[Unknown Act > Facts]
On August 31, 1961, Internal Revenue Agent Roger S. Davis visited Clauson’s Inn, located in North Falmouth, Massachusetts, as part of an investigation into possible tax evasion. He spoke with German S. Lopez, who operated the inn, to determine whether there was any dancing or other form of evening entertainment. Lopez denied it, but when Davis returned later that night, he saw dancing in the lounge and bar. On October 21, Davis returned to tell Lopez that the Inn might owe a cabaret tax and requested the Inn’s financial records. Lopez suggested that the two could reach an “agreement” and offered Davis $420 with a promise of more money if he dropped the issue. In Lopez’s version of the events, the money was for Davis to prepare the paperwork and put the Inn’s books in order. Lopez agreed to file paperwork for the current quarter and asked Davis to come back on October 24. Davis reported the meeting and turned the money over to his superior. When he returned on October 24, Davis wore a recording device. As they discussed Lopez’s tax liability, Lopez emphasized that he wanted Davis “on [his] side” and gave him more money.
Lopez was charged with four counts of attempted bribery of an internal revenue agent. Prior to trial, Lopez filed a motion to suppress the recorded evidence, and the motion was denied. He was convicted on three of the counts in district court. Although the defense did not focus on entrapment, the trial court judge provided jury instructions on the issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, No. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that entrapment only occurs when law enforcement professionals purposefully induce the commission of a crime. The petitioner’s offers of bribery happened before the agent responded in any favorable way, so the agent did not entrap the petitioner. Since the petitioner did not object to the jury instruction on entrapment at the time, he could not retroactively object. The Court also held that the wire recordings did not result from Davis misrepresenting himself. Lopez knew that Davis could use his statements against him if he chose to do so. The device only served to reliably record a conversation in which a government agent was a legal participant.
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the advances in recording technology required the Court to be vigilant about monitoring the constitutionality of their usage. In this case, he held that the recording only corroborated the legal testimony of the agent and was therefore admissible.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he stated that this case followed in the vein of On Lee v. United States, and both cases were wrongly decided. He argued that the recording was not merely a corroboration of earlier evidence but “independent third-party evidence.” He argued that the use of electronic recording devices revived the evils of the general warrant, which the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were written to prevent. He also argued that, in a conversation, the speaker assumes the risk that the other participant might repeat the conversation, but a wire recording adds a third party and another risk to the speaker’s privacy that he did not assume. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Arthur J. Goldberg joined the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
California prohibited the sale or transportation within its borders of avocados that did not meet a certain standard of maturity, which was defined according to oil content in its Agricultural Code. The federal Secretary of Agriculture used a different system for determining the maturity of avocados that were grown in Florida. Oil content was not a factor in these standards. Florida avocado growers tried to prevent the enforcement of the California law against them with regard to avocados that met the federal standard for maturity but did not have the oil level required by the California law.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Preemption does not arise if there is no direct conflict between federal and state laws, meaning that it is possible to comply with both of them simultaneously, and if the state law does not frustrate the purpose of the federal law.
In an opinion authored by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that federal law will preempt a state law if it is physically impossible to comply with both laws. In this situation, it would be possible to comply with both laws, since the Florida growers could have met the California standard if they had allowed their avocados more time to grow. This means that there was no inherent conflict between the two laws.
Justices White, Black, Douglas, and Clark dissented on the ground that the California statute was invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1959, Tennessee Gas Transmission Company filed a 7% proposed rate increase across all six of its zones with the Federal Power Commission. The rate increase was based on the expected cost of service and rate of return. The Commission imposed a five-month suspension period while hearings were conducted to determine whether the rate increase was reasonable. At the end of five months, the new rates would be applied, but they were subject to refund if the hearings found a reasonable rate lower than 7%. On August 9, 1960, the Commission found that only a 6 1/8% increase was reasonable and that Tennessee Gas must provide refunds.
Tennessee Gas challenged the ruling by arguing that requiring a refund prior to a final determination of cost made the company unable to recoup its 6 1/8%. Because Tennessee Gas spreads its rates differently across the different zones, there are certain zones in which the refund would be greater than the value of the new rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of Tennessee Gas.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Tom C. Clark delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that it is the company’s responsibility to determine a rate schedule that is “just and reasonable” in order to prevent the Commission from ordering a change. Additionally, since the company cannot expect to be able to recoup the losses it accrues during the five-month suspension period, it should not expect to recoup the losses during the readjustment period either. The Court also held that the Commission acted properly in order to protect consumers from excessive rates and charges, because Tennessee Gas was attempting to collect on an illegally high rate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
African American students in District 187 sued the school under the Civil Rights Act, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the school district contained an almost identical number of Caucasian and African American students, the petitioners alleged that the two races were taught in separate parts of the building and were compelled to use separate entrances and exits. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure exhaust administrative the remedies available under an Illinois law prohibiting segregation public schools. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for an 8-1 majority, reversed the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court held that exhausting state remedies was not a prerequisite to bringing a suit under the Civil Rights Act. It was also unclear that the Illinois law provided an adequate administrative remedy to preclude a suit in federal court. Justice John M. Harlan dissented, arguing that the Illinois law provided an adequate remedy.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A Maryland jury found John Brady and Charles Boblit guilty of first-degree murder in the state Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County. Brady maintained that he participated in the preceding robbery, but not in the killing. At sentencing, both men received the death penalty. After trial, Brady learned that Boblit previously confessed to the murder, but the prosecution suppressed that evidence for Brady’s trial. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that suppression of the confession denied Brady due process and remanded the case to reconsider the question of punishment only.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, No. In a 7-2 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion affirming the state court. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's suppression of evidence violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that according the Maryland state law, the confession would not exonerate Brady, so a remand only for reconsidering his punishment was proper.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In order to gain immediate possession of public land needed to build a dam, the United States sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Northern Division to condemn any outstanding mining claims on the land. The complaint asked the court to allow the United States to have the validity of any claims determined through administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior. Respondents sued to enjoin the administrative proceedings, but the District Court granted the United States summary judgment, holding that the court should wait for the administrative determination before proceeding with any mining claim. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that because the United States initiated the condemnation suit in District Court, the validity of mining claims must be left to the judiciary.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote for a unanimous court holding that the administrative proceedings were proper. Instituting the condemnation suit in District Court was an appropriate way to obtain possession and was not inconsistent with the administrative proceedings. The District Court was right to wait for the administrative determination.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The Employment Security Commission ruled that she could not receive unemployment benefits because her refusal to work on Saturday constituted a failure without good cause to accept available work. Under South Carolina law, employers were not allowed to require employees to work on Sunday.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from setting unemployment benefits eligibility requirements such that a person cannot properly observe key religious principles.
In a majority opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court held that the state's eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her faith. Furthermore, there was no compelling state interest which justified such a substantial burden on this basic First Amendment right.
Justices Douglas and Stewart concurred in separate opinions.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White, dissented on the ground that Seventh-Day Adventist was unavailable for Saturday work just as anyone who refuses Saturday work for personal reasons is unavailable, and that the effect of the Court's decision was to require South Carolina to make an exception in favor of those whose unavailability for work stems from religious convictions.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On June 30, 1960, several white and black people picketed the private Glen Echo Amusement Park in Montgomery County, Maryland. The demonstrators protested against the park's policy "not to have colored people on the rides, or in the park." During the demonstration, William Griffin and four other Negroes entered the park to test its management's resolve. A state deputy, who worked as a security staff member in the park, soon observed them. After informing them of the park's racial policy, the deputy asked them to leave. When Griffin and his friends refused, they were arrested and later convicted for criminal trespass. State appellate courts affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held that the arresting deputy, despite working as a private park employee at the time, possessed and acted under state authority, imputing responsibility for his actions to Maryland. Therefore, to the extent that he sought to enforce a private policy of racial discrimination, the state of Maryland must be charged with racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
187 black students were convicted in a magistrate's court of breach of the peace for peacefully assembling at the South Carolina State Government. Their purpose was to submit a protest of grievances to the citizens of South Carolina, and to the legislative bodies of South Carolina. During the course of the peaceful demonstration the police arrested the students after they did not obey an order to disperse. The students were convicted of breach of the peace. After their convictions were affirmed by the state supreme court, the students sought further review. They contended that there was a complete absence of any evidence of the commission of the offense and that they were thus denied due process of law.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows the Free Petition Clause to extend to the states as well as the federal government.
In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court reversed the criminal convictions of the black students. It was clear to the Court that in arresting, convicting, and punishing the students under the circumstances disclosed by the record, the state infringed the students' constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.
Justice Clark dissented.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
William Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in 1959 by Hartford, Connecticut police. After pleading guilty to pool selling, a misdemeanor, he was sentenced to one year in jail and fined $500, but the sentence was suspended after 90 days and Malloy was placed on two years probation. Some 16 months following his plea, a Superior Court appointed referee ordered Malloy to testify about gambling and other criminal activities in Hartford County. When Malloy refused, "on grounds it may tend to incriminate [him]" he was imprisoned for contempt and held until willing to answer questions. Malloy filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement. On appeal from the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors ruling, upholding an adverse Superior Court denial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a state. When determining if state officers properly obtained a confession, one must focus on whether the statements were made freely and voluntarily without any direct or implied promised or improper influence. Noting that the American judicial system is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment secures defendants against self-incrimination and compels state and federal officials to establish guilt by evidence that is free and independent of a suspect's or witnesses' statements.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A group of 15-20 African-American students entered Hooper's restaurant in Baltimore to engage in a sit-in to protest the restaurant's refusal to serve African-American patrons. They refused to leave when requested to do so by the hostess on behalf of Mr. Hooper, the president of the corporation that owned the restaurant. Mr. Hooper called the police, who told him that they needed a warrant to be able to do anything. After Mr. Hooper swore out a warrant, the students were arrested for violating a Maryland statute prohibiting trespassing. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, since the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions on January 9, 1962, Maryland had passed state and local laws that criminalized the conduct of Hooper's restaurant employees in refusing to serve the students because of their race. Under these statutes, the students' actions would not be illegal and their right to obtain service in the restaurant would be protected. The Court held that these laws supervened in this case because, although the convictions were affirmed in the Maryland Court of Appeals, the judgment was still not final as the case was before the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the ruling and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the new laws.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion should have reversed the judgment and directed the dismissal of the indictment. He wrote that the case should be decided on the merits and argued that policies allowing people to be refused service based on their race creates a second class of citizens, which the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were enacted to prevent. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg partially joined in the concurrence. In his separate concurrence, Justice Goldberg wrote that the Constitution guarantees all Americans the right to be treated equally with respect to public accommodations. He argued that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments have the express purpose of preventing any group from being treated as second-class citizens due to their race. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Douglas joined in the concurrence.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the application of a state's trespass laws in this case. He wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a state from prosecuting crimes against a person or person's property, as in the case of a trespass. Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel a private business owner to trade with anyone against his will, it does not prohibit a business owner from establishing rules regarding which customers he will or will not serve. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Farr, Whitlock & Co. contracted to buy sugar from a Cuban corporation. The corporation loaded the sugar on to the S.S. Hornfels, but in response to President Eisenhower reducing the Cuban sugar quota, Cuba issued a decree taking possession of the sugar. The Cuban government would only allow the sugar to leave Cuba if Farr, Whitlock entered into a new contract with Banco Nacional de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban government. After the sugar left Cuba, Farr, Whitlock refused to pay Banco Nacional. Banco Nacional sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover payment. The court granted summary judgment for Far, Whitlock, holding that Cuba’s taking of the sugar violated international law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an 8-1 decision, Justice John M. Harlan wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that it will not decide the validity of a decree by a foreign government absent a treaty or other agreement. It did not matter that the taking violated customary international law. The majority noted that a judicial decision on this issue without a treaty would strain U.S.-Cuba relations. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that he would decide the case on the merits, absent any specific objection to examining Cuba’s law under international law.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama, John M. Patterson, filed suit against the NAACP, a New York corporation advocating for equal rights for black Americans. He filed the action as an attempt to oust the association from the state. The claim alleged that the NAACP failed to comply with Alabama statutes requiring foreign corporations to register with the Alabama Secretary of State, along with other acts more clearly related to the NAACP’s political mission. That same day, the Attorney General obtained a restraining order barring the NAACP from conducting business in the state or attempting to comply with the statutory requirements in question. Before the case was heard on the merits, the court found the NAACP to be in contempt, in part for failing to comply with a court order requiring the NAACP to produce records.
The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the NAACP’s petition for a writ of certiorari. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held that requiring the NAACP to produce records including names and addresses of its members was a violation of those members’ freedom of association. The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, again affirmed the judgment of contempt, arguing that the Supreme Court’s judgment rested on the mistaken premise that Alabama had incorrectly interpreted its own procedural rules. The Supreme Court of the United States again remanded the case in a per curiam opinion, holding that the NAACP had satisfied the district court’s order even though the NAACP did not produce the membership lists.
The NAACP then filed an action in federal court, alleging that the Alabama courts were depriving the organization of its constitutional rights and seeking to enjoin enforcement of the trial court’s restraining order. The district court dismissed the action, but the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court, instructing the district court to retain jurisdiction only if Alabama state courts did not promptly try the NAACP’s case. The Supreme Court of the United States then ordered the district court to try the NAACP’s case unless the State of Alabama gave the NAACP a hearing before January 2, 1962. In December 1961, an Alabama circuit court decreed that the NAACP continued its activities in Alabama in violation of the laws and constitution of Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice John Harlan, the Court held that the form of the NAACP’s brief should not prevent it from obtaining a hearing in Alabama courts. Justice Harlan first determined whether the form of the NAACP's brief was a state question barring federal review. He noted that the Court had already ruled that most of the formal requirements deprived the NAACP of its federal constitutional rights. Justice Harlan cited the Court’s prior reasoning on the NAACP’s claim, confirming that novelty in state procedural requirements cannot prevent parties from seeking to vindicate their federal constitutional rights in state courts.
Justice Harlan also held that Alabama improperly applied the state registration requirements. He looked to the language of the statute, noting that the stated penalty for failure to comply was a forfeiture of one thousand dollars for each offense; there was no mention of permanent ouster in the statutory language. Justice Harlan determined that the purpose of the requirements was simply to ensure that foreign corporations would be amenable to suit in Alabama, and confirmed this interpretation through a brief overview of Alabama case law.
Turning to Alabama’s other allegations, Justice Harlan held that the vast majority of the NAACP’s actions did not violate any particular Alabama law, and all of its actions were constitutionally protected or controllable by other, more appropriate public remedies. Justice Harlan rejected Alabama’s contentions that the NAACP illegally 1) paid for two black students to attend the University of Alabama, 2) failed to disclose membership information, 3) made false allegations against state officials, 4) violated Alabama’s injunction, and 5) breached the peace, along with several other allegations. He argued that these activities were more related to the NAACP’s members’ freedom to associate for the collective advocacy of their ideas than to the NAACP’s privilege to do business in Alabama.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1955, Tennessee amended a statute that was based on the Atomic Energy Act and allowed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its contractors to operate without paying sales tax. Under the amended statute, contractors must pay a contractor’s tax, regardless of the source or destination of the product. Union Carbide Corp, H.K. Ferguson Co. — both of which hold AEC contracts — and the AEC sued Tennessee to recover the sales and contractor’s tax.
The trial court dismissed the suit due to the existing statute, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld state’s right to collect a contractor’s tax, but found that the companies should be reimbursed for the sales tax.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Constitution creates immunity from state taxes for the federal government and its properties, but that protection does not extend to federal contractors. Although a contractor may provide goods only to the federal government, the company still enters into a contract that results in financial compensation. Therefore, the contractor always stands to benefit financially and should not be immune from taxation. In this case, the Atomic Energy Commission chose to contract to separate companies rather than hire its own employees, so it may not confer tax immunities onto those contractors.
In his concurring opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that this case might have been a good opportunity to reconsider the issue of federal immunity from state taxes. However, given the legislative history surrounding this case, he concurred in the judgment of the court.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A jury convicted Harold Fahy and William Arnold of willful injury to public property, for painting black swastikas on the Beth Israel Synagogue in Norwalk, Connecticut. The judge admitted a can of black paint and a paintbrush into evidence. A police officer obtained these items during a warrantless search of Fahy’s garage. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut found that the brush and paint were products of an illegal search and should not have been admitted. The court affirmed the convictions, however, holding that the error in admitting the evidence was harmless.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the convictions, holding that the error was prejudicial. The evidence itself was incriminating and the prosecution used it to corroborate opinion testimony that the brush matched the markings on the synagogue. Justice John M. Harlan dissented, expressing that the U.S. Supreme Court should not interfere with state court findings on harmless errors. Justice Tom C. Clark, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Byron R. White joined the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After Winston Massiah was indicted on federal narcotics charges, he retained counsel, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. While on bail, Massiah had a conversation with one of his codefendants in the absence of counsel. Unknown to Massiah, the codefendant became a government informer and allowed police to install a radio transmitter under the seat of his car. A nearby government agent listened to the entire conversation by way of this transmitter. Massiah made several incriminating statements. At trial, the agent who listened to the conversation testified to the incriminating statements over Massiah’s objection. The codefendant never testified. A jury convicted Massiah and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that incriminating statements deliberately elicited by federal agents in the absence of counsel after the proceeding has begun violate the Sixth Amendment. The prosecution could not use these statements as evidence against Massiah. Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the statements should be admitted because they were voluntarily made and not coerced. The absence of counsel was only one factor among many the court should consider in this situation.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The WMCA, acting on behalf of several New York City registered voters, challenged the constitutionality of Article III, Sections 2-5 of the New York State constitution alleging that its apportionment formula resulted in unfair weighting of both state legislature houses by favoring lesser populated rural areas over densely populated urban centers. On appeal from a dismissal of their complaint by a three-judge district court, the Supreme Court granted the WMCA certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-to-3 decision, the Court began by noting that this case was property before it since no other political relief was available to the WMCA. The Court then held that New York's apportionment formula violated the Equal Protection Clause since it did not apportion the state's senate and assembly substantially on a population basis. Consequently, New York's legislative apportionment scheme significantly undervalued the weight of urban area voters as compared with their rural and less densely populated counterparts. This practice constituted a form of geographical discrimination that violated notions of equal protection.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
James P. Wesberry resided in a Georgia congressional district with a population two to three times greater than that of other congressional districts in the state. He asserted that because there was only one congressman for each district, his vote was debased as a result of the state apportionment statute and the state's failure to realign the congressional districts. Wesberry sought to invalidate the apportionment statute and enjoin defendants, the Governor and Secretary of State, from conducting elections under it. The district court dismissed the complaint for non-justiciability and want of equity. Wesberry appealed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Congressional districts must have roughly equal populations if this is feasible.
In an opinion authored by Hugo L. Black, the 6-3 majority held that the district court had jurisdiction because debasement of the right to vote as a result of a state congressional apportionment law was justiciable and not subject to dismissal for "want of equity." The Court further held that the apportionment statute was invalid because it abridged the requirement of Article 1, section 2 of the Constitution that The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.
Justice Clark concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the trial court erred in dismissing the case for nonjusticiability and want of equity, but stated further that Article 1, section 2, does not forbid disproportionate congressional districts and that the case should be remanded for a hearing to determine whether the apportionment statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the Constitution expressly provides that state legislatures and Congress have exclusive jurisdiction over problems of congressional apportionment of the type involved in the case.
Justice Stewart stated that he joined with Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent except insofar as there might be implied in that dissent the view that the issues were not justiciable.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1961, M.O. Sims, David J. Vann (of Vann v. Baggett), John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett), and other voters from Jefferson County, Alabama, challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. Lines dividing electoral districts had resulted in dramatic population discrepancies among the districts. The state constitution required at least one representative per county and senatorial district. However, the district in Jefferson County, which is near Birmingham, contained 41 times as many eligible voters as those in another district of the state. Sims and the other voters argued that this lack of proportionality prevented them from effectively participating in a republican form of government.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Equal protection requires that state legislative districts should be comprised of roughly equal populations if possible.
In an 8-to-1 decision authored by Justice Earl Warren, the Court upheld the challenge to the Alabama system, holding that Equal Protection Clause demanded "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens...." Noting that the right to direct representation was "a bedrock of our political system," the Court held that both houses of bicameral state legislatures had to be apportioned on a population basis. States were required to "honest and good faith" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal population as practicable.
Justice Stewart concurred, agreeing with Warren that the Court could intervene to address egregious situations of misapportionment, Stewart sought to limit the application of this decision to clear violations of equal protection. He felt wary of imposing specific guidelines on states for how to redraw the district lines or setting a certain range of ratios that would be acceptable.
Justice Harlan dissented, applying an originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which in his opinion had not been meant by the drafters to protect voting rights. He suggested that the Court was intruding on federalism principles protecting the states in their control of local matters.
Justice Clark concurred in a separate opinion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Under its 1867 Constitution, the State of Maryland's Senate has 29 seats, one for each of 23 counties and six for the City of Baltimore's legislative districts. The State's five most populous political subdivisions with over three-fourths of the 1960 population are represented by only slightly over one-third of the Senate's membership. In the House of Delegates, after temporary legislation in 1962, there existed a maximum population-variance ratio of almost 6-to-1. A group of residents, taxpayers, and voters brought suit, alleging that the legislative malapportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, the circuit court held that as to certain counties there was invidious discrimination in the apportionment of the House and that the senatorial apportionment was constitutional. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 opinion deliver by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that neither house of the Maryland Legislature is apportioned sufficiently on a population basis to be constitutionally sustainable, based on the Court's ruling in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Finding that the validity of the apportionment of both houses of the Maryland legislature were before it, the Court found that neither house could be sustained under the Equal Protection Clause because of the gross disparities from population-based representation in the apportionment of Senate seats. "Maryland's plan is plainly insufficient under the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause as spelled out in our opinion in Reynolds," wrote Chief Justice Warren. Justice John M. Harlan dissented.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186) Richard Sincock and several other New Castle County residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters, challenged the constitutionality of Delaware's apportionment scheme. The suit alleged that under Delaware's 1897 state constitution, no provisions existed for reapportionment that would reflect the changing demographic face of New Castle County and the City of Wilmington. On a appeal from a three-judge district court ruling against the state of Delaware, the Supreme Court granted Mabel Roman, Delaware's elections clerk, certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision the Court held that Delaware's apportionment practices, as codified in its state constitution both before and after a 1963 amendment, violated the Due Process Clause. Delaware's system of having one upper house apportioned on a geographical basis and one lower house apportioned on population basis was unconstitutional since population is the only permissible guide to apportionment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
During the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the New York Times published an ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law.
When the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel action against the Times and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the Times appealed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
To sustain a claim of defamation or libel, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant knew that a statement was false or was reckless in deciding to publish the information without investigating whether it was accurate.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled for the Times. When a statement concerns a public figure, the Court held, it is not enough to show that it is false for the press to be liable for libel. Instead, the target of the statement must show that it was made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity. Brennan used the term "actual malice" to summarize this standard, although he did not intend the usual meaning of a malicious purpose. In libel law, “malice” had meant knowledge or gross recklessness rather than intent, since courts found it difficult to imagine that someone would knowingly disseminate false information without a bad intent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On November 2, 1962, Jim Garrison, the District Attorney for the Parish of New Orleans, held a press conference in which he issued a statement disparaging the judicial conduct of the eight judges of the Parish’s Criminal District Court. He attributed the backlog of pending cases to the judges’ inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations. Based on these statements, Garrison was tried and convicted of defamation under the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Garrison appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and argued that the statute impermissibly infringed on his First Amendment rights to freedom of expression.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a criminal libel statute should conform to the same restrictions as civil libel statutes to protect the freedom of expression under the First Amendment. Therefore, such statutes may only criminalize statements that are knowingly false or made with a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. This limitation on libel statutes is in line with the precedent the Court established in New York Times v. Sullivan, and there is no reason that the freedom of speech protections should apply differently to a civil libel statute than to a criminal one. Based on this standard, the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute is unconstitutionally broad and infringes on the First Amendment’s protections of free speech.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black wrote that the First Amendment protects citizens from being punished by the government for expressing an opinion, and therefore there should be no law permitting criminal punishment for libel. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the concurrence. Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he argued that that the standard the majority opinion seeks to apply to criminal libel statutes does not adequately protect the freedom of speech. Justice Black joined in the concurring opinion. In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Arthur J. Goldberg wrote that the Constitution protects the absolute right of citizens and the press to criticize official conduct.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, granted an order to arrest debtor, Morris Gotthilf. Gotthilf appealed the decision, arguing that the statute authorizing arrest to enforce collection of debts violated the New York State and U.S. Constitutions. The Supreme Court of New York dismissed the appeal, because the original order was not final. Gotthilf did not file for leave to appeal certified questions before appealing the the U.S. Supreme Court as is required by New York law for non-final orders.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No answer. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The Court explained that it did not have jurisdiction because the original order was not a final judgment. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, writing that the majority’s result was unexpected and causes irreparable injury to Gotthilf because it is too late for him to appeal through the proper channels.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Acting on behalf of several voters in the Denver area, Andres Lucas sued various officials connected with Colorado's elections challenging the apportionment of seats in both houses of the Colorado General Assembly. Under Colorado's apportionment plan, the House of Representatives was apportioned on the basis of population but the apportionment of the Senate was based on a combination of population and other factors (geography, compactness and contiguity, accessibility, natural boundaries, and conformity to historical divisions). Consequently, counties with only about one-third of the State's total population would elect a majority of the Senate; the maximum population-variance ratio would be about 3.6-to-1; and the chief metropolitan areas, with over two-thirds of the State's population, could elect only a bare majority of the Senate. When a three-judge District Court upheld the plan, stressing its recent approval by the electorate, the Supreme Court granted Lucas certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires all districts to be substantially apportioned on a population bases. While noting that some deviation from strict population considerations may be permitted to offset minor underrepresentations of one group or another, the wholesale neglect of population considerations is unconstitutional. The Court added that although a majority of the Colorado electorate approved its apportionment scheme, this cannot override even a single individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote. The apportionment of Colorado's Senate rendered population considerations virtually insignificant, and was therefore unconstitutional.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1951, a group of African American students in Prince Edward County, Virginia filed a complaint in district court alleging that the Virginia laws requiring segregated schools denied them their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law. When the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, this case and others like it were remanded to the lower courts to order desegregation. Prince Edward County resisted desegregation by refusing to levy and collect the school taxes for the 1959-1960 school year, which forced the public schools in the county to close. The Prince Edward School Foundation formed to ensure private education for the white students. African American students did not receive formal education from 1959 until 1963, when federal, state, and county authorities collaborated to hold desegregated classes in county-owned buildings. In 1960, the Prince Edward Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance providing tuition grants for the children attending the private schools of the Prince Edward School Foundation.
In 1961, the petitioners amended their original complaint to include new respondents and the elements of failing to provide public free schools in the county and using public funds to pay for segregated private schools. The district court held that the county could not pay the tuition grants as long as the public school remained closed, but the court refrained from making a decision regarding the closed public schools until the Virginia courts ruled on the issue. Later, without waiting for the decision of the Virginia courts, the district court held that the public schools must reopen. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decisions on the grounds that the district court should have waited until the state courts determined the validity of the tuition grants and the closing of the public schools.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black authored the opinion of the 7-2 majority, in which the Court held that the closing of the county’s schools denied the African American children an education that was available to their white peers. Although the closing of public schools is not unconstitutional in itself, when schools are closed for the express purpose of denying education to a group of children based on race, the action violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the district court had the power to order the county to collect the necessary taxes and to reopen the public schools.
In a jointly filed dissenting opinion, Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice John M. Harlan disagreed with the holding that the district court could order the county to reopen the public schools.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder. Escobedo appealed the affirmation of his conviction of murder by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which held that petitioner's confession had been admissible even though it was obtained after he had requested and been denied the assistance of counsel.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
As soon as someone is in the custody of law enforcement, he or she has a Sixth Amendment right to speak to an attorney.
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Goldberg, the Court ruled that Escobedo’s Sixth Amendment rights had been violated. The Court reasoned that the period between arrest and indictment was a critical stage at which an accused needed the advice of counsel perhaps more than at any other. A suspect who was being interrogated by police while in custody, who had not been warned of his right to remain silent, and who had requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, had been denied the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Any statement elicited under such circumstances could not be used against him at a criminal trial. The Court therefore reversed Escobedo’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Justice Harlan dissented, opining that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois should be affirmed because the majority's conclusion would unjustifiably fetter legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement.
Justice Stewart dissented on the grounds that the right to assistance of counsel should not attach until the formal institution of proceedings by indictment, information, or arraignment, and that the majority's holding would have an unfortunate impact on the fair administration of criminal justice.
Justice White, joined by Clark and Stewart, dissented on the grounds that the majority's decision will be applicable whenever the accused becomes a suspect, rendering admissions to the police inadmissible unless the accused waives his right to counsel and rendering the task of law enforcement more difficult.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On June 14, 1960 at around 1 a.m., Nathan Jackson and Nora Elliot entered a Brooklyn hotel and registered for a room. Jackson drew a gun and took money from the clerk, then ordered the clerk and others upstairs before leaving the hotel. Outside, Jackson encountered a policeman. Both men drew their guns, and in the ensuing altercation, the policeman was fatally wounded and Jackson was shot twice. When a police detective questioned Jackson at the hospital around 2 a.m., he admitted to the robbery and to shooting the police officer. Jackson received pain medication and was questioned again around 4 a.m. He again admitted to the robbery and the shooting. An hour later, Jackson was taken into the operating room.
Jackson and Elliot were indicted and tried together. His two confessions were admitted into evidence without objection. In his testimony, Jackson testified to being pressured into answering questions in the hospital, which the state denied. Consistent with New York practice, the question of the validity of the confession was submitted to the jury along with the other issues. The jury found Jackson guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Jackson submitted a petition for habeas corpus alleging that the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of confession was unconstitutional and that his statement was involuntary. The district court denied the petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the New York procedure did not allow for a reliable determination of whether or not the confessions were voluntary. Because the judge does not rule on the issue and the jury only reports on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, there is no way to determine whether the jury found he confession voluntary. Without this information, there is no way to ensure that the defendant’s rights are protected. The Court also held that, in cases where there is insufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty without the confession, the jury will take the defendant’s guilt into account when considering the voluntariness of the confession. Because there are issues of fact in question, the Court remanded the case to that state courts, rather than the federal court.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that the question of whether a confession is voluntary should remain in the hands of the jury, per the New York procedure. Allowing the judge to rule on the voluntariness of the statement prior to the jury could only distort the jury’s findings and downgrade the value of the trial by jury. He agreed with the majority that the statements in this case were involuntary. Justice Tom C. Clark joined in the opinion concurring part and dissenting in part.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Tom C. Clark argued that the New York procedure was not in question because no objection was raised when the evidence was introduced in trial. Because this objection was not raised, it was improper for the majority to rule on the issue. He also argued that the question of voluntariness of a statement is an issue for the jury to consider, not a trial judge.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent and argued that issues such as the voluntariness of a confession should be decided by the jury, as the jury trial is the cornerstone of the US judicial system. He also argued that the majority’s opinion was inconsistent with previous rulings that upheld that primacy of the jury. Additionally, Justice Harlan wrote that limits should only be placed on the states’ ability to prevent criminal conduct when their actions infringe on “rights fundamental to a decent society,” which he argues this issue does not. Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Acting on behalf of residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters in Arlington and Fairfax County, Virginia, Harrison Mann challenged Virginia's 1962 amended statutory apportionment scheme as unrepresentative. Harrison called for a redistribution of legislative representation among the counties and independent cities of the state "substantially in proportion to their respective populations." When Levin Davis appealed an adverse three-judge district court ruling on behalf of Virginia's Secretary and State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court noted that under the Fourteenth Amendment all bicameral state legislatures must substantially apportion both seats of their houses on a population basis. In Virginia's case, neither of its legislative houses was apportioned on a population basis. Virginia's claim that the underrepresented counties were composed primarily of military personnel and their families, who often only resided in the state for relatively short periods of time, did not constitute a defense to its actions. Instead, this amounted to discrimination against a class of individuals merely because of the nature of their employment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Taylor Street Pharmacy in Columbia, South Carolina, allowed both black and white customers to buy goods and purchase food, but only the white customers were allowed to sit and eat at the lunch counter. On March 15, 1960, the petitioners, five black college students, sat at the counter and waited to be served. The previous day, the store manager arranged for police officers to be present in case of such a situation. After announcing that he would not serve the students and requesting that they leave, the store manager and one of the officers spoke individually to each petitioner. When they would not leave, the petitioners were arrested and charged criminal trespass and breach of the peace. The Recorder’s Court convicted the petitioners, and the County Court affirmed, as did the Supreme Court of South Carolina.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that there was no evidence that the petitioners’ conduct was anything other than polite and could not be construed as a breach of the peace. Given that the only evidence for a potential breach of peace was in the actions of hostile onlookers, there was no reason to arrest and convict the petitioners.
Justice William O. Douglas concurred and cited the reasons stated in his opinion in Bell v. Maryland. In his opinion in that case, Justice Douglas argued that the segregation of public places drastically and negatively affects the lives of black Americans. It is a relic of slavery and second-class citizenship that is antithetical to the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg concurred and cited the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in Bell v. Maryland. Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the concurrence.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black argued that the conviction for trespassing should stand, as the police acted correctly in removing the petitioners from the property after they had been asked to leave. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Byron R. White joined in the concurrence.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After a car accident in South Carolina, Hanna brought a claim against Plumer, the executor of the estate of the driver who hit him. Since Hanna was a resident of Ohio, and Plumer was a resident of Massachusetts, the case was heard by a federal court in Massachusetts sitting in diversity jurisdiction. Plumer was served by leaving copies of the summons with his wife, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Plumer successfully sought summary judgment at trial because Massachusetts law requires service to be delivered by hand.
The parties argued on appeal over how the Erie doctrine applied to this case. Plumer asserted that it would find a question to be substantive rather than procedural under the outcome-determinative test when applying federal law would alter the outcome of the case. He pointed out that applying federal law would change the outcome of the case, which otherwise would be dismissed, so the state procedural requirements and the grant of summary judgment should be upheld.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In cases when it is rationally possible to classify a law as either substantive or procedural, the federal courts have the authority to control their own practice and pleading procedures.
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Warren, the Court ruled for Hanna. To raise the Erie doctrine, the Court reasoned, the effect of a procedural rule on the outcome of a case must abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive law. There was no change to a substantive right here because the plaintiff simply could refile the case or serve the defendant personally. This issue thus related only to procedural requirements, so applying the outcome-determinative test was not appropriate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On June 7, 1960, Arthur Hamm, Jr. and Reverend C. A. Ivory, both black, entered McCrory’s Five and Ten Cent Store in Rock Hill, South Carolina. They made several purchases, then tried unsuccessfully to purchase food at the lunch counter. The store manager asked Hamm and Ivory to leave, but they refused to do so. The manager called the police, who again asked Hamm and Ivory to leave before finally arresting them.
The city of Rock Hill charged Hamm with willfully and unlawfully trespassing at McCrory’s, in violation of city and state laws. He was tried in district court without a jury, found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of one hundred dollars or serve thirty days in jail. The Court of General Sessions and the Supreme Court of South Carolina both affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court of South Carolina cited other South Carolina cases involving sit-down demonstrations, noting that those defendants consistently and unsuccessfully invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections.
The Civil Rights Act, passed in 1964 while his appeal was pending, declared that all persons should be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court held in a combined case that sit-in demonstrations could not be the subject of federal or state trespass prosecutions, and that any such convictions on appeal must be reversed. Justice Clark noted that the Court historically gave weight to the common law doctrine of abatement, which applied changes in law that occur after a trial court’s judgment but before the decision of an appellate court to the original judgment. He explained that this rule did not depend on the explicit intention of Congress. As the Civil Rights Act clearly prevented the federal prosecution of individuals for attempting to make use of public accommodations, Justice Clark held that it must also prevent state prosecutions through the supremacy clause. He declined to answer the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment alone prevented similar prosecutions at the state or federal level.
Justices William O. Douglas and Arthur J. Goldberg concurred. Justice Douglas characterized the Civil Rights Act as a means of enforcing protections already enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, there was no real issue with applying it retroactively to already unconstitutional state prosecutions.
Justice Hugo Black dissented. He read nothing in the Civil Rights Act to suggest that Congress intended to reverse sit-in trespassing convictions that occurred before the act took effect.
Justice John Harlan dissented. He rejected the majority’s assumption that the doctrine of abatement required courts to apply a federal change in law to Hamm’s state conviction through the supremacy clause.
Justice Potter Stewart dissented. He argued that a state’s abatement policy was determined by that state, not by federal courts.
Justice Byron White dissented. He could not discern any constitutional problem with Hamm’s state court conviction, and was confident that Congress did not intent to abate similar existing convictions through the Civil Rights Act. He noted Congress’ silence on the issue.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On December 14, 1961, the Baton Rouge police arrested 23 members of the Congress of Racial Equality ("CORE") on a charge of illegal picketing. In response B. Elton Cox, a leading member of CORE, and others planned to march through parts of Baton Rouge, LA, ending with a demonstration at the courthouse. An estimated 1,500 to 3,800 protesters demonstrated during the hearings of the 23 jailed members.
Baton Rouge Police Chief Wingate White confronted the protestors when they arrived at the courthouse, telling them that they must confine the demonstration "to the west side of the street" within a designated period of time. After the group began their demonstration, a sheriff ordered them to disperse. Officers then forcibly dispersed the demonstration and arrested several demonstrators, including Cox.
Cox was charged with four offenses under Louisiana law: criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse. He was acquitted of criminal conspiracy but convicted of the other three offenses. In accordance with Louisiana procedure, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed his "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" convictions on certiorari, and the "courthouse picketing" conviction on appeal, and the court affirmed all three convictions. Cox appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that all three statutes were unconstitutionally vague. This case (No. 24) addresses the "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" statutes, while the second case (No. 49) addresses the "courthouse picketing" statute.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Louisiana's "disturbing the peace" statute is unconstitutional on its face because it is vague in its overly broad scope, and the policy of Baton Rouge law enforcement of giving officers complete discretion in enforcing the "obstructing public passages" statute deprives Cox of his constitutional rights to freedom of speech and assembly. In a decision authored by Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, the Court was unanimous in finding the "disturbing the peace" statute unconstitutionally vague, and a majority of the Court (7-2) found that Cox's conviction for "obstructing public passages" violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Justices Hugo L. Black and Tom C. Clark each filed concurring opinions as to the "disturbing the peace" statute. Justices Black and Clark also concurred as to the "obstructing public passages" conviction, with Justice Byron R. White, joined by Justice John M. Harlan, dissenting as to that issue.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Since the late 19th century, Texas sold land to facilitate settlement in the state and construction of schools. If, however, a purchaser missed an interest payment on the property, the land was immediately forfeited back to the state unless the owner made the payment before the land could be re-sold. Under this program, Greenbury Simmons purchased and then forfeited some land in 1947. Just over five years later he offered to pay the interest to re-acquire the property. The state refused to comply with his wishes citing a 1941 amendment to its law which gave individuals five years to claim their forfeited land. Simmons's land was sold to the City of El Paso in 1955.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
While the Court agreed that the power of a state to modify the obligation of a contract is not limitless, it found that the 1941 amendment was not offensive to the Contract Clause. Justice White reasoned that the amendment was enacted with the intent of restoring "confidence in the stability and integrity of land titles" and to rectify difficulties that mineral speculators were creating for the state as it attempted to implement its land sale program. White argued that the five-year limit provided "purchasers with a bona fide interest in their lands" plenty of time to rescue their property while it served an important state interest of encouraging defaulting purchasers to comply with their contractual obligations to Texas.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 forbids any member of the Communist Party from serving as an executive officer of a labor union, with the goal of preventing politically-motivated strikes that would pose a danger to the national economy. Archie Brown, a San Francisco longshoreman and admitted member of the Communist Party, was three times elected to the executive board of the local International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union from 1959 through 1961. On May 24, 1961, Brown was charged with violating section 504 of the LMRDA. No evidence was presented at trial suggesting that Brown was involved in any other illegal activity or plotting a political strike. Brown was found guilty and sentenced to six months in prison. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the conviction and found that section 504 violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. In response to appeal by the United States to the Supreme Court, Brown also argued that section 504 constitutes a bill of attainder, a law that targets a single individual or group, and therefore violates Article I, Section 9.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, section 504 violates Article I of the Constitution. In 5-4 opinion authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court found that section 504 was indeed a bill of attainder. Section 504, the Chief Justice argued, "plainly" constituted a bill of attainder, defined in the opinion as "legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups," by designating "in no uncertain terms the persons who posses the feared characteristics." After finding that section 504 violated the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Court found no need to address questions pertaining to the First and Fifth Amendments.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
A right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights, and this right prevents states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Douglas, the Court ruled that the Constitution did in fact protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on contraception. While the Court explained that the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicted with the exercise of this right and was therefore held null and void.
Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Warren and Brennan, concurred. Rather than finding that the right to privacy was contained in imaginary penumbras, Goldberg located it in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Harlan concurred, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to privacy.
Justice White concurred, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was the proper basis for the decision.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Unpersuaded by the loose reasoning of the majority, Black felt that there was no way to infer that the Constitution contained a right to privacy. He also dismissed the views of the concurrences that it could be found in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Black, filed a separate dissenting opinion. Stewart argued that despite his personal view that the law was "uncommonly silly," he felt that the Court had no choice but to find it constitutional.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Seeger was convicted for refusing to be inducted into the armed forces. He argued that he was subject to the exemption under Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which provides that conscientious objectors need not serve in the armed forces if they have a specific religious training or belief that is related to a Supreme Being. Seeger was a genuine pacifist who made his objection in good faith, but he was denied the exemption because he did not believe in a Supreme Being, since he was agnostic about the existence of God. On the other hand, the root of his objection was based on religious study and faith rather than his personal morals. He argued that the provision containing the exemption was unconstitutional because it required proof of a belief in a Supreme Being.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
A person can have conscientious objector status based on a belief that has a similar position in that person's life to the belief in God.
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clark, the Court ruled that the statute was constitutional. Since there are over 250 religious groups in the United States, the Court reasoned, Congress could not be expected to specifically cover each of them in this federal law. In general, a conscientious objection is based on a religious belief rather than political, sociological, or philosophical views. The term "Supreme Being" should be interpreted to cover all types of faith, and the defendant's belief system fell within them, so it qualified for the exemption. However, the statute was held to be constitutional on its face.
Justice Douglas concurred.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans. The government sought to enjoin the motel from discriminating on the basis of race under Title II.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Commerce Clause extends the anti-discrimination provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to hotels that host travelers from outside the state.
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clark, the Court held the government could enjoin the motel from discriminating on the basis of race under the Commerce Clause. Since the motel was positioned near Interstates 75 and 85 and received most of its business from outside Georgia, this showed that it had an impact on interstate commerce, which is all that is needed to justify Congress in exercising the Commerce Clause power.
Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg concurred in a separate opinion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Ollie McClung argued that his restaurant could not be prohibited from discriminating against African Americans because Congress did not have power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His restaurant, Ollie's Barbecue, was located on a major road in Birmingham, Alabama and was close to an interstate highway. Half of its food came from outside Alabama, although its suppliers were local. It served a meaningful number of customers from outside the state.
He argued that his business was small and had no impact on interstate commerce, and that he did provide limited services to African Americans. McClung prevailed in federal district court and received an injunction barring the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act against Ollie's Barbecue.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Federal laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply not only to restaurants that serve interstate travelers, but also to restaurants that use food that has traveled in interstate commerce, which must provide fully equal access to African Americans.
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clark, the Court held McClung could be barred from discriminating against African Americans under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court reasoned that discrimination in restaurants posed significant burdens on "the interstate flow of food and upon the movement on products generally." Furthermore, discrimination also posed restrictions on blacks who traveled from state to state. The Court concluded that the Civil Rights Act was a rational way to protect interstate commerce because it could be expected to reduce the discrimination that undermined it.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On the night of June 16, 1962, a man later identified by a witness as Bob Granville Pointer entered a 7-11 Food Store and robbed the manager, Kenneth W. Phillips, of more than $300. The man then fled the store, and Phillips observed him talking to another man at a nearby intersection. A police dog led officers across the street from the 7-11 store to the front yard of a nearby residence, where Pointer was standing. A search of Pointer's person revealed eighty-one dollars in his billfold, and a later search revealed sixty-five dollars hidden in a discarded shoe.
The police arrested Pointer and Lloyd Earl Dillard and took them before a state judge for a preliminary hearing; the state charged them with robbing Phillips of $375 by assault, violence, or by putting in fear of life or bodily injury, in violation of Texas law. An assistant attorney general conducted the prosecution and examined witnesses, but neither of the defendants had a lawyer. Dillard tried to cross-examine Phillips, but Pointer did not.
Pointer was indicted on the robbery charge. At trial, Pointer testified on his own behalf, denying his alleged role in the robbery and swearing he had never been in the 7-11 store. The state offered a transcript of Phillips' testimony as evidence because Phillips had since moved out of Texas and did not intend to return. The defense objected to the use of the transcript as a denial of Pointer's right to confront a witness. The trial judge overruled because Pointer was present at the preliminary hearing, and Pointer was convicted. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction, rejecting Pointer's claim that the use of the transcript violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation required Texas to allow Pointer an opportunity to confront Dillard through counsel. Justice Black declined to answer whether the Sixth Amendment required Texas to appoint counsel to represent Pointer at a preliminary hearing. Justice Black described the history of the Sixth Amendment in the Court, writing that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed the right to counsel on the states. He emphasized the importance of a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him and described it as a fundamental right.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II concurred in the result, rejecting the majority's assumption that Sixth Amendment rights were incorporated and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, he argued that a right of confrontation was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the result, also disagreeing that the states were limited by the Sixth Amendment. He characterized the right to cross-examine as one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial.
Justice Arthur Goldberg concurred. He emphasized that the Court largely agreed that certain basic rights were fundamental and not to be denied by either state or federal governments under the Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In United States v. California (1947), the Court ruled that the federal government owned rights to the undersea land off the California coast, an area with rich oil and mineral deposits. The Court held that California's rights were limited to low and inland waters and appointed a special master to better define the limits of California's land rights. In a report filed in 1952, the special master based his definition on the one used by the federal government in foreign relations. In 1953, before the Court considered the special master's report, Congress passed the Submerged Land Act, granting to the states' ownership of underwater land within their borders "as they existed at the time such State became a member of the Union." The act limited states' seaward rights, however, to no more than three miles from the coastline. The act also acknowledged states' ownership of land beneath inland waters. The act gave no specific definition of either "coastline" or "inland waters" and did not address bodies of water adjoining the sea, such as bays.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The rights belong to the federal government. In a 5-2 decision authored by Justice John M. Harlan, the Court adopted the approach used by the special master and applied the definition used by the United States in foreign relations. Justice Harlan noted that no consensus on the definition of "inland waters" seemed to exist, and thus chose to establish a reliable, tenable definition, rather than one that could be easily amended by an act of Congress. "'Freezing' the meaning of 'inland waters'...serves to fulfill the requirements of definiteness and stability which should attend any congressional grant of property rights belonging to the United States."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
During Aaron Henry’s trial for disturbing the peace, the State of Mississippi introduced testimony of a police officer who conducted an unlawful search of Henry’s car. Henry allegedly made indecent proposals and offensive contact when he gave a ride to a hitchhiker. Henry’s counsel failed to object to the testimony when it was entered into evidence as required by local rules. Henry’s counsel later objected to the testimony in a motion for directed verdict, but the court denied the motion and the jury found him guilty. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the testimony was improperly admitted, and excused Henry’s lack of objection because he was represented by out-of-state counsel, who were unfamiliar with the local rules of criminal procedure. After this judgment, Mississippi filed a Suggestion of Error pointing out that Henry was represented by competent in state counsel as well as out of state counsel. As a result, the Mississippi Supreme Court withdrew its first opinion and affirmed the conviction, holding that even honest mistakes are binding.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Maybe. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion, vacating the lower judgment and remanding the case. The Supreme Court held that the Mississippi rule requiring contemporaneous objection to evidence serves a legitimate state interest, but the motion for directed verdict may also serve the same interest. The Court remanded the case to consider whether Henry had knowingly waived his objection to the officer’s testimony.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent, stating that the Supreme Court should decide the issue of waiver instead of remanding. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, expressing that the Supreme Court should dismiss the case because the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled on adequate state law grounds to preclude the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing the case. Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice Potter Stewart joined the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Attorney General on behalf of the United States sued Louisiana in a Louisiana federal district court alleging that the state had denied and would continue to deny African-Americans the right to vote. In 1898 Louisiana adopted a constitutional amendment that imposed burdensome requirements for voter registration, but which had a clause exempting those people registered to vote as of January 1, 1867 and the son or grandson of such people. African- Americans were not entitled to vote as of January 1, 1867. The district court agreed with the United States and held that Louisiana's requirements were unconstitutional.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Louisiana constitution's voter registration requirements are unconstitutional. With Justice Hugo L. Black writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the registration provisions stood in conflict with the Fifteenth Amendment's and 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)'s prohibitions against discrimination in voting because of race.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II disagreed that 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) was applicable.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was unconstitutional.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court decision reflected a concern that the statute provides the danger of "unduly suppressing protected expression." The board was allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory provisions for judicial participation in the the procedure to prohibit a film. The Court established three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect against the "undue inhibition of protected expression." These guidelines are to: (1) place the burden of proving the film is unprotected expression on the censors, (2) require judicial determination to impose a valid determination, and (3) require prompt determination "within a specified time period."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1961, the city of Montgomery, Alabama, was under martial law as a result of the riots that started when groups of Freedom Riders arrived at the Greyhound Bus Station. On May 25, 1961, a military convoy escorted Ralph D. Abernathy, an African-American pastor from Montgomery, and 10 others (both African-American and white) to the bus terminal. The group purchased tickets, and all 11 went to sit at the lunch counter. There were at least 30 people in the station and several hundred people outside who could see through the plate-glass windows to the lunch counter. Given the tense atmosphere in the city and particularly at the bus station, Colonel Poarch of the National Guard directed the Sheriff of Montgomery County to arrest the eleven men. In his opinion, their actions seemed “calculated to provoke a breach of the peace.”
Abernathy was convicted in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County on charges of disturbing the peace and unlawful assembly. He appealed the case and argued that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Court of Appeals of the State of Alabama affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals of Alabama.
Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice Byron R. White did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Victor Linkletter was convicted in state court on evidence illegally obtained by police prior to the Supreme Court decision concerning the Fourth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio. Mapp applied the exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings, denying the use of illegally obtained evidence at trial. Linkletter argued for a retrial based on the Mapp decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Constitution neither prohibited nor required "an absolute rule of retroaction." Only a case-by-case examination of the rules in question was required. The Court reasoned that police misconduct prior to Mapp had already occurred and would not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved. The Court also argued that applying the Mapp decision retroactively to all cases would threaten the "delicate state-federal relationship" and would "tax the administration of justice to the utmost." Only cases on direct review at the time of the Mapp ruling or later cases would be subject to retroactive consideration.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After a flood, the Small Business Administration made a disaster loan to Ethel May Yazzel and her husband to cover damages to their shop. The mortgage securing the loan referred to Texas law. When the Yazzel's defaulted on the loan, the U.S. Government sued to collect the balance due. Mrs. Yazzel moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Texas law of coverture meant the contract was not enforceable against her personally. Under the law of coverture, a woman's legal rights are subsumed by her husband upon marriage. The Government argued that federal law, which would not recognize coverture, applied because there was an overwhelming federal interest. The district court granted summary judgment and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Texas law. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Abe Fortas wrote for the majority holding that there was no overwhelming federal interest. The Government had voluntarily negotiated the contract knowing of the references to Texas law. The Court also noted there was no federal law, regulation, or contractual provision that allowed for application of federal law in this case.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a special concurrence stating that Texas law applied whether the contract referred to Texas law or not because the state interest in family property arrangement was greater than the federal interest. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent stating that federal law should apply because the loan was from the federal government and is, therefore, a federal matter.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Morris A. Kent Jr., a 16-year-old boy, was detained and interrogated by the police in connection with several incidents involving robbery and rape. After Kent admitted some involvement, the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction. This allowed Kent to be tried as an adult. Kent was indicted in district court. Kent moved to dismiss the indictment because the juvenile court did not conduct a "full investigation" before waiving jurisdiction, as required by the Juvenile Court Act. A jury found Kent guilty and sentenced him to serve 30-90 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, although it noted that the juvenile court judge provided no reason for the waiver.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Abe Fortas wrote for the majority. The Supreme Court determined there was not a sufficient investigation prior to the juvenile court waiver of jurisdiction. Kent did not receive a hearing, access to counsel, or access to his record prior to the waiver. The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the waiver was proper. Because Kent was 21 years old at the time of this decision, the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction if the waiver was proper. In light of this, the Court ordered that the conviction be vacated if the waiver was improper and sustained if proper.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent stating he would vacate the judgment and remand the case for reconsideration in light of two recent decisions by the court of appeals. Justice Hugo L. Black, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Graham v. John Deere Co. was a suit for the infringement of a patent that consisted of a combination of old mechanical elements for a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil in order to prevent damage to the plow. In 1955, the Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, ruling that a combination is patentable when it produces an "old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way." Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit held that, since there was no new result in the combination, the patent was invalid. The parties in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. 37) and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. 43) sought a declaration of invalidity and noninfringement of a patent on finger-operated sprayers with a "hold-down" cap issued to Cook Chemical. The District Court and the Court of Appeals sustained the patent.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court held that the Patent Act of 1952 did not lower the standards required for the patentability of an invention by adding an inquiry into obviousness to the statutory requirements of novelty and utility. The Court found that section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act Congress added the statutory nonobvious subject matter requirement, the determination of which is made after establishing the scope and content of prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. The Court concluded that the patents do not meet the test of the "nonobvious" nature of the "subject matter sought to be patented" to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art and were therefore invalid. This affirmed the decision in Graham v. John Deere Co. and reversed the other two.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On the night of October 10, 1960, Internal Revenue Service agents, along with a state patrol officer, went to the site of the "Apinook Mill" in Jarrett City, Connecticut. Agents gained entrance to the grounds, smelled the distinctive odor of ground mash indicating the presence of a still, and visually confirmed the presence of a column still in building 9A. The federal agents then applied for a warrant, after noting that the Treasury Department had not registered the still in question. The warrant was granted on October 11th.
On October 13th, federal agents entered building 9A by force after demanding entry and hearing no reply. They discovered an operating still inside, and found Frank Romano and John Ottiano standing nearby. Ottiano had the key to the facility on his person. Romano stated that he had been at the site for four days and claimed not to know how long the operation had existed.
Section 5601(b)(1) of the Excise Tax Technical Changes Act of 1958 ("ETTCA"), established a presumption of guilt for anyone shown to be at the place or site of an unregistered still. Section 5601(b)(1) was an amendment to Section 5601(a)(1), which defines the crime of possessing an unregistered still.
The United States charged Romano and Ottiano with three counts: possession of an illegal still, the illegal production of distilled spirits, and conspiracy to produce distilled spirits. Judge T. Emmet Clarie instructed the jury with a verbatim reading of the relevant provisions of the ETTCA. The jury found both men guilty of all counts. The court sentenced Romano and Ottiano to concurrent sentences on all three counts and fined them for possession of the unregistered still.
Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed the sentences for possession and illegal production of spirits. He held that the trial court's application of Section 5601(b)(1) was an unconstitutional violation of Romano and Ottiano's Fifth Amendment due process rights. He reasoned that the inference of possession did not necessarily follow from a defendant's presence, given that the defendant could be a purchaser of the product or simply a visitor to the site.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and yes. Writing for a unanimous court with three concurrences, Justice Byron White held that the jury could not simply infer possession from Romano and Ottiano's presence at the still. Romano and Ottiano's presence near the still created a rebuttable presumption; hence, the jury was improperly instructed that presence necessarily required a finding of guilt. Justice White rejected the government's argument that the amendment signified Congress' intention to overrule Section 5601(a)(1), effectively equating presence with possession. He found no evidence of this intention in the legislative history and noted that the government presented no cases where possession of a substance was proven solely by a defendant's presence near that substance.
The Court did not rule on Romano and Ottiano's charge for production of distilled spirits because its sentence was concurrent with the conspiracy charge, which was not at issue. Justice Hugo Black concurred. Referring to his dissent in United States v. Gainey, he held that the statute itself was an unconstitutional violation of Romano and Ottiano's Fifth Amendment right to due process, right against self-incrimination, and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury because the statute compels defendants to testify in order to rebut a presumption of guilt.
Justice William Douglas also concurred. He referred to his own dissent in Gainey, where he interpreted Section 5601(b)(1) as a description of a rule of evidence allowing but not mandating a jury to infer possession from a defendant's presence near an unregistered still.
Justice Abraham Fortas concurred without comment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1952, three escaped convicts took James Hill, his wife, and their five children hostage in their Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, home. After nineteen hours, the family was released unharmed. The convicts were later apprehended in a violent clash with police during which two of them were killed. In 1953, Joseph Hays' published a novel based on the Hill family's ordeal. When the novel was subsequently made into a play, Life Magazine ("Life") printed an article about the play that mirrored many of its inaccuracies concerning the Hill family's experience. Alleging that it deliberately misrepresented his story, Hill sought damages against Life. On appeal from an adverse ruling, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court remanded for a new trial where a reduced adverse ruling was imposed on Life. Following an unsuccessful appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted Life's owner, Time Inc. ("Time") certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court set aside the Appellate ruling against Time because the lower court failed to instruct the jury that Time's liability was contingent upon a showing that it knowingly and recklessly published false statements about the Hill family. The Court explained that absent a finding of such malicious intent on the part of a publisher, press statements are protected under the First Amendment even if they are otherwise false or inaccurate. The Court remanded for retrial under the new jury instruction.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented states from using a "test or device" (such as literacy tests) to deny citizens the right to vote. Under the Attorney General's jurisdiction, federal examiners were empowered to intervene to investigate election irregularities.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Fifteenth Amendment is a valid constitutional basis for the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Warren, the Court upheld the Act as constitutional. Noting that the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress "full remedial powers" to prevent racial discrimination in voting, the Act was a "legitimate response" to the "insidious and pervasive evil" which had denied blacks the right to vote since the Fifteenth Amendment's adoption in 1870.
Justice Black dissented in part. He argued that while he would have upheld most of the Act, he would have struck down certain provisions as beyond the scope of Congress’s power.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Clarence Ewell and Ronald K. Dennis were indicted on federal narcotics charges in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The men pleaded guilty and were sentenced, but the court vacated the convictions based on an unrelated Seventh Circuit decision that held that an indictment that does not allege the drug purchasers name is invalid. A few months later Ewell and Dennis were rearrested and reindicted on new complaints. The complaints contained the same allegations from the original indictment, but named the drug purchasers. Ewell and Dennis moved to dismiss, arguing that their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and their Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy were violated. The district court rejected the double jeopardy argument, but granted dismissal based on the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that the new indictment was not barred by the Sixth or Fifth Amendment. The right to speedy trial depends on the circumstances of the case. The Court also held that Ewell and Dennis were not prejudiced by the new indictments. Justice William J. Brennan concurred in the result, but expressed his disapproval at the government’s actions.
Justice Abe Fortas dissented, arguing that due process prevents the government from indicting an individual after vacation of that individual’s conviction arising out of the same transaction. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Standard Oil of Kentucky was charged with violating the Rivers and Harbors Act after discharging 100-octane aviation gasoline into the St. Johns River. The gasoline was commercially valuable and was discharged into the St. Johns River because a dockside shut-off valve had been accidentally left open. Standard Oil moved for dismissal by arguing that the word “refuse” meant “rejected matter,” which the accidentally discharged gasoline was not. The district court agreed and granted dismissal. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.