty and create a more cohesive, coherent, theory.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62640:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62650:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62650:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nElijah Manuel was a passenger in a car that was pulled over for failing to signal on March 18, 2011. When the police officer detected an odor of marijuana in the car, he dragged Manuel out of the car, pushed and kicked him, and handcuffed him. The officer found a bottle of pills in Manuel’s pocket during his pat-down. The pills were tested and the officers falsified the results to show the pills were ecstasy. The initial positive pill results were later tested at the scene of the arrest. More detailed negative lab results were presented by Manuel later. Manuel was arrested based on these initial results. The officers continued to rely on the false positive initial test throughout the grand jury proceedings, and he was held until May 4, when the Assistant State’s Attorney sought dismissal of the charges.\nManuel sued the City of Joliet and various city officials and alleged malicious prosecution as well as other civil rights claims. The district court dismissed most of Manuel’s claims as falling outside of the statute of limitations. His malicious prosecution claim was not time-barred, however, but was dismissed under Newsome v. McCabe, which held that federal claims of malicious prosecution stem from the right to due process and are not a Fourth Amendment issue. Therefore, there was no malicious prosecution claim under federal law if the state provided a similar cause of action, as Illinois did. On appeal, Manuel argued that Newsome did not foreclose a malicious prosecution claim on Fourth Amendment grounds when officers misrepresented evidence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling against Manuel as consistent with the Newsome precedent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62650:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62650:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62650:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAn individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure continues throughout the legal process of a criminal case. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that an individual’s claim that challenges pretrial detention falls within the scope of the Fourth Amendment regardless of whether legal process has begun. Even where legal process has begun, the prosecution itself may be unsupported by probable cause, which gives rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. In such cases, a detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim does not become a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim because the requirements of the Fourth Amendment have not been satisfied. The Court thus held that Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim was proper because his arrest was made without probable cause. The Court then declined to decide whether Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim arose when his criminal charges were dismissed or when legal process began and instead remanded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for further consideration.\nIn his dissenting opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the point at which Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim arose was irrelevant because Manuel filed his claim after the statute of limitations had run for either possible date. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority had ignored the question of whether a malicious prosecution claim may be brought under the Fourth Amendment. At the point that Manuel brought his claim, the only timely claim he could have made was one for malicious prosecution. However, while a claim under the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is typically brought against law enforcement officers, officers do not initiate or dismiss prosecution, which is required for a claim of malicious prosecution. Malicious prosecution claims also require subjective bad faith, whereas Fourth Amendment claims use an objective standard. Lastly, malicious prosecution requires a termination of charges, while a Fourth Amendment violation occurs regardless of whether charges are eventually dismissed or not. Therefore, Justice Alito argued that a malicious prosecution claim cannot be based on the Fourth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62650:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62651:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62651:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe parents of Joseph P. Murr and his siblings (the Murrs) purchased two adjacent lots (Lots E and F) in St. Croix County in 1960. The two lots together made up approximately .98 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Murrs’ parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1995, the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County’s code of ordinances. The relevant ordinance prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot was at least one acre. The ordinance further specified that if each lot is not at least one acre, the lots may be measured together to equal one acre. Seven years later, the Murrs wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied the Murrs’ application to sell the lots separately.\nThe Murrs sued the state and county and claimed the ordinance in question resulted in an uncompensated taking of their property and deprived them of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot.” The circuit court granted summary judgement to the state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62651:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62651:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62651:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a regulatory takings case, two legally distinct but commonly owned contiguous parcels should be combined for takings analysis purposes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that, while generally governmental regulation of property was not a taking, regulation could be so burdensome that it became a taking. The analysis essentially required courts to balance the rights of property ownership against the government’s power to adjust rights for the good of the public, which is a fact-intensive inquiry. In order to properly conduct this inquiry, it was necessary to define the scope of the relevant property. The Court had determined that two approaches did not adequately protect the property rights at stake: defining the property as only the portion targeted by the challenged regulation and allowing state law to define the property. Instead, courts should consider factors such as the treatment of land under state and local law, the physical characteristics of the land, and the prospective value of the regulated land. This inquiry was objective and examined the landowner’s reasonable expectation about whether the property at issue would be treated as a single parcel or separate ones. In this case, the proper application of these factors meant that the parcels in question should be evaluated as a single unit for takings analysis purposes.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to established private property rights, which had historically been defined by state law. Because the analysis of whether a regulation constituted a taking required the examination of the impact of the regulation on a property right, there was an incentive for property owners to define the relevant property rights narrowly to maximize the impact of the regulation. State laws, however, provided definite, easily ascertainable boundaries to units of land and therefore clearly defined the affected property. Using state law to define the relevant property for takings analysis purposes simplified the analysis and avoided creating a “litigation-specific” definition of property. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that the Court should reexamine its decisions on regulatory takings to determine whether such a concept was actually grounded in the original meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62651:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62652:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62652:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAcademic textbook publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Wiley) owns the American copyright for textbooks and often assigns its rights to its foreign subsidiaries to publish, print, and sell its textbooks abroad. Supap Kirtsaeng is a Thai citizen who came to the United States in 1997 to study mathematics. While he was in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to buy the English-language versions of his textbooks there, where they were cheaper, and mail them to him. Kirtsaeng would then sell the textbooks in America, where they were worth more, reimburse his friends and family, and make a profit.\nIn 2008, Wiley sued Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement. The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether Kirtsaeng was barred from asserting an affirmative defense because the copyrighted works in question were manufactured abroad. The Court held that the affirmative defense was available to Kirtsaeng and remanded the case. Kirtsaeng won the case on remand and sought an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses pursuant to Section 505 of the Copyright Act. The district court held that Section 505 provides that the court may “in its discretion” award attorney’s fees but is not bound to do so. Because Wiley’s suit was not “frivolous” or “objectively unreasonable,” the district court held that awarding Kirtsaeng attorney’s fees would “not promote the purposes of the Copyright Act.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62652:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62652:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62652:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWhen deciding whether to grant attorney’s fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act, courts should give substantial weight to the objective reasonableness of the losing party’s position, but that determination should not be the controlling factor. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that, while the objective reasonableness of the losing party’s position should be given substantial weight, the court retained discretion to consider that factor in light of other relevant considerations. While the language of Section 505 clearly granted a court discretion in awarding attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court had created some restrictions that advanced the overall goals of the Copyright Act -- to encourage creation while allowing others to build on previous work. The objective reasonableness factor for determining fee awards furthered useful copyright litigation because it encouraged both parties to advance strong legal positions and deterred frivolous suits based on weak claims. However, any fee award analysis must take into account more than only this factor, as others were relevant to the court’s determination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62652:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62653:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62653:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHillary Bouldin’s vehicle collided with Rocky Dietz’s in Montana in 2009. Dietz filed a negligence claim for injuries sustained from the accident. The action was removed to federal court. The parties made stipulations as to past damages, and the jury ruled in Dietz’s favor but awarded $0 in damages. The district court judge dismissed the jury but then reconsidered and re-empaneled the jury. He asked them to re-determine the damages in a manner consistent with the parties’ stipulation. The jury returned the same verdict and awarded $15,000 in damages. On appeal, Dietz claimed that the district court erred by recalling the jury after it had been dismissed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that dismissing the jury, then recalling the jurors, was not an abuse of discretion because the jurors were not exposed to prejudicial influence during the brief duration of their dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62653:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62653:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62653:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA federal district court judge has a limited ability to recall jurors in a civil case after identifying an error in their verdict, and that power was not abused in this case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set out many of the powers of a district court judge, they do not establish an exhaustive list. District court judges have some powers that are not enumerated in the Federal Rules, but those powers are limited in that they must be a “reasonable response” to whatever problems are confronting the court and they cannot contradict any other express rule or statute. Based on this analysis, district court judges may recall jurors when they identify an error in the jury’s verdict because this is a more expedient way to resolve the problem than empaneling a whole new jury and re-trying the case, and there is no rule or statute prohibiting such an action. However, a district court judge may only do so when there is no suggestion that the jurors have been prejudiced by their time outside of the jury room. Additionally, this power only exists in civil trials. In this case, the district judge did not abuse its discretion by exercising the limited power to recall the jurors after discovering that their verdict was a legal error.\nIn his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the common law rule preventing a judge from recalling a jury once the jury has had the opportunity to interact with the public after the conclusion of the case should control in this case. Although jurors are no longer as strictly sequestered as they once were, the prophylactic nature of drawing the rule at the opportunity for prejudice to occur is the most administrable rule that promotes confidence in the justice system. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority’s multi-factor test would create more confusion and therefore more litigation. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62653:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62654:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62654:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn June 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, along with criteria for determining when prosecutors can choose not to enforce immigration laws under DACA. People who qualify for DACA may apply for work authorization. In 2014, DHS established a similar process for parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as expanding DACA by making more people eligible. The new program was known as the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program.\nTexas and other states sued to prevent the implementation of DAPA and argued that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it had not gone through the notice-and-comment process, and because it was arbitrary and capricious. The states also argued that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which clarifies the President's power. The district court held that the states had standing to file the suit and temporarily enjoined the implementation of DAPA because the states had established a substantial likelihood of success on the notice-and-comment claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the states had standing as well as a substantial likelihood of success on their substantive and procedural claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62654:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62654:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62654:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an unsigned per curiam opinion, the equally divided Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62654:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62655:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62655:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) and alleged that, during regular game play on the Xbox 360, the discs would come loose due to vibrations and scratch against internal components of the gaming system, which rendered them permanently broken. Because only 0.4% of consoles caused this issue with regular players, the district court determined that a class action suit could not be certified and individuals in the suit would have to come forward on their own. The parties then stipulated a dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted the dismissal, and the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that the district court had misapplied applicable law and, therefore, abused its discretion in striking the class action allegations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62655:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62655:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62655:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nFederal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that a voluntary dismissal of individual claims with prejudice did not count as a final judgment that allowed for denial of class certification to be reviewed even after the court of appeals denied interlocutory appeal on the issue. Generally, federal courts of appeals may only review final judgments from district courts, and denial of class certification was not considered a final judgment. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) allowed for an appeal of the denial of class certification with the permission of the court of appeals. If the court of appeals denied the appeal, the plaintiffs may continue to litigate their individual claims. Their options at that point were that the district court may reverse its denial of class certification at any point prior to final judgment on those claims, or the plaintiffs could appeal the denial of class certification after the final judgment. In this case, the individual plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice, which subverted the procedure laid out in Rule 23(f). The plaintiffs’ proposed approach would allow indiscriminate appellate review of interlocutory orders, which both the final judgment rule and Rule 23(f) were intended to prevent.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice because there was no longer a case or controversy as Article III required. Article III denied federal courts the ability to adjudicate cases that did not affect the actual rights of the litigants before them. Therefore, federal courts did not have jurisdiction over cases like the one in question here, in which the parties were no longer adverse to one another on any of their claims. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62655:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62656:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62656:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEncino Motorcars, LLC (Encino) sold and serviced Mercedes-Benz automobiles. Hector Navarro was employed there as a service advisor, which involved him greeting customers and assessing their needs as they entered the business. Navarro, along with other similarly-situated plaintiffs, sued Encino for failing to pay overtime compensation when they worked more than forty hours a week. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, “service advisors” engaged in servicing automobiles are not entitled to overtime compensation, so the district court dismissed their overtime claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and held that Navarro and other employees were not exempted from overtime compensation. In reaching its decision, the appellate court relied on the Department of Labor’s 2011 determination that service advisors were not exempt under the FLSA, which was a reversal of the position that the Department had taken in 1987.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62656:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62656:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62656:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nBecause the Department of Labor did not give adequate reasons for altering its position on whether service advisors are exempt from overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the case should be remanded for reinterpretation that does not give controlling weight to the Department’s 2011 position. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, while courts generally give deference to the determinations of agencies that Congress has authorized to administer statutes, courts should only do so when the agency’s rules are procedurally sound. A basic procedural requirement is that the agency must give adequate reasons for its determinations, and such reasons are particularly important when a change in the agency’s position may impact long-standing interpretations of the relevant statute. In this case, the Department of Labor did not provide adequate reasons for its 2011 change in position that affected a decades-long understanding of the FLSA. Therefore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should not have afforded the 2011 determination the deference that it did, and the case should be remanded.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the majority’s opinion should not change how courts approach agency determinations, which well-established principles of administrative law still governs. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the case should not be remanded but rather that the Court should have decided the case based on the text of the FLSA. Because the text of the FLSA clearly exempts salesman, and service advisors are those who sell services related to automobiles, service advisors should be properly considered exempt from overtime compensation. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62656:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62657:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62657:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC. (Cuozzo) owns the 074 patent, “Speed Limit Indicator and Method for Displaying Speed and the Relevant Speed Limit,” and Garmin International, Inc. (Garmin) petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) for inter partes review of claims regarding the patent. The Board was established to process patent litigation faster by using inter partes review, and during that process, the Board uses the broadest reasonable interpretation when reviewing patent claims instead of the plain and ordinary meaning of patent claims. The Board found that claims 10, 14, and 17 were unpatentable. Cuozzo filed a motion to amend by replacing claims 10, 14, and 17 with claims 21, 22, and 23. The Board denied this request by applying the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to the term “integrally attached” regarding claim 14 on the components of the “Speed Limit Indicator.” Cuozzo appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that it lacked authority to review the Board’s finding under the broadest reasonable interpretation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62657:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62657:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62657:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Patent Trial and Appeal Board may apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of patent claims during an inter partes review proceeding, and such a proceeding is not judicially reviewable. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-0 majority. The Court held that judicial review of the decision of whether to institute inter partes review would not only go against the express wording of the statute, but it would also undercut the congressional objective of giving the Patent Office the power to revisit and revise earlier patent grants. The strong presumption of judicial review can be overcome by clear and convincing language and legislative history, as there was in this case. Additionally, because Congress did not expressly establish a standard for the Patent Office to apply in reviewing a patent claim in inter partes review, the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is acceptable as long as it is a reasonable exercise of the Patent Office’s rulemaking authority. The Court held that the broadest reasonable interpretation standard was appropriate because it encouraged a patent applicant to draft the claim narrowly, which meant that the claim would not unnecessarily prevent further patents on related work, and also resembled the standard used in district court litigation as well as other patent proceedings.\nIn his concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that ambiguities in statutory text should not always be interpreted as a delegation of authority to the appropriate administrative agency, and that the Court should reconsider the line of precedent that established that presumption. In this case, however, because there was an explicit delegation of authority to the Patent Office to promulgate the rules governing its own proceedings, the majority opinion appropriately deferred to the Patent Office’s determination.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the strong presumption in favor of judicial review should apply in this case and that the agency’s final decision should be appealable. The relevant statutory language explicitly stated that the decision of whether to institute inter partes review was “nonappealable” rather than “not subject to review;” therefore, while judicial review could not stop the proceedings from going forward, it could certainly apply to the question of whether the institution of such proceedings was lawful. Allowing for judicial review of that decision is also consistent with the rule that judicial review of final agency decisions encompassed earlier rulings that were not expressly judicially reviewable on their own. In determining otherwise, the majority opinion held that the Patent Office need not adhere to the review structure that Congress put in place, which could not have been what Congress intended. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62657:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62658:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62658:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 3, 2009, Robert F. McDonnell was elected Governor of Virginia. At the time of his election, he and his family were experiencing economic difficulties; by September 2010, he and his wife had a combined credit card balance of $90,000, and by 2012 the business he and his sister operated had a loan balance of $2.5 million. Shortly after his election, McDonnell met with Jonnie Williams, the founder and CEO of Star Scientific, Inc. (Star), which was trying to market a product called Anatabloc that could be used to treat chronic inflammation. Star wanted the Food and Drug Administration to classify Anatabloc as a pharmaceutical, which would be more profitable than the alternative classification of nutraceutical. However, such a classification would require expensive testing, clinical trials and studies, and Star lacked the funds. Between 2009 and 2012, Williams and McDonnell met several times and agreed that “independent testing [of Anatabloc] in Virginia was a good idea.” Williams also provided expensive gifts to the McDonnells and “was willing to help” with their financial troubles. A launch event for Anatabloc was held at the Governor’s Mansion, and Mrs. McDonnell facilitated meetings between Star officials and officials at the University of Virginia and Virginia Commonwealth University to get the studies started. Mrs. McDonnell also purchased, sold, and gifted Star stock in such as way as to avoid reporting requirements, and McDonnell spoke to various government officials about the benefits of Anatabloc.\nThe McDonnells were eventually arrested and charged for corruption, under federal statutes that make it a felony to take “official action” in exchange for money, campaign contributions, or any other thing of value. On September 4, 2014, McDonnell was found guilty on 11 counts of corruption. McDonnell appealed his conviction and argued that the jury instructions given at trial did not properly define the term “official action.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction and held that the jury instructions in question were adequate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62658:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62658:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62658:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAn “official act” is a decision or action on a question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy that involves a specific exercise of formal governmental power. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that arranging a meeting, contacting another official, or hosting an event -- on its own -- is not sufficient to rise to the level of an “official act” for the purpose of federal bribery statutes. This more limited reading of the statutory text gives each word a meaning that is proper in context and not superfluous, which is the best reading of the statute. Additionally, previous Supreme Court precedent has established that the existence of matters pending before a government official was not sufficient to find that any action related to those matters constituted an “official act.” Adopting a broader reading of the statutory language would likely chill public officials’ interactions with their constituents due to fears of prosecution and therefore make it more difficult for them to do their jobs. Based on this interpretation of the statutory language, the jury instructions at issue were impermissibly broad and did not provide enough guidance to the jury regarding whether the actions in question needed to be formal exercises of governmental power. Therefore, the conviction was vacated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62658:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62659:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62659:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTrinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. (Trinity) operates a licensed preschool and daycare called The Learning Center that was initially opened as a non-profit corporation but merged with Trinity in 1985. The Learning Center has an open admissions policy and incorporates daily religious instruction into its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants that provide funds for qualifying organizations to purchase recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. Trinity applied for such a grant but was denied because Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution states, “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion.” Trinity sued and argued that the denial of its application violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the First Amendment’s protections of freedom of religion and speech. The district court granted Missouri DNR Director Pauley’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Trinity moved for reconsideration and to amend its complaint to include allegations that such grants had previously been given to religious organizations. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and the denial of the motions to reconsider and amend the complaint.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62659:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62659:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62659:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular aid program violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of free exercise of religion. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protected the freedom to practice religion and subjects laws that burden religious practice to strict scrutiny. First Amendment precedent had established that laws that deny an otherwise generally available benefit because of religious status are unconstitutional, though laws that are neutral and generally applicable may be upheld even if they hamper religion. The distinction was whether the law in question discriminates against some or all religious beliefs. In this case, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources’ policy of denying religious organizations from its Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause because it discriminated against otherwise eligible organizations based solely on their religious character. The law did not need to prevent the religious organization from practicing its religious; it was sufficient that the law denied a religious organization the same opportunity to compete for a benefit that is otherwise available to all secular organizations. Because the state’s interest in using this policy was simply to draw a wide berth around religious establishment concerns, it was not a sufficiently compelling interest.\nIn his opinion concurring in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment clearly prohibited laws that facially discriminate against religion. To the extent that precedent suggested that a state may “disfavor” religion by placing minor burdens on religion in order to avoid state entanglement with religion, that precedent should be construed narrowly and did not apply in this case. Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in the opinion concurring in part. Justice Gorsuch wrote a separate opinion concurring in part in which he argued that the majority opinion’s suggested distinction between laws that discriminate based on religious status and those that do so based on religious use was untenable and unsupported by the Free Exercise Clause. Additionally, the majority opinion’s footnote that limited the opinion to addressing “express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing” risked making the opinion too case-specific and not based on general principles. Justice Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in part. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the First Amendment was clearly not meant to prevent religious organizations from accessing government-provided benefits such as police and fire services. The benefit here was for the health and safety of children and therefore was in the same class of government-provided services that religious organizations should be able to access.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that this case raised serious Establishment Clause concerns. The majority opinion required a state to directly fund a religious organization in a manner that assisted the spread of its religious message and views. This was precisely the sort of direct connection between church and state that the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent, as shown by extensive history of state disestablishment. Therefore, a prophylactic rule to prevent state funding of religious organizations was permissible, and many states had one. The majority opinion erroneously called this decision discriminatory, when it was actually a legitimate choice for states to make to avoid entanglement with religion. Even under the Free Exercise Clause, the doctrine allowed states to make exceptions to generally applicable laws based on an organization’s status as religious. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62659:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62660:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62660:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 8, 2013, police officers executed a warrant to search Richard Mathis’ house following allegations of sexual abuse from young men. The officers found a loaded rifle and ammunition. After he was arrested and while in custody, Mathis admitted to owning the rifle and ammunition, and he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because of his five previous burglary convictions in Iowa state courts. At trial, the district court used a modified categorical approach to determine that Mathis’ prior convictions constituted violent felonies because the elements of the offense were substantially similar to generic burglary and posed the same risk of harm to others. Therefore, Mathis was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment pursuant to the ACCA. Mathis appealed his conviction and argued that his Iowa convictions should not have constituted predicate offenses under the ACCA, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62660:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62660:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62660:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA state crime cannot qualify as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) if the elements of the state offense are broader than those of a listed generic offense based on an “elements-only inquiry,” not a modified categorical approach. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority, which held that, if the elements of the state crime are broader than the generic offense listed under ACCA, the sentence cannot be enhanced, even if the actual conduct in question fits the generic offense listed under ACCA. The textual, elements-only approach is supported by the text of the ACCA as well as Supreme Court precedent, and this approach also avoids unfairness to the defendant. The alternative approach would raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns because it would allow a judge to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of the crime apart from what the jury determined. In this case, because the elements of the state crime are broader than those of generic burglary, the conviction cannot give rise to a sentence enhancement under the ACCA.\nIn his concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that, while the majority opinion is correct that the Court’s statutory interpretation precedent controlled the decision in this case, Congress could not have intended for there to be vast sentencing disparities for defendants convicted in different jurisdictions based on substantially similar conduct. While Congress could and should resolve this problem through legislation, if it cannot do so, the Court may need to revisit its precedent. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurrence in which he argued that the interpretation of the ACCA that allows sentencing to be based on judge-determined, rather than jury-determined, facts violated the Sixth Amendment.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that, by distinguishing between the elements of a crime and the means by which it was accomplished, the majority opinion created a sentencing scheme in which two individuals who engaged in the same conduct could receive drastically different sentences. A state statute is not overbroad for the purposes of ACCA sentencing enhancement when the statute allows for alternative means of proving the crime, but the charging documents for the crime in question allege the version that matches the federal crime. The Court’s precedents allow for this type of interpretation. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the line of Supreme Court precedent that has limited courts’ ability to use the modified categorical approach has resulted in fewer convictions qualifying for ACCA sentence enhancement, which cannot be what Congress intended. In holding otherwise, the majority opinion moved further away from Congress’ intentions and ignored the real-world relevance of the facts of any given case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62660:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62661:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62661:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMaher Kara joined Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group in 2002, and began asking his older brother, Michael, who held a degree in chemistry, questions about certain aspects of his job. From 2004 to 2007 the Kara brothers regularly discussed mergers and acquisitions by Citigroup clients, though Maher suspected that Michael was using the information they discussed for insider trading. In the meantime, Maher became engaged to Bassam Yacoub Salman’s sister and Michael began to share some of the insider information he received from his brother with Salman. Salman did not directly trade through his own accounts but went through his brother-in-law, Karim Bayyouk. There were numerous occasions where Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed identical trades issued by Citigroup clients. As a result, Salman’s account reached $2.1 million. Salman was charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud and insider trading in 2011 and found guilty. He applied for a new trial, but his request was denied. He then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued there was insufficient evidence that he knew the information used for trades was from insider information. The appellate court found that, because of the close family relationship, there was sufficient evidence that Salman knew he was trading on insider information.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62661:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62661:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62661:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA close family relationship is sufficient to sustain a conviction for insider trading. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment and held that the close family relationship was sufficient evidence that Salman knew that he was imparting insider information. A person commits insider trading where they know that the person who made the tip stands to benefit from disclosing insider information. A personal benefit may be inferred where there is a personal relationship involved, such as one between a family member or a friend, because of the likelihood that the person being tipped will return the favor. Here, Maher tipped off his brother Michael, which established that Maher stood to benefit from the disclosure and had therefore violated his duty to Citigroup. Salman in turn committed insider trading because he knew that the information had been improperly given in the first place, and that Maher stood to benefit from its disclosure. Thus, the Court found that Salman’s knowledge of Maher’s potential for personal benefit from the tip supported his conviction for insider trading.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62661:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62664:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62664:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice entered Gregory Welch’s apartment because they had reason to believe that a robbery suspect was on the premises. After obtaining Welch’s consent to search the apartment, the police located a gun and ammunition that Welch later identified as his own. Welch was subsequently arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he pleaded guilty. Because Welch had three prior felony convictions, the district court determined that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) required that he be sentenced to a minimum of 15 years in prison. Welch appealed his sentence and argued that one of his felonies, a conviction for “strong arm” robbery in Florida state court in 1996, did not qualify as a predicate offense for the purpose of the ACCA because, at the time he was convicted, Florida state law allowed for a conviction of robbery with a much lower level of force than the federal law required. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that Welch’s conviction for robbery under Florida state law was a predicate offense for the purpose of the ACCA because it involved force that was “capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”\nIn 2013, Welch filed a collateral challenge to his conviction and argued that his prior conviction for strong arm robbery vague and that his trial counsel had been ineffective in allowing him to be sentenced under the ACCA. He sought a certificate of appealability to the appellate court, which the district court denied. Welch then sought a certificate of appealability from the appellate court and noted that there was a challenge to the ACCA based on its vagueness pending in the Supreme Court, Johnson v. United States. The appellate denied the certificate of appealability.\nThree weeks later, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States and held that the residual clause of the ACCA, which included action that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” in the definition of a violent felony, was unconstitutionally vague. The Court held that the residual clause violated the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments because it was so vague that it failed to give people adequate notice of the conduct it punished. In order to apply the residual clause to a case, courts had to assess the “hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version” of the crime in question, which made the application of the clause unconstitutionally arbitrary and unpredictable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62664:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62664:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62664:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe rule that the Supreme Court announced in Johnson v. United States regarding what constitutes a violent offense for the purposes of sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act applies retroactively. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the rule announced in Johnson, that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague, was a substantive rule of criminal procedure because it altered “the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes.” Unlike procedural rules that alter the permissible methods for determining whether conduct is punishable, substantive rules affect the reach of the statute itself rather than how it is applied. While procedural rules are generally not retroactive, substantive rules are; therefore, the rule the Court announced in Johnson should apply retroactively to this case.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that neither the Supreme Court nor the lower appellate court should have reviewed this case because Welch had failed to raise the Johnson vagueness claims at the district court level, and the higher courts should be reviewing only the decision that the district court made based on the issues presented there. Justice Thomas also wrote that the Johnson rule was not substantive because it did not place any class of persons or punishments outside of the statute’s reach, nor did it announce a new constitutional rule. Instead, the rule in Johnson should be properly understood as addressing the manner of Congress’ defining a sentencing enhancement, not the substantive conduct that triggers it. Therefore, the Johnson rule should not be given retroactive effect.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62664:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62690:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62690:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn April 2011, Apple Inc. (Apple) sued Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd. (Samsung) and argued that certain design elements of Samsung’s smartphones infringed on specific patents for design elements in the iPhone that Apple holds. The jury held that Samsung had infringed on Apple’s patents and awarded over $1 billion in damages. The district court ordered a partial retrial on the issue of damages because some damages had been awarded for a period in which Samsung did not have notice of some of the asserted patents. On retrial, the jury awarded nearly $300 million in damages. On appeal, Samsung argued that the district court erred in allowing the jury to award damages based on Samsung’s entire profits, rather than the fraction of profits directly attributable to the infringed patents themselves. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of damages because Samsung did not argue that there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the award.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62690:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62690:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62690:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nFor the purpose of calculating damages in a patent infringement action, the infringing “article of manufacture” may be defined as either an end product sold to a consumer or as a component of that product. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that the relevant text of the Patent Act encompasses both an end product sold to a consumer as well as a component of that product. The fact that a component may be incorporated into the larger end product does not place it outside the category of an “article of manufacture.” Therefore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit erred in interpreting that phrase too narrowly to only refer to the end product. Under the proper reading of the phrase, an infringer will sometimes be liable for the total profit from the component of the end product, but the Court declined to determine whether that is the case here.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62690:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62693:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62693:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn May 2005, Juan Bravo-Fernandez, the president of a private security firm in Puerto Rico, and Hector Martinez-Maldonado, a member of the Puerto Rican Senate, traveled to Las Vegas to see a boxing match. Bravo-Fernandez and Martinez-Maldonado were later indicted on charges that Bravo-Fernandez’s payment for the trip was connected to Martinez-Maldonado’s support of legislation beneficial to the security firm. The charges included violations of the federal bribery statute, conspiracy, and the Travel Act, which prohibits travel in interstate commerce for a criminal purpose -- in this case, the violation of the federal bribery statute. The jury convicted the defendants of violating the federal bribery statute, but found the defendants not guilty of conspiracy to violate the statute or of violating the Travel Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the convictions for violating the federal bribery statute because the jury was improperly instructed about what the government needed to prove. The appellate court remanded the case.\nBased on this holding, the district court entered an order that acquitted the defendants, but that order was vacated after the government clarified that the appellate court’s decision vacating the federal bribery convictions did not require the district court to enter an order of acquittal. The district court subsequently entered an order that clarified that the bribery convictions were vacated. The defendants moved to reinstate the initial order and argued that it was a judgment of acquittal that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, could not be rescinded. The district court denied the motion. The defendants then moved for acquittal and argued that the original acquittals for the Travel Act and conspiracy charges prevented the government from relitigating the bribery charges because a jury had already determined that the government failed to prove elements essential to conviction under the bribery statute. The defendants argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits relitigation of these issues. The district court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62693:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62693:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62693:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent the government from retrying defendants after a jury returns an irreconcilably inconsistent verdict of convictions and acquittals and the convictions are later vacated based on a different legal error. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court determined that retrial in this case would be precluded if the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had vacated the convictions (a) due to insufficient evidence or (b) to resolve the inconsistency of the jury’s verdicts. However, because the vacated judgment was due to a legal error, the petitioners may be retried. The Court also drew a distinction between a hung jury and the jury’s verdict in this case. A hung jury means a jury did not reach a decision at all; in this case, the jury supplied both an acquittal and a conviction, notwithstanding that the decision was vacated on appeal due to a legal error. Because it is unclear what the jury would have concluded without the legal error, the Government is not precluded from a new trial on the jury’s returned convictions.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Court should reconsider the precedents established in Ashe v. Swenson and Yeager v. United States. In Ashe, the Court found that the Double Jeopardy Clause sometimes precludes a successive prosecution when facts essential to conviction of the second crime have been “necessarily” resolved in an acquittal of the first crime. Justice Thomas argued that the Court erroneously extended Ashe in Yeager, which “bar[red] retrial on hung counts” after an earlier stage of the same proceeding, not a prior proceeding. However, because this decision did not extend the holding in those cases, Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62693:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62694:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62694:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMiguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment in state trial court. After the entry of a guilty verdict, two jurors informed Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel that one of the other jurors made racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez and the alibi witness during jury deliberations. The trial court authorized Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel to contact the two jurors for their affidavits explaining what the “biased” juror said about Pena-Rodriguez or his alibi witness. Based on these affidavits, which related racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez’s likely guilt and the alibi witness’ lack of credibility because both were Hispanic, Pena-Rodriguez moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Colorado held the jurors’ affidavits were inadmissible under Rule 606(b) of Colorado’s Rules of Evidence, which prohibits juror testimony on any matter occurring during the jury deliberations. The Supreme Court of Colorado also held Rule 606(b) did not violate Pena-Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury because Pena-Rodriguez had waived that right by failing to adequately question jurors about their racial bias during voir dire.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62694:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62694:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62694:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nRule 606(b) of Colorado’s Rules of Evidence may not bar evidence of racial bias which is offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that, if a juror makes a clear statement that he or she convicted a criminal defendant relying on racial stereotypes or animus, the trial court is permitted to consider evidence of the juror’s statements. The Court reiterated the sanctity of the jury to our criminal justice system and its reluctance to interfere with it. Rule 606(b), the no-impeachment rule, stems from the desire to prevent jurors from testifying about their deliberation after the verdict was entered, and it is a common law principle that is more lenient in some states than others. However, the Court noted that there was a possibility of an exception in the “gravest and most important cases.” In certain rare cases, when racial animus is apparent in a juror, the no-impeachment rule shall be set aside in an effort to protect the Sixth Amendment. Not every “offhand” racial comment from a juror will warrant setting aside the no-impeachment rule. The exception demands that a juror exhibit overt racial animus that calls into question his or her ability to make a fair and impartial judgment about the defendant. Although the Court noted that there were processes currently in place to prevent racial bias in juries, such as the process of voir dire--the preliminary examination and elimination of jury members--these protections were often not sufficient, and therefore this exception was necessary. In this case, the Court held that the juror’s statements were “egregious and unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias.” The juror in question also encouraged other jurors to join in his racially-motivated conviction.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion incorrectly interpreted the Sixth Amendment and its precedents. He explained that common law tradition does not permit impeachment of a verdict based on juror misconduct. If there is a reason to set aside the no-impeachment rule, it should be the legislature’s role to do so, not the role of the judiciary. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that barring the admission of juror testimony is deeply rooted in the criminal justice system’s history. He argued that, although racial bias is important to prevent, it should be treated no differently than other forms of impartiality by a juror for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62694:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62700:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62700:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarcelo Manrique was convicted in federal district court of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to a life term of supervised release and mandatory restitution, though the final judgment did not include an amount for the restitution and stated that would be included in the amended judgment. Manrique filed his notice of appeal before the amended judgment was entered. When the amended judgment was entered while the appeal was pending, it included the details of the restitution award, and both parties subsequently included arguments regarding the challenge of the award in their briefs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the restitution award because Manrique did not file a second notice of appeal regarding the amended judgment that included the amount of the restitution award.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62700:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62700:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62700:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAppellate courts may not review a restitution award where the amended judgment of the lower court granting restitution is entered after notice of appeal was filed. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, in order to secure appellate review of a judgment, a party must file notice of appeal from that particular judgment after that judgment has been entered. In this case, Manrique filed his only notice of appeal several months before the amended judgment granting restitution was entered. The Court rejected Manrique’s argument that the initial judgment deferring restitution and amended judgment granting restitution combined to form a single judgment. Instead, in cases of deferred restitution, the initial judgment and amended judgment qualify as two distinct appealable judgments. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment and held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit did not have jurisdiction to review the amended judgment.\nIn her dissenting opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that the district court failed to notify Manrique of his right to appeal from the amended judgment. Additionally, because the district court clerk sent the record for the amended judgment to the appellate court without waiting for Manrique to file notice of appeal, the district court conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court. Such conferral, Justice Ginsburg contended, adequately substituted the requirement that Manrique file a second notice of appeal from the amended judgment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62700:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62701:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62701:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nStanley Hsu, a Taiwanese business man, opened a Bank of America bank account while working in the United States. When he returned to Taiwan, he arranged for the daughter of one of his employees to receive his mail and forward it to him in Taiwan. Lawrence Eugene Shaw lived with the daughter and regularly checked her mail. When the Bank of America statements arrived for Hsu’s account, Shaw concocted a scheme in which he opened a PayPal account under Stanley Hsu’s name and used it to convince banks that he was Hsu for the purpose of transferring money from Hsu’s accounts to the PayPal account and from there to an account that Shaw controlled. Using this scheme, Shaw was able to transfer approximately $307,000 of Hsu’s money to himself before the fraud was discovered. Bank of America returned approximately $131,000 to Hsu, and PayPal returned approximately $106,000. Hsu lost about $170,000 by not notifying the banks within 60 days of the fraudulent transactions, as standard banking procedures require.\nThe government charged Shaw with violating the Bank Fraud Act of 1984, which criminalizes schemes “to defraud a financial institution.” Shaw requested a jury instruction that stated that the government had to prove that he intended not only to defraud the bank but also that he intended to target the bank as the principal financial victim. The district court refused to give the instruction and determined that the language of the Act required that the government prove only that the defendant intended to deceive the bank, not that he also intended the bank to bear the loss that resulted from the fraud. The jury convicted Shaw of 14 counts of bank fraud under the Act, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62701:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62701:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62701:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the statute at issue states deals specifically with property rights, and a bank has property rights in a bank account because the bank has the right to use the funds as a source of funds for loans that earn the bank interest. Therefore, any scheme that involves defrauding the funds from a bank account necessarily involves defrauding a bank. Although the statute requires that the government show there was a scheme to defraud, it does not require the government to show that the bank actually sustained a financial loss or that the intent of the scheme was to cause the bank to sustain a financial loss. Similarly, the defendant cannot argue that he didn’t have actual knowledge that the bank would be harmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62701:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62702:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62702:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVarsity Brands, Inc. (Varsity) designs and manufactures clothing and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for the clothing incorporate elements such as colors, shapes, lines, etc., and do not consider the functionality of the final clothing. Varsity received copyright registration for the two-dimensional artwork of the designs at issue in this case, which were very similar to ones that Star Athletica, LLC (Star) was advertising. Varsity sued Star and alleged, among other claims, that Star violated the Copyright Act. Star asserted counterclaims, including one that alleged that Varsity had made fraudulent representations to the Copyright Office because the designs at issue were not copyrightable. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Star argued that Varsity did not have valid copyrights because the designs were for “useful articles,” which cannot be copyrighted, and the designs cannot be separated from the uniforms themselves, which also makes the designs impossible to copyright. Varsity argued that the designs were separable and non-functional, and therefore that the copyrights were valid and had been infringed. The district court granted summary judgment for Star and held that the designs were integral to the functionality of the uniform. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the Copyright Act allows graphic features of a design to be copyrighted even when those designs are not separable from a “useful article.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62702:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62702:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62702:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA feature of a useful article is copyrightable if it can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional artwork that is separable from the useful article and if it would be a protectable pictorial, graphical, or sculptural work on its own (or if applied to another medium, such as a canvas). Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the Copyright Act clearly requires that, to be copyrightable, a design element of a useful article must be able to be identified separately from the article and be capable of existing separately from the article. The separate identification prong of this test requires only that the decisionmaker be able to distinguish a two- or three-dimensional element that has pictorial, graphical, or sculptural qualities. To satisfy the independent-existence requirement, the decisionmaker must determine that the element can exist as its own pictorial, graphical, or sculptural work and not merely as a part of a replica of the useful article in a different medium. This interpretation is consistent not only with the text of the Copyright Act but also with its history. In this case, the decoration designs of cheerleading uniforms satisfy both prongs of the test because the decorations can be identified as having their own pictorial, graphical, or sculptural qualities, and they would be copyrightable on their own if separated from the uniforms. The Court determined that the fact that the designs on their own still retained the outline of the cheerleading uniforms did not prevent them from being copyrightable because artwork designed to fit a particular space or object does not replicate that object or space when applied to a different medium. The Court rejected alternative tests for separability as ungrounded in the text of the statute.\n In her opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that separability analysis was unnecessary in this case because the designs are themselves copyrightable and are merely reproduced on useful articles. The designs are clearly pictorial, graphical, or sculptural works, which are copyrightable. The copyright for such a work includes the right to reproduce the work on a useful article and exclude a would-be infringer from doing the same.\n Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that, although he agreed with the majority opinion’s analysis of the test that the statute required, the designs at issue in this case failed the test. A feature is not separable from the useful article if it cannot be extracted without necessarily replicating the useful article in another medium. Because the designs in this case could only be represented as pictures, and therefore replicas, of the uniforms, they were not capable of existing independently of the useful article. Based on the statutory text and relevant case law, the designs fail the second prong of separability test. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62702:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62703:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62703:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag (SCA) produces adult incontinence products, as does First Quality Baby Products, LLC (First Quality). In 2003, SCA notified First Quality that it believed First Quality was infringing on one of its patents, and First Quality responded by arguing that, because the SCA patent in question was essentially the same as a prior-filed patent, it was invalid and therefore First Quality could not be infringing. The two companies ceased communication on the issue, but in 2004, SCA requested that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) reexamine its patent in light of the prior-filed one, and in 2007, the PTO determined that the patent in question was valid.\nIn 2010, SCA sued First Quality for patent infringement. First Quality moved for summary judgment because SCA had unreasonably delayed litigation, and the district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion regarding the unreasonable delay because SCA should have been able to proceed with litigation after the reexamination and had not provided evidence to justify the delay. SCA requested a rehearing before the entire appellate court to reconsider the issue in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, which held that the unreasonable delay defense cannot bar suits for copyright infringement that occurred during the three-year limitations period, and argued that the same analysis should apply to patent suits like this one. Upon rehearing, the appellate court rejected SCA’s argument and held that the Petrella decision did not affect its precedent, which stated that an unreasonable delay defense may be used in patent infringement claims brought within the six-year statute of limitations, and courts must examine the circumstances underlying those claims and the defense.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62703:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62703:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62703:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAn unreasonable delay in litigation is not a defense against a claim for damages brought within the six-year statutory period of limitations in a patent infringement case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the reasoning of Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, which held that an unreasonable delay defense cannot bar relief within the three-year statute of limitations for copyright cases, also applies to a patent infringement case. Because the unreasonable delay defense was meant to be in place when there was no statute of limitations, applying the defense during the statute of limitations period would conflict with the purpose of the defense. The Court explained that, at the time of the Patent Act’s enactment, there was a well-established general rule that the unreasonable delay defense cannot be used to bar damages on a claim filed during the statute of limitations period and that First Quality did not properly consider this rule. Although the rule was established in the context of patent cases, there is no “unambiguous consensus of lower court decisions” to support that patent law cases should be treated differently than copyright cases for this purpose.\nIn his dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the language of the Patent Act does not explicitly contain a statute of limitations period. Instead, the language allows a patentee to sue any time after an infringement takes place and sue in hopes of recovering significant damages from the preceding six years. The unreasonable delay defense prevents a plaintiff from succeeding in this effort and therefore should apply to patent cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62703:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62714:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62714:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMany homeowners in the Gulf Coast area had two separate insurance policies: One that covered flood but not wind damage, and another that covered wind but not flood damage. These policies were frequently administered by the same private insurance company, but the company would be responsible for paying wind damage claims, while government funds would pay for flood damage claims; therefore, there was an incentive for the companies to classify damage as caused by flood rather than wind. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (State Farm) was one of these companies that administered such policies in the Gulf Coast area. Cori Rigsby was a State Farm claims adjuster who believed that State Farm was wrongfully seeking to maximize its policyholders’ flood damage claims and minimize wind damage claims after Hurricane Katrina. Rigsby sued State Farm under the False Claims Act (FCA). The district court determined that State Farm had submitted false claims in violation of the FCA. On appeal, State Farm argued Rigsby had violated the FCA’s seal requirement, which stated that the complaint cannot be disclosed until the court orders the complaint served on the defendant, and that violation of the FCA seal requirement warrants immediate dismissal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, although Rigsby violated the seal requirement by disclosing the existence of the suit, the violation of the seal requirement does not warrant immediate dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62714:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62714:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62714:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that a violation of the False Claims Act’s seal requirement does not mandate dismissal of the complaint. The Court determines that the purpose of the requirement, in part, was the protect the government’s interests and therefore that a “rigid interpretation” of the requirement would undermine that interest. Furthermore, there is no legislative history to suggest Congress intended to condition a private right of action on compliance with a statutory mandate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62714:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62715:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62715:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBased on the 2010 Census, the Virginia General Assembly sought to redraw the legislative districts for the Virginia Legislature. At the time the districting legislation was prepared, Virginia was subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and therefore any new districting plan must have ensured that there would be no “retrogression” in the ability of racial minorities to elect the candidate of their choice. Accordingly, the new districting plan contained 12 majority-minority districts. On December 22, 2014, the plaintiffs, each of whom resided in one of the twelve challenged districts, sued and argued that those districts constituted racial gerrymanders that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the plaintiffs did not establish that race was the predominant factor in the creation of 11 of the 12 challenged district. The district court also held that, although race was the predominant factor in the creation of one district, in doing so the General Assembly was pursuing a compelling state interest and its use of race was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62715:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62715:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62715:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nRace can still be shown to be the predominant factor in redistricting even when traditional principles are respected, and district courts must engage in a holistic analysis of alleged racial gerrymanders. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the six-justice majority. The Court held that the lower court erred in applying the controlling legal principles in this case. Challengers to an alleged racial gerrymander do not need to show an actual conflict between the enacted redistricting plan and traditional redistricting principles; while such evidence might be persuasive, it is not required. Racial predominance can be shown through other factors, such the circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape or demographics, or more direct evidence regarding legislative purpose. The Court also held that a court’s analysis of an alleged racial gerrymander must be a holistic view of the whole district rather than focusing on the extent to which individual lines may deviate from the traditional principles. Therefore, any explanation for a particular portion of the lines must take into account the context of the district as a whole. On the issue of House District 75, the Court determined that the predominant use of race was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest because the legislature engaged in a careful functional analysis in apportioning the district.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, when a legislature creates a majority-minority voting district, the legislature is using race as a predominant motivation and therefore that action must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Justice Alito therefore joined the majority’s opinion regarding the acceptability of House District 75 and agreed that the other districts should be reexamined, but under the same standard as House District 75. In his separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that, because the legislature clearly created majority-minority districts, race was the predominating factor in creating those districts. Therefore the creation of such districts must be shown to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority’s holding that House District 75 satisfied this standard because the state neither asserted a sufficiently compelling interest nor was its use of race in the districting process narrowly tailored to serve the interest it asserted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62715:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62716:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62716:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1980, Bobby James Moore was convicted of capital murder for the shooting of James McCarble, a seventy-year-old store clerk, in Houston, Texas. Moore was sentenced to death, and his conviction and sentence were both affirmed on appeal. After a federal court granted habeas corpus relief, a new punishment hearing occurred in 2001, and Moore was again sentenced to the death penalty. His sentence was again affirmed on appeal. Moore sought state habeas relief and argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia should apply to his case; therefore, because he was intellectually disabled, he was exempt from execution. The habeas court granted relief based on the Atkins argument. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, however, reversed and held that Moore had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he had the requisite intellectual disability for the Atkins precedent to apply based on Texas case law that used a 1992 definition of intellectual disability.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62716:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62716:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62716:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe use of an outdated medical definition of intellectual disability violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as well as Supreme Court precedent. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that, by rejecting the habeas court’s application of medical guidance, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas (CCA) applied the wrong standard when it denied Moore habeas relief and approved his execution. State standards for determining when a person is exempt from the death sentence because of mental disability cannot ignore current medical standards defining mental disability. The CCA standard differed from current medical standards in multiple respects. First, the CCA failed to consider the “standard error of measurement” for Moore’s IQ score, which indicated his IQ was likely to fall within a range that dipped into a level consistent with mental disability. Second, the CCA gave improper weight to Moore’s perceived strengths when evaluating his ability to navigate everyday life; medical standards instead focus on a person’s deficits. Third, the CCA also relied on ”evidentiary factors” from Texas case law based on stereotypes about mental disability that create an unacceptable risk that mentally disabled persons will be executed.\nIn his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., agreed that the evidentiary factors the CCA applied violated the Eighth Amendment, but he argued that Moore’s IQ score established he was not mentally disabled. More broadly, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the majority opinion gave states too little guidance on how to properly enforce the Eighth Amendment ban on executing the mentally disabled. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62716:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62717:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62717:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 1995, Duane Edward Buck was arrested for the murder of his ex-girlfriend, Debra Gardner, and her friend Kenneth Butler. Buck was convicted of capital murder for both of the deaths. During the penalty phase of trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Buck’s future dangerousness based on his criminal history, his conduct, and his demeanor before and after arrest. The defense presented the testimony of a clinical psychologist to evaluate the risk of future dangerousness. That expert stated that he considered demographic factors, including race, in his analysis and that, statistically, minorities are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. On cross-examination, the prosecution clarified that the expert’s opinion was that the race factor “black” increased the likelihood of future dangerousness. The jury found that there was sufficient evidence of Buck’s future dangerousness without any sufficient mitigating factors to justify a life sentence, so the jury sentenced Buck to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence.\nBuck filed various claims for state and federal habeas relief that were denied, until the U.S. Supreme Court decided Trevino v. Thaler, which held that Texas’ procedural scheme made it almost impossible to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, and therefore that a procedural default on such a claim could be excused. While some of these claims were pending, the state attorney general admitted in a different case that the state should not have called an expert witness to testify about future dangerousness of a defendant based on race and named Buck’s case as one affected by similar testimony. Buck again sought federal habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel knowingly called an expert witness who testified that race was a factor in determining future dangerousness. The district court dismissed the claim because Buck failed to show that the outcome of his trial was prejudiced. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly denied Buck’s request for a Certificate of Appealability by holding that Buck did not show sufficient extraordinary circumstances to justify relief from the lower court’s judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62717:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62717:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62717:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the wrong standard of review when it denied Buck’s Certificate of Appealability (COA) for failing to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority, which held that the proper standard of review in COA analysis was whether Buck’s claim was reasonably debatable. An appellate court should not consider the actual merits of an appeal unless it first determined that the claim was reasonably debatable. In this case, by essentially deciding the appeal on its actual merits and then denying Buck’s COA based on that adjudication, the Fifth Circuit inverted the COA analysis and imposed an undue burden on Buck. The Court also held that Buck successfully demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel. It reasoned that Buck received inadequate assistance of counsel because his attorney introduced evidence that Buck was liable to be a future danger because of his race, and that it was reasonably probable that without this testimony he may not have been sentenced to death. Finally, the Court held that the district court’s denial of Buck’s motion for habeas relief was an abuse of discretion and noted that there was a reasonable probability that Buck was sentenced to death in part based on his race. To punish someone based on an immutable characteristic, the Court noted, “is a disturbing departure from a basic premise of our criminal justice system: Our law punishes people for what they do, not who they are.”\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion misapplied settled law in order to reach the outcome it desired. Under the majority’s construction of the COA analysis, no COA could ever be denied. The proper construction of the COA analysis requires that, in order to deny a COA because the prisoner’s claim is not reasonably debatable, a court must first determine that it is meritless. Justice Thomas also argued that Buck failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not demonstrate that his counsel materially prejudiced his defense. Additionally, Justice Thomas wrote that the district court’s denial of Buck’s motion for habeas relief was not an abuse of discretion, and he criticized the level of deference shown by the majority towards the findings of the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62717:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62721:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62721:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1998, Congress enacted the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), which provided that, if a position for which the President nominates and the Senate confirms (PAS position) becomes vacant, the first assistant automatically takes over as an “acting officer” for a period of 210 days. The President may also select a senior employee from the same agency or someone in a PAS position from another agency to serve as the acting officer. Pursuant to the FVRA, when the Ronald Meisberg resigned as the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a PAS position, the President directed Lafe Solomon, who held a senior position in the NLRB, to serve as the Acting General Counsel. Six months into his tenure, the President nominated him for the General Counsel position, but the Senate did not confirm him. On October 29, 2013, the Senate confirmed a different nominee, so by the time he stepped down, Solomon had served as Acting General Counsel from June 21, 2010, until November 4, 2013.\nSW General, Inc. provides ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona. Its emergency medical technicians (EMTs), nurses, and firefighters, are negotiated by a union that had negotiated with SW General for “longevity pay,” which meant that employees who had been with the company for at least ten years were guaranteed annual bonuses. In December 2012, between the expiration of one collective bargaining agreement and the negotiation of a new one, SW General stopped paying the longevity pay. The union filed an unfair labor practices claim with the NLRB, which issued a formal complaint. An administrative law judge determined that SW General had committed unfair labor practices, and SW General filed a list of exceptions, among which was a claim that Acting General Counsel was serving in violation of the FVRA. A provision of the FVRA states that the acting officer may not become the nominee for the position, and the nominee to fill the position may not serve in an acting capacity unless that nominee was the first assistant to the vacant position for at least 90 days in the previous year. Solomon was briefly a nominee for the position, and he had not served as the first assistant to the vacant position. SW General petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, and the appellate court did not address the merits of the case because it determined that Solomon’s tenure as Acting General Counsel violated the FVRA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62721:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62721:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62721:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe limitation on nominees to vacant positions serving in an acting capacity under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) apply equally to all nominees. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the FVRA prohibits any person nominated for a position for which the President nominates and the Senate confirms (PAS position) from performing the duties of that office. The Court determined that that the statutory language of the FVRA applied equally to first assistants who automatically assume such duties under Act and individuals selected by the President. The language left no room for any other interpretation. Thus, Solomon violated the FVRA when he continued to perform the duties of NLRB General Counsel after the President nominated him for the position.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the appointment of NLRB General Counsel under the FVRA without Senate approval is likely prohibited by the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the FVRA’s prohibitions against nominees to a PAS position performing the duties of the office only applies to first assistants who serve as acting officials automatically under the Act. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62721:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62722:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62722:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSections of the Immigration and Nationality Act require that noncitizens who are determined to be inadmissible to the United States must be detained during removal proceedings, though some may be released on bond if they can demonstrate that they are not a flight risk or a danger to the community. Alejandro Rodriguez and other detained noncitizens sued and argued that their prolonged detention without hearings and determinations to justify the detentions violated their due process rights. After litigation regarding class certification, the district court granted a preliminary injunction that required the government to provide each detainee with a bond hearing and to release that detainee unless the government could show, by clear and convincing evidence, that continued detention was justified. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that prolonged detention without a hearing raised serious constitutional concerns, and therefore that the relevant mandatory statutory language should be interpreted as having a time limitation; at the six-month mark, detainees are entitled to bond hearings. Because the plaintiff class proved that it was likely to succeed on the merits, the appellate court affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction. The plaintiff class then moved for a permanent injunction, which the district court granted and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court also determined that the duration of future detention and likelihood of eventual removal should not be considered in the bond hearings, and the noncitizens are entitled to bond hearings at six-month intervals throughout their detentions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62722:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62722:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62722:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) do not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention, and the Ninth Circuit misapplied the canon of constitutional avoidance in holding otherwise. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II (for which there was a plurality). Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full, and Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II (regarding jurisdiction of the Court to hear the case).\nIn Part II-A, a plurality of the Court (Alito, Roberts, Kennedy) held that it had jurisdiction to consider the respondents' claims, despite potential obstacles from 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and 1226(e). Section 1252(b)(9) limits the availablility of judicial review in removal proceedings to final orders only. The plurality noted that the \"respondents are not asking for review of an order of removal; they are not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal; and they are not even challenging any part of the process by which their removability will be determined.\" Thus, that section does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction in this case.\nIn Part II-B, the plurality similarly found that Section 1226(e), which states that the attorney general's discretionary judgment in removal matters \"shall not be subject to review.\" It found that a challenge to the extent of the government's detention authority is outside the scope of this provision and thus that exercise of jurisdiction is proper.\nWriting for the majority (Alito, Roberts, Kennedy, Gorsuch, Thomas) in Part III, Justice Alito considered the merits of the arguments. In III-A, he looked directly to the statutory text of Sections 1225(b) and found nothing in the text from which to infer a six-month time limit on the length of detention. Without textual support, the canon of constitutional avoidance is inapplicable, and the Ninth Circuit was incorrect to rely on Zadvydas v. Davis as authority for inferring a time limit.\nIn Part II-B, the majority interpreted Section 1226(c), which allows aliens to be released \"only if\" the attorney general decides that certain conditions are met, as unequivocally prohibiting their release under any other conditions. Because release on bail is prohibited, a bail hearing (periodic or otherwise) is unnecessary.\nIn Part II-C, the majority and Justice Sonia Sotomayor found that Section 1226(a) authorizes the attorney general to arrest and detain an alien \"pending a decision\" on removal and permits the attorney general to release the alien on bond. Nothing in the text of this provision supports the imposition of periodic bond hearings or the consideration of the length of detention to determine whether an alien should be released.\nJustice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined except for footnote 6. Justice Thomas opined that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) because claims challenging detention during removal proceedings fall squarely within the jurisdictional bar in that provision. Justice Thomas also wrote to say that the application of Section 1252(b)(9) does not violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62722:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "62722:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62722:Conclusion:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThomasfiledanopinionconcurringinpartandconcurringinthejudgment,inwhichJusticeGorsuchjoinedexceptforfootnote6.JusticeThomasopinedthattheCourtlacksjurisdictiontohearthecaseunder8U.S.C.§1252(b)(9)becauseclaimschallengingdetentionduringremovalproceedingsfallsquarelywithinthejurisdictionalbarinthatprovision.JusticeThomasalsowrotetosaythattheapplicationofSection1252(b)(9)doesnotviolatetheSuspensionClauseoftheConstitution.\nJustice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. The dissent highlights the fact that the case concerns \"persons whom immigration authorities believe are not citizens and may not have a right to enter into, or remain within, the United States\" but who \"[n]onetheless ... likely have a reasonable claim that they do have such a right.\" The dissent looks to constitutional language, purposes, and tradition, to find that bail is most likely required in these instances of civil confinement, and that at the very least a bail hearing is required. Finally, the dissent finds that interpreting the statute to require bail proceedings in instances of prolonged detention does not run contrary to the plain language or purpose of the statute.\nJustice Kagan took no part in the decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62722:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "62723:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62723:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAfter the 2010 Census, pursuant to the state Constitution, the North Carolina state legislature appointed House and Senate Committees to prepare a redistricting plan for U.S. House of Representatives districts. The heads of the respective committees hired a redistricting coordinator to design the new districts. The coordinator was given instructions orally; there were no written records of the precise instructions he received. The heads of the committees published public statements that highlighted certain criteria used in creating their proposed redistricting plan, such as the fact that, according to Supreme Court interpretation of the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, districts must be constructed to have a “Black Voting Age Population” (BVAP) of 50% plus one. To comply with this criterion, two districts were altered to have a BVAP over 50%, which meant that there were two more majority-black districts than there were under the 2001 Congressional Districting Plan. The state legislature enacted the new plan and the Department of Justice granted it preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.\nDavid Harris and Christine Bowser are U.S. citizens registered to vote in the two districts at issue. They sued and argued that North Carolina used the Voting Rights Act’s requirements as a pretext to place more black voters in those two districts to reduce black voters’ influence in other districts. The district court determined that race was the predominant factor motivating the redistricting plan and therefore that the redistricting plan was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62723:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62723:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62723:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe district court did not error in determining that North Carolina’s new districting plan constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, and neither claim nor issue preclusion based on the state court case dictate the outcome of this case. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the district court was presented with sufficient evidence to find that race was the predominant rationale for the redistricting. Additionally, North Carolina did not meet its burden of proving that it had a compelling interest to sort voters based on race that it met with narrowly tailored means. Although complying with the Voting Rights Act (VRA) might serve as a compelling reason, the state must demonstrate that it had good cause to think that it would transgress the requirements of the VRA if it did not draw race-based district boundaries. Because there was no evidence of “white bloc voting” prior to the new districting plan, there was no sufficient reason for the state to think there was a potential VRA violation that required race-based districting. The Court also held that, although issue or claim preclusion may arise when plaintiffs in two cases have a special relationship, the state never proved that such a relationship existed between the plaintiffs in this case and those in the similar state court case.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the relevant section of the VRA does not apply to redistricting and therefore could not be used to justify racial gerrymandering.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that, in evaluating a potential racial gerrymander, courts must assume the good intentions of the legislature. Therefore, the plaintiffs must meet the burden of showing that the legislature was improperly motivated by race and could have achieved any legitimate political objectives through another redistricting plan. The plaintiffs in this case failed to meet that burden by not submitting an alternative map of the districts in question. Although the majority opinion argued that the alternative map was only one method of showing that race was the predominant redistricting factor, Justice Alito wrote that the requirement was a sound one, based in precedent, that reflected the familiar allocation of burdens of proof. Additionally, Justice Alito argued that the lower court was not presented with sufficient evidence that considerations about race dominated the redistricting effort. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62723:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62725:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62725:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPromega Corporation owned four patents and was the exclusive licensee of another one for technology used in kits that can conduct genetic testing. The kits are usually used for the purposes of identifying forensic or paternity matches. In 2010, Promega sued Life Technologies Corporation (LifeTech) for infringing on the patents in question, and LifeTech filed counterclaims that argued that the asserted claims of the patents were invalid. The district court determined that LifeTech had directly infringed on the patents and the case proceeded to damages. During the damages phase, there was a dispute about whether or not Promega had met its burden to prove that it was eligible for damages based on its worldwide sales. The jury determined that Promega was eligible for the worldwide damages, but the district court granted LifeTech’s motion to vacate the judgment because it determined that, as a matter of law, Promega had failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain that jury verdict. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and determined that there was substantial evidence that LifeTech was liable for worldwide damages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62725:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62725:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62725:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA single component cannot justify liability for the producer of the component.Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 7-0 majority. The Court held that, because the phrase “substantial portion” was attached to the phrase “of components of a patented invention” in the text of the statute, the word “substantial” was meant to be read as a quantitative measure. Further, the plural use of the word “components” indicated that a “substantial portion” must always be more than one component. Thus, a single component could never constitute a “substantial portion” of a multi-component invention. The Court also determined that Congress intended this reading because the statute was meant to fill a gap in patent law that prevented enforcement of patent rights on collections of components produced in the United States and sent overseas. Therefore, Lifetech was not liable because it only produced one of the five components required for the kits.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., noted that the majority opinion failed to identify what number of components constituted a “substantial portion.” Rather, the opinion only identified that one component is not sufficient.\nChief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., did not participate in the decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62725:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62730:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62730:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn April 11, 2007, Travis Beckles was arrested because a sawed-off shotgun was located in his residence, and he had previous felony convictions, mostly for drug possession and sales. Beckles was convicted, and during the sentencing phase of his trial, the district court determined that Beckles was an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) who had been in possession of a firearm and was therefore subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Beckles was eligible for a sentence range from 360 months to life imprisonment, and the court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, five months of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. Beckles appealed and argued that the Sentencing Guidelines imposed an unreasonable sentence, that his prior convictions did not qualify as “violent felonies” subject to sentencing enhancement under ACCA, and that possession of a sawed-off shotgun was not a “crime of violence” subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Beckles’ conviction and sentence.\nThe U.S. Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States, which determined that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutional. On remand, the appellate court again upheld Beckles’ conviction and sentence because possession of a sawed-off shotgun was a “crime of violence.” The appellate court also held that the Johnson decision did not affect this case because Beckles was not sentenced under the residual clause of ACCA but rather under express language from the Sentencing Guidelines about sentencing enhancements for crimes of violence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62730:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62730:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62730:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court’s holding in Johnson v. US does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 7-0 majority. The Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines were not unconstitutionally vague like the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the Sentencing Guidelines are a simply a guide to assist judges exercise discretion in sentencing. The Sentencing Guidelines are primarily advisory, and do not necessarily constrain judge’s discretion. While the ACCA provides notice of potential punishment by providing the range of potential imprisonment length, the Sentencing Guidelines need not do so, as they are meant to guide judges and therefore need not provide notice to people who might be prosecuted.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy noted that while Sentencing Guidelines are not necessarily immune from constitutional challenges, they may not be challenged for vagueness.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in judgment in which she stated that, since Beckles was already convicted of a crime of violence under the ACCA, he could not challenge the Sentencing Guidelines. She asserted that the Court should wait until a case better-suited for ruling on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines was before it. In her separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed with Justice Ginsburg that the Court did not need to rule on the Sentencing Guidelines because Beckles had already been convicted under the ACCA. Additionally, Justice Sotomayor stated that, because the Sentencing Guidelines provided such strong guidance, they should be subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause.\nJustice Elena Kagan did not participate in the decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62730:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62731:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62731:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCrystal Monique Lightfoot and Beverly Ann Hollis-Arlington sued the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) in federal district court and alleged numerous state and federal law claims arising out of the foreclosure proceedings Fannie Mae initiated against Hollis-Arlington’s home. The district court dismissed and held that the plaintiffs had failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding their claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.\nThe plaintiffs then sued in California state court and alleged the state law equivalents of the claims in the earlier federal suit. Fannie Mae removed the case to federal court and argued that its federal corporate charter contained language that granted federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over cases in which it was involved as a plaintiff or defendant. The plaintiffs in this case moved for a remand back to state court, but the district court denied the remand and then dismissed all the claims as having already been litigated in the earlier case in federal court. The appellate court determined that the language in Fannie Mae’s federal charter conferred subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts and affirmed the dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62731:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62731:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62731:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “to sue or and be sued” language in the federal charter of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) does not grant federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction over case involving Fannie Mae, and American National Red Cross v. S.G. need not be overturned. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which examined previous cases in which the Court had decided whether a “sue and be sued” clause conferred federal jurisdiction. Although the language in Fannie Mae’s charter looks like language in charters that the Court held conferred federal jurisdiction, it also included the qualification “of competent jurisdiction,” which the other clauses lacked. Because this language was not identical to those in the charters that the Court had held established federal subject matter jurisdiction, the previous cases do not control the outcome of this case. Instead, the additional “competent jurisdiction” language means that only a court with existing subject matter jurisdiction can hear a case in which Fannie Mae is suing or being sued. The Court’s prior opinion in American National Red Cross v. S.G. does not require a different result because it confirmed the rule that a “sue and be sued” clause only confers federal jurisdiction if it specifically references federal courts. There was no reason to think that Congress intended a different result.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62731:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62732:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62732:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act protects foreign sovereigns from suits in American courts unless one of a set of specifically enumerated exceptions applies. One of these exceptions is when the foreign sovereign takes U.S. property (the expropriation exception), and another is when the action of the foreign sovereign has direct effect on U.S. commercial activity (the commercial activity exception).\nOklahoma-based company Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company owns a subsidiary that contracts with the Venezuelan state-owned corporation that controls the exploration, production, and exportation of oil in Venezuela. In 2007, the two companies executed contracts for the Venezuelan corporation to use Helmerich & Payne’s drilling rigs. By 2008, the unpaid debt from those contracts totaled more than $63 million, and when the debt was over $100 million in 2009, Helmerich & Payne announced it would not be renewing the contract and packed up its drills. Employees of the Venezuelan corporation, assisted by members of the Venezuelan National Guard blockaded the yards in which Helmerich & Payne was keeping its equipment, and then-President Hugo Chavez issued a Decree of Expropriation. Helmerich & Payne sued Venezuela and its state-owned corporation in federal district court under the expropriation and commercial activity exceptions to the FSIA. Venezuela moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion with respect to the expropriation claim but denied it with respect to the commercial activity claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that, because the expropriation claim was neither insubstantial nor frivolous, the district court should not have granted the motion to dismiss that claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62732:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62732:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62732:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “frivolous or insubstantial” standard is not consistent with the text and purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that the expropriation exception to the FSIA was a threshold question of jurisdiction that did not require the court to delve into the merits of the case to determine whether the claim was frivolous or insubstantial. Although a court may take evidence to resolve factual questions, that should be limited to determining whether the allegations state a valid claim that the property at issue was taken in violation of international law. The Court held that this interpretation of the statute is consistent with its language and serves its purpose of preventing foreign sovereigns from being improperly entangled in court proceedings, which follows Supreme Court precedent and the relevant international law principles.\nJustice Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62732:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62734:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62734:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Frys’ daughter, E.F., was born with cerebral palsy and was prescribed a service dog to assist with everyday tasks. Her school, which provided her with a human aide in accordance with her Individualized Education Plan (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), did not allow her to bring her service dog to school. The Frys sued the school, the principal, and the school district and argued that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and state disabilities laws. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the claims necessarily implicated the IDEA, which required plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative remedies before suing under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The Frys appealed and argued that the exhaustion requirement did not apply because they were seeking damages, which is not the sort of relief the IDEA provided. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and held that the Frys’ claims were essentially educational, which are precisely the sort of claims the IDEA was meant to address, and therefore the exhaustion requirement applied.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62734:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62734:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62734:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) does not require that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before suing under the Americans with Disabilities Act if the plaintiff’s claims are not based in, and seeking relief for, the denial of a free and appropriate public education (FAPE). Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the plain language of the exhaustion requirement in the IDEA only applies to remedies that are “available” under that statutory scheme, which is entirely structured around ensuring the provision of FAPE. If a lawsuit is not seeking relief for the denial of FAPE, then it is not seeking an available remedy under the IDEA, and the exhaustion requirement does not apply. Therefore, in determining whether the plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies, courts must examine the substance of the plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether the plaintiff is seeking relief for a denial of FAPE. Although this examination must do more than look at how the plaintiff labels the relief she seeks, it does not require that the court determine the plaintiff could have sought such relief. In this case, the Frys’ complaint alleges only disability-based discrimination and makes no allegations about the denial of FAPE, but the Court did not foreclose the possibility that a more in-depth examination would reveal something different.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that some of the indicators the majority opinion identified as helpful in determining whether a complaint sought relief for denial of FAPE would only confuse lower courts. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62734:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62735:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62735:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJevic Transportation, Inc. was a trucking company headquartered in New Jersey that in 2006 was purchased by a subsidiary of Sun Capital Partners. In 2008, Jevic filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; at that point, it owed about $53 million to its first-priority senior secured creditors and about $20 million to its tax and general unsecured creditors. Two lawsuits ensued in bankruptcy court: one was the truck drivers suing Jevic for violating federal and state Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Acts, which required 60 days’ notice to workers before they were laid off, and the other was a fraudulent conveyance action on behalf of the unsecured creditors. In March 2012, the parties to the fraudulent conveyance action negotiated a structured dismissal settlement that disposed of many of the claims, but left out the drivers. The drivers objected to the settlement because it distributed property to creditors of lower priority than the drivers, according to the priorities established in the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court rejected the objections and approved the proposed settlement. The federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed and held that the bankruptcy court had the discretion to approve a settlement scheme outside of the Chapter 11 proceedings that did not comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s distribution scheme.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62735:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62735:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62735:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nBankruptcy courts cannot authorize distributions of settlement proceeds that do not follow the priority distribution scheme established in the Bankruptcy Code without the consent of the affected creditors. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, although the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly state that the priority distribution rules apply to structured dismissal settlements, the priority system is so integral to the Bankruptcy Code that it should be presumed to apply absent an affirmative expression of Congress’ intent to do otherwise. Although the dismissal sections of the Bankruptcy Code grant judges some flexibility, that flexibility should be interpreted in the larger context of the statute as limited to orders that protect the reliance interests in the bankruptcy case, including those based on the priority rules. Although there have been lower court holdings that have allowed for settlement distributions that violated the priority scheme, those were interim dispositions, rather than final dispositions as in this case. Allowing a settlement distribution to deviate from the priority distribution scheme at the final distribution stage would circumvent the Bankruptcy Code’s procedural safeguards and therefore is impermissible.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the parties briefed and argued a narrower issue than they had first presented to the Court. While the original question had been the subject of multiple cases in the lower courts that had come out different ways, the narrower formulation of the question has not been extensively addressed by the lower courts and the Court should have declined to answer it. Justice Alito joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62735:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62737:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62737:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe city of Miami sued Bank of America Corporation and similar defendants under the Federal Housing Act (FHA) and argued that the banks engaged in predatory lending practices that targeted minorities for higher-risk loans, which resulted in high rates of default and caused financial harm to the city. Miami also alleged that the banks unjustly enriched themselves by taking advantage of benefits conferred by the city, that their actions denied the city of expected property and tax revenues, and cost the city money that it would not have had to pay had the banks not engaged in these predatory lending practices. The district court dismissed the FHA claims and held that Miami did not fall within the “zone of interests” the statute was meant to protect, and therefore did not have standing to sue under the FHA. The district court also held that Miami had not adequately shown that the banks’ conduct was the proximate cause of the harm the city claimed to have suffered. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that, as long as the plaintiffs in an FHA case would have standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution, they can sue under the FHA; the statutory standing requirement is not more narrow than Article III. The appellate court also determined that Miami had sufficiently shown that the banks’ actions were the proximate cause of the harm because the harm was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the actions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62737:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62737:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62737:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “aggrieved persons” language of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) does not impose a more narrow standing standard than Article III does and allows a city to sue, but the proximate cause standard requires the plaintiffs to show more than the possibility that a defendant could have foreseen the harm. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that a plaintiff must meet the traditional standing requirements--an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and can be redressed by judicial action--as well as showing that the plaintiff’s injury falls within the zone of interests the statute at issue protects. In this case, the City of Miami’s alleged injuries clearly fall within the zone of interests the FHA protects because the City alleged economic injuries that were similar to those that had been sufficient to create standing in prior cases. However, the simple foreseeability of the harm based on the conduct at issue does not satisfy the proximate cause requirement. Because the housing market is so complex and interacts with so many other economic systems, such a loose standard would drastically increase FHA litigation, and nothing in the statute suggests that Congress intended to allow that. The Court held that the proximate cause requirement is met when a plaintiff can show that there is a “direct relation” between the alleged conduct and alleged injury.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the City’s alleged injuries fall outside of the zone of interests that the FHA was supposed to protect and therefore that the City cannot be an “aggrieved person.” Justice Thomas argued that similar statutory language had been interpreted to confer more limited standing than what Article III allows and that, by enacting such language, Congress did not intend to allow all persons who could claim an injury in fact to recover under the statute. The typical “aggrieved person” under the statute is a potential homebuyer or lessee, and while other people may have similar interests at stake, the interests of the City are too different from those the statute was meant to protect. Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that foreseeability was not sufficient to establish proximate cause. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nJustice Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62737:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62738:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62738:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLuis Ramon Morales-Santana was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic to a father who had become an American citizen in 1917 and a mother who was a citizen of the Dominican Republic. At the time, Morales-Santana’s parents were unmarried, and when they married in 1970, Morales-Santana was “legitimated” by his father’s citizenship, and he became a lawful permanent resident in 1975. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act in effect at the time of Morales-Santana’s birth, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and a non-citizen mother only had citizenship at birth if the citizen father was physically present in the United States or one of its possessions for a period totalling ten years at some point prior to the child’s birth, and at least five of those years had to be after the age of 14. Because Morales-Santana’s father was only physically present in Puerto Rico until 20 days before his 19th birthday, when he left to work in the Dominican Republic, he did not meet the requirements to transfer derivative citizenship to Morales-Santana upon his birth.\nIn 2000, Morales-Santana was placed in removal proceedings because he had been convicted of various felonies. He applied to have the removal withheld and argued that he had derivative citizenship from his father, but the immigration judge denied the application. Morales-Santana filed a motion to reopen and argued that the denial of derivative citizenship violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although his father did not satisfy the requirements for unwed citizen fathers to transfer derivative citizenship, he did meet the less stringent requirements for unwed citizen mothers (which required physical presence in the United States or one of its possessions for at least a year at some point prior to the child’s birth), and the gender-based difference was a violation of Equal Protection. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the gender-based difference in the physical presence requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62738:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62738:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62738:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe statutory distinction between the physical presence requirements for transferral of derivative citizenship for unwed citizen mothers and unwed citizen fathers of foreign-born children violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and it is up to Congress, rather than the courts, to create a uniform solution that does not disadvantage any person on the basis of gender. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that laws granting or denying benefits on the basis of the gender of the qualifying parent were subject to heightened review under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. To be valid, such legislation must serve an important government objective and the means of accomplishing it must be substantially related to that objective. In this case, the Immigration and Nationality Act did not meet that burden. Instead, the gender differential was based solely on the now-untenable assumption that an unwed mother is the “natural and sole guardian of non-marital children.” Although the petitioner argued that the physical presence requirements served the important interest of ensuring a connection between the foreign-born non-marital child and the United States, a gender-based description does not accomplish that goal. Because the gender-based difference was due to overbroad, disfavored generalizations about gender, it did not serve an important government objective and therefore failed to pass the heightened scrutiny test. Despite the fact that the distinction between the physical presence requirements violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the judicial branch cannot resolve the problem by determining which requirement controls. Congress must instead address that issue in legislation.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in part in which he argued that only Congress could remedy the alleged equal protection violation in this case. Because the Court could not grant the relief that Morales-Santana requested, the Court should not reach a decision on whether the requirements were constitutional. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment in part.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62738:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62753:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62753:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2003, Leroy, Donna, Barry, and Suzanne Haeger were injured when one of the tires on their motorhome failed while they were driving on the highway, which caused the motorhome to swerve off the road and overturn. The tire was manufactured by The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (Goodyear). In 2005, the Haegers sued Goodyear, which was represented by Basil J. Musnuff on all cases involving that particular model of tire and by Graeme Hancock as local counsel. The parties reached a settlement without going to trial in 2010.\nOver a year later, the Haegers’ attorney saw an article that indicated that Goodyear had done testing on the tire in question that had not been provided to the Haegers during discovery. The attorney filed a motion for sanctions with the district court and argued that Goodyear had committed discovery fraud by knowingly concealing crucial tests. Goodyear opposed the motion and argued that it had never represented that it provided all the test records that had been conducted on the tire at issue. The district court determined that Goodyear and Musnuff had deliberately tried to frustrate attempts to resolve the case on its merits. The district court also determined that, while it could not impose sanctions because the matter was settled, it could award the plaintiffs attorney’s fees for all costs incurred after Goodyear’s responses to the first discovery request, which came to approximately $2.7 million. Musnuff and Goodyear were held jointly responsible for 80% of this figure, and Hancock for the other 20%. Musnuff and Goodyear appealed and argued that the district court could not impose such sanctions without the additional procedural protections required for the imposition of punitive sanctions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in both appeals that the district court had not abused its discretion and affirmed the award of sanction fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62753:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62753:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62753:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSanctions imposed by a federal court for a litigant’s misconduct in civil proceedings must be compensatory, rather than punitive in nature. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that, when a federal court sanctions bad-faith conduct by ordering a litigant to pay the other side’s legal fees, the award is limited to the fees the innocent party incurred solely due to the misconduct. To issue sanctions that exceed compensation, a court would need to provide procedural protections applicable in criminal cases, such as the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof. However, courts have considerable discretion to make findings regarding the financial impact of a litigant’s misconduct. In some cases, these findings may include determining what expenses were incurred after a particular moment in time. The only constraint on a court’s award is that its sum must not exceed compensation for fees attributable to the offending litigant’s misconduct.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62753:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62754:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62754:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first-degree residential burglary; both convictions resulted in two years’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “crime of violence,” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed.\nWhile Dimaya’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA’s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62754:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62754:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62754:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Immigration and Nationality Act’s “crime of violence” provision is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the 5-4 opinion as to parts . To determine whether a person’s conduct falls within a \"crime of violence\" under Section 16(b), courts consider the overall nature of the offense, particularly “whether ‘the ordinary case’ of an offense poses the requisite risk.” The Court found that the term “ordinary case” under the “crime of violence” was too vague in that it risked unpredictable and arbitrary interpretation. In 2015, the Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a similar provision of a different statute, see Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), and this provision suffers from the same problems as the one in that case.\nA plurality of the court (the majority minus Justice Neil Gorsuch) rejected the government’s argument removal cases deserved a less rigid form of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, largely because the penalty of deportation is so severe. Justice Gorsuch wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which he opined that even civil statutes that do not involve removal should be subject to a stringent void-for-vagueness review.\nChief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, dissented. Chief Justice Roberts argued that unlike the provision of a criminal statute that the Court struck down as overly vague in Johnson, the provision of the INA does not present the same kind of uncertainty that was present in that case.\nJustice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined in part by Justices Kennedy and Alito, to express \"doubt that our practice of striking down statutes as unconstitutionally vague is consistent with the original meaning of the Due Process Clause.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62754:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62755:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62755:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEndrew F. is an autistic fifth grade student who was placed in private school because his parents believed his public school education was inadequate. Endrew was placed in Firefly Autism House and his parents sued for reimbursement of Endrew’s private school tuition and related expenses pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). IDEA provides that if a free public school cannot meet the educational needs of a disabled student, the student’s parents may enroll their child in a private school and seek reimbursement for tuition and related expenses.\nThis case first went to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for review. The ALJ rejected Endrew’s parent’s request for reimbursement concluding that Endrew’s public school had provided him with “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) as required by the IDEA. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s ruling and held that Endrew’s parents failed to meet their burden to prove that Endrew was not provided with FAPE. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62755:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62755:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62755:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn order to provide children with disabilities the free appropriate public education guaranteed by under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), school districts must offer children an Individualized Education Program (IEP) that is reasonably calculated to enable each child to make progress appropriate for that child’s circumstances. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the inquiry into whether an IEP is reasonably calculated to allow a child to make progress is necessarily an intensive, fact-specific one and therefore neither the Court nor the statute could create a substantive standard. The Court’s decision in Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley suggests that “appropriate progress” for most children would allow them to be fully integrated into the classroom and to advance from grade to grade. This requirement is substantially more than the “de minimus” benefit that the school district argued was all it was required to provide. However, the Court also held that the standard Endrew F.’s parents argued for was too rigorous and was similar to one that the Court had rejected in its decision in Rowley. In conducting its fact-intensive inquiry, a reviewing court should give deference to the expertise of school authorities but must still ensure that an IEP is reasonably calculated to enable each child to make progress appropriate for that child’s circumstances.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62755:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62756:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62756:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe New York General Business Law prohibits surcharges on credit card transactions. Expressions Hair Design, along with four other New York businesses and their owners, sued Eric T. Schneiderman, the Attorney General of New York, as well as the District Attorneys of New York County and argued both that the statute violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the statute was unconstitutional under both theories. The district court found that the statute impermissibly distinguished between surcharges and discounts, which narrowed the form of commercial speech available to the plaintiffs and violated the First Amendment. Additionally, the statute was vague because its application depended entirely on the labels plaintiffs used. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the statute qualified as permissible regulation of economic activity. The appellate court determined that prices were not inherently protected speech and that, because the surcharge provision had an easily understood meaning, the provision was not unconstitutionally vague.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62756:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62756:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62756:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe New York General Business Law’s prohibition of credit card surcharges regulates speech and therefore implicates the First Amendment, but it is not unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the challenged law regulated speech, and not just conduct, because the law specifically regulates the manner in which businesses may communicate their prices to consumers. Because the U.S. Court of Appeals concluded that the law did not regulate speech, it did not determine whether the law violated the First Amendment, so the case was remanded for reconsideration in light of this decision. The Court also determined that the law was not unconstitutionally vague because the law clearly prohibits certain types of speech and specifically the speech these businesses wish to use.\nIn his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that virtually all government regulation affects speech. To determine what level of scrutiny to apply, courts generally consider the extent to which the challenged regulation affects a protected First Amendment interest. In this case, because the extent to which the New York law affects a protected First Amendment interest is unclear, Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that the case should be remanded. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which she argued that it was not clear exactly what the New York law prohibited, and that the case could not be properly resolved until the state courts authoritatively interpreted the law. Therefore, the appellate court should have either abstained from interpreting the law or certified the question to the highest state court. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62756:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62757:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62757:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDamiana Ochoa filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against her former employer, McLane Company (McLane), for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. McLane required all new employees and employees returning work after a medical leave to take a physical capability strength test for positions that are classified as physically demanding. Ochoa failed the test three times, and therefore her employment was terminated. The EEOC opened up an investigation into McLane Co. During the investigation, the EEOC issued a subpoena for information McLane withheld, including either “pedigree information” for each test-taker or reasons the test-taker’s employment was terminated. McLane continued to refuse to provide that information, so the EEOC filed a subpoena enforcement action. The district court required McLane to disclose some of the information the EEOC subpoenaed, but it refused to require McLane to divulge the “pedigree information” or reasons for termination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part after reviewing the lower court’s decision “de novo,” or without giving deference to the lower court’s determination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62757:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62757:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62757:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA district court’s determination on whether to enforce an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) subpoena should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, which gives deference to the lower court’s determination. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that, when there is no explicit statutory command regarding the level of deference a lower court’s determination deserves, there are two relevant factors to consider: the history of appellate practice and whether one actor is better positioned to decide the issue in question. In reviewing a district court’s decision of whether to enforce or quash an administrative subpoena, the history of appellate practice as well as current practice is for such decisions to be reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. This standard also reflects the fact that these decisions are case-specific ones that a district court judge is in a better position to make than an appellate court. Therefore, both factors indicate that the abuse of discretion standard is the correct one for appellate courts to use when reviewing a district court’s decision to enforce or quash an EEOC subpoena. Because the lower appellate court in this case did not review the district court’s decision under the correct standard, the Court remanded the case.\nIn her opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that, although the abuse of discretion standard is the correct one, the lower appellate court’s decision should be affirmed. Justice Ginsburg argued that the district court’s refusal to enforce the subpoena rested on legal error, and questions of legal error are reviewed under the “de novo” standard, without deference.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62757:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62759:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62759:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe respondents in this case are a group of male, non-U.S. citizens, most of whom are Muslim of Middle Eastern origin who were detained after the September 11, 2001 attacks and treated as “of interest” in the government’s investigation of these events. In their original claims, the plaintiffs alleged that they were detained without notice of the charges against them or information about how they were determined to be “of interest,” that their access to counsel and the courts was interfered with, and that they were subjected to excessively harsh treatment during their detention. They also asserted that their race, ethnicity, and national origin played a determinative role in the decision to detain them. The plaintiffs sued a number of government officials and argued that the government used their status as non-citizens to detain them when the government’s real purpose was to investigate whether they were terrorists and that the conditions of their confinement violated their Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. After a series of motions to dismiss, the district court dismissed the claims regarding the length of confinement but allowed the Constitutional claims to proceed. Both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed various aspects of that ruling.\nWhile that appeal was pending, some of the plaintiffs settled their claims against the government and the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which held that a complaint must allege sufficient facts to be plausible on its face and to allow a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the claimed conduct. Based on these events, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the length of confinement claims but remanded the conditions of confinement claims and allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The appellate court again dismissed some of the claims and allowed others to proceed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62759:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62759:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62759:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn suits against government officials for personally violating the Constitution, “context” should be defined narrowly for the purpose of determining whether a claim arose in a “new context,” and the government officials in this case are entitled to qualified immunity. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 4-2 majority. The Court held that Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents established an implied right of action to sue a federal official for money damages when the official violated constitutional rights. However, the Court had declined to extend the Bivens precedent because Congress had not enacted a statute that allowed for this type of remedy. Therefore, in order to respect the separation of powers, the situations in which a court determined that there was an implied right of action for monetary damages against a federal official should be rare. If there were “special factors counselling hesitation,” a court should not determine that a Bivens remedy was available. Although the Court had not defined “special factors,” they must be present in cases in which is is doubtful that Congress intended to allow for money damages against federal officials. Based on this background, for the purposes of determining whether a Bivens claim arises in a “new context” and must be subject to a special factors analysis, the term “context” should be defined narrowly. Because this case differed in a meaningful way from those that the Court has decided under Bivens previously, it arose in a new context and the special factors analysis should apply. The national security, policy, and separations of powers concerns here were all special factors that counseled against a determination that a Bivens implied right of action was appropriate in this case. The Court also determined that the government officials in this case were entitled to qualified immunity because reasonable officials in their positions would not have known that their conduct was unlawful under clearly established law regarding how a conspiracy applies to a governmental entity.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that he agreed with the majority that the Bivens precedent did not extend to this case. However, Justice Thomas argued that the qualified immunity analysis diverged from what Congress had intended. Instead of determining whether a reasonable official would have known that his actions violated clearly established law, qualified immunity for constitutional violations should be determined by what the common law historically would have covered.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that the plaintiffs in this case pleaded facts that were well within the scope of established Bivens law, and therefore the claims should be allowed to proceed. A case did not fall under Bivens if it arose out of a new context, which meant that the case was fundamentally different from those that the Court had considered before. In this case, the harms the plaintiffs claim to have suffered were very similar to those that the Court addressed in Bivens, and Congress had not indicated that it intended to withdraw the Bivens remedy in such a situation. Even if this case arose in a new context, the Bivens remedy should still be available because there was no alternative, existing process for protecting their interests and vindicating the harms they already suffered. Justice Breyer also argued that the Bivens precedent included sufficient safeguards to prevent judicial overreach and therefore there were no “special factors” that counseled hesitation from the courts. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor, Justice Elena Kagan, and Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62759:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62760:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62760:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe state of Colorado, like most states, imposes certain monetary penalties upon persons convicted of a crime. Shannon Nelson and Louis Madden were both separately arrested and charged with sexual assault crimes. Nelson was acquitted of all charges, and Madden was acquitted of one of two charges against him. Both requested refunds from the state for the penalties they had been charged, since their convictions were overturned. The trial court determined it lacked jurisdiction in Nelson’s case and only returned the funds taken from Madden in connection with the one charge on which he was acquitted. The Colorado Court of Appeals found that the state must refund the money Nelson and Madden had paid respective to their sexual assault charges that had been thrown out. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the decisions in both cases and held that, under the state’s Exoneration Act, an individual may only recover monetary losses from an arrest if they can “prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that [they were] ‘actually innocent.’”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62760:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62760:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62760:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nColorado’s Exoneration Act, which requires exonerated persons to “prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that they were ‘actually innocent’” in order to refund their money, is invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court returned to its reasoning in Mathews v. Eldridge, in which the Court looked at three factors: the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the defendants’ interests if the Exoneration Act is their only remedy, and what is at stake for the government. Nelson and Madden clearly had an interest in getting back the money they paid to the state upon their convictions. With regard to the second factor, the Court noted that the Exoneration Act did not allow the defendants to be presumed innocent, a presumption to which they are entitled. Finally, the Court held that Colorado has no claim of right to Nelson and Madden’s funds.\nIn his concurrence, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., looked to the historical, common-law tradition rather than using the Mathews framework. Generally, when an individual’s judgment is later reversed, the money is repaid; this general rule also applied to criminal cases. Because Colorado’s Exoneration Act provided defendants whose convictions are reversed with “no realistic opportunity to prove they are deserving of refunds,” it did not comport with the Due Process Clause.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the defendants had failed to show that they had a substantive entitlement to the money paid to the state upon their convictions. Justice Thomas argued that there had been no demonstration as to why exonerated individuals should automatically receive a refund of money that was paid pursuant to their then-valid convictions, nor had the defendants showed how they have been “deprived of a protected property interest” under the Fourteenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62760:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62761:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62761:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSimon Tam and his band, The Slants, sought to register the band’s name with the U.S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application because it found that the name would likely be disparaging towards “persons of Asian descent.” The office cited the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that “[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” Tam appealed the trademark officer’s decision, and the name was refused a second time by a board comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a panel of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under the Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and found that the trademark office was incorrect in refusing the trademark application and that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62761:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62761:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62761:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Disparagement Clause prohibits trademarks that disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group and violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that, the plain meaning of the text clearly indicated that the Disparagement Clause applied to racial and ethnic groups, and therefore the Clause applied to the mark at issue in this case. The Clause also facially discriminated based on viewpoint, as giving offense constitutes a viewpoint. Because the PTO simply approved trademarks, they were not government speech--to which the First Amendment prohibitions on viewpoint regulation did not apply--and holding otherwise would constitute a massive and unwise expansion of the government speech doctrine. Similarly, PTO approval of a trademark did not constitute government-provided subsidy, an area of cases in which viewpoint discrimination was sometimes determined to be constitutional. The Disparagement Clause was also not a permissible regulation of commercial speech because it was not narrowly drawn to serve a substantial interest. Any asserted interest of avoiding offense clearly contravened the purpose of the First Amendment’s protection of free speech, and the Clause was too broad to serve the government’s other stated interest of protecting the orderly flow of commerce.\nJustice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the First Amendment’s protections against viewpoint discrimination clearly applied in this case. There are very narrow and specific categories in which the government may regulate speech--such as fraud, defamation, and incitement--and the trademark at issue here did not fall within these categories. Instead, the Disparagement Clause specifically singled out a subset of messages that the government determined to be offensive and prohibits them, which was plainly unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Justice Kennedy also wrote that the majority opinion does not govern how any other provisions of the Lanham Act should be interpreted under the First Amendment, nor was the government speech doctrine at issue in this case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. In his separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that all government regulation of commercial speech should be analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62761:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62766:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62766:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLevon Dean, Jr. and Jamal Dean were brothers who agreed to participate in a robbery of a local drug dealer known as J.R. with Jessica Cabbell and Sarah Berg. On April 15, 2013, Levon and Jamal accompanied Berg to the Palmer House Motel in Sioux City, Iowa, to confront J.R. Jamal pulled a gun on J.R. and hit him on the head with the firearm. Berg, Jamal, and Levon fled the scene with J.R.’s car, cell phone, and methamphetamines. Later that month, Levon and Jamal robbed another methamphetamine dealer, C.B., at gunpoint in his home. In a similar manner, Jamal hit C.B. with his gun and fled the scene in C.B.’s car with $300, methamphetamines, and other electronics. During this robbery, the Deans ordered Hope Marsh who was living at the residence to come with and live with them. The Deans were eventually arrested in May of 2013.\nThe Deans were convicted of multiple crimes including robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, which requires that a crime “obstruct, delay, or affect commerce.” Levon Dean, Jr. was sentenced to 400 months, including a 360-month mandatory minimum consecutive sentence pursuant to the sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime under 18 U.S.C. §924(c). Without the mandatory minimum, Levon’s sentence guideline would have been 84-105 months. On appeal, Levon Dean challenged the sufficiency the evidence to establish a nexus to interstate commerce as the Hobbs Act requires, the sufficiency of evidence for his firearm convictions, and the reasonableness of his sentence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to follow the precedent it established in United States v. Hatcher, which held that the district court did not have discretion to reconsider mandatory minimums in sentences. The appellate court held that the district court’s sentence of 40-months to be served consecutively with the 360-month sentence was “substantively reasonable and not an abuse of the district court’s discretion.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62766:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62766:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62766:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA sentencing court may use its discretion when calculating an appropriate sentence for a felony serving as the basis for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §924(c). Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that §924(c) did not prevent sentencing courts from exercising the discretion that they have traditionally enjoyed when tasked with evaluating factors of a case. Although the government argued that sentencing should be calculated purely for each individual offense under §924(c), which made it a separate offense in a drug trafficking crime to use or possess a firearm, without considering the sentences the defendant might be facing on other counts, the Court determined that the law did not require such an approach. Therefore, a sentencing court could consider the other sentences, and their mandatory minimums, that a defendant might be facing in determining an overall appropriate sentence under 18 U.S.C. §924(c).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62766:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62767:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62767:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, was playing with friends on the cement culvert of the Rio Grande that separates El Paso, Texas from Juarez, Mexico. Hernandez and his friends took turns running up the incline of the culvert to touch the barbed-wire fence on the U.S. side of it and then running back down the incline to the Mexican side. Jesus Mesa, Jr., a U.S. Border Patrol Agent, arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernandez’s friends at the U.S. border, while Hernandez retreated to the Mexican side of the River and hid behind the pillars of the Paso del Norte bridge. Mesa, still standing on the U.S. side of the border, fired at least two shots at Hernandez, one of which struck him in the head and killed him.\nSix months after Hernandez’s death, his parents sued Mesa in federal district court in Texas and alleged that Mesa violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution through the use of deadly force and the failure to use of reasonable force when making arrests. Mesa moved to dismiss and argued that Hernandez lacked constitutional protection because he was an alien without voluntary attachments to the United States who was standing in Mexico when he was killed. Applying a formalist test, the district court concluded that the Constitution’s deadly-force protections stop at the border for non-citizens like Hernandez. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and held that the Fifth Amendment protections against deadly force applied but not the Fourth Amendment protections. The appellate court also held that Mesa was not entitled to qualified immunity. Rehearing the case en banc, the appellate declined to answer the Fifth Amendment question, but held that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity and that Hernandez could not assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment because he was a Mexican citizen without a significant voluntary connection to the United States who was on Mexican soil when he was shot and killed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62767:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62767:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62767:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nQualified immunity may not be granted based on facts that were unknown to the officer at the time of the incident, and a court should consider whether an implied right of action is appropriate under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents before addressing sensitive Fourth Amendment questions. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the lower appellate court erred in addressing the Fourth Amendment question in this case before considering whether there was an implied right of action under the Bivens precedent. Although this approach is appropriate in many cases, in this case the resolution of the Fourth Amendment question has such potentially far-reaching consequences that it may not be appropriate for the judicial branch to answer. Recent precedent established that a Bivens remedy is not available when there are “special factors counseling hesitation” from the courts, which might apply in this case. The Court also held that, because qualified immunity analysis was based on whether a reasonable officer would know that his actions were unlawful, the only relevant facts were what the officer knew at the time of the incident.\nIn his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that a remedy under the Bivens precedent should only be available in cases that are meaningfully similar to Bivens. Because this case was not, a Bivens remedy should not be available. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that precedent had established that the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution was determined by functional concerns, not formal ones. In this case, because the officer was a U.S. official who did not know whether he was shooting at an American citizen or whether the bullet would land in U.S. or Mexican territory, the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment should apply. Not applying the Fourth Amendment to the facts of this case based solely on the location of the injury relative to the border line would create an anomalous precedent that would be difficult to apply to other border cases. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62767:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62768:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62768:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn October 22, 2011, Brian Lewis was driving southbound on Interstate 95 in Norwalk, Connecticut, when William Clarke crashed into him while driving a limousine owned by the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. Lewis sued Clarke, claiming that he was injured as a result of Clarke’s negligent and careless driving. Clarke filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and argued that, because he was driving the limousine as an employee of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion and held that it did not lack subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity because Lewis sought damages from Clarke personally, not from the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed and held that tribal sovereign immunity extended to Clarke as a member of the tribe acting within the scope of his employment as a limousine driver with the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62768:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62768:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62768:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nTribal sovereign immunity is not implicated in a suit against a tribal employee in his individual capacity, and an indemnification provision cannot extend tribal sovereign immunity to conduct that it would not otherwise cover. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the fact that an employee was acting within the scope of his employment for the tribe when the tort was committed was not sufficient to give rise to tribal sovereign immunity. In deciding whether sovereign immunity applies, courts traditionally look at whether the relief sought is actually from the sovereign. Because an individual-capacity lawsuit is only against that individual, the sovereign is not a real party in interest and the individual cannot assert sovereign immunity. These principles apply equally to tribal sovereign immunity cases. The Court also held that an indemnification provision does not alter who is the real party in interest and cannot extend tribal sovereign immunity to conduct that it would not otherwise cover.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that tribal sovereign immunity does not extend to suits arising out of commercial activity conducted off of the tribal territory. In her separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that tribes interacting with non-tribal members outside of the tribal territory should be subject to general non-discriminatory state laws.\nJustice Neil M. Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62768:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62769:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62769:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJuan Esquivel-Quintana was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he pled guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the relevant statute in California. In California, unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor is defined as an act of sexual intercourse with a person who is a minor and not the spouse of the perpetrator. The statute further provides that anyone who is convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of a misdemeanor or a felony.\nAfter 2009, Esquivel-Quintana moved to Michigan, which is where the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA states that a non-citizen may be removed from the United States if he is convicted of an aggravated felony such as sexual abuse of a minor. An Immigration Judge ruled that Esquivel-Quintana’s conviction under California law constituted sexual abuse of a minor and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and held that the term “sexual abuse of a minor” in the INA encompassed convictions under the relevant California statute without looking at the individual facts of the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s decision. The appellate court determined that the BIA’s decision was entitled to deference as a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Chevron, USA, Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and that the rule of lenity--requiring that statutory ambiguity be resolved in the defendant’s favor--did not apply in a civil case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62769:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62769:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62769:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe crime of “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor” as defined by California law cannot be categorically considered the aggravated felony of “sexual abuse of a minor” for the purpose of mandatory removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that, to determine whether an underlying conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony for the purpose of removability under the INA, courts presume that conviction rested upon the least of the acts criminalized by the statute. In the case of the California law criminalizing “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor,” a minor is someone 18 years old or younger, so the minimum activity that the statute criminalizes was consensual sex between an 18-year-old and a 21-year-old. The Court held that, in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the ages of participants, the term “sexual abuse of minor” refers to minors under the age of 16. The language and structure of the statute, as well as related federal statutes and state criminal codes all support this interpretation. Because the least criminal activity that the California law criminalizes is not included under the INA’s definition of “sexual abuse of a minor,” the California law cannot be categorically considered “sexual abuse of a minor for the purpose of removal under the INA.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62769:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62770:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62770:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2014, Aleida Johnson filed for bankruptcy in Alabama bankruptcy court under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. In 2003 and years prior, Midland Funding had purchased a bundle of debt worth almost $2,000 from Johnson, so after she filed for bankruptcy, Midland Funding filed a proof of claim in the same court. Because the date of the last transaction in the account in question occurred in 2003 and the statute of limitations for collecting unpaid debt in Alabama is six years, Johnson sued Midland Funding in federal district court argued that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prevented bankruptcy actions that had passed their statutes of limitations.\nMidland Funding moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. The district court determined determined that, while the FDCPA prohibited the filing of a proof of claim known to be barred by the statute of limitations, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code allowed a creditor to file a proof of claim even after the statute of limitations has run. The district court resolved that conflict by holding that the creditors’ right to file a claim precluded debtors from challenging that practice under the FDCPA. Johnson appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court found that, although the Bankruptcy Code allowed creditors to file claims barred by the statute of limitations, that did not preclude them from liability under the FDCPA for filing the claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62770:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62770:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62770:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) does not prevent a creditor from filing a proof of claim on an unpaid debt in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding even after the statute of limitations on that debt has run. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the FDCPA only prohibits a debt collector from asserting any “false, deceptive, or misleading representation” or using an “unfair or unconscionable means” to collect on an unfair debt. Filing a proof of claim on a debt that is unenforceable because the statute of limitations has run does not count as “false” or “misleading” under the FDCPA. Although a claim is defined as a “right of payment” in the Bankruptcy Code, there is no requirement that the claim be enforceable. The Code treats the unenforceability of a claim as an affirmative defense, but the claim may still be filed and does not give rise to the type of practices the FDCPA was enacted to prevent. The Court also held that, while there is precedent that established that the filing of a claim that is known to be time barred was unfair in the civil suit context, that precedent does not extend to Chapter 13 proceedings. The Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA have different purposes, and to allow an FDCPA suit to proceed in this case would upset the balance between the two pieces of legislation.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that a creditor who knowingly tries to collect a time-barred debt in bankruptcy proceedings has violated the FDCPA. Because invoking the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, creditors have historically sought to collect on time-barred debts by filing claims and hoping that either the debtors do not respond or do not invoke the defense, which allows creditors to collect default judgments. This is precisely the type of practice that the FDCPA was enacted to prevent, and it has been interpreted as doing so in the civil suit context. Justice Sotomayor argued that the FDCPA should also prevent this practice in bankruptcy court because there are no additional protections for the debtor in that context that make the time-barred nature of the claim more likely to be noticed than there are in a civil suit. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62770:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62771:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62771:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOlive Clark and Joe Wellner were both residents at the Fountain Circle Care and Rehabilitation Center, a nursing home operated by Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership (Kindred Nursing) in Winchester, Kentucky. Prior to their admission to the facility, each had designated their relatives as attorneys-in-fact, which gave the relatives broad authority to enter into transactions and agreements on their behalf. Their relatives, Janis E. Clark and Beverly Wellner, used their status as attorneys-in-fact to sign an alternative dispute resolution agreements with the facility that stipulated that any disputes arising from the Olive’s and Joe’s stays at the facility would be resolved through arbitration.\nOlive and Joe both passed away in the spring of 2009, and Janis and Beverly each filed lawsuits against Kindred Nursing for personal injury and wrongful death on their behalf. Kindred Nursing moved to compel arbitration based on the agreements that Janis and Beverly had signed. The state trial court initially dismissed both judicial actions in favor of arbitration, but later reversed in accordance with the precedent the Supreme Court of Kentucky established in Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc. In that case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the power of attorney that authorized an attorney-in-fact to manage the principal’s “financial affairs” and “health-care decisions” did not include the authority to bind the principal to an optional arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower court’s decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62771:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62771:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62771:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts Kentucky state-law precedent that requires a clear statement in the power of attorney agreement in order to grant an attorney-in-fact the power to bind her principal to an arbitration agreement. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that, under the FAA, arbitration agreements may only be found invalid and unenforceable based on legal rules that would apply to any contract. Rules that apply only to arbitration agreements, even if they do not do so explicitly but focus on contracts that have the characteristics of arbitration agreements, violate the FAA and are therefore preempted. Because Kentucky’s clear statement rule focuses exclusively on the primary characteristic of an arbitration agreement--the waiver of the right to a jury trial--it does not put arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts, and therefore the FAA preempts it. To hold otherwise would allow states to undermine the express purpose of the FAA.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the FAA did not apply in state court proceedings and therefore did not preempt the state-law precedent in this case.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62771:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62772:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62772:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLester Packingham was convicted of taking “indecent liberties” with a minor in 2002, as a 21-year-old college student. Per North Carolina law, he was sentenced to a standard 10-12 month imprisonment, followed by a 24-month supervised release. Aside from being told to “remain away from” the minor, his conviction entailed no special stipulations. Packingham was arrested in 2010 after authorities came across a post on his Facebook profile, thanking God for having a parking ticket dismissed. He was arrested for violating North Carolina’s laws regarding convicted sex offenders, which barred the offender’s access to social media websites.\nIn his defense, Packingham argued that the law violated his First Amendment rights. He was convicted in trial court, which found that the state had a weighty interest in keeping sexual predators off of social media websites for the “protection of minors.” The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and held that the social media website provision of the law was unconstitutional. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that the law was constitutional by finding that the law was a “limitation on conduct” and not a restriction of free speech. The court found that the state had a sufficient interest in “forestalling the illicit lurking and contact” of registered sex offenders and their potential future victims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62772:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62772:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62772:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe North Carolina law prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing various websites, where minors are known to be active and have accounts, regardless of whether or not the sex offender directly interacted with a minor violates the First Amendment. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that, in order to be valid under the First Amendment, a content-neutral regulation of speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. In other words, the law cannot burden substantially more speech than necessary to advance the government’s legitimate interest. In this case, although the government has a legitimate interest in protecting children from abuse, this law too broadly restricted access to all sorts of websites. Even if it were limited only to social media websites, the law would still unconstitutionally restrict speech because of the vast number of functions that social media websites perform in the modern world. First Amendment jurisprudence has never allowed for such a broad regulation of speech, and similarly broad restrictions have been struck down. However, a state could accomplish the same goal by enacting a more narrowly written statute.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the majority opinion erred in equating the entire internet with a traditionally public forum instead of recognizing the importance of allowing states to regulate certain types of websites. The government certainly has a compelling interest in protecting children from potential sexual predation, and the internet is a place that allows sexual offenders to contact children in ways that they might not otherwise be able, so the government should be able to regulate sex offenders’ use of the internet to an extent. However, the North Carolina law at issue here went too far because it encompassed websites that were unlikely to facilitate a sex crime against a child. Because the North Carolina law prohibited more speech than necessary to further the government’s significant interest, it violated the First Amendment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62772:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62775:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62775:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJodie Nevils was a federal employee with a Coventry Health Care of Missouri (Coventry) health insurance plan that was governed by the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which expressly preempts state laws and regulations governing health insurance and benefits plans. After Nevils was awarded a settlement in a personal injury case, Coventry enforced a claim to the settlement money. Nevils sued Coventry and argued that Missouri law prevented insurance companies from claiming the proceeds of personal injury settlements. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and held that the FEHBA preempted state law regarding insurance companies’ claims to the proceeds of personal injury settlement. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and held that the FEHBA did not preempt state law in this case because an insurance company’s claim to a personal injury settlement does not clearly relate to “the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits.”\nAfter the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision, the Office of Personnel Management created a new formal rule. That rule stated that an insurance carrier’s rights and responsibilities with respect to the settlement of an individual covered by that insurance carrier’s plan “relate to the nature, provision, and extent of coverage or benefits” for the purpose of the FEHBA. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari for this case and vacated and remanded the lower court’s decision for reconsideration in light of this new rule. On remand, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that there is no precedent that establishes that a federal agency’s interpretation of a preemption clause receives judicial deference. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri again determined that the FEHBA did not preempt Missouri state law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62775:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62775:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62775:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) preempts state laws that prohibit insurance companies from claiming the proceeds of personal injury settlements pursuant to their contracts, and the express preemption clause of the FEHBA does not violate the Supremacy Clause. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the relevant contractual provisions “relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits,” including with respect to the payment of benefits, under the language of the FEHBA. Because the contractual provisions at issue grant the insurance carriers rights to payments in exchange for the benefits they provide, they clearly fall within the language of the statute. The Court also held that Congress used the language “relate to,” which has traditionally been interpreted broadly with respect to federal preemption of state laws. The statutory context and purpose, along with the significant federal interests at stake, also support this interpretation. Because the federal statute--not the contract at issue--overrides the state law, the Court determined that this scheme did not violate the Supremacy Clause.\nIn his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a statute that conferred an executive agency the power to create contracts that preempt state law might be an unconstitutional grant of power to the Executive Branch. However, because Nevils did not make that argument, the Court did not address it.\nJustice Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62775:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62776:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62776:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn October 2010, Deputies Christopher Conley and Jennifer Pederson of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department responded to a tip from an informant that wanted parolee Ronnie O’Dell had been seen in front of the nearby residence of Paula Hughes. The officers were informed that Angel Mendez and Jennifer Lynn Garcia lived together in the backyard of the Hughes residence. Although they did not have a search warrant, other officers directed Deputies Conley and Pederson to search the backyard. After determining that O’Dell was not in any of the three storage sheds in Hughes’ backyard, the deputies proceeded to a wooden shed surrounded by an A/C unit, clothes locker, clothes, and other belongings. The deputies did not knock and announce their presence. Deputy Conley, upon opening the door, saw the silhouette of a person holding a rifle through a curtain in the shed. Conley yelled “Gun!” and both deputies proceeded to shoot Mendez and Garcia. Whether Mendez was merely moving the gun or was pointing it at the deputies was subject to conflicting testimony at trial. As a result, Mendez required amputation of his right leg below the knee, and Garcia was shot in the back.\nMendez and Garcia sued Conley and Pederson and alleged that the deputies, in their official capacity, deprived them of their Fourth Amendment rights by performing an unjustified warrantless search and that the deputies failed to adhere to the knock-and-announce rule, which requires that officers announce their presence before they enter a home. The district court found for the plaintiffs on both these allegations and also held that, although the officers’ use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, they were liable for the shooting under the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule. That rule holds an officer liable for use of deadly force where the officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation via a Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s determination that the search violated the Fourth Amendment but reversed the knock-and-announce rule holding that because there was no controlling Ninth Circuit precedent on whether officers must announce themselves again at a separate residence on the same property. The appellate court also held that the officers were liable under the provocation rule because their unjustified search of the occupied shed led to the shooting.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62776:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62776:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62776:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule has no basis in the Fourth Amendment, and the lower court erroneously conflated multiple Fourth Amendment violation claims. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that provocation rule essentially asks whether, once an officer’s use of force has been determined to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, there was a different Fourth Amendment violation that made the otherwise reasonable use of force unreasonable. Because this rule uses one constitutional violation to manufacture an excessive use of force claim that has already been rejected under established Fourth Amendment precedent, it is an improper rule that lacks a constitutional basis. If the defendant has multiple Fourth Amendment violation claims, they should each be analyzed separately. The Court also held that, in its proximate cause analysis regarding the warrantless entry, the lower court erroneously conflated distinct Fourth Amendment claims.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62776:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62782:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62782:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWater Splash, Inc. is a Delaware corporation that makes aquatic playgrounds known as “splash pads” that are popular in urban areas. Tara Menon is a Canadian citizen who lives in Quebec, Canada, and at one point worked for Water Splash as a regional sales representative. Later, Menon began to work for South Pool, a Water Splash competitor. Sometime in 2012, Water Splash learned that South Pool had used some of its drawings and designs when it submitted a bid to the City of Galveston to construct splash pads at two of its city parks, and Water Splash subsequently sued Menon in Texas state court. Water Splash served Menon by mail, as allowed by a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure. When Menon did not respond, the trial court award Water Splash a default judgment.\nMenon filed a motion for a new trial seeking to set aside the default judgment because service was not accomplished pursuant to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the “Hague Service Convention”), a treaty that governs service of process from one member state to another. Both the United States and Canada are signatories to the treaty. The trial court denied Menon’s motion for a new trial but the Texas Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Hague Service Convention did not authorize service by mail. The Texas Court of Appeals denied a motion for a rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court of Texas denied review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62782:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62782:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62782:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Hague Service Convention does not prohibit service of process by mail. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that the Hague Service Convention allows for different methods of service, and Article 10(a) specifically mentions postal channels as a method of sending judicial documents as long as the receiving nation does not object. Although the text of the Article does not expressly refer to service of process, the text and structure of the Hague Service Convention as a whole indicate that it deals with service of process. Therefore, Article 10(a) must be construed as allowing service of process by mail. Even if the relevant language were interpreted as ambiguous, the drafting history, the Executive Branch’s interpretation, and the interpretation of foreign courts support the reading that the Hague Service Convention does not prohibit service of process by mail.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62782:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62783:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62783:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) protects employees from unexpected losses in their retirement plans by putting in place required safeguards on plans that qualify for ERISA protections. Church plans are exempted from the Act and its protections to prevent excessive entanglement of the government with religion through regulation.\nMaria Stapleton and the other plaintiffs in this case are a group of employees who work for Advocate Health Care Network (Advocate), which operates hospitals, inpatient, and outpatient treatment centers through northern Illinois, and are members of Advocate’s retirement plan. Advocate formed in 1995 as the result of a merger between two religiously affiliated hospital systems (though neither system was owned or financially operated by the church with which it was affiliated). Advocate is also affiliated with a church, and though it is not owned or financially operated by the church, it maintains contracts with the church and “affirms [the church’s] ministry.” The plaintiffs in this case sued Advocate and argued that the Advocate retirement plan is subject to ERISA, and therefore Advocate has breached its fiduciary duty by failing to adhere to ERISA’s requirements. The defendants moved for summary judgment because the Advocate plan fell under the ERISA exemption for church plans. The district court denied the motion because it determined that a plan established and maintained by a church-affiliated organization was not a church plan within the meaning of the statutory language. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, and this case was consolidated with two other ones presenting the same issue before the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62783:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62783:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62783:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “church plan” exemption of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) applies to plans that are maintained by a qualifying church-affiliated organization, even if that organization did not originally establish the plan. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the clear language of the statute stated that a church plan “includes” a plan maintained by a church-affiliated organization in the exemption. The plain meaning of that language was therefore that a plan maintained by a church-affiliated organization qualified for the exemption, regardless of whether that organization established it. This reading gave full effect to the language Congress chose and was supported by legislative history.\nIn her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that, while she agreed with the interpretation of the statutory text, the outcome was troubling because it resulted in employees of large healthcare organizations that in nearly all respects function as secular organizations being denied ERISA’s protections. Since so many “church-affiliated” organizations bear little resemblance to the organizations that Congress was originally considering when it enacted the statutory language, Congress might choose to take a different path.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62783:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62784:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62784:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTerry Honeycutt was a salaried employee who worked at Brainerd Army Store, which was owned by his brother, Tony Honeycutt. In 2008, when Terry noticed an increase in the number of “edgy looking” people purchasing Polar Pure, an iodine-based water purification product, he called the local police station to find out if there was anything he should know about it. The police confirmed Terry’s suspicion that Polar Pure was being used to manufacture methamphetamine and that he shouldn’t sell it if he felt uncomfortable. Brainerd Army Store was the only place that sold Polar Pure locally, and the product was kept behind the counter, so only the Honeycutt brothers sold it. Over the course of the next year, the Honeycutt brothers sold increasing amounts of Polar Pure. The Drug Enforcement Administration began investigating the brothers and the store, which culminated in a search warrant in 2010. The search warrant revealed that Polar Pure was the store’s highest grossing item and that it generated $260,000 of profit. After the DEA agents seized the store’s inventory of Polar Pure, the number of area meth labs using the iodine method dropped to “insignificant” levels. A grand jury indicted both brothers. Tony pled guilty, and Terry went to trial, where he was convicted on 11 of the 14 counts with which he was charged. The jury found him guilty and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 60 months for each count, but the jury did not order any forfeiture of the proceeds of the sales, because it found that, as a salaried employee, Terry did not reap the proceeds of the conspiracy.\nOn appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the doctrine of joint and several liability applied to co-conspirators for the purpose of forfeiture of the proceeds of drug sales. For the purposes of the forfeiture statute, a defendant may be jointly and severally liable for the proceeds of drug sales obtained by others with whom the defendant participated in the crime. Therefore, in this case, the district court erred in not ordering forfeiture of the proceeds.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62784:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62784:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62784:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe federal forfeiture statute does not require joint and several liability among co-conspirators for any reasonably foreseeable proceeds of conspiracy. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the plain text and structure of the relevant sections of the statute indicated that Congress did not intend for the statute to require joint and several liability. The statute limited forfeiture to property flowing from or used in the crime itself; in other words, forfeiture was limited to tainted property. Joint and several liability, however, would require the forfeiture of untainted property. Similarly, the language the statute used to describe forfeitable property was best interpreted as referring to only property that the defendant individually obtained. This interpretation also conformed with the structure of the broader statute, in which Congress provided for the forfeiture of substitute property, which would not have been necessary if Congress had intended to incorporate joint and several liability. Interpreting the statute as requiring joint and several liability would not only run counter to its language but would also circumvent the statutory scheme that Congress intended to establish.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62784:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62785:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62785:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) owns many patents for its printer toner cartridges. The customers who buy Lexmark’s cartridges may choose a cartridge subject to a “Return Program,” which is a combination single-use patent and contract license, and those who purchase the Return Program are given a discount on the cartridge in exchange for agreeing to use the cartridge once and then return the empty cartridge to Lexmark. Otherwise, customers may choose a cartridge free of restrictions on its use. Some of Lexmark’s cartridges sold abroad and all of the domestically-sold cartridges at issue were subject to both a discount and the Return Program. Impression Products, Inc. (Impression) acquired the cartridges at issue after a third party physically changed the cartridges to enable re-use in violation of the single-use Return Program. Then, Impression Products acquired the cartridges abroad and resold them in the United States.\nLexmark sued Impression and alleged that Impression infringed on Lexmark’s patents because Impression Products acted without authorization from Lexmark to resell and reuse the cartridges. Impression argued that, under the doctrine of exhaustion, Impression’s resale of the cartridges is non-infringing because Lexmark, in transferring the title by selling the cartridges initially, granted the requisite authority. The district court granted Impression’s motion to dismiss as it related to the domestically sold cartridges and held that the patent-holder’s rights were exhausted when the initial sale was authorized and unrestricted. The motion was denied as it related to the foreign-sold cartridges, however. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that Lexmark’s sale did not “confer authority” to Impression to resell without infringing on the patent. The appellate court also held that Lexmark’s foreign sales did not confer authority to import, sell, or use the cartridges, and it did not waive Lexmark’s rights to its patent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62785:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62785:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62785:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA patentee’s decision to sell an item exhausts all of its patent rights in that item, even if the e patentee purports to impose post-sale restrictions, and regardless of whether the sale occurs domestically or internationally. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the Patent Act had long recognized the common law doctrine of patent exhaustion as a way to limit patentees’ power to exclude others from using their patented products. Under the doctrine, once a patentee sold an item, that item was the property of the buyer, and the buyer could act according to the rights and benefits that come with ownership. Therefore, even when a patentee sold an item with an express restriction on its later use, that restriction could not be enforced under patent law, though it might be enforceable under contract law. Such patent exhaustion was uniform and automatic, regardless of how the patentee attempted to create and enforce an express restriction. The Court also held that an authorized sale outside of the United States triggered the doctrine of exhaustion just as a sale within the United States did because the common law doctrine does not have a territorial limit.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which she argued that a foreign sale should not exhaust a U.S. inventor’s patent rights because patent law is territorial. When a patentee had a U.S. patent that it wanted to exercise abroad, the patentee had to apply to each individual country in which it wanted to have an exclusive right to sell the product. Because U.S. patent law protection did not accompany a U.S. patentee’s sales abroad, U.S. patent law consequences should also not follow such foreign sales.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62785:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62786:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62786:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1984, the body of Catherine Fuller was discovered in an alley. She had clearly been badly beaten and raped. The police were unable to recover physical evidence that would identify the perpetrators, and the medical examiner was unable to determine how many people were involved. After investigating and conducting over 400 interviews, the police developed a theory that Fuller had been assaulted and killed by a large group of teens who had originally set out to rob her. A total of 13 teens were initially indicted and two of them, Harry Bennett and Calvin Alston, pled guilty and agreed to testify for the government. These two witnesses agreed on the outline of events but differed significantly on some of the details. Turner and several of the other defendants put forth alibi defenses, but some of their alibis conflicted with each other. The jury found Turner and nine of the other defendants guilty, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.\nNearly 25 years later, Turner and several of the other original defendants moved to have their sentences vacated and claimed that they had not received fair trials because the government had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which established that it was a violation of due process for the prosecution to suppress evidence favorable to the defense that is material to either guilt or punishment. Additionally, Turner and the other defendants argued that newly discovered evidence, including the recantations of Bennett and Alston, established that they were actually innocent of the crime. The trial court denied the motion, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed because Turner and the other former defendants had not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of their trials would have been different had the government disclosed the evidence in question and that the new evidence established their actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court consolidated this case with another suit by one of the other original defendants.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62786:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62786:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62786:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe precedent of Brady v. Maryland does not require that the convictions in this case be overturned because the withheld evidence in question is not material under the standard established in Brady. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, under Brady v. Maryland, the government violated a defendant’s due process rights if it withheld evidence that was favorable to the defense and material to guilt or punishment. Evidence was material for the purpose of the Brady analysis when there was a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the proceeding would have had a different outcome. The burden was on the defendant to show that the suppression of the evidence in question prejudiced the trial such it undermined confidence in the outcome. In this case, considering the suppressed evidence in the context of the entire record, the Court held that the evidence in question was not sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome and therefore did not meet the standard for materiality under Brady.\nJustice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that evidence was material under Brady when there was a reasonable probability that, had the undisclosed evidence been disclosed, the case would have resulted in either an acquittal or a hung jury rather than a conviction. Because all that was required was that the evidence convince a few jury members, the undisclosed evidence in this case clearly met the Brady materiality standard. Had the evidence been disclosed, the defendants would have been able to present a more unified defense, and there was a reasonable probability that such a defense would have persuaded one or more jurors that the prosecution had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62786:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62787:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62787:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJae Lee came to the United States from South Korea with his family in 1982 and has lived in the United States legally ever since, though he did not become a citizen. He eventually moved to Memphis, Tennessee, where he got involved in the drug trade. In 2009, after a successful sting operation, Lee was arrested and charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute. The government’s case against Lee was very strong, and on the advice of his attorney, Lee pled guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. Lee’s attorney had assured him that the guilty plea would not have immigration consequences; however, Lee’s guilty plea constituted a conviction of an aggravated felony, which is a deportable offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Lee subsequently appealed his conviction and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, which provides for a two-pronged test: whether the attorney’s counsel was deficient and whether the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld Lee’s conviction and determined that Lee could not satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test because there was not sufficient evidence that the outcome of Lee’s case would have been substantially different had he known about the risk of deportation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62787:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62787:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62787:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnder Strickland v. Washington, when a defendant claims that his plea was caused by ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant can demonstrate that he was prejudiced by showing a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, he would have gone to trial rather than accepting a plea. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the relevant question was not whether the defendant would have been acquitted at trial but whether, had the defendant been properly advised, he would have chosen to exercise his right to a trial. Even if a defendant were highly likely to lose at trial, as was the case here, inadequate assistance of counsel may still prejudice his ability to weigh his options and their potential consequences in deciding whether to take a plea. Because this inquiry was necessarily a fact-specific one that must be conducted on a case-by-case basis, the Court declined to create a sweeping, per se rule. In this case, Lee successfully demonstrated that avoiding deportation was a determinative issue in his decision-making, and therefore he met the standard to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice under the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of adequate assistance of counsel did not require counsel to provide accurate advice about the consequences of taking a plea. However, even under Sixth Amendment analysis, the majority opinion erred by applying a standard that did not require the defendant to show that the ineffective assistance of counsel he received prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. Precedent established that the prejudice inquiry was not limited to the stage of the proceeding at which the defendant received the ineffective assistance; instead, there must be a reasonable probability that the outcome of the whole proceeding would have been different. In this case, there is not sufficient evidence to show a reasonable probability that the result of the criminal proceeding would have been different. Therefore the defendant failed to show prejudice under the Strickland v. Washington standard. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62787:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62788:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62788:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTC Heartland LLC (Heartland) is a company organized under Indiana law and headquartered in Indiana. Kraft Food Brands LLC (Kraft) is a company organized under Delaware law and with its principal place of business in Illinois. Heartland sold liquid water-enhancing products that it shipped to Delaware, pursuant to two of its contracts. Kraft sued Heartland in federal district court in Delaware and argued that these products infringed on Kraft’s patents for similar products. Heartland moved to dismiss the claim and argued that the Delaware lacked personal jurisdiction over the lawsuit because Heartland is not registered to do business in Delaware, has no local presence in Delaware, and does not solicit business in Delaware. The district court held that, under U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit precedent, the subsection of the general venue statute that allows a defendant to reside in many jurisdictions for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction applies to the patent venue statute. However, this precedent runs counter the the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., which held that the definition of corporate residence is limited to the jurisdiction of incorporation and that the subsection of the general venue statute does not expand jurisdiction under the patent venue statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that Congress’ amendments to the general venue statute post-dated and therefore superseded the Fourco precedent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62788:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62788:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62788:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe subsection of the general venue statute that allows a corporation to reside in many jurisdictions for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction does not apply to the patent venue statute. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that its interpretation of the patent venue statute in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. was still controlling precedent. Although the general venue statute has been amended since that time, Congress has not amended the patent venue statute since its interpretation in Fourco, and the amendments to the general venue statute did not explicitly apply to patent venue. Additionally, the history of the patent venue statute indicated that it was not meant to dovetail with other venue statutes.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62788:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62789:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62789:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Howell, a veteran, and his ex-wife Sandra Howell divorced in 1991. The Arizona Superior Court granted Sandra half of John’s Military Retirement Plan (MRP) funds when the payments were to begin. John retired from the Air Force in 1992 and began receiving his retirement funds soon after. In 2005, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs determined that John suffered from degenerative joint disease in his shoulder, that the cause of the disease was directly related to his service, and that it caused him a net loss of 20% in his earnings. Because of this, he was entitled to tax-exempt military disability payments. To receive the disability payments, John had to waive an equal portion of his MRP benefits, which he did in July of 2004.\nIn 2013, Sandra sued John and claimed that she was still entitled to a full 50% of the MRP benefits John received, regardless of his waiver of a portion of his benefits due to disability. Both the Arizona Superior Court and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed in Sandra’s favor. John appealed and cited the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling in Mansell v. Mansell, which held that the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA) preempted state courts from allowing the former spouses of veterans to claim interest in the waived portion of the veteran’s MRP. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision and stated that, while the Mansell standard was applicable before divorce proceedings were finalized and during the proceedings, courts were split regarding the rules after a divorce had been granted. The Court found that, because the lower court did not grant Sandra an interest in the disability sum itself, but rather an interest in John’s overall assets in an equal sum, then Sandra was free to require payment from John to make up for the losses she would suffer due to his waiver of a portion of the benefits shared between them.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62789:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62789:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62789:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act preempts a state court’s order for a veteran to pay a former spouse that spouse’s full portion of the veteran’s military retirement pay despite the veteran’s post-divorce waiver of the retirement pay in order to receive service-related disability benefits. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that its decision in Mansell v. Mansell controlled and prevented state courts from treating the waived portion of military retirement pay as a divisible community asset for the purpose of divorce proceedings. Although the waiver in this case occurred after the divorce proceedings, the temporal difference does not alter the fact that the state court only had the power to award the former spouse an interest in the military retirement pay that was subject to later reduction; the state court could not eliminate this potential contingency.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that examining the purposes and objectives of Congress’ decision to preempt state law with federal law is an illegitimate basis to determine that a federal law preempts states’ laws. Regardless, such analysis was unnecessary to reach the decision in this case.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62789:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62797:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62797:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn August 10, 2003, Germaine Rucker was shot and killed. Kentel Myrone Weaver later admitted to shooting Rucker after the police questioned him. During jury selection for Weaver’s trial, the court officer closed the court to Weaver’s family and other members of the public due to overcrowding. Weaver was subsequently convicted of murder in the first degree. In 2011, Weaver filed a motion for a new trial and claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to the closure of the courtroom in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.The trial court denied Weaver’s motion. On direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Weaver’s conviction. The court held that Weaver had not shown that he suffered prejudice from his counsel’s failure to object to the court closure. Although a Sixth Amendment violation typically constitutes a “structural error,” which is automatically presumed to be prejudicial, the court held that, when the structural error resulted from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62797:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62797:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62797:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn the context of the violation of a right to a public trial during jury selection, when the structural error was first raised via an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must demonstrate that he suffered prejudice in order to secure a new trial. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that structural errors were so fundamental that they were errors in the trial process itself and therefore were not susceptible to harmless error analysis. An error may still be structural despite not resulting in fundamental unfairness each time it occurred. The right to a public trial was one such error. Generally, a structural error that the defendant objected to at trial and raised a direct appeal automatically allowed for a new trial. However, when the defendant did not preserve the issue but only raised it later within the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must meet the higher standard of the ineffective assistance claim and show that he suffered prejudice. When a structural error claim was raised at trial or on direct appeal, the systemic costs of remedying the error were relatively low. When the error was raised through an ineffective assistance of counsel claim during post-conviction proceedings, however, the costs were much higher, which justified placing this burden on the defendant. In this case, the defendant was unable to meet his burden to show that the violation of his right to a public trial was prejudicial to the outcome of his case, so he was not entitled to a new trial.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that it is not clear from precedent that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extended to the jury selection phase. Additionally, a defendant cannot establish that he suffered prejudice sufficient to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by showing that his counsel’s errors rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in the concurring opinion. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that this case called for a straightforward application of the ineffective assistance of counsel test. To prevail on such a claim, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was defective and that defect resulted in prejudice to the outcome of the trial. Because the defendant in this case could not meet that burden, he was not entitled to relief. Justice Gorsuch joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that a defendant who successfully demonstrated that his attorney’s deficient performance resulted in a structural error should not have to meet the additional requirement of showing that the error was prejudicial. Precedent had established that structural errors were categorically exempt from harmless error analysis. In this case, however, the majority opinion subjected the public-trial violation to precisely the examination that the Court had previously established was inappropriate and impossible for structural errors. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62797:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62798:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62798:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Clean Water Act (CWA) provides for judicial review in instances where the Environmental Protection Agency’s action results in the issuance or denial of any permit or places restrictions on waste emissions or other activities related to the waters.On August 28, 2015, a final rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that defined the scope of “the waters of the United States” under the CWA came into effect. Numerous states and other organizations challenged the validity of the agencies’ rule and contended both that it did not conform with the CWA and was improperly adopted in violation of the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. Following consolidation of the claims before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the National Association of Manufacturers intervened to join the plaintiffs and moved to dismiss. The plaintiffs argued that the CWA does not provide the federal circuit courts with jurisdiction over the agencies’ rule and that review is properly held in the district courts instead. The appellate court held that it had jurisdiction because, although the rule only defined the scope of U.S. waters, by defining its boundaries, the rule functionally placed restrictions on activity related to the waters. Therefore, the rule affected permitting requirements and thus had the practical effect of granting or denying permits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62798:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62798:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62798:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court reversed and remanded, holding because that the Waters of the United States Rule (WOTUS Rule or Rule) does not fall within the scope of Section 1369(b)(1) of the CWA, challenges to the rule must be filed in federal district courts rather than appellate courts.\nWriting for a unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor explained that there are generally two avenues for challenging final EPA actions: (1) in federal district court under the Administrative Procedures Act, or (2) in federal appellate court if the challenged action falls under one of seven specifically enumerated categories. Here, the Court rejected the government's arguments that the WOTUS Rule falls under two of the categories of EPA actions that are exclusively reviewable at the appellate level in the first instance.\nThe Court held that the first category, under §1369(b)(1)(E), which pertains to agency actions “approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345” does not apply because the WOTUS Rule is not an effluent limitation. It is also not an \"other limitation,\" which the statutory structure suggested must be similar to an effluent limitation. Further, the Rule was not promulgated under § 1311 because that section does not provide authority to define statutory terms appearing elsewhere in the CWA.\nThe second category, which pertains to actions falling under § 1369(b)(1)(F), encompasses and grants exclusive and original jurisdiction to courts of appeal to review EPA actions “issuing or denying any permit under section 1342.” The WOTUS Rule does not issue or deny individual permit applications, and the Court therefore rejected the argument that the Rule was exclusively reviewable in appellate court under § 1369(b)(1)(F).\nFinally, the Court rejected a number of policy arguments the government offered in support of its position. Though acknowledging the persuasiveness of arguments in favor of judicial efficiency and national uniformity with regard to broad regulations, among others, the Court held that these contentions did not outweigh the importance of following the statutory text.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62798:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62799:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62799:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 established a process for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to license “biosimilar” products: products that are “highly similar” to already-approved biological products. Under the Act, biosimilar product applicants must provide notice to the seller of the original product at least 180 days prior to the first commercial marketing of the biosimilar product. The Act also requires the biosimilar seller to provide the original seller with the details of its application within 20 days of receiving notice of FDA review.\nIn May 2014, Sandoz Inc. filed an application for FDA approval of its product Zarxio, which was highly similar to Amgen Inc.’s product Neupogen (both products are bone marrow stimulants). On July 7, 2014, the FDA notified Sandoz that its application was under review, and the next day, Sandoz notified Amgen of the application. Later that month, Sandoz informed Amgen that it would not disclose the details of its application as required by the Act. On March 6, 2015, the FDA approved Sandoz’s application; Sandoz then notified Amgen of the FDA’s approval.\nIn October 2014, Amgen sued Sandoz and claimed that Sandoz violated the Act because it failed to disclose the details of its application and did not give proper notice of commercial marketing before the FDA’s approval of its biosimilar product. The district court held that failure to disclose application details under the Act does not authorize the original seller to receive damages from the biosimilar product seller or prevent the sale of the biosimilar product. The court also held that an applicant may give notice of commercial marketing before FDA approval. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling and held that effective notice may only be given after the FDA has approved the application. Therefore, Sandoz’s notice was effective in March 2015 rather than July 2014, and Sandoz could not sell its biosimilar product until 180 days after the March 2015 notice. The court also held that, because the Act only permits remedies based on patent infringement claims, Sandoz’s failure to disclose the details of its application did not violate the Act. Both parties filed petitions for writs of certiorari which were granted and consolidated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62799:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62799:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62799:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 allows for commercial notice of a “biosimilar product” to be effective if given prior to approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but that the Act’s notice requirement is not enforceable with an injunction. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the only relief that the Act provided for the applicant’s failure to turn over application and manufacturing information was the filing of a declaratory judgment action. The relevant section of the Act explicitly stated that declaratory relief was available, and therefore no other relief, whether damages or injunctive, was available. The larger context of the statute, which only provided for injunctive relief in the specific instance of a breach of confidentiality, supported this interpretation. Although federal law did not allow for injunctive relief, on remand, the lower court should consider whether injunctive relief may be available under the relevant state law. The Court also held that the plain text of the Act places the notice requirement in relation to the first commercial marketing, not the FDA’s approval. Therefore, the Act allows for effective notice to be given prior to approval by the FDA.\nJustice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that Congress granted the FDA the authority to interpret the Act, and if it concluded that a different interpretation was correct, it could properly deviate from the majority’s holding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62799:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62800:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62800:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLand developer Steve Sherman sued the Town of Chester (Chester) and alleged a regulatory taking of his property because Chester prevented him from developing his land by requiring unfair and repetitive procedures. While that case was pending, a real estate company, Laroe Estates, Inc. (Laroe), sought to intervene in the case and claimed that it currently owned the property in question based on an initial 2003 agreement and a subsequent one in 2013. In 2013, TD Bank, which held a superior mortgage on the property, initiated foreclosure proceedings. Laroe and Sherman then entered into a new sales agreement that took the foreclosure proceedings into account, but TD Bank took possession of the property. The district court denied Laroe’s motion to intervene because Laroe was not the owner of an interest in the property at the time of the alleged taking and therefore lacked independent standing in the takings claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, Laroe was not required to show it independently had standing to intervene. The appellate court reasoned that the Second Circuit case United States Postal Service v. Brennan, which held that there is no need to impose a standing requirement on an intervenor if there is an established valid case or controversy, applied in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62800:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62800:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62800:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAn intervenor to a lawsuit must meet the requirements of Article III standing if the intervenor wishes to pursue relief that was not already requested by the plaintiff. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that Article III required that plaintiffs establish standing on each of their claims. When there are multiple plaintiffs, at least one of plaintiffs must have standing for the relief requested in the complaint. The Court held that the same principle applied to intervenors. Therefore, if an intervenor sought a different type of relief than what the current plaintiff was seeking, it must establish Article III standing for that relief. In this case, it was unclear whether the intervenor sought the same relief as the original plaintiff. That issue must be resolved by the lower court in order to determine whether Laroe Estates, Inc. must establish Article III standing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62800:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62801:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62801:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued Charles Kokesh for violating federal securities law by misappropriating funds from four business development companies. The district court found in favor of the SEC and ordered that Kokesh pay $34.9 million for “the ill-gotten gains causally connected” to Kokesh’s violations. On appeal, Kokesh argued that this “disgorgement” order is barred by the five-year statute of limitations on this type of claim because the SEC brought its action more than five years after the claims accrued. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the five-year statute of limitations did not apply to this case because the ordered payment was remedial rather than punitive in nature. The goal of disgorgement is not to punish a wrongdoer for illegal activity, but rather to return to the rightful owner whatever profits the wrongdoer gained in the course of the illegal activity. Therefore, a disgorgement payment may be ordered so long as the amount “reasonably approximates the ill-gotten gains causally connected to the Defendant’s violations.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62801:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62801:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62801:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSecurities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disgorgement functions as a penalty, and therefore is subject to the five-year statute of limitations. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, although disgorgement was originally supposed to be a form of restitution, since the 1970s courts have ordered disgorgement in the SEC context to deprive defendants of their profits and as a form of deterrence to protect the investing public. In 1990, Congress authorized the SEC to seek monetary civil penalties; though that statute did not address disgorgement, courts continued to order that remedy. Subsequently, the Court determined that the five-year statute of limitations applied when the SEC sought statutory monetary penalties. Because disgorgement is a remedy for wrongs to the public instead of only to an individual plaintiff, it is meant to be deterrent rather than compensatory and therefore functions as a penalty to which the five-year statute of limitations should apply.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62801:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62802:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62802:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn April 1998, Divna Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb from modern-day Bosnia, met with a U.S. immigration official to seek refugee status for her and her family at the close of the Bosnian civil war. Through a translator, Maslenjak told the immigration official that the family feared persecution in their home region of Bosnia based on their Serbian ethnicity. Maslenjak also told the immigration official that the family feared reprisal because her husband had evaded conscription into the Bosnian Serb militia during the war. Maslenjak and her family were granted refugee status in 1999 and immigrated to the United States in September 2000. Maslenjak was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on August 3, 2007. During the naturalization process, Maslenjak denied ever having given false or misleading information to a U.S. official in order to gain entry to the United states or to avoid removal.\nOn October 7, 2007 Maslenjak’s husband, Ratko, was convicted on two counts of making false statements on a government document for his failure to disclose that he had in fact served as an officer in a Serbian military unit. To avoid deportation, Ratko applied for asylum. Testifying on his behalf at the asylum hearing, Maslenjak admitted that Ratko had served in the Serbian militia and that she had lied to the immigration officer during the refugee application interview in 1998. Maslenjak was subsequently charged with two counts of naturalization fraud for denying having ever given false or misleading information to a U.S. official. At trial, the jury was instructed that, in order to find Maslenjak guilty of fraudulently obtaining her naturalization, it need not find that her false statements were material to the decision to approve her naturalization, merely that she made them knowing their falsehood. Maslenjak was convicted on both counts, sentenced to two years probation, and stripped of her citizenship. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed her conviction and held that proof of a material false statement was not a required element of naturalization fraud.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62802:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62802:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62802:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn order for a naturalized American citizen to be stripped of her citizenship, the government has to prove that she obtained her citizenship illegally; if the underlying illegality is a false statement to government officials, the government must prove that the false statement influenced the citizenship process. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that that the plain text of the naturalization fraud statute required a causal connection between the illegal action and obtaining citizenship. The broader statutory context also supported this interpretation because it relied on the same causal connection between the requirements for naturalization and obtaining citizenship. In the case of a false statement to government officials, the required causal connection was present when the false statement sufficiently altered the citizenship process such that it influenced the award of citizenship. The standard to determine when a false statement “sufficiently altered” the process was an objective one. The government had to prove that the misrepresentation would have prompted reasonable officials to investigate further, and at that point, the question was whether the investigation would likely have turned up any disqualifying information. The government need not definitively prove that it would have, and the defendant may show that she would have qualified despite the misrepresentation. This test balanced the government’s and defendant’s interests while also taking the realities of case-specific investigations into account. Because the jury instructions used in this case did not reflect this test, they were incorrect.\nIn his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Gorsuch wrote that it was sufficient to determine there needed to be a causal link between the illegal act and the awarding of citizenship. Because the jury was not instructed on this causal link, the jury instructions were incorrect. The majority opinion should not have gone further to announce new tests about what the government must show to prove that a misrepresentation affected the award of citizenship. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that that the relevant text required only that a false statement meet the same materiality standard that applied in other contexts--that the false statement had a “natural tendency to influence” the outcome, not whether it actually influenced the outcome. There was no indication that Congress intended a different standard to apply.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62802:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62803:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62803:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEpic Systems Corporation (Epic) is a Wisconsin-based healthcare data management software company. Epic has an arbitration agreement that requires its employees to resolve any employment-based disputes with Epic through individual arbitration and to waive their right to participate in or receive benefit from any class, collective, or representative proceedings. In February 2015, former Epic employee Jacob Lewis sued Epic in federal court individually and on behalf of similarly-situated employees and claimed that they had been denied overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Epic moved to dismiss the complaint and cited the waiver clause of its arbitration agreement. The district court denied Epic’s motion and held that the waiver was unenforceable because it violated the right of employees to engage in “concerted activities” under Section Seven of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and added that the waiver was also unenforceable under the savings clause of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). That clause provides that arbitration agreements are to be enforced unless there legal or equitable grounds that would render a contract unenforceable. Finding the waiver of collective proceedings illegal under the NLRA, the appellate court held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the FAA. This case was consolidated with Ernst & Young v. Morris and National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., both cases that dealt with the relationship between the FAA and the NLRA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62803:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62803:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62803:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that neither the Arbitration Act's saving clause nor the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) supersede Congress's instructions in the Federal Arbitration Act that arbitration agreements providing for individualized proceedings must be enforced. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a 5-4 majority. The majority found that the Federal Arbitration Act \"instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms\" and that the NLRA \"does not mention class or collection action procedures\" and thus cannot be read to displace the Arbitration Act.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion to add that \"the employees also cannot prevail under the plain meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act.\"\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent noted the extreme imbalance between employer and employee and Congress's attempt to remedy that imbalance in passing the NLRA and its forerunner, the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In this context, the dissent found that the Federal Arbitration Act should not shrink the NLRA's \"protective sphere.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62803:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62804:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62804:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn December 30, 1984, James McWilliams raped and robbed Patricia Reynolds, who died in surgery later that night. McWilliams was arrested, tried, and convicted of murder during robbery in the first degree and murder during rape in the first degree. At the sentencing phase, defense counsel requested that the court order neuropsychological testing for McWilliams. The court did so and ordered that the Alabama Department of Corrections (DOC) conduct the testing. The DOC doctor who conducted the testing recommended further testing from a doctor who was not affiliated with the DOC. The second doctor’s report was made available to both parties but did not arrive at the court until the day before the sentencing hearing, and the court did not allow a continuance for defense counsel to review the report with the assistance of an expert. At the sentencing hearing, the court concluded that there were aggravating factors but no mitigating factors and sentenced McWilliams to death by electrocution. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in Alabama state courts.\nIn 2004, McWilliams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition without addressing all of the specific claims, one of which included a claim that he was denied his due process rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma because the court did not provide him with an independent psychiatric expert. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for the district court to address the specific claims in the petition. The district court again denied the petition, and the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision by holding that McWilliams’ due process rights were not violated because he was provided with a competent psychiatric expert, which met the requirement of Ake, and any harm that he might have suffered was not prejudicial to the outcome of the sentencing hearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62804:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62804:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62804:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma clearly established that a state must provide an indigent defendant with access to an expert witness who is sufficiently available to the defense and independent of the prosecution to effectively conduct an examination and assist in the preparation of a defense. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, after certain threshold matters--such as the defendant’s indigence and whether his mental condition was relevant and in question--are met, then Ake v. Oklahoma clearly requires that the defendant be provided with access to a competent mental health expert who can effectively assist in the “evaluation, preparation, and presentation” of a defense. In this case, a single evaluation available to both parties and the assistance of an outside volunteer expert who suggested that the defense consult other experts as well did not relieve the state of its responsibility under Ake. The Court declined to address the question of whether Ake required that the state provide an indigent defendant with an expert retained specifically for the defense, as this case could be resolved on narrower grounds.\nJustice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that Ake did not clearly establish that an indigent defendant is entitled to a separate defense expert who is a member of the defense team. Although some language in Ake suggests that an indigent defendant is entitled to a separate defense expert, other language makes it clear that an indigent defendant is only entitled to an expert who can perform specific tasks for the defense team. There is no reason that a neutral expert cannot be sufficient. As further evidence that the rule from Ake is ambiguous, lower courts have diverged in their interpretation of the rule. Therefore, there can be reasonable dispute as to whether access to a neutral expert satisfies the state’s requirement under Ake. Justice Alito also argued that the majority opinion essentially ignored the question for which it granted certiorari and did not provide a basis for its failure to accept the lower court’s harmless error analysis. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62804:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62805:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62805:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn March 2011, Robert Nelson was employed by BNSF Railway Co. (BNSF) and sued the company for damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) based on knee injuries sustained during the course of his employment. BNSF moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court granted the motion and Nelson appealed. Brent Tyrrell also worked for BNSF and was allegedly exposed to carcinogens that caused him to develop ultimately fatal kidney cancer. In May 2014, Kelli Tyrell, the administrator of Brent’s estate, sued BNSF on Brent’s behalf under FELA for damages based on the injuries Brent sustained during the course of his employment. BNSF filed a motion to dismiss Tyrrell’s claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court denied the motion, and BNSF appealed. Both cases were filed in Montana state court because Supreme Court precedent for FELA decisions allows state courts jurisdiction to hear FELA cases solely due to the railroad doing business in the forum state. However, the injuries did not occur in Montana, and BNSF is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas.\nThe Supreme Court of Montana consolidated both cases to decide whether Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under FELA and whether Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under Montana law. BNSF argued that, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, the state courts cannot exercise general jurisdiction. However, the Montana Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that, because BNSF does business in Montana, under FELA, Montana courts have personal jurisdiction. Montana’s Supreme Court also held that the state has general personal jurisdiction over BNSF under Montana law because BNSF “maintains substantial, continuous, and systematic” contacts with Montana.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62805:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62805:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62805:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) does not address the issue of whether state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over railroads, and the Supreme Court’s precedent in Daimler AG v. Baumann controls a state court’s exercise of general jurisdiction. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the relevant language in FELA addresses venue and subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. The statute lacked the language that Congress typically uses to provide for personal jurisdiction, and there is no indication in the legislative history that suggested that Congress meant to do otherwise. Therefore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case must meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction jurisprudence. Because neither plaintiff in these cases was injured in Montana or in work related to Montana, the exercise of personal jurisdiction here would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so only the exercise of general jurisdiction would be permissible. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Baumann, BNSF Railway Co. did not have sufficiently substantial contact with Montana to be “at home” in Montana for the purpose of general jurisdiction.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which she argued that the decision in Daimler AG v. Baumann was a significant departure from the Supreme Court’s previous jurisdiction precedent. Because the “at home” language from Daimler replaced the more nuanced “continuous contacts” analysis from previous precedent, Daimler made it harder to subject multinational and multistate corporations to general jurisdiction and was wrongfully dispositive in cases like this one.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62805:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62806:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62806:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn February 2009, Erick Daniel Davila was found guilty of capital murder for the killings of Annette Stevenson and her granddaughter, Queshawn Stevenson. The jury sentenced Davila to death. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on direct appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Davila pursued habeas relief in the state courts, which was denied at the trial and appellate levels. Davila then sought federal habeas relief and claimed, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and state habeas counsel. Because Davila did not raise the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in the state habeas proceedings, the federal district court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted and denied habeas relief. Davila appealed and argued that Supreme Court precedent that ineffective state habeas counsel can overcome the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial claim should also apply to the procedural default of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62806:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62806:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62806:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIneffective assistance of appellate counsel does not overcome the procedural default of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, as a general rule, a federal court may not review claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court because they were decided on adequate and independent state procedural rule. A state prisoner may only overcome this bar by showing that there was cause to excuse his failure to comply and actual prejudice from the underlying constitutional violation. While there was an exception for when a state required defendants to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in a state post-conviction proceeding and the defendant failed to do so because of ineffective assistance of counsel, this exception was a narrow one. The Court had previously held that this exception applied only when the state prohibited defendants from bringing such claims on direct appeal. The exception was chiefly concerned with ensuring review of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, because of the crucial role that the criminal trial played in the justice system. Because this case dealt with appellate counsel, it did not raise the same serious concerns, and therefore the exception should not apply. Additionally, while the exception did not create systemic costs, the proposed rule in this case would do so without actually adding protections for defendants.\nIn his dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the reasons underlying the exception for procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims applied to procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. The exception reflected the understanding that a defendant could not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until his first opportunity to do so outside of the trial. Similarly, a defendant could not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel until the first opportunity to do so outside of that appellate proceeding. Because the same underlying due process concerns regarding effective assistance of counsel applied at the appellate level and there was no indication that expanding the exception in this way would lead to an increase in systemic costs, the procedural default exception should apply to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62806:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62807:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62807:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn March 16, 2008, Metropolitan Police Department officers responded to a noise complaint for a house party. Upon arrival, the officers heard loud music coming from the house. The officers then entered the house and observed party guests, including Theodore Wesby, drinking and watching “scantily clad women with money tucked into garter belts.” The partygoers claimed that a woman called “Peaches” was the host of the party, and that she had received permission from the owner, from whom Peaches was leasing the house. One partygoer called Peaches on the phone for an officer, since Peaches was not present. Peaches confirmed that she had permission from the owner, but when an officer called the owner, the owner claimed that the lease had not been executed and that he had not given permission for the party. The officers subsequently arrested the partygoers.\nSixteen of the arrested partygoers sued the officers and the District of Columbia for false arrest. The district court ruled in favor of the partygoers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed and held both that the officers did not have probable cause for entry and were not entitled to immunity from liability. Probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry under D.C. law exists where a reasonable officer concludes from information known at the time that the arrestee knew or should have known that they entered the house against the will of the owner. The court reasoned that, because the partygoers believed in good faith that the owner had given Peaches permission for the party, they could not have intended to enter unlawfully. The court also ruled that the officers were not entitled to immunity because it was unreasonable for them to believe that they were not violating the partygoers’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights against false arrest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62807:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62807:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62807:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court reversed and remanded. Justice Thomas authored the majority opinion, which held that (1) the officers had probable cause to arrest the partygoers, and (2) the officers were entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U. S. C. §1983. With regard to probable cause, Justice Thomas explained that the D.C. Circuit erred in analyzing individual factors rather than the totality of the circumstances at the party scene, which could have reasonably led the officers to believe that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity. On the qualified immunity question, the majority held that the officers were protected from suit unless their actions were \"clearly\" unlawful at the time. Given that they could have reasonably but mistakenly thought that they had probable cause to make the arrests at the time, their actions were not clearly unlawful. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62807:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62808:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62808:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the mid-2000s, Anthony Perry began to develop osteoporosis, so in order to alleviate his pain and to ensure that he could continue working, he made an informal agreement with his supervisor at the U.S. Census Bureau. The deal allowed Perry to take breaks throughout the day to control the symptoms of his osteoporosis, and to make up any time lost during the workday after hours with no penalty. On June 7, 2011, Perry received a proposed removal notice that alleged that he had been paid for hours that he had not worked. He contested the charges and pointed to the informal agreement he and his supervisor had made and his unblemished performance record. In August 2011, Perry and the agency entered into an agreement that required him to serve a thirty-day suspension, to retire on or before September 4, 2012, and to forfeit any discrimination claims against the agency. After serving his suspension and retiring, Perry brought a pro se claim before the Merit Systems Protection Board, the federal board that is authorized the hear certain challenges by federal employees to adverse employment actions. An administrative law judge (ALJ) initially ruled that the Board lacked jurisdiction because retirements are presumed to be voluntary, and the Board cannot review claims that resulted in settlement with the agency. Perry appealed to the Board, which remanded the case. Upon further review, the ALJ again denied that it had jurisdiction and held that Perry had not sufficiently shown that he was improperly coerced into settling his claims. Perry appealed to the Board again, which affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. Perry appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which transferred the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit based on a lack of proper jurisdiction.The appellate court docketed the case but granted Perry’s motion to suspend proceedings until the U.S. Supreme Court resolves the jurisdictional issue of which court system should hear the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62808:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62808:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62808:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA Merit Systems Protection Board decision to dismiss a case with mixed claims on jurisdictional grounds is subject to judicial review in district court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a case that is appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board and that asserts claims under both the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a “mixed case.” The CSRA established a series of procedural routes that a mixed case may take, including that, when the Board decides the case on the merits or procedural grounds, the proper forum for judicial review is district court. The Court determined that a case dismissed on jurisdictional grounds may still be considered a “mixed case” for the purpose of judicial review of that decision. Although the CSRA defined a mixed case it terms of its appealability to the Board, it did not require that the case be able to be successfully appealed to fall under the definition. If the Court were to hold otherwise, it would create an unworkable system of distinguishing among the Board’s dismissals based on substantive, procedural, and jurisdictional, grounds. Employees seeking to appeal would also have to bifurcate their claims to litigate the CSRA claims in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the federal discrimination law in district court. Such a system would be costly and impractical.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch wrote a dissent in which he argued that the plain text of the CSRA required that appeals regarding CSRA claims be heard in the Federal Circuit, while federal discrimination claims were appealed to the district court. Although the statute allowed employees to bring claims before the Board, if the Board determined that it did not have jurisdiction over those claims, the other statutory provisions still applied. Any problems or inefficiencies in this statutory scheme were for the legislative branch, not the judiciary, to fix. Justice Gorsuch also argued that there was no statutory text clearly defining a “mixed case” or its procedural path, and there was no indication that Congress intended to carve out a particular place for such a case. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62808:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62809:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62809:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe petitioners are a group of individuals who all obtained car loans from CitiFinancial Auto. When they were unable to make payments on the vehicles, CitiFinancial repossessed them, sold them, and then informed the petitioners they owed a balance to cover the difference between the agreed purchase price and the amount of money for which CitiFinancial sold the debt. It later sold the defaulted loans to Santander Consumer, USA (Santander), which attempted to collect these alleged debts. In November 2012, the petitioners filed a putative class action lawsuit that alleged that Santander violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in its communications with them. Santander moved to dismiss the action and claimed that it was not a “debt collector” under the regulations of the FDCPA because Santander merely bought the debt from another institution and did not originate it. The district court agreed with Santander and dismissed the case.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and declined to rehear the case en banc.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62809:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62809:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62809:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA party that purchases a debt and attempts to collect the debt for its own account is not a “debt collector” subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the plain text of the FDCPA defined debt collectors as those who collected debts owed to another and therefore focused on debt collection agents collecting on behalf of a debt owner. A debt owner who was collecting debts for his own profit was not subject to the FDCPA. Although the petitioners tried to argue that the statute’s use of the past tense “owed” covered those who were collecting debts that had been previously owned by someone else, as Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (Santander) did, that reading does not comport with the text of the statute. The Court held that it was clear that Congress intended to use “owed” in the present tense in the relevant part of the statute, because elsewhere Congress clearly distinguished between original and current creditors. Because the meaning of the text was plain and there was no evidence that Congress intended an alternate, broader reading, purchasers of debt who collect for their own accounts are not subject to the FDCPA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62809:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62810:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62810:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBefore it went bankrupt in 2008, Lehman Brothers operated as a global investment bank, with stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Between July 2007 and January 2008, the company raised over $31 billion through debt offerings. California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CPERS), the largest pension fund in the country, purchased millions of dollars of these securities. In 2008, another retirement fund filed a putative class action suit against Lehman Brothers that claimed that Lehman Brothers was liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for false and misleading statements. In February 2011, over three years after the initial proceedings were filed but before the district court had decided whether or not to certify the lawsuit as a class action, CPERS sued Lehman Brothers separately. The case was then merged with the other retirement fund’s lawsuit and transferred to the New York district court, where the first case was pending. Later in 2011, the parties involved in the initial suit settled. When CPERS received notice of the settlement agreement, it opted to pursue its own claims individually against Lehman Brothers. The district court dismissed the case as having been untimely filed because the filing of the initial putative class action suit did not constitute a timely filing for a later individual claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62810:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62810:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62810:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe filing of a putative class action lawsuit does not satisfy the three-year time limit in Section 13 of the Securities Act with respect to the individual claims of other class members.Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that there were two types of statutory time bars on the filing of claims: statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. Statutes of limitations were designed to encourage plaintiffs to diligently pursue known claims, and often did not begin to run until the plaintiff knew about the claim. In contrast, statutes of repose reflected a legislative determination that defendants should be free from liability after a certain point and began to run after the defendant’s last culpable act. Because Section 13 was a complete bar to recovery for claims brought more than three years after the relevant securities filing, it was defined in reference to the defendant’s last culpable act and was a statute of repose. Both the text and legislative history of Section 13 supported this categorization. Statutes of repose were generally not subject to equitable tolling provisions, which prevented the time limitations from running for a certain period, because they represented a legislative policy determination that superseded a court’s ability to grant equitable relief. Therefore, the filing of a putative class action does not satisfy the three-year time limit for the purpose of filing subsequent individual claims because the three-year statute of repose fully protects the defendant from liability when its limit is reached.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that Section 13 was only designed to ensure that defendants had notice of their potential liability within three years; the potential claims were not limited to those that could be filed within three years. In this case, because a class action was filed within the statutory time period, the defendants were on notice of their potential liability to the class. Justice Ginsburg also argued that the majority opinion harmed the ability of the investing public to protect their rights, which ran counter to the purpose of Section 11 of the Securities Act and increased the incentive for defendants to drag out litigation. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62810:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62811:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62811:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMS) is a global pharmaceutical company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York. BMS manufactures Plavix, a prescription drug intended to prevent blood clotting, and markets and sells the drug nationwide, including in California. In addition, BMS maintains five offices in California, four research facilities, and one government affairs office, as well as 250 sales representatives. In eight amended complaints filed with the San Francisco Superior Court, 86 California residents and 575 non-California residents joined in suing BMS and McKesson Corporation, a California-based Plavix distributor, on individual product defect claims. Each alleged serious side effects from their use of Plavix, that BMS had misrepresented the drug’s safety and efficacy, and asserted numerous California product liability causes of action against BMS. BMS moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction in California. BMS argued that these claims had no link to its California activities, as the nonresident plaintiffs were not injured by Plavix in California, had not been prescribed Plavix in California, and had not received Plavix distributed by McKesson from California. Additionally, BMS did not research or manufacture Plavix at its facilities in California. The trial court denied BMS’s motion and held that the company was subject to the California court’s general jurisdiction because it had “wide-ranging, continuous, and systematic activities in California.” The California Court of Appeal rejected the trial court’s assessment that BMS was subject to general jurisdiction in California, but held that the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims were sufficiently related to BMS’s California activities to support specific jurisdiction. The California Supreme Court affirmed and held that BMS’s nationwide marketing and distribution created a “substantial nexus” between the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims and BMS’s activities in California because the claims were based on the same allegedly defective product and misleading marketing that allegedly caused injury both in and outside of California.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62811:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62811:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62811:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWhen the plaintiffs’ claims would have been exactly the same even if the defendant had no forum state contacts, there is no basis for specific jurisdiction because the case does not sufficiently arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum activities. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which examined whether the defendant had a sufficient relationship with the state to subject it to jurisdiction. For general personal jurisdiction to apply, a corporation must be incorporated or headquartered within the state seeking to assert jurisdiction. For specific, or case-linked, jurisdiction, the suit had to arise out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Therefore, there must be a connection between the controversy at issue and the state seeking to exercise specific jurisdiction. In this case, the relevant plaintiffs were not California residents and did not claim to have suffered harm there; all the relevant acts occurred outside of California. Therefore, this case did not sufficiently arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with California for California to exercise specific jurisdiction.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority opinion would make it unnecessarily difficult to hold a nationwide corporation liable for acts that harm plaintiffs in different states. The basis for personal jurisdiction was whether the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with a state such that subjecting the defendant to a lawsuit within that state did not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Within this framework, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate when a defendant purposefully availed itself of the privileges of doing business in the forum state, when the claim arose out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the state, and when the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable under the circumstances. Applying these factors to this case showed that California had specific jurisdiction over these claims. By holding otherwise, the majority made it more difficult for plaintiffs to aggregate their claims, which would likely lead to an increase in litigation and make it easier for corporate defendants to avoid liability.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62811:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62817:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62817:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn May 2013, Rodney Class was arrested in the District of Columbia for possession of three firearms on United States Capitol Grounds in violation of 40 U.S.C. §5104(e). Class, representing himself, pleaded guilty in the district court. He appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on grounds of constitutional error and statutory error. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court and found Class guilty due to his guilty plea. The appellate court explained that the its precedent in United States v. Delgado-Garcia—which held that, “[u]nconditional guilty pleas that are knowing and intelligent...waive the pleading defendant[‘s] claims of error on appeal, even constitutional claims”—is binding on this case. Delgado articulates two exceptions to this rule in which a defendant may appeal: (1) “the defendant’s claimed right to not be haled into court at all” and (2) “that the court below lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case...” However, the court held that neither exception applies here.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62817:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62817:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62817:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, a guilty plea alone does not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of his conviction. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Court looked at several prior decisions developing its jurisprudence on how a guilty plea affects the constitutional claims available to a criminal defendant, finding a clear doctrine that \"a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.\" The Court found that Class had neither expressly nor implicitly waived his constitutional claims by pleading guilty and that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), which governs \"conditional\" guilty pleas, is inapplicable because the Rule's drafters specifically stated that the rule \"has no application\" to the types of constitutional claims raised in this case.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined, criticizing the majority for reaching a decision not clearly grounded in the Constitution or other basis, and for failing to clarify the \"confusing\" doctrine established in prior cases. The dissent looked first to the Constitution and found that it does not prohibit the waiver of rights Class asserted, then found that neither is there a federal statute or rule that bars such waiver. Ultimately, the dissent found that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should govern the case and thus that an unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional claims, except for those specifically described in the prior Court cases on point.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62817:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62818:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62818:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2007, Stephanie Artis was employed by the District of Columbia Department of Health (DOH) as a code inspector. She alleges that she and her supervisor developed a contentious relationship and that he singled her out for unfair treatment in the workplace. On April 17, 2009, Artis took her first administrative step against DOH by filing a discrimination claim with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and while that claim was pending, DOH terminated Artis’s employment in November 2010.\nIn December 2011, Artis filed a lawsuit against the District in federal court alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and invoked the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction to assert claims based on the District’s Whistleblower Act, False Claims Act, and common law. The district court granted the District’s motion on the pleadings and dismissed Artis’s sole federal claim, violation of Title VII, as facially deficient. It thus found it had no basis to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims.\nFifty-nine days after her claims were dismissed in federal court, Artis filed the remaining claims in a D.C. trial court. The District alleged that Artis’s claims were time barred based on the respective statutes of limitations, and the trial judge agreed, finding that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) does not suspend state statutes of limitations at the time of the unsuccessful federal filing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62818:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62818:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62818:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed and remanded, ruling in favor of Artis and finding that the tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 operates to suspend or “stop-the-clock” on supplemental state court claims while the concordant federal suit is pending and for 30 days thereafter. The majority rejected the District of Columbia’s argument that the statute simply provides for a 30-day grace period to refile those claims in state court. The Court also rejected the argument that it should disavow the stop-the-clock approach as a matter of constitutional avoidance, explaining that questions regarding the constitutionality of §1367(d) had been settled under prior case law. Justice Gorsuch dissented, with Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy joining.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62818:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62819:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62819:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharmaine Hamer, a former intake specialist for the Housing Services of Chicago (NHS) and Fannie Mae’s Mortgage Help Center, filed suit against her former employers, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae and NHS on September 14, 2015.\nUnder Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. Section 2107(a), Hamer had until October 14, 2015 to appeal the judgment. On October 8, 2015, her attorney filed a motion to extend the appeal deadline to December 14, 2015, which the district court granted. Hamer filed her appeal on December 11, 2015.\nIn a brief requested by the appellate court, Fannie Mae and NHS argued that Hamer’s appeal was untimely under Rule 4(a)(5)(C) and thus that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. That rule states that “[n]o extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time or 14 days after the date when the order granting the motion is entered, whichever is later.” Hamer argued that the rule is at odds with 28 U.S.C. Section 2107(a), which provides that “the district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause.” The appellate court found Hamer’s argument unpersuasive and dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62819:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62819:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62819:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA court-made rule imposing a time limit is not jurisdictional. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), the Court held an appeal filing deadline prescribed by statute is \"jurisdictional\" in that missing the deadline requires dismissal of the appeal. Here, applying the principle that only Congress may determine a lower federal court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Court noted that in contrast to congressional legislation, court-made rules (including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure) cannot be jurisdictional. The Court vacated the decision of the of the Seventh Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62819:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62820:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62820:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA Georgia jury convicted Marion Wilson of malice murder and several other felonies. At sentencing, Wilson’s attorney argued that Wilson was not the triggerman and presented evidence of his difficult childhood. The trial court sentenced Wilson to death, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Wilson filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia, in which he argued ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in the sentencing phase of his trial. His argument rested on lay testimony that could have been used as evidence of his difficult childhood and expert testimony that could have explained his poor judgment skills. The superior court denied the petition in a written order. Wilson then filed an application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, which the Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied in a one-sentence order.\nWilson then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the district court denied him relief on the grounds that the state trial court reasonably applied clearly established federal law. However, the district court granted Wilson a certificate of appealability on the issue of effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, reasoning that “the one-line decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia . . . is the relevant state-court decision for our review because it is the final decision on the merits.” In his petition for rehearing en banc, Wilson argued that the panel should have examined the last reasoned decision by a state court. Georgia originally argued a federal court should “look through” a summary order to see whether it was based on procedural grounds or merits, but then it changed its position and argued that the court should look to the reasoned opinion. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, appointed an amicus curiae to argue Georgia’s original position on the matter. The Eleventh Circuit en banc ultimately concluded that federal courts do not need to “look through” a summary decision on the merits to review the reasoning of a lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62820:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62820:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62820:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling, holding that a federal habeas court reviewing an unexplained state court decision on the merits should “look through” that decision to the most recent related state court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning, and that the state may rebut that presumption by showing that the unexplained decision most likely relied on different grounds than the reasoned decision below.\nThe Court explained that since its holding in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, every circuit to have considered the matter except for the Eleventh Circuit has applied a “look through” presumption where there has been a reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim and subsequent unexplained orders upholding the judgment or rejecting the same claim, presuming that those later unexplained orders rested on the same ground.\nThe Court rejected the state’s argument that its opinion in Harrington v. Richter controls in this context, as that case did not directly consider the “look through” issue, and it also did not bar the application of Ylst’s reasoning in a case involving an unexplained decision on the merits.\nThe Court further explained that the “look through” presumption is not an absolute rule, and that while it is not a presumption that the Court applies in a general sense relative to silent opinions, when federal courts employ it pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, it is for a specific and narrow purpose. Thus, there should be no reason why a federal court’s opinion of a state court’s silence should create binding precedent outside of this context. Finally, the Court explained that the “look through” approach does not show disrespect for the states, and is unlikely to lead a large number of courts to write full opinions where they otherwise would have ruled summarily.\nThe Court remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit for further review consistent with the majority opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito and Thomas joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62820:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62828:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62828:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Village at Lakeridge, LLC, (Lakeridge) filed for bankruptcy on June 16, 2011. At that time, MBP Equity Partners 1, LLC (MBP), a member of Lakeridge, decided to sell its claim on Lakeridge’s assets to Robert Rabkin. In a deposition, Rabkin testified that he had a close relationship with a member of MBP’s board. U.S. Bank National Association, which also held a claim to Lakeridge’s assets, offered to purchase Rabkin’s claim, but Rabkin decided not to accept it. U.S. Bank subsequently filed a motion to designate Rabkin as both a statutory and non-statutory insider, either of which would prevent Rabkin from voting on bankruptcy plan proceedings. The bankruptcy court held that Rabkin had become a statutory insider by purchasing a claim from MBP, which the court considered an insider because it was an affiliate of Lakeridge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that insider status is a question of fact that appellate courts review under the deferential standard of clear error. Under the clear error standard, an appellate court will only reverse a lower court’s finding if it is clear from the evidence that a mistake has been made. After reviewing the case under this standard, the appellate court reversed and held that a third party that is assigned a claim does not assume the insider status of the assigning party. The court also held that Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider because the evidence did not show that Rabkin had a close enough relationship with the member of MBP’s board to be considered an insider.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62828:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62828:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62828:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Ninth Circuit was correct to review the Bankruptcy Court's determination under a \"clear error\" standard because the \"mixed question\" whether a designation of non-statutory insider status is more factual than legal. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. In the Ninth Circuit, the determination of insider status turns on whether the facts support an \"arm's length transaction\" between the parties. Applied to the facts of this case, the issue was whether Rabkin’s purchase of MBP’s claim was conducted as if the two were strangers to each other? While this question involves issues of law and fact, the answer turns primarily on factual determinations, therefore the more deferential \"clear error\" standard was the appropriate standard of review.\nJustice Anthony Kennedy filed concurring opinion to clarify that the Court does not necessarily find that the Ninth Circuit's standard is complete or proper, only that the application of that standard leads to the result the Court did in fact reach. Justice Sonia Sotomayor also filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch joined, disapproving the Court's decision not to address the question whether the Ninth Circuit's \"arm's length transaction\" standard is the correct one.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62828:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62830:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62830:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral alien individuals were injured, kidnapped, or killed by terrorists in attacks against Israeli citizens overseas. The surviving aliens and the families of those who perished in the attacks accused Arab Bank, PLC (Arab Bank), a bank corporation headquartered in Jordan, of financing and facilitating various terrorist organizations involved in the attacks. The survivors sued Arab Bank in New York federal court under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which provides for federal district court jurisdiction over civil actions brought by aliens. Arab Bank moved to dismiss the ATS claims under the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In that case, the appellate court held that the ATS does not authorize claims against foreign corporations. The district court acknowledged that, because the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Kiobel on other grounds and had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the court of appeals’ holding was still controlling precedent and therefore dismissed the ATS claims. On appeal, the appellate court noted that the Supreme Court’s decision did cast some doubt on the corporate liability holding in Kiobel. However, because the Supreme Court had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62830:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62830:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62830:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Alien Tort Statute (ATS) does not permit lawsuits against corporations. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court found that the original purpose of the ATS was to ensure that federal courts of the United States were available venues for foreign nationals alleging violations of international law and thereby to assuage potential foreign-relations issues. The Court reasoned that in this case, to allow the lawsuit to proceed would have the opposite policy effect, straining diplomatic relations with Jordan. If Congress wants to allow for lawsuits against foreign corporations in these types of circumstances, Congress should explicitly do so.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch wrote a concurrence in which he concluded that there are two additional reasons the lawsuit should be dismissed—that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that does not create a new cause of action and that federal courts should require a domestic defendant before hearing a lawsuit under the ATS.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor wrote that the text, history, and purpose of the ATS support the conclusion that corporations may be sued under the law and that the Court's decision absolves corporations of responsibility for egregious human rights abuses.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62830:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62831:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62831:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 1997, Carlos Manuel Ayestas, a Honduran national, was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Santiaga Paneque at her home in Houston, Texas. Ayestas appealed his conviction and filed for state habeas relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; he argued that his trial counsel failed to secure the testimony of family members who could have presented mitigating evidence. The state habeas court found that Ayestas’ trial attorney was not ineffective and denied his application for habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the findings of the state habeas court and denied relief as well.\nIn 2009, Ayestas, with a new attorney, filed a federal habeas petition and claimed that his trial counsel had been ineffective because he had failed to conduct a reasonable investigation that would have uncovered “available and abundant” mitigating factors. However, the district court found that his claim was procedurally defaulted because it had not been raised in the state habeas proceeding and denied relief. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The US Supreme Court subsequently decided Martinez v. Ryan, which held that ineffectiveness of state habeas counsel in failing to bring an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim may excuse a procedural default. The Supreme Court later extended the holding of Martinez to Texas’ habeas scheme in Trevino v. Thaler. In light of these decisions, Ayestas asked for a rehearing. On rehearing in the district court, Ayestas filed a motion for investigative assistance that was “reasonably necessary” to develop his broader ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f). The district court denied the motion based on Fifth Circuit precedent that holds that investigative assistance is not “reasonably necessary” unless the habeas petitioner can carry the ultimate burden of proof on the underlying claim at the time of the request for investigative assistance. The district court determined that Ayestas could not meet his burden of proof on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and therefore denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62831:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62831:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62831:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Alito, after explaining that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because it related to a judicial rather than an administrative decision, the Court held that the Fifth Circuit applied the wrong legal standard in affirming the denial of Ayestas' claim for the investigative funding needed to prove his entitlement to federal habeas relief under 18 USC § 3599(f). Analyzing the statutory language, the Court concluded that it called for district courts to exercise their discretion in determining whether a reasonable attorney would deem the services sought by the funding to be sufficiently important to the case in order to meet the \"reasonably necessary\" requirement. The Fifth Circuit's \"substantial need\" standard was more stringent, and therefore improper.\nThe Court explained that the Fifth Circuit also erred in requiring Ayestas to present \"a viable constitutional claim that [was] not procedurally barred,\" as this rule had become too restrictive in light of Trevino, and lower courts could potentially err in denying funding requests in cases where such funding could allow a petitioner to overcome a procedural default. On the other hand, the Court also explained that district courts had broad discretion in ruling on § 3599(f) funding requests, and while a funding applicant need not prove that they will win their case due to the funding services, the courts must evaluate the likelihood of success as part of the \"reasonably necessary\" test.\nThe Court remanded to the Fifth Circuit the state's alternative argument that § 3599(f) funding is never \"reasonably necessary\" when a petitioner for habeas relief seeks to bring a procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim based on facts outside the state court record.\nJustice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62831:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62839:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62839:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (the Gun Lake Tribe) is an Indian tribe in western Michigan that was first formally recognized by the U.S. Department of the Interior in 1999. In 2001, the Tribe petitioned for a tract of land called the Bradley Property to be put into trust for the Tribe’s use under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 465, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the petition in 2005. The Tribe subsequently constructed and opened the Gun Lake Casino on the Bradley Property.\nDavid Patchak lives in a rural area near the Bradley Property and asserts that he moved there because of its unique rural setting and that the construction and operation of the casino caused him injury. Patchak filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior and other defendants, claiming that the Secretary lacked the authority to put the Bradley Property into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe. That lawsuit was argued up to the U.S. Supreme Court on a threshold issue of standing, and after the Supreme Court held that Patchak had standing to sue, President Obama signed into law the Gun Lake Act, which provided, among other things, that any legal action relating to the Bradley Property “shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62839:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62839:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62839:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a plurality opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court affirmed the ruling by the D.C. Circuit, concluding that Section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act did not violate Article III of the Constitution. The Court stated that it was not an impermissible exercise of legislative power for Congress to change the law applicable to pending lawsuits, even if it made one side much more likely to prevail. The Court distinguished this scenario from legislative attempts to compel a particular result under old law, which would have violated Article III. The Court explained that by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction in actions relating to the property at issue, §2(b) “changed” the law, and that making this type of change was a valid exercise of legislative power. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Sotomayor joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, and Justices Kennedy and Gorsuch joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62839:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62843:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62843:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nValley View Downs, LP, the owner of a Pennsylvania racetrack, acquired all shares of a competing racetrack, Bedford Downs, in exchange for $55 million. The exchange took place through Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, the escrow agent, and Valley View borrowed money from Credit Suisse and other lenders to pay for the shares. Shortly thereafter, Valley View filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.\nFTI Consulting, Inc., as Trustee of the litigation trust that includes Valley View as one of the debtors, brought this lawsuit against Merit Management Group, a 30% shareholder in Bedford Downs. FTI seeks to avoid Bedford's $16.5 million transfer to Valley View under Bankruptcy Code sections 544, 548(a)(1)(b), and 550, which are safe harbor provisions for transfers \"made by or to\" certain enumerated entities. It is undisputed that Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank are financial institutions within the language of the statute, but at issue is whether the language “made by or to” includes institutions that act merely as a conduit for the transfer and do not benefit from it.\nThe Seventh Circuit held that section 546(e) does not provide a safe harbor against avoidance of transfers between non-named entities where a named entity merely acts as a conduit for the transfer. The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the provision in the same way as the Seventh, while the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held to the contrary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62843:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62843:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62843:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, the safe harbor provision of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a safe harbor against avoidance of transfers between non-named entities where a named entity merely acts as a conduit for the transfer. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The language of §546(e) and the specific context in which it is used support the conclusion that the relevant transfer for purposes of the safe-harbor inquiry is the transfer the trustee seeks to avoid. The statutory structure also supports this interpretation. Applying that interpretation to the facts of the case, the Court found that because the parties do not contend that either Valley View or Merit is a covered entity, the transfer falls outside of the §546(e) safe harbor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62843:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62847:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62847:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSAS Institute Inc. appealed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in which that court held that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) did not err in issuing a final written decision in an inter partes review that was petitioned by SAS Institute. While the PTAB contended that it need only have addressed certain challenged claims, rather than every challenged claim, SAS alleged that the PTAB in fact misconstrued a claim term, as well as erred by not addressing all the claims SAS challenged in its original petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62847:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62847:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62847:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-4 opinion the Court reversed and remanded, holding that when the United States Patent and Trademark Office institutes an inter partes review to reconsider an already-issued patent claim, under 35 U.S.C. §§311–319, it must decide the patentability of all of the claims the petitioner has challenged.\nJustice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion, stating that the plain text of the statute decided the question in this case. The Court explained that § 318(a)'s use of the words \"shall\" and \"any\" imposed a mandatory and comprehensive directive. Thus, if the statutory language provided that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board's \"final written decision 'shall' resolve the patentability of 'any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,' it mean[t] the Board must address every claim the petitioner . . . challenged.\"\nThe Court went on to state that § 312(a)(3) envisioned a review process guided by the petitioner rather than the agency. And while the agency director had the authority to reexamine any patentability questions on an ex parte basis at any time under § 303(a), Congress structured the inter partes review statute to provide the director with simply a \"yes or no\" choice as to whether to review pursuant to a given petition.\nThe Court rejected the notion that efficiency considerations justified a claim-by-claim approach, characterizing this as a policy argument better suited for legislative than judicial consideration. It also found unpersuasive the idea that any \"partial institution\" power asserted by the director was not entitled to Chevron deference. Finally, the opinion noted that judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act remained available in the event that the agency acted outside the confines of its statutory authority.\nJustice Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. Justice Kagan joined the dissent except as to Part III-A.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62847:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62848:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62848:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOhio currently employs a process that clears the state’s voter rolls of individuals who have died or relocated. Under this process, voters who have not voted for two years are sent notices to confirm their registration. If the state receives no response and these individuals do not vote over the next four years, they are ultimately removed from the rolls.\nPlaintiffs are various civil rights groups that are challenging the process, claiming that it is not only inappropriate to remove individuals from the voter rolls as a consequence of failing to vote but also violates part of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. The Act prohibits a program for voter-list maintenance for federal elections that involves “the removal of the name of any personal from the official list of voters . . . by reason of the person’s failure to vote.” Plaintiffs believe that the Supreme Court should involve itself and determine whether this process violates the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit previously struck down these rules, deeming them a violation of federal voting law because Ohio's process involves using an individual's failure to vote as a \"trigger\" for sending out a confirmation notice to that person. Plaintiffs consequently argue that there is no reason to disturb the appellate court decision. Defendants argue that Ohio is adhering to federal voter law, as set forth in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62848:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62848:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62848:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nOhio's list-maintenance process does not violate any provision of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) or the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court found that Ohio's procedure of requiring (1) a failure to vote for two years, (2) a failure to return a notice card, and (3) a failure to vote for four additional years was sufficiently rigorous under NVRA and its amended versions. The Court reasoned that by the plain language of the statute, NVRA forbids removal of a voter if failure to vote is the sole reason for removal. While Ohio list-maintenance process does use failure to vote as a trigger for removal, because it is not the sole basis for removal, it does not violate the statute. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in full but wrote separately to offer constitutional reasons for rejecting the proposed interpretation of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA).\nJustice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. The dissent argued that the Ohio process does in fact rely on failure to vote to purge voter lists and that the additional requirement of responding to a mailed notice does not mitigate this violation of the statute.\nJustice Sotomayor wrote a separate dissenting opinion arguing that the majority's decision ignores the driving purpose behind the NVRA—to address voter suppression laws—and pointing to statistics from amicus briefs showing that the law has a disproportionate effect of unregistering substantially more African American voters as compared to suburban white voters.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62848:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62849:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62849:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn April 2011, police arrested four men in connection with a series of armed robberies. One of the men confessed to the crimes and gave the FBI his cell phone number and the numbers of the other participants. The FBI used this information to apply for three orders from magistrate judges to obtain \"transactional records\" for each of the phone numbers, which the judges granted under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). That Act provides that the government may require the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when \"specific and articulable facts show[] that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.\" The transactional records obtained by the government include the date and time of calls, and the approximate location where calls began and ended based on their connections to cell towers—\"cell site\" location information (CSLI).\nBased on the cell-site evidence, the government charged Timothy Carpenter with, among other offenses, aiding and abetting robbery that affected interstate commerce, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Carpenter moved to suppress the government's cell-site evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the FBI needed a warrant based on probable cause to obtain the records. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62849:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62849:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62849:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe government's warrantless acquisition of Carpenter's cell-site records violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The majority first acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment protects not only property interests, but also reasonable expectations of privacy. Expectations of privacy in this age of digital data do not fit neatly into existing precedents, but tracking person's movements and location through extensive cell-site records is far more intrusive than the precedents might have anticipated. The Court declined to extend the \"third-party doctrine\"—a doctrine where information disclosed to a third party carries no reasonable expectation of privacy—to cell-site location information, which implicates even greater privacy concerns than GPS tracking does. One consideration in the development of the third-party doctrine was the \"nature of the particular documents sought,\" and the level of intrusiveness of extensive cell-site data weighs against application of the doctrine to this type of information. Additionally, the third-party doctrine applies to voluntary exposure, and while a user might be abstractly aware that his cell phone provider keeps logs, it happens without any affirmative act on the user's part. Thus, the Court held narrowly that the government generally will need a warrant to access cell-site location information.\nJustice Anthony Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined. Justice Kennedy would find that cell-site records are no different from the many other kinds of business records the government has a lawful right to obtain by compulsory process. Justice Kennedy would continue to limit the Fourth Amendment to its property-based origins.\nJustice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, emphasizing the property-based approach to Fourth Amendment questions. In Justice Thomas's view, the case should not turn on whether a search occurred, but whose property was searched. By focusing on this latter question, Justice Thomas reasoned, the only logical conclusion would be that the information did not belong to Carpenter.\nJustice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito distinguishes between an actual search and an order \"merely requiring a party to look through its own records and produce specified documents\"—with the former being far more intrusive than the latter. Justice Alito criticizes the majority for what he characterizes as \"allow[ing] a defendant to object to the search of a third party's property,\" a departure from long-standing Fourth Amendment doctrine.\nJustice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which he emphasizes the \"original understanding\" of the Fourth Amendment and laments the Court's departure from it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62849:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62852:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62852:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring hydraulic fracturing (known as “fracking”) procedures, fluid is pumped into oil and gas wells to stimulate production. However, the wellheads that sit on top of oil and gas wells are not designed to withstand continuous exposure to fracking fluids and can sustain significant damage as a result. In an attempt to address this issue, Stinger Wellhead Protection Inc., a subsidiary of Oil States Energy Services, first tried using a design described in Canadian Patent Application No. 2,195,118 (the ’118 Application) that relies on using hydraulic pressure first to push a “mandrel” into the wellhead through which the fracking fluid could be pumped without contacting the wellhead equipment. That method failed to sufficiently address the issue, so the Oil States subsidiary attempted a different method using a mechanical lockdown mechanism (described in Patent No. 6,179,053, or the ’053 Patent), rather than hydraulic pressure. In 2012, Oil States filed a patent infringement suit against Greene’s Energy Group, during the course of which litigation the district court found the ’053 Patent to be distinct from the ’118 Application using the “ordinary meaning” standard. Greene’s filed for inter partes review, which is a process used by the Patent and Trademark Office where one party asks the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board to reconsider the PTO’s issuance of an existing patent and invalidate it on the ground that it was anticipated by prior art or obvious. Oil States challenges the practice of inter partes review as violating the constitutional right of patent owners to a jury and an Article III forum before having their patent invalidated.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62852:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62852:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62852:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s ruling, holding that the the Patent and Trademark Office’s inter partes review process did not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution.\nWriting for the majority in a 7-2 decision, Justice Thomas explained that inter partes review falls precisely within the public rights doctrine, with the grant of a patent being a matter involving public rights, and inter partes review involving the same basic matter as the grant of a patent.\nThe opinion went on to clarify that three of the Court’s holdings under the Patent Act of 1870 recognizing patent rights as the “private property of the patentee” did not contradict this conclusion. The Court also explained that despite a history of patent disputes being decided by the judicial system in 19th-century England, inter partes review did not violate the principle that Congress may not remove matters of common law from judicial purview. The opinion further noted that just because American courts have typically decided patent disputes, they need not always do so, as matters governed by the public rights doctrine may be assigned to any of the three branches of government.\nThe Court stated that it has never adopted a “looks like” test to establish whether a matter was properly decided outside of an Article III court, meaning that drawing similarities between the inter partes review process and that of a court was inconsequential here. It also emphasized that its holding was narrow, and should not be misconstrued to suggest that patents are not property pursuant to the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.\nFinally, the Court held that inter partes review does not run afoul of the Seventh Amendment, explaining that when Congress properly assigns a matter to a non-Article III entity, the Seventh Amendment does not create an independent barrier to that body’s adjudication of the dispute.\nJustice Breyer authored a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Justice Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62852:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62859:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62859:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2010, for the first time in over forty years, Wisconsin voters elected a Republican majority in the state assembly and the senate, and a Republican governor. As a result, the Republican leadership developed a voting district map that its drafters calculated would allow Republicans to maintain a majority under any likely voting scenario. The redistricting plan was introduced in July 2011, and both the senate and the assembly passed the bill shortly thereafter. The governor signed the bill into law in August 2011. Even before it was enacted, the plan faced two legal challenges, on constitutional and statutory grounds. A federal court upheld the plan as not violating the “one person one vote” principle nor violating the Equal Protection Clause.\nPlaintiffs in this case challenge the plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. At issue is whether the plan systematically dilutes the voting strength of Democratic voters statewide.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62859:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62859:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62859:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe plaintiffs failed to demonstrate Article III standing, so there is no need to resolve any of the questions presented. In a unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court sidestepped (for now) all of the key issues regarding partisan gerrymandering, resolving the case instead on the technical issue of judicial standing. For a plaintiff to bring a case in federal court, she must have Article III standing, which requires showing three elements, one of which is \"injury in fact.\" To show injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that she has suffered \"invasion of a legally protected interest\" that is \"concrete and particularized.\" In this case, the Court found that the plaintiffs alleged but did not prove individual harms, providing evidence instead only of statewide harms of alleged partisan gerrymandering. The Court thus vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch did not join the majority with respect to the decision to remand the case and allow the plaintiffs a second chance to prove standing and thus wrote separately to express this disagreement with the disposition.\nJustice Elena Kagan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan agreed with the findings and conclusions of the Court but wrote separately, in essence, to describe how the plaintiffs might proceed upon remand. Justice Kagan suggests that the plaintiffs might present more than simply a vote dilution theory, but also an infringement of their First Amendment right of association. Such a claim, according to Justice Kagan, would not require the plaintiffs to show injury-in-fact in the form of injury to her particular voting district because that claim would be statewide in nature. She predicts that partisan gerrymandering \"injures enough individuals and organizations in enough concrete ways . . . that standing requirements, properly applied, will not often or long prevent courts from reaching the merits of cases like this one.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62859:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62863:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62863:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction to decide federal law claims brought under that statute. Congress then passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which precluded certain state law securities class actions, and amended the 1933 Act to reflect that limitation on state court claims.\nBeaver County Employees' Retirement Fund filed a lawsuit in a California superior court asserting claims under the 1933 Act. Cyan Inc. moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the amended 1933 Act precluded state courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims entirely. The superior court rejected Cyan's objection to the exercise of jurisdiction. Federal district courts are split as to whether state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over covered class actions that allege only 1933 Act claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62863:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62863:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62863:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) does not strip state courts of jurisdiction to hear claims under the Securities Act of 1933, nor does it permit defendants to remove class actions alleging only 1933 Act claims from state to federal court. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court found that the language of SLUSA, which modifies the Securities Act of 1933, leaves the state courts' jurisdiction intact. The background rule of § 77v(a) gives state courts concurrent jurisdiction over all suits “brought to enforce any liability or duty created by” that statute. Section 77p, which bars certain securities class actions based on state law, controls if there is a conflict between § 77v(a) and § 77p, but §77p does nothing to limit state-court jurisdiction over class actions brought under the 1933 Act. The Court also found that the structure and context also support its reading of the provision.\nThe 1933 Act barred the removal of certain claims from state to federal court. Section 77p(c) of SLUSA modifies the removal ban, permitting the removal of certain class actions to federal court, where they are subject to dismissal. The Court found that the most natural reading of that provision does not alter the ban on removal of class actions alleging only 1933 Act claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62863:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62866:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62866:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, CO, and requested that its owner, Jack C. Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages.\nCraig and Mullins filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), §§ 24-34-301 to -804, C.R.S. 2014. After the Division issued a notice of determination finding probable cause, Craig and Mullins filed a formal complaint with the Office of Administrative Courts alleging that Masterpiece discriminated against them in a place of public accommodation in violation of CADA.\nThe Administrative Law Judge issued a written order finding in favor of Craig and Mullins, which was affirmed by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the Commission's ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62866:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62866:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62866:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court reversed in a 7-2 decision, holding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's conduct in evaluating a cake shop owner's reasons for declining to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated the Free Exercise Clause.\nThe Court explained that while gay persons and same-sex couples are afforded civil rights protections under the laws and the Constitution, religious and philosophical objections to same-sex marriage are protected views and can also be protected forms of expression. The Colorado law at issue in this case, which prohibited discrimination against gay people in purchasing products and services, had to be applied in a neutral manner with regard to religion. The majority acknowledged that from Phillips' perspective, creating cakes was a form of artistic expression and a component of his sincere religious beliefs.\nThe Court also explained that in 2012, the year that Phillips refused his services to Craig and Mullins, the law in Colorado and across the country with regard to same sex marriage was much more unsettled than it became after United States v. Windsor, 570 US 744 (2013) and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US ___ (2015). At the time, the State Civil Rights Division had also concluded in at least three other cases that bakers had acted lawfully in declining to make cakes that included messages they disagreed with, specifically messages demeaning gay persons. Thus it was not unreasonable for Phillips to believe that he was acting lawfully at the time, and his claims before the Commission were entitled to neutral treatment.\nHowever, the Court stated that Phillips did not receive this neutral treatment, with members of the Commission showing clear and impermissible hostility toward his religious beliefs. The Court explained that commissioners' comments disparaging Phillips' beliefs and characterizing them as rhetorical were inappropriate, though these comments were not mentioned or disavowed in subsequent legal proceedings. The Court concluded that these comments cast doubt on the fairness of the Commission's consideration of Phillips' claims. The Court also pointed out that disparities between Phillips' case and those of other bakers with objections to making cakes with anti-gay messages, and who were victorious before the Commission, further reflected hostility toward the religious basis for Phillips' position.\nThe Court concluded that the Commission's actions violated the State's duty under the First Amendment not to use hostility toward religion or a religious viewpoint as a basis for laws or regulations. Under the facts of this case, the Court determined that Phillips' religious justification for his refusal to serve Craig and Mullins was not afforded the neutral treatment mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.\nJustice Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, in which she was joined by Justice Sotomayor, stating that neither the Commission's comments regarding Phillips' religious views nor its alleged disparate treatment of bakers objecting to making cakes with anti-gay messages justified ruling in favor of Phillips.\nJustice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Breyer, in which she agreed with the majority that the Commission had not given neutral treatment to Phillips' religious views, but declined to assign any significance to the Commission's treatment of bakers who refused to create cakes with anti-gay messages because she believed that this did not violate the Colorado law at issue in Phillips' case.\nJustice Gorsuch also filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito, in which he argued that the cases of Phillips and the bakers who objected to using anti-gay messages in their baking were quite similar, and the Commission acted inappropriately in treating them differently.\nJustice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, and was joined by Justice Gorsuch. Thomas argued that an order requiring Phillips to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple would violate his First Amendment rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62866:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62869:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62869:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704, to prohibit state-sanctioned sports gambling. Included in PASPA are exceptions for state-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware, as well as for New Jersey, provided that New Jersey also enact a sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA's enactment, which it did not do. PASPA also permits any sports league whose games are or will be the subject of sports gambling to bring an action to enjoin the gambling.\nIn 2011, the New Jersey Legislature held a referendum asking voters whether sports gambling should be permitted, and 64 percent voted in favor of a state constitutional amendment that would permit sports gambling. The legislature then drafted and received voter approval of a sports-wagering constitutional amendment, after which time, in 2012, it enacted the Sports Wagering Act (\"2012 Act\"), which authorized certain regulated sports wagering at New Jersey casinos and racetracks and implemented a comprehensive regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events.\nFive sports leagues sued under PASPA to enjoin the New Jersey law, which the state defended by arguing that PASPA was unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine. The district court held that PASPA was constitutional and enjoined the 2012 Act. The legislature passed a second law (\"2014 Law\") that purported to repeal the regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events, effectively providing tacit authorization of them. The leagues again sued to enjoin the 2014 Law, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the leagues and issued a permanent injunction against the governor and other state agencies. A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed, and upon rehearing, the Third Circuit en banc affirmed the majority opinion of the panel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62869:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62869:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62869:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Alito, the court reversed in favor of the State of New Jersey, finding that PASPA's provision prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling schemes violates the anticommandeering doctrine under the 10th Amendment to the Constitution as interpreted under New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Pursuant to this authority, “Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative process of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’\"\nIn so holding, the Court explained that when a state fully or partially repeals old laws prohibiting sports gambling schemes, as New Jersey did in enacting the 2014 Law, it \"authorizes\" those schemes under PASPA. The Court also explained that there was no meaningful difference between directing a state legislature to enact a new law or prohibiting a state legislature from doing so, and PASPA's anti-authorization provision violated the anticommandeering principle because it specifically mandated what a state could and could not do. The Court stated that complying with the anticommandeering rule is important because it serves as one of the Constitution's structural safeguards of liberty, advances political accountability, and prevents Congress from shifting regulatory costs to the states.\nThe Court further held that no provision of PASPA is directly severable from those at issue in this case.\nJustice Breyer joined the majority opinion as to all except Part VI-B, and filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and Justice Breyer joined in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62869:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62872:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62872:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn September 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up in an a crowded area in Jerusalem. Among the injured were eight U.S. citizens, who consequently filed a lawsuit against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its role in providing material support to the attackers. In general, sovereign governments are immune from lawsuit, but the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (\"FSIA\") provides an exception to that immunity in cases of state-sponsored of terrorism. A district judge in D.C. entered a $71.5 million default judgment against Iran, which Iran did not pay. The plaintiffs then litigated numerous cases across the country in an attempt to attach and execute on Iranian assets to satisfy the judgment.\nThe case at hand involves four collections of ancient Persian artifacts within the possession of the University of Chicago and Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. With few exceptions, a foreign state's property in the United States is immune from attachment and execution. The plaintiffs argued before the district court that they should be able to attach and execute Iran's property under subsections (a) and (g) of 28 U.S.C. § 1610, as well as section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (\"TRIA\"). The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that while § 1610(a) permits execution on a foreign state's property \"used for a commercial activity in the United States,\" that provision requires use by the foreign state itself, not a third party (such as a museum). The district court also held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 1610(g) permits attachment to property of a foreign state in aid of execution only in cases described elsewhere in § 1610, rendering that provision unavailable to the plaintiffs in this case. Finally, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 201 of TRIA applies only to assets blocked by executive order, and in the absence of an executive order blocking the particular assets sought, plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of that provision either.\nThe Seventh Circuit's holding thus conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's prior holding that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terrorism victims to attach and execute upon any assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, regardless of whether the assets are otherwise subject to execution under section 1610.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62872:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62872:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62872:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, Section 1610(g) does not provide a freestanding basis for parties to attach and execute against the property of a foreign state. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 8-0 unanimous Court. Looking first at the statutory text, the Court found that the most natural reading of Section 1610(g)(1)—that certain property will be \"subject to attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon [a §1605A] judgment as provided in this section\"—is that there must be an indepedent basis for the withdrawal of property immunity. To conclude otherwise would have rendered the other provisions of §1610(g) superfluous because any plaintiff with a §1605A judgment could seek property attachment under §1610(g) regardless of whether the conditions of any those provisions were met. The Court's interpretation is also consistent with the historical practice of rescinding attachment and execution immunity primarily in the context of a foreign state's commercial acts. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62872:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62875:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62875:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCarlo J. Marinello II owned and operated a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada. Between 1992 and 2010, Marinello did not keep an accounting of his business, nor did he file personal or corporate income tax returns. Indeed, he shredded bank statements and business records. After an investigation by the IRS, Marinello was indicted by a grand jury on nine counts of tax-related offenses, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, one year of parole, and was ordered to pay over $350,000 to the IRS in restitution.\nOne of the counts of which Marinello was charged and convicted was violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who \"in any . . . way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title.\" Marinello appealed his conviction on the grounds that the phrase \"the due administration of this title\" requires the defendant be aware of IRS action, and the government provided no evidence at trial that Marinello knew of a pending IRS investigation against him. Finding that knowledge of a pending investigation is not an element of the offense of which Marinello was convicted, the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62875:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62875:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62875:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe federal crime of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct or impede the due administration of the tax laws, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), requires proof that the defendant acted with knowledge of a pending Internal Revenue Service action. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. Justice Breyer found that in the past, the Court had interpreted similar criminal statutes to require a \"nexus\" between the defendant's obstructive conduct and a particular judicial proceeding. Given that the key words in the statute \"obstruct\" and \"impede\" require an object the taxpayer must act with respect to a particular person or thing of which he is aware. Moreover, just because a taxpayer knows that the IRS will review his tax return does not mean that every Tax Code violation constitutes obstruction. Rather, in addition to satisfying the nexus requirement, the government must also demonstrate that the proceeding was pending at the time the defendant engaged in the obstructive conduct or at least was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a separate dissent in which Justice Samuel Alito joined. Justice Thomas found that the plain language of the statute forbids \"corrupt efforts to impede the IRS from performing any of these activities\" and does not require that the defendant acted with knowledge of a pending IRS action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62875:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62877:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62877:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPaul Somers worked as Vice President of Digital Realty Trust from 2010 to 2014. According to his complaint, Somers filed several reports to senior management regarding possible securities law violations by the company, after which reports the company fired him. He did not report his concerns to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before he was terminated. Somers then sued Digital Realty, alleging violations of state and federal laws, including Section 21F of the Exchange Act, which includes the anti-retaliation protections created by the Dodd-Frank Act. Digital Realty sought to dismiss the Section 21F claim on the ground that, because Somers did not actually report the possible violations to the SEC, he was not a \"whistleblower\" as defined in the Act and thus not entitled to protection under its provisions.\nThe Fifth Circuit in 2013 had strictly applied the Act's definition of \"whistleblower\" to the anti-retaliation provision, while the Second Circuit, finding the statute itself ambiguous and applying Chevron deference to the SEC's reasonable interpretation of it, had held in 2015 that the provision extends to all those who make disclosures of suspected violations, regardless of whether the disclosures are made internally or to the SEC. The district court in this case followed the Second Circuit's approach and denied Digital Realty's motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62877:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62877:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62877:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNo, the anti-retaliation provision for \"whistleblowers\" in the Dodd-Frank Act protects only individuals who report alleged misconduct to the SEC. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Act explicitly defines whistleblowers as any individual who provides pertinent information \"to the Commission,\" and this definition is corroborated by Dodd-Frank's purpose to aid the SEC's enforcement efforts by incentivizing people to tell the SEC about violations. Individuals who report violations to any other federal agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor, are not within the scope of this express definition of whistleblower in the Dodd-Frank Act. Because the language of the statute is not ambiguous, the SEC's contrary view is not entitled to Chevron deference.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch joined, in which he joined the majority in its reading of the statutory text of the Dodd-Frank Act, but not as to the majority's use of a Senate Report to determine the purpose of the statute.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor joined the Court's opinion in full but noted her disagreement with Justice Thomas's suggestion in his concurrence that a Senate Report is not an appropriate source for the Court to consider when interpreting a statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62877:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62884:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62884:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles Murphy was an inmate in the Vandalia Correctional Center in Illinois. In July 2011, correctional officers hit Murphy, fracturing his eye socket, and did not provide him proper medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law theories. A jury returned a verdict in his favor and awarded him damages for some of his claims under state law, and the district court awarded him attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Two of the defendants appealed the judgment, arguing that the Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the state-law claims and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that 25 percent of the damages awarded be used to pay the attorney fee award.\nThe Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the state officials or employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity against state-law claims where the officials or employees violated statutory or constitutional law, which violations Murphy alleged and proved. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the attorney fee award, however, finding that the 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) requires that the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award and that the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62884:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62884:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62884:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe phrase \"not to exceed 25 percent\" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) with respect to the award of attorneys fees in a civil rights suit means that the district court must use as much of the judgment as necessary to satisfy the fee award without exceeding the 25% limit, as the Seventh Circuit held. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The language of the provision, including the words \"shall\" and use of the infinitive phrase \"to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded\" indicated the mandatory, rather than discretionary, nature of the provision's command to the district court. The majority also found that the statutory scheme, including Congress's intent in enacting a new and different law for prisoner rights suits, as well as the surrounding provisions, supported this reading of the statute.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan joined. In the dissent's view, the plain language of the provision at issue should give district courts the discretion to allocate a portion of a prisoner-plaintiff’s monetary judgment to an attorney’s fee award, provided that the portion is not greater than 25 percent. In support of its position, the dissent points to language considered but not accepted by Congress that more clearly supports the respondent-prisoners' interpretation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62884:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62887:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62887:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTerrence Byrd was driving on a divided four-lane highway near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he was pulled over allegedly for violating a state law requiring drivers to use the left lane for passing only. Recognizing the car as a rental car, the officers asked Byrd for his license and rental agreement, which he had difficulty locating. Once he did locate them, the officers noted that the rental agreement did not list Byrd as an authorized driver, and when they ran his identification, they noted that he was using an alias and had an outstanding warrant in New Jersey. Despite the warrant’s indication that it did not request extradition from other jurisdictions, the officers attempted to contact authorities in New Jersey to confirm they did not seek Byrd’s arrest and extradition, allegedly following protocol for such situations. The officers experienced difficulty with their communications, however, and returned to Byrd’s car, where they asked him to exit the vehicle and about his warrant and alias.\nThe officers asked whether Byrd had anything illegal in the car and then requested Byrd’s consent to search the car, noting that they did not actually need his consent because he was not listed on the rental agreement. The officers allege that Byrd gave his consent, but Byrd disputes this contention. The subsequent search turned up heroin and body armor in the trunk of the car.\nAt trial, Byrd moved to suppress the evidence, challenging the initial stop, the extension of the stop, and the search. The district court determined that the violation of the traffic law justified the initial stop and that the extension of the stop was justified by the officers’ developing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Byrd maintains that he did not consent to the search, so the issue remains whether he needed to consent at all—that is, whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, despite not being listed on the rental agreement. If he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the officers’ search of the vehicle did not require his consent.\nThere is a circuit split as to whether an unlisted driver of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, and the Third Circuit (where the district court in this case sits) has held that such a driver does not. Thus, the district court denied Byrd’s motion to suppress, and the Third Circuit, reviewing the factual questions for clear error and the legal question de novo, affirmed the judgment of the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62887:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62887:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62887:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that a driver of a rental car who has the renter's permission to drive it but is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement does have a reasonable expectation of privacy against government searches of the vehicle. Although such a driver does not have a property interest in the car, property principles inform the reasoning behind this conclusion. A driver who has the permission of the lawful possessor or owner of the car has complete \"dominion and control\" over the property and can rightfully exclude others from it. The Court analogized to the situation in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), where the Court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment in which he was staying temporarily with the owner's permission, not withstanding the fact that the apartment was not lawfully his. Essential to the Court's holding was the finding that the driver in this case was in lawful possession; indeed, the driver of a stolen vehicle lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in a car he may be driving.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which Neil Gorsuch joined, questioning the validity of the \"reasonable expectation of privacy\" test. Justice Samuel Alito filed a separate concurring opinion encouraging the Court of Appeals to consider the question whether Byrd may assert a Fourth Amendment claim or to decide the appeal on another appropriate ground.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62887:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62888:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62888:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMatthew Vogt was employed as a police officer with the City of Hays, Kansas, when he applied for a position with the City of Haysville police department. During Vogt’s interview process with the City of Haysville, he disclosed that he had kept a knife obtained while working for the City of Hays.\nThe City of Haysville made Vogt an offer of employment contingent on his reporting his acquisition of the knife to the City of Hays and returning it, which Vogt did. Upon this report, the City of Hays chief of police ordered Vogt to issue a statement regarding the knife, which Vogt submitted nominally, in addition to a letter of resignation due to his intent to accept the position with the Haysville Police Department.\nThe Hays police chief began an internal investigation into Vogt and required him to issue a more detailed statement regarding the knife. This subsequent statement led to additional evidence, and Hays Police Department submitted both to the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, asking the Bureau to initiate a criminal investigation. As a result of the criminal investigation, the Haysville Police Department withdraw its offer of employment to Vogt.\nVogt was charged in state court with two felony counts related to his possession of the knife. Following a probable cause hearing, the state district court determined that probable cause was lacking and dismissed the charges. Vogt brought a federal lawsuit alleging that the use of his compelled statements (1) to start an investigation leading to the discovery of additional evidence concerning the knife, (2) to initiate a criminal investigation, (3) to bring criminal charges, and (4) to support the prosecution during the probable cause hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.\nThe district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim, and, reviewing the claims de novo, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding as to the first three claims but reversed as to the fourth one, finding that the Fifth Amendment is violated when criminal defendants are compelled to incriminate themselves and the incriminating statement is used in a probable cause hearing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62888:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62888:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62888:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted. Justice Neil Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62888:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62889:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62889:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn two occasions, a particular unique-looking motorcycle evaded Albemarle police officers after they observed the rider violating traffic laws. After some investigation, one of the officers located the house where the suspected driver of the motorcycle lived and observed what appeared to be the same motorcycle covered by a tarp in the driveway. The officer lifted the tarp and confirmed that it was the motorcycle (which was also stolen) that had eluded detainment on multiple occasions. The officer waited for the suspect to return home, at which point he went to the front door to inquire about the motorcycle. Initially the suspect denied knowing anything about it but eventually confessed that he had bought the motorcycle knowing that it had been stolen. The officer arrested the suspect for receipt of stolen property.\nAt trial, the defendant sought to suppress the motorcycle as evidence on the grounds that the police officer conducted an illegal warrantless search (by lifting the tarp covering the motorcycle parked in the driveway) that led to its discovery. The trial court held that the search was based on probable cause and justified under the exigent circumstances automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and convicted the defendant. The appeals court affirmed on the grounds of exigent circumstances, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed as well, but under the automobile exception only. The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that the automobile exception applies even when the vehicle is not “immediately mobile” and applies to vehicles parked on private property.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62889:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62889:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62889:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Fourth Amendment's automobile exception does not permit a police officer without a warrant to enter private property to search a vehicle parked a few feet from the house. In an 8–1 opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court held that its own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the home and the \"curtilage\" of one's home (the area immediately surrounding it) clearly prevents officers from entering and searching without a warrant, even if the object searched is an automobile. The Court found that the area searched (the back of the driveway) was indeed the curtilage of the defendant's home, and thus the Fourth Amendment's highest degree of protection applies there. Although warrantless searches of automobiles are permissible in limited circumstances, the warrantless search of an automobile parked within the curtilage of one's home is not permissible.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion to express doubt about the Court's authority to impose the exclusionary rule on the states.\nJustice Samuel Alito wrote a dissenting opinion in which he opined that the automobile exception should apply in this case and that the search was in no way \"unreasonable.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62889:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62891:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62891:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from Congress before active-duty military officers may hold a \"civil office,” including positions that require \"an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.\" 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA). A judge convicted Nicole Dalmazzi of wrongfully using ecstasy, a Schedule I controlled substance and sentenced her to dismissal and confinement for one month. The AFCCA affirmed the findings and sentence. Dalmazzi moved the CCA to vacate its judgment because of the participation of Judge Mitchell on the panel. Before the CCA ruled on her motion, Dalmazzi filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), so the CCA dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The CAAF rejected as moot Dalmazzi’s challenge to Judge Mitchell's continued service on the AFCCA, because his CMCR commission had not been signed until after the AFCCA decided her case on the merits. Both of the other consolidated cases involve similar facts, where Judge Mitchell was on the CCA panel that affirmed the convictions of the petitioners.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62891:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62891:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62891:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in this case and in the consolidated case Cox v. United States (16-1017). The Court reached the merits and issued a decision in the third consolidated case only, Ortiz v. United States (16-1423).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62891:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62892:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62892:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEncino Motorcars, LLC, which sells and services Mercedes-Benz cars, employed Hector Navarro and others as “service advisors.” Their role was to greet car owners upon arrival in the service area of the dealership, listen to customers’ concerns about their cars, evaluate the repair and maintenance needs of the cars, suggest services, write up estimates, and follow up with the customer while repair work was being done.\nNavarro and the other plaintiffs alleged in federal district court that Encino Motorcars violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them overtime wages. The district court dismissed the claim, finding that the FLSA exempts service advisors from its overtime compensation provisions. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, using the principle of Chevron deference to rely on a regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor in 2011 interpreting the statutory exemption as not encompassing service providers. The US Supreme Court vacated the panel’s decision, holding that the regulation lacked sufficient explanation and thus was not entitled to deference. On remand, the Ninth Circuit formulated its own interpretation of the applicable FLSA provision and concluded that the exemption does not encompass service advisors.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62892:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62892:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62892:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit, holding that because service advisors at car dealerships are “salesm[e]n . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles,” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A), they are exempt from the FLSA's overtime-pay requirements.\nConstruing the relevant portions of the statute, the Court explained that a service advisor is clearly a “salesman” who sells services to customers for their vehicles. The Court also concluded that service advisors are “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” since they are integral in the process of providing maintenance and repair services to customers, even if they do not spend most of their time physically repairing vehicles. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s use of the distributive canon, as well as its conclusion that FLSA exemptions should be construed narrowly in holding that service advisors were not exempt. It also rejected the appellate court’s reliance on a 1966-67 DOL Occupational Outlook Handbook and the FLSA legislative history, both of which the Court found unpersuasive.\nJustice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62892:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62893:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62893:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEthlyn Hall, an elderly landowner in the Virgin Islands, filed suit against her son when she grew dissatisfied with his actions as her attorney. After Ethlyn passed away, one of her daughters, Elsa Hall, served as personal representative of the estate (the “Estate”) and continued to press Ethlyn’s claims against Samuel. Samuel brought claims of his own against Elsa in a separate proceeding. He argued that Elsa had poisoned his relationship with his mother, which caused him serious emotional distress. The Estate’s claims and Samuel’s claims were consolidated and tried together. A jury rejected the Estate’s claims and rendered a two million dollar verdict in Samuel’s favor. The District Court entered separate judgments on both aspects of the jury’s decision.\nThe Estate appealed the judgment with respect to its claims, but did not appeal the judgment in favor of Samuel because the district court vacated the jury verdict and his claims were still awaiting retrial. Samuel argue that the appellate court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal while his claims were still pending in the district court, and the Third Circuit agreed.\nThe Third Circuit relied on its binding precedent in Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, which held that when two cases have been consolidated for all purposes, a final decision on one set of claims is generally not appealable while the second set remains pending. The Estate argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp. affirming the appealability of final judgment in a case that was part of a multi-district litigation should dictate the outcome of the case and permit the exercise of jurisdiction over the claims that have a final judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62893:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62893:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62893:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court unanimously held that when one of multiple cases consolidated under FRCP 42(a) is finally decided, that ruling confers upon the losing party the right to immediate appeal regardless of whether any of the other consolidated cases are still pending.\nBecause the meaning of the term “consolidate” as used in Rule 42(a) was ambiguous, the Court examined its legal lineage and concluded that it extended back at least to the first federal consolidation statute, enacted in 1813. Pursuant to that history, the Court found it to be clear that an individual case consolidated under the Rule maintains its independent character, at least to the extent that it is appealable when it is finally resolved, whether or not proceedings are ongoing in the other consolidated cases.\nThe Court also explained that under the consolidation statute that was in place for 125 years before Rule 42(a) was enacted, consolidation was a case management tool rather than a means of completely merging the consolidated cases into one, meaning that prior to Rule 42(a), a final judgment in a single case was immediately appealable. Because Rule 42(a) was explicitly modeled on the consolidation statute, and the term “consolidate” used therein is ambiguous, the term presumably carries forward the same meaning it had under the old statute.\nThe Court rejected the argument that the term “consolidate” took on a new meaning under Rule 42(a), namely that it permitted consolidation for either limited or all purposes. It also explained that the Federal Rules Advisory Committee would not have silently changed the meaning of a term that had been in use pursuant to a long-term, settled understanding.\nFinally, the Court stated that it was not creating a rule that a district court could not consolidate a group of cases for all purposes, but it reiterated that in this context, cases retain their individual identities to the extent that final judgments in any specific case are immediately appealable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62893:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62896:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62896:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1977, the Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, upheld against a First Amendment challenge a Michigan law that allowed a public employer whose employees were represented by a union to require those of its employees who did not join the union nevertheless to pay fees to it because they benefited from the union’s collective bargaining agreement with the employer.\nIllinois has a law similar to that upheld in Michigan. The governor of Illinois brought a lawsuit challenging the law on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment by compelling employees who disapprove of the union to contribute money to it. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the governor lacked standing to sue because he did not stand to suffer injury from the law, but two public employees intervened in the action to seek that Abood be overturned. Given that Abood is binding on lower courts, the district court dismissed the claim, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for the same reason.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62896:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62896:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62896:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the State of Illinois’ extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violated the First Amendment, meaning that Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, which held otherwise, was overruled.\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court began by stating that the district court had jurisdiction over Janus’ suit, as he was undisputedly injured in fact by the state’s agency fee system, and the harm he suffered could be redressed if he prevailed in court.\nMoving on to the merits, the Court concluded that the state’s collection of agency fees from nonconsenting public employees was a violation of the First Amendment, and that Abood was incorrect in deciding otherwise. The Court stated that requiring individuals to endorse ideas they disagreed with runs counter to First Amendment principles, and that even under a more permissive standard than the “exacting” strict scrutiny that the Court had applied in evaluating the constitutionality of agency fees in the past, the Illinois scheme could not pass muster.\nThe Court explained that neither of Abood’s two justifications for agency fees, which were maintaining “labor peace” and eliminating the risk of “free riders,” could survive under this standard, finding that both problems could be mitigated through less restrictive means than agency fees. The Court also rejected newer state interests that had been asserted, which were to support bargaining with a sufficiently funded agent and increasing workforce efficiency, stating that unions could be effective without agency fees.\nThe Court further reasoned that stare decisis principles did not require deference to Abood, finding that Abood was poorly reasoned, lacked workability, and that over time it had become an “outlier” in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. It also stated that Abood’s uncertain status, along with the short-term nature of collective bargaining agreements and unions’ ability to protect themselves when agency-fee provisions were critical to their bargains all militated against giving Abood decisive weight.\nIn light of these reasons, the Court concluded that the practice of states and public-sector unions collecting agency fees from nonconsenting employees was a violation of the First Amendment, and that no further agency fees or other forms of payment to a public-sector union could be collected, nor could attempts be made to collect such payments from employees without their consent.\nJustice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent faulted the Majority for upsetting the balance that Abood brought to public-sector labor relations, and for disregarding stare decisis principles for no special reason. It also criticized the Majority for issuing its decision without considering the consequences it could have in light of the fact that over 20 states had elaborate statutory schemes built on the Abood decision, thousands of contracts involving millions of employees relied upon those laws, and the government services that these public-sector employees performed impacted the lives of tens of millions of Americans.\nJustice Sotomayor filed an additional dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62896:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62897:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62897:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRobert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy’s motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy’s motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy’s guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty.\nThe Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel’s failure to follow McCoy’s direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62897:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62897:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62897:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nInherent in the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel is the autonomy right of a criminal defendant to choose the objective of his defense and insist that counsel not admit guilt, even if the counsel's experience-based view is that admitting guilt offers the best chance of avoiding the death penalty. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court distinguished decisions that may be made by counsel and those reserved to the client. Counsel may make decisions described as \"trial management\" such as whether to call a particular witness or raise certain objections to evidence. Reserved exclusively to the client are decisions including whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one's own behalf, and forgo an appeal. Whether to assert innocence as a defense is also within those decisions reserved to the client. Because the issue presented in this case involves client autonomy, not effectiveness of counsel, the error is considered \"structural error\" and is not subject to harmless-error review.\n Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. In the dissent's view, the Court's holding arbitrarily distinguishes between counsel's conspicuously omitting discussion of one element of a crime and expressly conceding that element. The dissent further criticizes the majority for reaching an overly broad holding despite the unusual circumstances of the particular case before it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62897:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62898:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62898:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFlorencio Rosales-Mireles pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). His total criminal-history score was calculated according to the US Sentencing Guidelines Manual, but when calculating the criminal-history score, the probation officer erroneously counted a 2009 Texas conviction of misdemeanor assault twice. His total criminal-history score, combined with other factors, led a sentence of 78 months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Rosales-Mireles did not object to the sentence after it was imposed.\nThe Fifth Circuit found that Rosales-Mireles met the three prongs necessary to meet the plain error standard. However, if all three prongs are met, the court has the discretion to remedy the plain error if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The court declined to exercise its discretion in this case and therefore affirmed the judgment of sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62898:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62898:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62898:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court reversed and remanded, holding that a miscalculation of a Federal Guidelines sentencing range that has been determined to be plain and to affect a defendant’s substantial rights calls for a court of appeals to exercise its discretion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) to vacate the defendant’s sentence in the ordinary case.\nIn a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Court explained that the Fifth Circuit’s narrow shock-the conscience standard was too restrictive in defining the extent of the appellate court’s jurisdiction in this context. The risk of unnecessary deprivation of liberty that can result from this narrow approach undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings where a Guidelines error is plain, because it is ultimately the district court that is responsible for ensuring that it applies the correct Guidelines range. In addition, the Court stated that remands for resentencing are inexpensive compared to remands for retrial, and ensuring that Guidelines determinations are accurate furthers the Sentencing Commission’s goals of uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.\nJustice Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Alito.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62898:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62903:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62903:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince 1997, Microsoft has operated a web-based email service available for public use without charge (most recently called Outlook.com). Much of the data associated with this service is saved on datacenters operated by Microsoft and its subsidiaries, which are located throughout the world.\nIn 2013, Microsoft was served with a search and seizure warrant for the data pertaining to a particular user. That user's data was stored solely in Microsoft's datacenter in Dublin, Ireland. Microsoft disclosed all other responsive information requested in the warrant but moved the magistrate judge to quash the warrant with respect to the user data stored in Dublin. The magistrate judge denied Microsoft's motion to quash, finding that the Stored Communications Act (SCA) authorized the district court to issue a warrant for \"information that is stored on servers abroad.\" The magistrate judge held that the place where the government would review the content (the United States), not the place where the content was stored (Ireland) was the relevant place of seizure.\nMicrosoft appealed the magistrate judge's decision, and the district court affirmed after reviewing de novo. The district court also held Microsoft in civil contempt for refusing to comply fully with the warrant. The Second Circuit held that the SCA does not authorize courts to issue and enforce against US-based service providers warrants for the seizure of customer email content that is stored exclusively on foreign servers and thus reversed the district court's denial of the motion to quash, vacated the finding of contempt, and remanded the case to the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62903:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62903:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62903:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWhile this case was pending, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, which amended the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq., to require email providers to disclose emails in its \"possession, custody, or control,\" even if the emails are stored outside the United States. The government then procured and served Microsoft with a new warrant pursuant to the amended law, and the parties agreed that the new warrant had replaced the original warrant at issue in this case. The Court explained that because there was no longer any live dispute between the parties, the case had become moot. The Court vacated the ruling on review and remanded the case to the Second Circuit with instructions to vacate the district court's contempt finding and its denial of Microsoft's motion to quash, and to direct the district court to dismiss the case as moot.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62903:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62904:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62904:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLos and Roosevelt Dahda – twin brothers – were indicted on charges that they had conspired to acquire and distribute marijuana. Much of the evidence against the Dahdas was obtained through wiretaps of cell phones used by the co-conspirators, including the Dahdas. The wiretaps arose out of nine orders issued by a federal district court in Kansas. Prior to trial, the Dahdas brothers moved to suppress the information obtained from the wiretaps on the grounds that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction. The trial court rejected that argument, and both were found guilty and sentenced.\nThe Tenth Circuit upheld the decision allowing evidence from the cellphones to be used against the brothers. Although the court of appeals agreed that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction, it held that such defect did not \"directly and substantially affect a congressional intention to limit wiretapping. The court identified two “core concerns” of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968—privacy and uniformity—that were not implicated by the Dahdas’ argument that the order exceeded the Kansas district court’s jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62904:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62904:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62904:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA unanimous Court, with the exception of Justice Gorsuch who took no part in the opinion, affirmed the 10th Circuit’s ruling, but with different reasoning than the appellate court had used. In an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court explained that the 10th Circuit had incorrectly applied United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505, 527 (1974) in deciding the case. Giordano and its “core concerns” test only applied to the first subsection of the statutory provision at issue, which dealt with “unlawfully intercepted” communications, where in this case, the second subsection, regarding facially insufficient wiretap orders, was the portion in dispute.\nThe Court went on to hold that the wiretap orders authorized by the Kansas district court judge were not facially insufficient because they were not lacking any information that the wiretap statute required them to include, noting that “not every defect results in an insufficiency.” The Court also explained that the challenged language authorizing interception outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction was surplus, and thus did not render the orders facially insufficient.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62904:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62905:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62905:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the credit-card industry, there is what is called a “two-sided market.” Cardholders benefit from holding a card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of cardholders use it. Thus, the cardholder and the merchant both depend on widespread acceptance of a card.\nIn the United States, credit-card transaction volume is comprised primarily of four networks: Visa (45%), American Express (26.4%), MasterCard (23.3%), and Discover (5.3%). Because of the way Visa and MasterCard transactions are handled, they do not directly set certain fees, but merely influence these prices. In contrast, American Express is directly involved in the vast majority of transactions involving its cards. Thus, it maintains direct relationships with both its cardholders and merchants and directly sets the relevant fees.\nIn the 1980s, Visa and MasterCard adopted exclusionary rules preventing member institutions from issuing card products on the Amex or Discover networks, and ran ad campaigns highlighting Amex’s smaller network and higher merchant fees. In response, Amex strengthened contractual restraints designed to control how merchants treat Amex cardholders at the point of sale, known as non-discriminatory provisions (NDPs).\nIn 2010, the federal government and 17 states sued Amex, Visa, and MasterCard for unreasonably restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act. They alleged that the credit card companies used anti-steering provisions to suppress competition and block competition from rival networks. In 2011, Visa and MasterCard entered into consent judgments and voluntarily rescinded their anti-steering provisions. Amex proceeded to trial, and the district court ruled that Amex’s NDPs violated US antitrust laws. Reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the lower court should have weighed the NDPs’ net effect on both merchants and cardholders under the generally accepted “rule of reason.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62905:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62905:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62905:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAmex's anti-steering provisions do not violate federal antitrust law. In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court first looked to the definition of the market in this context, finding that it consists of both cardholders and merchants. The \"rule of reason\" establishes a burden-shifting process for showing antitrust violations, the first burden being on the plaintiffs to show anticompetitive effects. Defining the market as it did, the Court found that the government needed to prove not only that the anti-steering provisions had an anticompetitive effect on the merchants (which it did show), but also that they had an anticompetitive effect on the cardholders (which it did not). Having found that the government failed to meet its burden in the first step of the \"rule of reason\" test, the Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit.\nJustice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. In dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the majority for coming up with a market definition that has no basis in precedent and instead actually contradicts its holding in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). Justice Breyer points to the finding by the district court of direct evidence of significant anticompetitive effects of the anti-steering provisions and would find that this evidence is sufficient to meet its burden under the \"rule of reason\" burden-shifting framework.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62905:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62907:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62907:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael N. Currier was indicted by a single grand jury and charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Before trial, the defense and prosecution agreed to sever the firearm charge from the grand larceny and burglary charges. The case proceeded to trial on the burglary and grand larceny charges, and a jury acquitted Currier of both charges.\nWhen the Commonwealth of Virginia sought to try Currier on the remaining charge of felon in possession of a firearm, he objected that collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) protections embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded his retrial. Notwithstanding his objections, Currier was tried, convicted, and sentenced. Currier filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict, and the trial court denied his motion. The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s conviction, as did the Supreme Court of Virginia.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62907:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62907:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62907:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court affirmed the Virginia Supreme Court’s ruling in a 5-4 vote, holding that because Currier consented to a severance of the multiple charges against him, his second trial and resulting conviction, following an acquittal at his first trial, did not violate the double jeopardy clause.\nJustice Gorsuch delivered the Court’s opinion with respect to Parts I and II, explaining that the double jeopardy clause bars a person from being tried more than once “for the same offence.” Currier argued that the Court’s precedent in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) required a ruling in his favor. However, the Court stated that for a second trial to be precluded under Ashe, the Court must have been able to conclude that “it would have been irrational for the jury” in the initial trial to acquit without finding for the defendant on a fact essential to a conviction in the second trial. The Court then distinguished Ashe from the instant case by pointing out that even if Currier’s second trial could be classified as a retrial of the same offense under Ashe, he consented to it.\nThe Court went on to explain that the relevant precedent was Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977), in which the issue was a trial on a greater offense after an acquittal of a lesser-included offense. In Jeffers the Court held that if a single trial on multiple charges would be sufficient to avoid a double jeopardy violation, there could not be a violation where the defendant seeks two separate trials and persuades the trial court to grant the request. The Court stated that if consent could nullify a double jeopardy complaint in a situation involving a second trial for a greater offense, it could certainly overcome a double jeopardy complaint under Ashe. To hold otherwise would have been inconsistent with Jeffers and other Supreme Court precedent.\nIn Part III, Justice Gorsuch was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito in concluding that civil issue preclusion principles could not be applied to criminal law through the double jeopardy clause to stop parties from retrying any issue or bringing in evidence regarding a previously tried issue.\nJustice Kennedy filed a separate opinion concurring in part, finding that because Parts I and II resolved the case fully and properly, the scope of double jeopardy protections defined in Ashe did not need to be part of the Court’s analysis here.\nJustice Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62907:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62909:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62909:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Chattahoochee River starts in north Georgia, flows southwest past Atlanta, and then flows south along Georgia's border, first with Alabama, then with Florida. In the southwest corner of Georgia, the Chattahoochee joins the Flint River, to form the Apalachicola River, which flows south through northwest Florida and into the Apalachicola Bay in the Gulf of Mexico. At issue is the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (ACF Basin), which the US Army Corps of Engineers reports drains a total of 19,800 square miles in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, which is distributed roughly into 74%, 15%, and 11%, respectively.\nPursuant to congressional authorizations, the Corps operates a system of dams in the ACF Basin based on a Master Manual governing all the dams and a reservoir regulation manual for each individual dam. The Master Manual was completed in 1958 and has not been comprehensively revised since then. There have been several lawsuits among the states seeking update and clarify the apportionment of the waters of the ACF Basin. The present action was filed by Florida, which alleges that the ecosystem and economy of the Apalachicola region \"are suffering serious harm\" because of Georgia's consumption and storage of water from the Basin. Florida invokes the US Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to ask that the Court equitably apportion the waters of the ACF Basin. For equitable relief to be granted, Florida must first show standing—that is, that it has suffered a wrong through the action of another state that can be corrected by the courts. Second, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence a \"threatened invasion of rights . . . of serious magnitude.\" Third, the state must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of apportionment substantially outweigh the harm that could result. If a state meets this burden, the Court must craft an equitable-apportionment decree. After lengthy evidentiary hearings, the Special Master filed a report recommending that the Court deny Florida's request for relief on the ground that \"Florida has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62909:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62909:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62909:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nFlorida made a legally sufficient showing as to the possibility of fashioning an effective remedial decree equitably apportioning the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (ACF Basin). In a 5–4 opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the Special Master applied too strict a standard (\"clear and convincing evidence\") when he determined that the Court could not fashion a appropriate relief. A complaining state should not have to prove with specificity the details of a workable decree; rather, it need only to show that it is possible to fashion such a decree, applying principles of \"flexibility\" and \"approximation.\" The Court reserved judgment as to the ultimate disposition of the case, finding only that Florida had made a legally sufficient showing of redressability. Further findings are needed to resolve many of the other evidentiary issues.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch joined. The dissent points out that the issue raised in this case is entirely about the balance-of-harms analysis and criticizes the majority for \"mush[ing] the requirements from our precedents together.\" In the dissent's view, the precedents are abundantly clear, and after a full trial, Florida failed to meet its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that \"the benefits of apportionment substantially outweigh the harm that could result.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62909:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62911:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62911:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Rio Grande originates in Colorado, flows south into New Mexico, and flows into Texas near El Paso. The Rio Grande Compact apportions the water of the Rio Grande Basin among the states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. Among other things, the Compact provides that Colorado must deliver a specific quantity of water to the New Mexico state line, and that New Mexico must then deliver a specific quantity of water to Elephant Butte Reservoir, a federal Bureau of Reclamation project that distributes water to New Mexico and Texas.\nTexas alleges that New Mexico has depleted Texas's equitable apportionment of water under the Compact by allowing diversion of surface water and pumping of groundwater that is hydrologically connected to the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte. New Mexico contends that the Compact does not require it to deliver any specific amount of water to the Texas state line and thus that its actions do not violate the Compact.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62911:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62911:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62911:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court held that the United States is permitted to intervene in this particular dispute over a compact between states to defend \"distinctively federal interests\" that a normal litigant might not be permitted to pursue in traditional litigation. To reach this conclusion, the Court assessed four considerations. First, the compact at issue in this case is inextricably intertwined with certain other contracts that implicate federal interests (the Rio Grande Project and the Downstream Contracts). Second, the United States has a critical role in the operation of the compact at issue. Third, a breach of the compact could jeopardize the federal government’s ability to satisfy its treaty obligations to Mexico. Finally, the United States has asserted its compact claims in an existing action brought by Texas, seeking substantially the same relief and without that State’s objection. The Court specifically limited its holding so as not to answer the question whether the United States may initiate litigation to force a State to perform its obligations under the compact or expand the scope of an existing controversy between states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62911:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62921:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62921:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe National Institute of Family and Life Advocates and two other religiously-affiliated pro-life entities engaged in providing pregnancy-related services in the state of California (collectively “NIFLA”) sought to enjoin the enforcement of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the “Act”). The law’s stated purpose is to ensure access to reproductive health services for all California women, regardless of income. NIFLA argued that the Act’s requirements that (1) licensed clinics provide information to patients about free and low-cost publicly funded family planning services, including contraception and abortion, and that (2) unlicensed clinics inform patients of their unlicensed status violated their free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment.\nThe U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied NIFLA’s motion for preliminary injunction, concluding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as required under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), as to either their free speech or free exercise claims.\nThe Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court had not abused its discretion by denying the injunction. The Court rejected NIFLA’s argument that strict scrutiny should apply to the Act, because while the law compelled content-based speech by requiring NIFLA to disseminate information about low-cost family planning services, it did not discriminate based on viewpoint. Relying on its own precedent in the face of a circuit split regarding the level of scrutiny to apply in the abortion-related disclosure context, the Court reasoned that the type of speech at issue in this case was professional speech. It was therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny, which the family planning information disclosure requirement survived.\nThe Court also affirmed that the requirement that unlicensed facilities disclose their unlicensed status survived any level of scrutiny.\nFinally, the Court agreed with the decision below that NIFLA was not entitled to a preliminary injunction on free exercise grounds, finding that the Act to be a facially neutral law of general applicability that survived rational basis review. The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari did not include this issue.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62921:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62921:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62921:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the pro-life pregnancy center petitioners were likely to succeed on their claim that the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the “FACT Act” or the “Act”) violated the First Amendment.\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court began its discussion by explaining that the licensed notice was a content-based regulation that likely violated the First Amendment. The court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of the licensed notice as regulating professional speech, stating that the Court had never recognized “professional speech” as a separate category of speech that was subject to different free speech rules. The Court explained that it had only granted lesser protection to professional speech in two situations--where professionals were required to disclose “factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech,’’’ and where states regulated professional conduct that incidentally implicated speech--and that neither of those lines of authority were applicable in the instant case. The Court further stated that it had a long history of protecting the First Amendment rights of professionals outside of those two contexts, emphasizing that imposing content-based regulations on professional speech created a risk of the government seeking to suppress unpopular ideas rather than advance legitimate regulatory objectives. The Court also concluded that the licensed notice did not survive even intermediate scrutiny, as it was “wildly underinclusive” in light of the Act’s stated purpose of providing low income women with information about the state-sponsored health services at issue.\nThe Court also held that the unlicensed notice unduly burdened protected speech. Assuming without deciding that rules requiring professionals to disclose “factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’” applied here, the Court stated that California was required to show that such disclosures were only justified if they addressed a potentially real and not simply hypothetical harm, and that here, the state had only presented hypothetical risks. And even if the state had overcome this requirement, the Court ruled that the unlicensed notice was still unduly burdensome because it “impose[d] a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement that [wa]s wholly disconnected from the State’s informational interest,” possibly leaving unburdened speakers whose messages aligned with the state’s views.\nJustice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined.\nJustice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. The dissent argued that both notice requirements were likely to pass constitutional scrutiny. Regarding the licensed notice, Breyer highlighted the Court’s precedent permitting state notice requirements as to abortion alternatives, such as adoption, and asked why a state law couldn’t require healthcare provider to provide information about abortion and childbirth services in this case. Breyer also rejected the majority’s assertion that the unlicensed notice was supported by only a “hypothetical” interest, as well as the conclusion that this particular requirement should be deemed facially unconstitutional due to the fact that it could create an undue burden in some situations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62921:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62922:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62922:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFane Lozman was a resident of the City of Riviera Beach (the “City”), where he was a vocal critic of the City’s plan to utilize eminent domain to redevelop the Riviera Beach Marina. After the redevelopment plan was approved, Lozman filed suit against the City under the Florida Sunshine Law, seeking to invalidate the City’s approval of the plan due to insufficient public notice for the emergency meeting during which the plan had been approved. The city council met in a closed session to discuss the lawsuit, and the meeting transcript seemed to reflect councilmembers suggesting that the City should employ intimidation tactics in fighting Lozman’s claim.\nOn November 15, 2006, Lozman attended a regularly scheduled city council meeting and was granted permission to speak during the non-agenda public comment portion of the meeting. When it was his turn to speak, he attempted to begin discussing corruption in local government, and a councilmember instructed him to discontinue his comments on that topic. Lozman repeatedly ignored the councilmember’s instructions, and she ultimately instructed a City police officer to arrest Lozman.\nLozman was charged with, inter alia, disturbing a lawful assembly. The prosecuting attorney concluded that there was probable cause for the arrest, but dismissed the charges on the grounds that successful prosecution was unlikely.\nIn February 2008, Lozman filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the City had arrested him at the city council meeting in retaliation for his opposition to the redevelopment plan. He alleged (1) retaliation by false arrest under the First Amendment, (2) unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and (3) common law false arrest. The case went to trial in November 2014 with Lozman appearing pro se. The jury found in favor of the City on all claims. Lozman filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied.\nOn appeal, Lozman argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the jury’s finding of probable cause on the charge of disturbing a lawful assembly was against the great weight of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this contention in light of the evidence presented at trial. It further explained that under its own precedent, a finding of probable cause bars a claim for false arrest under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and state law.\nThe Eleventh Circuit also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the district court’s instruction on retaliatory animus, stating that any error the instruction may have contained was harmless because the jury’s probable cause finding defeated Lozman’s retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. The appeals court also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the lower court’s jury instructions regarding the City’s authority to limit public comment during city council meetings. The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari did not include these two issues.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62922:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62922:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62922:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nRuling 8-1, the Court vacated and remanded, holding that the existence of probable cause for Lozman’s arrest for disrupting a city council meeting did not bar his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under the circumstances of this case.\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court explained that its holding in this case was narrow. Lozman had conceded that probable cause for his arrest existed, but claimed that his arrest was in retaliation for his earlier protected speech, which took the form of an open-meetings lawsuit and public criticisms of city officials. However, the parties disagreed as to what standard should govern the allegations of retaliatory arrest. Lozman argued that the applicable precedent was Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), a civil case in which a teacher alleged retaliatory employment action in violation of his First Amendment rights, and the Court held that the employer could not be liable unless the alleged constitutional violation was a but-for cause of the employment termination. The City argued that Mt. Healthy should not provide the sole standard in this case, and that instead Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), a criminal case which held that a plaintiff alleging retaliatory prosecution must show the absence of probable cause for the underlying criminal charge, should govern the case. But the Court responded that the question of what precedent applied to this issue need not be decided in a broad sense given that the facts of this case were so unusual in the retaliatory arrest context.\nIndeed, Lozman did not sue the officer who made the arrest, and likely could not have succeeded on a retaliatory arrest claim against him as the officer seemed to have acted in good faith, and there was no indication that he had any knowledge of Lozman’s prior lawsuit or criticisms of the local government. Instead, Lozman alleged that city officials had implemented an official policy of intimidation against him due to his lawsuit and public statements criticizing them, and that their premeditated plan culminated in his arrest at the city council meeting. Further, in order for the city to be subject to liability under § 1983, Lozman would need to prove that he suffered harm as a result of an “official municipal policy,” distinguishing his claim from most cases alleging retaliatory arrest, which often involve on-the-spot judgements by individual police officers.\nGiven the uniqueness of this case in the retaliatory arrest context, along with the core First Amendment values at stake, the Court held that Lozman did not need to prove the absence of probable cause to maintain his retaliatory arrest claim. The Court also concluded that Mt. Healthy was the proper standard for assessing the retaliatory arrest claim on remand under these particular facts, but declined to address the requirements for proving such a claim in other contexts. The Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.\nJustice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62922:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62923:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62923:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMinnesota Statute § 211B.II prohibits individuals from wearing political apparel at or around polling places on primary or election days. The text of the statute did not define “political”, so Minnesota election officials distributed policy materials to help identify which items fell within the scope of the law. Election officials received instructions to request that anyone wearing apparel which violated the guidelines laid out in the policy materials remove or cover it up. While officials were instructed to allow the person to vote regardless of their compliance, misdemeanor prosecution was a possible outcome, should an individual refuse the removal or cover-up request.\nThis case arose when Andrew Cilek, executive director for Minnesota Voters Alliance, was temporarily prevented from voting at his local polling place in November 2010 because he was wearing a t-shirt with a Tea Party logo and a button that advocated for the requirement of a photo ID to vote.\nMinnesota Majority, Minnesota Voters Alliance, and Minnesota Northstar Tea Party Patriots, along with their association Election Integrity Watch (EIW), filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Secretary of State and various county election officials to enjoin enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. The parties claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as-applied, and was selectively enforced, which also violated their Equal Protection rights.\nInitially, the district court dismissed all claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed as to the claims regarding Equal Protection and facial First Amendment violations. It reversed and remanded the as-applied First Amendment claim. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment against EIW, et al., on the as-applied First Amendment claim. Reviewing de novo the grant of summary judgment against EIW, the Eighth Circuit considered EIW's claim that the Minnesota statute was not reasonable, as applied to Tea Party apparel, because the Tea Party is not a political party in Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit was unpersuaded and held that the district court was correct in its ruling, since EIW had failed to present specific facts that showed banning Tea Party apparel was not reasonable, given the Minnesota statute's purpose. The Eighth Circuit held that EIW's argument that voters in Tea Party apparel were affected by selective enforcement had also failed, as it offered nothing more than speculation that voters wearing other forms of political apparel avoided enforcement of the statute. EIW, et al., then petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the lower courts’ ruling was correct.\nEIW indicates in their petition for a writ of certiorari that there is a circuit split on the issues presented, where the Eighth Circuit’s ruling aligns with the D.C. and Fifth Circuit, which both have held that the government has authority to ban forms of political speech near polling places. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held, by contrast, that a complete ban on all political speech, absent any limiting principle, is unconstitutional, regardless of the location in which such speech has been banned.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62923:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62923:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62923:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Minnesota statute prohibiting individuals from wearing political apparel at a polling place violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court reasoned that a polling place is a nonpublic forum under its precedents, which means that the state may place reasonable limits on speech therein. Content-based restrictions on speech must be \"reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression\" based on the speaker's viewpoint. The text of the Minnesota statute made no distinction based on the speaker's political persuasion, so it would be permissible so long as it is \"reasonable.\" One component of reasonableness is the presence of \"objective, workable standards\" guiding enforcement of the law. Because the statute in question does not define the term \"political\" nor any other key terms describing the types of apparel subject to the prohibition, the law affords too much discretion in enforcing the ban and is thus unreasonable.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. The dissent would not have reversed and remanded the court of appeals below, as the Court did, but instead would have certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court to give the state courts \"a reasonable opportunity to pass upon and construe the statute.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62923:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62930:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62930:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMark A. Sveen and Kaye L. Melin were married in 1997. Sveen purchased a life insurance policy that year, and the following year he named Melin the primary beneficiary, and his children the contingent beneficiaries. Sveen and Melin divorced in 2007, and Sveen died in 2011.\nMinnesota had changed its probate code in 2002 to apply a revocation-upon-divorce statute to life insurance beneficiary designations. Sveen had never changed the designation on his life insurance policy, and Melin was therefore still listed as the primary beneficiary at the time of his death.\nThe insurance company filed an interpleader to establish whether the revocation-upon-divorce statute nullified this designation. Sveen’s children and Melin cross-claimed for the proceeds, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the children, rejecting Melin’s contention that retroactively applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution.\nThe Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that under its own precedent, the dispositive issue in this context was the right of the policyholder to have his wishes carried out in accordance with his intentions at the time he signed the contract. Applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute retroactively would deprive him of that right in violation of the Contract Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62930:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62930:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62930:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an 8-1 opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the retroactive application of Minnesota’s revocation-upon-divorce statute, which automatically nullifies an ex-spouse’s beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy or other will substitute, does not violate the contracts clause of the Constitution.\nThe Court explained that not all laws affecting pre-existing contracts violate the contracts clause. There is a two-step inquiry to determine whether such a law is in fact unconstitutional in this context. The first question is whether the state law “operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.” This inquiry involves three sub-issues, which are the extent to which the law 1) undermines the contractual bargain, 2) interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and 3) prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights. If those factors reflect a substantial impairment, the Court must then ask whether the law has been crafted in an “appropriate” and “reasonable” way to advance “a significant and legitimate public purpose.”\nIn this case the Court stopped its inquiry after considering only the first factor, finding that the Minnesota statute did not substantially impair pre-existing contractual arrangements. It found that first, the law in this case was intended to reflect the policyholder’s intent that he or she likely would not want their life insurance proceeds to pass to a former spouse, thus supporting rather than undermining the contractual scheme. Second, the law was not likely to thwart the policyholder’s expectations, as the policyholder could not reasonably expect a beneficiary designation to stay in place after a divorce. Third, the law in this case served as a mere default rule, which the policyholder could undo at any time by sending in a new beneficiary designation form. The Court stated that such a minimal paperwork burden does not violate the contracts clause under its well-established precedent.\nJustice Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62930:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62931:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62931:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nErik Hughes pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses and entered into a plea agreement with the government under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes accordingly. Hughes then sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits defendants who have been “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court relied on Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) in determining that Hughes was ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range,” but on a plea agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62931:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62931:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62931:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) (“Type C”) plea bargain is “based on” the defendant’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines range as long as that range was a component of the framework the court used in imposing the sentence or accepting the plea bargain, meaning that in this case, Erik Hughes could seek a sentencing reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).\nThe Court explained that a central purpose of the Guidelines is uniformity in sentencing. However, in the wake of the Court’s 4-1-4 decision in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011), which considered the question of a defendant’s eligibility for a reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(2) after entering into a Type C agreement, some circuits followed the plurality opinion while others followed Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, depending on how they applied Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).\nIn seeking to resolve this split in authority, the Court stated that a district court imposes a sentence that is “based on” the Guidelines range if the range was part of the basis the court used in exercising its discretion to impose a sentence. District courts are required to use the Guidelines range as a starting point for calculating sentences in every case, including cases involving Type C agreements. As such, in most cases, sentences imposed pursuant to Type C agreements are “based on” the defendant’s guidelines range. Therefore, when the Sentencing Commission lowers the range for a particular offense, unless there is a clear showing that the court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the Guidelines range, a defendant who has entered into a Type C agreement related to that offense will generally be eligible for a reduction in sentence under § 3582(c)(2). The Court stated that this interpretation, as a systemic, structural matter, best supported the sentencing system Congress put into place.\nPursuant to this reasoning and in light of the fact that the Guidelines range was a basis for Hughes’ sentence, the Court held that he was eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2) given that the range had been lowered\nThe Court declined to decide the question of how Marks should properly apply.\nJustice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion in which she explained that she was joining the majority in full in the instant case in order to help resolve the confusion that had arisen in the aftermath of Freeman, but stated that she still believed that her concurrence in Freeman set forth the most convincing application of § 3582(c)(2)’s text.\nJustice Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito and Thomas joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62931:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62932:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62932:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRene Sanchez-Gomez and defendants in three other criminal cases (collectively “Defendants”) objected to a policy (the “Policy”) of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California (the “District”) which required them to appear for pretrial non-jury proceedings in full physical restraints. The Policy, which applied to most in-custody defendants appearing in such proceedings, was proposed by the U.S. Marshals Service and accepted by the District’s judges.\nThe magistrate judges in all four cases overruled the Defendants’ objections to the Policy. The Defendants appealed these denials to the district court, and also filed emergency motions challenging the Policy’s constitutionality. The district court denied all relief, and the four cases were consolidated before the 9th Circuit.\nThe 9th Circuit, sitting en banc, construed the Defendants’ appeals as petitions for writs of mandamus under its supervisory authority, and found that it had jurisdiction to review the Policy’s constitutionality. It explained that while the individual Defendants’ claims may be moot by the time of review due to their criminal cases ending and the Policy having been changed, under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Gerstein v. Pugh, the Defendants represented a broader group of similarly situated people who could be injured should the Policy be reinstated. Thus, applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review mootness exception, the supervisory mandamus case was not moot. However, because the Policy was no longer in effect, the court withheld a formal writ of mandamus.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62932:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62932:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62932:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA unanimous Court held that the case is moot. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court found that the appellate court's reliance on Gerstein was misplaced, as that case does not support a freestanding exception to mootness outside the class action context. Further, the mere presence of allegations that might, if resolved in respondents' favor, benefit other similarly situated individuals does not save their case from mootness. Additionally, the Court found unpersuasive the respondents' arguments that their claims fall within the exception to mootness by virtue of being \"capable of repetition yet evading review\" because the possibility that a person will be criminally prosecuted is insufficient to establish judicial standing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62932:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62933:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62933:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSharline and Ray Lundgren and the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (the “Tribe”) own adjacent pieces of property in Skagit County, Washington. The space between a fence running across the width of the Tribe’s property and its southern border became a subject of dispute between the parties after the Tribe attempted to assert ownership of it in 2013.\nThe Lundgrens’ property had been in their extended family since approximately 1947, during which time they had always treated the fence as the property line. In 2013 the Tribe purchased land to the north of the Lundgrens’ property, and were apparently not aware of the fence at that time. When they discovered it, they informed the Lundgrens of their intention to assert ownership rights over the disputed portion of land.\nIn 2015, the Lundgrens filed suit to quiet title to the property, seeking summary judgment on the basis that they had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession or mutual acquiescence and recognition long before the Tribe bought its parcel. The Tribe moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, and because the Lundgrens could not join them as a necessary and indispensable party. The trial court denied the Tribe’s motion, and the Tribe sought direct discretionary review. In the resulting ruling, the court granted the Lundgrens’ motion for summary judgment, finding that they had established legal ownership of the disputed property through adverse possession and mutual recognition and acquiescence.\nThe Washington Supreme Court accepted the Tribe’s amended motion for discretionary review of both prior orders, and affirmed. The court rejected the argument that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, which neither the Tribe nor Congress had waived with regard to quiet title actions. The court found that because it had in rem jurisdiction, the Tribe’s sovereign immunity did not create a barrier to jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62933:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62933:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62933:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-2 opinion by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the Washington Supreme Court to address the common-law question of sovereign immunity. The majority clarified that its decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation addressed only a question of statutory interpretation, not the question presented here of whether Indian tribes have sovereign immunity in in rem lawsuits. The respondents ask the Court to affirm on an alternative, common-law ground—that the tribe cannot assert sovereign immunity because the suit relates to immovable property located in Washington state and purchased by the tribe.\nChief Justice John Roberts filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Anthony Kennedy joined. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Samuel Alito joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62933:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62934:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62934:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nChina Agritech is a holding company incorporated in Delaware, with a principal place of business in Beijing. The company represented that it manufactured and sold organic compound fertilizers and other agricultural products to farmers in over two dozen provinces throughout China. It listed its shares on NASDAQ in 2005, and in 2009 reported to the SEC a net revenue of triple the amount it had reported four years earlier. In 2011, company shareholders alleged fraudulent business practices by China Agritech. The company denied the allegations and announced that it would conduct an internal investigation, and subsequently dismissed its independent auditor. Later that year, NASDAQ halted trading in and initiated delisting proceedings against China Agritech’s stock, and in 2012 the SEC revoked the stock’s registration.\nShareholders sued China Agritech in two successive putative class actions in 2011 and 2012, alleging various securities law violations against the company and several individual defendants. Class certification was denied in both cases.\nShareholder Michael Resh brought a third putative class action against the company and individual defendants in 2014, alleging securities law violations arising from the same facts and circumstances as the first two cases. China Agritech moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it had been filed after the two year limitations period applicable under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Resh and the additional plaintiffs argued that under the American Pipe & Construction v. Utah line of cases, the limitations period had been tolled on their claims during the pendency of the two prior class actions. The district court rejected this contention, finding that under American Pipe and its progeny, the limitations period was tolled as to individual class members, but that the Supreme Court had not decided whether an entirely new class action based on a substantially identical class was subject to the same rule. It ruled that the limitations period was therefore tolled as to the individual claims of the named plaintiffs in the instant case, but not as to the putative class.\nThe Ninth Circuit reversed, with a three-judge panel finding that the plaintiffs’ class action would not be time-barred where: (1) the named plaintiffs had been unnamed in the two prior suits, which were against many of the same defendants and involved the same underlying events; (2) the two prior cases were timely; (3) class certification was denied in the earlier actions; and (4) pursuant to the American Pipe line of cases, the named plaintiffs’ individual claims were tolled during the pendency of the two prior class actions. The panel explained that permitting such claims to go forward was consistent with the policy goals of tolling in general. The panel further stated that in light of FRCP 23’s requirements, as well as principles of comity and preclusion, the existing legal system contains sufficient safeguards to prevent litigants from filing repetitious actions in light of this ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62934:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62934:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62934:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that upon denial of class certification, a putative class member may not, in lieu of promptly joining an existing suit or promptly filing a individual action, commence a class action anew beyond the time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations.\nThe Court explained that American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker addressed only putative class members wishing to file individual suits after a class certification denial. The Court reasoned that the “efficiency and economy of litigation” that support tolling of individual claims under American Pipe do not support the commencement of untimely successive class claims, stating that any additional class claims should be filed early in relation to the first lawsuit seeking class certification. The economy of litigation does however favor delaying individual claims until class certification has been denied.\nThe Court explained that this interpretation is supported by FRCP 23, as well as the securities litigation statute governing the case, which evince a preference for resolving class certification questions and grouping class filings at the outset of the litigation. The Court stated that there is little reason to allow plaintiffs who passed up opportunities to take part in pending class claims to become involved several years later. The Court further explained that plaintiffs who commence class actions after the expiration of the limitation period are not likely to qualify as diligent in asserting claims and seeking relief, which is typically a requirement for equitable tolling. Further, the Respondents’ proposed interpretation would allow the statute of limitations to be extended over and over again for a new lead plaintiff after each class certification denial, a result not envisioned by American Pipe.\nJustice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62934:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62935:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62935:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTimothy D. Koons and four other defendants were convicted of methamphetamine conspiracy offenses. During the sentencing phase of each defendant’s trial, the government moved to reduce the defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) for providing substantial assistance to the prosecution in the prosecution or investigation of another person. The district court in each case granted the government’s motion and reduced the defendant’s sentence to a term below the statutory mandatory minimum. All five defendants subsequently moved for further sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows a district court to reduce the sentence of “a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”\nThe Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit panel majority in holding that defendants are eligible for discretionary § 3582(c)(2) reductions. Rather, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the statute to require the sentence be based on a range subsequently lowered by the Commission, and that in these five cases the sentence was based instead on the mandatory minimum and their substantial assistance. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of sentencing reductions, but for reasons different from those used by the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62935:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62935:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62935:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court held that the petitioners were not eligible for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) because their sentences were not “based on” their lowered Federal Sentencing Guidelines ranges, but rather were “based on” the mandatory minimum sentences for their offenses and their substantial assistance to the government. The Court explained that for a sentence to be “based on” a lowered Guidelines range, the range needed to have played at least a relevant part in a defendant’s sentencing. In this case the district court did not consider the Guidelines ranges in its ultimate sentencing decisions, but instead relied on the applicable mandatory minimums.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62935:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62936:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62936:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2011, the State of Maryland engaged in a process of redistricting, which in that state entails two parallel procedures: a public-facing procedure led by the Governor’s Redistricting Advisory Committee and an internal procedure involving Maryland’s congressional delegation and a consulting firm called NCEC Services, Inc. NCEC developed sample maps using voter demographic data, a computer program, and a proprietary metric that predicts the likelihood of Democratic candidate success. In comparison to sample maps submitted by third parties, the NCEC-developed maps were assessed to be more likely to see Democratic candidate success. There is no evidence that the final map that was enacted to law was one of the ones developed by NCEC; rather, former Governor Martin O’Malley testified that the legislative director and staff from the Maryland Department of Planning likely created the final document. After the 2011 plan was implemented, the “Cook Partisan Voting Index” rated the Sixth District as a “likely” Democratic seat, whereas before the 2011 plan, the Sixth District was a “safe” Republican seat. In the 2012 congressional election, Democrat John Delaney defeated incumbent Republican congressman Roscoe Bartlett by a 20.9% margin. Subsequent elections saw other Democratic candidates succeeding over Republican candidates.\nThe plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring the State from enforcing the 2011 redistricting plan and requiring the State to implement a new map in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. A majority of the district court panel denied the motion and stayed the case pending the outcome of Gill v. Whitford, another gerrymandering case before the US Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62936:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62936:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62936:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWithout resolving the substantive questions, the Court held, in an unsigned per curiam opinion, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Republican voters' motion for a preliminary injunction. To succeed on a motion for preliminary injunction, the party seeking the injunction must show likelihood of success on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public's interest. Even assuming, contrary to the district court's findings, that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, the Court found that they had unreasonably delayed seeking a preliminary injunction and that the public interest was not served in granting the injunction. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the motion for preliminary injunction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62936:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62941:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62941:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIndividual voters in Texas, along with organizations representing Latinos and African Americans, filed a number of lawsuits in 2011, challenging the Texas legislature’s congressional and state house redistricting plans. The actions were consolidated and proceed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas (“Texas District Court”). The plaintiffs alleged racial gerrymandering in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) as well as the 14th and 15th Amendments to the United States Constitution. At that time Texas was bound by the preclearance requirements under § 5 of the VRA, and therefore the State simultaneously filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (“D.C. District Court”) seeking preclearance of the redistricting plans.\nWhile trial proceedings were pending in both district courts, the 2012 primary elections were approaching. As a result, the Texas District Court assumed the task of implementing interim redistricting plans, which it did on an expedited basis, without access to all relevant facts, and with the understanding that most parties to the litigation alleged that those plans contained many of the same statutory and constitutional infirmities as the challenged plans. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the first iteration of the interim maps on the grounds that the court had not been sufficiently deferential to the legislature; the Texas District Court issued more deferential plans in February 2012.\nThe D.C. District Court subsequently denied preclearance to the proposed redistricting plans on the basis that they were enacted with discriminatory intent and had the effect of abridging minority voting rights. Texas appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.\nAfter the Texas District Court’s interim maps were used for the 2012 elections, the Texas legislature failed to take any action on redistricting in the 2013 regular session. However, it convened a special session during which it adopted, among others, the Texas District Court’s congressional interim map (“Plan C235”) without any changes. The governor subsequently signed the legislation adopting this plan.\nIn June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Shelby County v. Holder, which removed the § 5 preclearance requirements from the VRA. Texas was therefore no longer automatically subject to preclearance requirements, and the U.S. Supreme Court later vacated and remanded for further proceedings the D.C. District Court’s preclearance decision, which the lower court then dismissed as moot.\nThe defendants subsequently sought to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims in the Texas District Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the case had become moot. In response, the plaintiffs expressed their desire to amend their complaints regarding the 2011 plans and to challenge the 2013 plans. The court granted them leave to amend, and denied the State’s motions to dismiss. The court explained that the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the 2011 plans were not moot because, inter alia, the plaintiffs continued to be harmed by them. The court also ordered that the 2013 plans, which included Plan C235, be used for the 2014 elections. The plaintiffs then filed their amended complaints, including claims related to both the 2011 and 2013 plans. Most plaintiffs included claims that Plan C235 violated § 2 of the VRA and the 14th and 15th Amendments.\nThe Texas District Court held trials on the 2011 plans in 2014, and found that they violated certain aspects of § 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. In the ongoing litigation, the plaintiffs contended that the 2013 plans, including Plan C235, included some of the same elements that the court determined were the result of discriminatory intent or statutory or constitutional violations as in the 2011 plans.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62941:Facts:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "62941:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62941:Facts:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\n.MostplaintiffsincludedclaimsthatPlanC235violated§2oftheVRAandthe14thand15thAmendments.TheTexasDistrictCourtheldtrialsonthe2011plansin2014,andfoundthattheyviolatedcertainaspectsof§2oftheVRAandthe14thAmendment.Intheongoinglitigation,theplaintiffscontendedthatthe2013plans,includingPlanC235,includedsomeofthesameelementsthatthecourtdeterminedweretheresultofdiscriminatoryintentorstatutoryorconstitutionalviolationsasinthe2011plans.\nIn August 2017, the Texas District Court issued an interlocutory order regarding the plaintiffs’ C235 claims. It found that the racially discriminatory intent and effects identified in the 2011 plans carried through to the 2013 plans where the redistricting lines remained the same. It explained that the legislature had adopted the court’s interim plans (which included C235) as part of a litigation strategy that was designed to insulate the plans from any further challenge. The legislature had not engaged in any deliberative process to remove the discriminatory elements from the plans before adopting them, but instead intentionally furthered and continued the discrimination in the existing plans.\nThe court also concluded that the configurations of CD 27 and CD 35 under Plan C235 violated § 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. As to CD 27, though the court had found in 2012 that this district did not reflect a racially discriminatory purpose because it was not possible to create an additional Latino opportunity district in the region, the Texas legislature had still engaged in vote dilution. Regarding CD 35, the court stated that while C235 was enacted in 2013, the challenged district boundaries that it reflected were drawn in 2011 and found to violate § 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. The court explained that the Texas legislature did not engage in any meaningful effort to cleanse the discriminatory elements from the 2013 plan before it was adopted, and in fact intended to maintain that discrimination in enacting the plan in substantially the same form.\nThe court additionally found that the plaintiffs had proven a § 2 “results” violation as to CD 27, HD 32, and HD 34, and a racial gerrymandering claim as to HD 90.\nThe court’s order directed the Texas Attorney General to issue a written advisory within three days as to whether the legislature would convene a special session to address the issue of redistricting. If the legislature did not plan to hold a special session, the parties were ordered to appear before the court to prepare remedial redistricting plans.\nIn January 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the defendants’ appeal on the merits, at which time the Court would also consider the question of jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62941:Facts:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "62941:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62941:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court reversed and remanded in a 5-4 vote, holding that the Texas District Court erred in disregarding the presumption of good faith on the part of the Texas Legislature and improperly reversed the burden of proof in requiring the state to show a lack of discriminatory intent in adopting new districting plans; the Court also held that one of the state house districts at issue was an impermissible racial gerrymander.\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court began by explaining that it had jurisdiction to review the orders in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, because they qualified as interlocutory injunction orders.\nWith regard to the redistricting plans, the Court began its discussion by stating that in redistricting cases, legislatures are entitled to a presumption of good faith, and that the challengers had the burden of proof when alleging that a state law was enacted with discriminatory intent. It also stated that a finding of past discrimination was not sufficient to undermine the good faith presumption.\nThe Court found that in this case, the 2011 plans were repealed and not enacted by the 2013 legislature, which instead enacted the Texas District Court’s interim plans with minimal changes, and without carrying forward the effects of the 2011 legislature’s discriminatory intent. The Texas District Court had violated the applicable burden of proof principles in referencing the need to “cure” the “taint” of the earlier legislature’s process, and faulting that legislature for its lack of deliberation on this issue. The Court further concluded that evidence of the 2011 legislature’s intent and the Texas District Court’s interim plans, when viewed with other evidence in the record, was insufficient to prove bad faith and intentional discrimination on the part of the 2013 legislature.\nAfter discussing its reversal of the Texas District Court’s intent finding, the Court addressed the four remaining districts that were invalidated on alternative grounds. It reversed the Texas District Court’s holding with regard to the three districts regarding which it relied on § 2’s “effects” test, but affirmed the holding that one district was an impermissible racial gerrymander.\nWith regard to the district findings it reversed, the Court explained that to support a § 2 “effects” claim, under Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), a plaintiff must establish three factors: (1) a geographically compact minority population sufficient to constitute a majority in a single-member district, (2) political cohesion among the members of the minority group, and (3) bloc voting by the majority to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. After making that showing, the plaintiff must then prove that the minority group’s votes are diluted by the district lines under the totality of the circumstances.\nRegarding the Texas District Court’s finding that CD 27 violated § 2 by diluting the votes of Latino voters in Nueces County, who the district court ruled should have been included in a Latino opportunity district, the Court found that the plaintiffs were unable to show that an additional Latino opportunity district could be formed in that region of Texas. The Court also held that the Texas District Court erred in ruling that HD 32 and HD 34 did not comply with § 2, stating the the court’s findings showed that those two districts did not in fact violate § 2.\nFinally, the Court affirmed the ruling that HD 90 was an impermissible racial gerrymander. That district was not derived from the Texas District Court’s interim plan, but was instead modified substantially by the 2013 legislature. The state argued that its use of race as a primary factor in shaping HD 90 was proper and even necessary to comply with § 2’s requirements, but the Court found that it failed to make the requisite showing of narrow tailoring.\nJustice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62941:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "62941:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62941:Conclusion:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\naffirmedtherulingthatHD90wasanimpermissibleracialgerrymander.ThatdistrictwasnotderivedfromtheTexasDistrictCourt’sinterimplan,butwasinsteadmodifiedsubstantiallybythe2013legislature.ThestatearguedthatitsuseofraceasaprimaryfactorinshapingHD90wasproperandevennecessarytocomplywith§2’srequirements,buttheCourtfoundthatitfailedtomaketherequisiteshowingofnarrowtailoring.JusticeThomasfiledaconcurringopinion,inwhichJusticeGorsuchjoined.\nJustice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, and was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan. Sotomayor rejected the Majority’s assertion that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case, disagreeing with its conclusion that the lower court’s orders constituted an injunction. She also disagreed with the Majority’s conclusion that the Texas District Court had erred with regard to the legal test for discriminatory intent. Sotomayor contended that the lower court had engaged in a careful consideration of the legislature’s intent rather than presuming invidious intent, and correctly found that the legislature intended to discriminate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62941:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "62942:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62942:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe US Supreme Court issued a 2016 order granting certiorari in this patent infringement case, vacating a 2015 ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and remanding the matter for further consideration in light of , 579 U.S. __ (2016). On remand, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment for enhanced damages for willful infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284, but reinstated its 2015 opinion in all other respects.\nThe underlying dispute in the case related to patent-practicing devices sold by ION Geophysical Corporation (“ION”) which were combined and used in non-infringing streamer systems at sea, but that would infringe on patents belonging to WesternGeco LLC (“WesternGeco”) if used in that manner in the US. The jury found infringement by ION, found no invalidity as to any asserted claims, and awarded WesternGeco, among other amounts, $93.4 million in lost profits.\nIn a subsequent appeal to the Federal Circuit, ION asked, among other things, that the lost profits award be reversed. In its 2015 opinion, the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed that award on the grounds that under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), WesternGeco was not entitled to lost profits arising from foreign uses of its patented invention. As stated above, the court then reinstated this portion of that opinion in 2016.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62942:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62942:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62942:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nRuling 7-2, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that WesternGeco’s award for lost profits was a permissible domestic application of § 284 of the Patent Act.\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court explained that there was a presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal statutes, but that a two-step framework applied when deciding extraterritoriality questions. The first step asks whether that presumption may be rebutted. If not, the second step inquires as to whether the the case implicates the domestic application of the statute. Factors relevant to the second determination include identifying the statute’s focus, and asking whether the conduct pertinent to that focus occurred domestically. If the answer is yes, then it is a permissible domestic application of the statute.\nThe Court went on to state that though it is generally preferable to begin this inquiry with step one, courts have discretion to begin with step two, and the Court chose to do that in this case. In ascertaining the statute’s focus, the Court explained that the § 284 general damages provision was geared toward “infringement.” As such, in determining the focus of § 284 in a particular case, the type of infringement that occurred needed to be identified. In the instant case, WesternGeco’s infringement and lost profits claim was based on § 271(f)(2), the provision that regulates the domestic act of “suppl[ying] in or from the United States.” The Court explained that it had previously acknowledged that this section applied to domestic interests. The conduct in this case that was relevant to the statutory focus, and which consisted of exporting components from the U.S., took place in the U.S. As such, WesternGeco’s award was a permissible domestic application of § 284.\nJustice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Breyer.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62942:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62943:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62943:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nR. Scott Appling hired the law firm of Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP (“Lamar”) to represent him in legal proceedings against the former owners of his business. Appling incurred significant legal fees, and verbally told Lamar that he would be able to pay them after he received a sizeable tax refund that he was expecting. In reliance upon this statement, the firm continued to represent him through the conclusion of the litigation. Appling received a tax refund, though it was smaller than what he had told Lamar he was anticipating, and he put it into his business rather than paying the debt he owed to Lamar. Lamar obtained a judgment against Appling, and Appling subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Lamar initiated an adversary proceeding to collect the debt, and the bankruptcy court ruled that the amount was not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) because Lamar had justifiably relied upon Appling’s fraudulent statements. The district court affirmed.\nThe 11th Circuit reversed and remanded. Noting a circuit split on how to construe the statute at issue, the court explained that because Appling’s fraudulent statements about his tax refund were not in writing and qualified as statements “respecting [his] . . . financial condition” under § 523(a)(2)(B), the debt could be discharged.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62943:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62943:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62943:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court held that a statement regarding a specific asset can be a “statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” under section 523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. Interpreting the statutory provision at issue, the Court explained that the use of the word “respecting” in the legal context generally has a broadening effect. The Court also stated that the statute’s legislative history supported its reading.\nJustices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch joined the opinion of the Court as to all but Part III-B.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62943:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62945:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62945:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSergio Fernando Lagos pled guilty in federal district court to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and multiple counts of wire fraud. He admitted that for a period of two years, he and his co-conspirators misled General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) regarding the value of their assets in order to increase their revolving loan amount and secure under-collateralized funds.\nFollowing his guilty plea, Lagos appealed the district court’s order of restitution to the 5th Circuit. He argued that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) did not allow restitution for the legal, expert, or consulting fees incurred by GECC in the course of investigating Lagos’ suspected fraud and the bankruptcy proceedings that followed.\nThe 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s order in light of its own precedent interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) under the MVRA to permit restitution for investigative and legal costs, even under circumstances where these costs were incurred outside of the government’s investigation. The appeals court noted that the D.C. Circuit has adopted a narrower reading of the statute in question, though multiple other circuits have not.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62945:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62945:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62945:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the words “investigation” and “proceedings” in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) are limited to government investigations and criminal proceedings, and do not include private investigations and civil or bankruptcy proceedings. The Court also held that the fact that the victim shared the findings of its investigation with the government did not make the costs of the private investigation “necessary . . . other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation . . . of the offense” within the meaning of subsection (b)(4).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62945:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62946:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62946:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) commenced an administrative enforcement action against Raymond J. Lucia and Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (collectively “Petitioners”) for alleged anti-fraud violations of the Investment Advisers Act arising from the way they presented their retirement wealth management strategy to prospective clients. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found liability and imposed sanctions including a lifetime industry bar against Petitioners. The Commission granted the parties’ petitions for review, and found that Petitioners had committed anti-fraud violations and imposed the same sanctions as the ALJ. The Commission also rejected the argument that the administrative proceedings had been unconstitutional because the ALJ who handed down the initial decision was a constitutional Officer who had not been appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.\nPetitioners asked the D.C. Circuit to vacate the Commission’s decision and order under review on the grounds that the ALJ who made the administrative ruling was a constitutional Officer who had not been appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause. The appeals court rejected this argument, explaining that Commission ALJs were not constitutional Officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, primarily because of their lack of authority to issue final decisions on behalf of the Commission pursuant to the agency’s regulatory scheme.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62946:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62946:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62946:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-2 opinion, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that administrative law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission are “officers of the United States” subject to the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court began by stating that under its precedent, as established in United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), to be classified as an officer rather than an employee, a person needs to have a “continuing” position established by law, and must “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” It went on to explain that the factors in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), the case directly governing the instant matter, matched up almost exactly to the elements in Lucia’s case.\nIn Freytag, the Court ruled that U.S. Tax Court “special trial judges” (STJs) were officers because they met the elements required under Germaine and Buckley, and because they had significant discretion in addition to considerable responsibilities in presiding over administrative proceedings. These responsibilities included “tak[ing] testimony, conduct[ing] trials, rul[ing] on the admissibility of evidence, and hav[ing] the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders.” The Court reasoned that the SEC’s ALJs, like the STJs in Freytag, held a continuing office established by law, and exercised the same degree of discretion when carrying out the same functions as the STJs. But in contrast with the Tax Court STJs, whose decisions were always required to be reviewed by a regular Tax Court judge, the SEC ALJs’ decisions were not always subject to review; if the SEC decided against review then the ALJ’s decision would become final and be “deemed the action of the Commission.” As such, the SEC ALJs were officers of the United States subject to the Appointments Clause.\nIn light of this conclusion, because Lucia had made a timely challenge in his case to the constitutional validity of the ALJ’s appointment, he was entitled to a new hearing before a properly appointed official.\nJustice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.\nJustice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, and was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor as to Part III.\nJustice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62946:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62947:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62947:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1854 and 1855, the federal Indian tribes in what is currently the state of Washington entered into a series of treaties, collectively known as the “Stevens Treaties,” which provided that the Tribes would relinquish significant portions of their land to make up the state of Washington, and in exchange, they would be guaranteed the right to off-reservation fishing. This so-called “fishing clause” guaranteed the Tribes “the right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory.”\nSince those treaties, there have been recurring and ongoing disputes between the Tribes and (originally) the white settlers there and (today) the state government itself. The present case arises from the Tribes’ contention that the government was building and maintaining culverts (channels carrying water under roads or sidewalks) that diminished the size of salmon runs in traditional fishing areas for the Tribes. The 20+ Tribes represented in the suit allege that this diminishment amounts to violation of the fishing clause of the treaties.\nWashington contends that it constructed the culverts in a particular way according to federal law and that the federal requirement caused it to violate the treaties.\nThe district court found for the Tribes and issued an injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62947:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62947:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62947:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, an equally divided Court affirmed the lower court's decision. Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62947:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62948:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62948:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWescley Fonseca Pereira entered the United States in June 2000 as a non-immigrant visitor authorized to stay until December 21, 2000. Pereira overstayed his visa, and in May 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personally served him with a notice to appear for a removal hearing. The notice did not specify the date and time of his initial removal hearing, but instead ordered him to appear before an immigration judge “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” When the immigration court set a date and time, it mailed Pereira a notice with such information. However, the notice was sent to Pereira’s street address on Martha’s Vineyard rather than his post office box, so Pereira never received it. When Pereira did not appear for his removal hearing, an immigration judge ordered him removed in absentia.\nPereira was not removed and instead remained in the country. In March 2013, he was arrested for a motor vehicle violation and detained by DHS. Through his attorney, Pereira filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, claiming he had never received the hearing notice with the time and place. Although Pereira conceded that he could be removed, he sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), a provision that gives the attorney general discretion to cancel the removal of a non-permanent resident alien if the alien meets certain criteria, including ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States. This continuous period ends “when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)” of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Pereira contends that because he did not receive notice of the time and place of his removal hearing, his presence in the country was continuous and over ten years under the statute.\nThe Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that a notice to appear that does not contain the date and time of the hearing is nonetheless effective to end the period of continuous physical presence. However, Pereira challenges this reading of the statute. The First Circuit determined that the relevant provisions of the INA are ambiguous as to whether notice must include the date and time of the hearing to be effective, but the court found that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and thus subject to Chevron deference.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62948:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62948:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62948:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA notice to appear for a removal hearing that does not specify the time and place of the hearing does not trigger the stop-time rule. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court reasoned that a \"notice to appear\" that does not include with specificity both \"when\" and \"where\" cannot reasonably be expected to result in a person appearing at their hearing. The Court looked to the text of the statute, which provides that the continuous period in question ends \"when the alien is served with notice to appear,\" and \"notice to appear\" is defined throughout the section as \"a written notice . . . specifying . . . \"the time and place at which the proceedings will be held.\" The text of the statute is thus unambiguous, so Chevron deference to the interpretation by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is unnecessary. This requirement of a \"notice to appear\" is also consistent with congressional intent.\nJustice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion to note his concern over the way courts apply Chevron deference.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which he finds that the language of the statute is ambiguous and thus that the BIA's interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62948:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62949:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62949:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe so-called Dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution prohibits states from imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval. Consistent with this doctrine, the US Supreme Court held, in 1967, that a state cannot require an out-of-state seller with no physical presence within that state to collect and remit taxes for goods sold or shipped into the state. The Court affirmed this holding in 1992. In 2015, the Court heard another case with similar facts and while it declined to change its jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence questioning whether the Court should continue following the earlier cases in light of additional dormant Commerce Clause cases as well as the significant technological and social changes that affect interstate commerce.\nIn an apparent appeal to the doubt expressed by Justice Kennedy in that concurring opinion, the South Dakota Legislature passed a law requiring sellers of “tangible personal property” in that state who do not have a physical presence in the state to remit sales tax according to the same procedures as sellers who do have a physical presence. The act limited the obligation to sellers with gross revenue from sales in South Dakota of over $100,000, or 200 or more separate transactions, within one year. The legislature passed the law in defiance of Supreme Court jurisprudence, citing its inability to maintain state revenue in the face of increasing internet sales and their effect on sales tax collections.\nThe State commenced a declaratory judgment action in state court seeking a declaration that certain internet sellers subject to the law must comply with it. The sellers moved for summary judgment based on the binding Supreme Court cases. The court granted the motion for summary judgment and enjoined the State from enforcing the law. The State appealed to the state supreme court, and likewise bound by Supreme Court precedent, that court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62949:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62949:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62949:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe physical-presence rule of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois is unsound and incorrect, so both of those cases are overruled. In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that sellers who engage in a significant quantity of business within a state may be required to collect and remit taxes, despite not having a physical presence in the state. First, the Court reasoned that the physical presence rule of Quill is not a necessary interpretation of the requirement that a state tax must be \"applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state.\" Physical presence is an outdated proxy for \"substantial nexus,\" and the Court's due process doctrine provides other methods of establishing whether a seller has a substantial nexus to the state. Then, it found the rule in Quill creates, rather than resolves, market distortions. It puts businesses with physical presence at a competitive disadvantage relative to remote sellers. Finally, the Court explained by example how the rule in Quill as imposes \"the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinction that the Court's modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow.\"\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion clarifying that he \"should have joined\" Justice White's dissenting opinion in Quill and to criticize the Court's \"entire negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.\"\nJustice Neil Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion to criticize the dormant Commerce Clause, as well.\nChief Justice John Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. The dissent would find that \"the internet's prevalence and power have changed the dynamics of the national economy\" is a rationale not for discarding the physical-presence rule, but for upholding it. In the dissent's view, \"any alteration to those rules with the potential to disrupt such a critical segment of the economy should be undertaken by Congress.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62949:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62950:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62950:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSeveral subsidiaries of the Canadian National Railway Company (“the railway”) began in 1996 paying its employees in stock options as part of their compensation. Under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3231(e)(1), any form of “money remuneration” paid to railway employees is subject to an excise tax “equal to a specified percentage of its employees’ wages....” (Railroad retirement tax rates are much higher than social security tax rates.)\nWhen employees exercise their stock options when the market price exceeds the price at which the employee has a right to buy the stock, the employee can benefit from a windfall. The Internal Revenue Service argues that this windfall is taxable, just as employees’ wages are taxable.\nThe district court found for the government, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The appeals court reasoned that while the government’s argument that “anything that has a market value is a form of money remuneration” was too broad, it was still correct in its assertion that stock is equivalent to cash. Moreover, as a policy concern, the government’s position avoids creating a tax incentive that could distort the ways in which employers structure compensation packages.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62950:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62950:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62950:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court reversed and remanded, holding that employee stock options are not taxable “compensation” under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act because they are not “money remuneration.”\nIn a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Gorsuch, the Court explained that as a matter of textual interpretation, stock options did not fall within the definition of “money” as it was understood at the time the Act was adopted. Stock options could be bought or sold for money, but did not constitute a medium of exchange themselves. And while adding the term “remuneration” indicated that Congress wanted to tax monetary compensation, which could take many forms, it did not indicate that it wanted to tax things that were not money at all, like stock.\nThe Court also stated that the broader statutory context of the time supported its reading. A provision of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code treated “money” and “stock” as two different things, and a companion statute to the Act taxed “all remuneration” instead of just “money remuneration,” reflecting a difference in meaning between the two.\nThe IRS itself also issued a regulation in 1938, explaining that the Act taxes “all remuneration in money, or in something which may be used in lieu of money,” which included things like salaries, commissions, and bonuses. But the regulation did not suggest that stock was taxable.\nJustice Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62950:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62951:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62951:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2013, Adaucto Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135–168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.\nThere is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553(a) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62951:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62951:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62951:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court affirmed, holding that because the record in this case as a whole demonstrated that the judge had a reasoned basis for his decision, the judge’s explanation for reducing Chavez-Meza’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to the middle instead of the bottom of the amended Federal Guidelines range was adequate.\nIn a 5-3 opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court stated that even if a judge reducing a prisoner’s sentence were subject to the same requirements as the original sentencing judge, the district court’s explanation was appropriate in this case. The Court pointed out that the judge making the sentence modification, who was in fact the same judge who imposed the original sentence, had access to all of the factors considered at the original sentencing. He also certified that he had considered the relevant factors under § 3553(a), and then lowered Chavez-Meza’s sentence to a point somewhat higher than the bottom of the new sentencing range. The Court found this unsurprising in light of the judge’s conclusion that the original sentence of 135 months was sufficiently high. The Court stated that there may be cases in which a disproportionate sentence reduction may require a more detailed explanation. But here, given the simplicity of the case, as well as the judge’s familiarity with the case history and the relevant sentencing factors, his explanation fell within the scope of discretion available to him under the law as a sentencing judge.\nJustice Kennedy authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.\nJustice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62951:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62954:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62954:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order No. 13,769 (EO-1), which, among other things, suspended entry for 90 days of foreign nationals from seven countries identified by Congress or the Executive as presenting heightened terrorism-related risks. EO-1 was immediately challenged in federal district court, and the judge entered a nationwide temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of several of its provisions. A panel of the Ninth Circuit denied the government's emergency motion to stay the order pending appeal. Rather than continuing to litigate the matter, the government announced that it would revoke that order and issue a new one.\nOn March 6, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,780 (EO-2). Section 2(c) of EO-2 directed that entry of nationals from six of the seven countries designated in EO-1 be suspended for 90 days from the effective date of the order, citing a need for time to establish adequate standards to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists. Section 6(a) directed that applications for refugee status and travel of refugees into the United States under the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) be suspended for 120 days from the effective date \"to review the adequacy of USRAP application and adjudication procedures.\" Section 6(b) suspended the entry of any individual under USRAP once 50,000 refugees have entered the United States in fiscal year 2017. The effective date of the order was March 16, 2017. EO-2 was subject to swift litigation as well.\nOn June 14, just before Section 2(c) of EO-2 was by its terms set to expire, President Trump issued a memorandum to Executive Branch officials declaring the effective date of each enjoined provision of EO–2 to be the date on which the injunctions in these cases “are lifted or stayed with respect to that provision.\" The government sought review in both cases, making arguments both on the merits of the cases and on procedural issues.\nIn a per curiam opinion issued simultaneously with an order granting certiorari, the Court granted the government's applications for a stay of the preliminary injunction with respect to Sections 6(a) and (b) of Executive Order 13,780 (EO-2), thereby allowing enforcement of those provisions. Under the Court's ruling, the government may enforce Section 6(a) except as to any \"individual seeking admission as a refugee who can credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,\" nor may such an individual be excluded under Section 6(b).\nOn September 24, 2017—the same day EO-2 was expiring—President Donald Trump issued a Proclamation restricting travel to the United States by citizens from eight countries. That Proclamation too was challenged in federal court as attempting to exercise power that neither Congress nor the Constitution vested in the president. The Ninth Circuit struck down the Proclamation, and the Supreme Court granted review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62954:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62954:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62954:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court assumed without deciding that the plaintiffs' claims are justiciable and held that the Proclamation does not violate the president's statutory authority or the Establishment Clause. The Court did not resolve the question whether the district court's global injunction is impermissibly overbroad. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion for the 5–4 majority. The majority first considered Hawaii's argument that the September 2017 order exceeds the president’s authority under federal immigration laws. Under Section 1182(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the president has \"broad discretion\" to suspend the entry of non-citizens into the United States. The Proclamation was the result of a “worldwide, multi-agency review” that determined that entry by certain non-citizens would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. Thus, the Proclamation does not exceed any statutory power of the president.\nNor does the Proclamation violate another statute, Section 1152(a)(1)(A), which bars discrimination based on nationality in the issuance of visas. While that section prohibits discrimination, it does not limit the president's authority to block the entry of nationals of some countries, just as several other presidents have done before President Trump.\nFinally, the majority considered the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim. On its face, the majority found the Proclamation did not favor or disfavor any particular religion. But even looking behind the face of the Proclamation, the majority found that the facts that many majority-Muslim countries were not subject to restrictions and that some non-majority-Muslim countries were subject to the restrictions supported the government's contention that the Proclamation was not based on anti-Muslim animus and was instead based on \"a sufficient national security justification.\"\nJustice Anthony Kennedy joined the majority and authored a separate concurring opinion emphasizing that any subsequent proceedings must afford deference to the executive, as the majority opinion states, and also urging government officials to act and speak in accordance with the Constitution even when their actions and speech are not subject to judicial review or intervention.\nJustice Clarence Thomas also joined the majority and authored a separate concurring opinion largely to express concern over the trend of federal district courts to issue \"global\" or \"nationwide\" injunctions and to call upon the Court to address that trend, which Justice Thomas believes oversteps the authority of those courts absent legislation granting them such authority.\nJustice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Kagan joined, in which he questioned whether the government is actually applying the exemption and waiver programs as it purports to do, citing evidence that it may not be doing so. In light of this evidence, Justice Breyer would remand the case to the district court and would keep the order on hold until that issue is resolved.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority for \"ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the Proclamation inflicts upon countless families and individuals, many of whom are United States citizens.\" Focusing on the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claims, Justice Sotomayor opined that the Court incorrectly chose to apply the rational basis standard of scrutiny, despite prior cases indicating a higher level of scrutiny was required in such cases, and she would find that even under the rational basis test, the Proclamation should fail because in the president's own terms it was originally and continues to be \"total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.\"", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62954:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62955:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62955:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2010, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) included a privately owned parcel of land (“Unit 1”) in Louisiana in an expanded designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. Though these endangered frogs had not inhabited Unit 1 for decades, the land contained historic breeding sites. Other necessary features would need to be restored however. The landowners, Weyerhaeuser Company and two other entities (collectively, the “Landowners”), intended to use the land for residential and commercial development, as well as timber operations. They brought suit against the FWS in federal district court, challenging Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. All parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in favor of the agency on the merits.\nA divided 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, upholding Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat. The court rejected the Landowners’ argument that the FWS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making this designation on the theory that Unit 1 was not presently habitable nor essential to species conservation. Explaining that land need not be habitable to be considered “essential” under 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of that term. The majority also held that the FWS had not acted unreasonably in interpreting the ESA to not contain a requirement that land be “currently” habitable by a species to be designated as critical habitat.\nThe 5th Circuit also held that the FWS had not made an arbitrary and capricious decision under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) in not excluding Unit 1 from the critical habitat based on economic impacts, and that this determination was not reviewable in federal court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62955:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62955:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62955:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous (8–0) opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held as to the first question presented that to be designated a \"critical habitat\" under the Endangered Species Act, the land must also be habitat for the species. The Court found unpersuasive FWS's argument that habitat can include areas that, like Unit 1, would require modification to support a given species but which do not currently serve as habitat for the species. The statute provides that when the Secretary lists a species as endangered he must also \"designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical habitat.\" That language on its face requires that only \"habitat\" of an endangered species is eligible for designation as \"critical habitat.\" Thus, even if if an area otherwise meets the statutory definition of \"unoccupied critical habitat,\" Section 4(a)(3)(A)(i) does not authorize the agency to designate the area as critical habitat unless it is also habitat for the species.\nAs to the second question, the Court held that the agency's determination is subject to judicial review. The Administrative Procedure Act creates a presumption that agency determinations are subject to judicial review that may be rebutted only if the relevant statute precludes review or the action is specifically granted by law to the agency's discretion. Here, the Court found neither. Although the second sentence of Section 4(b)(2) states the Secretary \"may\" exclude an area from critical habitat, that section requires the Secretary to consider economic impact and relative benefits before deciding whether to exclude an area from critical habitat or to proceed with designation. Because the statute articulates a meaningful standard against which to judge the Secretary's exercise of discretion, the agency's determination is not beyond judicial review.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62955:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62963:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62963:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2012, the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, passed an ordinance affecting private properties determined to be or contain cemeteries. In relevant part, the ordinance required that “all cemeteries within the Township ... be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight hours” and that no owner could unreasonably restrict nor charge any fee to access the cemetery (the “public-access provision”). Additionally, the ordinance permitted a Township officer to enter any property within the Township to determine whether there is a cemetery on the property, in order to enforce the public-access provision.\nRose Mary Knick owns property in the Township of Scott, and in April 2013, a Township officer entered her property without an administrative warrant and identified certain stones as grave markers. The officer cited Knick as violating the ordinance. Knick disputes that a cemetery exists on her property and filed a lawsuit to challenge.\nKnick challenged the ordinance on several grounds, two of which are most salient. First, she alleges that the ordinance authorizes unrestrained searches of private property in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. Second, she argues that the ordinance takes private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Notably, Knick did not initiate an “inverse-condemnation proceeding” against the Township, which is the local administrative process for challenging a taking by the government.\nThe district court dismissed all but two of Knick’s claims with prejudice, and dismissed two of them (described above) without prejudice pending exhaustion of state-law remedies. Knick appealed the dismissal of her claims to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that although the ordinance was constitutionally suspect, she lacks Article III standing because she failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact and redressability as to her Fourth Amendment claim, and that her Fifth Amendment claims are not ripe until she has sought and been denied just compensation using state inverse-condemnation procedures as required in the US Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62963:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62963:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62963:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA government violates the Takings Clause when it takes property without compensation, and a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at that time; the state-litigation requirement set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), is overruled.\nChief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion for the Court. The Court found that the state-litigation requirement in Williamson County “imposes an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs” and “conflicts with the rest of our takings jurisprudence.” Looking to the text of the Takings Clause, the Court found that the most natural reading of that provision is that the right of compensation arises at the time of the taking. Under Williamson County, the government did not need to compensate in advance or simultaneously with the taking, but only provide a “reasonable, certain, and adequate” mechanism for recovering such compensation after the fact. By forcing plaintiffs to seek compensation after the taking in state court before allowing them to proceed in federal court, Williamson County imposes an “unjustifiable burden” on these plaintiffs. Additionally, the Court expressed concern over the likelihood that a plaintiff would bring a state-court claim, lose, and therefore be precluded from bringing a claim in federal court at all.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurrence underscoring his opposition to the position advocated by the township, the United States (as amicus curiae), and the dissent, that there is no constitutional violation as long as there is a mechanism for receiving compensation later.\nJustice Elena Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Kagan argued that the Takings Clause is at its core (and in its text) different from other constitutional provisions in its qualifying phrase “without just compensation.” Justice Kagan argued that the Clause does not forbid all takings, only those without just compensation, and the majority disregards the text of the Clause in its interpretation requiring compensation at the time of taking. Justice Kagan also dismissed the majority’s concern over the preclusive effect of state-court litigation, arguing that Congress bears the burden of correcting errors that become evident from application of laws. Most importantly, the dissent noted, the majority departs from lost-established precedent and disregards the doctrine of stare decisis.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62963:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62964:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62964:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHerman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law.\nIn January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release.\nThe 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62964:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62964:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62964:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)’s delegation of authority to the U.S. Attorney General to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion for the four-justice plurality.\nThe plurality first noted that the Court had previously interpreted this provision of SORNA in Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012), to require the attorney general to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible. In light of this prior interpretation and the context of the provision and the statutory purpose, the plurality found unpersuasive Gundy’s argument that the provision gives the attorney general discretion to do whatever he wants as to pre-Act offenders. The nondelegation doctrine holds that Congress may not transfer to another branch “powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative” but may delegate on executive agencies discretion to implement and enforce laws, so long as Congress has provided an “intelligible principle” to which the agency must conform. The Court’s decision in Reynolds makes clear that § 16913(d) contains an “intelligible principle”—namely, that the attorney general apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as possible—and thus the provision does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. The plurality also noted that no attorney general has used the provision in a more expansive way.\nJustice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment, expressing that he would like to revisit the Court’s approach to nondelegation. However, under the Court’s present jurisprudence, he finds no reason to invalidate SORNA’s delegation of authority in this provision.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Unlike Justice Alito, the dissent would use this case to change its approach to the nondelegation doctrine. The dissent expresses concern that SORNA gives the attorney general “the power to write his own criminal code governing the lives of a half-million citizens.”\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62964:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62965:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62965:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThree lawful permanent residents filed a class action for habeas relief in the US District Court for the Northern District of California when immigration authorities took them into custody and detained them without bond hearings years after they had been released from serving criminal sentences for offenses that could lead to removal. The plaintiffs’ position was that they were not detained “when . . . released” from criminal custody, and thus were not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).\nThe district court certified the class, which included “[i]ndividuals in the state of California who are or will be subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. section 1226(c) and who were not or will not have been taken into custody by the government immediately upon their release from criminal custody for a Section 1226(c)(1) offense.” The court also issued a preliminary injunction directing the government to provide all class members with a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).\nThe Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the First Circuit and rejecting reasoning followed in four other circuits, holding that the immigration detention at issue under § 1226(c) must take place promptly upon the noncitizen’s release from criminal custody. The appellate court explained that the statute’s plain language reflected an immediacy with regard to when the immigration detention must take place in relation to the release from custody, and rejected arguments by the government that would allow for detentions to occur following significant delays.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62965:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62965:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62965:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA noncitizen does not become exempt from mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) through the failure of the Department of Homeland Security to take him into immigration custody immediately upon release from criminal custody. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion of the 5–4 majority with respect to Parts I, III-A, III-B-1, and IV (joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh), and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III-B-2 (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh).\nIn Part I, Justice Alito recited the facts and procedural history of the case for the 5–4 majority. In Part II, Justice Alito wrote for a minority addressing four questions regarding the court’s jurisdiction. In Part III-A, the majority looked to the plain text of § 1226(c) and found that the grammar of the provision and the meaning of the term “described” within the provision require reading the statute as meaning that the scope of “the alien” is fixed by the offenses described in subparagraphs (A)–(D), even if they were not arrested “immediately” when they were released from criminal custody.\nIn Part III-B-1, the majority concluded from “textual cues” that even if an alien is not arrested under authority bestowed by subsection (c)(1), he may face mandatory detention under subsection (c)(2). In Part III-B-2, the minority applied a principle for interpreting time limits on statutory mandates to conclude that a statutory rule that officials “shall act within a specified time” does not preclude action later.\nIn Part IV, the majority addressed (and rejected) the respondents’ arguments that the majority’s reading of the statute would (1) render key language superfluous, (2) lead to anomalies, and (3) violate the canon of constitutional avoidance.\nJustice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion to emphasize the narrowness of the issue before the Court. Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that the case “is not about whether a noncitizen may be removed from the United States on the basis of criminal offenses” nor is it about “whether” or “how long” a noncitizen may be detained” during removal proceedings or before removal. Finally, it is not about whether Congress may mandate that the Executive Branch detain noncitizens during removal proceedings or before removal, as opposed to merely giving it discretion to detain.\nJustice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that courts lack jurisdiction to decide questions concerning the detention of noncitizens before final orders of removal have been entered. However, notwithstanding his opinion on jurisdiction, given that the Court exercised jurisdiction, Justice Thomas would largely agree with the majority as to the resolution of the merits.\nJustice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the majority’s reading runs counter to the ordinary meaning of the statute’s language, the statute’s structure, and relevant canons of interpretation. Under the majority’s broad interpretation, the statute would forbid bail hearings even for noncitizens whom the Secretary detained many years after their release from prison.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62965:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62970:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62970:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2016, Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty to charges that he was a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He had two previous convictions for robbery in Florida, where an element of that offense was “overcoming victim resistance.” Some state courts have interpreted this offense as requiring only slight force to overcome victim resistance. Stokeling therefore contended that both of his robbery convictions should not qualify as “violent felonies” in the context of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because those convictions did not require a violent use of force. The district court agreed with Stokeling as to one of his convictions. The United States appealed to the 11th Circuit, which vacated Stokeling’s sentence and remanded the case for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62970:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62970:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62970:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA state robbery offense that has as an element the use of force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance is categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it necessitates the use of “physical force.” Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a 5–4 majority. The ACCA’s elements clause covers any offense that has as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” A majority of states define non-aggravated robbery as requiring a degree of force sufficient only to overcome a victim’s resistance; indeed, even the “slightest offensive touching” constitutes “physical force” in a majority of states. Stokeling’s proposed definition of physical force as force “reasonably expected to cause pain or injury” is inconsistent with the degree of force needed to commit robbery at common law and therefore cannot be adopted. Under the broader interpretation of “physical force,” robbery under Florida law qualifies as an ACCA-predicate offense under the elements clause, so the decision of the Eleventh Circuit below is affirmed.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. The dissent opines that in light of the Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), which held that the words “physical force” in the ACCA mean “a heightened degree of force, rather than minimal contact,” a Florida robbery, which can be committed through use of only slight force, should not be a “violent crime” under the ACCA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62970:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62981:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62981:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2011, Victor Stitt tried to shove a loaded handgun into his girlfriend’s mouth and threatened to kill her. A neighbor called the police, and Stitt fled but later surrendered to police. A jury found Stitt guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. In light of Stitt’s nine prior “violent felony” convictions, the court designated Stitt as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him accordingly. The ACCA applies to those felons guilty of possessing a firearm who also have at least three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. Stitt appealed the conviction, arguing that none of his nine prior convictions constituted “violent felonies.” The US Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States invalidated the violent-felony status of three of his prior convictions, leaving only six aggravated-burglary convictions. The Sixth Circuit has held that Tennessee aggravated burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA, so a panel of that court affirmed the sentence. Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit overturned its precedent and held that a conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary does not qualify as an ACCA violent felony.\nIn a separate case, Jason Sims pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, based in part on two prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions. Sims appealed his conviction and the Eighth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded his case for rehearing.\nThe US Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for the purpose of oral argument. At issue in both cases is whether the elements of the state crimes of which the defendants were convicted are “the same as, or narrower than, those of the general offense.” If they are broader than those of the general offense, then they cannot serve as ACCA predicate offenses.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62981:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62981:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62981:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that “burglary” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) encompasses not just “dwellings” but also any “vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation.” The general definition of burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” The Court previously recognized that when the ACCA was adopted in 1986, it was intended to reflect the definition of burglary used by most states. Because the statutory word “structure” is broad enough to encompass vehicles, and a majority of states in 1986 included in the definition of burglary vehicles adapted for or customarily used for lodging, the defendants’ state court convictions were for violent crimes within the meaning of the ACCA. The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Stitt, No. 17-765, and vacated the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sims, No. 17-766, remanding the case for the lower court to resolve novel state law arguments.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62981:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62986:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62986:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn a group of consolidated class actions, three plaintiffs sued Google on behalf of internet users who claimed that their privacy was violated under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et. seq., and California law by the company’s disclosure of their internet search terms to third party websites. The case went to mediation, and the parties reached a settlement which they submitted to the district court for approval in July 2013.\nAmong the terms of the settlement were that Google would pay $5.3 million of the $8.3 million total to six cy pres recipients, provided that they agreed to dedicate the funds to promoting education and initiatives relating to internet privacy. The district court certified the class for settlement purposes, and preliminarily approved the settlement. Notice was sent out to the class in 2014, with 13 class members opting out and 5, including Thomas Frank, filing objections (“the Objectors”).\nThe district court approved the parties’ settlement in 2015, and with regard to the objections, found that: (1) the cy pres award was appropriate because the award was non-distributable, (2) Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement was not affected by whether the award was cy pres, (3) there was a substantial nexus between the cy pres recipients and the interests of the class members, and there was no evidence that the parties’ preexisting relationships with the recipients influenced the selection process, and (4) the amount of attorney fees was commensurate with the benefit to the class.\nThe Ninth Circuit approved the district court’s ruling approving the settlement, holding that the district court had not abused its discretion with regard to any of the four findings described above.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62986:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62986:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62986:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nRather than answer the question presented, the Court issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion vacating the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court noted that there remain \"substantial questions\" about whether any of the named plaintiffs has standing to sue, in light of its decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. __ (2016).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62986:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62987:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62987:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrank Varela filed a class action complaint against his employer, Lamps Plus, under theories including negligence, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract after the company released employee personal identifying information in response to a phishing scam. Varela had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment. After he filed suit, Lamps Plus relied on this agreement as a basis for a motion to compel bilateral arbitration.\nThe district court found the agreement to be a contract of adhesion and ambiguous as to whether it permitted class arbitration. It construed the ambiguity against the drafter, Lamps Plus, and allowed the arbitration to proceed on a class-wide basis. Lamps Plus appealed, arguing that it had not agreed to class arbitration, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed and ruled that class arbitration could move forward.\nThe appeals court explained that because the agreement was capable of two reasonable interpretations, the district court was correct in finding ambiguity. Under California law it was also proper to construe the ambiguity against the drafter, particularly since it was a contract of adhesion. Further, it was a reasonable interpretation of the agreement to conclude that it covered legal disputes including class-wide claims, not just individual ones. By accepting this interpretation, the district court had found the requisite “contractual basis” for agreement to class arbitration under Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62987:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62987:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62987:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnder the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), an arbitration agreement that is ambiguous as to the availability of class arbitration does not manifest sufficient consent by the parties to submit to class arbitration. In a 5-4 opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the arbitration agreement between Varela and his employer, Lamps Plus, which contained only general language commonly used in arbitration agreements, did not provide the necessary contractual basis for compelling class arbitration.\nThe Court first determined that it had jurisdiction to review the lower court’s decision because an order that both compels arbitration and dismisses the underlying claims is a “fundamental” change in the rights of a party and thus qualifies as “a final decision with respect to an arbitration” within the meaning of the statute.\nOn the merits, the Court first noted that the availability of class arbitration is a matter of consent—that is, all parties must consent to class arbitration for it to be available. Because there are crucial differences between class arbitration and sole arbitration, the Court found utmost importance in giving effect to the intent of the parties. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), the Court held that a contract’s silence toward class arbitration precluded its availability, and the same holds true for ambiguity.\nThe Court rejected the California law that an ambiguous provision of a contract be construed against the drafter, finding that rule preempted by the FAA despite arguments by Varela and the dissenting justices that the law is nondiscriminatory.\nJustice Clarence Thomas joined the majority but wrote a separate concurrence expressing that he would not reach consideration of the California law of interpretation.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined, to emphasize that the Court’s decision strays even further from the principle that “arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.” Justice Ginsburg notes the irony that in contracts between parties with vastly unequal bargaining power, as between employers and employees, an inference that an ambiguous contract requires solo arbitration vests the employer with even greater power of coercion.\nJustice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion expressing his individual view that both the court of appeals, below, and the Court itself lacked jurisdiction to review the case.\nJustice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion to point out that the majority reaches its holding without actually first agreeing that the contract is ambiguous, thereby unnecessarily invading California law by invoking preemption.\nJustice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer join, and in which Justice Sotomayor joins as to Part II. Justice Kagan pointed out that the FAA, while requiring courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, does not federalize contract law. Thus, even under the FAA, state law governs the interpretation of arbitration agreements as long as it treats other types of contracts the same way. In Justice Kagan’s view, this principle should resolve the matter in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62987:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62988:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62988:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRussell Bucklew was convicted by a state court jury of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals process, Bucklew was scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He then filed an action in federal district court alleging that execution by Missouri’s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical condition from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely cause him to hemorrhage during the execution, potentially choking on his own blood.” As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also requested discovery of the qualifications of two members of the lethal injection team, alleging that they might not be qualified for the positions for which they are hired.\nThe district court granted summary judgment to the state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the state’s execution method “presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers,” and failed to propose “an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain,” both of which steps are required by US Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew’s request for discovery, finding that it was inappropriate to “assume that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their assigned duties.” Reviewing the district court’s findings de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62988:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62988:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62988:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA death-row inmate alleging that the state’s method of execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, either on its face or as applied to that inmate, must show (1) a feasible and readily implemented alternative method that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain and (2) that the state refused to adopt the method without a legitimate penological reason. In a 5–4 opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court held that Bucklew did not meet his burden.\nThe Court first considered the proper test for challenges to lethal injection protocols as applied to a particular inmate. In Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), a plurality of the Court held that a state’s refusal to alter its lethal injection protocol could violate the Eighth Amendment only if an inmate first identified a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative procedure that would “significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” Subsequently, in Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. __ (2015), a majority of the Court clarified that the plurality opinion in Baze was controlling. The Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a painless death—only punishments that “intensif[y] the sentence of death” with a “superaddition of terror, pain, or disgrace.” Anyone bringing an Eighth Amendment challenge must therefore satisfy the Baze-Glossip test. The Court rejected Bucklew’s argument that methods posing a substantial risk of suffering when applied to a particular inmate should be considered “categorically” cruel. Bucklew failed to show that Missouri’s lethal injection protocol would “superadd” to his death sentence.\nThe Court then considered whether Bucklew satisfied the test, finding he had not. The majority identified two reasons Bucklew failed to show his proposed alternative—nitrogen hypoxia—was viable. First, he did not produce adequate evidence that nitrogen hypoxia could be “readily implemented,” and second, he failed to show that the state lacked a legitimate reason for declining to switch from its current method of execution to one that is “untried and untested.” Finally, the Court found that even if Bucklew had satisfied his burden of showing a viable alternative, he failed to show that the alternative would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.\nJustice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but authored a concurring opinion reiterating the position he expressed in his concurring opinion in Baze that “a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain.”\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh wrote a separate concurrence joining the majority in full but also underscoring the Court’s additional holding that the alternative method of execution need not be authorized under current state law.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined as to all but Part III. First, Justice Breyer argued that Bucklew had provided sufficient evidence by which a fact finder could conclude execution by lethal injection would subject him to impermissible suffering. Because a genuine issue exists as to this material fact, summary judgment for the state was inappropriate. Second, even accepting that the Glossip majority opinion governs, Justice Breyer argued that the substantially different circumstances of the present case rendered the reasoning in Glossip inapplicable and that the majority’s holding unconstitutionally places a high burden on the prisoner to describe in detail an alternative method of execution. Finally, Justice Breyer expresses general concern that an expedient death penalty may be mutually exclusive of a reliable and fair death penalty.\nJustice Sotomayor filed a separate dissenting opinion, as well, to criticize and clarify as “troubling dicta” the majority’s “lament[ation]” of “late-arising death penalty litigation.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62988:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62989:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62989:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDominic Oliveira completed an apprenticeship program offered by New Prime Inc. (Prime), an interstate trucking company. After Oliveira graduated from the program, Prime representatives advised Oliveira to set up a limited liability company and work for Prime as an independent contractor, as manifested by an independent contractor operating agreement signed by Oliveira on behalf of his new LLC. Oliveira alleges that Prime exercised significant control over his work, inconsistent with his status as an independent contractor. Oliveira terminated his contractor relationship with Prime and began working as an employee of Prime, where his job responsibilities were “substantially identical” to those he had as an independent contractor.\nOliveira then brought a class-action lawsuit against Prime, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a state minimum-wage statute, among other claims. Prime filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which Oliveira opposed on the grounds that the contract is exempted under Section 1 of the FAA and that anyway, the question of applicability of the Section 1 exemption was one for the court to decide.\nThe district court concluded that the question of applicability of Section 1 of the FAA was for the court to decide, and it then held that “contracts of employment of transportation workers” does not extend to independent contractors. Having reached this conclusion, the district court ordered additional discovery on the issue of whether Oliveira was an employee or an independent contractor in order to be able to decide whether the contract was a contract of employment under Section 1. The district court thus denied Prime’s motion to compel arbitration.\nThe US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the applicability of the FAA is a threshold question for the court to determine. The appellate court then held that Section 1 does apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent-contractor relationship.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62989:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62989:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62989:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous (8–0) opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court held that a court should determine whether the FAA applies and that “contracts of employment” include those that purport to establish an independent-contractor relationship. Looking to the language and structure of the FAA, the Court reasoned that courts may compel arbitration only in arbitration agreements involving commerce or maritime transactions. Thus, a court must make the threshold determination whether the FAA applies to the contract at issue, notwithstanding any delegation clause.\nAs to the meaning of “contracts of employment,” the Court looked to the original meaning and evolution of the phrase, finding that it was not a term of art that referred only to contracts that created an employer-employee relationship, but instead broadly meant “work agreements.” Using this definition of “contracts of employment,” the Court held that Oliveira’s agreement with New Prime falls within Section 1’s exception.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion to clarify that while she would reach the same outcome, the meanings of terms or phrases can and do sometimes evolve, and courts must interpret them flexibly.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62989:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62990:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62990:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2000, John Guido and Dennis Rankin were hired by the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona. They were full-time firefighter captains, and at ages 46 and 54, respectively, were the two oldest full-time employees at the Fire District when they were terminated in 2009. Guido and Rankin filed age discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found reasonable cause to believe that the Fire District had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Guido and Rankin subsequently filed suit against the Fire District.\nThe Fire District sought summary judgment on the basis that it was not an “employer” within the meaning of the ADEA, and the district court agreed. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ruling counter to what other circuits have concluded, the appellate court stated that a political subdivision of a state does not need to have 20 or more employees, as private sector employers do, in order to be covered by the ADEA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62990:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62990:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62990:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous (8–0) opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the ADEA applies to all state political subdivisions, regardless of the number of employees. The Court first looked to the plain language of the statute, finding the two-sentence delineation in the definitional provision § 630(b), coupled with the expression “also means” at the start of §630(b)’s second sentence, establish two separate categories: persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 20 or more employees; and states or political subdivisions. The latter category has no numerosity limitation. For this reason, the Court found that Mount Lemmon Fire District was subject to the ADEA despite the number of full-time employees there.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62990:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62991:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62991:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVernon Madison has been on death row in Alabama for over 30 years and has had several serious strokes, rendering him unable to remember committing the crime for which he is to be executed. He also exhibits other symptoms of brain damage, including slurred speech, blindness, inability to walk independently, and urinary incontinence. Madison was originally scheduled to be executed in May 2016, and he challenged his competency in state court. The court denied his claim, and Madison then sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that he was incompetent to be executed.\nIn November 2017, the US Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief in Dunn v. Madison, finding that the state court’s determinations of law and fact were “not so lacking in justification” as to give rise to error “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” as required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).\nMadison was rescheduled for execution for January 2018, and he again petitioned state court for relief, this time with new evidence that the court-appointed expert upon whose testimony the prior courts relied had been suspended from the practice of psychology. The court again denied his petition, finding Madison competent to be executed. Madison then sought asked the US Supreme Court to consider the constitutional issues underlying his claim, rather than the AEDPA ones it ruled on earlier.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62991:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62991:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62991:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a state from executing a prisoner who cannot remember committing his crime, but it does prohibit executing a prisoner who cannot rationally understand the reasons for his execution, whether that inability is due to psychosis or dementia.\nIn a 5-3 opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court reviewed its precedents on the scope of the Eighth Amendment as applied to mentally incompetent death row prisoners. In 1986, the Court held in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of a prisoner who has “lost his sanity” after sentencing, relying on a “moral intuition” that “killing one who has no capacity” to understand his crime or punishment “simply offends humanity.” In Ford, the Court also pointed out that there is no “retributive value” in executing a person who has no comprehension of the sentence. In 2007, the Court in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, provided more specific criteria for how to identify prisoners ineligible for execution, identifying the “critical question” as whether a “‘prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a mental illness’ that he lacks a ‘rational understanding’ of ‘the State’s rationale for [his] execution.’”\nAlthough the parties disputed in the lower courts whether the lack of memory of commiting the crime, alone, disqualified a prisoner from execution, Madison accepted Alabama’s position that it does not, under Panetti. Likewise, the parties disputed in the lower courts whether Panetti applies only to prisoners suffering from psychosis, and categorically excludes those suffering from dementia, and Alabama accepted Madison’s position that it does not. The remaining issue, then, is whether the prisoner is unable to rationally understand the reasons for his sentence; if so, the Eighth Amendment forbids his execution. This is a question for the lower court on remand.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. The dissent would not have reached the second question, opining that Madison presented only the first question in its petition and that Madison’s counsel raised the other question only after concluding that the first argument was unlikely to prevail.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62991:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62992:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62992:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Loos worked as an employee of BNSF Railway Company until his termination in November 2012 for a series of attendance policy violations. Related to at least some of the attendance violations was an injury Loos sustained in 2010 when he fell in the train yard. After being terminated, Loos brought two claims against his former employer: a claim of retaliation under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) and a claim of negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The district court found that Loos had not established a prima facie case of retaliation under FRSA and granted BNSF's motion for summary judgment on that claim, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.\nThe FELA negligence claim proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Loos—$30,000 for lost wages and $11,212.78 for medical expenses. BNSF moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to offset the lost wages award by the amount of Loos’s share of taxes owed under the RRTA. The district court denied the motion, finding no RRTA tax was owed on the award. The Eighth Circuit reviewed this determination de novo and found that the text of RRTA is unambiguous in not including damages for lost wages in its definition of compensation as money remuneration for services rendered. Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling using alternate reasoning.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62992:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62992:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62992:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nDamages for lost wages are “compensation” under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA) and thus are subject to employment taxes. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the RRTA and the Court’s precedent require the finding that Loos must pay taxes on the portion of a jury award for compensating him for lost wages while he was unable to work due to his injury.\nThe Railroad Retirement Act entitles railroad workers to various benefits in a scheme similar to that described by the Social Security Act. The Court held in Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946), that the term “wages” included pay for active service as well as pay for periods of absence from active service and that backpay for time lost due to “the employer’s wrong” counted as “wages.” Similarly, in United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 572 U.S. 141 (2014), the Court held that severance payments qualified as taxable “wages” under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA). Drawing upon these interpretations comparable terms in comparable schemes, the Court found that the term “compensation” under the RRTA includes pay for periods of absence from active service, so long as the pay stems from the “employer-employee relationship.”\nJustice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, opining that the compensation to Loos was for injury, rather than for services not rendered, and thus was not taxable under the language of the RRTA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62992:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62993:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62993:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRoberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors whom they allege developed cancer after they were exposed to asbestos working on Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. They sued multiple defendants, including manufacturers of “bare metal” ship components, or parts that were made and shipped before any asbestos-containing insulation materials were added. The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both negligence and strict liability.\nThe defendant manufacturers removed the case to federal court, and moved for summary judgment based on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors’ injuries because they shipped their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright-line as opposed to the fact-specific rule that can be relevant to the bare metal defense, and regarding which circuits are split. The district court again granted summary judgment on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule.\nThe plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit did not consider their strict liability claims on appeal because it considered them abandoned. It therefore affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict liability. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling on the negligence claim, holding that maritime law principles permit the manufacturer of a bare metal product to be held liable for asbestos-related injuries when they are reasonably foreseeable results of the manufacturer’s actions. In so holding, the appellate court applied the bare metal defense's fact-specific standard rather than the bright-line rule.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62993:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62993:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62993:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnder maritime tort law, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn if its product requires incorporation of a part produced by a third party, the resulting fully incorporated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users would be aware of that danger. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court held that Air and Liquid Systems owed a duty to warn the plaintiffs about the danger of the ship components even though the Navy, not the manufacturer, added the parts with asbestos. Three approaches have emerged from the duty to exercise reasonable care in warning prospective users of a product that requires later incorporation of a dangerous part for the integrated product to function as intended. Of those three, the Court chose the approach that imposes neither the narrowest nor broadest liability on manufacturers, finding it most appropriate for the maritime context, which recognizes “a special solicitude for the welfare of sailors.”\nJustice Neil Gorsuch wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined. The dissenters would adopt the bare-metal defense approach, consistent with traditional common law of torts.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62993:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62994:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62994:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAnimal Science Products, Inc., et al. (“Petitioners”) are US vitamin C purchasers who commenced a multidistrict class action lawsuit against Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al. (“Respondents”), which are business entities incorporated under the laws of China, alleging violations of U.S. antitrust laws. Specifically, they claimed that Respondents engaged in price-fixing and supply manipulation in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Respondents did not deny that they had coordinated prices and sought to create a supply shortage, but moved to dismiss on the grounds that they acted in accordance with Chinese government regulations requiring them to do so. The district court denied Respondents’ motion to dismiss and a subsequent motion for summary judgment. Following a jury trial, the court entered a judgment of approximately $147 million against Respondents, and enjoined them from engaging in any further anti-competitive activity.\nRespondents appealed to the 2nd Circuit, which vacated the judgment, reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, and remanded the case with instructions for the lower court to dismiss Petitioners’ complaint with prejudice. The appellate court based its reversal on international comity grounds, explaining that the district court had erred in not deferring appropriately to the Chinese government’s explanation of its domestic laws, which mandated the conduct by Respondents that was considered anti-competitive under US law. Particularly given that the Chinese government had appeared in the proceedings, the fact that Respondents could not simultaneously comply with US and Chinese laws necessitated the conclusion that the district court should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction in this case. The appeals court further held that other factors significant under an international comity balancing test derived from 3rd and 9th Circuit case law affirmed that abstention was appropriate in the instant matter.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62994:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62994:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62994:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous decision, Court reversed and remanded, holding that a federal court determining foreign law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 should accord respectful consideration to a foreign government’s submission, but the court is not bound to accord conclusive effect to the foreign government’s statements.\nWriting for the Court, Justice Ginsburg explained that under Rule 44.1, a court’s determination of foreign law “must be treated as ruling on a question of law.” Further, in evaluating the foreign law question at issue, a court may consider any relevant material, and is not limited to materials submitted by the parties.\nThe Court further stated that neither Rule 44.1 nor other sources speak to the weight that a court must give to a foreign government’s submissions, and while in the spirit of international comity a court should “carefully consider” a foreign state’s views regarding the meaning of its own laws, the ultimate import of those views will vary based on a number of factors. While no specific formula will apply in all cases, key considerations include: the statement’s “clarity, thoroughness, and support”; “its context and purpose”; “the transparency of the foreign legal system”; “the role and authority of the entity or official offering the statement”; and “the statement’s consistency with the foreign government’s past positions.”\nThe Court concluded that when viewed in the context of these considerations, the 2nd Circuit’s ruling was inconsistent with both Rule 44.1 and the Court’s treatment of analogous state government submissions. Further, in focusing on the Chinese government’s statements, the appellate court overlooked evidence in the record submitted by the U.S. purchasers. The Court additionally stated that the ruling below was inconsistent with international practice. The case was sent back to the lower courts for further consideration consistent with the Court’s opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62994:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62995:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62995:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAttorney Richard Culbertson represented four plaintiffs appealing denials of Social Security benefits. After successfully challenging all four denials, Culbertson asked the district court to award him attorney’s fees in those cases under 42 U.S.C. § 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) pertain to proceedings in court, and are statutorily limited to 25% of the past-due benefits the claimant receives. Fees awarded under § 406(a) pertain to administrative proceedings; that section does not explicitly limit the fee amount that the Social Security Commissioner can award in that context.\nIn ruling on Culbertson’s fee requests, the district court relied on 11th Circuit precedent limiting the total fee amount awarded under both § 406(a) and 406(b) to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimants. This meant that in one case his fee award was limited to 25% of the past-due benefits, in two cases the district court declined to rule on the § 406(b) fee award until the Commissioner ruled on the §406(a) award (so as to not award him an amount that exceeded 25% of the past-due benefits), and that in the final case, the court granted his § 406(b) request but barred him from requesting any further fees under § 406(a), again seeking to prevent him from exceeding the 25% cap.\nIn his appeal, Culbertson contended that other circuits have not applied this 25% cap to the aggregate fee amount awardable under both § 406(a) and (b), but instead applied that limit only to § 406(b) fees. The 11th Circuit rejected this argument, applying its prior precedent to affirm the district court’s ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62995:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62995:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62995:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap applies only to fees for court representation and not to the aggregate fees awarded under subsections (a) and (b). Section 406(b) authorizes a court rendering a favorable judgment to a claimant “represented before the court by an attorney” to award “a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent” of past-due benefits. By using the language “such representation,” the Court found, the statute refers only to the representation already described in that section—that is, representation before the court. The cap, therefore, applies only to fees for representation before the court, not the agency. Moreover, the Court opined that had Congress intended to cap fees for agency-stage representation, it would have included the same language that appears in § 406(b) in § 406(a).\nThe Court found unpersuasive the argument that the agency’s pool of 25 percent of past-due benefits supported a reading of a cap on the aggregate fees. The language of the statute provides for two pools, and the agency chose to maintain only one.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62995:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62997:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62997:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBudha Ismael Jam and others are Indian fishermen, farmers, and others who live in Gujarat, India. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is an international organization headquartered in Washington, DC, that provides loans in the developing world to projects that are unable to receive private capital. The IFC loaned $450 million to an Indian company for the construction and operation of the Tata Mundra Plant in Gujarat, India. The loan agreement with the Indian power company included provisions that the company may not cause damage to surrounding communities, and IFC retained supervisory authority and could revoke financial support for the project.\nThe plant’s construction and operation did cause harm to the surrounding communities, as reported in IFC’s own internal audit, in violation of the agreement. However, the IFC did not take any steps to force the loan recipients into compliance.\nThe plaintiff fishermen and farmers brought this lawsuit in federal court in DC seeking damages based largely on tort causes of action. They also raised a claim as an alleged third-party beneficiary of the contract between IFC and the power company.\nThe district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that IFC was immune from suit under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) and further that the IFC had not waived its immunity to this suit. The relevant part of IOIA provides that international organizations “shall enjoy the same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). The president of the United States determines whether an organization is entitled to such immunity, and an executive order in 1956 designated the IFC as entitled to the “privileges, exemptions, and immunities” conferred by the statute.\nThe Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the IFC is immune under IOIA and that it did not waive immunity for this suit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62997:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62997:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62997:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (IOIA) affords international organizations the same immunity from suit that foreign governments enjoy today under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), not what they enjoyed when the law was passed.\nIn a 7–1 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the International Finance Corporation, an IOIA international organization, is immune from suit only to the extent that foreign sovereign governments are immune from suit. The Court interpreted the IOIA “same as” language as making international organization immunity and foreign sovereign immunity continuously equivalent. The Court found that this interpretation is bolstered by the “reference canon” of statutory interpretation, which provides that when a statute refers to a general subject, it adopts the law on that subject at the time a question arises, as opposed to when a statute refers to a statute by title, in which case it adopts the law as it existed at the time the statute was enacted.\nJustice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which he gave greater weight to the IOIA’s “history, its context, its purposes, and its consequences” than to canons of statutory interpretation.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62997:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62998:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "62998:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) enforces the provisions of the Act. In the early 1980s, a uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals (both plaintiffs in this case). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in the meantime banned the mining of uranium “until a program for permitting uranium mining is established by statute.” Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect.\nVirginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law and enjoining the state to grant uranium mining permits. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that the AEA does not regulate non-federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court’s conclusion de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "62998:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "62998:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "62998:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe federal Atomic Energy Act (AEA) does not preempt a Virginia state-law ban on non-federal uranium mining. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the three-justice plurality opinion.\nLooking first at the text of the AEA, the plurality found it notably lacking in any provision expressly preempting state law and in fact that it grants the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) extensive authority to regulate nearly every aspect of nuclear fuel except mining. Thus, states are free to regulate the mining of uranium. The plurality declined to speculate as to the legislative purpose behind the AEA and found Virginia Uranium’s arguments for preemption to go far beyond the statute’s text and structure.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg agrees that Virginia’s mining ban is not preempted but declines to join the plurality’s discussion of “the perils of inquiring into legislative motive.”\nChief Justice John Roberts filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel Alito joined. The dissent criticizes the plurality opinion for “set[ting] out to defeat an argument that no one made, reaching a conclusion with which no one disagrees.” The dissent would characterize the question as whether a state can purport to regulate a field that is not preempted as an indirect means of regulating other fields that are preempted, and to that question the dissent would answer in the negative.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "62998:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63000:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63000:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis lawsuit arose out of Apple’s handling of the sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2007, and from the outset, it has been a “closed system,” meaning that Apple controls which apps can be loaded onto an iPhone, which it does via the “App Store.” Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third-party developer, Apple receives 30% of the sale price.\nIn 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action complaint against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone app market. The complaint was dismissed on technical grounds, as were several subsequent attempts at similar lawsuits by both the same and other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of plaintiffs included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these facts was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the developers after the sale.\nApple filed yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sue under the US Supreme Court’s precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Under Illinois Brick, “only the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution” may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then they cannot sue Apple. However, if they are considered to have bought the apps from Apple, then they may sue Apple.\nThe district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Illinois Brick and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and found that, contrary to a ruling on the same issue by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs are direct purchasers from Apple within the meaning of Illinois Brick and thus have standing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63000:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63000:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63000:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nConsumers who purchase goods or services at higher-than-competitive prices from an allegedly monopolistic retailer may sue the retailer under antitrust law. In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court held that the plaintiff iPhone owners in this case, who purchased apps through Apple’s App Store, are direct purchasers under the Court’s precedential case Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and thus may sue Apple.\nSection 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), provides that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue.” The Court has previously interpreted this provision to mean that “immediate buyers” from the alleged antitrust violators may sue the antitrust violators, but “indirect purchasers” (those who are two or more steps removed from the violator in a distribution chain) may not. The plaintiff iPhone owners in this case are not so distantly removed from Apple to foreclose a lawsuit; the Court found the absence of an intermediary between the consumers and Apple to be dispositive.\nThis interpretation is consistent not only with the statutory text and the Court’s precedent, but also the policy behind antitrust law. To hold otherwise would “provide a roadmap for monopolistic retailers” to evade antitrust law.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined. The dissent argues that Illinois Brick broadly prohibits “pass on” theories of damages for antitrust violations, rather than the narrower reading based in contract embraced by the majority. As such, the dissent would find that the suit by the plaintiff consumers here is precisely the type of lawsuit proscribed in Illinois Brick.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63000:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63001:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63001:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn January 23, 2015, Gilberto Garza, Jr. entered an Alford plea—that is, a plea maintaining innocence but conceding that the evidence is likely to convince a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—to aggravated assault. On February 24, 2015, he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Both plea agreements required Garza to waive his right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreements and imposed the sentence in accordance with both of them. Shortly after sentencing, Garza informed his trial counsel that he wished to appeal, but counsel declined to file the appeal, citing Garza's waivers.\nFour months after he was convicted and sentenced, Garza filed a petition for post-conviction relief in each case, alleging that his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing notices of appeal. Garza’s attorney stated in an affidavit that he did not file an appeal because Garza had waived his right to appeal by accepting the plea agreements. The district court dismissed Garza’s petition to open the appeals period on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.\nUnder Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to “reasonably effective” legal assistance. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show: (1) that counsel’s representation was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Generally, counsel’s failure to file an appeal at a criminal defendant’s request is professionally unreasonable and therefore deficient, and most federal circuit courts interpret Flores-Ortega to mean that attorneys are ineffective when they do not file an appeal if the clients requested it, regardless of whether the defendants had waived their rights.\nThe Idaho Supreme Court held contrary to the majority of federal circuit courts, finding that Flores-Ortega does not require an automatic “presumption of prejudice” when counsel declines to file an appeal in light of an appeal waiver. Rather, the defendant must still show deficient performance and resulting prejudice.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63001:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63001:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63001:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe presumption of prejudice for Sixth Amendment purposes recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), applies regardless of whether a defendant has signed an appeal waiver.\nIn a 6–3 opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court held that Garza’s trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal despite Garza’s repeated requests. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must prove (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that the deficiency was “prejudicial to the defense.” In Flores-Ortega, the Court held that “prejudice is presumed” in certain contexts, including when counsel “deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken.” Garza’s appeal waivers—and appeal waivers generally—are not an absolute bar to all appellate claims. Indeed, some appeals fall outside the scope of the waiver, and there is always a possibility that the government might forfeit or breach the agreement of which the waiver is part. Given these scenarios, Garza could have pursued an appeal had his trial counsel acceded to his requests and filed a notice of appeal. By failing to do so, Garza’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, and in which Justice Samuel Alito joined in part. The dissent opined that Garza’s counsel acted reasonably by declining to file an appeal on the grounds that doing so could jeopardize his plea bargain. The dissent characterized the majority’s holding as resulting in a “defendant-always-wins” rule that has no basis in the Court’s precedents or the Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63001:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63002:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63002:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFrancis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer. Lorenzo’s only investment-banking client at the relevant time was a start-up company named Waste2Energy Holdings (W2E). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology.\nThe technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $15 million in “debentures”—which is debt secured only by the debtor’s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E’s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company’s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $10 million.\nAfter an audit, W2E filed a Form 8-K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $370,552. Lorenzo’s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about them. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “several key points” about W2E’s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning the devaluation of W2E’s intangible assets, he assured both that the offering came with “3 layers of protection,” which were: $10 million in “confirmed assets”; purchase orders and LOIs for “over $43 [million] in orders”; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “at the request of [Lorenzo’s boss]” and the other stated it was sent “at the request of [another broker with the firm].” Lorenzo’s name and title were at the bottom of both emails.\nThe SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, and Charles Vista with violating three securities-fraud provisions: Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933; Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Lorenzo’s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo proceeded to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated all three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ’s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission’s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b-5(b). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo’s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained “ultimate authority” over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court’s definition of “maker” of false statements in Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63002:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63002:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63002:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nDissemination of false or misleading statements with intent to defraud falls within the scope of Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) even if the disseminator did not “make” the statements as defined by the Court’s precedent. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the 6–2 majority opinion of the Court.\nSecurities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful “(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact..., or (c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit...in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), the Court held that the “maker” of a statement under subsection (b) is the person with “ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.” However, one does not need to be the “maker” of a statement to be subject to subsections (a) and (b) of this rule. The Court looked to the ordinary meaning of the terms in both subsections and found that Lorenzo’s actions fall well within those subsections notwithstanding the fact that he did not “make” the statements under subsection (b). Moreover, Lorenzo’s actions are a “paradigmatic example” of securities fraud that the rule contemplates and forbids.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that the majority “eviscerate[d]” the distinction between primary and secondary liability in fraudulent-misstatement cases and “misconstrue[d]” the securities laws and the Court’s precedent.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63002:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63003:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63003:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJohn Sturgeon wanted to use his hovercraft on the Nation River, which runs through Alaska’s Yukon-Charley National Preserve conservation unit, designated as such by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., to reach moose hunting grounds. The State of Alaska would permit him to do so, whereas the federal government would not pursuant to National Park Service regulations. Sturgeon argued that the Nation River belonged to Alaska, and that the National Park Service could not regulate or prohibit the use of hovercraft on that portion of the river. Sturgeon sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the Park Service from enforcing its hovercraft ban. The district court and appellate court denied him relief, interpreting the statute as limiting the Park Service’s authority to impose Alaska-specific regulations on inholdings but not its authority to enforce nationwide regulations like the hovercraft rule. The US Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and remanded the case for further consideration.\nOn remand from the US Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Nation River was public land for purposes of ANILCA and thus that it was subject to the regulatory authority of the National Park Service.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63003:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63003:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63003:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Nation River is not public land, so it is exempt under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) from the National Park Service’s regulatory authority, as are all non-public lands and navigable waters within Alaska’s national parks. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that Alaska’s Nation River is not a public land because the United States does not and cannot have “title” to the Nation River. Under 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c) (“Section 103(c)”) the Park Service may exercise its authority only on public lands, so non-public lands are outside its domain. Moreover, navigable waters within Alaska’s national parks are also exempt from the Park Service’s normal regulatory authority because ANILCA expressly defines “land” to mean “lands, waters, and interests therein.”\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, emphasizing certain “important regulatory pathways that the Court’s decision leaves open for future exploration.” Specifically, Justice Sotomayor points out that the Court’s holding does not preclude the Park Service from exercising any regulatory authority over the Nation River, only that it may not regulate the Nation River as if it were within Alaska’s federal park system.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63003:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63004:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63004:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTyson Timbs purchased a Land Rover for approximately $42,000 in January 2013 using the proceeds from his father’s life insurance policy. During the following four months, Timbs used the vehicle for multiple trips within Indiana to transport heroin. After a series of controlled purchases involving a confidential informant, Timbs was arrested at a traffic stop. At the time of his arrest in May, the Land Rover had approximately 15,000 more miles on it than when he purchased it in January.\nThe state charged Timbs with two charges of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft. He later pleaded guilty to one charge of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining charge. After accepting the plea, the trial court sentenced Timbs to six years, five of which were to be suspended. Timbs also agreed to pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200.\nIn addition, the state sought to forfeit Timbs’ Land Rover. The trial court denied the state’s action, ruling that the forfeiture would be an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, characterizing it as grossly disproportional to the seriousness of the offense. The court also noted that the maximum statutory fine for Timbs’ felony dealing charge was $10,000, and the vehicle was worth roughly four times that amount when Timbs purchased it. The trial court ordered the state to release the vehicle immediately. The court of appeals affirmed.\nThe Indiana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court had never clearly incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also ruled that the state had proven its entitlement to forfeit the Land Rover under state law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63004:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63004:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63004:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection applicable to the states. In an opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court found that the Excessive Fines Clause finds its origins in the Magna Carta, the historic English Bill of Rights, and state constitutions from the colonial era to the present day. As such, it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” As such, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Clause against—that is, applies to—the states with equal force as against the federal government.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion to acknowledge that, in his opinion, the appropriate vehicle for incorporation is the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than its Due Process Clause.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment but expressly disagreeing with the majority’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to incorporate, instead finding that the Clause must be incorporated by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63004:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63005:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63005:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from Congress before active-duty military officers may hold a \"civil office,” including positions that require \"an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.\" 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA).\nA judge convicted Keanu Ortiz of possessing and distributing child pornography, and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. A panel of the AFCCA, which included Judge Mitchell, affirmed the findings and sentence. Ortiz filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), asking the court to consider whether Judge Mitchell was disqualified from serving on the CCA because he had been appointed to the CMCR. Ortiz claimed that Judge Mitchell's CMCR appointment precluded him from serving on the CCA under both the the federal statute and the Constitution. The CAAF rejected both of Ortiz's arguments.\nNote: This case was original consolidated under Dalmazzi v. United States (16-961), and the oral argument audio and transcripts can be found there.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63005:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63005:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63005:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court has jurisdiction to review decisions by the US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on the CMCR and AFCCA does not violate the Appointments Clause or 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2)(A). Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority.\nFirst, the Court found that the CAAF's not being an Article III court does not remove the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review its decisions. The Supreme Court uncontroversially reviews the decisions of many non-Article III courts, including state courts and those of the District of Columbia. Nor does the fact that CAAF is part of the Executive Branch remove the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over it. Because it is a permanent court of record established by Congress, the Supreme Court may properly exercise jurisdiction over it.\nSecond, as to Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on CMCR and AFCCA, the Court found that the express authorization to assign military officers to the CMCR under §950f(b)(2) was both necessary and sufficient to exempt him from §973(b)(2)(A). Once the Secretary of Defense placed Judge Mitchell on the CMCR, the president's subsequent appointment of him to AFCCA did not negate the secretary's earlier action but ratified it. With respect to the constitutional claim, the Court held that it has never interpreted the Appointments Clause to impose rules about dual service.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion. He joined the majority's opinion in full but wrote separately to say that the conclusion reached by the Court is consistent with the founders' understanding of judicial power.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. The dissent would find the Court lacks jurisdiction over decisions by the CAAF because the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction permits it to review only the lawful exercise of judicial power. Because the CAAF is a military tribunal and part of the Executive Branch, the dissent argues the Court lacks jurisdiction to review its decisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63005:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63006:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63006:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case was consolidated for argument with Dalmazzi v. United States (16-961) and Ortiz v. United States (16-1423).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63006:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63006:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63006:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in this case and in the consolidated case Dalmazzi v. United States (16-961). The Court reached the merits and issued a decision in the third consolidated case only, Ortiz v. United States (16-1423).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63006:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63007:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63007:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have \"the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways.\" Cougar Den is a Yakama-owned fuel distributor that imports millions of gallons of fuel into the state each year to sell to the public. In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $3.6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for hauling fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department’s ALJ ruled that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department’s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe’s right to travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempts members from taxes or state fees on commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing \"any trade, traveling, and importation\" by members of the Yakama tribe “that requires the use of public roads,” even those outside the reservation. Based on this interpretation, the state’s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63007:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63007:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63007:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “right to travel” provision of the Yakama Treaty of 1855 (between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians) preempts the state’s fuel tax as applied to Cougar Den’s importation of fuel by public highway for sale within the reservation.\nJustice Stephen Breyer delivered an opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. For this plurality of the Court, Justice Breyer agreed with the Washington Supreme Court below that a provision of the Yakama Treaty of 1855 that guarantees the Yakama “the right . . . to travel upon all public highways” preempts a state tax triggered when motor fuel “enters into [Washington] state,” a tax exempted only for “bulk transfer,” such as pipeline or ship but not by ground transportation. A key component of the treaty was the right to travel with goods for sale or distribution, and the tax impermissibly burdened that treaty right.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the treaty was drafted by the United States in a language the Yakamas could not read, and the Yakamas relinquished large amounts of territory in exchange for their treaty rights. Under these circumstances, Justice Gorsuch argued, the treaty should be interpreted as the Yakama understood it.\nChief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh joined. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the tax burdens possession, not travel, and that it would apply regardless of how the fuel entered the state. Under this interpretation, the tax does not impermissibly burden the treaty right.\nJustice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the language of the treaty is best interpreted to mean that the Yakamas have the right to travel on public highways equal to the right that other U.S. citizens have. Thus, a state can apply any nondiscriminatory restrictions on travel without unduly burdening the treaty rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63007:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63008:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63008:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSailors and spouses of sailors injured in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of Aden, Yemen filed suit in 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1130, 1602, et seq., alleging that Sudan had provided material support to al Qaeda, whom they alleged was responsible for the attack. In accordance with the plaintiffs’ request, the clerk of the court served the summons and complaint on Sudan by mailing the case documents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received a return receipt. Sudan did not answer the complaint within the required time frame, and the clerk of the court therefore entered a default against Sudan. In 2012, the district court entered a default judgment against Sudan in the amount of approximately $314,000, and found that service had been proper. The clerk of the court mailed a copy of the default judgement to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received confirmation that it had been delivered.\nThe judgment was registered in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which in late 2013 and early 2014 issued three turnover orders directing particular banks to turn over assets of Sudan to the plaintiffs. After the third turnover order was issued, Sudan filed a notice of appearance, and on the same day, appealed the turnover orders to the Second Circuit. The appeals court affirmed the orders, holding that service of process had been proper under FSIA. In 2015, Sudan sought a rehearing en banc, and the United States filed an amicus brief in support of the petition. The Second Circuit denied Sudan’s request for a rehearing en banc.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63008:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63008:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63008:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWhen civil process is served on a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) requires a mailing to be sent directly to the foreign minister’s office in the foreign state. In an 8–1 majority opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court held that the most natural reading of § 1608(a)(3) required that the Republic of Sudan be served by a mailing sent directly to its foreign minister’s office in Sudan, not to the Sudanese Embassy in the United States.\nA federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state in limited circumstances as described in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). Relevant in this case is that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign state only “where service has been made under section 1608.” That section, specifically § 1608(a)(3), allows for four methods of serving civil process, one of which—at issue in this case—is service “by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched . . . to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.” The Court found that “addressed” means having one’s name and address placed on the outside of a letter or package, and that an “address” means “a residence or place of business.” The foreign nation’s embassy in the United States is neither “a residence” nor its “place of business.” Moreover, to “dispatch” means to “send directly” to the address of the intended recipient.\nThe Court then found that its interpretation of the meaning of the statute bolstered by other related provisions. The “addressed and dispatched” language is intended to be “reasonably calculated to give actual notice” to the recipient.\nFurther, the Court found that its interpretation leads to other logical results. If mailing a service packet to a foreign state’s embassy in the United States were sufficient, then it would be easier to serve the foreign state itself than to serve a person in that foreign state under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is an illogical result.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion arguing that FSIA “neither specifies nor precludes the use of any particular address” and that, given “the unique role that embassies play in facilitating communications between states,” service by mailing to Sudan’s embassy in Washington, D.C., should comply with the requirements of FSIA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63008:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63009:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63009:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWest Virginia Code 11-21-12(c)(6) (“Section 12(c)(6)”) exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals. Plaintiffs James and Elaine Dawson allege that this differential treatment is proscribed by 4 U.S.C. § 111, which allows for state taxes on federal retirement benefits only if “the taxation does not discriminate...because of the source of the pay or compensation.” James Dawson spent most of his career with the US Marshal Service and retired in 2008. Dawson and his wife sought to exempt Dawson’s federal retirement income from his state income tax, but the tax commissioner refused to allow the exemption.\nThe Office of Tax Appeals affirmed the tax commissioner’s denial of the Dawsons’ 12(c)(6) exemption, and the Dawsons timely appealed. The Circuit Court of Mercer County found that the tax scheme does violated 4 U.S.C. § 111 and reversed the Office of Tax Appeals. The tax commissioner appealed the circuit court’s decision, and on appeal, the state supreme court reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63009:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63009:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63009:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe West Virginia law that taxes the retirement income of federal marshal but exempts from taxation state and local law enforcement officers unlawfully discriminates against federal employees, in violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court found that the state law confers a benefit to state and local retirees that federal retirees cannot receive and that there are no “significant differences between the two classes” of employees that justify differential treatment. The Court found unpersuasive the state’s arguments that the law affects too few people to meaningfully interfere with federal government operations and that the statute is not intended to harm federal retirees. The prohibition on discrimination, 4 U.S.C. § 111, applies to any state tax, not only those that are cumbersome, and the state’s purpose in adopting the discriminatory tax is irrelevant. With no meaningful distinction between retired federal marshals and state law enforcement retirees, the state cannot treat the two classes of retirees differently for purposes of taxation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63009:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63011:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63011:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary medical-expert testimony and did not pose a sufficiently specific hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek was disabled from May 4, 2013, but not before. Biestek appealed the ALJ’s determination, and the district court affirmed.\nThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Biestek did not meet the back-pain-related impairment requirement and that the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63011:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63011:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63011:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA vocational expert’s refusal to provide the underlying private data during a Social Security disability benefits hearing does not categorically preclude the testimony from counting as “substantial evidence” in federal court. In a 6–3 opinion by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that whether testimony amounts to “substantial evidence” requires a case-by-case determination and cannot be subject to a categorical rule as Biestek proposed in this case.\n“Substantial evidence” is anything more than “a mere scintilla.” Under the categorical approach proposed by Biestek, the testimony of a vocational expert who refuses a request for supporting data would never constitute substantial evidence, which is an illogical result. If there is no demand for underlying data, the vocational expert’s testimony may count as substantial evidence even without supporting data. The mere addition of a request for that data should not render the expert’s testimony categorically inadequate.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the question presented in the case required considering not only the propriety of a categorical rule but also the narrower circumstances of Biestek’s case. In this case, Justice Sotomayor argued that the expert provided only conclusory testimony that cannot alone constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusions.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, arguing that the expert’s bottom-line testimony fails to satisfy the government’s statutory burden of substantial evidence. Justice Gorsuch argued that if “clearly mistaken evidence, fake evidence, speculative evidence, and conclusory evidence aren’t substantial evidence [and federal appellate jurisprudence says they are not], the evidence here shouldn’t be either.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63011:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63012:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63012:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHelsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations of palonosetron for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (“CINV”). All four claim priority to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on-sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102.\nThe sale referenced by Teva in its defense was an exclusive supply and purchase agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed.\nThe district court upheld as valid Helsinn’s patents and rejected Teva’s “on sale” defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the patents were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before the critical date was “overwhelming.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63012:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63012:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63012:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAn inventor’s sale to a third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential constitutes invalidating prior art. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous (9–0) Court.\nThe patent statute in force immediately before the America Invents Act (AIA) contained an “on-sale bar” which invalidated patents that had been on sale. Applying the presumption that when Congress reenacts the same language, it adopts the earlier judicial construction of the phrase, the Court found that the AIA consequently prohibits patents that had previously been on sale. Therefore, the commercial sale to a third party who is required to keep the invention confidential falls within the on-sale bar of the AIA and invalidates the patent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63012:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63013:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63013:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2012, Archer & White Sales, Inc.—a distributor, seller, and servicer for multiple dental equipment manufacturers—filed a lawsuit against Henry Schein, Inc. and its parent company—allegedly the largest distributor and manufacturer of dental equipment in the United States. In its lawsuit, Archer alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, and Schein moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in a contract (“Dealer Agreement”) between Archer and another distributor who was allegedly Schein’s predecessor in interest.\nAfter a hearing, the magistrate judge held (1) the arbitration clause manifested an intent to have an arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability; (2) there is a reasonable construction of the arbitration clause that would call for arbitration in this dispute; and (3) the standard for determining whether equitable estoppel is appropriate requires arbitration against both signatories and non-signatories to the Dealer Agreement.\nThe district court vacated the magistrate judge’s order and held that the court could decide the question of arbitrability, and that the dispute was not arbitrable because the plain language of the arbitration clause expressly excluded suits that involved requests for injunctive relief. The court declined to reach the question of equitable estoppel. Schein appealed to the Fifth Circuit.\nIn the Fifth Circuit, courts must look first to whether the parties “clearly and unmistakably” intended to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. If they did, “the motion to compel arbitration should be granted in almost all cases,” except where “the argument that the claim at hand is within the scope of the arbitration agreement is ‘wholly groundless.’” This standard requires consideration of whether there is a plausible argument for the arbitrability of the dispute. If there is no such plausible argument, “the district court may decide the ‘gateway’ issue of arbitrability despite a valid delegation clause.’”\nReviewing the district court’s determinations de novo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63013:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63013:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63013:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “wholly groundless” exception to arbitrability is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, so the question of arbitrability should be resolved by an arbitrator, not a court. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court reiterated its prior decisions that parties to a contract have the ultimate say in whether to have an arbitrator or a court resolve disputes—not only the merits of disputes, but also questions of arbitrability. The Court found that in this contract, the parties had delegated to an arbitrator the question of arbitrability, so a court cannot override the contract and resolve such questions.\nThe Court found unpersuasive Archer & White’s arguments to the contrary, holding that neither the text of the Act nor Congress’s intent in designing it supported a reading of the Act that empowers a court to resolve the question of arbitrability against the express wishes of the contracting parties.\nThe Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to consider the question whether the contract in fact delegated the arbitrability question to an arbitrator.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63013:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63017:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63017:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBeginning in 2010, hundreds of plaintiffs around the country filed personal injury lawsuits against drug manufacturer Merck Sharp & Dohme (“Merck”), claiming that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax had caused them to suffer severe thigh bone fractures. Under state tort law, each plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Merck’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drug label failed to include an adequate warning regarding the risk of femur fractures.\nIn 2011 the cases were consolidated as a multi-district litigation action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The cases subsequently grew to include over 1,000 plaintiffs. After discovery and a bellwether trial, the district court ruled in favor of Merck on a summary judgment motion, dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that they were preempted by federal law under Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), which held that state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted in the event that there is “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the warning that a plaintiff claims was necessary.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling, holding that preemption was an affirmative defense, and that Merck had not sufficiently proven that it was entitled to that defense as a matter of law. Under Wyeth’s demanding “clear evidence” standard, the appellate court found that the plaintiffs had produced adequate evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the FDA would have approved an appropriately worded warning about the risk of femur fractures, or at least that the chances of FDA rejection were not highly probable. Pursuant to Wyeth and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, this showing was sufficient to defeat summary judgment and move forward to trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63017:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63017:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63017:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWhether the FDA’s rejection of a proposed drug label preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims requires “clear evidence” that the drug manufacturer fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state law and that the FDA informed the drug manufacturer that it would not approve that change and is primarily a legal question that must be resolved by a judge, not a factual question to be resolved by a jury.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored the Opinion of the Court (6-3 in its reasoning, but 9-0 in the judgment). Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law preempts state law when it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” Here, the state law at issue is state common law or statutes that require drug manufacturers to warn drug consumers of the risks associated with a particular drug. The federal law at issue is the statutory and regulatory scheme by which the FDA regulates the labels of brand-name prescription drugs.\nIn Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), the Court held that “absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change” to the label, the Court could not conclude that it was impossible to comply with both federal and state labeling requirements.” Applied to the facts of that case, that the state-law claims were preempted by federal law only if the drug manufacturer showed it “fully informed” the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state law, and also that the FDA then informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA would not approve changing the drug’s label to include that warning. Justice Breyer clarified that “clear evidence” is not a heightened evidentiary standard but a requirement that the court consider “whether the relevant federal and state laws ‘irreconcilably conflic[t].’”\nIt is not enough that the FDA simply act. It must act pursuant to its congressionally delegated authority, as preemption only occurs when federal law—not all agency action—conflicts with state law. The question whether the FDA’s disapproval of the proposed label is primarily one of law and thus better suited for judges, not juries, to resolve. Judge are “better equipped” than juries “to evaluate the nature and scope of an agency’s determination...and to interpret agency decisions in light of the governing statutory and regulatory context.” Thus, the Third Circuit erred in treating the preemption question as one of fact, not law.\nJustice Clarence Thomas joined the majority and wrote separate concurring opinion to explain his understanding of preemption doctrine. Justice Thomas argued that the FDA’s response letter in this case “was not a final agency action with the force of law,” and thus could not preempt under the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring only in the judgment of the Court, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito agreed with the majority that the question of preemption in this case is a question of law, but he declined to join the majority because of concern that its discussion of the law and facts may be misleading on remand. Justice Alito argued that a standard of proof like “clear evidence” has “no place in the resolution of this question of law” and that notwithstanding the majority’s suggestion to the contrary, there are other ways in which a drug manufacturer may change a label without prior FDA approval.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63017:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63018:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63018:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRussell Bartlett was arrested by Alaska state troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight for disorderly conduct and harassment. Bartlett subsequently sued the officers for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, making claims including false arrest and imprisonment, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the retaliatory arrest claim, explaining that under its own precedent, a showing of probable cause did not preclude a claim of retaliatory arrest. The appellate court noted that in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court had clarified that its decision in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), which held that a plaintiff could not make a retaliatory prosecution claim if the charges were supported by probable cause, did not necessarily extend to retaliatory arrests. And since that time, the Ninth Circuit had held that a plaintiff could make a retaliatory arrest claim even if the arresting officers had probable cause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63018:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63018:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63018:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe presence of probable cause for an arrest defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion.\nTo prevail on a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, the plaintiff must show that the official acted with a retaliatory motive and that the motive was the “but-for” cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The Court looked to analogous situations to determine how to identify whether improper motive caused the injury: the torts of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Analysis of motive of these torts supports the conclusion that the presence of probable cause should defeat a retaliatory arrest claim, regardless of the subjective motive of the arresting officer. Thus, if the officer has probable cause, then even the presence of a retaliatory motive motive is irrelevant unless the plaintiff presents “objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been” (an equal protection, rather than First Amendment, argument).\nJustice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion as to all but Part II-D (in which the Court described a narrow qualification for the situation in which officers have probable cause for an arrest but exercise discretion not to do so). He wrote separately to concur in part and concur in the judgment.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63018:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63019:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63019:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that produces online journalism and licenses articles to websites while retaining the copyright to the articles. Wall-Street.com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under the license agreement, Wall-Street was required to remove all of the content produced by Fourth Estate from its website before cancelling its account. However, when Wall-Street cancelled its account, it continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate.\nFourth Estate filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement, although it filed an application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights and the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The district court dismissed the action, finding “registration” under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of copyrights “register the claim,” and that step had not occurred. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63019:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63019:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63019:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nRegistration of a copyright claim “has been made” not when an application for registration is filed, but only after the copyright office has processed the application and registered the copyright. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Fourth Estate’s application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights was not yet complete for the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) because the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The Court looked to the language of the first two sentences of § 411(a) and found that under Fourth Estate’s proposed interpretation of the statute—that application alone would constitute registration—the second sentence would be made superfluous. Canons of statutory construction caution against such interpretations. The Court found that the more plausible interpretation—that registration occurs only when the copyright office finishes processing the application—is consistent with other provisions of the Copyright Act, as well.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63019:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63020:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63020:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan for $329,940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were initiated several times, but never completed. Obduskey’s loan remained in default, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP to pursue non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other things, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss on all claims, and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.\nUpon Obduskey’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the appellate court held that based on the statute’s plain language as well as policy considerations, the FDCPA did not apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court’s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began servicing the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not a debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same as attempting to collect a money debt.\nIn reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, and ruled in conflict with the outcomes reached on this topic in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits.\nObduskey petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari, and will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. This is the same question presented in Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63020:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63020:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63020:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA business engaged in no more than non-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), except for the limited purpose of § 1692f(6). In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that law firm McCarthy & Holthus LLP was not a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA when it merely initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure action. The Court first looked to the primary definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA, which is “any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is to collect, directly or indirectly, debts.” The Act then provides a limited-purpose definition that a debt collector “also includes any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” The Court found the language “also includes” strongly suggests that the limited-purpose security enforcers do not fall within the scope of the primary definition. This reading gives effect to every word of the definition. The Court then found that the purpose (to treat security-interest enforcement differently from ordinary debt collection so as to avoid conflicts with state non-judicial foreclosure schemes) and legislative history of the FDCPA (the language ultimately used in the Act was a compromise between competing versions of the bill that treated security-interest enforcement vastly differently) support this interpretation.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion in which she emphasizes how complex the statute is and calls upon Congress to clarify the statute if it feels the Court (understandably, given the statute’s complexity) interpreted it incorrectly. She also notes that the Court “rightly cabins its holding to the kinds of good-faith actions presented here” and does not suggest that “pursuing nonjudicial foreclosure is a license to engage in abusive debt collection practices.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63020:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63022:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63022:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1993, a tax auditor for the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) read a newspaper about Gilbert P. Hyatt, an inventor, and the large amounts of money he was making from the patent. The auditor decided to investigate Hyatt, and, after finding some discrepancies, opened an audit on Hyatt’s 1991 state tax return. In conducting the audit, the auditor found additional discrepancies surrounding Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada and opened an audit as to his 1992 tax returns. FTB determined that Hyatt owed $1.8 million in state income taxes, plus $1.4 million in penalties and $1.2 million in interest, resulted in a tax assessment of $4.5 million for Hyatt’s 1991 tax year. FTB further found that Hyatt owed over $6 million in taxes and interest for 1992, plus penalties.\nHyatt challenged the conclusions by filing protests with FTB and then in California courts. In 1998, Hyatt sued FTB in Nevada state court seeking damages for intentional torts and bad-faith conduct allegedly committed by FTB auditors during tax audits of Hyatt’s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns.\nFTB filed a motion for partial summary judgment challenging the Nevada district court’s jurisdiction over Hyatt’s declaratory relief cause of action. The district court granted partial summary judgment, finding that the timing of Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada should be resolved via the administrative investigation. FTB also asked the Nevada Supreme Court to decide whether it was entitled to complete immunity under several theories: it enjoyed complete immunity under California law, it was entitled to sovereign immunity, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and comity. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded FTB was not entitled to complete immunity under any of these principles, but was entitled to partial immunity equal to the immunity a Nevada government agency would receive. Thus, the court concluded that FTB was immune from the negligence cause of action, but not from the intentional tort causes of action.\nFTB appealed to the US Supreme Court, and the Court upheld the court’s determination that FTB was entitled only to partial immunity under comity principles. Two other questions from this litigation made their way to the US Supreme Court, and the Court (1) split 4–4 as to whether it should overrule Nevada v. Hall, which provides “that one State ... can open the doors of its courts to a private citizen’s lawsuit against another State ... without the other State’s consent,” and (2) held that the Constitution does not permit Nevada to award damages against California agencies under its state law that are greater than it could award against Nevada agencies in similar circumstances. With these preliminary legal questions resolved, a Nevada jury finally found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him $85 million for emotional distress, $52 million for invasion of privacy, over $1 for special damages for fraud, and $250 million in punitive damages. The Nevada Supreme Court issued upholding the damages, subject to the statutory caps to which FTB is entitled, consistent with the US Supreme Court’s holding on that issue.\nFTB asked the US Supreme Court to reconsider the first question again, whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63022:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63022:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63022:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNevada v. Hall, 440 US 410 (1979), is overruled; states are immune from suit in the courts of other states. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for a 5-4 majority.\nThe Court criticized the Hall decision as “misread[ing] the historical record and misapprehend[ing] the constitutional design created by the Framers.” The Court found that it was “well settled” at the time of the founding that states were immune from suit and the Constitution preserved this broad immunity, except in a very narrow set of circumstances. The Court further found state sovereign immunity from suit “integral to the structure of the Constitution.” Finally, given that the principle of stare decisis is “at its weakest when interpreting the Constitution” the Court determined that Nevada v. Hall should be overruled.\nJustice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the Court in Hall clearly answered the very same question—whether the Constitution requires or merely permits a state to grant another state immunity from suit in its courts—and there is no good reason to overrule the decision in that case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63022:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63023:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63023:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTerance Martez Gamble was convicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in concluding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), that prosecution in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments are separate sovereigns (the so-called “separate sovereigns” exception). Under this binding precedent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63023:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63023:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63023:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court declined to overturn the dual-sovereignty doctrine.\nThe Court first clarified that the dual-sovereignty doctrine is not an exception to the right against double jeopardy, but a corollary to the text of the Fifth Amendment. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits individuals from being “twice put in jeopardy . . . for the same offence.” Because an “offence” is determined by law, and laws are determined by a sovereign (the federal or state government), the laws of two sovereigns create two “offences.” The Court found unpersuasive Gamble’s arguments that precedents should be abandoned, including his claim that the incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states eroded the theoretical foundation for the dual-sovereignty rule.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he argued for his originalist view that the proper role of stare decisis is subordinate to the text of the Constitution and other duly enacted federal law.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause should bar “successive prosecutions for the same offense by parts of the whole USA” and that the separate-sovereigns doctrine is based upon a mere “metaphysical subtlety.”\nJustice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion arguing that “[a] free society does not allow its government to try the same individual for the same crime until it’s happy with the result,” yet “the Court today endorses a colossal exception to this ancient rule against double jeopardy.” Justice Gorsuch pointed out the “separate sovereigns” doctrine appears nowhere in the text of the Fifth Amendment and violates the very essence of the right against double jeopardy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63023:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63024:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63024:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTroy Lambert purchased an alleged aphrodisiac dietary supplement that was manufactured by Nutraceutical, but that had not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Based on the product’s labels, Lambert believed that the supplement would enhance his sexual performance, and had he known these claims were false, he would not have purchased the product.\nLambert believed that the product violated FDA regulations because it purported to increase sexual desire but had not been through clinical testing, and because it was not FDA-approved. He further alleged that the product illegally failed to prominently display this lack of FDA approval on its labeling, and that the labeling also failed to mention a potentially dangerous ingredient. Lambert filed a consumer class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(b)(3), alleging state law claims related to unfair competition, false advertising, and other violations.\nThe district court granted class certification based on the full refund damages model, which applies when a product is useless and involves calculating the average retail price and the number of units sold. The judge hearing the case retired, and Lambert’s action was reassigned to a new judge. Discovery was completed, and Nutraceutical filed a motion for decertification. The new judge granted the motion, finding that Lambert had failed to provide essential evidence to apply his classwide damages model, meaning that common issues did not predominate as required under Rule 23(b)(3).\nTen days after the order was issued decertifying the class, Lambert informed the court that he intended to file a motion for reconsideration, and the court instructed him to file the motion within ten days, which was twenty days after the decertification order. In accordance with the court’s instructions, Lambert filed his motion for reconsideration ten days later, highlighting evidence from his class certification motion that could be used to support the full refund damages model. He also offered an alternative damages model for the first time, based on non-restitutionary engorgement.\nThree months later, the court denied his motion for reconsideration, rejecting his proposed damages models. Lambert timely filed a petition under Rule 23(f) for permission to appeal the district court’s orders denying the motion for reconsideration and granting the motion for class decertification to the 9th Circuit, which conditionally granted his petition.\nA three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit held that Lambert’s Rule 23(f) petition for class certification had been timely filed with the appellate court. The court explained that because Rule 23(f)’s 14-day deadline was procedural rather than jurisdictional, equitable exceptions such as tolling could apply. It also held that filing a motion for reconsideration before the Rule 23(f) deadline would toll the deadline. The panel further held that other circumstances could toll the deadline. In this case, Lambert had informed the district court of his intention to file a motion for reconsideration within Rule 23(f)’s 14-day window, and had submitted the filing within the ten-day time frame set by that court. The panel concluded that under these circumstances the deadline should be tolled and Lambert’s motion for reconsideration should be considered timely filed with the Ninth Circuit, while recognizing that a number of other circuits would likely reach the opposite conclusion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63024:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63024:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63024:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nRule 23(f) is a non-jurisdictional claim processing rule that is not subject to equitable tolling. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court first noted that the rule at issue is located within the rules of procedure, not in a congressionally enacted statute, which makes it a claim-processing rule. Then, the Court looked to the context of the governing rules, as well as to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and found that the relevant rules express clear intent that Rule 23(f) not be subject to equitable tolling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63024:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63025:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63025:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nClayvin Herrera is an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe of Indians. Herrera and several other tribal members went elk hunting on the Crow Reservation, and at some point, followed several elk across a fence, thereby leaving the Crow Reservation and entering the Big Horn National Forest in Wyoming. They shot three bull elk and took the meat with them to Montana. None of the hunters had a license, and it was closed season.\nHerrera was cited with two hunting-related misdemeanors under Wyoming law. He moved to dismiss the charges under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution and the Laramie Treaty of 1868. He argued that the treaty gave the Crow Tribe the right to hunt off the reservation and that the treaty was still valid and thus preempted state law. Bound by the Tenth Circuit’s 1995 decision in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995), the state court held that Crow Tribe members do not have off-reservation treaty hunting rights anywhere within the state of Wyoming. Herrera was tried and convicted by a jury on both counts. He appealed the lower court’s pretrial determination on the off-reservation treaty hunting right. Reviewing the lower court’s conclusions de novo, the state appeals court affirmed the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63025:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63025:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63025:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWyoming’s admission to the Union did not abrogate the Crow Tribe’s 1868 federal treaty right to hunt on the “unoccupied lands of the United States,” nor did the lands of the Bighorn National Forest become categorically “occupied” when the forest was created.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the 5-4 majority opinion.\nAs to the question whether the Crow Tribe’s hunting rights under the 1868 Treaty expired when Wyoming became a state, the Court first found that the lower court erroneously relied on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995), which relied on Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896). In Race Horse, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Wyoming’s admission to the Union extinguished treaty rights of Indians under the 1868 Treaty. The Court subsequently established in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) a different rule for determining whether a treaty right was extinguished. The Court in Mille Lacs held that the “crucial inquiry” for interpreting a treaty was whether Congress “clearly expressed” an intent to abrogate an Indian treaty right. Absent such clearly expressed intent, treaty rights cannot be impliedly extinguished at statehood. Thus, while the Mille Lacs Court did not expressly overrule Race Horse, the logic of that case and its progeny, including Repsis, are invalid.\nThe Court found unpersuasive Wyoming’s argument that Repsis precludes Herrera from arguing that the 1868 Treaty right survived Wyoming’s becoming a state. Even when the requirements for issue preclusion are met, there is an exception if there has been an intervening “change in the applicable legal context.” While Repsis involved a the same legal question (whether the 1868 Treaty right survived Wyoming’s statehood) and essentially the same parties (Wyoming and the Crow Tribe), the Court’s decision in Mille Lacs constitutes an “intervening change” that triggers an exception to the doctrine of issue preclusion.\nApplying Mille Lacs, rather than Repsis, the Court found that Congress had not “clearly expressed” an intent to abrogate the treaty’s right to hunt “unoccupied” lands when admitting Wyoming to the Union. The mere acquisition of statehood did not categorically make the lands “occupied,” nor did the creation of the Bighorn National Forest on those lands under any natural understanding of the meaning of the word “occupied.”\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito argued that issue preclusion should bar Herrera’s claim and that the Court should not reach the merits of interpreting the 1868 Treaty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63025:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63027:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63027:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the Medicare program, which provides health insurance to Americans 65 and older. Patients may obtain coverage under different “parts” of Medicare, two of which are at issue in this case. When patients enrolled in Medicare Part A receive healthcare, the government makes direct payments to hospitals for the services provided. Patients enrolled in Medicare Part C receive a government subsidy to enroll in a private insurance plan. Importantly, patients enrolled in Part A tend to have lower incomes than those enrolled in Part C.\nHHS contracts with “fiscal intermediaries” to reimburse healthcare service providers for services rendered to Medicare Part A patients. These intermediaries make an initial payment based on an estimate of the cost of services provided and are later adjusted based on actual cost reports.\nThe Medicare Act authorizes reimbursement adjustments to increase payments to hospitals that treat a disproportionately high number of low-income patients. The rate of adjustment is calculated in part based on the number of “patient days” for patients “entitled to benefits under part A” of Medicare. In 2012, HHS sought to interpret this phrase as including patient days for patients entitled to benefits under Part C of Medicare as well. Including Part C days in the adjustment calculus would result in lower reimbursement rates, which translates into hundreds of millions of dollars.\nThe plaintiff hospitals challenged the rate adjustment in the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, as required by statute. The Board concluded that it lacked authority to resolve the issue, which triggered expedited review before the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the rate adjustment was an “interpretive rule” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and thus was exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement for new rules. The hospitals appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the adjustment was not merely an “interpretive rule” and that HHS violated the Medicare Act by promulgating the rule without providing notice and the opportunity for comment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63027:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63027:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63027:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Department of Health and Human Services neglected its statutory duty to provide notice and an opportunity to comment before implementing a rule changing its Medicare reimbursement formula. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority.\nThe Court focused on whether the government’s announcement in 2014 established or changed a substantive legal standard (as opposed to an interpretive legal standard). Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), in order to establish or change a substantive legal standard, an agency must provide notice and an opportunity to comment. A substantive legal standard is one that has the “force and effect of law,” while an interpretive legal standard merely advises the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules it administers. Specifically, under the APA, statements of policy are definitionally not substantive. The Medicare Act uses the word “substantive” in a different way. Under the Medicare Act, “statements of policy” can establish or change a “substantive legal standard.” Had Congress wanted to incorporate the same meaning for “substantive” in the Medicare Act as it did in the APA, it could have done so (and did not).\nThe Court looked then to the text and structure of the Medicare Act, finding that both support reading the new rule as establishing or changing a substantive legal standard. Given the clear language of the statute, HHS did not meet its statutory duty under 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) to provide notice and comment.\nBecause it reached its conclusion solely under § 1395hh(a)(2), the Court did not address the question whether § 1395hh(a)(4) independently required HHS to provide notice and comment.\nJustice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the language at issue in the Medicare Act, like the APA, applies only to “substantive” or “legislative” rules. Thus, Justice Breyer would remand the case to the court of appeals to consider whether the agency determination is a substantive rule (which requires notice and comment) or an interpretive rule (which does not).\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63027:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63028:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63028:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2016, Citibank initiated a debt-collection action in a North Carolina state court against George W. Jackson, alleging that Jackson had failed to pay for a water treatment system he purchased using a Citibank-issued credit card. In responding to Citibank’s complaint, Jackson asserted a counterclaim against Citibank and third-party class-action claims against Home Depot and Carolina Water Systems (CWS). In these third-party claims, Jackson alleged that Home Depot and CWS had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to the water treatment systems; Jackson’s counterclaim against Citibank alleged that Citibank was jointly and severally liable to him because Home Depot had sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank. Citibank subsequently dismissed its claims against Jackson.\nHome Depot filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Home Depot then filed a motion to realign parties with Jackson as plaintiff and Home Depot, CWS, and Citibank as defendants. Jackson moved to remand the case to state court and amended his third-party complaint to remove any reference to Citibank.\nThe district court denied Home Depot’s motion to realign parties, finding that there were not “antagonistic parties on the same side,” and granted Jackson’s motion to remand because Home Depot was not a “defendant” eligible to remove under CAFA. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly declined to realign the parties because the purpose of realignment—to prevent parties from fraudulently manufacturing diversity jurisdiction—was not implicated in the dispute. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that allowing Home Depot to remove would be inconsistent with its prior interpretations of CAFA’s removal statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63028:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63028:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63028:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNeither the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, nor the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b), permits removal to federal court by a third-party counterclaim defendant. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Clarence Thomas found that while Home Depot is a “defendant” to a “claim,” section 1441(a) refers to the defendant of a “civil action,” not a claim. If Congress intended for defendants to remove such actions to federal court, it would have done so as it has done in other contexts. Interpreting section 1441(a) to allow for removal by a party who was not a defendant to the original action defies the text of the statute, as well as the history and purpose of the removal procedure.\nNor does 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) permit removal by Home Depot in this circumstance. The Court found unpersuasive Home Depot’s argument that section 1453(b) permits removal by “any defendant” to a “class action.” This interpretation would require interpreting the term “defendant” to have different meanings in different sections of the statute, rendering the the removal provisions incoherent. The same holding in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941)—that a counterclaim defendant who was the original plaintiff is not one of “the defendants”—applies equally to third-party counterclaim defendants.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh joined. The dissent argued that third-party counterclaim defendants are defendants within the language of the statute and that the distinction the Court draws between various parties leaves third-party defendants unprotected under both CAFA and section 1441. The dissent described this distinction as “irrational” and contrary to the plain meaning and context of removal laws generally.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63028:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63029:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63029:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOracle licenses its enterprise software for a substantial one-time payment and also sells maintenance contracts to licensees so they can update their software through Oracle’s support website. Rimini Street provided third-party support for Oracle’s software in lawful competition with Oracle’s direct maintenance service. To compete effectively, however, Rimini also needed to provide software updates to its customers, which would constitute copyright infringement if obtained without a proper license (which Rimini did not have). With Oracle’s knowledge, Rimini obtained Oracle software updates from Oracle’s website by a means that violated the Oracle website’s terms of use.\nOracle filed a lawsuit against Rimini and obtained a partial summary judgment and a jury verdict. The jury awarded Oracle $50,027,000 plus attorney’s fees and costs, resulting in a total monetary judgment of $124,291,396.82. Rimini appealed the judgment. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that 17 U.S.C. § 505 allows for recovery of “full costs” and the district court properly relied on Ninth Circuit precedent in Twentieth Century Fox v. Entertainment Distribution in awarding $12,774,550.26 in non-taxable costs, despite ostensibly conflicting language in 28 U.S.C § 1920 identifying six categories of costs taxable against the losing party.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63029:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63029:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63029:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe term “full costs” in § 505 of the Copyright Act means only the costs specified in the general costs statute in §§ 1821 and 1920. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in awarding non-taxable costs to the prevailing party in the copyright infringement suit. Sections 1821 and 1920 define what the term “costs” encompasses, and only Congress—not the courts—may award litigation expenses beyond those specified in those sections. The word “full” in the statutory phrase “full costs” refers only to all costs otherwise available under the law, not additional costs.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63029:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63030:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63030:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGary and Venida Thacker filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for its alleged negligence involving an accident on the Tennessee River. The Thackers and a friend were participating in a fishing tournament on the river at the same time the TVA was attempting to raise a downed power line in the same part of the river. An electrical component struck Gary Thacker and the friend, severely injuring Thacker and killing the friend instantly.\nThe district court dismissed the Thackers’ lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.\nThe United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit unless it unequivocally waives its immunity by statute. This immunity extends to government agencies, as well. TVA is a corporate agency expressly authorized to engage in commercial, power-generating activities, and the TVA Act expressly provides that TVA “may sue and be sued in its corporate name,” subject to certain exceptions. Extrapolating from a principle of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Eleventh Circuit has held that TVA cannot be subject to liability when engaged in governmental functions that are discretionary in nature. Applying its own precedent, the Eleventh Circuit found that TVA was engaged in exactly this type of function at the time of the accident with the Thackers and thus was immune from suit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63030:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63030:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63030:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe statute that waives the Tennessee Valley Authority’s sovereign immunity from suit by making it a “sue-and-be-sued” type entity is not subject to a discretionary function exception of the kind in the Federal Tort Claims Act but may be subject to an implied restriction as recognized in Federal Housing Authority v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940). Justice Elena Kagan delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nThe terms of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 contain no exception for suits based on the discretionary functions of the entity. To read the statute as implicitly allowing for an exception for discretionary functions would run contrary to the language of the statute and the express intent of Congress in passing the TVA Act, and would violate separation-of-powers principles. The courts below incorrectly inferred the discretionary function exception found in the Federal Tort Claims Act and should instead have considered whether TVA has immunity based on whether the allegedly negligent conduct was governmental or commercial in nature. If it is governmental, the lower court might find that the suit is barred under Burr to “avoid grave interference” with TVA’s important governmental functions, but if it is commercial, TVA cannot invoke sovereign immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63030:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63031:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63031:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTo sell liquor in the state of Tennessee, one must have a license from the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC). Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A), an individual must have “been a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made to the commission,” and there is a ten-year residency requirement to renew a liquor license. The state imposes similar requirements on entities seeking a license.\nTwo entities did not satisfy the residency requirement when they applied for a license with the TABC, so TABC deferred voting on their applications. The Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association, which represents Tennessee business owners and represented the two entities here, informed TABC that litigation was likely. In response, the state attorney general filed an action in state court seeking declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The Association removed the action to federal district court.\nThe district court determined that the durational-residency requirements are facially discriminatory, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63031:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63031:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63031:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe dormant Commerce Clause forbids, notwithstanding the Twenty-First Amendment, a state from regulating liquor sales by granting licenses only to individuals or entities that have met state residency requirements. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the 7-2 opinion of the Court.\nThe Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence holds that “a state law that discriminates against out-of-state goods or nonresident economic actors can be sustained only on a showing that it is narrowly tailored to ‘advance a legitimate local purpose.’” Tennessee’s residency requirement favors residents over nonresidents. The Association does not defend the law under this standard, however, instead pointing to the state’s authority to regulate the “transportation or importation” of alcohol under the Twenty-First Amendment.\nSection 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment states: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” Viewing this provision “as one part of a unified constitutional scheme,” the Court examined the “basic structure of federal-state alcohol regulatory authority.” The Court noted that at the time the Eighteenth Amendment (nationwide prohibition) was ratified, it had already been established that the Commerce Clause prevented states from discriminating against the citizens and products of other states. Against this backdrop, when the Twenty-First Amendment was ratified, “the Commerce Clause did not permit the States to impose protectionist measures clothed as police-power regulations.” Thus, while § 2 of the Amendment gives states latitude with respect to the regulation of alcohol, it does not allow them to violate the nondiscrimination principle.\nIn light of this analysis, the Court concluded that protectionism is not a legitimate local purpose and that the residency requirement “has at best a highly attenuated relationship to public health or safety.”\nJustice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the original meaning of the Twenty-First Amendment was to allow states broad authority to regulate alcohol within their borders, which encompassed the authority to impose residency requirements on those seeking to sell alcohol.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63031:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63041:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63041:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA New York regulation requires cable-TV networks with 36 or more channels to provide “at least one full-time activated channel for public-access use.” This channel must be open to the “public on a first-come, first-served, non-discriminatory basis.” New York City awarded cable franchises for Manhattan to Time Warner, provided that Time Warner provide four public-access channels, which are designated to be overseen by the Manhattan Community Access Corporation (MCAC), known as the Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN).\nPetitioners DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez have had a contentious relationship with MNN since 2011, and their feud culminated in August 2013 with MNN suspending both Melendez and Halleck from all MNN services and facilities. They filed a lawsuit against MCAC, several employees, and the City of New York, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights.\nGenerally, private actors cannot violate the constitutional rights of individuals; a finding of a constitutional violation requires “state action.” However, when the government creates a private entity by special law and retains authority to appoint a majority of directors, the actions of that private entity can sometimes be regarded as governmental action. Finding that the government retained authority to appoint only two of the thirteen members of MCAC’s board, the district court held that MCAC, its employees, and the City of New York did not create a public forum within the First Amendment and dismissed the First Amendment claim for lack of state action. A majority of a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed as to the City of New York but reversed as to MCAC and its employees, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC to find that New York City had “delegated to MNN the traditionally public function of administering and regulating speech in the public forum” of public-access cable television. Thus, MNN creates a public forum and functions as a state actor.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63041:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63041:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63041:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nPrivate operators of public access channels are not state actors and therefore are not subject to constitutional liability. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority.\nThe Free Speech Clause prohibits the government from abridging a person’s speech, and the Court’s state-action doctrine determines whether an actor is the government, subject to the First Amendment, or a private entity, who is not. Under established doctrine, a private entity may qualify as a state actor if it exercises “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,” but admittedly “very few” functions fall into that category. Operating public access channels on a cable system is not a power “traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”\nThe Court rejected the argument that “operating public access channels” is too narrow a characterization and that the activity is actually providing a traditional exclusive public forum. The provision of a forum for speech does not automatically make the provider a state actor. The Court also rejected the argument that because the state regulates MNN with respect to the public access channels, MNN is a state actor. The Court instead described the city’s regulation as analogous to a government license, which would also not convert a private entity into a state actor. Nor does the city own the channels; nothing in the agreements suggests that the city possesses any property interest in the cable system or its public access channels.\nThus, MNN does not qualify as a state actor and thus is not subject to the First Amendment’s restrictions on government.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent criticized the majority for creating and addressing a case that was not before the Court. The dissent argued that New York City secured a property interest in public-access television channels when it granted a cable franchise to a cable company. The state regulations that require the public-access channels to be made open to the public make those channels a constitutional public forum. By entering into a contract with the City to administer that forum, MNN—which would have otherwise been a private actor—becomes a state actor subject to the First Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63041:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63042:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63042:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nReturn Mail, Inc. owns a US patent directed to the processing of mail items that are undeliverable due to an inaccurate or obsolete address of the intended recipient. Return Mail sought to license the patent to the US Postal Service (“USPS”) and when it was unsuccessful, it filed a lawsuit against USPS alleging unlicensed and unlawful use and infringement of the patent. USPS filed a petition with the Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) asking that the patent be declared unpatentable on several grounds. In response, Return Mail addressed the unpatentability arguments and further argued that USPS lacked statutory standing to institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).\nThe Board held that USPS was not statutorily barred from filing the petition for review, and on the merits determined that all of the challenged patent claims were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63042:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63042:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63042:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnder the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), the federal government is not a “person” capable of petitioning the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to institute patent review proceedings. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion.\nThe Court determined that the AIA does not define “person” and looked instead to the Dictionary Act, which defines “person” as including natural individuals and businesses, but not governments “unless the context indicates otherwise.” The Court then looked to whether anything in the context “indicates otherwise,” thereby rebutting the presumption that governments are not “persons.”\nFirst, the Court cited several examples where it had applied the presumption against treating the government as a statutory person. It then looked to the use of the word “person” elsewhere in the AIA, finding that in some instances, the term plainly included the government and in other instances it plainly excluded the government. The Court found the provision at issue was not so plain and could be read either way. Finding no historic reason to permit the government to participate in post-grant review, “which was enacted just eight years ago,” the Court opined that patent infringement lawsuits against the government are not as onerous as those against non-government actors. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that Congress intentionally treated government actors differently from private actors.\nJustice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the “purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation” indicate congressional intent to include, not exclude, the government in the term “person.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63042:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63043:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63043:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTempnology, LLC, made and owned the intellectual property to specialized products such as towels, socks, headbands, and other accessories designed to stay at a low temperature even when used during exercise. Tempnology and Mission Product Holdings executed an agreement in 2012 that (1) granted Mission distribution rights to some of Tempnology’s products, (2) granted Mission a nonexclusive license to Tempnology’s intellectual property, and (3) granted Mission a license to use Tempnology’s trademark and logo to sell and promote the products.\nAfter accruing multi-million-dollar operating losses in 2013 and 2014, Tempnology filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in September 2015. The following day, it moved to reject its agreement with Mission under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor-in-possession to “reject any executory contract” that is not beneficial to the company.\nAlthough the parties do not dispute that Mission can insist that the rejection not apply to the patent licenses in the agreement, it is unsettled in the First Circuit (where the proceedings were brought) whether Mission can also insist that the rejection not apply to the trademark licenses. The bankruptcy court found that Tempnology’s rejection of the agreement left Mission with only a claim for damages for breach of contract, and no claim that Tempnology was under an obligation to further perform the license agreement. The First Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63043:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63043:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63043:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA bankruptcy debtor’s rejection of a contract under Section 365 has the same effect as breach outside the bankruptcy context and as such cannot rescind rights that the contract previously granted.\nJustice Elena Kagan delivered the 8-1 opinion of the Court. Before turning to the merits of the case, the Court considered whether the case was moot, as Tempnology argued. It is not. Mission Product Holdings presented a plausible claim for money damages, and even if a victory in the lawsuit would not make it rich or even better off, “it remains a live controversy”—which surpasses the threshold for a case to be heard in federal court.\nTurning to the merits, the Court considered the effect of a debtor’s rejection of a contract under Section 365. The text of that section provides that a debtor may, subject to court approval, “assume or reject any executory contract,” and the Code defines rejection as “a breach of [an executory] contract,” deemed to occur “immediately before the date of the filing of the petition.” As the term “breach” is neither defined in the Code nor a specialized bankruptcy term, it must be given the ordinary meaning it has outside the bankruptcy context. When breach of a contract occurs outside of bankruptcy, the parties to the contract do not go back to their precontract positions; rather, the counterparty retains the rights it has received under the agreement. That the rejection—and therefore breach—occurred in a bankruptcy context does not affect this outcome. Therefore, the rejection cannot rescind rights the contract previously granted. Even the distinctive features of trademarks and trademark law do not support a different interpretation of Section 365.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion in which she joined the Court’s opinion in full. Her concurrence highlights two features of the Court’s holding. First, the Court’s holding is limited; it does not hold that every trademark licensee has the unfettered right to continue using licensed marks postrejection. Second, in holding as it does, the Court confirms “that trademark licensees’ postrejection rights and remedies are more expansive in some respects than those possessed by licensees of other types of intellectual property.” Justice Sotomayor points out that the differences between trademark and other intellectual properties might affect the outcome in other disputes between licensors and licensees.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the writ should have been dismissed as improvidently granted. Justice Gorsuch can identify no viable legal theory for damages in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63043:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63044:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63044:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAndre Ralph Haymond was convicted by a jury of one count of possession and attempted possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 38-months’ imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release. Two years into his supervised release, probation officers conducted a surprise search of Haymond’s apartment and seized several devices. After conducting a forensic examination of the devices, officers found evidence that the devices had recently contained child pornography. Based on these findings, Haymond’s probation officer alleged that Haymond had committed five violations of his supervised release, the relevant one of which was the possession of child pornography, in violation of the mandatory condition that Haymond not commit another federal, state, or local crime.\nThe district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond had possessed child pornography, which triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Haymond challenged the district court’s findings, arguing, among other things, that the statute violates his constitutional rights by subjecting him to imprisonment based on facts not found by a jury. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Haymond’s constitutional arguments. It affirmed the district court’s revocation of his supervised release but vacated his sentence and remanded for sentencing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63044:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63044:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63044:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a 5-4 decision, the Court vacated the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered an opinion for a four-justice plurality of the Court, in which he concluded that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) in this case violated Haymond’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment but based on different reasoning.\nJustice Gorsuch reasoned that at the time the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were adopted, judges’ power to sentence criminal defendants was limited by the jury’s finding of facts. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Court held unconstitutional a sentencing scheme that allowed a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on the judge’s finding of new facts by a preponderance of the evidence. And in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the Court held that the same principle applies when a judge finds additional facts to increase the mandatory minimum. Those two cases mandate the outcome in this case: that the statutory scheme violated Haymond’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Justice Gorsuch suggested that on remand, the Tenth Circuit consider whether its remedy—declaring the last two sentences of §3583(k) “unconstitutional and unenforceable”—sweeps too broadly.\nJustice Breyer concurred in the judgment, characterizing the provision at issue as “less like ordinary supervised-release revocation and more like punishment for a new offense,” which requires that jury—not judge—find facts of criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Justice Breyer would reach the same conclusion without relying on Apprendi.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito argued that the terms of the Sixth Amendment and the original understanding of the scope of the jury trial, coupled with the Court’s precedents with respect to supervised-release revocation proceedings, militate toward the opposite conclusion of the plurality.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63044:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63048:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63048:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1987, Ricky Lee Smith filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI) resulting from disability. The following year, an administrative law judge (ALJ) approved his application, and Smith received benefits until 2004, when he was found to be over the resource limit.\nSmith filed another application for SSI in August 2012, alleging additional medical conditions as a result of his original disability. The claim was initial denied, and denied again upon reconsideration.\nSmith filed a timely request for a hearing before an ALJ, and after the hearing, an ALJ denied Smith’s claim on March 26, 2014. Smith claims to have mailed a written request for review before the Appeals Council on April 24, 2014, and followed up by fax on September 21, 2014. A claims representative spoke with Smith on October 1, 2014, to inform him that his request may not have been received and that his request was filed as of that day, October 1, 2014.\nThe Appeals Council dismissed the request for review as untimely, as Smith proffered no evidence showing the request for was sent within the appropriate time. Smith filed a civil action seeking review of the Appeals Council’s dismissal. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because the Appeals Council’s dismissal did not constitute a final decision subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63048:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63048:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63048:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA decision of the Appeals Counsel dismissing a disability claim on timeliness grounds is a “final decision” for purposes of determining whether judicial review is available. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.\nThe plain language of the statute supports the interpretation that dismissal for untimeliness is a “final decision” because such a dismissal is a terminal event. Moreover, that interpretation finds support in the greater statutory context because the dismissal is an agency action that determines the rights and obligations of the parties, which, in most administrative law contexts, is the event that triggers judicial review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63048:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63050:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63050:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn Bladensburg, Maryland, as part of a memorial park honoring veterans is a 40-foot tall cross, which is the subject of this litigation. Construction on the cross began in 1918, and it was widely described using Christian terms and celebrated in Christian services. In 1961, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission acquired the cross and the land, as well as the responsibility to maintain, repair, and otherwise care for the cross. The Commission has spent approximately $117,000 to maintain and repair the cross, and in 2008, it set aside an additional $100,000 for renovations.\nSeveral non-Christian residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland, expressed offense at the cross, which allegedly amounts to governmental affiliation with Christianity. American Humanist Association is a nonprofit organization advocating for separation of church and state. Together, AHA and the individual residents sued the Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Commission’s display and maintenance of the cross violates the Establishment Clause. Applying the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the district court found that the Commission did not violate the Establishment Clause because (1) the cross has a secular purpose, (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not have a primary effect of endorsing religion. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63050:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63050:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63050:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Bladensburg Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Elena Kagan joined the majority opinion in part.\nThe Court explained that although the cross originated as a Christian symbol, it has also taken on a secular meaning. In particular, the cross became a symbol of World War I as evidenced by its use in the present controversy. The Lemon test, which the Court first articulated in 1971 as a way to discern Establishment Clause violations, does not serve its intended purpose, particularly as applied to religious symbols or monuments. Thus, when the question arises whether to keep a religious monument in place (as opposed to a question whether to put up a new one), there should be a presumption that the monument is constitutional.\nApplying this presumption rather than the Lemon test, the Court found the Bladensburg Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause because it has historical importance beyond its admittedly Christian symbolism.\nJustice Breyer joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full but wrote a separate concurrence joined by Justice Kagan to highlight his belief that there is no single test for Establishment Clause violations. Rather, a court asked to resolve such questions must consider “the basic purposes that the Religion Clauses were meant to serve: assuring religious liberty and tolerance for all, avoiding religiously based social conflict, and maintaining that separation of church and state that allows each to flourish in its separate sphere.”\nJustice Kavanaugh also joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full and also wrote his own concurring opinion. He even more harshly criticized the Lemon test, arguing that “the Court’s decisions over the span of several decades demonstrate that the Lemon test is not good law and does not apply to Establishment Clause cases in any of” five categories, which he enumerated.\nJustice Kagan joined most of Justice Alito’s opinion but wrote a separate concurrence to note that, although “rigid application of the Lemon test does not solve every Establishment Clause problem,” courts should still focus on the purpose and effect of government action in deciding whether it violates the Constitution.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, but based on entirely different reasoning. Justice Thomas does not believe the Establishment Clause applies to state and local governments, and even if it did, it applies only to prevent coercive action by the government. Justice Thomas would overrule the Lemon test in all contexts.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch would dismiss the lawsuit for lack of standing, arguing that simply being offended by the cross’s presence is insufficient to meet the injury requirement of Article III standing.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that the cross “is the foremost symbol of the Christian faith,” and using it as a war memorial doesn’t change that. Maryland’s decision to maintain that Christian symbol on public land “elevates Christianity over other faiths, and religion over nonreligion.” Justice Ginsburg additionally pointed out that an appropriate remedy for an Establishment Clause violation is not necessarily to destroy the memorial, as the majority suggests, but to transfer title to the land on which it sits to a private entity—in fact, a private entity owned the land when the cross was first erected.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63050:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63052:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63052:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPetitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug-related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so by his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 6, 2017.\nWhile on supervised release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state-law offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state-court charges in exchange for a predetermined six-year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a series of continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont’s probation officer informed the federal district court of Mont’s state-court convictions and sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state-court convictions.\nMont challenged the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63052:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63052:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63052:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nPretrial detention later credited as time served for a new conviction tolls (pauses) a supervised-release term under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), even if the court must make the tolling calculation retrospectively, after learning whether the time will be credited. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 5-4 majority opinion affirming the lower court.\nSection 3624(e) provides that a “term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” In interpreting this provision, the Court looked first to the dictionary definition of “imprisoned,” finding that definition to include pretrial detention. Then the Court noted the expansive phrase “in connection with,” giving rise to a sufficient nexus between the pretrial detention and the conviction because the pretrial detention is credited toward the sentence for that same conviction. Although under this interpretation, Section 3624(e) would require courts to retrospectively assess whether a period of pretrial detention tolls a term of supervised release, the Court determined that this retroactive crediting would not cause undue uncertainty for defendants like Mont. Finally, the Court found that “statutory context” supported this interpretation as well, given that supervised release is intended to facilitate a prisoner’s transition back into the community and a period in prison does not serve this purpose.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch joined. The dissent argued that the plain text of the statute cannot authorize tolling when the defendant is in pretrial detention and a conviction is merely a possible future event. The present tense used in the statute precludes the majority’s interpretation. Moreover, the purpose of pretrial confinement is to ensure the defendant shows up for trial, not to punish the defendant for a crime.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63052:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63053:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63053:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1996, four employees of Tardy Furniture Store in Winona, Mississippi, were killed during an armed robbery. Curtis Giovanni Flowers was tried for the murder of one of the employees and was convicted and sentenced to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that Flowers’s right to a fair trial had been violated by admission of evidence of the other three murder victims. Flowers was tried and convicted for the murder of a second victim of the same incident, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the same grounds. In a third trial, Flowers was tried for all four murders, and a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Finding that prosecutor Doug Evans had engaged in racial discrimination during jury selection, the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed and remanded. The fourth and fifth trials were on all four counts of capital murder, and both resulted in mistrials when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict during the guilt phase.\nIn the sixth trial, Flowers was tried again and convicted for all four murders.\nFlowers appealed his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the State violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the jury selection process by exercising its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory way. The prosecution had struck five African American prospective jurors. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Flowers’s arguments as to the jury selection, but the US Supreme Court ordered the court to reconsider in light of its ruling in Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), where it held that the defendant in a capital case had shown intentional discrimination in the selection of jurors. On remand to the state supreme court, the court again upheld the ruling for the state. Flowers again sought review by the US Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari as to the question whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63053:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63053:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63053:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe trial court at Flowers’s sixth murder trial committed clear error in concluding that the State’s peremptory strike of a particular black prospective juror was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion.\nUnder Batson v. Kentucky, once the defendant has made a prima facie case of discrimination, the State must provide race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes. The trial court judge must then determine whether the provided reasons actually motivated the peremptory strikes or instead were simply pretext for unlawful race discrimination. The Court found four categories of evidence present in Flowers’s sixth trial that the State’s peremptory strike of one juror in particular—Carolyn Wright—was based on racial discrimination.\nFirst, the Court found that the State’s history of peremptory strikes in Flowers’s first four trials strongly supported the conclusion that the State’s use of peremptory strikes in his sixth trial was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. The State appeared “relentless” in trying to strike all black jurors to have an all-white jury try Flowers. Second, the Court noted that the State’s use of peremptory strikes in the sixth trial followed the same pattern as in the first four trials. Third, the Court observed that the State spent far more time questioning the black prospective jurors than the accepted white jurors—an indicator (though not dispositive) of discriminatory intent. Fourth and finally, the Court found significant differences between the jurors who were struck and not struck. The State asked extensive questions of Carolyn Wright, a black juror who was struck, about her knowledge of the facts, witnesses, and Flowers’s family, but did not ask three white prospective jurors about their comparable connections to witnesses. The Court found these four factors, plus the overall context to support the determination that the trial court had committed clear error in concluding the State’s peremptory strike was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.\nJustice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full but filed a concurring opinion to note how extraordinary the circumstances in this case are and that although he agrees with the Court’s judgment here, he would be disinclined to do so in the majority of cases that are “less unusual” in their facts.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissent in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, criticizing the majority for ignoring the race-neutral reasons the State gave for striking Carolyn Wright. Both Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court should not have even granted the case, but having done so, it decided wrongly on the merits. Justice Thomas (alone) criticized Batson, arguing that it “requires that a duly convicted criminal go free because a juror was arguably deprived of his right to serve on the jury.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63053:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63067:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63067:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPetitioner James L. Kisor is a veteran of the US Marine Corps who served in the Vietnam War. In 1982, Kisor filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) asserting that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of his service in Vietnam. Ultimately, the VA denied his claim in May 1983. In June 2006, Kisor sought review of his previously denied claim, and the VA granted him relief under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which allows a petitioner to “reopen” a denial by “submitting new and material evidence.” In his 2006 petition, Kisor identified materials supporting his claim that existed in 1983 but which were not associated with his file.\nNotably, the VA did not grant Kisor relief under Section 3.156(c), which authorizes the agency to “reconsider” a previously denied claim in the event that it “receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.” This provision is more favorable to veterans because it provides for a retroactive effective date for any benefits awarded, whereas benefits granted under Section 3.156(a) are effective only on the date the application to reopen was filed.\nThe VA’s decision (technically made by the Board of Veterans Appeals) relied on the meaning of the term “relevant” as used in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). The VA found that the additional documents (Kisor’s Form 214 and the Combat History document) did not qualify as “relevant” for purposes of this section because it did not “suggest or better yet establish that [petitioner] has PTSD as a current disability.” In the VA’s view, records are not “relevant” when they are not “outcome determinative.”\nCourt of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed as well.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63067:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63067:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63067:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAuer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)—which direct courts to give deference to an agency’s reasonable reading of its own genuinely ambiguous regulations—are not overruled.\nJustice Elena Kagan announced the judgment and delivered an opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Chief Justice Roberts joined in part, forming a majority of the Court for those parts.\nJustice Kagan, writing for the 5-4 majority, first described the history of the case before it arrived before the Court.\nThen, writing for a four-justice plurality, she described other examples of ambiguous regulations and explained the history of the doctrine of Auer deference. She explained that Auer deference is “rooted in a presumption that Congress would generally want the agency to play the primary role in resolving regulatory ambiguities” because agencies are best equipped to interpret the often-technical regulations at issue.\nWriting again for the majority, Kagan continued to outline the requirements that must be met for Auer deference to apply: First, a court should not afford an agency Auer deference unless the regulation is genuinely ambiguous, a determination the court can make only after it has exhausted all the traditional tools of construction. Second, the agency’s reading must be reasonable, under the text, structure, and history of the regulation. Notwithstanding some courts’ interpretation to the contrary, the language “plainly erroneous” from Seminole Rock does not mean that agency constructions of rules are entitled to greater deference than agency constructions of statutes. Third, the regulatory interpretation must be one actually made by the agency; that is, it must be the agency’s authoritative or official position, not merely an ad hoc statement. Fourth, the interpretation must in some way implicate the agency’s substantive expertise, and fifth, it must reflect “fair and considered judgment.”\nOn behalf of the plurality, Kagan went on to address Kisor’s arguments. She explained that Auer is not inconsistent with the judicial review provision of the APA, nor does it circumvent the APA’s rulemaking requirements. Contrary to Kisor’s arguments, Kagan cited empirical evidence to support her position that Auer does not encourage agencies to issue vague and open-ended interpretations of those rules they prefer. Finally, she quickly dispensed of Kisor’s argument that it violates separation-of-powers principles.\nOn behalf of the majority, Kagan wrote that the doctrine of stare decisis cuts strongly against Kisor’s position. There is no “special justification” to reverse Auer, and even if the Court were wrong about its presumption of what Congress would want, Congress can correct it.\nApplying the principles outlined in the opinion, a redo is necessary for two reasons: The Federal Circuit “jumped the gun” in declaring the regulation ambiguous, and it also “assumed too fast” that Auer deference should apply in the event of genuine ambiguity.\nChief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurrence in part to reiterate Justice Kagan’s assertion that overturning Auer and Seminole Rock was not warranted. He also noted that the cases in which Auer deference is appropriate largely overlap with cases in which it would be unreasonable for a court to be persuaded by an agency's interpretation of its own regulation. He pointed out that the gulf between the majority’s position and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent is not so great as it may initially appear.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63067:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "63067:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63067:Conclusion:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\ngenuineambiguity.ChiefJusticeRobertswroteaseparateconcurrenceinparttoreiterateJusticeKagan’sassertionthatoverturningAuerandSeminoleRockwasnotwarranted.HealsonotedthatthecasesinwhichAuerdeferenceisappropriatelargelyoverlapwithcasesinwhichitwouldbeunreasonableforacourttobepersuadedbyanagency'sinterpretationofitsownregulation.Hepointedoutthatthegulfbetweenthemajority’spositionandJusticeGorsuch’sdissentisnotsogreatasitmayinitiallyappear.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch penned a separate opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined and Justice Samuel Alito joined in part, concurring in the judgment but highly critical of Justice Kagan’s opinion. On behalf of himself and three other justices, Justice Gorsuch wrote a history of Auer deference, describing the decision and resulting doctrine “an accident.” He went on to explain that Auer is inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act and the separation of powers principle. On behalf of himself and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch responded to Justice Kagan’s public policy considerations and argued that while the majority gave lip service to stare decisis, it effectively changed the test set forth in precedents—which effectively overrules it in all but name.\nJustice Kavanaugh wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. In his opinion, Justice Kavanaugh emphasizes two points: first, he reiterates the Chief Justice’s point that “the distance between” the two main opinions in this case “is not as great as it may initially appear,” and second, he expresses agreement with the Chief Justice that the decision in this case addresses only judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations, and not at all judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63067:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "63072:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63072:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nErik Brunetti owns the clothing brand “fuct,” founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an intent-to-use application for the mark FUCT, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, finding it comprised immoral or scandalous matter (the pronunciation of “fuct” sounds like a vulgar word) in violation of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that while the Board did not err in concluding the mark should be excluded under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, that section’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63072:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63072:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63072:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Lanham Act prohibition on the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks infringes the First Amendment. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.\nIn Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. __ (2017), the Court held that a prohibition on registration of marks based on their viewpoint violates the First Amendment, and that a provision of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of “disparaging” marks was viewpoint based. A prohibition on the registration of marks that are “immoral” or “scandalous”—at issue in this case—is similarly viewpoint based and therefore violates the First Amendment. The prohibition distinguishes between ideas aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to them, which is the epitome of viewpoint-based discrimination.\nThe Court rejected the government’s proposal that the statute is susceptible to a limiting construction that would remove its viewpoint bias. The language of the statute does not support such a reading and to interpret it as such would be to “fashion a new one.”\nJustice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full and wrote a separate concurrence to highlight the importance of the Court continuing to affirm the principle that the First Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint discrimination. Justice Alito noted that Congress can adopt “a more carefully focused statute” that would prohibit the registration of “vulgar” marks without violating the First Amendment.\nChief Justice John Roberts filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Chief Justice argued that while he agreed with the majority that the “immoral” portion of the statute was not susceptible to a narrowing construction but agreed with Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s argument in favor of such a construction with respect to the “scandalous” portion.\nJustice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed with the majority as to “immoral” but disagreed as to “scandalous.” Justice Breyer advocated against the categorical approach to First Amendment speech issues and for an approach that considers “whether the regulation at issue works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.”\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Breyer joined. While Justice Sotomayor conceded that the majority’s construction of the statute is a reasonable one, it is not the only reasonable one and erroneously treats “immoral and scandalous” as a “unified standard.” She argued for a narrowing construction of the prohibition on “scandalous” marks to address only “obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.” Such a construction would save the provision and avoid the “rush to register [vulgar, profine, and obscene] trademarks” that the Court’s decision makes probable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63072:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63073:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63073:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEmulex Corp., a Delaware company that sold computer components, and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc., announced in February 2015 that they had entered into a merger agreement, with Avago offering to pay $8.00 for every share of outstanding Emulex stock, which was 26.4% higher than the value of Emulex stock the day before the merger was announced. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, Emerald Merger Sub, Inc., initiated a tender offer for Emulex’s outstanding stock in April 2015. (A tender offer is a type of takeover bid in which the offeror publicly offers to purchase a specified amount of the target company’s stock, usually at a price higher than market value.)\nIt is customary for the target company to issue a statement to shareholders recommending that they either accept or reject the tender offer. Before issuing such a statement, Emulex hired Goldman Sachs to determine whether the proposed merger agreement would be fair to shareholders. Goldman Sachs determined that it would be fair, despite a below-average merger premium, and Emulex issued a statement consistent with that determination. Some of the shareholders were unhappy with the merger’s terms and brought a class action lawsuit against Emulex, Avago, Merger Sub, and the Emulex Board of Directors, alleging violations of federal securities laws.\nThe district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the lead plaintiff’s claim under Section 14(e) did not plead the requisite mental culpability for claims under that section, the separate claim under Section 14(d) failed because that section does not establish a private right of action for shareholders confronted with a tender offer, and its Section 20(a) claim because its first two claims were insufficient.\nReviewing de novo the district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision as to the Section 14(e) claim (but affirmed as to the Section 14(d) claim). Citing the US Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the five other circuits that have interpreted Section 14(e). Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, claims under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) require a showing of negligence, not scienter (intent or knowledge of wrongdoing).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63073:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63073:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63073:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe writ was dismissed as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63073:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63074:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63074:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn the words of the Ninth Circuit decision below, “[t]his case arises out of a complex set of bankruptcy proceedings.”\nPetitioner Bradley Taggart is a real estate developer who owned 25% interest in Sherwood Park Business Center (“SPBC”). Respondents Terry Emmert and Keith Jehnke also each owned a 25% interest in SPBC. In 2007, Taggart purported to transfer his share of SPBC to his attorney, John Berman.\nEmmert and Jehnke sued Taggart and Berman in Oregon state court, alleging that the transfer violated SPBC’s operating agreement by not allowing Emmert and Jehnke the right of first refusal. Emmert and Jehnke also sought attorneys’ fees. Taggart moved to dismiss the claim and filed a counterclaim for attorneys’ fees.\nIn November 2009, shortly before the case went to trial, Taggart filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The state-court action was stayed pending the resolution of the bankruptcy petition, and in February 2010, Taggart received his discharge in the bankruptcy proceedings.\nAfter the discharge, Emmert and Jehnke, represented by attorney Stuart Brown, continued the state-court action. Taggart was largely absent from subsequent proceedings, although Berman renewed his motion to dismiss on Taggart’s behalf at the close of evidence. After a trial, the state court ruled in favor of Emmert and Jehnke and unwound the transfer of Taggart’s share of SPBC to Berman and expelled Taggart from the company. The state court entered a judgment that allowed any party to petition for attorneys’ fees, which led to yet more complicated litigation in state and federal courts.\nBrown, the attorney for Emmert and Jehnke, filed a petition for attorneys’ fees in state court on behalf of SPBC, Emmert, and Jehnke, against both Berman and Taggart, but limiting fees against Taggart to those incurred after the date of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge. The petition notified the court of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge but argued he could still be liable for attorneys’ fees on the theory that Taggart had “returned to the fray.”\nWhile the attorneys’ fee petition was pending in state court, Taggart sought to reopen his bankruptcy proceeding in bankruptcy court. Once reopened, Taggart asked the court to hold Brown, Jehnke, Emmert, and SPBC (collectively the “Creditors”) in contempt for violating the bankruptcy discharge by seeking an award of attorneys’ fees against him in the state court action.\nThe state court ruled that Taggart had “returned to the fray” as a matter of law, so he could be held liable for attorneys’ fees incurred after his bankruptcy. Taggart timely appealed the state-court determination.\nSubsequently, the bankruptcy court denied Taggart’s motion for contempt, agreeing with the state court that Taggart had “returned to the fray.” On appeal, the district court reversed, finding that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus the discharge injunction barred the claim against him for attorneys’ fees. The district court remanded for a determination whether the Creditors had “knowingly violated the discharge injunction in seeking attorneys’ fees.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found they had knowingly violated the discharge injunction and thus held them in contempt. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) reversed the bankruptcy court’s finding of contempt, finding they had a good faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their attorneys’ fee claim.\nBack in state court, the state appellate court found that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus reversed the state trial court as to its ruling on attorneys’ fees. As a result, the federal district court and the state appellate court both agreed that the Creditors could not pursue attorneys’ fees against Taggart, and the BAP’s ruling freed them from being held in contempt for knowingly violating the discharge injunction.\nThe Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP’s opinion, holding that the Creditors did not knowingly violate the discharge injunction and thus could not be held in contempt because they had a subjective good-faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their state-court claim for attorneys’ fees.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63074:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63074:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63074:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe bankruptcy code allows a court to hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nThe bankruptcy code states that a discharge order “operates as an injunction” and that a court may issue any “order” or “judgment” that is “necessary or appropriate” to “carry out” other bankruptcy provisions. In other, non-bankruptcy contexts, the Court has held that civil contempt is inappropriate where there is “a fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.” The Court found no reason that this principle should not apply equally in a bankruptcy context. Thus, civil contempt is appropriate only if the creditor violates a discharge order based on an objectively unreasonable understanding of the discharge order. Because the Ninth Circuit below applied a different standard in determining whether civil contempt was appropriate, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63074:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63075:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63075:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above.\nOn appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part.\n18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63075:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63075:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63075:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nTitle 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which provides enhanced penalties for using a firearm during a “crime of violence,” is unconstitutionally vague. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.\nThe Court recently decided two cases in which it was asked to interpret so-called residual clauses. In Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), the Court held that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague. In Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court held that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16 was also unconstitutionally vague. In both of those cases, the Court interpreted the statute to require courts to use a “categorical approach” to determine “whether an offense qualified as a violent felony or crime of violence.” This categorical approach prevented judges from considering how the defendant actually committed the offense and weigh instead only the crime’s “ordinary case.” The residual clause at issue here is nearly identical to the one held to require a categorical approach in Dimaya, and the Court found no good reason to interpret it differently.\nThe phrase “by its nature” compels the categorical approach, and to understand the nearly identical language of 18 U.S.C. § 16 differently would “make a hash of the federal criminal code.” The history of the statute, too, supports this interpretation of the clause, and the Court has never invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance, as the government advocated, to expand the reach of a criminal statute to save it.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, and in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined in part. The dissenters argued that the residual clause in this case is fundamentally different from those struck down in Johnson and Dimaya because those cases involved sentencing based on prior convictions, whereas this one focuses only on current conduct during the presently charged crime. Justices Kavanaugh and Alito (without the Chief Justice) also warned of the dire consequences of the Court’s decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63075:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63076:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63076:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $60 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was that Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees who would be performing the cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, a Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had submitted a bid, it did not win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts—including forgery, deception, and threats—to induce Parsons to award the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in particular refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. That employee was replaced, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward.\nFrom February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, who had orchestrated the fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract for bidding and awarded it to ArmorGroup.\nSeveral years later, in 2010, FBI agents interviewed Parsons employee Billy Joe Hunt about his role in a separate kickback scheme, and during that interview Hunt informed the agents about the contractors’ fraudulent scheme involving the subcontract for security services. Hunt was charged with federal crimes related to the kickback scheme and served ten months in federal prison.\nAfter he was released, in 2013, Hunt filed a qui tam action under seal alleging that Parsons and Cochise had violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33, by submitting to the United States false or fraudulent claims for payment. The United States declined to intervene in the action, and Hunt’s complaint was unsealed. The contractors moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunt’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1), which requires a civil action alleging an FCA violation to be brought within the later of (1) “6 years after the date on which the violation ... is committed” or (2) “3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances....” The district court granted the contractors’ motion to dismiss, finding that under either provision, Hunt’s claim would be time-barred. Reviewing the district court’s dismissal de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Eleventh Circuit held that when Hunt (the relator) learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitation purposes, and thus the period began to run when government officials learned of the facts giving rise to the claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63076:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63076:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63076:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA relator in a False Claims Act qui tam action may rely on the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) in a suit in which the United States has declined to intervene, but the relator does not constitute an “official of the United States” for purposes of that section. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.\nSection 3731(b) establishes two limitations periods that apply to “civil action[s] under section 3730,” and both government-initiated suits and relator-initiated suits are “civil action[s] under section 3730.” Thus, the plain text of the statute imposes both limitations periods on both types of actions. To interpret the statute otherwise would violate the principle that “a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed meaning.”\nHaving resolved the first question, the Court then turned to whether the relator constitutes an “official of the United States” in this circumstance, finding that he does not. The relator is a private party, neither appointed as an officer nor employed by the United States, and nothing in the statute suggests an expansive interpretation of “the official” that would include such a private party.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63076:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63077:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63077:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJamar Quarles was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles’s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon-in-possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months’ incarceration.\nUnder federal law, a generic burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Michigan law defines the crime of third-degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering a dwelling and while entering or present in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles’s argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent-upon-entry element that is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at entry, so the Michigan crime of third-degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63077:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63077:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63077:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe generic definition of burglary in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) includes, if state law permits it, any unlawful “remaining in” presence in a building or structure “when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.\nThe Court first looked to the ordinary usage of the phrase “remaining in,” finding that it refers to a continuous activity. Additionally, a majority of state burglary statutes encompassed the “remaining in” concept at the time the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) was passed, and all five of the state appellate courts that had addressed the question of timing had embraced the “at any time” position. Finally, the Court considered the purpose of the ACCA—to require enhanced imprisonment terms for repeat “armed career criminals”—would be frustrated if the Court adopted the narrower interpretation requiring intent to be present at the time of the unlawful entry.\nJustice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurrence to reiterate his view that the Court should revisit its “categorical approach” to the enumerated-offenses clause of the ACCA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63077:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63078:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63078:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHamid Mohamed Ahmed Ali Rehaif was present in the United States on an F-1 nonimmigrant student visa to study at Florida Institute of Technology. He was academically dismissed in December 2014, and his immigration status was terminated in February 2015. Rather than departing the country, Rehaif remained, and in December 2015 went to a shooting range, purchased a box of ammunition, and rented a firearm for an hour. Six days later, an employee at the hotel where Rehaif was staying reported to the police that Rehaif had been acting strangely. Following up on the tip, an FBI agent spoke with Rehaif, who admitted firing firearms at the shooting range and knowing that his student visa was out of status because he was no longer a student. Rehaif consented to a search of his hotel room, where agents found the remainder of the ammunition he purchased.\nA federal grand jury charged Rehaif with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” The penalty for violating that statute, described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), is a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both.\nAt trial, the government requested a jury instruction that “[t]he United States is not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” Rehaif objected to this instruction, arguing that the government had to prove both that he had knowingly possessed a firearm and that he had known that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed the firearm.” The government also requested the instruction that “[t]he alien’s status becomes unlawful upon the date of the status violation”; Rehaif requested instead the instruction that “[a] person admitted to the United States on a student visa does not become unlawfully present until an Immigration Officer or an Immigration judge determines that [he] ha[s] violated [his] student status.” The district court instructed the jury as requested by the government and overruled Rehaif’s objection. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, citing binding circuit precedent holding that the government does not need to prove that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, as well as precedents from other circuits and lack of action by Congress to alter the law (suggesting the common judicial construction of the law was what Congress intended).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63078:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63078:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63078:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “knowingly” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) applies to both the possession and status elements of a § 922(g) crime, under which it is a criminal offense for a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” to possess “any firearm or ammunition.” That is, to convict a defendant of this crime, the government must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he belonged to the relevant class of persons when he possessed it.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. There is a longstanding presumption that “Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” Courts apply this presumption of mental state, or “scienter,” even in the absence of any scienter in the statute. The text of § 924(a)(2) provides that “whoever knowingly violates” certain subsections “shall be” subject to certain penalties. Thus, using “ordinary English grammar,” the Court read the statutory term “knowingly” as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime. The Court found further support for its interpretation in the basic principle of criminal law that criminal intent separates wrongful from innocent acts.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Alito criticized the majority for manipulating the statutory text in an unnatural manner to apply the scienter requirement—“knowingly”—to the status element of the crime. Justice Alito argued that the Court has never inferred that Congress intended to impose a mental culpability requirement on an element that concerns the defendant’s own status and should not do so in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63078:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63079:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63079:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRespondent Brian Newton worked for Parker Drilling Management Services on a drilling platform fixed on the outer Continental Shelf, off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. His shifts lasted fourteen days, and he regularly worked twelve hours per day. He alleges that he usually took fifteen to thirty minutes during his shifts to eat without clocking out and that Parker did not provide 30-minute meal periods for each five hours worked, as required under California law. After Parker terminated him, Newton sued in state court for wage and hour violations under California law. Parker removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion, finding that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a comprehensive statutory scheme that leaves no room for state law to address wage and hour grievances arising on the Outer Continental Shelf. The district court recognized that the FLSA contains a clause that expressly allows for more protective state wage and overtime laws but held nonetheless that California’s laws offered Newton no protections.\nA panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal on the pleadings, finding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act allows the laws of adjacent states to apply to drilling platforms as long as state law is “applicable” and “not inconsistent” with federal law. California’s wage and hour laws are not inconsistent with the FLSA, so the district court erred in dismissing the claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63079:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63079:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63079:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) permits the application of state law only when there is a gap in the coverage of federal law; if federal law addresses the issue, state law is inapplicable. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nThe OCSLA extends “the Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States” to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) “to the same extent as if” the OCS were “an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State.” Further, the OCSLA commands that state laws be adopted as federal law on the OCS “to the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with” other federal law. Newton argued, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that state law is “applicable” whenever it pertains to the subject matter at issue, and it is “inconsistent” only if it is incompatible with the federal scheme—that is, only if it would be preempted under the Court’s ordinary preemption principles.\nThe Court found this argument unpersuasive, favoring instead Parker’s argument that state law is “applicable” only if there is a gap in federal law that needs to be filled and that state law may be “inconsistent” with federal law even if it is possible for a party to satisfy both sets of laws. For example, although the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) generally gives way to more protective state wage-and-hour laws, such state laws are inconsistent with the FLSA when adopting them as surrogate federal law would produce two different standards. The Court found this approach to preemption more persuasive because the two terms “applicable” and “not inconsistent” must be read together and interpreted “in light of the entire statute.”\nUnder this standard, some of Newton’s claims fail for relying on California law rather than federal law. The Court remanded the remaining claims for further consideration in light of this standard.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63079:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63080:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63080:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice’s descendants as the primary beneficiaries (none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time of creation). In 2002, the original trust was divided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice’s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust (“the Trust”), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina.\nIn 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated during those years, despite that no funds were distributed. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund of taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust’s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed.\nThe The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “minimum contacts” connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non-contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and its trustee, are all outside the state, does not establish sufficient contacts with North Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme court affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63080:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63080:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63080:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Due Process Clause prohibits a state from taxing trust income based solely on its beneficiaries' in-state residency. If the income has not been distributed to the beneficiaries and the beneficiaries have no right to demand that income and are uncertain to receive it, the state has no power to tax the trust income.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Due Process Clause permits a state to collect taxes only if there is “some definite link, or some minimum connection” between the state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax. The crux of this question is whether the government’s taxation action is reasonable. In the context of a trust beneficiary, the answer turns on the extent to which the beneficiary controls or possesses the property to be taxed and the relationship of that property to the state. The trust income income at issue in this case does not meet the minimum connection necessary to support the state tax because the beneficiaries did not actually receive any income from the trust during the years in question, nor could they exercise control over it.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito emphasized that the opinion in this case merely applies existing precedent and leaves unchanged the governing standard and the reasoning applied in earlier cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63080:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63081:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63081:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Food Stamp Act of 1964 started one of the largest and fastest-growing welfare programs in the country. Formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) spent over $78 billion on over 46 million people in fiscal year 2012, as compared to the $75 million spent during its first year. Respondent Argus Leader Media, who runs a newspaper in South Dakota, invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to seek information from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) on how much money individual retailers received from taxpayers each year. The USDA refused to provide the information, citing numerous exemptions to FOIA.\nArgus filed a lawsuit against the USDA in federal district court, which found that the USDA properly withheld the information under FOIA Exemption 3, which applies to information prohibited from disclosure by another federal law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Exemption 3 did not apply to the contested data, and remanded the case back to the district court. On remand, the issue before the court was whether Exemption 4—which covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”—applied to the information sought.\nFor the purpose of applying Exemption 4, the circuit courts have adopted a definition of “confidential” different from the term’s ordinary meaning. Courts have held the term to mean that Exemption 4 applies only if disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the source of the information. There is a circuit split as to what “substantial competitive harm” means. The district court in this case adopted the definition from the DC Circuit, which has held that “competitive harm may be established if there is evidence of ‘actual competition and the likelihood of substantial competitive injury.’” Appling that definition to the facts at hand, the court found speculative the USDA’s claims of competitive injury and entered judgment for Argus. The USDA decided not to appeal the judgment, so petitioner Food Marketing Institute (FMI) intervened and filed the appeal. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63081:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63081:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63081:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWhere commercial or financial information is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of privacy, the information is “confidential” within the meaning of Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.\nThe Court first looked to whether the Food Marketing Institute had standing to appeal. The Institute would suffer financial injury as a result of disclosure, such injury would be the direct consequence of a judgment ordering disclosure, and a favorable ruling by the Supreme Court in this case would redress that injury. As such, the Court concluded the Institute has standing.\nAt the time FOIA was enacted, the term “confidential” meant “private” or “secret.” For information that is communicated from one party to another, that means that (1) the information is customarily kept private, and (2) the party receiving it has provided some assurance that it will remain private. In this case, it is uncontested that retailers customarily keep private the type of information at issue. Thus, under the plain meaning of the term, the information is “confidential.”\nIn giving the word “confidential” a different meaning in National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the DC Circuit inappropriately relied on legislative history rather than first going to the statute’s text and structure. The concept of “substantial competitive harm” that the DC Circuit developed is based not on statutory language but on testimony of witnesses in congressional hearings on a different bill that was never enacted. Additionally, while true that courts should “narrowly construe” FOIA exemptions, courts cannot arbitrarily constrict Exemption 4 by adding limitations found nowhere in its text.\nJustice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer articulated a third condition for finding confidentiality in addition to the two described by the majority: “release of such information must cause genuine harm to the owner’s economic or business interests.” While Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that the “substantial competitive harm” rule from the DC Circuit is unworkable, he argued that the majority incorrectly interpreted Exemption 4 as having no harm requirement whatsoever. According to Justice Breyer, “the language permits, and the purpose, precedent, and context all suggest, an interpretation that insists upon some showing of harm.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63081:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63082:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63082:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDuring the 2009 Working Families Party primary election in Troy, New York, several individuals forged signatures and provided false information on absentee ballot applications in an attempt to affect the outcome of the primary. The individuals submitted the forged applications to the commissioner of the Rensselaer County elections board, Edward G. McDonough. McDonough approved the applications but later claimed that he did not know they had been forged.\nAfter the plot was uncovered, the state court appointed Youel Smith as a special district attorney to lead the investigation and prosecution of those involved. McDonough claimed that Smith engaged in an elaborate scheme to frame McDonough for the crimes. According to McDonough, Smith knew that McDonough was innocent and fabricated evidence in the form of forged affidavits, false testimony, and faulty DNA methods. After the first trial ended in a mistrial, the second trial ended in McDonough’s acquittal on December 21, 2012.\nOn December 18, 2015, McDonough filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Smith and the other defendants violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence and using it against him before a grand jury and in two trials. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other things, that McDonough’s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the allegedly fabricated evidence had been disclosed to McDonough over three years before he filed his Section 1983 claim.\nThe district court granted the motions to dismiss as to McDonough’s due process claims, citing the statute of limitations. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the precedent in that circuit established that the statute of limitations begins to run on a fabrication of evidence claim when the plaintiff has “reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” The Second Circuit acknowledged that Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held otherwise but expressly disagreed with those decisions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63082:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63082:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63082:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nContrary to the holding of the Second Circuit, below, the statute of limitations for McDonough’s § 1983 fabricated evidence claim began to run when the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor—that is, when he was acquitted at the end of his second trial. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.\nThe question of when a claim begins to accrue is presumptively when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action. The claimed right here is a constitutional due process right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of a government official’s fabrication of evidence. To determine when accrual begins, the Court considered the analogous tort of malicious prosecution. Under common law, malicious prosecution accrues only once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, largely because (1) this policy for accrual avoids parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter (and the resulting possibility of conflicting judgments), and (2) it also avoids collateral civil attacks on criminal judgments. Both of these rationales hold true for McDonough’s fabricated-evidence claim and thus support applying the same accrual rule.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that because McDonough did not identify the specific constitutional right that was violated, the Court should have dismissed the case as improvidently granted.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63082:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63083:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63083:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nLois Davis was an information technology (IT) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation by the county, the director resigned. Davis alleges that after the director’s resignation, her supervisor—who was a personal friend of the director—retaliated against her for making the complaint.\nDavis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “previous religious commitment,” and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment.\nDavis submitted to the Commission an “intake questionnaire” in which she wrote in the word “religion” next to a checklist labeled “Employment Harms or Actions” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all claims.\nThe Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first time that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on the religious discrimination claim, as required by Title VII. The district court agreed, finding that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge it, the district court dismissed Davis’s religious discrimination claim with prejudice.\nTitle VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There is no consensus within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement is a jurisdictional requirement (which may be raised at any point and cannot be waived) or merely a prerequisite to suit (and thus subject to waiver). Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), in which the Court held that the Title VII’s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63083:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63083:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63083:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nTitle VII’s administrative-exhaustion requirement is a waivable claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.\nJurisdictional requirements are generally quite narrow and refer either to the classes of cases a court may hear (as in subject matter jurisdiction) or the persons over whom a court may exercise its authority (personal jurisdiction). Claim-processing rules, in contrast, broadly require parties to take certain steps in or prior to litigation.\nThe requirement in Title VII that the complainant exhaust all administrative remedies appears in provisions separate and distinct from the parts of that statute that confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear such claims. The administrative-exhaustion requirement is more similar to other types of rules that the Court has held nonjurisdictional, such as the directions to raise objections in an agency rulemaking procedure before asserting them in court or to follow copyright registration procedures before suing for infringement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63083:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63084:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63084:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPetitioner PDR Network is a company that “delivers health knowledge products and services” to healthcare providers and is perhaps most known for publishing the Physicians’ Desk Reference, a popular reference book with information on various prescription drugs. In December 2013, PDR Network sent by fax to Carlton & Harris, a chiropractic office in West Virginia, an advertisement for a free eBook version of the 2014 Physicians’ Desk Reference. The material advised that the recipient had received the offer “because you are a member of the PDR Network.”\nOn behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated recipients of faxes from PDR Network, Carlton & Harris sued PDR Network in federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, which generally prohibits the use of a fax machine to send “unsolicited advertisement[s].” Under that statute, the recipient of an unsolicited fax advertisement can sue the sender for damages and recover actual monetary loss or $500 in statutory damages for each violation. If a court finds the sender “willfully or knowingly violated” the TCPA, the recipient is entitled to triple damages.\nAs a preliminary matter, the court found that the Hobbs Act does not require the court to defer to the FCC’s interpretation of an unambiguous term. Substituting its own definition of “unsolicited advertisement” for the FCC’s definition of the term, which was promulgated by rule in 2006 (“2006 FCC Rule”), the court found that PDR Network’s fax was not an unsolicited advertisement because it lacked a “commercial aim.” Moreover, the court found that even under the 2006 FCC Rule, the fax would not be an “unsolicited advertisement.” For this reason, the district court granted PDR Network’s motion to dismiss.\nCarlton & Harris appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision, finding that the Hobbs Act disallows district courts from considering the validity of orders like the 2006 FCC Rule, and that the district court’s interpretation of the rule is at odds with the plain meaning of its text.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63084:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63084:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63084:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe extent to which a 2006 order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is binding on a district court turns on two preliminary questions: (1) whether the order is the equivalent of a “legislative rule” with the “force and effect of law”; and (2) whether the subject of the rule (in this case, PDR Network) had a prior and adequate opportunity to seek judicial review of the order.\nJustice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court that was unanimous in its judgment. Whether an agency’s order is binding on courts depends on two preliminary considerations. First, the order must be equivalent to a “legislative rule” with the “force and effect of law,” as opposed to an “interpretive rule,” which merely “advises the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.” Second, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency action be subject to judicial review except “to the extent that a prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law.” The Hobbs Act requires certain challenges to FCC final orders to be brought in a court of appeals, so a court should determine whether this provision afforded PDR Network a prior and adequate opportunity for judicial review. The Court declined to resolve these questions, instead vacating the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanding for consideration of these preliminary questions.\nJustice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Thomas’s concurrence highlights, in his view, the Court’s mistaken understanding of the relationship between federal statutes and the agency orders interpreting them. Justice Thomas argues that federal courts cannot disregard the text of the governing statute when considering whether or not to treat agency orders as controlling law.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh concurred in the judgment, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Kavanaugh criticizes the majority for answering a question other than the one presented in this case. Rather than resolving a different question, Justice Kavanaugh would conclude that the Hobbs Act does not bar a defendant in an enforcement action from arguing that the agency’s interpretation of the statute is wrong. He suggests that the Fourth Circuit on remand (and other courts, when the issue arises) can employ the analysis set forth in his separate concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63084:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63085:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63085:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRespondent Christopher Batterton was a deckhand on a vessel owned and operated by the the petitioner, Dutra Group. While Batterton was working on the vessel, a hatch cover blew open and crushed his hand. The hatch cover blew open because the vessel lacked a particular exhaust mechanism, the lack of which made the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law.\nThe district court denied Dutra Group’s motion to strike the claim for punitive damages, and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.\nIn Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit held that “punitive damages are available under general maritime law for claims of unseaworthiness,” as distinguished from Jones Act claims, where punitive damages are unavailable. Dutra Group argues that Evich is implicitly overruled by the US Supreme Court’s decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), which holds that loss of society damages are unavailable in a general maritime action for wrongful death and lost future earnings are unavailable in a general maritime survival action.\nThe Ninth Circuit found unpersuasive Dutra Group’s argument, finding that the Court in Miles considered only damages for loss of society and of future earnings, not punitive damages. While Miles does limit recovery for “pecuniary loss,” punitive damages are not “pecuniary loss,” which means simply loss of money. Thus, Miles left undisturbed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Evich.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63085:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63085:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63085:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on a maritime claim of unseaworthiness. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.\nThe Court first needed to reconcile two seemingly conflicting precedents. In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., the Court held that non-economic damages were unavailable in a general maritime-law wrongful death action because such relief was unavailable under the Jones Act. But in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009), the Court held under maritime law that a plaintiff may seek punitive damages for an employer’s willful and wanton disregard of its obligation to pay maintenance and cure. The Court distinguished Atlantic Sounding based on the finding in that case that there was significant “historical evidence” that punitive damages had been available in maintenance-and-cure cases. In contrast, punitive damages were unavailable under the Jones Act, and there was “overwhelming historical evidence” that punitive damages were unavailable in general maritime-law unseaworthiness actions for personal injuries. The Court found “practically dispositive” the absence of recovery of punitive damages in maritime cases.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Ginsburg argued that by default, punitive damages are available in maritime cases, and Miles exemplified the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, the Jones Act had expanded the remedies available to seamen and did not bar punitive damages in unseaworthiness actions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63085:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63086:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63086:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn May 2013, Gerald P. Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He became lethargic on the way to the police station, so the arresting officers took him to a hospital instead. An officer read him a statutorily mandated form regarding the state implied consent law, but Mitchell was too incapacitated to indicate his understanding or consent and then fell unconscious. Without a warrant, at the request of the police, hospital workers drew Mitchell’s blood, which revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be .222.\nMitchell was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that his blood was taken without a warrant and in the absence of any exceptions to the warrant requirement. The state argued that under the implied-consent statute, police did not need a warrant to draw his blood. Many states, including Wisconsin, have implied consent laws, which provide that by driving a vehicle, motorists consent to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content. The trial court sided with the state and allowed the results of the blood test into evidence. Mitchell was convicted on both counts.\nMitchell appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with respect to the issue “whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law...violates the Fourth Amendment.” The Supreme Court of Wisconsin accepted the certification and upheld the search 5–2, but without any majority for the rationale for upholding it.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63086:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63086:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63086:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA four-justice plurality of the Court concluded that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test without a warrant. Justice Samuel Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered a plurality opinion.\nWriting for himself, Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh, Justice Alito noted that blood alcohol concentration (BAC) tests are searches subject to the Fourth Amendment. As such, a warrant is generally required before police may conduct a BAC test, unless an exception applies. The “exigent circumstances” exception allows the government to conduct a search without a warrant “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” The Court has previously held that the fleeting nature of blood-alcohol evidence alone does not automatically qualify BAC tests for the exigent circumstances exception, but additional factors may bring it within the exception. For example, in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court held that “the dissipation of BAC did justify a blood test of a drunk driver whose accident gave police other pressing duties, for then the further delay caused by a warrant application would indeed have threatened the destruction of evidence.” Similarly, a situation involving an unconscious driver gives rise to exigency because officials cannot conduct a breath test and must instead perform a blood test to determine BAC.\nUnder the exigent circumstances exception, a warrantless search is allowed when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” The plurality pointed to three reasons such a “compelling need” exists: highway safety is a “vital public interest,” legal limits on BAC serve that interest, and enforcement of BAC limits requires a test accurate enough to stand up in court.\nThe plurality suggested that on remand, Mitchell can attempt to show that his was an unusual case that fell outside the exigent circumstances exception (perhaps because police conceded that they had time to get a warrant to draw his blood).\nJustice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment but would have applied a per se rule under which “the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream creates an exigency once police have probable cause to believe the driver is drunk, regardless of whether the driver is conscious.”\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the plurality “needlessly casts aside the established protections of the warrant requirement in favor of a brand new presumption of exigent circumstances.” Established precedent should determine the outcome in this case: unless there is too little time to do so, police officers must get a warrant before ordering a blood draw. The dissent also argued that the state statute “cannot create actual and informed consent that the Fourth Amendment requires.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63086:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63090:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63090:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe State of New York law prohibits the possession of firearms without a license. To obtain a handgun license, an individual must apply with a local licensing officer—which, in New York City, is the police commissioner—and the application process involves an investigation into the applicant’s mental health history, criminal history, and moral character. There are two primary types of handgun licenses: “carry” licenses and “premises” licenses. This case involves the latter, which permits the licensee to “have and possess in his dwelling” a pistol or revolver. The premises license is specific to a particular address, and the handguns permitted by the license may not be removed from that address except in limited circumstances prescribed by law. One such circumstance is to “transport his/her handgun(s) directly to and from an authorized small arms range/shooting club, unloaded, and in a locked container, the ammunition to be carried separately.” All small arms ranges/shooting clubs authorized under the rule are located in New York City.\nThree individuals with premises licenses sought to transport their handguns to shooting ranges and competitions outside New York City—which is prohibited by the rule. One of the individuals sought to transport his handgun between the premises in New York City for which it was licensed and his second home in Hancock, New York—which the rule also prohibits. The three individuals and petitioner New York State Rifle & Pistol Association filed a lawsuit in federal district court, asking the court to declare the city’s restrictions unconstitutional and to enjoin the city from enforcing them.\nThe district court found the rule “merely regulates rather than restricts the right to possess a firearm in the home and is a minimal, or at most, modest burden on the right” and thus did not violate plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. The district court also held that the rule did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment right of expressive association, or the fundamental right to travel. Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63090:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63090:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63090:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court held that the petitioners’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the City’s rule is moot because after the Court granted certiorari, the City amended the rule, permitting the petitioners to transport firearms to a second home or shooting range outside the city.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion to express agreement with the determination that the claim in this case is moot but also to agree with the dissenting justices in their interpretation of the leading Second Amendment cases, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in full and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in part. Justice Alito argued that the Court incorrectly dismissed the case as moot and that the Court should have decided the case on the merits to correct lower courts' misapplication of Heller and McDonald.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63090:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63091:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63091:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis civil action first arose in 2014, when 12 Virginia voters alleged racial gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That case ultimately went before the US Supreme Court, and in 2017, the Court held that a lower court had applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the challengers’ claims of racial gerrymandering. The Court upheld one of the districts and remanded the case for the lower court to reconsider the districting in the remaining 11 districts.\nIn June 2018, the lower court struck down the 11 districts as unconstitutional, finding that race was the main factor used to determine the boundaries for the districts. The court found that the legislature failed to prove that the districts as drawn, which attempted to put the exact same percentage of African American adults in each district, were necessary to comply with federal voting-rights laws.\nThe Virginia House of Delegates appealed the district court’s decision to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed to review the case, as well as the preliminary question whether the House of Delegates has judicial standing to appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63091:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63091:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63091:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Virginia House of Delegates lacks standing to file this appeal, either representing the state’s interests or in its own right. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion for a 5-4 majority.\nTo bring a suit (or appeal) in federal court, the litigant must have judicial standing. That is, the litigant must show (1) a concrete and particularized injury, that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. To appeal a decision that the primary party does not challenge, as here, an intervenor must independently demonstrate standing. Here, the primary party, Virginia, does not appeal the decision of the district court, but an intervenor, the House of Delegates, does. As such, the House of Delegates must demonstrate standing, which it does not.\nFirst, the Court considered whether the House of Delegates had standing to represent the state’s interests. Under Virginia law, the authority for representing the state’s interests in civil litigation lies exclusively with the state attorney general. Thus, the House of Delegates cannot and does not displace this authority.\nThen, the Court considered whether the House of Delegates had standing in its own right, concluding again that it does not. The Court has never recognized that a judicial decision invalidating a state law inflicts a cognizable injury on the parts of the state government that were involved in the law’s passage, and it declined to do so here. Given that the state manifests an intent to end the litigation—as evidenced by its decision not to appeal the district court’s decision—the House of Delegates alone cannot carry on the litigation against the will of the state.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh joined. The dissent would find that the House of Delegates does have standing because the new redistricting plan would inflict harm on the House by changing each representative’s constituents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63091:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63092:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63092:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA three-judge district court struck down North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the map and that the map was the product of partisan gerrymandering. The district court then enjoined the state from using the map after November 2018. North Carolina Republicans, led by Robert Rucho, head of the senate redistricting committee, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63092:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63092:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63092:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nPartisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond the reach of the federal courts.\nChief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion. Federal courts are charged with resolving cases and controversies of a judicial nature. In contrast, questions of a political nature are “nonjusticiable,” and the courts cannot resolve such questions. Partisan gerrymandering has existed since prior to the independence of the United States, and, aware of this occurrence, the Framers chose to empower state legislatures, “expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress” to handle these matters. While federal courts can resolve “a variety of questions surrounding districting,” including racial gerrymandering, it is beyond their power to decide the central question: when has political gerrymandering gone too far. In the absence of any “limited and precise standard” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering, federal courts cannot resolve such issues.\nJustice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the Court for sidestepping a critical question involving the violation of “the most fundamental of . . . constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.” Justice Kagan argued that by not intervening in the political gerrymanders, the Court effectively “encourage[s] a politics of polarization and dysfunction” that “may irreparably damage our system of government.” She argued that the standards adopted in lower courts across the country do meet the contours of the “limited and precise standard” the majority demanded yet purported not to find.\nThis case was consolidated with Lamone v. Benisek, No. 18-726, and the Court released a single opinion resolving both cases.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63092:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63093:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63093:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSecretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued a decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court by a coalition of states, cities, and counties, with the challengers alleging that the question could cause a significant undercount because some households with individuals who are unlawfully present in the country would be deterred from responding. The challengers claim the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that it violates various regulatory, statutory, and constitutional provisions.\nAs part of its challenge, the challengers sought—and the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for their action, authorized—depositions of high-ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross’s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue.\nOn October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government’s previous stay application without prejudice, “provided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before the depositions in question are taken.” The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high-ranking officials, so the government renewed its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the deposition of Secretary Ross but allowed others to proceed.\nThe government filed a petition for mandamus asking the Court to direct the trial court to exclude fact-finding beyond the official records, or, in the alternative, review the appellate court decision itself. Treating the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, the Court granted the petition to review the decision of the court below.\nBefore the Court could rule, however, the district court issued its decision enjoining the Secretary from reinstating the question at issue. That action rendered the original case moot but presented an additional question whether the district court properly issued the injunction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63093:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63093:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63093:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Secretary of Commerce did not violate the Enumeration Clause or the Census Act in deciding to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 census questionnaire, but the District Court was warranted in remanding the case to the agency where the evidence tells a story that does not match the Secretary’s explanation for his decision. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the divided Court.\nAs to the question of standing, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the district court’s finding that reinstating a citizenship question on the census would likely result in noncitizen households responding to the census at lower rates, causing them to be undercounted and subsequently to lose federal funds, constituted a concrete and imminent injury.\nWriting for himself and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Enumeration Clause permits Congress, and by extension the Secretary of Commerce, to inquire about citizenship on the census questionnaire. In reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice noted the “long and consistent historical practice” of Congress to exercise “broad authority” over the census.\nThen, the Chief Justice, writing for a 6-3 majority (Roberts, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan), held that the Secretary’s decision is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). While The Census Act gives “broad authority” to the Secretary to administer the census, his discretion is not without limits. The APA exempts from judicial review agency actions that are discretionary, but “the taking of the census is not one of those areas.” Because the Census Act provides general requirements for agency decisionmaking, the Secretary’s decision is subject to judicial review.\nWriting for himself and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Secretary did not abuse his discretion in deciding to reinstate the citizenship question. The Chief Justice noted that the Secretary conducted an analysis weighing the value of obtaining more complete and accurate citizenship data against the uncertain risk that reinstating a citizenship question would result in a lower response rate. Because his decision to reinstate the question was reasonable and reasonably explained, it was not “arbitrary and capricious.”\nAgain writing for himself and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, the Chief Justice held that the Secretary did not violate the Census Act, reversing the district court’s ruling to the contrary. Section 6 of the Census Act authorizes the Secretary to acquire administrative records from other federal agencies and state and local governments and requires him to use that data rather than conducting direct inquiries, to the extent possible. Assuming that § 6 applied, the Chief Justice found that the Secretary complied with it for the same reasons he found the Secretary’s decision not “arbitrary and capricious”—that is, administrative records were insufficient to provide the requested citizenship data. Even if he had not complied with it, his decision would constitute harmless error because “he fully informed Congress of, and explained, his decision.”\nFinally, writing for himself and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, the Chief Justice affirmed the district court’s decision to remand the action to the agency. A court generally is limited to the existing administrative record, but it may inquire into “the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers upon a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.” Although the district court was premature in invoking that exception, the Chief Justice agreed with its ultimate conclusion that the decision to reinstate a citizenship question “cannot adequately be explained.” The Chief Justice pointed to evidence “that does not match the Secretary’s explanation for his decision,” and given these “unusual circumstances,” concluded that the district court correctly remanded the action to the agency.\nJustice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas criticized the Court for its holding, in his characterization, that “the Secretary’s stated rationale did not factor at all into his decision.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63093:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "63093:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63093:Conclusion:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\n.”TheChiefJusticepointedtoevidence“thatdoesnotmatchtheSecretary’sexplanationforhisdecision,”andgiventhese“unusualcircumstances,”concludedthatthedistrictcourtcorrectlyremandedtheactiontotheagency.JusticeThomasfiledanopinionconcurringinpartanddissentinginpart,inwhichJusticesGorsuchandKavanaughjoined.JusticeThomascriticizedtheCourtforitsholding,inhischaracterization,that“theSecretary’sstatedrationaledidnotfactoratallintohisdecision.”\nJustice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the Secretary’s decision to add the citizenship question was arbitrary and capricious and therefore violated the APA, regardless of whether the decision was pretextual.\nJustice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, largely criticizing the Court for getting involved in the policy question whether a citizenship question should be included on the census and whether the reasons given by the Secretary were his only reasons or his real reasons. He argued that the Court has “no authority to decide whether the Secretary’s decision was rendered in compliance with the . . . APA.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63093:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "63095:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63095:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Clean Water Act (CWA) requires National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters from point sources, which the CWA defines as “discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances.” In contrast, all other sources of pollution are characterized as nonpoint sources and are controlled through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other non-CWA programs. The CWA also distinguishes between groundwater and navigable waters, the latter being “waters of the United States” and exclusive of the former.\nConstructed with funding by the EPA in the 1970s, the County of Maui’s Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility treats wastewater generated by homes and business in the western part of Maui by injecting treated wastewater (called “effluent”) into underground injection control (UIC) wells—a common method used by municipalities to dispose of effluent. Before injection, effluent is treated to meet R-1 water standards, Hawaii’s highest standards for recycled water. Some of the treated effluent is used for resort and golf course irrigation. Upon injection, effluent immediately mixes with groundwater and disperses vertically and horizontally, eventually migrating to the ocean. Over 90% of the effluent/groundwater mixture enters the ocean through diffuse flow, with no identifiable entry point. Reports from 1973, 1991, and 1994 indicate that both the EPA and the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) understood that the wastewater entered the ocean, and neither agency suggested that this result required NPDES permitting.\nThe district court at summary judgment held that the County violated the CWA by discharging effluent through groundwater and into the ocean without the NPDES permit required by the CWA, and that the County had fair notice of its violations. The court based its ruling on findings that the County “indirectly discharged[d] a pollutant into the ocean through a groundwater conduit,” (2) the groundwater is a “point source” as defined by the CWA, and (3) the groundwater is a “navigable water” under the CWA. The County appealed, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63095:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63095:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63095:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Clean Water Act (CWA) requires a permit when there is a direct discharge, or a functional equivalent of a direct discharge, of pollutants from a point source into navigable waters. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority.\nThe scope of the statutory language “from any point source” turns on the word “from.” The environmental groups advocated for the broad interpretation adopted by the Ninth Circuit, below—that a pollutant must be “fairly traceable” to the point source. In contrast, the County of Maui and the Solicitor General, as an amicus curiae, argued that the statute required a permit only if the point source is the “last conveyance” that conducted the pollutant to the navigable waters. Based on the statutory context, including inferred congressional intent and legislative history, and “longstanding regulatory practice,” the Court interpreted the phrase to mean something between the two positions advocated by the parties. Specifically, the Court found that the CWA requires a permit if there is a functional equivalent of a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters. The Court described a non-exhaustive list of seven factors to consider when deciding whether a discharge is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge, the most important of which are the time and distance. The Court did not decide whether the facts in the case satisfied its functional equivalent test, but rather vacated the Ninth Circuits judgment and remanded the case for application of the new test.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority in full and authored a concurring opinion to note three points. First, he noted the Court’s interpretation of the CWA is consistent with the interpretation set forth in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Second, Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that the statute—not the Court—is vague as to when a pollutant may be considered to have come “from” a point source. Third, with respect to Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent in this case, Justice Kavanaugh disagreed that “the Court does not commit to which factors are the most important in determining whether pollutants that enter navigable waters come ‘from’ a point source.”\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that based on the statutory text and structure, a permit is required only when a point source discharges pollutants directly into navigable waters.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority “makes up a rule that provides no clear guidance and invites arbitrary and inconsistent application.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63095:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63102:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63102:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 and 2005, which his bank referred to Klemm & Associates for collection. Klemm filed a collections lawsuit against Rotkiske in March 2008 but was unable to locate him for service of process. Klemm refiled its suit in January 2009 and attempted to serve Rotkiske at the same address. Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, someone at that address accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default judgment against him. Rotkiske only discovered the judgment when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014.\nRotkiske filed the present action against Klemm alleging that its actions violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Klemm moved to dismiss the claim as time-barred, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The FDCPA provides that any action under the Act must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” Rotkiske argued that the statute incorporates a “discovery rule,” which is recognized in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and which “delays the beginning of a limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury.” The district court rejected this argument, finding that under a plain reading of the statute, the limitations period begins at the time of injury. Rotkiske appealed, but before the appellate panel issued its opinion and judgment, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the judgment of the district court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63102:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63102:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63102:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe statute of limitations in § 1692k(d) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act begins to run when the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, not when it is discovered. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority affirming the judgment below. The Court first looked at the statutory language of the FDCPA, finding that the plain meaning of the statute of limitations unambiguously refers to the date of the alleged violation. The Court rejected Rotkiske’s argument that the statute incorporates a “discovery rule” that would delay the beginning of the limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury, finding the “atextual judicial supplementation...particularly inappropriate.” The Court declined to consider Rotkiske’s fraud-based equitable defense because he failed to preserve that argument when he appealed to the Third Circuit.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to point out that the Court has “long recognized” the equitable “discovery rule” in cases of fraud or concealment, notwithstanding the majority’s disparagement of that rule in its opinion in this case.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion in which she agrees with the majority’s determination that the “discovery rule” does not apply to the one-year statute of limitations in the FDCPA, but she disagrees with the majority that Rotkiske failed to preserve a fraud-based discovery argument in the court below. Justice Ginsburg would hold that if the conduct giving rise to the claim is fraudulent, or if fraud infects the manner in which the claim is presented, then the fraud-based discovery rule governs. Because, in her view, Rotkiske did preserve this argument on appeal, she would allow adjudication of his claim on the merits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63102:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63104:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63104:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe controversy before the Court arises from three cases presenting the same issue.\nIn State v. Garcia, Ramiro Garcia was stopped for speeding in Overland Park, Kansas. When asked why he was speeding, he told officers that he was on his way to work. A records check revealed that he was already the subject of an investigation, and police contacted his employer to obtain employment documents. Among the documents was his federal Form I-9, which listed a social security number belonging to another person. Further investigation revealed that Garcia had used the same number on other federal and state forms. On the basis of this information, Garcia was charged with identity theft under state law.\nIn State v. Morales, a special agent with the Social Security Administration determined that Donaldo Morales was using a social security number issued to another person. The agent reviewed Morales’s employment file, which included a federal Form I-9 as well as various federal and state tax forms. Morales was charged with identity theft and two other state-law offenses.\nIn State v. Ochoa-Lara, federal and state officers determined that Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara was using a social security number issued to another individual to lease an apartment. On further investigation, officers reviewed the Form W-4 that Ochoa-Lara had completed for employment and found he was using the same social security number that belonged to another individual. On this basis, Ochoa-Lara was charged with two counts of identity theft under state law.\nAll three defendants were convicted of at least one related charge, and all three appealed their convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63104:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63104:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63104:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) neither expressly nor impliedly preempts Kansas’s application of its state identity-theft and fraud statutes to the noncitizens in this case. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the 5-4 majority opinion.\nThe express preemption provision of IRCA applies only to employers and those who recruit or refer prospective employees and thus does not apply to state laws, such as the one at issue in this case, that impose criminal or civil sanctions on employees or applicants for employment. The Kansas Supreme Court erroneously relied on a different provision, § 1324a(b)(5), which prohibits any use of an I-9 or any information “contained in” that form; that interpretation is “contrary to standard English usage.” Thus, IRCA does not expressly preempt state law.\nFurther, IRCA does not impliedly preempt state law for two key reasons. First, Kansas’s prosecutions of the noncitizens in this case were based on the information provided not in the I-9, but in tax-withholding forms, which are outside of immigration-enforcement functions. Thus, the relevant provisions of the IRCA “did not create a comprehensive and unified system regarding information a State may require employees to provide.” Second, the Court found no intent by Congress to eliminate overlap between state identity-theft prosecutions and federal prosecution fraud crimes arising from the employment-verification process or tax-withholding forms. Thus, the federal laws do not conflict with the state laws, nor do they pose “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of IRCA.”\nBecause IRCA neither expressly nor impliedly preempts Kansas’s laws, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision, validating the convictions below.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined to express his view that the Court should explicitly abandon its “purposes and objectives” preemption jurisprudence.\nJustice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part (with respect to express preemption and dissenting in part (with respect to implied preemption), in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that IRCA’s text, structure, context, and purpose, make it “‘clear and manifest’” that Congress has “occupied at least the narrow field of policing fraud committed to demonstrate federal work authorization.” In Justice Breyer’s view, it should not matter that Kansas relied on the information in the tax-withholding forms rather than the I-9; the noncitizens were still submitting information as part of the process of verifying their employment eligibility.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63104:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63106:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63106:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEvangelisto Ramos was charged with second-degree murder and exercised his right to a jury trial. After deliberating, ten of the twelve jurors found that the prosecution had proven its case against Ramos beyond a reasonable doubt, while two jurors reached the opposite conclusion. Under Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury verdict law, agreement of only ten jurors is sufficient to enter a guilty verdict, so Ramos was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.\nRamos appealed his case, and the state appellate court affirmed the lower court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63106:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63106:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63106:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Sixth Amendment, as incorporated against the states, requires that a jury find a criminal defendant guilty by a unanimous verdict. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the primary opinion.\nIn Part I, Justice Neil Gorsuch (writing for a majority: himself and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Brett Kavanaugh) noted that the original public meaning of the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury, as well as its history, support an interpretation that it requires guilt be determined by a unanimous jury. Because this right is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” it is incorporated against the states (that is, it applies to state governments as well) by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in state court.\nIn Part II-A, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the same majority, explained how the Court’s jurisprudence came to allow Oregon and Louisiana to permit non-unanimous jury verdicts, describing the fractured plurality opinions in those cases (Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana) with a fifth vote from Justice Lewis Powell that was “neither here nor there” but effectively permitted those states to proceed with non-unanimous jury verdicts.\nIn Part II-B, Justice Gorsuch wrote for a plurality of the Court (himself, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor), describing the confusion surrounding the Apodaca decision and the apparent conflict in the Court’s precedent as to whether the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts.\nIn Part III, Justice Gorsuch, again writing for the majority, rejected Louisana’s arguments for non-unanimous jury verdicts, finding that the drafting history of the Sixth Amendment is ambiguous at best, the Apodaca plurality’s reasoning was “skimpy,” and most importantly, that the Apodaca plurality “subjected the ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict to its own functionalist assessment.”\nIn Part IV-A, Justice Gorsuch, writing for a plurality (himself and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer), addressed the dissent’s argument that the principle of stare decisis required the Court to stand by its decision in Apodaca and uphold Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury law. Justice Gorsuch argued that under no view can the plurality opinion in Apodaca be controlling on today’s Court.\nWriting again for a majority in Part IV-B-1, Justice Gorsuch noted that even if the Court accepted the premise that Apodaca established a precedent, no one on the Court today would say it was rightly decided, and “stare decisis isn’t supposed to be the art of methodically ignoring what everyone knows to be true.”\nFor the four-justice plurality (Justice Kavanaugh did not join this part), Justice Gorsuch in Part IV-B-2 addressed the reliance interest Louisiana and Oregon have in the security of their final criminal judgments. Justice Gorsuch minimized the significance of the state’s reliance interests and pointed instead to the reliance interests of the American people in having a just criminal jury that uniformly requires a unanimous verdict for a finding of guilt.\nJustice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring as to all but Part IV-A, writing separately to raise three points: “First, overruling precedent here is not only warranted, but compelled. Second, the interests at stake point far more clearly to that outcome than those in other recent cases. And finally, the racially biased origins of the Louisiana and Oregon laws uniquely matter here.”\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh wrote an opinion concurring in part to explain his view of how stare decisis applies in this case, laying out seven factors, which he argued, support overruling Apodaca in this case.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas noted from the outset that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury includes protection against non-unanimous jury verdicts and would thus resolve the question there. He would further find that the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal court, but would find that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates it against the states.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63106:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "63106:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63106:Conclusion:0:1", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nsevenfactors,whichheargued,supportoverrulingApodacainthiscase.JusticeClarenceThomasfiledanopinionconcurringinthejudgment.JusticeThomasnotedfromtheoutsetthattheSixthAmendmentrighttotrialbyjuryincludesprotectionagainstnon-unanimousjuryverdictsandwouldthusresolvethequestionthere.HewouldfurtherfindthattheSixthAmendment'srighttoajurytrialrequiresaunanimousverdicttosupportaconvictioninfederalcourt,butwouldfindthatthePrivilegesorImmunitiesClauseincorporatesitagainstthestates.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, and which Justice Elena Kagan joined as to all but Part III-D. Justice Alito argued that stare decisis requires following Apodaca and that in overruling that case, the majority “cast[] aside an important and long-established decision with little regard for the enormous reliance the decision has engendered.” In the part of the dissent that Justice Kagan did not join, Justice Alito argued that the reliance in this case “far outstrips” the reliance interests in other recent cases where the dissenters in those cases claimed reliance interests.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63106:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "para->sent with overlap"}}
{"doc_id": "63107:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63107:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nKraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for many years. However, in 2008, his marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his wife and estranged from their children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed.\nIn November 2009, Kahler went to his wife’s grandmother’s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler was arrested, charged, and sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler’s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “completely lost control.”\nUnder Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.” In effect, this law makes irrelevant “whether the defendant is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong with respect to his actions.”\nThe Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63107:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63107:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63107:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nYes; due process does not require Kansas to adopt an insanity test that turns on a defendant’s ability to recognize that his crime was morally wrong. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for a 6-3 majority of the Court. The Court acknowledged that for hundreds of years, judges have recognized that a criminal defendant’s insanity at the time of the commission of a criminal act can relieve criminal responsibility. And while the Kansas law at issue does make irrelevant the question of moral incapacity, it still permits mental illness as a defense to culpability if it prevented a defendant from forming the criminal intent required for commission of the crime. The Court has repeatedly declined to adopt one particular version of the insanity defense, and it declined to do so in this case, as well. No single version of the insanity defense has become so ingrained in American law as to be “fundamental,” and states retain the authority to define the precise relationship between criminal culpability and mental illness.\nJustice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer argued that Kansas did not merely redefine the insanity defense; it “eliminated the core” of a defense “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” He provided several hypotheticals to illustrate his point that Kansas’s version of the insanity defense “requires conviction of a broad swath of defendants who are obviously insane and would be adjudged not guilty under any traditional form of the defense.” As such, he would conclude that Kansas’s law violates a “fundamental precept of our criminal law” and thus is unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63107:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63113:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63113:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis is the second time this case regarding partisan gerrymandering in Maryland comes before the Supreme Court. In Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. __ (2018), the Court heard the case and issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion that did not resolve the substantive legal questions. Rather, in that opinion the Court emphasized that the case was in its early stages and that the Court was reviewing the district court’s decision under a lenient standard—abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the Court found that the district court’s ruling (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction barring the state from enforcing the redistricting plan and requiring it to implement a new map for the 2018 midterm elections) was not unreasonable.\nAfter the Court decided Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. __ (2018)—holding that the Democratic voter plaintiffs in Wisconsin had failed to demonstrate Article III standing based on claims of statewide injury due to unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering—the district court in the Maryland case held another hearing. This time, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and ordered the state to draw a new map for the 2020 election. Maryland appealed to the Supreme Court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63113:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63113:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63113:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nPartisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond the reach of the federal courts.\nChief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion (consolidated under Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422). Federal courts are charged with resolving cases and controversies of a judicial nature. In contrast, questions of a political nature are “nonjusticiable,” and the courts cannot resolve such questions. Partisan gerrymandering has existed since prior to the independence of the United States, and, aware of this occurrence, the Framers chose to empower state legislatures, “expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress” to handle these matters. While federal courts can resolve “a variety of questions surrounding districting,” including racial gerrymandering, it is beyond their power to decide the central question: when has political gerrymandering gone too far. In the absence of any “limited and precise standard” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering, federal courts cannot resolve such issues.\nJustice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the Court for sidestepping a critical question involving the violation of “the most fundamental of . . . constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.” Justice Kagan argued that by not intervening in the political gerrymanders, the Court effectively “encourage[s] a politics of polarization and dysfunction” that “may irreparably damage our system of government.” She argued that the standards adopted in lower courts across the country do meet the contours of the “limited and precise standard” the majority demanded yet purported not to find.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63113:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63115:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63115:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhile on patrol, a Kansas police officer ran a registration check on a pickup truck with a Kansas license plate. Upon running the check, the officer learned that the truck was registered to Charles Glover, Jr., and that his license had been revoked. Acting on suspicion that the owner was unlawfully operating the vehicle (based on the assumption that the registered owner of the truck was also the driver), the officer stopped the truck. The officer confirmed that Glover was the driver and issued him a citation for being a habitual violator of Kansas traffic laws.\nGlover moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to Glover, the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. The state argued that a law enforcement officer may infer that the owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle, absent information to the contrary, and the knowledge that the owner has a revoked license combined with that inference gives rise to reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.\nThe state trial court concluded that it is not reasonable for an officer to infer that the registered owner of a vehicle is also its driver and granted Glover’s motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed, and the Kansas Supreme Court granted review. The supreme court reversed the lower court, holding that the inference impermissibly “stacked” assumptions and would relieve the state of its burden of showing reasonable suspicion for a stop.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63115:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63115:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63115:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWhen a police officer lacks information to the contrary, it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the officer to assume that the driver of a vehicle is its owner, and if the owner’s license is revoked, to conduct an investigative stop of the vehicle. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the 8-1 majority. Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may make a “brief investigative traffic stop” when he has “a particularized and objective basis” to suspect legal wrongdoing. Courts must permit officers to use common sense to make judgments and inferences about human behavior. In this case, the police officer’s common-sense inference was that the vehicle’s owner was most likely the driver, which provided sufficient suspicion to stop the vehicle. It does not matter that a vehicle’s driver is not always its registered owner; the officer’s judgment was based on common-sense judgment and experience. Thus he had reasonable suspicion, and the traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.\nJustice Elena Kagan authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, to point out that the license-revocation alert does not end the inquiry because, in a similar setting with slightly different facts, there might not be reasonable suspicion. Justice Kagan specifically described that most license suspensions (as opposed to revocations) do not relate to driving at all but are highly correlated with poverty.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court’s decision ignores “key foundations of our reasonable-suspicion jurisprudence and impermissibly and unnecessarily reduces the State’s burden of proof.” Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that seizing the vehicle was constitutional because drivers with revoked licenses in Kansas have demonstrated a disregard for the law, arguing that that conclusion “flips the burden of proof.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63115:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63121:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63121:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nDonald Zarda worked in 2010 as a sky-diving instructor at Altitude Express. Part of his job was to participate in tandem skydives with clients, in which he was necessarily strapped in close proximity to the client. A gay man, Zarda sometimes told female clients about his sexual orientation to address any concern they might have about being strapped to a man for a tandem skydive. On one occasion after Zarda informed a female client about his sexual orientation and performed the tandem jump with her, the client alleged that Zarda had inappropriately touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior. In response to this complaint, Zarda's boss fired him. Zarda denied touching the client inappropriately and claimed that he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation.\nZarda filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that he was fired because of his sexual orientation and also because of he did not conform to male gender stereotypes. He brought a claim in federal court alleging, among other things, that Altitude Express violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating him because of his sexual orientation. The district court ruled for Altitude Express, finding that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation. After the district court's ruling, the EEOC issued an opinion in a separate case (persuasive but not binding on federal district courts) that Title VII's “on the basis of sex” language necessarily includes discrimination “on the basis of sexual orientation.” In light of this decision, Zarda moved for the district court to reinstate his Title VII claim, but the district court denied the motion, citing binding Second Circuit precedent, Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), and Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005).\nZarda appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled for Altitude Express as well. The panel declined Zarda’s request that it reconsider its interpretation of Title VII and overturn Simonton and Dawson, as only the court sitting en banc can do that. The Second Circuit then agreed to rehear the case en banc and expressly overruled Simonton and Dawson, finding, consistent with the EEOC’s position, that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination because of sex necessarily includes discrimination because of sexual orientation.\nThis case is consolidated for oral argument with Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 17-1618.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63121:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63121:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63121:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAn employer who fires an individual employee merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority of the Court.\nTitle VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Looking to the ordinary public meaning of each word and phrase comprising that provision, the Court interpreted to mean that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based, at least in part, on sex. Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat employees differently because of their sex—the very practice Title VII prohibits in all manifestations. Although it acknowledged that few in 1964 would have expected Title VII to apply to discrimination against homosexual and transgender persons, the Court gave no weight to legislative history because the language of the statute unambiguously prohibits the discriminatory practice.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, criticizing the majority for attempting to “pass off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation,” but actually revising Title VII to “better reflect the current values of society.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion arguing that, as written, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (or by extension, transgender status).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63121:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63122:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63122:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare services coordinator in 2003. During his ten-year career with Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Shortly thereafter, Bostock received criticism for his participation in the league and for his sexual orientation and identity generally. During a meeting in which Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in the gay softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed. Shortly afterwards, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.”\nWithin months of his termination, Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three years later, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that Bostock’s claim relied on an interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to a 1979 decision holding otherwise, the continued which was recently affirmed in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). Bostock appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. In addition to noting procedural deficiencies in Bostock’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel pointed out that it cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit en banc decision.\nThis case is consolidated for oral argument with Altitude Express v. Zarda, No. 17-1623.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63122:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63122:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63122:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAn employer who fires an individual employee merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority of the Court.\nTitle VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Looking to the ordinary public meaning of each word and phrase comprising that provision, the Court interpreted to mean that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based, at least in part, on sex. Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat employees differently because of their sex—the very practice Title VII prohibits in all manifestations. Although it acknowledged that few in 1964 would have expected Title VII to apply to discrimination against homosexual and transgender persons, the Court gave no weight to legislative history because the language of the statute unambiguously prohibits the discriminatory practice.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, criticizing the majority for attempting to “pass off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation,” but actually revising Title VII to “better reflect the current values of society.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion arguing that, as written, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (or by extension, transgender status).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63122:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63123:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63123:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges.\nBarton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a).\nThe immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63123:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63123:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63123:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA lawful permanent resident who commits a serious crime during the initial seven years of residence attains “inadmissible” status for the purposes of the stop-time rule, regardless of whether he is seeking admission, and thus is ineligible for cancellation of removal. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for a 5-4 majority of the Court.\nLooking at the text of the statute, the Court noted that cancellation of removal is precluded when the noncitizen, during the initial seven years of residence in the United States, “committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2)”, even if conviction occurred after those first seven years. Commission of such an offense renders the nonresident “inadmissible.” In this case, Barton’s offenses were serious offenses referred to in section 1182(a)(2) and occurred within the first seven years of his residence, therefore rendering him inadmissible. By being inadmissible, he was, therefore, ineligible for cancellation of removal.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority “conflate[d]” the terms “inadmissible” and “deportable,” leading to the “paradox[ical]” conclusion that one can be already admitted to the country yet also “inadmissible.” Justice Sotomayor argued that for the stop-time rule to render Barton ineligible for relief from removal, the Government must show he committed an offense that made him deportable, not inadmissible.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63123:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63124:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63124:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for a shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1,900-mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needed to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the river in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, but no government agency is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes to search for obstructions in that area may do so, but dredging requires a permit from the Corps of Engineers.\nAs it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an abandoned anchor, causing approximately 264,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $143 million.\nFrescati originally paid for the cleanup and was then reimbursed $88 million by the federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati and the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs from CITGO, the intended recipient of the oil.\nAt the beginning of what turned out to be extensive litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was not liable under contract or tort law. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Frescati was a third-party beneficiary of CITGO’s safe berth warranty and that CITGO had a duty of care to Frescati (thus implicating liability under both contract and tort theories). On remand, the district court found CITGO liable under both contract and tort. However, the court also found that the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CITGO into believing the anchorage was free of obstructions and reduced CITGO’s liability by 50%. The government, CITGO, and Frescati all appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the contract claim, vacated the negligence claim, and affirmed in part other claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63124:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63124:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63124:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA safe-berth clause in a voyage charter agreement—which requires the party to designate a safe berth for a vessel to load and discharge cargo—establishes a warranty of safety. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for a 7-2 majority of the Court. The Court first looked at the text of the safe-berth clause in the charter agreement, finding that it imposes, unqualified, on the charterer a duty to select a safe berth. Although the clause does not expressly use the word “warranty,” it need not do so to be subject to such an obligation. Basic principles of contract law hold a party strictly liable for a breach of contract, regardless of fault or diligence, and those principles determine the outcome here, as well.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined. Justice Thomas argued that the majority’s conclusion “is the wrong rule and finds no basis in the contract’s plain text.” Because the plain language of the safe-berth clause “contains no warranty of safety,” Justice Thomas would remand the case for factfinding on whether industry custom and usage establish such a warranty.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63124:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63125:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63125:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for-profit corporation that operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home’s owner and operator that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated.\nStephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes.\nThe district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home’s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63125:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63125:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63125:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAn employer who fires an individual employee merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority of the Court.\nTitle VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Looking to the ordinary public meaning of each word and phrase comprising that provision, the Court interpreted to mean that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based, at least in part, on sex. Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat employees differently because of their sex—the very practice Title VII prohibits in all manifestations. Although it acknowledged that few in 1964 would have expected Title VII to apply to discrimination against homosexual and transgender persons, the Court gave no weight to legislative history because the language of the statute unambiguously prohibits the discriminatory practice.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, criticizing the majority for attempting to “pass off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation,” but actually revising Title VII to “better reflect the current values of society.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion arguing that, as written, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (or by extension, transgender status).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63125:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63135:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63135:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented the shipwreck for nearly twenty years in photographs and videos and registered his works with the U.S. Copyright Office.\nAt some point before October 2013, the state of North Carolina posted various of the copyrighted works of Allen online without his permission. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a settlement agreement with Allen and his company, paying him for the infringement of his works and agreeing not to infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again posted and published Allen’s works. The state then passed “Blackbeard’s Law,” which purportedly converted Allen’s works into “public record” materials that the state could use freely.\nAllen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Allen argued that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA)—which defines potential infringers of copyright to include “any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity”—abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims.\nThe district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding persuasive Allen’s arguments regarding the CRCA’s abrogation of sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity via the CRCA.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63135:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63135:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63135:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nCongress lacked the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for the Court unanimous in the judgment. First, the Court considered whether, in the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Congress had enacted “unequivocal statutory language” abrogating the states’ immunity from lawsuits. The Court concluded that it had. Next, the Court considered whether Congress had authority to do so. Allen argued that the Intellectual Property Clause (art. I § 8, cl. 8) of the U.S. Constitution authorized the exercise of that power, but the Court rejected that theory in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Board, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and stare decisis requires following that precedent unless there is a “special justification” to overturn it. Neither does Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment give Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits. For Congress’s action to fall within its Section 5 authority, “there must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented and the means adopted to that end.” In the absence of any evidence of this nature, the CRCA fails this test. Thus, Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in that Act.\nJustice Clarence Thomas joined in part and authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas agreed with the majority’s conclusion but noted two disagreements. First, he argue that the Court need not “special justification” to overrule precedent; rather, the Court must correct its error if the prior decision is “demonstrably erroneous.” But the present case does not even meet that lower standard. Second, he declined to join the majority’s discussion regarding future copyright legislation.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Breyer pointed out the inherent unfairness to creators and artists that arises from the Court’s decision but concurred in the judgment because the Court’s precedent in Florida Prepaid “controls this case.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63135:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63136:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63136:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGonzalo Holguin was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law, and sentenced to 24 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. Holguin was again arrested for possession and intent to distribute, and after that arrest the government filed a petition to revoke the supervised release term. Before the revocation hearing occurred, Holguin pleaded guilty to the second set of charges.\nAt the revocation hearing, the district court explained the allegations of the revocation petition to Holguin and asked how he pleaded. Holguin answered “True.” Holguin’s attorney argued for a concurrent sentence on the revocation, but the court issued a 12-month consecutive sentence instead. Holguin appealed the reasonableness of his sentence, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding Holguin had failed to make a formal objection after the announcement of his sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63136:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63136:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63136:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA criminal defendant need not make a formal objection to his issued sentence in order to preserve his right on appeal to have that sentence reviewed for “reasonableness” rather than for “plain error,” the standard that would control absent sufficient objection at the time of sentencing. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer noted a split of authority among the various federal courts of appeal and explained, “We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ suggestion that defendants are required to refer to the “reasonableness’ of a sentence” to preserve their right to have that sentence reviewed for reasonableness rather than plain error. In other words, “A defendant who, by advocating for a particular sentence, communicates to the trial judge his view that a longer sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ has thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in an appellate challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” The Court continued, “He need not also refer to the standard of review” in his argument or objection to preserve the more favorable reasonableness standard of review on appeal.\nThe Court also noted a pair of issues raised by the government and various amicus curiae about preserving a claim of improper sentencing procedures and also when a party has preserved particular arguments regarding an appeal over the length of a sentence. The Court refused to reach those larger issues, holding only that the appellant had preserved his right to appeal the length of his sentence as unreasonable in the particular circumstances of this case.\nJustice Alito authored a concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, to further elaborate on the limited nature of the ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63136:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63137:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63137:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. __ (2014), the Supreme Court unanimously held that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), fiduciaries to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) are not entitled to a presumption of prudence regarding their decisions to buy or hold employer stock. Rather, for a plaintiff to state a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence based on inside information, the plaintiff need only “plausibly allege that a prudent fiduciary in the defendant’s position could not have concluded that [an alternative action] would do more harm than good to the fund.” Thus the Court established a “context-specific” pleading standard rather than a generalized presumption standard.\nIBM offers as a benefit to its employees an ERISA-qualified ESOP, invested predominantly in IBM common stock, with Retirement Plans Committee of IBM as the fiduciary. In 2015, two substantially similar lawsuits were filed against IBM and its officers, one under securities laws and the other under ERISA. Both lawsuits alleged that IBM fraudulently concealed problems with the company’s microelectronics unit, thereby artificially inflating IBM’s reported value. By continuing to invest in IBM stock despite allegedly knowing that the market price was artificially inflated due to the fraudulent scheme, the plaintiffs in the ERISA lawsuit argued that the ESOP’s fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence under Section 404 of ERISA.\nThe district court dismissed the ERISA lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the pleading standard established in Fifth Third, as they had not alleged facts showing that the fiduciaries “could not have concluded” that publicly disclosing the alleged “fraud” or halting further investments in IBM stock would be more likely to harm the fund than to help it.\nThe plaintiffs amended their complaint to add generic allegations that disclosure of the alleged fraud was “inevitable” and that the magnitude of the stock price correction resulting from a delayed disclosure would increase over time. The plaintiffs also added a claim that the fiduciaries could have avoided doing more harm than good by instead purchasing a “low-cost” hedging product.\nThe district court again dismissed the lawsuit for failing to meet the Fifth Third pleading standard and because a prudent fiduciary could reasonably find their proposed alternative likely to cause more harm than good. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding that “when a ‘drop in the value of the stock already held by the fund’ is inevitable, it is far more plausible that a prudent fiduciary would prefer to limit the effects of the stock’s artificial inflation on the ESOP’s beneficiaries through prompt disclosure.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63137:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63137:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63137:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to determine whether to entertain the parties’ arguments on ERISA’s duty of prudence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63137:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63138:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63138:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case arises from Montana’s Anaconda Smelter site—the location of a large copper concentrating and smelting operation that started in 1884 and expanded to other nearby areas in 1902. In 1977, Atlantic Richfield purchased Anaconda Smelter, and it shut down smelter activities in 1980. The smelter operations over the almost-century of operations caused high concentrations of arsenic, lead, copper, cadmium, and zinc to contaminate soil, groundwater, and surface water. In 1983, the EPA prioritized the Anaconda Smelter site as a Superfund site, working with Atlantic Richfield to address the contamination. Since then, Atlantic Richfield has worked with the EPA for 35 years to remediate the site, at a cost of approximately $470 million.\nIn 2008, landowners within the Anaconda Superfund site sued Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court, alleging that the smelter operations between 1884 and 1980 had caused damage to their properties. Atlantic Richfield raised no objections to the plaintiffs’ claims of loss of use and enjoyment of property, diminution of value, incidental and consequential damages, and annoyance and discomfort. However, it did object to the common-law claim for “restoration” damages.\nTo establish a claim for restoration damages in Montana, plaintiffs must prove that they will actually use the award to clean up the site. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that restoration of their property requires “work in excess of what the EPA required of Atlantic Richfield in its selected remedy.” Atlantic Richfield moved for summary judgment, arguing that the restoration claim constituted a “challenge” to the EPA’s remedy and thus was jurisdictionally barred by CERCLA § 113, which deprives courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to EPA-selected remedies. Atlantic Richfield also argued that the landowners are “potentially responsible parties” and thus must seek EPA approval under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) of CERCLA before engaging in remedial action. Finally, Atlantic Richfield argued that CERCLA preempted state common-law claims for restoration.\nThe trial court held that CERCLA permitted plaintiffs’ claim for restoration damages, and Atlantic Richfield sought a writ of supervisory control from the Montana Supreme Court, which the court granted. Over a dissent, the Supreme Court of Montana rejected all three of Atlantic Richfield’s arguments, affirming the trial court’s decision permitting the plaintiffs to proceed to a jury trial on their restoration claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63138:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63138:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63138:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over the landowners’ claim for restoration, and the Montana Supreme Court erred in holding that the landowners in this case were not potentially responsible parties under CERCLA and thus did not need the Environmental Protection Agency’s approval to take remedial action.\nChief Justice Roberts delivered the majority opinion.\nIn Part II-A, the Court unanimously held that it had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Montana Supreme Court. The Court has jurisdiction to review final judgments, and a state court judgment is a “final judgment if it is “an effective determination of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein.” Because under Montana law, a supervisory writ proceeding is a self-contained case, not an interlocutory appeal, it was a final judgment subject to review.\nIn Part II-B, the Chief Justice, writing for the 8-1 majority, found that the Act does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over this lawsuit. While § 113(b) of CERCLA provides that “the United States district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under this chapter,” thereby depriving state courts of jurisdiction over such actions, the landowners’ common law nuisance, trespass, and strict liability claims arise under Montana law, not under the Act. Justice Samuel Alito dissented from this part of the opinion, writing in his separate opinion that the issue of whether state courts have jurisdiction to entertain challenges to EPA-approved CERCLA plans was “neither necessary nor prudent” to decide in this case.\nIn Part III, the Chief Justice, writing for the 7-2 majority, held that the Montana Supreme Court erred by holding that the landowners were not potentially responsible parties under the Act and therefore did not need EPA approval to take remedial action. To determine who is a potentially responsible party, the Court found that the Act includes as “covered persons” any “owner” of “a facility,” and that a “facility” includes “any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.” Under this definition, the landowners are “potentially responsible parties,” and this reading is consistent with the Act’s objective “to develop a ‘Comprehensive Environmental Response’ to hazardous waste pollution.” Justice Neil Gorsuch (joined by Justice Clarence Thomas) dissented from this part of the opinion, arguing that the majority’s holding departs from CERCLA’s terms in a way that transforms the Act “from a law that supplements state environmental restoration efforts into one that prohibits them.” Justice Gorsuch expressed concern that the Court’s reading “strips away ancient common law rights from innocent landowners and forces them to suffer toxic waste in their backyards, playgrounds, and farms.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63138:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63139:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63139:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBy way of relevant background, James McKinney’s childhood was “horrific” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse—all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention.\nIn 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half-brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney’s jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree murder (without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder), and Hedlund’s jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder.\nAt McKinney’s capital sentencing hearing (before a judge), a psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD “resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered.” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could trigger McKinney’s childhood trauma and produce “diminished capacity.” The trial judge credited the psychologist’s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non-statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney’s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death.\nThe Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied relief, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and held that the Arizona courts had violated the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by refusing to consider McKinney’s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a death penalty case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved for independent review of McKinney’s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court; McKinney opposed the motion on the ground that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was ‘final’ before the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63139:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63139:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63139:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAfter a finding of a capital sentencing (Eddings) error during habeas corpus review, the state appellate court, rather than the jury, may reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to resentence the defendant. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion for the Court.\nIn Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), the Supreme Court a state appellate court may conduct the reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances after a capital sentencing error was found on collateral review. Although that case involved improperly considering an aggravating circumstance, and this case involved improperly ignoring a mitigating circumstance, the Court found no meaningful difference in the context. Thus, the Court found, Clemons determined the outcome in this case. The Court found unpersuasive McKinney’s argument that because the Arizona trial court, not a jury, made the initial aggravating circumstances finding that made him eligible for the death penalty, a jury must weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the Court’s decision in Ring. Agreeing with the court below, the Court found that McKinney’s case was “final” before Ring was decided, and that case does not apply retroactively to this situation.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s precedent require the application of new rules of constitutional law to cases currently on direct review (with two exceptions, neither of which applies, by the Court’s own holding). Thus, Justice Ginsburg, argued, the “pivotal question” in this case is whether McKinney’s case is currently on direct review, in which case Ring applies (retroactively), or on collateral review, in which case Ring does not apply. McKinney’s first appeal of a criminal conviction is “the archetype” of direct review, and his renewal of that first appeal “cannot sensibly be characterized as anything other than direct review.” As such, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Arizona Supreme Court’s proceeding presently before the Court is a direct review and thus that Ring applies, making McKinney’s death sentences unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63139:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63140:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63140:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2015, Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company’s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which sets forth the standard of care of fiduciaries. Sulyma alleged that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his employment (and thus investment) period of 2010 to 2012.\nIntel moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred under 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2), which provides that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and ordered discovery for the question of the statute of limitations. After discovery, the district court found no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “actual knowledge” does not mean that the plaintiff knew that the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach. For a Section 1104 action, this means the plaintiff must have known that the defendant had acted and that those acts were imprudent. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63140:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63140:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63140:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe three-year statute of limitation does not run from the date where a plaintiff had access to but did not read, or could not recall reading, the information giving rise to an ERISA claim. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Alito explained that, “Although ERISA does not define the phrase ‘actual knowledge’” in setting the statute of limitations, “its meaning is plain.” After quoting a number of general and legal dictionaries (though stating the exercise was “hardly necessary to confirm the point”), the Court concluded that an individual must in fact be aware of a piece of information in order to have “actual knowledge” of it.\nThe Court pointed to other sections of the ERISA statute that make the distinction more clearly than that governing the statute of limitations for an ERISA claim. Because Congress repeatedly drew a distinction between “what an ERISA plaintiff actually knows and what he should actually know,” the Court would not impute to knowledge to an ERISA plaintiff absent evidence of what that plaintiff was in fact aware of that gave rise to the ERISA claim.\nThe Court concluded by noting the limitations of its holding. It noted that its ruling did not limit any of the ways a defendant might demonstrate actual knowledge by an ERISA plaintiff sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations, nor does it allow a plaintiff to disclaim actual knowledge where the evidence points to actual knowledge. Finally, the Court also clarified that its holding does not stop defendants from arguing that “willful blindness” to a potential ERISA claim should allow a defendant to avoid the actual knowledge necessary to trigger ERISA’s statute of limitations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63140:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63141:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63141:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichelle Monasky, a U.S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two-month-old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky’s parental rights.\nThe Italian court ruled in Taglieri’s favor ex parte (without an appearance by Monasky). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri’s petition, finding that Italy was the baby’s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky’s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc.\nThe International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights “under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal.” To determine the child’s habitual residence, a court must look “to the place in which the child has become ‘acclimatized,’ or as a back-up inquiry, “shared parental intent.” Because the child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in the district court’s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit (en banc) affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63141:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63141:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63141:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnder the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, a child’s “habitual residence” depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an actual agreement between the parties. Such a determination is subject to review for clear error.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the Court that was unanimous in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined in part and concurred in the judgment. The text of the Convention does not define “habitual residence,” but the accompanying explanatory report states that a child habitually resides where she is at home. No single fact is dispositive of all cases; instead, courts must make a fact-driven inquiry “sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense.”\nThe Court found unpersuasive Monasky’s argument that an actual agreement between the parents on where to raise their child was required to determine the child’s habitual residence. None of the treaty partners interpret the treaty that way, and to do so would run counter to the principle that the inquiry is an intensely fact-driven one.\nTurning to the question of the standard of review, the Court found that because the question of habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact that is heavily fact-laden, a determination by a trial court should be entitled to deferential clear-error review.\nJustice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas would have decided this case principally on the plain meaning of the treaty’s text—which leads to the same outcome.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63141:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63142:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63142:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEntertainment Studios Network (ESN), owned by African American actor and comedian Byron Allen, and the National Association of African American-Owned Media, an entity created by Allen, sued Comcast over the latter’s decision not to carry ESN’s channels. ESN alleged that Comcast’s decision not to carry ESN’s networks was based, at least in part, on racial animus against ESN, which is the only 100% African American-owned multi-channel media company in the United States. At the time of Comcast’s decision, several other large distributors— including Charter Communications, Time Warner Cable, DirecTV, and AT&T—had also declined to enter into carriage agreements with ESN.\nThe district court dismissed ESN’s original complaint and several subsequent amended complaints against Comcast and other defendants for failure to plead facts that state a plausible claim for relief. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit held in a related case involving Charter Communications that “mixed-motive claims are cognizable under § 1981,” meaning that “even if racial animus was not the but-for cause of a defendant’s refusal to contract, a plaintiff can still prevail if she demonstrates that discriminatory intent was a factor in that decision.” Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that ESN had stated a valid Section 1981 claim based on its assertions that the carriers had entered into contracts with “white-owned, lesser-known networks during the same period.”\nThe Ninth Circuit declined petitions for rehearing en banc.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63142:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63142:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63142:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA plaintiff who sues for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must show—in all parts of the lawsuit—that race was the actual cause of her injury. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court noted from the outset that normally, a plaintiff suing for an injury must prove actual causation (also called “but-for” causation), and that burden of proof remains constant throughout the life of the lawsuit. The Court rejected Entertainment Studios Network (ESN)’s argument that § 1981 creates an exception to these default principles, finding that the statute’s text and history, as well as the Court’s precedent, support reading it as following the normal rules. Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows for a “motivating factor” causation test, the history of that statute is unique and does not apply to § 1981. Because § 1981 follows the usual rules, a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, the plaintiff would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which she noted her disagreement with a strict but-for causation standard in discrimination cases such as this one but acknowledged the Court’s own precedent otherwise. Justice Ginsburg further clarified that she rejected (and the Court did not resolve) Comcast’s narrow view of the scope of § 1981, that it applies only to the final decision whether to enter a contract and not to earlier stages of the contract-formation process.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63142:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63143:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63143:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRitzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property from Jackson Masonry, but the sale was never completed. Ritzen claims that Jackson breached the contract by providing erroneous documentation about the property just before the deadline, while Jackson claims Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding to purchase the property by the deadline.\nRitzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court, and just before trial, Jackson filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of the litigation under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Ritzen filed a motion to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ritzen did not appeal the denial. Instead, Ritzen brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Jackson, finding that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract.\nAfter this adverse ruling, Ritzen filed two appeals in the district court. The first appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s order denying relief from the automatic stay (which Ritzen did not appeal at the time). The second appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s determination that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. The district court ruled against Ritzen on both appeals; the first appeal was untimely filed, and the second one failed on the merits.\nRitzen appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reviewed the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under the abuse of discretion standard and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Ritzen had missed two deadlines: the contract deadline, leading to its breach, and the appeal deadline, leading to its waiver of appeal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63143:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63143:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63143:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA bankruptcy court’s order unreservedly denying relief from the automatic stay constitutes a final, immediately appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the majority opinion on behalf of the unanimous Court.\nThe Court first looked to its own precedent in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496 (2015), in which it held that a bankruptcy court’s order rejecting a proposed plan was not final because it did not conclusively resolve the relevant “proceeding.” Bankruptcy court orders are final only when they definitively dispose of discrete disputes within the bankruptcy case. Applying that reasoning to the facts of this case, the Court found that a bankruptcy court’s order unreservedly granting or denying relief from a bankruptcy’s automatic stay conclusively resolves a discrete dispute and thus qualifies as an independent “proceeding” within the meaning of §158(a).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63143:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63144:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63144:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in 1986 as a legal immigrant but was removed in 1998 due to felony drug convictions. In September 2016, Guerrero filed a motion to reopen, claiming that the 2014 decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Abdelghany rendered him eligible to seek relief under former Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c). The immigration judge denied Guerrero’s motion to reopen, finding it not timely filed. Given that Abdelghany was decided in 2014, the immigration judge found the two-year delay in filing the motion to reopen indicated Guerrero had not diligently pursued his rights as required for equitable tolling.\nOn appeal, the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. And the BIA agreed with the immigration judge that equitable tolling did not apply to extend the 90-day deadline. Guerrero argued that he could not have filed his motion to reopen until the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations if he establishes “that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”).\nOn appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that equitable tolling did not apply. Within the Fifth Circuit, under Penalva v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2018) the question whether a litigant acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling is a factual question, not a question of law, and thus is not reviewable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63144:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63144:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63144:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe phrase “questions of law” in the Immigration and Nationality Act’s Limited Review Provision, 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(D), includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Stephen Breyer concluded that the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the petitioners’ “factual” due diligence claims for equitable tolling purposes.\nThe Court first looked to the statute’s language, finding that nothing there precludes the conclusion that Congress used the term “questions of law” to refer to the application of a legal standard to settled facts. Courts repeatedly refer to mixed questions of law and fact as “questions of law.” The Court then considered the principle of statutory construction favoring judicial review of administrative action, finding that principle supported interpreting the court of appeals as having appellate jurisdiction in cases such as this one. Next the Court looked at the language immediately surrounding the phrase at issue, finding a “zipper clause,” which consolidates judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.” The Court then turned to the statutory history and relevant precedent, finding that they too supported an interpretation of “questions of law” as including the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined all but one subpart. Justice Thomas argued that despite being presented with a narrow question, the Court’s decision answers a much broader question and “effectively nullifies a jurisdiction-stripping statute” by disregarding the text and structure of the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63144:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63145:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63145:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case arises out of a complex procedural history involving a patent dispute between several parties and concerns not the merits of the proceedings but a procedural aspect of it.\nThe America Invents Act created “inter partes review” as a way of challenging a patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. One provision, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), precludes the institution of inter partes review more than one year after the petitioner “is served with a complaint” alleging infringement of the patent. The parties disagree over whether this one-year time bar applies when the underlying patent infringement suit has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.\nThe Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, held that it does apply. The court rejected the argument that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice restores the parties to their positions as though no legal proceedings had ever begun, concluding instead that a defendant served with a complaint remains “served” even if the civil action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and thus does such a dismissal does not toll the statute of limitations.\nFurther, 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) provides that “the determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” Notwithstanding this provision, the en banc Federal Circuit held that a decision to institute an inter partes review after finding that the § 315(b) time bar did not apply was appealable.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63145:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63145:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63145:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSection 314(d) precludes judicial review of a Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute inter partes review upon finding that §315(b)’s time bar did not apply. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the 7-2 majority opinion for the Court.\nThe text of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), as well as the Court’s decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. __ (2016), preclude a party from arguing on appeal that the agency should have refused “to institute an inter partes review.” A challenge under § 315(d) constitutes an appeal of the agency’s decision “to institute an inter partes review” and thus falls within the general prohibition of § 314(d). The majority (though without Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito) found further support for this understanding in the statute’s purpose and design, which is “to weed out bad patent claims efficiently.” The Court found Click-to-Call’s claims to the contrary unpersuasive.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined in large part, arguing that the majority’s decision allows a “politically guided agency” to take the rightful property of an inventor and immunizes the agency’s action from judicial review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63145:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63146:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63146:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress, in order to persuade the nation’s health insurance industry to provide insurance to previously uninsured or uninsurable persons, the legislation creating the Affordable Care Act provided that insurance losses over a designated percentage would be reimbursed, and comparable profits would be turned over to the government.\nIn reliance on the government’s commitment to reimburse them, the nation’s insurance industry provided the designated health insurance. However, when some carriers experienced significant losses, the government refused to appropriate the funds to pay the statutory shortfall and prohibited existing funds from being used for this purpose. As a result, the insurers did not receive reimbursement.\nSeveral of these insurance carriers filed suit against the government seeking reimbursement. The courts denied them the relief they sought, in part relying on the “cardinal rule” disfavoring implied repeals, which applies with “especial force” to appropriations acts and requires that repeal not to be found unless the later enactment is “irreconcilable” with the former.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63146:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63146:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63146:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe insurance carriers in this case have a right to payment under the “Risk Corridors” program of the Affordable Care Act, Congress did not repeal the obligation of the federal government to pay the carriers, and the carriers can sue for payment under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for an 8-1 majority. First, the Court considered whether the Risk Corridors program, Section 1342 of the Affordable Care Act, obligated the federal government to pay participating insurers the full amount calculated by the statute. Congress may create an obligation directly through statutory language, which it did through the Risk Corridors program, in plain language. Thus, the legal duty of the government became a legal liability when the insurance carriers participated in the health care exchanges.\nSecond, the Court considered whether Congress impliedly repealed the obligation by passing appropriations riders. The Court first noted its “aversion to implied repeals,” especially in the context of appropriations. For an implied repeal, the government must show more than merely the failure to appropriate sufficient funds, which it did not do here.\nFinally, the Court considered whether the insurance carriers properly brought suit under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims. Although the federal government is immune from suit unless it unequivocally consents, it waived immunity for certain damages suits in the Court of Federal Claims through the Tucker Act. A claim falls within the Tucker Act’s immunity waiver if: (1) the claim “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained,” (2) the obligation-creating statute does not provide its own detailed remedies, and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act does not provide an avenue for relief. In this case, the Court found that the insurance carriers’ claim satisfied this test and was thus properly brought under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims.\nJustices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined the majority opinion except as to the part discussing the legislative history of the appropriations riders.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority’s decision “infers a private right of action” where Congress did not expressly create one. Specifically, Justice Alito questioned the test the Court has used (and used in this case) to determine whether a claim may be brought against the United States under the Tucker Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63146:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63147:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63147:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Official Code of Georgia Annotated is a compilation of Georgia statutes accompanied by various annotations, “consisting of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor’s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references.” Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions “shall be merged with annotations,” Georgia law says that the annotations themselves do not have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., an operating division of the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state exercises pervasive supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia.\nPublic.Resource.Org (PRO) is a non-profit organization with a mission of improving public access to government records and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the print version of the OCGA and its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely accessible to the public. It also distributed digital copies to Georgia legislators and other organizations and websites.\nThe Commission sent PRO several cease-and-desist letters on the grounds that publication infringes on the State of Georgia’s copyright in their work, but PRO persisted. The Commission sued PRO in 2015 in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief. PRO acknowledged its publication and dissemination of the OCGA but denied that the State of Georgia holds an enforceable copyright in the Code. The district court ruled for the Commission, finding that because the annotations of the OCGA lack the force of law, they are not public domain material. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that because of the way they are written and integrated into the “official” code, the annotations in the OCGA are attributable to the constructive authorship of the People and are thus intrinsically public domain material. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined the identity of the public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created—finding that each of these markers supported the conclusion that the People were constructively the authors of the annotations.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63147:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63147:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63147:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnder the government edicts doctrine, the annotations beneath the statutory provisions in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated are ineligible for copyright protection. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion.\nUnder the government edicts doctrine, judges cannot be authors of the works they produce in the course of their official duties, regardless of whether the material carries the force of law. The same reasoning applies to legislators and the works they produce. The “animating principle,” amply supported by precedent, is that “no one can own the law.”\nFirst, the Court considered whether the annotations are created by legislators. Although the annotations were prepared by a private company, the work-for-hire agreement provides that Georgia’s Code Revision Commission is the sole “author” of the work. Because of the way it is created, receives funding and staffing, and operates, the Commission is an “arm” of the Georgia Legislature with “legislative authority” that includes “preparing and publishing the annotations.” This link is bolstered by the fact that the Commission brought this lawsuit “on behalf of and for the benefit of” the Georgia Legislature and the State of Georgia.\nThen, the Court considered whether the annotations are created in the course of legislative duties. Although the annotations are not enacted into law through bicameralism and presentment, the Court cited a decision by the Georgia Supreme Court holding that the preparation of the annotations under Georgia law constitute an act of “legislative authority.”\nThe Court found unpersuasive Georgia’s arguments to the contrary. First, Section 101 of the Copyright Act, which lists “annotations” among the kinds of works eligible for copyright protection, refers only to annotations that represent an original work of authorship, which the annotations cannot be when legislators are the authors. Second, the fact that the Copyright Act excludes from copyright protection works by federal officials but does not mention state officials does not lead to the negative inference that state officials must be eligible to be authors. Neither the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, a non-binding administrative manual, nor the overall purpose of the Copyright Act, supports Georgia’s position.\nThe Court pointed out that if it adopted Georgia’s position and allowed “everything short of statutes and opinions” to be copyrightable, then “States would be free to offer a whole range of premium legal works for those who can afford the extra benefit.” That outcome would force many people “to think twice before using official legal works that illuminate the law we are all presumed to know and understand.”\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined and Justice Stephen Breyer joined in part. Justice Thomas argued that the Court should leave to Congress the decision whether to exclude state legislators from copyright authorship and that the majority misunderstands the word “author.”\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined, arguing that the annotations are not created in a legislative capacity because of key differences between judges and legislators.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63147:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63148:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63148:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nGregory Dean Banister was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. He filed a habeas petition asserting numerous constitutional violations, which the district court denied on the merits on May 15, 2017. He also requested a certificate of appealability (COA), which the district court also denied in the same order.\nOn June 12, 2017, Banister filed a motion to “amend or alter” the judgment of the district court pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the court denied on the merits on June 20, 2017.\nOn July 20, 2017, Banister filed a notice of appeal and an application for a COA, which the district court “considered” despite its previous order denying the COA, but again denied on July 28, 2017. Banister then sought and received from the Fifth Circuit an extension of time to file a COA application. He filed a petition for a COA with the Fifth Circuit on October 11, 2017, and the court denied his petition, citing lack of jurisdiction, on May 8, 2018. The Fifth Circuit held that Banister’s purported 59(e) motion was, in fact, a successive habeas petition, which would not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), the Fifth Circuit noted that “alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63148:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63148:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63148:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a habeas court’s judgment is not a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), so Banister’s appeal was timely. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for the 7-2 majority.\nTo determine what “second or successive application” means, the Court first turned to historical habeas doctrine and practice and the purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which governs federal habeas proceedings. In Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257 (YYYY), decided before AEDPA, the Court held that Rule 59(e) applied in habeas proceedings. Although the language of the rule has since changed, those changes did not narrow the scope of that rule. In the fifty years since the adoption of the Federal Rules, only once has a court dismissed a Rule 59(e) motion as impermissibly successive, resolving all other cases on the merits. When Congress passed AEDPA, it gave no indication it intended to change this understood meaning of a successive application, nor do its purposes suggest such a change in meaning.\nThe Court pointed out that its decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), applied to Rule 60(b) and that Rule 60(b) is substantially different from Rule 59(e) in critical ways. While Rule 60(b) is a means of attacking a habeas court’s judgment, a Rule 59(e) motion is a one-time effort to point out alleged errors in a just-issued decision before taking a single appeal.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, arguing that because a Rule 59(e) motion asserts a habeas claim, it must be viewed as a “second or successive habeas petition” and be treated as such.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63148:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63149:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63149:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSince it was ceded to the United States in 1898, Puerto Rico has accumulated substantial debt, in large part due to its ambiguous legal status as a protectorate of the United States and the economically detrimental policies the United States has enacted over the decades. Exacerbated by a series of governmental financial deficits and a recession, Puerto Rico’s debt crisis came to a head in 2015, when its governor announced that the Commonwealth was in a “death spiral” and was unable to pay its debt. In June 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act of 2016 (PROMESA), which gave him authority to appoint a seven-member Financial Oversight and Management Board that would have control over Puerto Rico’s budget and would negotiate the restructuring of its $125 billion indebtedness. President Obama appointed the seven-member board in August 2016 based on lists supplied by Republic and Democratic lawmakers.\nA number of creditors and elected officials of Puerto Rico have been dissatisfied with the board and its decisions and brought a lawsuit challenging President Obama’s authority to appoint the board members. The challengers alleged that the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that the Senate confirm high-level federal officers and that the board members were within the scope of this Clause. The federal district court in Puerto Rico ruled against the creditors, finding the board is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth government established pursuant to Congress’s plenary powers under the Territorial Clause and that the board members are not “Officers of the United States.”\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that the Territorial Clause does not supersede the application of the Appointments Clause in an unincorporated territory and that the board members are “Officers of the United States” because: (1) they occupy “continuing positions,” (2) exercise “significant authority” that is the same or more than that exercised by other officers the U.S. Supreme Court has found to be “Officers of the United States,” and (3) exercise their authority “pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Moreover, these officers are “principal” officers subject to the Appointments Clause because they are answerable to and removable only by the President and are not directed or supervised by others who were appointed by the President with Senate confirmation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63149:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63149:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63149:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Appointments Clause constrains the appointments power as to all officers of the United States, including those who exercise power in or in relation to Puerto Rico, but the Clause does not restrict the appointment or selection of the members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board. Based on this conclusion, the Court had no reason to address the second question presented. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the opinion of the Court that was unanimous in the judgment.\nThe Appointments Clause of the federal Constitution is intended to allocate between the President and the Senate responsibility for selecting officers to hold high federal positions. Because of this purpose, the Appointments Clause should apply to all officers of the United States, even those with powers and duties related to Puerto Rico.\nHowever, the Appointments Clause does not restrict the appointment of local officers that Congress vests with primarily local duties. When an officer has primarily local duties, he is not an officer of the United States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. The Board members have primarily local powers and duties, exemplified by the fact that the power of the Board is backed by Puerto Rico law rather than federal law. Indeed, the Board’s duty is to oversee the fiscal and budgetary development of Puerto Rico and to initiate bankruptcy proceedings in the interests of Puerto Rico. Consequently, the Appointments Clause does not constrain the appointments power as to the Board members.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment but based on interpretation of the “original public meaning” of the phrase “Officers of the United States” within the Appointments Clause.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment to explore issues the Court did not (and did not need) to address regarding the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. Specifically, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the history of that relationship calls into question whether the Board members may be territorial officers of Puerto Rico when “they are not elected or approved, directly or indirectly, by the people of Puerto Rico.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63149:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63151:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63151:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNamed plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against U.S. Bank and other over alleged mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan between 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage in prohibited transactions with a subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded in 2008.\nThe defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted in part. However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim that the defendants engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2014, with the parties still in litigation, the plan became overfunded; that is, it contained more money than was needed to meet its obligations. The defendants raised the argument that the plaintiffs had not suffered any financial loss and moved to dismiss the remainder of the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a concrete interest in any monetary relief the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63151:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63151:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63151:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue in federal court because, win or lose this case, they would still receive the exact same monthly benefits they are already entitled to receive. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority.\nAs participants in a defined-benefit plan (as opposed to a defined-contribution plan, such as a 401(k)), the plaintiff retirees receive a fixed payment each month, notwithstanding any changes to the value of the plan or the investment decisions of the plan’s fiduciaries. As such, the poor decisions by the fiduciaries did not cause any actual injury to the plaintiffs in this case. Without concrete injury, the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the fiduciaries’ actions.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas joined the majority in full but wrote separately to opine that the Court’s precedents on standing unnecessarily complicate the issue by requiring the Court to engage with petitioners’ analogies to trust law.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court’s decision precludes pensioners from bringing a federal lawsuit to stop or cure retirement-plan mismanagement until their pensions are on the verge of default. She cautioned that this outcome conflicts both with common sense and long-standing precedent.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63151:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63153:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63153:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPetitioner Noris Babb worked as a pharmacist for the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Bay Pines, Florida, since 2004. While there, she helped to develop the Geriatric Pharmacotherapy Clinic (GPC), which serves older veterans with diseases or disabilities common to individuals of advanced age with military service. In 2009, Pharmacy Management gave Babb an advanced scope (full practice authority) to prescribe medications without a physician, which was necessary for her position. In 2010, the VA rolled out a nationwide treatment initiative similar to the GPC Babb had helped develop. Against recommendations by Human Resources and despite requests from doctors, Pharmacy Management rejected applications by several current module pharmacists—all females over 50—and granted applications of two pharmacists under 40.\nTwo of the female pharmacists who were denied advancement filed Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, and Babb provided statements and testified in support of their EEO claims. The pharmacists claimed that their non-selection purportedly for lack of advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination and that any justification for denying advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination as well.\nBabb alleged that as a result of her participation in the EEO process, she was denied opportunities to participate in the new program and that Pharmacy Management required her to agree to a schedule that was unworkable for her department. Unable to meet this requirement, Babb’s advanced scope was removed and was consequently disqualified from promotion. A female pharmacist under 30 without an advanced scope was selected for the promotion.\nBabb brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) alleging that she was the victim of gender-plus-age discrimination and that the VA retaliated against her for participating in protected EEO in violation of those laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the VA. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Babb argued that the district court erred in part by not allowing her to prove that illegal discrimination or retaliation was a “motivating factor” behind the VA’s refusal to promote her. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding itself bound by precedent that federal sector employees’ claims under ADEA and Title VII require that the plaintiff show discrimination or retaliation is a “but for” factor in the adverse personnel action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63153:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63153:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63153:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), requires that age not be taken into consideration at all in making personnel actions, but if age is a but-for cause of the personnel action, that fact may be important in determining the remedy to which the plaintiff is entitled. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. The relevant provision provides “All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.” The Court found the plain meaning of the statute supports the reading that age does not need to be a but-for cause of an employment decision for there to be a violation. To reach this conclusion, the Court focused on several phrases as well as the syntax of the sentence. This interpretation is also consistent with the Court’s precedent interpreting the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the ADEA’s private-sector provision, and Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision because the language in those provisions is “markedly” different. The Court noted, however, that but-for causation is important in determining the appropriate remedy. For example, the plaintiffs cannot obtain compensatory damages without showing that age discrimination was a but-for cause of the employment decision. Remedies must be tailored to the injury, and the injury is measured in part by the causal relationship.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, pointing out that the Court’s decision does not foreclose claims arising from discriminatory processes (as distinct from decisions) and that the same provision may also permit damages remedies even when the federal government engages in “nondispositive” age discrimination.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court’s reading of the statute is too broad and “disrupts the settled expectations of federal employers and employees.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63153:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63154:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63154:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOutokumpu operates a steel plant in Alabama that contains three “cold rolling mills,” which are required for manufacturing and processing certain steel products. In November 2007, while Outokumpu’s plant was under construction, the company’s predecessor, ThyssenKrupp, entered into three contracts with F.L. Industries (“Fives”) to provide three different-sized mills. Each of these three contracts contains an arbitration clause that, among other things, requires that arbitration take place in Dusseldorf, Germany, and that the forum apply the substantive law of Germany.\nThe contracts define the parties to each as Outokumpu and Fives and provide that any mention of either party also includes any subcontractors of that party; appended to the contracts is a list of subcontractors, including petitioner GE Energy Conversion France SAS (“GE Energy”), formerly known as Converteam SAS.\nFives contracted with GE Energy to provide three motors for each of the three mills, for a total of nine motors, which were manufactured in France and delivered and installed in Alabama between 2011 and 2012. By June 2014, the motors began to fail, and by August 2015, motors in all three mills failed. It came to light that Fives and GE Energy had entered into a separate agreement with another party that designated Fives to represent the interests of all three parties in the event of a dispute.\nOutokumpu filed a lawsuit against GE Energy in Alabama state court in 2016, and GE Energy removed to federal court and moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court granted GE Energy’s motion to compel and dismissed the action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed and remanded as to the motion to compel, holding that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards requires that the arbitration agreement be signed by the parties before Court or their privities, and only under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (which does not expressly restrict arbitration to the specific parties to an agreement) can parties compel arbitration through the doctrine of equitable estoppel.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63154:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63154:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63154:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not conflict with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines that permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.\nChapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not “alter background principles” of state law, including doctrines like equitable estoppel, which authorizes contract enforcement by a nonsignatory. Chapter 2 of the FAA provides that “Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that [Chapter 1] is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention.” The relevant provision of the Convention states that courts of a contracting state “shall...refer the parties to arbitration” when the parties to the action entered into a written agreement to arbitrate and one of the parties requests the referral.\nThe Court then considered whether state-law equitable estoppel doctrine permitted under Chapter 1 conflicts with the Convention, concluding that it does not. Most importantly, the text of the Convention is silent as to whether nonsignatories may enforce arbitration agreements under domestic doctrines such as equitable estoppel; this silence is dispositive of the matter. This understanding is consistent with the history of the Convention as well as the post-ratification understanding of signatory nations.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to note that the application of domestic doctrine like equitable estoppel must be rooted in the principle of consent to arbitrate.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63154:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63155:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63155:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis case arises from the scandal that became known as “Bridgegate.” Defendants William E. Baroni, Jr. and Bridget Anne Kelly conspired to create major traffic jams in Fort Lee, New Jersey, after Fort Lee’s mayor refused to endorse the 2013 reelection bid of then-Governor Chris Christie. The defendants and others limited motorists’ access to the George Washington Bridge, the world’s busiest bridge, for four days during the first week of Fort Lee’s school year, resulting in extensive traffic delays.\nIn 2015, a grand jury indicted Baroni and Kelly for their roles in the scheme. Each was charged with seven counts, including conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally misapply property of an organization receiving federal benefits, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the substantive offense underlying that conspiracy, 18 U.S.C § 666(a)(1)(A). A jury convicted the defendants on all counts. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction as to four of the seven, including the two at issue here. In support of its conclusion, the court reasoned that the defendants had defrauded the Port Authority of its property by citing a “traffic study” as the purpose for the lane closures rather than their “real reason” of political payback.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63155:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63155:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63155:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nBaroni and Kelly could not have violated the federal-program fraud or wire fraud laws because the scheme did not aim to obtain money or property. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. First, the Court looked to the language of the federal wire fraud statute and the federal-program fraud statute, finding those statutes “limited in scope to the protection of property rights.” Thus, the government needed to prove not only that Baroni and Kelly engaged in deception, but that the object of that deception was money or property. Taking control of the lanes of the bridge does not constitute taking of government property because under Court precedent, a scheme to alter a regulatory choice does not amount to taking of property. Similarly, causing increased costs of compensating traffic engineers and back-up toll collectors is an incidental product and not the “object of the fraud,” as required by the statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63155:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63156:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63156:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMarcel and Lucky Brand are competitors in the apparel industry, and this dispute arises over Marcel’s allegation that Lucky Brand is infringing on its “Get Lucky” trademark through its use of “Lucky” on its merchandise in violation of an injunction entered in an earlier action between the two parties.\nIn 2003, the two parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a trademark dispute in which Lucky Brand agreed not to use “Get Lucky” and Marcel agreed to release certain claims it might have in the future arising out of its trademarks. The two parties contest the scope of Marcel’s release of claims, with Marcel contending that it only released claims as to infringement that occurred prior to the 2003 execution of the agreement and Lucky Brand arguing that it released any future claim Marcel may have in relation to any trademark registered prior to the execution of the agreement. Further litigation ensued.\nIn litigation between the two parties over substantially the same trademark disputes, Lucky Brand argued for its interpretation of the 2003 settlement agreement. It moved to dismiss on the basis that because the marks at issue were registered prior to the settlement agreement, Marcel released any claim alleging infringement of those marks. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it was premature to determine which claims were subject to release in the 2001 agreement. However, the district court noted that Lucky Brand was “free to raise the issue . . . again after the record is more fully developed.” Lucky Brand raised the defense again in its answer and as an affirmative defense, but not again during the litigation. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for Marcel, declaring that Lucky Brand infringed on Marcel’s “Get Lucky” trademark and enjoining Lucky Brand from using the “Get Lucky” mark. Lucky Brand did not appeal.\nIn 2011, Marcel filed another lawsuit against Lucky Brand alleging that the latter continued to use “Lucky Brand” mark after the injunction. Lucky Brand moved for summary judgment on the basis that Marcel’s claims were precluded by res judicata in light of the final disposition of the previous action. The district court agreed, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding the allegedly barred claims “could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.” On remand, Marcel filed a second amended complaint, which Lucky Brand moved to dismiss on the sole basis that the 2001 agreement barred Marcel’s claims. The district court granted the motion and rejected Marcel’s argument that Lucky Brand was precluded from raising those claims.\nThe Second Circuit vacated, concluding that the doctrine of claim preclusion (or more precisely, defense preclusion) applied in situations as this one and that it barred Lucky Brand from invoking its release defense again in this action.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63156:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63156:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63156:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nBecause the trademark action at issue challenged different conduct—and raised different claims—from an earlier action between the parties, Marcel cannot preclude Lucky Brand from raising new defenses, including a defense that Lucky Brand failed to press fully in the earlier suit. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for the unanimous Court.\n“Res judicata” is a term that comprises two doctrines of preclusion. First, issue preclusion (also known as “collateral estoppel”) precludes a party from litigating an issue actually decided in a prior case and necessary to the judgment. Second, claim preclusion (also known as “res judicata”) prevents parties from raising claims that could have been raised and decided in a prior action, even if they were not actually litigated. Courts define the “same claim” as meaning the claims arise from the same transaction, or involve a “common nucleus of operative facts.” In this case, the Court found the two suits “were grounded on different conduct, involving different marks, occurring at different times.” The 2005 claims arose from Lucky Brand’s alleged use of “Get Lucky,” while the 2011 claims arose from other alleged uses of the word “Lucky,” not the phrase “Get Lucky.” As such, they did not share a “common nucleus of operative facts,” and claim preclusion therefore cannot apply.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63156:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63157:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63157:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPetitioners Kendra Espinoza and others are low-income mothers who applied for scholarships to keep their children enrolled in Stillwater Christian School, in Kalispell, Montana. The Montana legislature enacted a tax-credit scholarship program in 2015 to provide a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donate to private, nonprofit scholarship organizations. Shortly after the program was enacted, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated an administrative rule (“Rule 1”) prohibiting scholarship recipients from using their scholarships at religious schools, citing a provision of the state constitution that prohibits “direct or indirect” public funding of religiously affiliated educational programs.\nEspinoza and the other mothers filed a lawsuit in state court challenging Rule 1. The court determined that the scholarship program was constitutional without Rule 1 and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department and reversed the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63157:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63157:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63157:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe application of the Montana Constitution’s “no-aid” provision to a state program providing tuition assistance to parents who send their children to private schools discriminated against religious schools and the families whose children attend or hope to attend them in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion on behalf of the 5-4 majority.\nThe Court first noted that the Free Exercise Clause “protects religious observers against unequal treatment” and against “laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of religious status.” In this case, Montana’s no-aid provision excluded religious schools from public benefits solely because of religious status. As such, the law must be subject to strict scrutiny review; that is, the government must show that its action advances “‘interests of the highest order” and that the action is “narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.” Montana’s interest in this case—which the Court described as creating greater separation of church and state than the federal Constitution requires—does not satisfy strict scrutiny given its infringement of free exercise. Because the Free Exercise Clause barred the application of Montana’s no-aid provision, the Montana Supreme Court lacked the authority to invalidate the program on the basis of that provision.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, opining that the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause (not at issue in this case) hampers free exercise rights.\nJustice Samuel Alito and Justice Gorsuch each filed their own separate concurrences. Justice Alito argued, as he did in dissenting from the Court’s decision earlier this term in Ramos v. Louisiana, that original motivation should have no bearing on the present constitutionality of a provision of law, yet even without that consideration, the majority reached the correct conclusion in this case. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court’s characterization of the Montana Constitution as discriminating based on “religious status” and not “religious use,” is dubious at best.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the Montana Supreme Court’s decision does not place a burden on petitioners’ religious exercise and thus does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court’s precedents establish that neutral government action is not unconstitutional solely because it fails to benefit religious exercise.\nJustice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined in part. Justice Breyer argued that the majority’s approach and conclusion risk the kind of entanglement and conflict that the Religion Clauses are intended to prevent. Instead, Justice Breyer opined that the Court’s decision in Locke—upholding the application of a no-aid provision in Washington State based on the conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause permitted Washington to forbid state-scholarship funds for students pursuing devotional theology degrees—controlled the outcome in this case, in which the no-aid provision was “materially similar.”\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed a separate dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court in this case resolved a constitutional question not presented, thereby violating “Article III principles older than the Religion Clause” itself. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor continued, the Court answered incorrectly that question it should not have addressed in the first place.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63157:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63158:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63158:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPetitioner Romag Fasteners, Inc., sells magnetic snap fasteners for use in wallets, handbags, and other leather goods. Respondent Fossil designs, markets, and distributes fashion accessories, including handbags and small leather goods. In 2002, Fossil and Romag entered into an agreement to use Romag fasteners in Fossil’s products, and Fossil’s manufacturers purchased tens of thousands of Romag fasteners between 2002 and 2008. In 2010, the president of Romag discovered that certain Fossil handbags sold in the United States contained counterfeit snaps bearing the Romag mark. Romag sued Fossil in 2010 for patent and trademark infringement. Romag alleged that Fossil knowingly adopted and used the Romag mark without Romag’s consent.\nA jury found that Fossil had infringed Romag’s trademark and patents but that none of the violations were willful. The jury awarded Romag trademark damages under two theories: over $90,000 in profits “to prevent unjust enrichment” and over $6.7 million in profits “to deter future trademark infringement.” For the latter award, the jury found that Fossil had acted with “callous disregard” for Romag’s trademark rights. However, the district court struck the jury’s award, finding that “a finding of willfulness remains a requirement for an award of defendants’ profits in this Circuit.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that within the Second Circuit, a showing of willfulness was required for an award of profits. Romag petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In light of its decision in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 580 U.S. __ (2017), that affected the patent infringement claims in this case, the Court granted the petition, vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision, and remanded the case. On remand, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the district court’s judgment declining to award Fossil’s profits.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63158:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63158:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63158:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSection 35 of the Lanham Act does not require a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit to show that a defendant willfully infringed the plaintiff’s trademark as a precondition to an award of profits. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion of the Court on behalf of the 8-1 majority.\nThe plain language of Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) does not require a plaintiff alleging a claim under § 1125(a) to show willfulness. Rather, the statute mentions “willfulness” only in connection to § 1125(c). The Court declined to read into the statute words that are not there, particularly since Congress included the term “willfulness” elsewhere in the very same statutory provision.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan to note that while willfulness is a “highly important” consideration in awarding profits under Section 35 of the Lanham Act, it is not an “absolute precondition.”\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, to highlight a distinction, supported by the weight of authority, between “willful” infringement and “innocent” infringement—a distinction she criticizes the majority of being “agnostic” about.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63158:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63159:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63159:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnited Western Bancorp, Inc. (UWBI) was in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings when it received a tax refund check from the Internal Revenue Service that was the result of net operating losses incurred by one of UWBI’s subsidiaries (United Western Bank). UWBI and its subsidiaries had entered into a tax allocation agreement in 2008 that was the source of the present ownership dispute. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) alleged that, as receiver for the Bank, it was entitled to the federal tax refund that was due because the refund stemmed exclusively from the Bank’s business loss carrybacks. Simon Rodriguez, in his capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of UWBI, initiated a bankruptcy adversary proceeding against the FDIC, alleging that UWBI owned the tax refund and thus that it was part of the bankruptcy estate.\nThe bankruptcy court agreed with Rodriguez and entered summary judgment. The FDIC appealed to federal district court, which reversed the bankruptcy court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. Under federal common law, “a tax refund due from a joint return generally belongs to the company responsible for the losses that form the basis of the refund.” Applying this rule and noting that the agreement’s intended treatment of tax refunds mandates the same result, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the tax refund at issue belonged to the Bank and thus that the FDIC, as receiver for the Bank, was entitled to summary judgment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63159:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63159:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63159:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn an opinion authored by Justice Gorsuch, a unanimous Court held that state law is “well equipped to handle disputes involving corporate property rights.” Federal common law should only exist to “protect uniquely federal interests” the Court explained. “Nothing like that exists here” it continued. While the federal government potentially has a sufficiently unique interest in rules governing the receipt of taxes from corporate entities, the court elaborated, it questioned the strength of any interest in how a tax refund, once received, is distributed among the members of that entity. The Court found that neither federal courts that have applied federal common law to this question nor the FDIC as the advocate for federal common law in this case had ever articulated a sufficient unique federal interest to justify the existence of federal common law on this point.\nThe Court did not decide whether the outcome of the particular dispute before it would have been different if decided under the applicable state law rather than erroneously under the federal common law it deemed improper. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal for that determination.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63159:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63160:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63160:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides in relevant part that a person who has three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. In recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a “categorical” approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a “violent felony” within the ACCA. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a “serious drug offense” as well.\nEddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses—five for sale of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had “knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance,” that is, that the substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular’s Florida convictions would qualify as a “serious drug offense” because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63160:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63160:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63160:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe statute does not require “a generic-offense matching exercise” between the elements of the offenses listed in the federal statute and the elements of the state offense under which the defendant was convicted. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg adopted the argument of the United States, which instead would have the trial court asked “whether the state offense’s elements necessarily entail one of the types of conduct” identified in the federal statute.\nThe Court found that two features of the statute in question lead to this interpretation. The first is that the offenses listed in the statute are “unlikely names for generic offenses” and therefore refer to underlying conduct and not offenses themselves. Secondly, the use of the word “involving” in the statute suggests an intention to describe criminal conduct and not particular criminal offenses.\nThe Court noted that both parties’ interpretations of the statutory language “achieve a measure of inconsistency. Justice Ginsburg explained, “Resolving this case requires us to determine which form of consistency Congress intended: application of [the statute] to all offenders who engaged in certain conduct or to all who committed certain generic offenses (in either reading, judging only by the elements of their prior convictions).“ She continued, “For the reasons explained, we are persuaded that Congress chose the former.”\nIn a brief concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh stated he joined the Court’s opinion in full but wrote separately to explain that the rule of lenity advocated by Shular was not appropriately invoked where the Court found the statutory language unambiguous.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63160:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63161:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63161:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nSergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old Mexican national, was playing with friends in the cement culvert between El Paso, Texas, and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernández’s friends on U.S. territory. Hernández ran into Mexican territory and stood by a pillar near the culvert. From U.S. territory, Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at Hernández, one of which struck Hernández in the face and killed him.\nHernández’s parents filed a lawsuit against the officer and various other defendants alleging violation of their son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and part and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that Hernández lacked Fourth Amendment rights, but his parents were entitled to a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding an implied cause of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights), and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the parents’ claims, holding that they had failed to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not “clearly established” that it was unconstitutional for an officer on U.S. soil to shoot a Mexican national on Mexican soil.\nThe U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2016 and reversed the en banc Fifth Circuit as to qualified immunity. The Court remanded the case so the lower court could determine whether the shooting violated Hernández’s Fourth Amendment rights and whether his parents could assert claims for damages under Bivens. On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit once again affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, holding that the excessive force claim was unlike any that had been decided previously and thus the plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy under Bivens. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __ (2017), in which the Court held that for a new type of claim to be cognizable under Bivens, there must be some special factor makes the judiciary better suited than the legislature to recognize such a claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63161:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63161:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63161:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court’s decision in Bivens does not extend to claims based on a cross-border shooting by a federal law enforcement officer. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion for a 5-4 majority.\nBivens recognized an implied cause of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the Court has extended that holding to cover claims under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments as well. When considering whether to extend Bivens, a court must ask (1) whether the claim arises in a “new context” or involves a “new category of defendants,” and if so, then (2) whether there are “special factors” that weigh against extending Bivens to that type of claim.\nIn this case, the Court found the claims arise from a new and “significantly” different context—a cross-border shooting. As to the second part of the test, the Court also found “multiple” separation-of-powers factors counseling hesitation before extending Bivens: (1) to extend Bivens to this context implicates foreign relations, which is beyond the reach of the Court, (2) the risk of undermining border security and the system of military discipline created by statute and regulation, and (3) Congress has “repeatedly” declined to recognize a damages award against federal officials who cause injury outside U.S. borders. For these reasons, the Court declined to recognize a Bivens cause of action for the injury in this case.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas joined the majority in full but wrote separately to suggest that the Court discard Bivens and its progeny of cases.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that conduct by a “rogue” federal officer is not a new context, but the very context contemplated in Bivens. Even if it were a new setting, Justice Ginsburg argued neither foreign policy nor national security would be endangered by recognizing a Bivens claim in this case, so no “special factors” counsel against recognizing the claim.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63161:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63162:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63162:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopted a program—known as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)—to postpone the deportation of undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children and to assign them work permits allowing them to obtain social security numbers, pay taxes, and become part of “mainstream” society in the United States.\nIn 2017, after the national election, when the Trump administration replaced the Obama administration, DHS began a phase-out of DACA. The parties do not dispute the authority of a new administration to replace old policies with new policies, but the plaintiffs in this and related challenges allege that the new administration terminated DACA based on a mistake of law rather than in compliance with the law. Specifically, the Trump administration terminated DACA based on a conclusion that the Obama administration had created DACA “without proper statutory authority and with no established end-date” and thus that it was an “unconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch.”\nThe plaintiffs in this case and the related cases challenged this conclusion of law, alleging that the recission of DACA violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it was arbitrary and capricious, and because it was a substantive rule that did not comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. The challengers also alleged that the recission deprived DACA recipients of constitutionally protected liberty and property interests without due process of law and violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was motivated by discriminatory animus.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the DACA recission was not “committed to agency discretion by law” and that there was “law to apply.” Further, the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction restoring DACA, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to win on the merits of their arguments, they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in the plaintiffs’ favor, and the injunction is in the public interest.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63162:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63162:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63162:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Department of Homeland Security’s decision to wind down DACA is reviewable, and its decision was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion.\nAs a threshold matter, the Court noted that the APA contains a rebuttable presumption that agency action is subject to judicial review. Because DACA was not merely a non-enforcement policy but affirmatively created a program for conferring immigration relief, it constitutes agency action subject to judicial review. Further, because the parties do not challenge any removal proceedings, the jurisdictional provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act do not apply.\nUnder the APA, an agency must supply “reasoned analysis” for its actions. The rescission memorandum failed to consider the possibility of eliminating benefits eligibility while continuing forbearance, relying solely on the Attorney General’s conclusion regarding the illegality of benefits. Moreover, the rescission memorandum failed to address whether there was “legitimate reliance” on the DACA Memorandum. While an agency does not need to consider all policy alternatives, it is required to assess “important aspects” of the problem before it. Given that deferred action was not only “within the ambit” of DACA, but its “centerpiece,” the failure to consider these options rendered the decision arbitrary and capricious.\nJoined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan, The Chief Justice also opined that the respondents in this case failed to establish a plausible inference that the rescission was motivated by animus, in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part. Though she joined the Chief Justice’s opinion as to the reviewability of the rescission and the conclusion that it was arbitrary and capricious, Justice Sotomayor argued that it was premature to dismiss the respondents’ equal protection claims and would thus remand the case to allow the respondents to develop those claims.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Thomas argued that because the Obama administration’s implementation of DACA was unlawful, DHS’s decision to rescind the program is “clearly reasonable” and that the Court’s decision allows administrations to “unlawfully bind their successors by unlawfully adopting significant legal changes through Executive Branch agency memoranda” that “cannot be undone” without “sufficient policy justifications to the satisfaction of this Court.” Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment only as to the rejection of the equal protection claim.\nJustice Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, to reiterate his agreement with Justice Thomas’s dissent and with Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s separate dissent.\nJustice Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the Court should have focused not on the memorandum by DHS Secretary Duke, but the one by the subsequent DHS Secretary Nielsen, which the Court “jettison[ed]” as a post hoc justification. In Justice Kavanaugh’s view, the Nielsen Memorandum reasonably explained the decision to rescind DACA and thus would pass muster as an explanation for the rescission.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63162:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63163:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63163:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn June 2014, Louisiana passed Act 620, which required “that every physician who performs or induces an abortion shall ‘have active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.’”\nSeveral abortion clinics and doctors challenged Act 620, and while that challenge was pending in the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a “nearly identical” Texas law in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt (WWH), finding that the Texas law imposed an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion while bringing about no “health-related benefit” and serving no “relevant credentialing function.” The district court hearing the challenge to Act 620 accordingly declared Act 620 facially invalid and permanently enjoined its enforcement.\nThe district court made detailed findings of fact and determined that “admitting privileges also do not serve ‘any relevant credentialing function,’” and that “physicians are sometimes denied privileges ... for reasons unrelated to [medical] competency.” The district court further determined that the law would “drastically burden women’s right to choose abortions.”\nA panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the panel majority reviewed the evidence de novo and concluded that the district court erred by overlooking “remarkabl[e] differen[ces]” between the facts in this case and in WWH. The panel concluded that “no clinics will likely be forced to close on account of the Act,” and thus, the law would not impose an undue burden on women’s right to choose abortions. A divided Fifth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63163:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63163:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63163:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Fifth Circuit’s judgment, upholding a Louisiana law that requires abortion providers to hold admitting privileges at local hospitals, is reversed. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the plurality opinion on behalf of himself and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.\nAs a threshold matter, the plurality noted that the State had waived its argument that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the law by conceding the standing issue “as part of its effort to obtain a quick decision from the District Court on the merits of the plaintiffs’ undue-burden claims.” However, even if it had not, “a long line of well-established precedents” support the conclusion that plaintiffs may assert rights on behalf of third parties when “enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights.”\nTurning to the merits, the plurality first reiterated the law established in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. ___ (2016)—that courts must conduct an independent review of the legislative findings given in support of an abortion-related statute and weigh the law’s “asserted benefits against the burdens” it imposes on abortion access. The plurality found that the district court faithfully applied this standard. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the lower court, not as to the legal standard, but as to the factual findings. However, an appeals court may not set aside findings of fact unless they are “clearly erroneous,” which they were not in this case. Rather, the district court’s findings had “ample evidentiary support” both as to burdens and as to benefits, so its legal conclusion that the Louisiana law was unconstitutional was proper.\nChief Justice John Robert concurred in the judgment, reasoning that the plaintiffs had standing and that because the Louisiana law was nearly identical to the Texas law at issue in Whole Woman’s Health, it imposed a burden on access to abortion just as severe as that imposed by the Texas law the Court struck down in that case. Under the principle of stare decisis, that like cases should be treated alike, the Chief Justice concurred in the judgment striking down the Louisiana law. In so concluding, however, he noted, that he disagreed with the decision in Whole Woman’s Health at the time and continued to disagree with it.\nJustice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing both that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the Court lacks the authority to declare Louisiana’s “duly enacted law” unconstitutional. Justice Thomas criticized the Court’s abortion precedents as “creat[ing] the right to abortion out of whole cloth.”\nJustice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch, Clarence Thomas, and Brett Kavanaugh joined in part. Justice Alito argued that the majority “misuses the doctrine of stare decisis, invokes an inapplicable standard of appellate review, and distorts the record.” Specifically, Justice Alito criticized the plurality for abandoning the constitutional test in Casey for a new balancing test established in Whole Woman’s Health, a test the Chief Justice purported to reject.\nJustice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion arguing that in deciding the case and striking down the law, the Court exceeded its authority.\nJustice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion and pointed out that a 5-4 majority of the Court (himself included) rejected the balancing test of Whole Woman’s Health, while a different 5-4 majority concluded that the Louisiana law must be struck down. In Justice Kavanaugh’s view, the record is not adequately developed to properly evaluate the Louisiana law. As such, he agreed with Justice Alito that the case should be remanded for additional factfinding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63163:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63164:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63164:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Appalachian Trail spans over 2,000 miles, from Maine to Georgia, with approximately 1,000 miles of the Trail crossing through lands within national forests. Under the National Trails System Act, the Secretary of the Interior has the responsibility to administer the trail and that responsibility may not be transferred to any other federal agencies. The Mineral Leasing Act grants the U.S. Forest Service the authority to grant certain rights-of-way through lands in the National Forest System, but no federal agency has the authority to grant equivalent rights-of-way through lands in the National Park System.\nIn 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission granted Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC (Atlantic) authorization to construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas pipeline that would cross the Appalachian Trail at points located within the George Washington and Monogahela National Forests. After a review process, the Forest Service authorized Atlantic to proceed with construction of the pipeline, finding it had authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant a right-of-way for the pipeline and that the pipeline “would have no long lasting impacts” on the Trail.\nCowpasture River Preservation Association and others filed a petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of the Forest Service’s record of decision and special use permit. The court granted the petition, vacated the record of decision and special use permit, and remanded to the Forest Service. Notably, the court determined that the Forest Service lacked authority to grant the right-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act because the Appalachian Trail is a “unit” of the National Park System. The court determined that the Mineral Leasing Act “specifically excludes” the Trail “from the authority of the Secretary of the Interior ‘or appropriate agency head’ to grant pipeline rights of way.”\nThe Court consolidated this case for oral argument with U.S. Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association, No. 18-1584.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63164:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63164:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63164:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Forest Service did have the authority to issue the special use permit because the Department of the Interior’s decision to assign responsibility for the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park System. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for the 7-2 majority of the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in full except as to the part of the majority’s discussion explaining why Cowpasture’s proposed interpretation would vastly expand the Park Service’s jurisdiction in a way inconsistent with the regulatory scheme.\nThe Court first noted that it is undisputed that the Forest Service has jurisdiction over the federal lands within the George Washington National Forest. At issue was whether the presence of the Appalachian Trail removes that part of the lands from the Forest Service’s jurisdiction and places them under the jurisdiction of the Park Service. The Court observed that the Forest Service entered into a “right-of-way” agreement with the National Park Service, which resulted in the Appalachian Trail. A right-of-way is a type of easement, granting only nonpossessory rights of use of the land, so the grant of the right-of-way did not divest the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the land. Thus, the Court concluded, the Secretary retained authority to issue the special use permit for the pipeline running underneath the Trail.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority complicated what should be a simple question: “Is the Appalachian National Scenic Trail ‘land in the National Park System’?” Because federal law does not distinguish “land” from the Trail “any more than it distinguishes ‘land’ from the many monuments, historic buildings, parkways, and recreational areas that are also units of the Park System,” the dichotomy the Court draws contravenes the text of the statutes governing the Appalachian Trial.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63164:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63165:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63165:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEvelyn Sineneng-Smith operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. Her clients were mostly natives of the Philippines, who were unlawfully employed in the United States and were seeking to obtain legal permanent residence (green cards). Sineneng-Smith purported to help her clients obtain permanent residence through the Labor Certification process, but that program expired on April 30, 2001. Sineneng-Smith knew that the program had expired but nonetheless continued to tell clients that they could obtain green cards via Labor Certifications.\nFederal law prohibits encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in the country, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence is in violation of the law. Sineneng-Smith was indicted, charged, and convicted by a jury of violating this law. She appealed her conviction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals solicited supplemental briefing on several constitutional questions presented in the appeal. The court held that the statute was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, criminalizing a “substantial amount of protected expression in relation to the statute’s narrow legitimate sweep.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63165:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63165:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63165:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit panel abused its discretion when it “drastic[ally]” departed from the principle of party presentation in ruling on the issue of constitutional overbreadth. The Court found that the Ninth Circuit did not address the party-presented controversy, but instead addressed a different question that the parties did not raise, constituting a “radical transformation” of the case.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision violates “far more than the party presentation rule.” He noted that while he has joined the Court in applying overbreadth doctrine in the past, he has “since developed doubts about its origins and application.” Finding no basis in the Constitution’s text, he would urge the Court to revisit that doctrine.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63165:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63172:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63172:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNidal Khalid Nasrallah, a native and citizen of Lebanon, was 17 years old when he entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2006. He became a lawful permanent resident the following year.\nIn 2011, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Nasrallah pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property in interstate commerce. An immigration judge determined that one of those convictions made Nasrallah subject to removal as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). However, the judge also found Nasrallah had established a clear probability that he would be tortured and persecuted in Lebanon by groups such as Hezbollah and ISIS because of his Druze religion and western ties, so the judge granted him a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Both the government and Nasrallah appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On appeal, the BIA held that the immigration judge erred in granting Nasrallah a deferral, and it ordered his removal.\nNasrallah appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Reviewing the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo, the Eleventh Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Nasrallah’s petition for review. Specifically, Nasrallah had asked the court to reweigh the factors involved in the removal order, but under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), the courts lack jurisdiction to review the factual findings underlying the denial of removal relief. The court therefore dismissed Nasrallah’s claim for lack of jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63172:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63172:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63172:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nFederal courts have jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s factual challenges to an administrative order denying relief under the Convention Against Torture. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion on behalf of the 7-2 majority.\nTo understand the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and D, the Court looked to three related statutes. First, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 authorizes noncitizens to obtain direct “review of a final order of removal” in a court of appeals and requires that all challenges arising from the removal proceedings be consolidated. Second, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA) implements the relevant provision of the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and provides for judicial review of CAT claims “as part of a final order of removal.” Third, the REAL ID Act of 2005 states that final orders of removal and CAT claims may be reviewed only in the courts of appeals. Because a factual challenge to a CAT claim, as Nasrallah brought in this case, is not a challenge to a final order of removal, FARRA provides that the denial of the CAT claim is reviewable “as part of a final order of removal.” The challenger must meet the burden of “substantial evidence”—that is, that any reasonable factfinder would be compelled to arrive at a different conclusion from that at which the agency arrived.\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that a so-called “zipper clause” of Section 1252(b)(9) determines the meaning of Section 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D), and that clause precludes judicial review of CAT orders.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63172:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63173:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63173:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nArthur J. Lomax is a Colorado prisoner at the Limon Correctional Facility. While at a different prison, he filed a lawsuit against several prison employees and filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (without paying the usual court fees) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Upon direction of the district court, Lomax amended his complaint to allege violations of his Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The same district court dismissed without prejudice three of Mr. Lomax's previous actions on the grounds that they failed to state a claim. The district court further noted that these dismissals were “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which bars inmates from filing or appealing a federal civil action without paying the associated fees if they have filed three or more cases or appeals that were dismissed because the lawsuits were frivolous or malicious or did not properly state a legal claim for relief.\nBecause of the previous strikes, the court ordered Lomax to show cause before proceeding in forma pauperis. In response to the show cause order, Lomax argued (among other things) that because the prior dismissals were without prejudice, they do not count as strikes.\nThe district court denied Lomax’s motion as barred by the three-strikes provision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63173:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63173:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63173:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nDismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion on behalf of the majority that was unanimous except as to footnote 4 (dicta as to the provision’s applicability when a court gives a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint), which Justice Clarence Thomas did not join.\nThe three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), generally prevents a prisoner from bringing suit in forma pauperis (IFP) if he has had three or more prior suits “dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” The very language of that provision covers all dismissals for failure to state a claim, whether issued with or without prejudice. To read it differently would require reading the word “dismissed” in Section 1915(g) as “dismissed with prejudice,” which not only runs contrary to the plain language but would create conflicts with other parts of the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63173:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63174:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63174:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was investigating Seila Law LLC, a law firm that provides debt-relief services, among others. As part of its investigation, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law that requires the firm to respond to several interrogatories and requests for documents. Seila Law refused to comply with the demand, so the CFPB filed a petition in the district court to enforce compliance. The district court granted the petition and ordered Seila Law to comply with the CID. Seila Law appealed the district court’s order on two grounds, one of which was that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured.\nSpecifically, Seila Law argued that the CFPB’s structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers because it is an independent agency headed by a single Director who exercises substantial executive power but can be removed by the President only for cause. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.\nThe court found two Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers controlling: Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). According to the Ninth Circuit panel, those cases indicate that the for-cause removal restriction protecting the CFPB’s Director does not “impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty” to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63174:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63174:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63174:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s leadership by a single Director removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers, but that provision is severable from the Dodd-Frank Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court.\nArticle II of the federal Constitution vests the entire “executive Power” in the President alone, though lesser executive officers may assist the President in discharging his duties. The President retains the power supervise and to remove these lesser executive officers, and Congress may not restrict the President’s power to remove such officers, except in two circumstances, neither of which was present in this case.\nFirst, Congress may grant for-cause removal protection to a multimember body of experts who were balanced along partisan lines, appointed to staggered terms, performed only “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial functions,” and were said not to exercise any executive power. Second, Congress may grant for-cause removal protection to an inferior officer—the independent counsel—who had limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.\nThe director of the CFPB falls within neither of these exceptions, and the Court declined to extend the exceptions to a new situation because the CFPB’s structure has no foothold in history or tradition and the CFPB’s single-director configuration is incompatible with the structure of the Constitution, which “scrupulously” avoids concentrating power in the hands of any single individual, save the President.\nThe Chief Justice, joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Brett Kavanaugh, concluded that the Director’s removal protection is severable from the other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that establish the CFPB and define its authority.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, concurring with the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the CFPB’s structure violates the separation of powers but dissenting as to the severability of the clause. Justice Thomas argued that he would repudiate entirely the first exception in which Congress may restrict the President’s power to remove lesser executive officers and that the doctrine of severability is entirely unfounded because it “involves nebulous inquir[ies] into hypothetical congressional intent.”\nJustice Elena Kagan authored an opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined, concurring with the Chief Justice’s conclusion as to severability but dissenting as to the conclusion that the configuration violates the separation of powers. Justice Kagan argued that for-cause removal restrictions serve to create in administrative agencies “a measure of independence from political pressure” and that “the text of the Constitution, the history of the country, the precedents of this Court, and the need for sound and adaptable governance—all stand against the majority’s opinion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63174:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63175:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63175:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nVijayakumar Thuraissigiam is a native and citizen of Sri Lanka and a Tamil, an ethnic minority group in Sri Lanka. Thuraissigiam entered the United States via its southern border, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers arrested him and placed him in expedited removal proceedings. Thuraissigiam indicated a fear of persecution in Sri Lanka, but an asylum officer determined he had not established a credible fear of persecution and referred him for removal. A supervisor affirmed the officer’s finding, and an immigration judge affirmed it as well in a check-box decision.\nThuraissigiam filed a habeas petition in federal district court, arguing that his expedited removal order violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) did not authorize jurisdiction over Thuraissigiam’s claims and rejecting his argument that the removal process to which he was subjected effectively suspended the writ of habeas corpus, in violation of the Suspension Clause.\nA panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. Because the administrative scheme governing credible fear determinations in this context is “meager,” and § 1252(a)(2) disallows judicial review of whether DHS complied with the procedures, the process does not meet minimum constitutional requirements.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63175:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63175:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63175:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAs applied to this case, 8 U.S.C. §1252(e)(2)—which limits the habeas review obtainable by an alien detained for expedited removal—does not violate the Suspension or Due Process Clauses. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 7-2 majority opinion.\nTo determine the scope of the Suspension Clause, the Court first considered its meaning at the time the Constitution was adopted. The Clause provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Habeas has traditionally provided a means to seek release from unlawful detention. However, the respondent in this case does not seek release from custody, but an additional opportunity to obtain asylum. Because this meaning was not contemplated at the time the Constitution was adopted, his claims fall outside the scope of the writ.\nTurning to the question of due process, the Court noted that a noncitizen who is unlawfully in the United States has only those rights that Congress has provided him by statute. The protections of the Due Process Clause do not apply to an individual simply because he might physically be within the United States. Given that the Court’s precedents establish that “the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law” for noncitizens, the respondent received all the process that was required.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to expand on the discussion of the original meaning of the Suspension Clause.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored a concurring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, noting that the Court’s holding should be applied only to this particular case (since that was the narrow question presented) and should not address more broadly the question whether the Suspension Clause protects people challenging removal decisions.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the majority makes asylum determinations by the Executive Branch unreviewable, “no matter whether the denial is arbitrary or irrational or contrary to governing law.” Such unchecked power, Justice Sotomayor warned, “handcuffs the Judiciary’s ability to perform its constitutional duty to safeguard individual liberty and dismantles a critical component of the separation of powers.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63175:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63176:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63176:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCharles Liu operated an EB-5 fund, which is a fund that offers lawful permanent residence opportunities to foreigners who make significant investments in the United States. However, Liu misappropriated millions of dollars that had been invested in the fund, in violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits the making of false statements in the context of a securities offering.\nThe district court ordered Liu to “disgorge” (pay back) $26 million, the amount investors had paid into the EB-5 fund, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In petitioning the Supreme Court’s review, Liu argued that the SEC lacked the authority to obtain disgorgement, under the Court’s 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC, which held that disgorgement awarded under the court’s equitable power is a penalty, not a remedial measure.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63176:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63176:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63176:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement action, a disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded for victims is equitable relief permissible under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5). Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion on behalf of the 8-1 majority of the Court.\nTo determine whether disgorgement was an available remedy, the Court first looked to traditional equitable remedies, noting that courts have long used equitable remedies (albeit by different names) to prevent parties from unjustly gaining profit from wrongdoing. Though disgorgement was not, by that name, a traditional equitable remedy, it serves the same essential purpose and works in the same way and thus is available as a remedy.\nNext, the Court considered what limitations on disgorgement should exist. First, the effect should be only to return the defendant’s wrongful gains to those harmed by the defendant’s wrongdoing. Second, the remedy must be limited to the profits obtained by each individual defendant. Third, the remedy must be limited to the “net” profits, considering both receipts and expenses.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that disgorgement should be unavailable as a remedy because, in his view, “disgorgement is not a traditional equitable remedy.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63176:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63182:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63182:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nBooking.com operates a website on which customers can make travel and lodging reservations and has used the name BOOKING.COM since at least 2006. In 2011 and 2012, Booking.com filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) four trademark applications for the use of BOOKING.COM as a word mark and for stylized versions of the mark.\nUnder the Lanham Act, marks must be “distinctive” to be eligible for protection, and generic terms are not distinctive. The USPTO examiner rejected Booking.com’s applications, finding that the marks were not protectable because BOOKING.COM was generic as applied to the services for which it sought registration (online hotel reservation services, among others).\nThe Lanham Act also allows protection for “descriptive” terms that have acquired secondary meaning, or a mental association in the minds of consumers between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. In the alternative, the USPTO concluded that the marks were merely descriptive and that Booking.com had failed to establish that they had acquired secondary meaning as required for trademark protection.\nBooking.com appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the rejection of Booking.com’s applications. The Board found that BOOKING.COM was a generic term for these types of services and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. Because “booking” generically refers to “a reservation or arrangement to buy a travel ticket or stay in a hotel room” and “.com” indicates a commercial website, the Board reasoned that consumers would understand the resulting term “BOOKING.COM” to refer to an online reservation service for travel—the very services proposed in Booking.com’s applications. The district court reversed, ruling Booking.com had acquired secondary meaning. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the district court's reversal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63182:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63182:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63182:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA term styled “generic(dot)com” is a generic name for a class of goods or services—and thus ineligible for federal trademark protection—only if the term has that meaning to consumers. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the 8-1 majority opinion holding that because the lower court determined that consumers do not perceive the term “BOOKING.COM” to signify online hotel-reservation services as a class, it is not a generic term and thus is eligible for federal trademark protection.\nThe Court first noted that a generic name is ineligible for federal trademark registration. The parties did not dispute that the word “booking” is generic for hotel-reservation services. The PTO, however, argued that the combination of a generic word and “.com” is also generic. The Court disagreed, finding that rule is not supported by the PTO’s own past practice or by trademark law or policy.\nAdding “.com” to a company name is different from adding “Company” in that only one company can occupy a particular Internet domain name at a time, so even a “generic(dot)com” term could convey to consumers an association with a particular website. Moreover, a strict legal rule that entirely disregards consumer perception is incompatible with a bedrock principle of the Lanham Act.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, observing that Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissenting opinion “wisely observes that consumer-survey evidence ‘may be an unreliable indicator of genericness’” and that the PTO might well have been correct in its assessment, but that question was not before the Court in this case. Instead, the Court considered only the validity of the per se rule the PTO adopted.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that Booking.com’s company name informs the consumer of the basic nature of its business and nothing more. As such, the addition of “.com” to an otherwise generic term, such as “booking,” should not yield a protectable trademark because doing so would be inconsistent with trademark principles and sound trademark policy.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63182:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63187:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63187:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Google implemented its Android Operating System (Android OS), it wrote its own programming language based on Java, which is owned by Oracle. To facilitate developers writing their own programs for Android OS, Google’s version used the same names, organization, and functionality as Java's Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).\nOracle sued Google for copyright infringement, but the federal district judge held that APIs are not subject to copyright because permitting a private entity to own the copyright to a programming language would stifle innovation and collaboration, contrary to the goals of copyright. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that the Java APIs are copyrightable but leaving open the possibility of a fair use defense. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Google’s petition for certiorari.\nUpon remand to the district court, a jury found that Google's use of the Java API was fair use. Oracle appealed, and the Federal Circuit again reversed the lower court. The Federal Circuit held that Google's use was not fair as a matter of law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63187:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63187:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63187:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAssuming a software interface may be subject to copyright protection, Google’s limited copying of the Java SE Application Programming Interface constituted a fair use of that material under copyright law. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 6-2 majority opinion.\nCopyright law aims to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by simultaneously granting creators exclusive copyrights and limiting the scope of such rights through the fair use doctrine. To decide no more than necessary to resolve the case, the Court assumed that software code is subject to copyright protection.\nCourts consider four statutory factors in evaluating whether a secondary use is fair. First, Google’s use of the Java APIs is transformative. Google copied only what was necessary to allow programmers to work in a different computing environment but with a familiar programming language. Second, the copied lines are “inherently bound together with uncopyrightable ideas,” suggesting that the application of fair use to this context is unlikely to undermine the general copyright protection that Congress provided for computer programs. Third, Google copied only .4% of the entire API, weighing in favor of fair use. Finally, the record shows that Google’s new smartphone platform is not a market substitute for Java SE. Because all four factors support a finding of fair use, Google’s limited copying constituted fair use.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that the Court should have addressed the question whether Oracle’s code is copyrightable. Justice Thomas would have concluded that it is, and then he would have found that Google’s use of that copyrighted code was not fair. By copying Oracle’s code, Google “erased 97.5% of the value of Oracle’s partnership with Amazon, made tens of billions of dollars, and established its position as the owner of the largest mobile operating system in the world.”\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63187:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63188:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63188:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2014, a general court-martial composed of a military judge alone found Michael Briggs guilty of rape in violation of Article 120(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2000), for conduct that occurred nine years earlier, in 2005. The UCMJ allows for a military offense that is punishable by death to be “tried and punished at any time without limitation.” In contrast, other military offenses are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.\nRelying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a death sentence for rape of an adult woman, Briggs argued on appeal that rape was not “punishable by death” and thus was subject to the five-year statute of limitations for non-capital crimes. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) rejected his challenge because Briggs had not raised the statute of limitations claim at trial. The court therefore affirmed the finding and sentence of the judge below. Briggs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Reviewing for plain error, the C.A.A.F. reversed the lower court, finding that the Rules for Courts-Martial R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(B) requires the military judge to inform the accused of the right to assert the statute of limitations. As such, the court found that if the military judge had informed Briggs of a possible statute of limitations defense, he would have sought dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63188:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63188:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63188:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces erred in concluding that the five-year statute of limitations applies to the prosecution of rape. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion on behalf of a unanimous (8-0) Court.\nThe UCMJ exempts offenses “punishable by death” from the statute of limitations for prosecutions. Even though the offense of rape is no longer punishable by death, the context of that phrase implies that the offense itself is still not subject to the statute of limitations that applies to other offenses. First, the UCMJ is a “uniform” code, which means that it generally refers only to other provisions within the UCMJ itself, rather than external sources of law. The “most natural place” to determine whether rape was “punishable by death” and thus exempt from the statute of limitations is the UCMJ itself. Second, statutes of limitations are intended to provide clarity, and having to consider “all applicable law” to determine whether an offense is punishable by death obscures, rather than clarifies, the filing deadline. Finally, it is “unlikely” that lawmakers would want a statute of limitations to refer to judicial interpretations of such provisions, given that the purposes of statutes of limitations differ from the ends served courts’ Eighth Amendment analysis.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion to opine that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from the CAAF but expressing agreement with the majority on the merits.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63188:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63190:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63190:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the U.S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed their names on the national “No Fly List,” despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to become FBI informants reporting on fellow Muslims. They sued the agents in their official and individual capacities in U.S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the RFRA. They claim that the listing of their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), because their refusal was compelled by Muslim tenets. Under RFRA, “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”\nThe U.S. District Court dismissed the claims against the agents in Appeals for the Second Circuit, a panel of which reversed the lower court. One of the agents, Tanzin, moved for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63190:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63190:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63190:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe express remedies of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) permit litigants to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous (8-0) Court.\nRFRA states that persons may sue and “obtain appropriate relief against a government,” including officials of the United States. In using this language, RFRA adopts a meaning of the word “government” different from its ordinary meaning—one that encompasses individual officials. The phrase “appropriate relief” is “open-ended,” and monetary damages have long been awarded as an appropriate form of relief. Thus, the best understanding of RFRA is that it permits lawsuits seeking money damages against individual federal officials.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63190:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63191:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63191:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPetitioners Daniel D. Glasser, Norton I. Kretske, and Alfred E. Roth were Assistant United States Attorneys in the Northern District of Illinois, specializing in liquor and revenue offenses. They, along with Anthony Horton, a professional bondsman, and Louis Kaplan, an automobile allegedly engaged in illicit alcohol trafficking around Chicago, were found guilty and sentenced for conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to bribery.\nIn a joint trial, Glasser was represented by William Scott Stewart and George Callaghan. Kretske was originally represented by the firm “Harrington & McDonnell, but Kretske was dissatisfied with the firm, and the trial judge proposed appointing Stewart to represent Kretske (in addition to Glasser, whom Stewart was already representing). Glasser objected to the appointment, arguing (through Stewart) that that there would be a conflict of interest in representing both defendants. The judge appointed Stewart to represent Kretske over Glasser’s objection.\nA jury of 11 men and one woman convicted all five defendants of conspiracy to defraud the United States, and the judge denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial.\nThe Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63191:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63191:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63191:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\n1. A defense lawyer’s conflict of interest arising from a simultaneous representation of co-defendants violates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel.\n2. The exclusion of women (other than members of the League of Women Voters who had taken a jury training class) from the jury pool violates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury consisting of a fair cross-section of the community.\nIn an opinion by Justice Frank Murphy, the Court reversed the conviction of Glasser (No. 30) and affirmed the convictions of the other two defendants (Nos. 31 and 32). The assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment requires that such assistance be “untrammeled and unimpaired” by a court order appointing one lawyer to represent multiple defendants, despite conflicting interests. Not only did Stewart have conflicting interests, but those conflicts prejudiced Glasser. The Court declined to calculate exactly the degree of prejudice to Glasser by the conflict of interest but described such a calculus as “at once difficult and unnecessary.” The Court concluded that neither Kretske and Rother were prejudiced, so it declined to reverse their convictions.\nThe Court further held that in the selection of federal juries, the understandable desire for competent jurors should not lead to the result of a jury that is not a fair cross-section of the community. Thus, the exclusion of women, except those members of the League of Women Voters who had taken a jury training class, violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury consisting of a fair cross-section of the community.\nJustice Felix Frankfurter filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Harlan Stone joined. Frankfurter argued that Glasser, by remaining silent, had acquiesced to the appointment and waived his right to appeal by not objecting. Moreover, he argued that the joint representation benefited Glasser.\nJustice Robert Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63191:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63199:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63199:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJames R. Adams is a resident of Delaware and member of that state’s bar. Adams considered applying for a judicial position but ultimately decided not to because the state required the candidate to be a Republican, and Adams was neither a Republican nor a Democrat.\nAdams filed a lawsuit against the governor, challenging the provision of the Delaware Constitution that limits judicial service to members of the Democratic and Republican Parties. First, the district court held Adams had Article III (“constitutional”) standing as to some, but not all of the provisions, but that because he had prudential standing to the other provisions, it would consider his challenge as to all of them. Turning to the merits, the district court noted that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent in Elrod v. Burns and Branti v. Finkel, a government employer may not make employment decisions based on political allegiance except with respect to policymakers. The court found that a judge’s job is to apply, rather than create, the law, and thus that judges do not fall within the policymaking exception of Elrod and Burns. As such, the court found the provision unconstitutional in its entirety.\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed only as to the provisions for which Adams lacked Article III standing.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63199:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63199:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63199:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nBecause Adams had not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he failed to demonstrate Article III standing to challenge the Delaware Constitution’s political balance requirement for appointments to the State’s major courts. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous (8-0) opinion of the Court.\nArticle III standing requires that an “injury in fact” be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” In this context, Adams needed to show that he was likely to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future, which required a showing that he was “able and ready” to apply. He did not adequately make this showing, supporting his claim only with two statements he made that he wanted to be a judge without other supporting evidence of his intent to do so. As such, his grievance is generalized and does not meet the requirement for an “injury in fact.”\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion expressing her agreement that Adams did not demonstrate Article III standing. In anticipation that the constitutional questions raised in the case were likely to be raised again, she highlighted two considerations that “may inform their answers”: the possibility of material difference between the “major party” requirement and the “bare majority” requirement, and a question of the severability of those two requirements.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63199:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63205:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63205:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63205:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63205:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63205:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nLand reserved for the Creek Nation since the 19th century remains “Indian country” under the Major Crimes Act (MCA), which grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to try certain major crimes committed by enrolled members of a tribe on that land. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion holding that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Jimcy McGirt.\nThe Court first noted that all parties agreed that McGirt’s crimes were committed on lands described as belonging to the Creek Nation in an 1866 treaty and federal statute. Though the early treaties did not refer to the Creek lands as a “reservation,” the Court has held that similar language in treaties from the same era was sufficient to create a reservation. An 1856 treaty promised that “no portion” of Creek lands “would ever be embraced or included within, or annexed to, any Territory or State” and that the Creek Nation would have the “unrestricted right of self-government,” with “full jurisdiction” over enrolled Tribe members and their property.\nOnce a federal reservation is established, only Congress can diminish or disestablish it through a “clear expression of congressional intent.” The Court acknowledged that Congress has broken many promises to the Tribe but none has manifested “clear expression of congressional intent” to disestablish the Creek Reservation. The Court rejected Oklahoma’s argument that Congress never established a reservation in the first place, finding that such a conclusion “would require willful blindness to the statutory language.” The Court also rejected Oklahoma’s argument that the Oklahoma Enabling Act transferred jurisdiction from federal courts to state courts as contrary to the plain terms of the MCA. The mere fact that Oklahoma has been exercising jurisdiction in these cases does not make it in any more correct. Indeed, “unlawful acts, performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to amend the law.”\nChief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito and Brett Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined in part. The dissent accused the majority of examining the statutes in isolation rather than considering a broader inquiry, which would have led to the conclusion that a reservation did not exist when McGirt committed his crimes.\nJustice Thomas authored a dissenting opinion to argue that the Court had no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals because it rests on adequate and independent state ground.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63205:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63206:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63206:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform issued a subpoena to Mazars USA, the accounting firm for Donald Trump (in his capacity as a private citizen) and several of his businesses, demanding private financial records belonging to Trump. According to the Committee, the requested documents would inform its investigation into whether Congress should amend or supplement its ethics-in-government laws. Trump argued that the information serves no legitimate legislative purpose and sued to prevent Mazars from complying with the subpoena.\nThe district court granted summary judgment for the Committee, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding the Committee possesses the authority under both the House Rules and the Constitution.\nIn the consolidated case, Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 19-760, two committees of the U.S. House of Representatives—the Committee on Financial Services and the Intelligence Committee—issued a subpoena to the creditors of President Trump and several of his businesses. The district court denied Trump’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent compliance with the subpoenas, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in substantial part and remanded in part.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63206:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63206:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63206:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe courts below did not take adequate account of the significant separation of powers concerns implicated by congressional subpoenas for the President’s information. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.\nThe Court first acknowledged that this dispute between Congress and the Executive is the first of its kind to reach the Court and that the Court does not take lightly its responsibility to resolve the issue in a manner that ensures “it does not needlessly disturb ‘the compromises and working arrangements’ reached by those branches. Each house of Congress has “indispensable” power “to secure needed information” in order to legislate, including the power to issue a congressional subpoena, provided that the subpoena is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.” However, the issuance of a congressional subpoena upon the sitting President raises important separation-of-powers concerns. The standard advocated by the President—a “demonstrated, specific need”—is too stringent. At the same time, the standard advocated by the House—a “valid legislative purpose”—does not adequately safeguard the President from an overzealous and perhaps politically motivated Congress.\nRather than adopt either party’s approach, the Court proposed a balancing test that considers four factors. First, courts should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose requires involving the President and his papers, or whether the information is available elsewhere. Second, courts should consider whether the subpoena is no broader than reasonably necessary in scope so as to still serve Congress’s legislative purpose. Third, courts should evaluate the evidence Congress has offered to “establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative purpose”—the more “detailed and substantial,” the better. Finally, courts should assess what burdens a subpoena imposes on the President.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that Congress can never issue a legislative subpoena for private, unofficial documents.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that even accepting the balancing test adopted by the majority, the House subpoenas should fail without a greater showing from the House as to each of the four considerations outlined by the majority.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63206:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63207:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63207:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe district attorney of New York County issued a grand jury subpoena to an accounting firm that possessed the financial records of President Donald Trump and one of his businesses. Trump asked a federal court to restrain enforcement of that subpoena, but the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case based on Supreme Court precedent regarding federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The court held, in the alternative, that there was no constitutional basis to temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin the subpoena at issue.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court with respect to the alternative holding, finding that any presidential immunity from state criminal process does not extend to investigative steps like the grand jury subpoena. However, it found that the Supreme Court precedent on which the lower court relied did not apply to the situation and vacated the judgment as to that issue and remanded the case to the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63207:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63207:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63207:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nArticle II and the Supremacy Clause neither categorically preclude, nor require a heightened standard for, the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President. All nine justices agreed that a President does not have absolute immunity from the issuance of a state criminal subpoena, but a seven-justice majority voted to affirm the decision of the Second Circuit below.\nChief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court. The Chief Justice noted from the outset that the Supreme Court has long held that the President is subject to subpoena in federal criminal proceedings. In this case, the question was whether the President has absolute immunity from state criminal subpoenas. The Court held in Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), that federal criminal subpoenas do not rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive’s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated functions, and here, it rejected the President’s argument that state criminal subpoenas pose a unique and greater threat. A properly tailored state criminal subpoena will not hamper the performance of a President’s constitutional duties, there is nothing inherently stigmatizing about a President performing a normal citizen’s duty of furnishing information relevant to a criminal investigation, and the risk that subjecting sitting Presidents to state criminal subpoenas will make them targets for harassment is minimal given that federal law allows for a President to challenge allegedly unconstitutional influences. For these reasons, the Constitution does not categorically preclude the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.\nNext the Court turned to the question whether a state grand jury subpoena must satisfy a heightened need standard, finding that it does not, for three reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Burr v. United States (1807) made clear that a President “stands in nearly the same situation with any other individual” with respect to production of private papers. Second, the President in this case did not show that the protection of a heightened need standard is necessary to allow him to fulfill his Article II functions. Third, absent a need for protection, the public interest in fair and effective law enforcement weighs in favor of comprehensive access to evidence. Still, the President has multiple avenues to challenge the subpoena under state law if it is issued in bad faith or is unduly broad. Thus, the Constitution does not require a heightened need standard for a state grand jury subpoena.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, noting that he would apply the standard articulated in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)—that the prosecutor demonstrate a specific need for the President’s information.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion in which he looked to the text of the Constitution to find no support for the President’s claim of absolute immunity from the issuance of a grand jury subpoena. However, he drew a distinction between immunity from issuance of the subpoena and relief against its enforcement. Based on this distinction, Justice Thomas would vacate and remand.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion in which he characterized the issue in the case as necessarily implicating the broader question whether the Constitution imposes restrictions on a State’s deployment of its criminal law enforcement powers against a sitting President. Justice Alito would grant the President greater protection from state law enforcement powers than the majority’s opinion does.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63207:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63208:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63208:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Alliance for Open Society International and other organizations receive funding from the U.S. government to help with their mission of fighting HIV/AIDS abroad. The government provides the funds on the condition that “no funds be used to provide assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” In U.S. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International Inc., decided in 2013, the Court held that the condition compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. Although the government consequently did not apply the condition to Alliance for Open Society International, it continued to apply the condition to the organization’s foreign affiliates. The organization sued, asking for permanent injunctive relief. The district court granted the requested relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63208:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63208:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63208:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nBecause the foreign affiliates of American nongovernmental organizations possess no First Amendment rights, the federal law restricting funding to organizations with “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking,” 22 U.S.C. §7631(f), is not unconstitutional as applied to them. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-3 majority opinion.\nForeign citizens who are physically outside of the United States do not have rights under the U.S. Constitution. Foreign nongovernmental organizations are foreign citizens as a matter of corporate law, despite being affiliated with American organizations, and as such, they are separate legal units with distinct legal rights and obligations. Therefore, the foreign affiliates have no First Amendment rights, and Congress retains the authority to condition the aid it provides to a foreign organization.\nJustice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion to reiterate his position that he disagrees with the holding in the original case, in his belief, the policy requirement does not compel anyone to say anything.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor joined. In Justice Breyer’s view, the question presented is essentially whether American organizations enjoy the same constitutional protection against government-compelled distortion when they speak through clearly identified affiliates that have been incorporated overseas.” To this question, Justice Breyer would answer “yes.”\nJustice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63208:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63209:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63209:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAgnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru was an teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School and brought a claim against the school under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school on the basis that Morrissey-Berru was a “minister.” In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court first recognized a ministerial exception, which exempts religious institutions from anti-discrimination laws in hiring employees deemed “ministers.”\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that Morrissey-Berru was not a “minister”; she had taken one course on the history of the Catholic church but otherwise did not have any religious credential, training, or ministerial background. Given that she did not hold herself out to the public as a religious leader or minister, the court declined to classify her as a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63209:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63209:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63209:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “ministerial exception,” which derives from the religion clauses of the First Amendment, prevents civil courts from adjudicating the former employee's discrimination claims in this case, and in the consolidated case, St. James School v. Biel, against the religious schools that employed them. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 7-2 majority opinion.\nCourts generally try to stay out of matters involving employment decisions regarding those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious institutions, and the Court formally first recognized this principle, known as the “ministerial exception,” in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC. In that case, the Court considered four factors before reaching its conclusion that the employee was a “minister” for purposes of an exception to generally applicable anti-discrimination laws. However, the Court expressly declined “to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.” The factors relied upon in Hosanna-Tabor were specific to that case, and courts may consider different factors to decide whether another employee is a “minister” in another context. The key inquiry is what the employee does. Educating young people in their faith, which was the responsibility of the plaintiffs in these two cases, is at the very core of a private religious school’s mission, and as such, Morrissey-Berru and Biel qualify for the exception recognized in Hosanna-Tabor.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that courts should “defer to religious organizations’ good-faith claims that a certain employee’s position is ‘ministerial.’”\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, arguing that the Court incorrectly classified the teachers as “ministers,” given that the teachers taught primarily secular subjects, lacked substantial religious titles and training, and were not even required to be Catholic. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor argued, the majority’s approach “has no basis in law and strips thousands of schoolteachers of their legal protections.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63209:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63210:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63210:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2014, Roxanne Torres was involved in an incident with police officers in which she was operating a vehicle under the influence of methamphetamine and in the process of trying to get away, endangered the two officers pursuing her. In the process, one of the officers shot and injured her. Torres pleaded no contest to three crimes: (1) aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer, (2) assault on a police officer, and (3) unlawfully taking a motor vehicle.\nIn October 2016, she filed a civil-rights complaint in federal court against the two officers, alleging claims including excessive force and conspiracy to engage in excessive force. Construing Torres’s complaint as asserting the excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. In the court’s view, the officers had not seized Torres at the time of the shooting, and without a seizure, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63210:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63210:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63210:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion.\nUnder the Court’s precedents, common law arrests are considered seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and the application of force to the body of a person with intent to restrain constitutes an arrest even if the arrestee escapes. The use of a device, here, a gun, to effect the arrest, makes no difference in the outcome; it is still a seizure. There is no reason to draw an “artificial line” between grasping an arrestee with a hand and using some other means of applying physical force to effect an arrest. The key consideration is whether the conduct objectively manifests the intent to restrain; subjective perceptions are irrelevant. Additionally, the requirement of intent to restrain lasts only as long as the application of force. In this case, the officers’ conduct clearly manifested intent to restrain Torres and was thus a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, arguing that “neither the Constitution nor common sense” support the majority’s definition of a seizure.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63210:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63211:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63211:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe City of Chicago towed and impounded the Robbin Fulton’s vehicle for a prior citation of driving on a suspended license. Fulton filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action treating the City as an unsecured creditor. The City filed an unsecured proof of claim, and the bankruptcy court confirmed Fulton’s plan. The City then amended its proof of claim and asserted its status as a secured creditor. It refused to return Fulton’s vehicle, and Fulton filed a motion for sanctions against the City.\nThe bankruptcy court held that the City was obligated to return the vehicle under Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009), a binding case in which the Seventh Circuit had held that a creditor must comply with the automatic stay and return a debtor’s vehicle upon her filing of a bankruptcy petition. The City moved to stay the order in federal district court, and the court denied its request. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment denying the City's request.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63211:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63211:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63211:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362 prohibits only affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo of estate property at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, not the mere passive retention of possession of the debtor’s property. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous (8-0) opinion of the Court.\nSection 362(a)(3) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate. The most natural understanding of that language is that it prohibits affirmative acts that would affect the estate property. To read it as the Respondents propose would render superfluous the § 542’s “central command”—that an entity in possession of certain estate property “shall deliver to the trustee ... such property.” Additionally, the Respondents’ proposed interpretation would mean that § 362(a)(3) required turnover at the same time that § 542 exempted it.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63211:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63212:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63212:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nClemente Avelino Pereida, a native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, arising from his attempt to use a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Pereida, and Pereida sought cancellation of the removal application. At issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude; if so, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be ineligible for cancellation of removal.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was Pereida’s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal. However, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction, so Pereida failed to meet his burden. Because Pereida did not establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that he did not show such eligibility and denied Pereida’s petition for review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63212:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63212:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63212:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA nonpermanent resident seeking to cancel a lawful removal order must show that he has not been convicted of a disqualifying offense when the statutory conviction on his record is ambiguous regarding whether a disqualifying offense formed the basis of his conviction. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-3 majority opinion.\nThe Court first looked to the text of the relevant provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A), which states that “an alien applying for relief or protection from removal has the burden of proof to establish” that he “satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements” and thus deserves a favorable exercise of discretion to cancel the removal order. One of these requirements is that they have not been convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense, such as crimes involving “moral turpitude.” Failure to show even one of these requirements is a failure to meet one’s burden, so Pereida’s failure to prove that the basis of his conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude meant he failed to meet his burden. This interpretation is supported as well by the context of the INA and a similar requirement of noncitizens who seek admission.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the Court should apply the so-called “categorical approach” to determine the nature of a crime that a noncitizen was convicted of committing—an approach the Court has “clearly and repeatedly” embraced in the INA context. That approach would require a judge to look only at certain specified documents, and unless those documents show the crime of conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude, the judge must find the conviction was not such a crime. Following that approach in this case would result in a finding that Pereida was not convicted for a disqualifying crime.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63212:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63215:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63215:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2006, Petitioner Manfredo M. Salinas applied for a disability annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act, but the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (“the Board”) denied his application. After the filing period had expired, Salinas sought reconsideration, which the Board also denied, based on its conclusion that Salinas had not shown good cause for missing the deadline. Salinas did not pursue any further action on his application, so the Board’s denial became a final decision on February 9, 2007.\nNearly seven years later, in 2013, Salinas filed a new application for a disability annuity. The Board granted him an annuity, but Salinas appealed the annuity's beginning date and amount. During that appeal, Salinas asked the Board to reopen all its decisions on his prior applications, including the decision denying his 2006 application. After a hearing, a Board hearing officer concluded that Salinas's 2006 application was beyond the four-year timeframe for reopening based on new and material evidence or administrative error under the Board's regulations. Salinas then asked the U.S. Court of Appeals to review the Board's decision not to reopen his 2006 application. Following its own binding precedent holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a Board decision declining to reopen a prior benefits claim, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Salinas’s petition.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63215:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63215:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63215:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA decision by the Railroad Retirement Board denying a request to reopen a prior benefits claim is subject to judicial review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion.\nThe Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (RRA) “makes judicial review under the RRA available to the same extent that review is available” under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA). The RUIA allows any person “aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c) of this section” to “obtain a review of any final decision of the Board.” Because Salinas’s 2006 application was the “terminal event” in the Board’s administrative review process and substantively affected Salinas’s benefits and the Board’s obligations under RRA, the denial was a “final decision of the Board” under RUIA and thus subject to judicial review. This conclusion is bolstered by the plain text of § 335(f), which authorizes judicial review of “any” final decision, and even if the text were ambiguous, there is a “strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.”\nJustice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Thomas argued that while the majority may correctly interpret RUIA, the RRA’s provision is critically different. RUIA explains how to obtain judicial review, but RRA separately defines what may be reviewed. The dissent argued that the statutory language of RRA limits judicial review to Board decisions determining rights or liabilities, so its denial of Salinas’s claim was outside the scope of review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63215:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63216:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63216:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to address intrusive and unwanted phone calls to Americans. One provision of that Act—the automatic call ban—prohibits phone calls to cell phones that use “any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.” As passed, the Act recognized two exceptions to the ban: automated calls “for emergency purposes” and those made to a cell phone with “the prior express consent of the called party.” In 2015, Congress amended the Act to add a third exception for calls made to cell phones “to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.” Moreover, automated calls made by the federal government itself are not barred by the automated call ban.\nThe American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. challenged this third provision of the Act, alleging that it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by imposing a content-based restriction on speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding unpersuasive the free speech argument. The district court applied strict scrutiny review (testing whether the government had demonstrated the law is necessary to a \"compelling state interest,\" that the law is \"narrowly tailored\" to achieving this compelling purpose, and that the law uses the \"least restrictive means\" to achieve that purpose) to the debt-collection exemption and ruled that it does not violate the Free Speech Clause. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court that strict scrutiny review applied but concluded that the debt-collection exemption does not satisfy that level of review. Finding that the provision was severable from the Act, the Fourth Circuit struck down only that provision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63216:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63216:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63216:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Fourth Circuit’s judgment—that the robocall restriction’s government-debt exception in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) violates the First Amendment but is severable from the remainder of the statute—is affirmed.\nA majority of the justices—Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh—believed that the statute at issue regulated speech based on its content and was thus subject to strict scrutiny. In their view, the law is a content-based restriction because it favors speech made for the purpose of collecting government debt over political and other speech. Under strict scrutiny, a law must be “necessary” to achieve a “compelling” state interest and must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve that interest. Justice Kavanaugh authored an opinion applying strict scrutiny and concluding that the government-debt exception fails this level of scrutiny because the Government did not sufficiently justify the differentiation between government-debt collection speech and other categories of robocall speech, such as political speech, issue advocacy, etc.\nJustices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan argued in multiple opinions that the speech at issue in this case was commercial speech and thus restrictions on such speech were subject only intermediate scrutiny. Under this test, the restriction must only be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment because, in her view, the provision at issue failed intermediate scrutiny. She argued that the government did not adequately explain “how a debt-collection robocall about a government-backed debt is any less intrusive or could be any less harassing than a debt-collection robocall about a privately backed debt.” In contrast, Justice Breyer’s partial dissent argued that the provision at issue does satisfy intermediate scrutiny, noting that the effect of the law is to disadvantage non-governmental debt collectors, who are already subject to substantial regulation, and the law is narrowly tailored to protect “the public fisc”—an important government interest.\nA majority of the Court—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh—found the provision severable from the rest of the Act. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch dissented from this conclusion, arguing that the doctrine of severability amounts to rewriting legislation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63216:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63219:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63219:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was driving a Ford Explorer on a Montana highway when the tread on one of her tires separated. She lost control of the vehicle and died as a result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch.\nThe personal representative of Gullett’s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design-defect, failure-to-warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.\nFor a state court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the defendant’s headquarters are within the state or if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s activities within the state.\nFord Motor Co. has its headquarters in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford assembled the vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon resident, who later sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana.\nThe district court denied Ford’s motion to dismiss, finding a “connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that by advertising and selling parts within the state of Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in that state and was therefore subject to specific jurisdiction there.\nThis case is consolidated with Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, No. 19-369, which arises in Minnesota but presents the same legal question.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63219:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63219:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63219:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe state courts in this case properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant because of the connection between plaintiffs’ product-liability claims arising from car accidents occurring in each plaintiff’s state of residence and Ford’s activities in those states. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion.\nThe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits a state court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Such exercise requires that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the forum state that the maintenance of a suit there is reasonable. Despite Ford’s argument to the contrary, this requirement establishes no “causation” requirement. That is, for jurisdiction to attach, it is not necessary that the defendant’s forum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims. Rather, the Court’s precedents require only that the suit “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Ford’s substantial presence in the states (advertising, selling, and servicing those two car models, even if not the two specific vehicles involved in this case) establishes minimum contacts, and it does not matter that those contacts did not cause the plaintiffs’ injuries.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that the Court need not focus on the words “relate to” as an independent basis for specific jurisdiction, and that doing so “risks needless complications.”\nJustice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch argued against the majority’s focus on the phrase “relate to” and elaborated on the “needless complications” referenced by Justice Alito in his concurrence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63219:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63220:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63220:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Women’s Health Amendment to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that women's health insurance include coverage for preventive health care, including contraception. The rule provided that a nonprofit religious employer who objects to providing contraceptive services may file an accommodation form requesting an exemption to the requirement, thereby avoiding paying for or otherwise participating in the provision of contraception to its employees.\nIn Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), the Supreme Court held that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), closely-held for-profit corporations were also entitled to invoke the exemption if they had sincere religious objections to the provision of contraceptive coverage. Then, in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, (2014), the Court held that an entity seeking an exemption did not need to file the accommodation form; rather, its notification to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was sufficient to receive the exemption. HHS and the Departments of Labor and Treasury promulgated a final rule in compliance with these rulings.\nThen, in Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. __ (2017), the Court considered another challenge to the rule, which asserted that merely submitting the accommodation notice “substantially burden[ed] the exercise of their religion,” in violation of RFRA. In a per curiam opinion, the Court declined to reach the merits of that question.\nIn 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services under the Trump administration promulgated regulations that greatly expanded the entities eligible to claim an exemption to the requirement that group health insurance plans cover contraceptive services. The new rules, which the agencies promulgated without issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking or soliciting public comment, expanded the scope of the religious exemption and added a “moral” exemption.\nPennsylvania and New Jersey challenged the rules in federal district court, alleging that they violate the Constitution, federal anti-discrimination law, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After a hearing and reviewing evidence, the district court issued a nationwide injunction enjoining the rules’ enforcement, finding the states were likely to succeed on their APA claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.\nThis case is consolidated with a similar case, Trump v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-454, presenting the same legal question.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63220:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63220:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63220:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury had the authority under the ACA to promulgate the religious and moral exemptions, and they promulgated those exemptions consistent with the manner required under the Administrative Procedure Act. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the five-justice majority opinion.\nFirst, the Court considered whether the Departments had the statutory authority to promulgate the rules. The relevant provision of the ACA states requires insurers provide women “additional preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)].” The Court interpreted this “as provided for” language to be a broad grant of authority and discretion to decide what counts as preventive care and screenings, including the ability to identify and create exemptions. Because it found the ACA gave the Departments the authority to promulgate these exceptions, it did not need to consider whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) required or authorized the exceptions. Nonetheless, it was appropriate for the Departments to consider RFRA because of the likelihood of conflict between the contraceptive mandate and RFRA.\nThen, the Court considered whether the Departments had violated the procedural requirements of the APA. The Court rejected the argument that the procedure was defective due to the Departments’ naming the relevant document “Interim Final Rules with Request for Comments” instead of “General Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.” Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that the rule was invalid because the Departments had failed to keep an open mind during the notice-and-comment period. Open-mindedness is not a requirement of the APA.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito argued that the Court should have gone further and ruled “not only that it was appropriate for the Departments to consider RFRA, but also that the Departments were required by RFRA to create the religious exemption (or something very close to it).”\nJustice Elena Kagan authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. In Justice Kagan’s view, the language of the ACA granting HRSA’s authority was ambiguous, and the doctrine of Chevron deference requires the Court to defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute—that HRSA had the power to create exemptions from the contraceptive mandate. Though concurring in the Court’s judgment, Justice Kagan would remand the case for the lower court to determine whether the exemptions are the product of reasoned decision-making, or instead are arbitrary and capricious.\nJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court reached the wrong conclusion, that the language of the Women’s Health Amendment authorizes HRSA to determine only the type of women’s health services, not to undermine the statutory directive to provide such services at a minimum. Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court’s decision would immediately cause “between 70,500 and 126,400 women” to lose access to no-cost contraceptive services.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63220:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63221:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63221:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nUnder Washington State law, each political party with presidential candidates is required to nominate for the Electoral College electors from its party equal to the number of senators and representatives allotted to the state. Nominees must pledge to vote for the candidate of their party, and any nominee who does not vote for their party candidate is subject to a fine of up to $1,000. Washington, as is the case with all but two other states, has a “winner-take-all” electoral system, which means that all of a state’s electoral votes go to the winner of the popular vote in that state.\nIn the 2016 Presidential Election, petitioner Chiafolo and others were nominated as presidential electors for the Washington State Democratic Party. When Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine won the popular vote in Washington State, the electors were required by law to cast their ballots for Clinton/Kaine. Instead, they voted for Colin Powell for President and a different individual for Vice President. The Washington secretary of state fined the electors $1,000 each for failing to vote for the nominee of their party in violation of state law.\nThe electors challenged the law imposing the fine as violating the First Amendment. An administrative law judge upheld the fine, and a state trial court on appeal affirmed.\nThis case was originally consolidated with a similar case arising in Colorado, Colorado Department of State v. Baca, No. 19-518, but is no longer consolidated as of the Court's order of March 10, 2020.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63221:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63221:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63221:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA state may constitutionally enforce a presidential elector’s pledge to support his party’s nominee—and the state voters’ choice—for President. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion that was unanimous in the judgment.\nArticle II, §1 gives the States the authority to appoint electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,” which the Court has interpreted as conveying to the states “the broadest power of determination” over who becomes an elector. The Twelfth Amendment, which also addresses the Electoral College, only sets out the electors’ voting procedures. Thus, the appointment power of the states is extensive, and nothing in the Constitution prohibits states from taking away the discretion of presidential electors’ discretion, as Washington does. The history of voting in this country supports the conclusion that electors do not have the discretion to vote however they like; indeed “long settled and established practice” of voting in this nation requires finding that electors are required to vote for the candidate whom the state’s voters have chosen.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, but for a different reason. Justice Thomas disagreed with the Court that Article II determines the outcome in this case; he would resolve this case by simply recognizing the principle enshrined in the Tenth Amendment that “[a]ll powers that the Constitution neither delegates to the Federal Government nor prohibits to the States are controlled by the people of each State.” Justice Neil Gorsuch joined as to the discussion of the Tenth Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63221:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63224:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63224:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn March 2018, the City of Philadelphia barred Catholic Social Services (CSS) from placing children in foster homes because of its policy of not licensing same-sex couples to be foster parents. CSS sued the City of Philadelphia, asking the court to order the city to renew their contract. CSS argued that its right to free exercise of religion and free speech entitled it to reject qualified same-sex couples because they were same-sex couples, rather than for any reason related to their qualifications to care for children.\nThe district court denied CSS’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the City’s non-discrimination policy was a neutral, generally applicable law and that CSS had not demonstrated that the City targeted CSS for its religious beliefs or was motivated by ill will against its religion.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63224:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63224:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63224:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care services unless CSS agrees to certify same-sex couples as foster parents violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.\nPhiladelphia’s actions burdened CSS’s religious exercise by forcing it either to curtail its mission or to certify same-sex couples as foster parents, in violation of its stated religious beliefs. Although the Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that neutral, generally applicable laws may incidentally burden religion, the Philadelphia law was not neutral and generally applicable because it allowed for exceptions to the anti-discrimination requirement at the sole discretion of the Commissioner. Additionally, CSS’s actions do not fall within public accommodations laws because certification as a foster parent is not “made available to the public” in the usual sense of the phrase. Thus, the non-discrimination requirement is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the government show the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.\nThe Court pointed out that the question is not whether the City has a compelling interest in enforcing its non-discrimination policies generally, but whether it has such an interest in denying an exception to CSS. The Court concluded that it did not.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined and in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined as to all but the first paragraph. Justice Barrett acknowledged strong arguments for overruling Smith but agreed with the majority that the facts of the case did not trigger Smith.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito would overrule Smith, replacing it with a rule that any law that burdens religious exercise must be subject to strict scrutiny.\nJustice Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined, criticizing the majority’s circumvention of Smith.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63224:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63228:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63228:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIndustrial facilities, power plants, and other manufacturing complexes use water from lakes, rivers, estuaries, and oceans to cool their facilities through cooling water intake structures. Because these structures potentially cause significant harm to aquatic life, Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate their design and operation. In April 2011, the EPA proposed new regulations for cooling water intake structures. As part of the rule-making process and required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, in 2012, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service about the potential impacts of the regulations and produced a written biological opinion on the impacts of the proposed agency action.\nThe Sierra Club made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records generated during the EPA’s rule-making process, including the documents generated as part of the consultation with the Services. The Services withheld some of the requested records, citing Exemption 5 of FOIA, which shields from disclosure documents subject to the “deliberative process privilege.” The district court determined that 12 of the 16 requested records were not protected to the privilege and ordered disclosure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s order to disclose some of the records but reversed as to two of the records.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63228:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63228:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63228:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) an agency’s in-house draft biological opinions that are both predecisional and deliberative, even if the drafts reflect the agencies’ last views about a proposal. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion.\nThe deliberative process privilege of Exemption 5 of FOIA protects from disclosure “documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” The rationale behind the exemption is to encourage officials to communicate candidly with each other during the deliberative process. However, it does not apply to documents reflecting the final agency decision. Documents are “predecisional” if they were generated before the agency’s final decision on the matter and “deliberative” if prepared to help the agency formulate its position.\nThe documents at issue in this case were drafts of biological opinions because “more work needed to be done.” As such, they could not have been generated before the agency’s final decision had been made. That the recommendations ultimately proved to be the last word does not affect their status as “predecisional.”\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer argued that in the specific context of the rulemaking processes of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, so-called Draft Biological Opinions reflect “final” decisions regarding the “jeopardy” the EPA’s then-proposed actions would have caused, and as such, would normally fall outside, not within, Exemption 5.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63228:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63229:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63229:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPolice caught Charles Borden, Jr., with a pistol during a traffic stop in April 2017, and he subsequently pleaded guilty possessing that firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government recommended sentencing Borden as an armed career criminal, under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Borden objected, arguing that one of his prior convictions—reckless aggravated assault—did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA. Borden argued that reckless aggravated assault requires only a mental state of recklessness, and reckless use of force does not amount to a crime of violence under the ACCA. Retroactively applying Sixth Circuit precedent holding that reckless aggravated assault does constitute a violent felony under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA, the district court held that all three of Borden’s aggravated assault victims constituted “crime[s] of violence” under the ACCA and designated him as an armed career criminal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63229:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63229:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63229:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) does not encompass reckless aggravated assault. Justice Elena Kagan authored the four-justice plurality opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment to reverse and remand the case.\nThe elements clause of the ACCA defines “violent felony” as an offense requiring the “use of physical force against the person of another.” According to the plurality, the phrase “against another” requires conduct directed at another individual. Recklessness, which is the disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, cannot be directed at another individual and so cannot meet the definition of a violent felony.\nJustice Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, reasoning that reckless aggravated assault is not a violent felony under the ACCA because the “use of physical force...has a well-understood meaning applying only to intentional acts designed to cause harm.” Justice Thomas argued that the reckless conduct at issue in this case falls within the ACCA’s residual clause, which the Court (erroneously, in his view) struck down.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the plurality “disregards bedrock principles and longstanding terminology of criminal law, misconstrues ACCA’s text,” and “overrides Congress’s judgment about the danger posed by recidivist violent felons.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63229:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63230:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63230:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) against a constitutional challenge by characterizing the penalty for not buying health insurance as a tax, which Congress has the power to impose. In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress enacted an amendment to the ACA that set the penalty for not buying health insurance to zero, but it left the rest of the ACA in place. Texas and several other states and individuals filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the individual mandate again, arguing that because the penalty was zero, it can no longer be characterized as a tax and is therefore unconstitutional. California and several other states joined the lawsuit to defend the individual mandate.\nThe federal district court held that the individual mandate is now unconstitutional and that as a result, the entire ACA is invalidated because the individual mandate cannot be “severed” from the rest of the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion but remanded the case for reconsideration of whether any part of the ACA survives in the absence of the individual mandate. The Supreme Court granted California’s petition for review, as well as Texas’s cross-petition for review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63230:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63230:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63230:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Affordable Care Act’s minimum essential coverage provision. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.\nTo have standing to bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” No plaintiff in this case has shown such an injury.\nWith respect to the individual plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged—past and future payments necessary to carry the minimum essential coverage that §5000A(a) requires—not “fairly traceable” to the allegedly unlawful conduct. There is no penalty for noncompliance, only the statute’s unenforceable language, which alone is insufficient to establish standing.\nWith respect to the state plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged not traceable to the government’s allegedly unlawful conduct. The state plaintiffs alleged direct and indirect injuries. The states alleged indirect injuries in the form of increased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs, but they failed to show how an unenforceable mandate would cause state residents to enroll in valuable benefits programs that they would otherwise forgo. The states alleged direct injuries in the form of increased administrative and related expenses, but those expenses are the result of other provisions of the Act, not §5000A(a) and are thus not fairly traceable to the conduct alleged.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, praising Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent in this case (describing the “epic Affordable Care Act trilogy”) but stopping short of agreeing with his opinion in its entirety because Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs lack standing in this case.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that Texas and the other state plaintiffs have standing and that because the “tax” imposed by the individual mandate is now $0, the mandate cannot be sustained under the taxing power.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63230:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63233:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63233:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWhen Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without the possibility of parole “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” The circuit court held the hearing weighing the factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63233:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63233:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63233:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA sentencing authority need not find a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole; a discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient to impose a sentence of life without parole on a defendant who committed a homicide when they were under 18. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion.\nIn Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court held that “a sentencer [must] follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing” a life-without-parole sentence.” And in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the Court stated that “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.” Taken together, these two cases refute Jones’s argument that a finding of permanent incorrigibility is constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence of life without parole. The Court noted that it expresses neither agreement nor disagreement with Jones’s sentence, and its decision does not preclude states from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving juvenile commission of homicide.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that the Court should have reached the same outcome by declaring that Montgomery was incorrectly decided.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority effectively circumvents stare decisis by reading Miller to require only “a discretionary sentencing procedure where youth is considered.” Under Montgomery, sentencing discretion is necessary, but under Miller, it is not sufficient. Rather, a sentencer must actually make the judgment that the juvenile is one of those rare children for whom life without parole is a constitutionally permissible sentence.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63233:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63235:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63235:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTwo undercover FBI agents mistakenly identified petitioner James King as a criminal suspect and approached him. The parties differed in their account of the facts as to whether the agents identified themselves as police officers, but King apparently perceived he was being mugged and resisted their attempts to restrain him. A violent fight ensued, in which the officers severely beat King until onlookers called 911 and local police arrived on the scene. The local police officers ordered bystanders to delete video footage of the altercation because the videos could reveal the identities of undercover FBI officers. King was taken to the hospital, where he received medical treatment and was discharged. On his discharge, police arrested him and took him to Kent County Jail, where he spent the weekend in jail before posting bail and visiting another hospital for further examination. Prosecutors pursued charges, but a jury acquitted King of all charges.\nKing then filed a lawsuit against the United States and both FBI agents, alleging that the agents violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable seizure and by using excessive force. In general, the United States and its agents are immune from liability under the principle of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity in specific situations, and the plaintiff bringing an FTCA claim bears the burden of showing his claim falls within such situations. The FTCA also contains a “judgment bar” provision that precludes a plaintiff from bringing additional claims concerning the “same subject matter” as an FTCA claim after a judgment is entered on the FTCA claim.\nThe district court found that King failed to prove one of the six requirements for FTCA to apply, and therefore that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear King’s claim against the United States. The court further held that the defendant agents were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in their favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the FTCA judgment bar does not preclude King’s remaining claims because the court did not reach the merits of the FTCA claims and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63235:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63235:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63235:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe district court’s order dismissing King’s FTCA claims was a judgment on the merits and thus triggered the Act’s judgment bar to block his Bivens claims. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nThe FTCA’s judgment bar was drafted “against the backdrop doctrine of res judicata,” or claim preclusion, and so a judgment on the merits will trigger that bar. A dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is a “quintessential” merits decision because it signifies that the undisputed facts fail to establish all the elements of the FTCA claims. Although the question is “complicated” by the jurisdictional effect of a failure to state a claim, the Court noted that when the pleading of a claim and the pleading of jurisdiction coincide, as in this case, “a ruling that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits.”\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion to note that the Court “does not today decide whether an order resolving the merits of an FTCA claim precludes other claims arising out of the same subject matter in the same suit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63235:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63237:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63237:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMichael Baca, Polly Baca, and Robert Nemanich were appointed as three of Colorado’s nine presidential electors for the 2016 general election. Colorado law requires presidential electors to cast their votes for the winner of the popular vote in the state for President and Vice President. When Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in that state, instead of casting his vote for her, Mr. Baca cast his vote for John Kasich. The Colorado Secretary of State discarded his vote and removed him as an elector. As a result, Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich voted for Hillary Clinton, despite their desire to vote for John Kasich.\nThe three presidential electors sued the Colorado Department of State, alleging that the law requiring presidential electors to vote for the presidential candidate who wins the popular vote in that state violates their constitutional rights under Article II and the Twelfth Amendment of the federal Constitution. The district court dismissed the action, finding the electors lacked standing to bring the lawsuit, and in the alternative, because the electors failed to state a legal claim because the Constitution does not prohibit states from requiring electors to vote for the winner of the state’s popular vote. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court as to Mr. Baca’s standing, but reversed as to the standing of the other two electors who did not cast their votes in violation of the law. On the merits, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding the state’s removal of Mr. Baca and nullification of his vote were unconstitutional.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63237:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63237:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63237:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court reversed the judgment of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit below, for the reasons stated in Chiafalo v. Washington. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in that case, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor took no part in the decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63237:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63246:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63246:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nAgusto Niz-Chavez, a Guatemalan native and citizen, came to the United States without inspection in 2005. On March 26, 2013, he was served with a notice to appear before an immigration judge at a date and time to be determined later, and approximately two months later, on May 29, 2013, he received a notice of hearing in removal proceedings. Niz-Chavez made an appearance at the hearing on June 25, 2013, where he conceded removability and stated his intent to seek withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and relief under the Convention Against Torture.\nAfter a hearing on the merits, the immigration judge denied both applications, and Niz-Chaves appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In addition to challenging the immigration judge’s conclusions, Niz-Chavez asked the Board to remand the case in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Pereira v. Sessions, in which the Court held that a notice to appear that does not include the specific time and place of the noncitizen's removal proceedings does not trigger the stop-time rule under §1229(a) of the INA. Niz-Chavez argued that under Pereira, he was now eligible for cancellation because of the deficiency of the notice to appear he received. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s decision and denied the motion to remand, finding that Niz-Chavez was not eligible for cancellation under Pereira. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied Niz-Chavez’s petition for review of each of the challenged decisions by the Board.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63246:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63246:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63246:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe government must serve a single document that includes all the required information for the notice to appear to trigger the IIRIRA’s stop-time rule. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion.\nSection 1229b(d)(1) states that the stop-time rule is triggered “when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a),” and Section 1229(a) states that “written notice...shall be given...to the alien...specifying” the time and place of his hearing, among other listed items. The singular article “a” (as in “a notice”) means, to an ordinary reader, a single document containing the required information, not a series of such document with the information spread across them.\nThe IIRIRA’s statutory structure confirms this interpretation. For example, it refers to “the Notice” and “the time of the notice” in other nearby provisions (emphasis added). Its history, too, supports this reading. In passing the IIRIRA, the Congress intentionally changed the law from authorizing the government “to specify the time and place for an alien’s hearing ‘in the order to show cause or otherwise’” to requiring that the “time and place information...be included in a notice to appear, not ‘or otherwise.’”\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, arguing that the government’s provision of notice in two documents, as was the case here, should be sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63246:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63247:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63247:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2004, Congress delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to gather information about potential tax shelters, which the IRS does by requiring taxpayers their advisors to maintain and submit records pertaining to any \"reportable transactions.\" IRS regulations define what constitutes reportable transactions. Failure to maintain and submit such records can result in substantial penalties for taxpayers and tax advisors.\nOn November 21, 2016, the IRS published Notice 2016-66, which identified certain “micro-captive transactions” as a subset of reportable transactions. As a result, taxpayers and those advising them who engaged in such transactions were required to report them or else be subject to substantial penalties.\nOn March 27, 2017, Petitioner CIC Services, an advisor to taxpayers engaging in micro-captive transactions, sued the IRS and the Treasury Department in federal court, alleging that the IRS promulgated Notice 2016-66 in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Petitioner asked the court to stop the IRS from enforcing the Notice. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the federal defendants raised the defense that the lawsuit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63247:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63247:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63247:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA lawsuit seeking to enjoin IRS Notice 2016–66 as an unlawful regulatory mandate does not trigger the Anti-Injunction Act, even though a violation of the Notice may result in a tax penalty. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nThe Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars the filing of lawsuits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” CIC’s lawsuit challenged Notice 2016–66’s reporting obligations, which, alone, would place it clearly beyond the scope of the Act. However, a consequence for failing to report as required under the Notice is a tax penalty, which makes the result in this case less clear. However, when considering a “suit[’s] purpose,” a court looks not at the taxpayer’s subjective motive, but at the relief the suit requests. If the relief sought is an injunction against the collection or assessment of a tax, the Act prohibits it. Because CIC’s suit contests the legality of Notice 2016–66, not the statutory tax penalty, it is not prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act. This conclusion is supported by public policy; allowing the lawsuit to proceed will not open the floodgates to pre-enforcement tax litigation.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to suggest that the Court’s conclusion might be different if CIC Services were a taxpayer instead of a tax advisor because of the slightly different role tax penalties play with respect to individual taxpayers.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion observing that, in his view, the Court’s ruling in this case established a rule that pre-enforcement suits challenging regulatory taxes or traditional revenue-raising taxes are barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, but pre-enforcement suits challenging regulations backed by tax penalties are not barred, even if those suits might preclude the collection or assessment of a tax.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63247:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63248:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63248:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThedrick Edwards was sentenced to life in prison for the commission of several robberies and rape in 2006. At Edwards’s trial, the state used its challenges to exclude all but one African American juror from the jury, and at least one person voted to acquit Edwards, a black man, on each count. At the time, Louisiana permitted conviction by a 10-2 vote, so Edwards’s conviction became final in 2010.\nOn April 20, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts. Edwards argues that he would not have been convicted if he had been prosecuted in one of 48 other states or by the federal government, rather than in Louisiana.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63248:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63248:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63248:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.\nA decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral (habeas) review. Applying constitutional rules retroactively undermines the principle of finality, which is “critical to the operation of our criminal justice system.” However, two questions are relevant to the consideration whether a rule may be applied retroactively: (1) whether it is a new rule or applies a settled rule, and (2) whether it is a “watershed” procedural rule. New rules, as opposed to application of settled rules, ordinarily do not apply retroactively unless they are “watershed.” The “watershed” exception is “extremely narrow” and applies only when the new rule “alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” In fact, the only time the Court has recognized a new rule as being watershed was in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which established the right to counsel.\nFirst, the Ramos rule is new because it was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. Second, Ramos presents none of the considerations for a watershed rule. The situation in Ramos does not support a different outcome from (1) other jury-unanimity cases that the Court did not apply retroactively, (2) other cases decided based on original meaning that the Court did not apply retroactively, and (3) other cases involving race discrimination that the Court did not apply retroactively.\nAs a new rule of criminal procedure, the jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas noted that the Court could alternatively have resolved the case by applying the statutory text of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which, in his view, leaves no room for a court to grant relief under the present facts.\nJustice Gorsuch also filed his own separate concurring opinion, which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that the Court’s decision correctly eliminated the “watershed” exception that was never really an exception at all.\nJustice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the majority for not only misapplying the “watershed” exception in this case but also for going further and eliminating the exception altogether, preventing any procedural rule from ever benefiting a defendant on habeas review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63248:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63250:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63250:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRespondents are a class of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders, which generally are not open to challenge. However, if a noncitizen has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in the countries designated in their removal orders, the person may pursue withholding of removal. That is the remedy the respondents in this case sought, and they are being detained by the government while they await the outcome of those withholding-only proceedings.\nThe respondents requested individualized bond hearings, which could lead to their release during the withholding-only proceedings. The government argued that they are not entitled to individualized bond hearings because they were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and bond hearings were denied.\nThe noncitizens argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1226, rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1231, governs their detention. Section 1226 provides for detention \"pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States\" and allows for discretionary release on bond.\nThe district court ruled in favor of the noncitizens, finding that the text of the two statutes made clear that § 1226 applied. The court held that § 1231 does not come into play until the government has “the present and final legal authority to actually execute that order of removal.” A divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63250:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63250:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63250:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSection §1231, not §1226, governs the detention of aliens subject to reinstated orders of removal. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.\nSection 1231 authorizes detention “when an alien is ordered removed” and enters the “removal period,” which begins on “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” The presence of the word “administratively,” means DHS does not need to wait for the alien to seek or exhaust judicial review of that order. Even if the alien pursues withholding-only relief, the removal order remains in full force, and DHS retains the authority to remove the alien to any other authorized country. The validity of removal orders is not affected by the outcome of withholding-only proceedings. The statutory structure confirms this interpretation.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, concurring except as to the majority’s determination that it has jurisdiction to review the decision below. Justice Thomas argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear challenges to detention during the removal process but otherwise agreed with the majority’s opinion.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that it is unreasonable to infer, and statutory language does not support, that Congress intended to deny a bond hearing to individuals who reasonably fear persecution or torture, and who, as a result, face proceedings that may last for many months or years.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63250:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63252:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63252:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that purchase mortgages, buy and sell mortgage-backed securities, and guarantee many of the mortgages in the United States. In 2005 and 2006, as the housing market was reaching its peak, Fannie and Freddie over-invested in risky mortgages in an attempt to compete with large investment banks and mortgage lenders. In the aftermath of the 2008 housing crisis, during which Fannie and Freddie required billions of dollars in federal bailouts, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency to oversee the two GSEs. FHFA was to be led by a single director who could be fired by the President “for cause.”\nUpon its creation, FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie in a conservatorship with itself as the conservator and negotiated agreements with the Department of Treasury. Under the agreements, the Treasury would invest billions of dollars in the GSEs in return for compensation consisting in part of fixed dividends. For several years, the GSEs’ dividend obligations exceeded their total earnings, requiring them to draw even more money from the Treasury. FHFA and Treasury negotiated and came up with the “Third Amendment,” which replaced the fixed dividend with a variable quarterly dividend equal to the GSEs’ net worth minus a specified capital reserve.\nCollins and others are shareholders in Fannie and Freddie. They filed a lawsuit challenging the actions of FHFA, claiming the agency had destroyed the value of their ownership interests. The shareholders argued that FHFA had exceeded its authority under two federal statutes and that the structure of FHFA violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The district court dismissed the statutory claims and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment on the constitutional claim. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the statutory claims but reversed the judgment as to the constitutional claim, finding that the structure of FHFA was unconstitutional but the remedy was to invalidate the provision addressing removal of FHFA’s director. In a deeply divided opinion, the Fifth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, affirmed as to one statutory claim, reversed as to the other statutory claim, held that FHFA’s structure violated the Constitution, and held that the appropriate remedy was to declare unconstitutional the removal provision, not to invalidate the Third Amendment.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63252:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63252:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63252:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\n1. Because the FHFA did not exceed its authority under the Recovery Act as a conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the anti-injunction provisions of the Recovery Act bar the statutory claim brought by shareholders of those entities.\n2. The structure of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which restricts the President’s power to remove the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Director, violates the separation of powers.\n3. It is unnecessary to set aside the entire Third Amendment, but the case is remanded for the lower court to determine the proper remedy based on the harms suffered.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.\nThe Court first considered whether the shareholders were barred from bringing their statutory claim. The Recovery Act contains a provision known as the anti-injunction provision, stating that unless review is specifically authorized by a provision or requested by the Director, “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.” This provision applies only when the FHFA exercised its “powers or functions” “as a conservator or a receiver,” and not when it exceeds those powers or functions. When the FHFA agreed to the Third Amendment, it was acting in the best interests of the regulated entity or the Agency, as required by statute, and thus it was exercising authority granted to it by the Recovery Act. As such, the shareholders are barred from bringing their statutory claim.\nThe Court then considered the shareholders’ constitutional claim—that the Recovery Act violated the separation of powers by restricting the President’s power to remove the Director. As a threshold matter, the Court determined that the shareholders had standing to bring their claim and that their claim is not moot. Turning to the merits, the Court noted that its decision in Seila Law is “all but dispositive”; there, the Court held Congress could not limit the President’s power to remove the single director of an independent agency (the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in that case). Just as the CFPB was in Seila Law, the FHFA is led by a single director, so Congress similarly cannot limit the President’s power to remove the director of the FHFA.\nFinally, the Court considered the relief to which shareholders were entitled based on the success of their constitutional claim. Because the head of the FHFA apparently had the authority to carry out the functions of the office, the Court declined to hold that the Third Amendment must be completely undone and differentiated directors unconstitutionally appointed from those unconstitutionally insulated from removal. The parties disputed whether the unconstitutional restriction caused harm, so the Court remanded the issue for the lower courts to resolve.\nJustice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but authored a concurring opinion to clarify that “the government does not necessarily act unlawfully even if a removal restriction is unlawful in the abstract.”\nJustice Neil Gorsuch joined the majority opinion except as to the question of retrospective relief. In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court should vacate the judgment below with instructions requiring the appellate court to set aside the Director’s ultra vires actions as “contrary to constitutional right” and criticized the Court’s attempt to differentiate unconstitutionally appointed directors from those unconstitutionally insulated.\nJustice Elena Kagan authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Kagan agreed with the majority that the FHFA acted within its statutory authority but argued that the Court could have reached the conclusion that the FHFA’s for-cause removal provision violates the Constitution on stare decisis alone, rather than using “faulty theoretical premises” that go “further than it needs to.”\nJustice Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which Justice Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the Court’s decision in Seila Law expressly distinguished the FHFA from the CFPB on the ground that the FHFA does not possess “regulatory or enforcement authority remotely comparable to that exercised by the CFPB.” As such, Seila Law should not determine the outcome in this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63252:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63253:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63253:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nScott Tucker owned several companies that provided high-interest, short-term loans via several websites. The loans allegedly required customers to agree to terms that were obscured in several long, cross-referenced agreements. In April 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”) filed a lawsuit against Tucker and his businesses in federal court in Nevada. The Commission alleged that Tucker’s loan business violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”)’s prohibition against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” The Commission asked the court to enjoin Tucker from engaging in consumer lending and to order him to disgorge his profits from the scheme.\nThe court granted the Commission’s requested relief, enjoined Tucker from providing loans, and ordered him to pay approximately $1.27 billion in equitable monetary relief to the Commission. The court instructed the Commission to direct “as much money as practicable” to “direct redress to consumers,” then to “other equitable relief” related to the practices described in the Commission’s complaint, and finally to the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement. Tucker appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In relevant part, the Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker’s argument that the FTC Act authorizes district courts only to enter “injunctions,” and that the district court’s order to pay “equitable monetary relief” is not an injunction. The Ninth Circuit noted that its precedent squarely holds that § 13 of the FTC Act “empowers district courts to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63253:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63253:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63253:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSection 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act does not authorize the Commission to seek, or a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nCongress established the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 to enforce the Act’s prohibitions on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” by initiating administrative proceedings under Section 5 of the Act. Section 13(b) of the Act, which Congress added in 1973, authorizes the Commission to obtain “in proper cases” a permanent injunction in federal court against “any person, partnership, or corporation” that the Commission believes “is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law” that the Commission enforces. In the late 1970s, the Commission began using Section 13(b) to obtain court orders in consumer protection cases without the prior use of the administrative proceedings in Section 5 of the Act, and in the 1990s, it extended that practice to seek monetary awards in antitrust cases. Today, the Commission frequently uses Section 13(b) to seek equitable monetary relief directly in court.\nThe Court concluded that the Commission’s practice effectively bypasses the process set forth in Section 5 and was not the intent of the Congress that enacted Section 13(b). The provision does not explicitly authorize the Commission to obtain court-ordered monetary relief, and such relief is foreclosed by the structure and history of the Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63253:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63254:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63254:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nNoah Duguid brought this lawsuit because Facebook sent him numerous automatic text messages without his consent. Duguid did not use Facebook, yet for approximately ten months, the social media company repeatedly alerted him by text message that someone was attempting to access his (nonexistent) Facebook account.\nDuguid sued Facebook for violating a provision of the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 that forbids calls placed using an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), or autodialer. Facebook moved to dismiss Duguid’s claims for two alternate reasons. Of relevance here, Facebook argued that the equipment it used to send text messages to Duguid is not an ATDS within the meaning of the statute. The district court dismissed the claim, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Facebook’s equipment plausibly falls within the definition of an ATDS. TCPA defines an ATDS as a device with the capacity “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.” Ninth Circuit precedent further clarifies that an ATDS “need not be able to use a random or sequential generator to store numbers,” only that it “have the capacity to store numbers to be called and to dial such numbers automatically.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63254:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63254:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63254:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nUnder the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, to qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system,” a device must have the capacity either to store or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion of the Court.\nSection 227(a)(1) defines an autodialer as “equipment which has the capacity...to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and to dial such numbers.” Contrary to Duguid’s contention, the clause “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies both verbs to “store” and to “produce” telephone numbers. Because Facebook’s notification system neither stores nor produces numbers “using a random or sequential number generator,” it is not an autodialer.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment to caution about the majority’s overreliance on a canon of statutory construction, that “when there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a modifier at the end of the list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63254:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63255:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63255:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 2016, Chike Uzuegbunam, a student at Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC), began distributing religious literature in an outdoor plaza on GGC’s campus. The campus police stopped him, however, citing GGC’s “Freedom of Expression Policy,” which stated that students were generally permitted to engage in expressive activities only in two designated speech zones, and only after reserving them.\nLater, Uzuegbunam reserved one of the designated speech zones to speak to students about his religious beliefs, and campus police again stopped him. According to the police, he was exceeding the scope of his reservation by speaking in addition to handing out literature. After this incident, neither Uzuegbunam nor Joseph Bradford—another GGC student who wishes to speak publicly on campus about his religious beliefs—have attempted to speak publicly or distribute literature on campus.\nUzuegbunam and Bradford filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the school’s policies, both facially and as-applied, violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They also sought nominal damages for the violation of these rights. GGC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and while that motion was pending, GGC revised its “Freedom of Expression Policy” to allow students to speak anywhere on campus without having to obtain a permit, except in limited circumstances. It also removed the portion of its student code of conduct that Uzuegbunam and Bradford had challenged. After making these changes, the school filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot.\nThe district court dismissed the case as moot, concluding that the claims for nominal damages could not save otherwise moot constitutional challenges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63255:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63255:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63255:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA constitutional challenge to a school policy that seeks nominal damages is not rendered moot if the constitutional policy is revised during litigation because an award of nominal damages can redress the past injury. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for the 8-1 majority.\nTo satisfy the Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) they suffered an injury in fact, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3) that the remedy sought from the Court would redress the injury. The parties did not dispute that Uzuegbunam had established the first two elements, leaving only the question whether the remedy he sought—nominal damages—can redress the constitutional violation that Uzuegbunam alleged occurred.\nCommon law demonstrates that while early English courts required a plaintiff to prove monetary damages, they later “reasoned that every legal injury necessarily causes damage,” so courts award nominal damages even if there is no evidence of other damages. At the time of the Constitution’s ratification, courts were already following the latter approach. Thus, an award of nominal damages does redress any legal injury.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority in full but wrote separately to note his agreement with the Chief Justice and the U.S. Solicitor General that “a defendant should be able to accept the entry of a judgment for nominal damages against it and thereby end the litigation without a resolution of the merits.”\nChief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the case is moot because the plaintiffs are no longer students, the challenged restrictions no longer exist, and the plaintiffs have not alleged actual damages. The Chief Justice noted that if nominal damages can preserve a live controversy to establish Article III standing, future plaintiffs have every incentive to “tack[] on a request for a dollar” to ensure that federal courts resolve their disputes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63255:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63258:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63258:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1929, just weeks before the October 1929 global stock market crash, several Jewish art dealers in Germany purchased a collection of medieval reliquaries. During the ensuing global depression, the dealers sold about half the pieces and stored the remainder in the Netherlands. Nazi leaders negotiated with the dealers to buy the remaining pieces; the parties dispute whether this negotiation was made under coercive circumstances. After World War II, the collection was transferred to Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz (“SPK”), a German governmental institution that holds the cultural artifacts of former Prussia, and has been on display in a German museum nearly continuously since then.\nIn 2014, heirs of the Jewish art dealers—respondents in this case—participated in a non-binding mediation process before the Advisory Commission for the Return of Cultural Property Seized as a Result of Nazi Persecution, Especially Jewish Property (the “Advisory Commission”). In what the heirs describe as a “predetermined conclusion, and against the evidence,” the Advisory Commission recommended against restitution of the collection.\nThe respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court in the District of Columbia, invoking the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity when “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,” as the jurisdictional basis for their claims. Germany and SPK moved to dismiss, and the district court largely denied the motion, holding the claims fell within the scope of the expropriation exception. Germany and SPK appealed, and the U.S. Appeals Court for D.C. affirmed as to jurisdiction, reiterating its holding in a prior case that a genocidal taking is a violation of international law and rejecting Germany’s and SPK’s argument based on principles of international comity.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63258:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63258:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63258:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3), incorporates the domestic takings rule, which recognizes that a foreign sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property is not a violation of international law. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court.\nFSIA immunizes foreign sovereigns from the jurisdiction of United States courts, subject to several specific exceptions, including the so-called expropriation exception, which abrogates immunity in any case “in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue.” 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3). The taking of property by a foreign sovereign from its own nationals, at issue in this case, does not violate international law because it does not interfere with relations among states. Known as the domestic takings rule, this principle has endured, notwithstanding developments in other areas of international human rights law. The text of FSIA’s expropriation exception supports this interpretation, as do other provisions of FSIA. Because Germany took property from its own citizens, that act did not violate international law and thus cannot be the basis for an exemption to sovereign immunity under the FSIA’s expropriation exemption.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63258:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63259:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63259:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe plaintiff/respondents in this case are former enslaved children who were kidnapped and forced to work on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up to fourteen hours without pay. They filed a class-action lawsuit against large manufacturers, purchasers, processors, and retail sellers of cocoa beans, including petitioner Nestle USA (and Cargill Inc., petitioner in a consolidated case).\nNestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., both domestic corporations, effectively control cocoa production in the Ivory Coast and operate “with the unilateral goal of finding the cheapest source of cocoa in the Ivory Coast,” resulting in a “system built on child slavery to depress labor costs.” The respondents allege that the defendants are aware that child slave labor is a problem in the Ivory Coast yet continue to provide financial support and technical farming aid to farmers who use forced child labor.\nThe children filed a proposed class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the defendant companies were liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs failed to allege the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting slave labor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that corporations are liable for aiding and abetting slavery, in part because it found that norms that are “universal and absolute” can provide the basis for an ATS claim against a corporation, and the prohibition of slavery is “universal.” It did not address the defendants’ argument that the complaint sought an extraterritorial application of the ATS, which the U.S. Supreme Court had recently proscribed in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). On remand, the district court dismissed the claims alleging aiding and abetting slave labor under the ATS, finding that the complaint sought an impermissible extraterritorial application of the ATS.\nIn the interim, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __ (2018), holding that foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. Again the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the holding in Jesner does not disturb its prior holding as to the domestic defendants, Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., and that the specific domestic conduct alleged by the plaintiffs falls within the focus of the ATS and does not require extraterritorial application of that statute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63259:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63259:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63259:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nTo plead facts sufficient to support a domestic application of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, plaintiffs must allege more domestic conduct than general corporate activity; the Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding is reversed, and the case is remanded. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion in which a majority of the Court concluded that the respondents here improperly seek extraterritorial application of the ATS.\nThe Court’s precedents establish “a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.” First, a court must presume that a statute applies only domestically and ask “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication” that rebuts this presumption. Second, where the statute does not apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that “the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States.” The ATS does not rebut the presumption, so the question is whether the relevant conduct occurred in the United States.\nNearly all the conduct that the respondents describe as aiding and abetting forced labor—providing training, fertilizer, tools, and cash to overseas farms—occurred in Ivory Coast. As the Court made clear in Kiobel, “mere corporate presence” and activity are not sufficient to support domestic application of the ATS. As such, the respondents did not plead sufficient facts to support domestic application of the ATS.\nJoined only by Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, Justice Thomas wrote that the respondents’ suit fails for a separate reason: the Court cannot create a cause of action—only Congress may do that.\nJustice Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, which Justices Alito and Justice Kavanaugh joined in (different) parts. Justice Gorsuch, joined only by Justice Alito, argued that nothing in the ATS supports the notion that corporations are immune from suit. Then, joined only by Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch argued that courts lack discretion to create new causes of action under the ATS and should stop doing so.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which Justices Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that Justice Thomas’s interpretation of ATS as limited to the three international law torts that were recognized in 1789 contravenes the Court’s express holding in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), as well as the text and history of the ATS.\nJustice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that if a particular claim may be brought under the ATS against a natural person who is a United States citizen, a similar claim may be brought against a domestic corporation.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63259:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63260:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63260:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRosalie Simon and other respondents in this case are Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in Hungary. They sued the Republic of Hungary and other defendants in federal court in the United States seeking class certification and class-wide damages for property taken from them during World War II. Importantly, they did not first file a lawsuit in Hungary. Rather, they invoked the expropriation exemption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in claiming the federal court had jurisdiction, though their substantive claims arose from federal and D.C. common law.\nThe district court dismissed the suit, holding that FSIA's treaty exception grants the Hungarian defendants immunity, that the 1947 Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Hungary set forth an exclusive mechanism for Hungarian Holocaust victims to obtain recovery for their property losses, and that permitting the plaintiffs' lawsuit to proceed under FSIA would conflict with the peace treaty's terms. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to the non-property claims and reversed as to the property-based claims. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether, as a matter of international comity, it should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over those claims until the plaintiffs exhaust domestic remedies in Hungary.\nOn remand, the district court again dismissed the case, holding that international comity required that the plaintiffs first exhaust their claims in Hungary. Again, the D.C. Circuit reversed, noting that its intervening decision in Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany (2018) “squarely rejected” the comity-based ground for declining to exercise jurisdiction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63260:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63260:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63260:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for further proceedings consistent with Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. ___ (2021).", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63260:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63271:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63271:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTexas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Compact to resolve disputes about the Pecos River, which traverses both states. A River Master performs annual calculations of New Mexico's water delivery to ensure it complies with its Compact obligations. A party may seek the Supreme Court's review of the River Master's calculations within 30 days of its final determination.\nIn 2014 and 2015, after heavy rainfall, a federally owned reservoir in New Mexico retained large amounts of flood waters in the Pecos Basin. When the reservoir's authority to hold the water expired, it began to release the water. Texas could not use the released water, so it also released the water to make room for water flowing from New Mexico.\nWhen the River Master calculated and reported New Mexico's obligations for 2014 and 2015, it did not reduce Texas's rights to delivery based on the evaporation of water stored in the federal reservoir in New Mexico that Texas could not use. The 30-day review period lapsed, and New Mexico filed no objection. However, in 2018, New Mexico filed a motion challenging the River Master's calculations. Rather than dismiss the untimely objection, the River Master modified the governing manual to allow retroactive changes to final reports, gave that modification retroactive effect, and amended the 2015 report to credit New Mexico for the evaporative loss.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63271:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63271:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63271:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nTexas’s motion to review the Pecos River Master’s determination is denied. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.\nNew Mexico’s motion for credit for the evaporated water was not untimely. As Texas and New Mexico agreed to postpone the River Master’s resolution of the evaporated water issue, neither party may now object to the negotiation procedure the River Master outlined for resolving the dispute. Additionally, Texas’s request that Net Mexico store water at a facility in New Mexico was based on Texas’s understanding that the water belonged to Texas.\nJustice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the Court’s rejection of Texas’s argument that New Mexico forfeited any objection to the River Master’s 2014 report because it did not file an objection by the deadline imposed by the amended decree. However, he would vacate and remand the case for the River Master to redo his analysis in accordance with the relevant terms of the amended decree and the manual.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63271:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63274:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63274:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nMing Dai, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum in the United States. An immigration judge denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, although it did not expressly state that Dai’s testimony lacked credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the immigration judge’s decision. Dai appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the BIA and the immigration judge's ruling, holding that Dai was entitled to withholding of removal proceedings. The appellate court specifically noted that absent a finding that Dai was not credible, he was entitled to a presumption of credibility.\nThis case was consolidated with Garland v. Alcaraz-Enriquez, No. 19-1156.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63274:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63274:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63274:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA court of appeals cannot presume that an immigrant’s testimony is true or credible simply based on an absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nThe Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires that a court reviewing a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) accept “administrative findings” of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Coupled with the established principle that a reviewing court is “generally not free to impose” additional judge-made procedural requirements on agencies, this requirement means that so long as the record contains “contrary evidence” that a reasonable factfinder could find sufficient, a reviewing court may not overturn the agency’s factual determination.\nAlthough another provision of the INA does describe a presumption of credibility on appeal, it notes that outside the appeal, there is no such presumption of credibility. However, a court’s review of decisions by the BIA is not an appeal in this context. The only “appeal” is from the immigration judge (IJ) to the BIA. Subsequent judicial review is not an appeal but a “petition for review”; as such, there is no presumption of credibility at that stage of review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63274:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63275:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63275:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn July 2018, the Mayor and City of Baltimore filed suit in Maryland state court against 26 oil and gas companies that Maryland says are partly responsible for climate change. The complaint asserted eight causes of action, all founded on Maryland law, and sought monetary damages, civil penalties, and equitable relief. Two of the defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting eight grounds for removal. Baltimore then moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court rejected all eight grounds for removal and granted Baltimore’s motion for remand back to state court.\nThe defendants appealed the remand order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1442 does not provide a proper basis for removal of the suit.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63275:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63275:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63275:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA federal appellate court has jurisdiction to consider all of a defendant’s grounds for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-1 majority opinion of the Court.\nSection 1447(d) provides that “an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” In this case, the defendants had relied on the federal officer removal statute in § 1442, which is precisely one of the situations in which § 1447(d) permits an appeal. While the Fourth Circuit interpreted the provision as authorizing only the part of the district court’s order discussing § 1442, the ordinary meaning of § 1442—particularly the use of the word “order”—does not support that interpretation. Rather, § 1447(d) permits appellate review of the district court’s remand order without qualification. This conclusion is consistent with the Court’s most analogous precedent, Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), in which it held that another provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which allows a district court to certify “an order,” is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court. Finally, the Court found Baltimore’s policy arguments “cannot overcome a clear statutory directive.”\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court’s holding allows defendants to “sidestep” § 1447(d)’s bar on appellate review simply by “shoehorning a § 1442 or § 1443 argument into their case for removal.” This, Justice Sotomayor argued, “lets the exception swallow the rule.”\nJustice Samuel Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63275:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63276:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63276:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains a collection of rules governing ownership of broadcast media, intended to promote “competition, diversity, and localism.” In 1996, in response to sentiment that the rules were overly restrictive, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act, of which Section 202(h) required the Commission to review the broadcast ownership rules on a regular basis. The FCC’s performance of its duties under that section has been the subject of extensive litigation.\nIn 2017, the FCC issued an order eliminating altogether newspaper/broadcast and television/radio cross-ownership rules, and making other substantial changes. It also announced its intention to adopt an incubator program, calling for comment on various aspects of the program. In August 2018, the FCC established a radio incubator program. Numerous parties filed petitions for review challenging various aspects of the FCC’s order. Among them, Petitioner Prometheus Radio Project argued that the FCC did not adequately consider the effect its rule changes would have on ownership of broadcast media by women and racial minorities.\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that although the FCC did “ostensibly” consider this issue, its analysis was “so insubstantial” that it cannot provide a “reliable foundation” for the FCC’s conclusions. As such, the Third Circuit vacated the bulk of the agency’s actions over the past three years as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63276:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63276:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63276:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe Federal Communications Commission (FCC)’s 2017 decision to repeal or modify three of its media ownership rules was not arbitrary or capricious for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court.\nThe FCC has broad authority to regulate broadcast media “as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.” In considering whether to repeal or modify its existing ownership rules, the agency considered evidence in the record and reasonably concluded that the three ownership rules at issue were no longer necessary to serve the agency’s public interest goals of competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity, and that the rule changes were not likely to harm minority and female ownership. The FCC acknowledged the gaps in data on which it relied and noted that despite requesting data supporting the contention that harm would result to minority- and female-owned media companies, it received no such data. Because its decision was based on the record and was reasonable, its decision to repeal or modify three of its rules was not arbitrary or capricious.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to argue that the Third Circuit improperly imposed nonstatutory procedural requirements on the FCC by forcing it to consider ownership diversity in the first place.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63276:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63277:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63277:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nArizona offers two methods of voting: (1) in-person voting at a precinct or vote center either on election day or during an early-vote period, or (2) “early voting” whereby the voter receives the ballot by mail and either mails back the voted ballot or delivers the ballot to a designated drop-off location.\nArizona law permits each county to choose a vote center or a precinct-based system for in-person voting. In counties using the vote-center system, registered voters may vote at any polling location in the county. In counties using the precinct-based system, registered voters may vote only at the designated polling place in their precinct. About 90% of Arizona’s population lives in counties using the precinct-based system. If a voter arrives at a polling place and is not listed on the voter rolls for that precinct, the voter may cast a provisional ballot. After election day, election officials review all provisional ballots to determine the voter’s identity and address. If officials determine the voter voted out of precinct (OOP), the county discards the ballot in its entirety, even if (as is the case in most instances), the OOP voter properly voted (i.e., was eligible to vote) in most of the races on the ballot. The Democratic National Committee challenged this OOP policy as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it adversely and disparately affects Arizona’s Native American, Hispanic, and African American citizens.\nArizona law has permitted early voting for over 25 years, allowing voters to request an early vote-by-mail ballot either on a per-election basis or on a permanent basis. Some counties permit voters to drop their early ballots in special drop boxes, but all counties permit the return of early ballots by mail, or in person at a polling place, vote center, or authorized election official’s office. Many voters (particularly minorities) who vote early use third parties to collect and drop off voted ballots, which, until 2016, was permissible. Despite “no evidence of any fraud in the long history of third-party ballot collection in Arizona,” Republican legislators in 2016 passed H.B. 2023, which criminalized the collection and delivery of another person’s ballot. The DNC challenged H.B. 2023 as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment because it was enacted with discriminatory intent.\nAfter a ten-day bench trial, the district court found in favor of Arizona on all claims. The DNC appealed, and a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. A majority of the full Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, and the court reversed, finding the district court “clearly erred.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63277:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63277:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63277:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nNeither Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy nor H.B. 2023 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and H.B. 2023 was not enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.\nAs a threshold matter, the petitioner, Arizona Attorney General Brnovich, has standing to appeal the decision below because he is an authorized representative of the state. Additionally, the Court declined to establish a test to govern all VRA § 2 challenges; its decision applies only to the facts of the cases below.\nThis is the first time the Court has considered how Section 2 of the VRA applies to time, place, or manner voting rules. The text of that provision prohibits a state from abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. Although the statute requires equal openness and equal opportunity to vote, they are not separate requirements; equal openness is the “core.” This openness is assessed using the “totality of the circumstances.”\nNeither Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy nor H.B. 2023, the ballot-collection law, violates Section 2 of the VRA. Neither imposes burdens on voters that exceed the “usual burdens of voting,” and any racial disparity in burdens is “small in absolute terms.” The state has legitimate and important interests in ensuring even distribution of voters among polling places and preserving the integrity of election procedures. Finally, the Court accepted the district court’s finding that H.B. 2023 was not enacted with a discriminatory purpose.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch concurred with the majority opinion in full but wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, to note that the parties did not raise the question (and therefore the Court did not decide) whether the VRA provides an implied cause of action under Section 2.\nJustice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Kagan argued that the majority’s decision narrowly reads the language of Section 2 of the VRA in a way that undermines its essential purpose to guarantee that members of every racial group have equal voting opportunities.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63277:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63278:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63278:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Patent Trial and Appeal Board consists of a Director, a Deputy Director, a Commissioner for Patents, a Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative patent judges. Under 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), appoints Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) to the Board. Among other responsibilities, APJs decide questions of patentability in inter partes review, a “hybrid proceeding” with “adjudicatory characteristics similar to court proceedings.”\nArthrex owns a patent that was subject to inter partes review, and a three-judge panel consisting of three APJs issued a final written decision finding the claims unpatentable. Arthrex appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit, claiming that the appointment of APJs violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Federal Circuit agreed, finding that the statute as currently constructed makes APJs principal officers, who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The court severed the portion of the Patent Act restricting removal of the APJs in order to render them inferior officers and thus remedy the constitutional appointment problem.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63278:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63278:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63278:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe unreviewable authority wielded by APJs during inter partes review is incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an inferior office. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court, in which he was joined in that holding by Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett.\nHaving found a constitutional violation, Chief Justice Roberts cured the defect by requiring that the Director of the USPTO hold the ultimate authority to review the final outcome of inter partes review proceedings--a departure from the statutory scheme passed by Congress. Though only Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined this part of the opinion, a concurring opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan approved of the remedy despite disagreeing with the holding that made it necessary.\nJustice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. While he was part of the majority that held APJs wielded unconstitutional authority, his remedy would have been to invalidate the statutory scheme and send the problem to Congress for a fix that complied with the Constitution.\nJustice Clarence Thomas dissented from the majority’s approach. He concluded both that the APJs were inferior officers under the Constitution under the statutory scheme approved by Congress, and that the appropriate remedy once the Court held otherwise was to have vacated the decision of the APJs at the heart of the dispute.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63278:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63281:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63281:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nA California Highway Patrol officer observed a parked car “playing music very loudly,” and then the driver, Arthur Gregory Lange, honked the horn four or five times despite there being no other vehicles nearby. Finding this behavior unusual, the officer began following Lange, intending to conduct a traffic stop. After following Lange for several blocks, the officer activated his overhead lights, and Lange “failed to yield.” Lange turned into a driveway and drove into a garage. The officer followed and interrupted the closing garage door. When asked whether Lange had noticed the officer, Lange replied that he had not. Based on evidence obtained from this interaction, Lange was charged with two Vehicle Code misdemeanors and an infraction.\nLange moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the garage. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor argued that Lange committed a misdemeanor when he failed to stop after the officer activated his overhead lights and that the officer had probable cause to arrest Lange for this misdemeanor offense. Based on this probable cause, the prosecutor argued that exigent circumstances justified the officer’s warrantless entry into Lange’s garage. Lange’s attorney argued that a reasonable person in Lange's position would not have thought he was being detained when the officer activated his overhead lights, and the officer should not have entered Lange's garage without a warrant. The court denied Lange’s motion to suppress, and the appellate division affirmed. Lange pled no contest and then appealed the denial of his suppression motion a second time. The appellate division affirmed Lange's judgment of conviction.\nIn the meantime, Lange filed a civil suit, asking the court to overturn the suspension of his license, and the civil court granted the petition after determining Lange's arrest was unlawful. The court reasoned that the “hot pursuit” doctrine did not justify the warrantless entry because when the officer entered Lange's garage, all the officer knew was that Lange had been playing his music too loudly and had honked his horn unnecessarily, which are infractions, not felonies.\nBased on the inconsistent findings of the courts, Lange petitioned for transfer to the California Court of Appeal, which concluded that Lange's arrest was lawful and affirmed the judgment of conviction.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63281:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63281:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63281:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nPursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not categorically qualify as an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless entry into a home. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court.\nThe Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires a police officer to obtain a warrant to enter a home, but under settled law, an officer may enter a home without a warrant under certain specific circumstances, including exigency. The Court has recognized exigent circumstances when an officer must act to prevent imminent injury, the destruction of evidence, or a felony suspect’s escape.\nThat a suspect is fleeing does not categorically create exigency. In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), the Court recognized that the “hot pursuit” of a felony suspect created exigency that justified warrantless entry into a home. However, that case did not address hot pursuit of misdemeanor suspects. Rather, the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents support a case-by-case assessment of the exigencies arising from a particular suspect’s flight.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion noting that the reasoning of the majority and that of Chief Justice John Roberts in his opinion concurring in the judgment are not so dissimilar as they might seem at first. Rather, cases involving fleeing misdemeanor suspects “will almost always” involve a recognized exigent circumstance” such that warrantless entry into a home is justified.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas noted that the general case-by-case rule described by the majority is subject to historical, categorical exceptions. Joined by Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Thomas also noted that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence discovered in the course of pursuing a fleeing suspect.\nChief Justice Roberts authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Samuel Alito joined. The Chief Justice argued that it is well established that the flight, not the underlying offense, justifies the “hot pursuit” exception.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63281:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63293:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63293:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nWillie Earl Carr sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), but an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied his claim and the agency’s Appeals Council declined to review the decision. Carr appealed to a federal district court.\nWhile his case in the district court was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, that Securities and Exchange Commission ALJs are “inferior officers” under the Appointments Clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution, and as inferior officers, they must be appointed by the President, a court, or the head of the agency.\nIn response to Lucia, the SSA Commissioner appointed the SSA’s ALJs. After these appointment actions, Carr raised a claim for the first time that the ALJs who had rejected their claims had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause.\nThe district court agreed, vacating the SSA’s decision and remanding the case for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs. By agreeing on the merits, the district court held that Carr had not waived his right to raise an Appointments Clause claim by failing to raise that claim during the administrative proceedings. The SSA Commissioner appealed, arguing that Carr did waive the Appointments Clause challenge by failing to raise it earlier. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63293:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63293:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63293:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nPersons seeking disability benefits under the Social Security Act need not argue at the agency level that the administrative law judges hearing their disability claims were unconstitutionally appointed for that argument to be preserved on appeal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion.\nGenerally, administrative review schemes require parties to give the agency an opportunity to address an issue before seeking judicial review of that question, known as “issue exhaustion.” However, if there is not a statute or regulation that imposes an issue-exhaustion requirement, courts decide whether to require issue exhaustion in a manner consistent with “the rule that appellate courts will not consider arguments not raised before trial courts.” In this case, issue exhaustion was not necessary.\nFirst, agency adjudications are not well suited to address structural constitutional challenges because such issues usually fall outside the adjudicators’ areas of technical expertise. Second, issue exhaustion is generally not required when the agency is unable to provide meaningful relief to resolve the issue. As such, the Courts of Appeals erred in imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement on petitioners’ Appointments Clause claims.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Thomas agreed with the Court that there was no need for an exhaustion rule based solely on the conclusion that the proceedings bear little resemblance to adversarial litigation.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, noting that in his view, the “nonadversarial nature” of the agency’s procedures is generally irrelevant to whether the ordinary rule requiring issue exhaustion ought to apply.” However, the Appointments Clause challenges at issue fall into the well-established exceptions for constitutional and futile claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63293:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63294:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63294:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 1975, California enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA”), which, among other things, created the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“the Board”). Shortly after Act went into effect and established the Board, the Board promulgated a regulation allowing union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer worksites under specific circumstances.\nCedar Point Nursery, an Oregon corporation, operates a nursery in Dorris, California, that raises strawberry plants for producers. It employs approximately 100 full-time workers and more than 400 seasonal workers at that location. On October 29, 2015, organizers from the United Farm Workers union (\"the UFW\") entered the nursery, without providing prior written notice of intent to take access as required by the regulation. The UFW allegedly disrupted the workers, and some workers left their work stations to join the protest, while a majority of workers did not.\nSometime later, the UFW served Cedar Point with written notice of intent to take access. Cedar Point filed a charge against the UFW with the Board, alleging that the UFW had violated the access regulation by failing to provide the required written notice before taking access. The UFW likewise filed a countercharge, alleging that Cedar Point had committed an unfair labor practice.\nCedar Point then sued the Board in federal district court alleging that the access regulation, as applied to them, amounted to a taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and an illegal seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Cedar Point appealed. Reviewing the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss de novo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the access regulation does not violate either provision, and it affirmed the lower court.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63294:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63294:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63294:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property to solicit support for unionization constitutes a per se physical taking. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.\nThe Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property for public use “without just compensation.” There are two types of takings: physical appropriations of land and imposition of regulations that restrict the landowner’s ability to use the land. Physical takings must be compensated. Use restrictions are evaluated using a flexible test developed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), which balances factors such as the “economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.”\nIn this case, the California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property is a physical taking. The regulation does not restrict the growers’ use of their own property, but instead appropriates the owners’ right to exclude third parties from their land, “one of the most treasured rights” of property ownership. By granting access to third-party union organizers, even for a limited time, the regulation confers a right to physically invade the growers’ property and thus constitutes a physical taking.\nJustice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion describing another way the Court could have arrived at the same conclusion, using a different precedent.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the regulation does not physically appropriate growers’ property; rather, it temporarily regulates their right to exclude others and as such should be subject to the “flexible” Penn Central rule.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63294:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63296:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63296:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nOn July 21, 2020, President Donald Trump announced that the population figures used to determine the apportionment of Congress would, in a reversal of long-standing practice, exclude non-citizens who are not lawfully present in the United States. To implement this new policy, the President ordered the Secretary of Commerce to provide him two sets of numbers for each state. The first number was the total population as determined in the 2020 census and the second, the total population as determined in the 2020 census minus the number of \"aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status.\" The President left it to the Secretary to determine how to calculate the latter figure, but since the 2020 census did not not collect information regarding citizenship status, let alone legal immigration status in this country, it remained unclear how the Secretary would obtain that number.\nImmediately after the President filed the memorandum, two sets of plaintiffs—a coalition of 22 States and D.C., 15 cities and counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors (the \"Governmental Plaintiffs\"); and a coalition of non-governmental organizations—challenged the decision to exclude illegal aliens from the apportionment base for Congress on the ground that it violates the Constitution, statutes governing the census and apportionment, and other laws.\nThe federal district court found for the plaintiffs, concluding that by directing the Secretary to provide two sets of numbers, one derived from the census and one not, and announcing that it is the policy of the United States to use the latter to apportion the House, the memorandum violated the statutory scheme. In addition, the court concluded that the memorandum violated the statute governing apportionment because, so long as they reside in the United States, illegal aliens qualify as “persons in” a “State” as Congress used those words.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63296:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63296:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63296:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nIn a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court held that the plaintiffs in this case had not shown standing and that their claims were not ripe for adjudication. As such, the Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.\nFor a federal court to have jurisdiction to hear a case, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they have standing, which requires “an injury that is concrete, particularized, and imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Further, the case must be “ripe”—that is, it must not depend on “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”\nAlthough the President clearly expressed his desire to exclude unlawfully present noncitizens from the apportionment base “to the extent practicable,” it remains mere conjecture whether and how the Executive Branch might eventually implement this general statement of policy. Moreover, the plaintiffs had suffered no concrete harm from the policy itself, because the policy “does not require them ‘to do anything or to refrain from doing anything.’” As such, the courts lack jurisdiction to hear the case because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated Article III standing or that the case is ripe for review.\nJustice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the plaintiffs did have standing based on its own precedents in census cases, which have recognized standing based on a substantial risk of anticipated apportionment harm. Justice Breyer also argued that the question is ripe for resolution, and as such, that the plaintiffs should prevail on the merits because “the plain meaning of the governing statutes, decades of historical practice, and uniform interpretations from all three branches of Government demonstrate that aliens without lawful status cannot be excluded from the decennial census solely on account of that status.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63296:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63297:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63297:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nEdward Caniglia and his wife Kim got into a heated argument, during which Caniglia displayed a gun and told Kim something to the effect of “shoot me now.” Fearing for her husband’s state of mind, Kim decided to vacate the premises for the night. The next morning, she asked an officer from the Cranston Police Department to accompany her back to the house because she was worried that her husband might have committed suicide or otherwise harmed himself.\nKim and several police officers went to the house, and while the encounter was non-confrontational, the ranking officer on the scene determined that Caniglia was imminently dangerous to himself and others and asked him to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, which Caniglia agreed to. While Caniglia was at the hospital, the ranking officer (with telephone approval from a superior officer) seized two of Caniglia’s guns, despite knowing that Caniglia did not consent to their seizure.\nCaniglia was evaluated but not admitted as an inpatient. In October of 2015, after several unsuccessful attempts to retrieve his firearms from the police, Caniglia’s attorney formally requested their return, and they were returned in December. Subsequently he filed a lawsuit under Section 1983 alleging the seizure of his firearms constituted a violation of his rights under the Second and Fourth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Caniglia appealed. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “community caretaking” as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in the context of a vehicle search, whether that concept applies in the context of a private home was a matter of first impression within the First Circuit. The appellate court held that the doctrine does apply in the context of a private home and affirmed the lower court’s decision.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63297:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63297:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63297:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, described in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), does not extend to the home. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion, holding that police officers’ seizure of the petitioner’s guns from his home violated his Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches and seizures.\nThe lower court’s conclusion that the “community caretaking” exception permitted the officers to seize the petitioner’s guns relied on an extension of Cady, which held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s jurisprudence makes clear that vehicle searches are different in kind from home searches, the latter of which are subject to the highest level of protection the Constitution affords. The Court has repeatedly declined to expand the scope or number of exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home, and it declined to do so here.\nChief Justice John Roberts authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Stephen Breyer joined, to clarify that the Court’s decision does not disturb the Court’s holding in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), that a peace officer does not need a warrant to enter a home in situations where there is a “need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.”\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion to note that while he agrees with the Court’s opinion, there are certain related questions the Court did not decide.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63297:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63308:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63308:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nShareholders of Goldman Sachs Group filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the company and several of its executives committed securities fraud by misrepresenting the company’s freedom from, or ability to combat, conflicts of interest in its business practices. The district court certified a shareholder class, but in 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order because the district court did not apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in determining whether Goldman had rebutted the legal presumption that the shareholders relied on Goldman’s alleged misstatements in purchasing its stock at the market price (known as the Basic presumption). On remand, the district court certified the class once more, and this time, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order certifying the class. The court concluded that, on remand, the district court had applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Goldman’s rebuttal evidence to conclude that it had failed to rebut the Basic presumption.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63308:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63308:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63308:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nWhile a defendant in a securities class action may point to the generic nature of the alleged misrepresentations to show that those statements had no impact on the price of the security in overcoming the Basic presumption, that defendant bears not only the burden of production, but also the burden of persuasion. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion of the Court, in which she was joined in full by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Neil Gorsuch—joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito—concurred in part and in the judgment, while Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in part but dissented from the judgment.\nJustice Barrett wrote, “The parties now agree, as do we, that the generic nature of a misrepresentation often in important evidence of price impact courts should consider at class certification” and not just at the merits phase of securities litigation. Because the Court concluded that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit may not have properly considered the generic nature of the alleged statements, it vacated that court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. As for which party bears the burden of persuasion, the Court held that the Second Circuit properly allocated the burden to the defendant but noted that “the burden of persuasion should rarely be outcome determinative” at the class certification stage.\nWhile concurring in the decision to remand the case because the Court of Appeal did not sufficiently consider the generic nature of the alleged misstatements, Justice Gorsuch disagreed that the defendant should bear the burden of persuasion in overcoming the Basic presumption.\nJustice Sotomayor, on the other hand, dissented from the Court’s judgment because she believed the Court of Appeal had, in fact, adequately considered the generic nature of the alleged misstatements before granting class certification. In other words, while she agreed with the entirety of the Court’s analysis of how to proceed, she believed that the Second Circuit had met that standard and would not have vacated its ruling.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63308:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63309:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63309:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn February 2011, Sergio Ramirez went with his wife and father-in-law to purchase a car. When the dealership ran a joint credit check on Ramirez and his wife, it discovered that Ramirez was on a list maintained by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), of people with whom U.S. companies cannot do business (i.e. “a terrorist list”). Ramirez and his wife still bought a car that day, but they purchased it in her name only. TransUnion, the company that had prepared the report, eventually removed the OFAC alert from any future credit reports that might be requested by or for Ramirez.\nOn behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Ramirez TransUnion in federal court, alleging that the company’s actions violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The district court certified a class of everyone who, during a six-month period, had received a letter from TransUnion stating that their name was a “potential match” for one on the OFAC list, although only a fraction of those class members had their credit reports sent to a third party.\nThe jury awarded each class member nearly $1,000 for violations of the FCRA and over $6,000 in punitive damages, for a total verdict of over $60 million. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the statutory damages but reduced the punitive damages to approximately $32 million.\nTransUnion asked the Supreme Court to resolve two questions, of which the Court agreed to decide only the first.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63309:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63309:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63309:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nOnly a plaintiff concretely harmed by a defendant’s violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act has Article III standing to seek damages against that private defendant in federal court. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion.\nTo have Article III standing to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show that she suffered concrete injury in fact, that the injury was fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling by the court. To show a concrete injury, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the asserted harm is similar to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts—i.e., a close historical or common-law analogue for their asserted injury.\nOf the 8,185 class members, TransUnion provided third parties with credit reports containing OFAC alerts for only 1,853 individuals; these individuals have standing. The remaining 6,332 class members stipulated that TransUnion did not provide their credit information to any potential creditors during the designated class period and thus have failed to demonstrate concrete harm required for Article III standing. Mere risk of future harm is insufficient to establish standing.\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Thomas argued that injury in law to a private right has historically been sufficient to establish “injury in fact” for standing purposes, and each class member in this case has demonstrated violation of their private rights.\nJustice Kagan authored a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor arguing that Congress expressly allowed these plaintiffs to bring their claim of violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, yet the majority disallows them from doing so. Justice Kagan noted her slightly different understanding of the “concrete injury” requirement for Article III standing that Justice Thomas described in his dissent but suggested such a difference would not lead to a different outcome.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63309:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63310:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63310:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s television plan as violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes are subject to a different and less stringent analysis than other types of antitrust cases. Because of this lower standard, the NCAA has long argued that antitrust law permits them to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from professional sports.\nSeveral Division 1 football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, arguing that its restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits,” violated antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for the athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic benefits, such as “computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies.” However, the district court held that the NCAA may still limit cash or cash-equivalent awards for academic purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing the NCAA’s interest in “preserving amateurism,” but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63310:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63310:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63310:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe NCAA’s rules restricting certain education-related benefits for student-athletes violate federal antitrust laws. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch upheld the trial court’s ruling. The Court affirmed that the traditional “rule of reason” standard was appropriate in this case and rejected the NCAA’s call for a more deferential standard. Because the student-athletes who brought the lawsuit did not appeal the Ninth Circuit’s ruling upholding the NCAA’s rules “untethered to education,” the Court did not pass judgment on that aspect of the case.\nIn affirming the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Court clarified that a prior statement made in the 1984 case NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma noting that the NCAA’s role in maintaining the “revered tradition of amateurism” was “entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act” was not a shield against all challenges to compensation restrictions, as such rules were not even at issue in that case. Instead, there was nothing so unique about the NCAA or amateur sports to alter the traditional method of analysis applied to claims of antitrust violations.\nIn a concurring opinion, Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted that while other rules limiting student-athlete compensation unrelated to academics remain in place because they were not properly before the Court, this decision makes clear that the same traditional “rule of reason” analysis would apply. He concluded, “there are serious questions whether the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules can pass muster under ordinary rule of reason scrutiny.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63310:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63312:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63312:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe California Attorney General’s office has a policy requiring charities to provide the state, on a confidential basis, information about their major donors, purportedly to help the state protect consumers from fraud and the misuse of their charitable contributions. Petitioner Americans for Prosperity (and the petitioner in the consolidated case, Thomas More Law Center) either failed to file or filed redacted lists of their major donors with the California Attorney General’s office, despite filing complete lists with the federal Internal Revenue Service, as required by federal law.\nIn response to demands by the California Attorney General that they file the lists, the organizations filed a lawsuit alleging that the filing requirement unconstitutionally burdened their First Amendment right to free association by deterring individuals from financially supporting them. The organizations provided evidence that although the state is required to keep donor names private, the state’s database was vulnerable to hacking, and many donor names were repeatedly released to the public. Based in part on this finding, the district court granted both organizations’ motions for a preliminary injunction and then ultimately found for them after a trial, holding that the organizations and their donors were entitled to First Amendment protection under the principles established in the Supreme Court’s decision in NAACP v. Alabama. In so holding, the court reasoned that the government’s filing demands were not the “least restrictive means” of obtaining the information and thus did not satisfy “strict scrutiny.”\nA panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, based on its conclusion that “exacting scrutiny” rather than “strict scrutiny” was the appropriate standard, and “exacting scrutiny” requires that the government show that the disclosure and reporting requirements are justified by a compelling government interest and that the legislation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.\nThe Ninth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63312:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63312:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63312:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nCalifornia’s disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court.\nCompelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy is a type of restraint on freedom of association. Such a restraint is subject to “exacting scrutiny,” which requires “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Though the government-mandated disclosure regime need not be the “least restrictive means” of achieving the government’s interest, it must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve it.\nCalifornia’s disclosure requirement is “dramatically mismatch[ed]” to the state’s interest in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing, imposing an unjustifiable “widespread burden on donors’ associational rights.”\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas would apply strict scrutiny to the disclosure requirement, leading to the same conclusion that it is facially invalid. However, Justice Thomas took issue with the Court’s opinion that the statute is unconstitutional in all applications.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito disagreed with the majority that precedents establish that exacting scrutiny applies in these types of cases. He noted that the outcome is the same under either level of scrutiny, so he would not decide what level of scrutiny applies.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority accepts, without requiring the plaintiffs to show, an actual First Amendment burden. In effect, Justice Sotomayor argued, the majority allows regulated entities to avoid obligations “by vaguely waving toward First Amendment ‘privacy concerns.’”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63312:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63313:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63313:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was “punishable as an Armed Career Criminal” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months’ imprisonment.\nIn 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his motion, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause, not the residual clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.\nIn 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif.\nOn remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.\nThe Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error, he could not prove that he was prejudiced by the errors or that they affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked at the entire trial record and Greer’s previous convictions, not merely the evidence submitted to the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for review.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63313:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63313:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63313:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, and an error under Rehaif v. United States, is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion.\nRule 51(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant can preserve a claim of error “by informing the court” of the claimed error when the relevant “court ruling or order is made or sought.” Rule 52(b) allows an appellate court to review for “plain error” “even though it was not brought to the court’s attention” if it “affects substantial rights.” Thus, the defendant must show that, if\nthe district court had correctly instructed the jury on the mental culpability element of a felon-in-possession offense, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would have been acquitted. If the defendant does not dispute the fact of his prior convictions, he has not met this burden. Such is the case here. Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an appellate court conducting plain-error review may consider the entire record—not just the record from the particular proceeding where the error occurred.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor noted that the Court’s analysis does not extend to harmless-error review and that the knowledge-of-status element is an element just like any other, which the government must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, while defendants seeking relief based on Rehaif errors bear must prove only plain error. She joined the majority as to Greer’s case but as to Gary in the consolidated case would vacate the judgment below and remand so the Fourth Circuit below could address the question whether Gary can prove that the error affected his substantial rights.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63313:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63314:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63314:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nB.L., a student at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS), tried out for and failed to make her high school's varsity cheerleading team, making instead only the junior varsity team. Over a weekend and away from school, she posted a picture of herself on Snapchat with the caption “Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” The photo was visible to about 250 people, many of whom were MAHS students and some of whom were cheerleaders. Several students who saw the captioned photo approached the coach and expressed concern that the snap was inappropriate. The coaches decided B.L.’s snap violated team and school rules, which B.L. had acknowledged before joining the team, and she was suspended from the junior varsity team for a year.\nB.L. sued the school under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (1) that her suspension from the team violated the First Amendment; (2) that the school and team rules were overbroad and viewpoint discriminatory; and (3) that those rules were unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment in B.L.’s favor, ruling that the school had violated her First Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63314:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63314:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63314:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe First Amendment limits but does not entirely prohibit regulation of off-campus student speech by public school officials, and, in this case, the school district’s decision to suspend B.L. from the cheerleading team for posting to social media vulgar language and gestures critical of the school violates the First Amendment. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.\nAlthough public schools may regulate student speech and conduct on campus, the Court’s precedents make clear that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression” when they enter campus. The Court has also recognized that schools may regulate student speech in three circumstances: (1) indecent, lewd, or vulgar speech on school grounds, (2) speech promoting illicit drug use during a class trip, and (3) speech that others may reasonably perceive as “bear[ing] the imprimatur of the school,” such as that appearing in a school-sponsored newspaper. Moreover, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court held that schools may also regulate speech that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”\nThe school’s interests in regulating these types of student speech do not disappear when the speaker is off campus. Three features of off-campus speech diminish the need for First Amendment leeway: (1) off-campus speech normally falls within the zone of parental responsibility, rather than school responsibility, (2) off-campus speech regulations coupled with on-campus speech regulations would mean a student cannot engage in the regulated type of speech at all, and (3) the school itself has an interest in protecting a student’s unpopular off-campus expression because the free marketplace of ideas is a cornerstone of our representative democracy.\nIn this case, B.L. spoke in circumstances where her parents, not the school, had responsibility, and her speech did not cause “substantial disruption” or threaten harm to the rights of others. Thus, her off-campus speech was protected by the First Amendment, and the school’s decision to suspend her violated her First Amendment rights.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, explaining his understanding of the Court’s decision. Justice Alito argued that a key takeaway of the Court’s decision is that “the regulation of many types of off-premises student speech raises serious First Amendment concerns, and school officials should proceed cautiously before venturing into this territory.”\nJustice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that schools have historically had the authority to regulate speech when it occurs off campus, so long as it has a proximate tendency to harm the school, its faculty or students, or its programs. Justice Thomas viewed the facts of this case as falling squarely within that rule and thus would have held that the school could properly suspend B.L. for her speech.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63314:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63315:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63315:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nPetitioners Jose Sanchez and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection or admission in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, they applied for and received temporary protected status (TPS) and were subsequently permitted to remain in the United States due to periodic extensions of TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals by the Attorney General.\nIn 2014, Sanchez and his wife applied to become lawful permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied their applications, finding that Sanchez was “statutorily ineligible” for adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the United States. They challenged the denial in federal district court, and the district court granted their motion for summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS meets § 1255(a)’s requirement that an alien must be “inspected and admitted or paroled” to be eligible for adjustment of status. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding no support in the text, context, structure, or purpose of the statutes for the claim that a grant of TPS may serve as an admission for those who entered the United States illegally.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63315:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63315:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63315:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nThe conferral of Temporary Protected Status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a does not constitute an “admission” into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1255, so recipients of such status are not eligible to become lawful permanent residents. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nSection 1255 provides a way for a “nonimmigrant”—that is, a foreign national who is lawfully present in the United States for a designated, temporary basis—to become a lawful permanent resident (LPR). One requirement for eligibility is an “admission” into the country, and “admission” is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”\nEntering the country via a provision of humanitarian law that bypasses the inspection and authorization procedure does not meet the requirement for “admission,” so those who are present in the country by that means are not eligible to become lawful permanent residents.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63315:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63316:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63316:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nIn 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class-action lawsuit against various online travel companies (OTCs), such as Hotels.com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those companies charged constitute the “cost of occupancy” and therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel.\nToward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for \"an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, releasing all supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties.\" The OTCs’ proposed order stated that \"costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39.\" San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC’s proposed order.\nThen the OTCs filed a bill of costs in the district court seeking over $2.3 million, which included over $2 million for “post-judgment interest” and “premiums paid for the supersedeas bonds.” San Antonio objected and asked the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63316:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63316:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63316:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nFederal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 does not permit a district court to alter a court of appeals’ allocation of the costs listed in subdivision (e) of that Rule. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nRule 39 gives the courts of appeals discretion over the allocation of appellate costs, setting default rules that apply unless the court “orders otherwise.” These default rules and the language and structure of Rule 39 suggest that the appeals court makes all determinations as to the costs. This comprehensive scheme leaves no room for the district court to modify the appeals court’s allocation of costs, and indeed to read the Rule as giving the district court such power would undermine the authority of the appeals court to make the determination in the first place.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63316:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63318:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63318:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe United States captured the island of Guam from Spain in 1898, during the Spanish-American War. From 1903, the United States maintained military rule until the passage of the Guam Organic Act in 1950, which formally transferred power from the United States to Guam’s newly formed civilian government. Guam remains an “unincorporated territory of the United States.”\nIn the 1940s, the Navy constructed and operated the Ordot Dump for the disposal of municipal and military waste, allegedly including munitions and chemicals such as DDT and Agent Orange, and continued to use the landfill throughout the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Ordot Dump lacked basic environmental safeguards, and as a result, contaminants were released into the Lonfit River, which ultimately flows into the Pacific Ocean.\nIn 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added the Ordot Dump to its National Priorities List, and in 1988, it designated the Navy as a potentially responsible party. However, because the Navy had relinquished sovereignty over the island, Guam remained the owner and operator of the Ordot Dump. As such, the EPA repeatedly ordered Guam to propose plans for containing and disposing of waste at the landfill.\nIn 2002, the EPA sued Guam under the Clean Water Act, asking the court to require Guam to comply with the Act, in part by submitting plans and a compliance schedule for a cover system of the Ordot Dump, and by completing construction of the cover system. The EPA and Guam agreed that Guam would pay a civil penalty, close the Ordot Dump, and design a cover system. Guam closed the Ordot Dump in 2011.\nIn 2017, Guam sued the United States, alleging that the Navy was responsible for the Ordot Dump’s contamination and was thus responsible for the costs of closing and remediating the landfill. Guam’s claims rested on two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Section 107 allows for a “cost-recovery” action and Section 113(f) allows for a “contribution” action. The statute of limitations for the former action is six years, compared to only three for the latter. The district court concluded that Guam’s agreement with the EPA did not trigger section 113, so Guam could maintain its section 107 claim against the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63318:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63318:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63318:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nGuam can pursue its lawsuit against the federal government over the cleaning costs associated with the Ordot Dump. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nSubsection 113(f) allows a party to seek contribution “from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA” and provides that “a person who has resolved its liability to the United States . . . may seek contribution from any person who is not party to a settlement referred to in § 113(F)(2).” The language and structure of this statute support the interpretation that the right of contribution is predicated on CERCLA liability. Because the statutory language is best understood only in reference to CERCLA, the most natural reading of the provision is that a party may seek contribution under CERCLA only after settling a CERCLA-specific liability, not resolving environmental liability under some other law. Thus, the agreement between the EPA and Guam did not trigger the statute of limitations for seeking contribution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63318:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63319:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63319:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nHologic, Inc. and another company sued Minerva Surgical, Inc. for patent infringement (U.S. Patent Nos. 6,872,183 and 9,095,348). The patents relate to procedures and devices for endometrial ablation, which is a treatment involving the destruction of the lining of the uterus in order to treat menorrhagia, or abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding.\nBoth of the patents at issue list as an inventor Csaba Truckai, who assigned his interests in both patents to NovaCept, Inc., a company he co-founded. NovaCept was subsequently acquired by another company, and Hologic acquired that company. Hologic is the current assignee of both patents and sells the resulting NovaSure system throughout the United States.\nTruckai left NovaCept and, in 2008, founded the accused infringer in this case, Minerva Surgical. Truckai and others at Minerva developed the Endometrial Ablation System (EAS), which received FDA approval in 2015 for the same indication as Hologic’s NovaSure system.\nIn 2015, Hologic sued Minerva alleging that Minerva’s EAS infringed certain claims of its patents. Minerva asserted that the patents were invalid based on lack of enablement and failure to provide an adequate written description, and moreover were not patentable due to prior art. Hologic moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of assignor estoppel, which bars a patent’s seller from attacking the patent’s validity in subsequent patent infringement litigation. The court granted the motion as to both patents, based on the relationship between the inventor Truckai and his company Minerva. The court of appeals affirmed as to the infringement.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63319:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63319:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63319:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent can be barred under the doctrine of assignor estoppel from asserting a defense of invalidity if, and only if, the assignor’s claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations the assignor made in assigning the patent. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.\nThe doctrine of assignor estoppel dates back to late 18th-century England, and the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized and approved it in American jurisprudence in Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924). The doctrine is grounded in a principle of fairness, that an inventor should not be able to assert invalidity of a patent he assigned but can merely argue about how to construe the patent’s claims.\nThe Court refused to abandon the doctrine of assignor estoppel entirely, finding that doing so would have broad effects that contradict many of the Court’s precedents. Moreover, the principle of fairness that originally grounded the doctrine applies equally still. Specifically, when an inventor warrants that a patent claim is valid and then assigns it to another, his denial of the validity violates norms of equitable dealing. However, to fully serve that purpose of fairness, the doctrine has its limits. If the assignor did not make explicit or implicit representations that conflict with the invalidity defense, there is no ground for applying assignor estoppel. In this case, the Federal Circuit erred by not considering whether Hologic’s new claim was materially broader than the ones Truckai had assigned, which would mean that Truckai could not have warranted its validity when making the assignment.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority avoids answering the essential threshold question whether Westinghouse should be overruled and thus cannot answer the question presented in the petition in this case. Justice Alito would therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the majority recrafted a rule of assignor estoppel entirely different from that in Westinghouse. Because the Patent Act of 1952 does not incorporate the doctrine of assignor estoppel, Justice Barrett would hold the doctrine no longer applies.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63319:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63321:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63321:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nCongress amended the Clean Air Act through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in an effort to reduce the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels. The legislation set certain targets for replacing fossil fuels with renewable fuels but created several exemptions, including one for small refineries if compliance in a given year would impose disproportionate economic hardship.\nThe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated three different orders granting extensions of the small refinery exemption, but these orders were not made publicly available. A group of renewable fuels producers challenged the orders, alleging that the orders exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority. The Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that a small refinery may obtain an exemption only when it had received uninterrupted, continuous extensions of the exemption for every year since 2011.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63321:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63321:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63321:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA small refinery that previously received a hardship exemption may obtain an “extension” under §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) even if it saw a lapse in exemption coverage in a previous year. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion.\nAlthough the key term “extension” is not defined in the statute, three textual clues indicate that it means an extension in time. The plain meaning of the word “extension” in a temporal sense does not require unbroken continuity. Without modifiers like “successive” or “consecutive,” nothing in the statute suggests that a lapse in coverage precludes the extension.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Barrett argued that the question before the Court is simply whether the provision limits the EPA to prolonging exemptions currently in place, or instead allows the EPA to provide exemptions to refineries that lack them. Justice Barrett concluded that the text and structure of the statute make clear that the EPA cannot “extend” an exemption that a refinery no longer has.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63321:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63322:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63322:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nFor over a century after the Alaska Purchase in 1867, the federal government had no settled policy on recognition of Alaska Native groups as Indian tribes. In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which authorized the creation of two types of corporations to receive money and land: Alaska Native Regional Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations (collectively ANCs).\nIn 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) to “help Indian tribes assume responsibility for aid programs that benefit their members.” ISDA defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.”\nIn 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Title V of which makes certain funds available to the recognized governing bodies of any \"Indian Tribe\" as that term is defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). The Department of the Treasury concluded that ANCs were eligible to receive Title V funds.\nSix federally recognized tribes in Alaska and twelve federally recognized tribes in the lower 48 states challenged that determination, arguing that ANCs are not “Indian Tribes” within the meaning of the CARES Act or ISDA. Although the government conceded that ANCs have not been historically recognized as eligible for special programs and services because of their status as Indians, it nevertheless argued that Congress expressly included ANCs within the ISDA definition.\nThe district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that ANCs must qualify as Indian tribes to give effect to their express inclusion in the ISDA definition, even though no ANC has been recognized as an Indian tribe. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that ANCs are not eligible for funding under Title V of the CARES Act because they are not “recognized” as Indian tribes.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63322:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63322:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63322:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nAlaska Native Corporations (ANCs) are “Indian tribe[s]” under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) and thus eligible for funding available to “Tribal governments” under Title V of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.\nThe majority determined that under the plain meaning of the ISDA, ANCs are Indian tribes. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) is the only statute the ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition mentions by name, so eligibility for ANCSA’s benefits satisfies the definition’s final “recognized-as-eligible” clause. The respondents failed to demonstrate that the phrase “Indian tribe” is a term of art that should exclude ANCs, and none of their other arguments for reading “Indian tribes” as exclusive of ANCs were persuasive.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Elena Kagan. Justice Gorsuch argued that the plain language and construction of the ISDA suggest that ANCs are not “Indian tribes,” supported by analogy to another statute with “nearly identical language in remarkably similar contexts,” and that the majority overlooked the critical statutory word “recognized.”", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63322:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63323:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63323:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nTarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a “detectable” amount of cocaine base (3.9 grams), thus triggering the penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months’ imprisonment with 6 years’ supervised release.\nTerry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling of § 841(b) from 5 grams of cocaine base to 28 grams. The district court denied his motion, concluding that Terry did not commit a “covered offense” and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the statutory penalties for certain offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend § 841(b)(1)(C), Terry’s offense was not a “covered offense.”\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63323:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63323:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63323:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nCrack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) do not have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act because a sentence reduction under the Act is available only if an offender’s prior conviction of a crack cocaine offense triggered a mandatory minimum sentence. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court.\nAn offender is eligible for a sentence reduction only if he previously received “a sentence for a covered offense,” which the Act defines as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by” certain provisions in the Fair Sentencing Act. The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties only for offenses that triggered mandatory-minimum penalties. Because Terry was convicted for an offense that does not have a mandatory minimum, his offense was not a “covered offense” and thus was not eligible for a sentence reduction under the Act.\nJustice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. She expressly declined to join the majority’s “sanitized” description of the history of penalties for crack offenses and pointed out that because Terry was both convicted under subparagraph (C) and sentenced as a career offender, he never had a chance to ask for a sentence that reflects today’s understanding of the lesser severity of his crime, and he never will get that chance without action by the political branches.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63323:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63324:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63324:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nRefugio Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national, was granted permanent resident status in the United States in 1990. In 1991, he was convicted of a felony DUI in California, and he was subsequently deported because a DUI is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and felony DUI is an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided in United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001), that a DUI is not a crime of violence and later held that classification to apply retroactively. United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2013).\nPalomar-Santiago returned to live in the United States, this time without authorization. He was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), which requires a district court to dismiss a § 1326 indictment if the defendant proves (1) he exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) he was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review at the deportation hearing; and (3) that the deportation order was fundamentally unfair. However, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a defendant does not need to prove the first two elements if he can show the crime underlying the original removal was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and does not need to show the third element if he can show the removal should not have occurred at all.\nThe district court held that Palomar-Santiago met his burden in showing his crime was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and that he was wrongfully removed from the United States. On appeal, the federal government disputed that circuit precedent required the result the district court reached but argued that the precedent is wrong. Lacking authority to overturn circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed without addressing the merits of the government’s claims.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63324:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63324:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63324:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA defendant seeking dismissal of a prior deportation order must prove each statutory requirement for bringing such a collateral attack. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nSection 1326(d) requires that defendants charged with unlawful reentry “may not” challenge their underlying removal orders “unless” they “demonstrat[e]” each of three conditions. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation to the contrary—that the first two elements are not required if the noncitizen was removed for an offense that should not have rendered him removable—is incompatible with the text of that provision. The first element, exhaustion of administrative remedies, exists “precisely so noncitizens can challenge the substance of immigration judges’ decisions.” Additionally, all of the requirements apply regardless of whether the defendant alleges the removal order was procedurally flawed or substantively invalid.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63324:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63331:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63331:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nJoshua James Cooley was parked in his pickup truck on the side of a road within the Crow Reservation in Montana when Officer James Saylor of the Crow Tribe approached his truck in the early hours of the morning. During their exchange, the officer assumed, based on Cooley’s appearance, that Cooley did not belong to a Native American tribe, but he did not ask Cooley or otherwise verify this conclusion. During their conversation, the officer grew suspicious that Cooley was engaged in unlawful activity and detained him to conduct a search of his truck, where he found evidence of methamphetamine. Meanwhile, the officer called for assistance from county officers because Cooley “seemed to be non-Native.”\nCooley was charged with weapons and drug offenses in violation of federal law. He moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that Saylor was acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction as a Crow Tribe law enforcement officer when he seized Cooley, in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”). The district court granted Cooley’s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Saylor, a tribal officer, lacked jurisdiction to detain Cooley, a non-Native person, without first making any attempt to determine whether he was Native.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63331:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63331:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63331:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nA tribal police officer has the authority to detain temporarily and to search a non-tribe member traveling on a public right-of-way running through a reservation for potential violations of state or federal law. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.\nNative American tribes are “distinct, independent political communities” exercising a “unique and limited” sovereign authority within the United States. Among the limitations is the general lack of inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal members. However, the Court recognized two exceptions to this rule in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). First, a tribe may regulate the activities of non-tribal members “who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” Second, a tribe may “exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” The authority at issue in this case aligns with the second exception “almost like a glove.” None of the policing provisions Congress has enacted fit the circumstances of this case as well as the Court’s understanding in Montana, and particularly the second exception. Rather, legislation and executive action appear to assume that tribes retain the detention authority presented in this case.\nJustice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion noting that his agreement is limited to a narrow reading of the Court’s holding.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63331:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63332:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63332:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThis is an ongoing case of original jurisdiction, the facts of which are explained here. In sum, the case involves a water-rights dispute between Georgia and Florida over the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63332:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63332:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63332:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nFlorida failed to establish that Georgia’s overconsumption of interstate waters was either a substantial factor contributing to, or the sole cause of, Florida’s injuries. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion on behalf of the unanimous Court.\nTo succeed on its claim, Florida must show by the heightened “clear and convincing evidence” that the harm it suffered—collapse of its oyster fisheries—was caused by Georgia’s overconsumption. The record evidence establishes at most that increased salinity and predation contributed to the collapse of Florida’s fisheries, not that Georgia’s overconsumption caused the increased salinity and predation. Thus, Florida failed to meet its burden of persuasion, so its exceptions to the findings of the Special Master’s report are overruled, and the case is dismissed.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63332:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63335:Facts:0", "chunk_id": "63335:Facts:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Facts]\nThe Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717Z, permits private companies to exercise the federal government’s power to take property by eminent domain, subject to certain jurisdictional requirements. PennEast Pipeline Co. obtained federal approval to build a pipeline through Pennsylvania and New Jersey and sued under the NGA to gain access to the properties along the pipeline route, of which the State of New Jersey owns 42. New Jersey sought dismissal of PennEast’s lawsuits for lack of jurisdiction based on the state’s sovereign immunity and, separately, because PennEast failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the NGA.\nThe district court ruled in favor of PennEast and granted a preliminary injunctive relief for immediate access to the properties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding that while the NGA delegates the federal government’s eminent-domain power, it does not abrogate state sovereign immunity. PennEast’s lawsuits are thus barred by Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Facts", "heading": "", "id": "63335:Facts:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}
{"doc_id": "63335:Conclusion:0", "chunk_id": "63335:Conclusion:0:0", "text": "[Unknown Act > Conclusion]\nSection 717(h) of the Natural Gas Act authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to delegate to a private company the power to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or states. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.\nStates are generally immune from lawsuits unless they have consented or Congress has abrogated their immunity. With respect to the federal eminent domain power, the states waived their sovereign immunity when they ratified the Constitution. That power carries with it the ability to condemn property in court. Because the Natural Gas Act delegates the federal eminent domain power to private parties, those parties can initiate condemnation proceedings, including against state-owned property. This understanding is consistent with the nation’s history and the Court’s precedents. Thus, PennEast’s condemnation of New Jersey land to build the pipeline does not offend state sovereignty.\nJustice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Joining Justice Barrett’s dissenting opinion in full, Justice Gorsuch added only a clarification that states have two federal-law immunities from suit: structural immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The lower court should consider whether either type of immunity bars the suit.\nJustice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined. Justice Barrett argued that Congress’s power to strip states of their sovereign immunity is extremely limited, and there is no reason to treat private condemnation actions as within one of those limited exceptions.", "metadata": {"doc_type": "statute", "act": "Unknown Act", "section_path": "Conclusion", "heading": "", "id": "63335:Conclusion:0", "split_method": "section-or-paragraph"}}