[Unknown Act > Facts]
Gerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare services coordinator in 2003. During his ten-year career with Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Shortly thereafter, Bostock received criticism for his participation in the league and for his sexual orientation and identity generally. During a meeting in which Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in the gay softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed. Shortly afterwards, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.”
Within months of his termination, Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three years later, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that Bostock’s claim relied on an interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to a 1979 decision holding otherwise, the continued which was recently affirmed in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). Bostock appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. In addition to noting procedural deficiencies in Bostock’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel pointed out that it cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit en banc decision.
This case is consolidated for oral argument with Altitude Express v. Zarda, No. 17-1623.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
An employer who fires an individual employee merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the 6-3 majority of the Court.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Looking to the ordinary public meaning of each word and phrase comprising that provision, the Court interpreted to mean that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based, at least in part, on sex. Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat employees differently because of their sex—the very practice Title VII prohibits in all manifestations. Although it acknowledged that few in 1964 would have expected Title VII to apply to discrimination against homosexual and transgender persons, the Court gave no weight to legislative history because the language of the statute unambiguously prohibits the discriminatory practice.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, criticizing the majority for attempting to “pass off its decision as the inevitable product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation,” but actually revising Title VII to “better reflect the current values of society.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion arguing that, as written, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (or by extension, transgender status).


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges.
Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a).
The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.”


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
A lawful permanent resident who commits a serious crime during the initial seven years of residence attains “inadmissible” status for the purposes of the stop-time rule, regardless of whether he is seeking admission, and thus is ineligible for cancellation of removal. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for a 5-4 majority of the Court.
Looking at the text of the statute, the Court noted that cancellation of removal is precluded when the noncitizen, during the initial seven years of residence in the United States, “committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2)”, even if conviction occurred after those first seven years. Commission of such an offense renders the nonresident “inadmissible.” In this case, Barton’s offenses were serious offenses referred to in section 1182(a)(2) and occurred within the first seven years of his residence, therefore rendering him inadmissible. By being inadmissible, he was, therefore, ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority “conflate[d]” the terms “inadmissible” and “deportable,” leading to the “paradox[ical]” conclusion that one can be already admitted to the country yet also “inadmissible.” Justice Sotomayor argued that for the stop-time rule to render Barton ineligible for relief from removal, the Government must show he committed an offense that made him deportable, not inadmissible.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for a shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1,900-mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needed to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the river in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, but no government agency is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes to search for obstructions in that area may do so, but dredging requires a permit from the Corps of Engineers.
As it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an abandoned anchor, causing approximately 264,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $143 million.
Frescati originally paid for the cleanup and was then reimbursed $88 million by the federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati and the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs from CITGO, the intended recipient of the oil.
At the beginning of what turned out to be extensive litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was not liable under contract or tort law. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Frescati was a third-party beneficiary of CITGO’s safe berth warranty and that CITGO had a duty of care to Frescati (thus implicating liability under both contract and tort theories). On remand, the district court found CITGO liable under both contract and tort. However, the court also found that the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CITGO into believing the anchorage was free of obstructions and reduced CITGO’s liability by 50%. The government, CITGO, and Frescati all appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the contract claim, vacated the negligence claim, and affirmed in part other claims.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
A safe-berth clause in a voyage charter agreement—which requires the party to designate a safe berth for a vessel to load and discharge cargo—establishes a warranty of safety. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for a 7-2 majority of the Court. The Court first looked at the text of the safe-berth clause in the charter agreement, finding that it imposes, unqualified, on the charterer a duty to select a safe berth. Although the clause does not expressly use the word “warranty,” it need not do so to be subject to such an obligation. Basic principles of contract law hold a party strictly liable for a breach of contract, regardless of fault or diligence, and those principles determine the outcome here, as well.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined. Justice Thomas argued that the majority’s conclusion “is the wrong rule and finds no basis in the contract’s plain text.” Because the plain language of the safe-berth clause “contains no warranty of safety,” Justice Thomas would remand the case for factfinding on whether industry custom and usage establish such a warranty.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for-profit corporation that operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home’s owner and operator that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated.
Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes.
The district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home’s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented the shipwreck for nearly twenty years in photographs and videos and registered his works with the U.S. Copyright Office.
At some point before October 2013, the state of North Carolina posted various of the copyrighted works of Allen online without his permission. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a settlement agreement with Allen and his company, paying him for the infringement of his works and agreeing not to infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again posted and published Allen’s works. The state then passed “Blackbeard’s Law,” which purportedly converted Allen’s works into “public record” materials that the state could use freely.
Allen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Allen argued that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA)—which defines potential infringers of copyright to include “any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity”—abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding persuasive Allen’s arguments regarding the CRCA’s abrogation of sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity via the CRCA.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Congress lacked the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for the Court unanimous in the judgment. First, the Court considered whether, in the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Congress had enacted “unequivocal statutory language” abrogating the states’ immunity from lawsuits. The Court concluded that it had. Next, the Court considered whether Congress had authority to do so. Allen argued that the Intellectual Property Clause (art. I § 8, cl. 8) of the U.S. Constitution authorized the exercise of that power, but the Court rejected that theory in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Board, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and stare decisis requires following that precedent unless there is a “special justification” to overturn it. Neither does Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment give Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits. For Congress’s action to fall within its Section 5 authority, “there must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented and the means adopted to that end.” In the absence of any evidence of this nature, the CRCA fails this test. Thus, Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in that Act.
Justice Clarence Thomas joined in part and authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas agreed with the majority’s conclusion but noted two disagreements. First, he argue that the Court need not “special justification” to overrule precedent; rather, the Court must correct its error if the prior decision is “demonstrably erroneous.” But the present case does not even meet that lower standard. Second, he declined to join the majority’s discussion regarding future copyright legislation.
Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Breyer pointed out the inherent unfairness to creators and artists that arises from the Court’s decision but concurred in the judgment because the Court’s precedent in Florida Prepaid “controls this case.”


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Gonzalo Holguin was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law, and sentenced to 24 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. Holguin was again arrested for possession and intent to distribute, and after that arrest the government filed a petition to revoke the supervised release term. Before the revocation hearing occurred, Holguin pleaded guilty to the second set of charges.
At the revocation hearing, the district court explained the allegations of the revocation petition to Holguin and asked how he pleaded. Holguin answered “True.” Holguin’s attorney argued for a concurrent sentence on the revocation, but the court issued a 12-month consecutive sentence instead. Holguin appealed the reasonableness of his sentence, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding Holguin had failed to make a formal objection after the announcement of his sentence.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
A criminal defendant need not make a formal objection to his issued sentence in order to preserve his right on appeal to have that sentence reviewed for “reasonableness” rather than for “plain error,” the standard that would control absent sufficient objection at the time of sentencing. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer noted a split of authority among the various federal courts of appeal and explained, “We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ suggestion that defendants are required to refer to the “reasonableness’ of a sentence” to preserve their right to have that sentence reviewed for reasonableness rather than plain error. In other words, “A defendant who, by advocating for a particular sentence, communicates to the trial judge his view that a longer sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ has thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in an appellate challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” The Court continued, “He need not also refer to the standard of review” in his argument or objection to preserve the more favorable reasonableness standard of review on appeal.
The Court also noted a pair of issues raised by the government and various amicus curiae about preserving a claim of improper sentencing procedures and also when a party has preserved particular arguments regarding an appeal over the length of a sentence. The Court refused to reach those larger issues, holding only that the appellant had preserved his right to appeal the length of his sentence as unreasonable in the particular circumstances of this case.
Justice Alito authored a concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, to further elaborate on the limited nature of the ruling.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. __ (2014), the Supreme Court unanimously held that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), fiduciaries to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) are not entitled to a presumption of prudence regarding their decisions to buy or hold employer stock. Rather, for a plaintiff to state a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence based on inside information, the plaintiff need only “plausibly allege that a prudent fiduciary in the defendant’s position could not have concluded that [an alternative action] would do more harm than good to the fund.” Thus the Court established a “context-specific” pleading standard rather than a generalized presumption standard.
IBM offers as a benefit to its employees an ERISA-qualified ESOP, invested predominantly in IBM common stock, with Retirement Plans Committee of IBM as the fiduciary. In 2015, two substantially similar lawsuits were filed against IBM and its officers, one under securities laws and the other under ERISA. Both lawsuits alleged that IBM fraudulently concealed problems with the company’s microelectronics unit, thereby artificially inflating IBM’s reported value. By continuing to invest in IBM stock despite allegedly knowing that the market price was artificially inflated due to the fraudulent scheme, the plaintiffs in the ERISA lawsuit argued that the ESOP’s fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence under Section 404 of ERISA.
The district court dismissed the ERISA lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the pleading standard established in Fifth Third, as they had not alleged facts showing that the fiduciaries “could not have concluded” that publicly disclosing the alleged “fraud” or halting further investments in IBM stock would be more likely to harm the fund than to help it.
The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add generic allegations that disclosure of the alleged fraud was “inevitable” and that the magnitude of the stock price correction resulting from a delayed disclosure would increase over time. The plaintiffs also added a claim that the fiduciaries could have avoided doing more harm than good by instead purchasing a “low-cost” hedging product.
The district court again dismissed the lawsuit for failing to meet the Fifth Third pleading standard and because a prudent fiduciary could reasonably find their proposed alternative likely to cause more harm than good. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding that “when a ‘drop in the value of the stock already held by the fund’ is inevitable, it is far more plausible that a prudent fiduciary would prefer to limit the effects of the stock’s artificial inflation on the ESOP’s beneficiaries through prompt disclosure.”


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to determine whether to entertain the parties’ arguments on ERISA’s duty of prudence.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
This case arises from Montana’s Anaconda Smelter site—the location of a large copper concentrating and smelting operation that started in 1884 and expanded to other nearby areas in 1902. In 1977, Atlantic Richfield purchased Anaconda Smelter, and it shut down smelter activities in 1980. The smelter operations over the almost-century of operations caused high concentrations of arsenic, lead, copper, cadmium, and zinc to contaminate soil, groundwater, and surface water. In 1983, the EPA prioritized the Anaconda Smelter site as a Superfund site, working with Atlantic Richfield to address the contamination. Since then, Atlantic Richfield has worked with the EPA for 35 years to remediate the site, at a cost of approximately $470 million.
In 2008, landowners within the Anaconda Superfund site sued Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court, alleging that the smelter operations between 1884 and 1980 had caused damage to their properties. Atlantic Richfield raised no objections to the plaintiffs’ claims of loss of use and enjoyment of property, diminution of value, incidental and consequential damages, and annoyance and discomfort. However, it did object to the common-law claim for “restoration” damages.
To establish a claim for restoration damages in Montana, plaintiffs must prove that they will actually use the award to clean up the site. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that restoration of their property requires “work in excess of what the EPA required of Atlantic Richfield in its selected remedy.” Atlantic Richfield moved for summary judgment, arguing that the restoration claim constituted a “challenge” to the EPA’s remedy and thus was jurisdictionally barred by CERCLA § 113, which deprives courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to EPA-selected remedies. Atlantic Richfield also argued that the landowners are “potentially responsible parties” and thus must seek EPA approval under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) of CERCLA before engaging in remedial action. Finally, Atlantic Richfield argued that CERCLA preempted state common-law claims for restoration.
The trial court held that CERCLA permitted plaintiffs’ claim for restoration damages, and Atlantic Richfield sought a writ of supervisory control from the Montana Supreme Court, which the court granted. Over a dissent, the Supreme Court of Montana rejected all three of Atlantic Richfield’s arguments, affirming the trial court’s decision permitting the plaintiffs to proceed to a jury trial on their restoration claim.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over the landowners’ claim for restoration, and the Montana Supreme Court erred in holding that the landowners in this case were not potentially responsible parties under CERCLA and thus did not need the Environmental Protection Agency’s approval to take remedial action.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority opinion.
In Part II-A, the Court unanimously held that it had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Montana Supreme Court. The Court has jurisdiction to review final judgments, and a state court judgment is a “final judgment if it is “an effective determination of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein.” Because under Montana law, a supervisory writ proceeding is a self-contained case, not an interlocutory appeal, it was a final judgment subject to review.
In Part II-B, the Chief Justice, writing for the 8-1 majority, found that the Act does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over this lawsuit. While § 113(b) of CERCLA provides that “the United States district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under this chapter,” thereby depriving state courts of jurisdiction over such actions, the landowners’ common law nuisance, trespass, and strict liability claims arise under Montana law, not under the Act. Justice Samuel Alito dissented from this part of the opinion, writing in his separate opinion that the issue of whether state courts have jurisdiction to entertain challenges to EPA-approved CERCLA plans was “neither necessary nor prudent” to decide in this case.
In Part III, the Chief Justice, writing for the 7-2 majority, held that the Montana Supreme Court erred by holding that the landowners were not potentially responsible parties under the Act and therefore did not need EPA approval to take remedial action. To determine who is a potentially responsible party, the Court found that the Act includes as “covered persons” any “owner” of “a facility,” and that a “facility” includes “any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.” Under this definition, the landowners are “potentially responsible parties,” and this reading is consistent with the Act’s objective “to develop a ‘Comprehensive Environmental Response’ to hazardous waste pollution.” Justice Neil Gorsuch (joined by Justice Clarence Thomas) dissented from this part of the opinion, arguing that the majority’s holding departs from CERCLA’s terms in a way that transforms the Act “from a law that supplements state environmental restoration efforts into one that prohibits them.” Justice Gorsuch expressed concern that the Court’s reading “strips away ancient common law rights from innocent landowners and forces them to suffer toxic waste in their backyards, playgrounds, and farms.”


[Unknown Act > Facts]
By way of relevant background, James McKinney’s childhood was “horrific” due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse—all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention.
In 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half-brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney’s jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree murder (without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder), and Hedlund’s jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder.
At McKinney’s capital sentencing hearing (before a judge), a psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD “resulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered.” The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could trigger McKinney’s childhood trauma and produce “diminished capacity.” The trial judge credited the psychologist’s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non-statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney’s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied relief, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and held that the Arizona courts had violated the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by refusing to consider McKinney’s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a death penalty case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved for independent review of McKinney’s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court; McKinney opposed the motion on the ground that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was ‘final’ before the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
After a finding of a capital sentencing (Eddings) error during habeas corpus review, the state appellate court, rather than the jury, may reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to resentence the defendant. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion for the Court.
In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), the Supreme Court a state appellate court may conduct the reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances after a capital sentencing error was found on collateral review. Although that case involved improperly considering an aggravating circumstance, and this case involved improperly ignoring a mitigating circumstance, the Court found no meaningful difference in the context. Thus, the Court found, Clemons determined the outcome in this case. The Court found unpersuasive McKinney’s argument that because the Arizona trial court, not a jury, made the initial aggravating circumstances finding that made him eligible for the death penalty, a jury must weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the Court’s decision in Ring. Agreeing with the court below, the Court found that McKinney’s case was “final” before Ring was decided, and that case does not apply retroactively to this situation.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg argued that the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s precedent require the application of new rules of constitutional law to cases currently on direct review (with two exceptions, neither of which applies, by the Court’s own holding). Thus, Justice Ginsburg, argued, the “pivotal question” in this case is whether McKinney’s case is currently on direct review, in which case Ring applies (retroactively), or on collateral review, in which case Ring does not apply. McKinney’s first appeal of a criminal conviction is “the archetype” of direct review, and his renewal of that first appeal “cannot sensibly be characterized as anything other than direct review.” As such, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Arizona Supreme Court’s proceeding presently before the Court is a direct review and thus that Ring applies, making McKinney’s death sentences unconstitutional.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2015, Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company’s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which sets forth the standard of care of fiduciaries. Sulyma alleged that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his employment (and thus investment) period of 2010 to 2012.
Intel moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred under 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2), which provides that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and ordered discovery for the question of the statute of limitations. After discovery, the district court found no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “actual knowledge” does not mean that the plaintiff knew that the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach. For a Section 1104 action, this means the plaintiff must have known that the defendant had acted and that those acts were imprudent. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The three-year statute of limitation does not run from the date where a plaintiff had access to but did not read, or could not recall reading, the information giving rise to an ERISA claim. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Alito explained that, “Although ERISA does not define the phrase ‘actual knowledge’” in setting the statute of limitations, “its meaning is plain.” After quoting a number of general and legal dictionaries (though stating the exercise was “hardly necessary to confirm the point”), the Court concluded that an individual must in fact be aware of a piece of information in order to have “actual knowledge” of it.
The Court pointed to other sections of the ERISA statute that make the distinction more clearly than that governing the statute of limitations for an ERISA claim. Because Congress repeatedly drew a distinction between “what an ERISA plaintiff actually knows and what he should actually know,” the Court would not impute to knowledge to an ERISA plaintiff absent evidence of what that plaintiff was in fact aware of that gave rise to the ERISA claim.
The Court concluded by noting the limitations of its holding. It noted that its ruling did not limit any of the ways a defendant might demonstrate actual knowledge by an ERISA plaintiff sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations, nor does it allow a plaintiff to disclaim actual knowledge where the evidence points to actual knowledge. Finally, the Court also clarified that its holding does not stop defendants from arguing that “willful blindness” to a potential ERISA claim should allow a defendant to avoid the actual knowledge necessary to trigger ERISA’s statute of limitations.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Michelle Monasky, a U.S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two-month-old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky’s parental rights.
The Italian court ruled in Taglieri’s favor ex parte (without an appearance by Monasky). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri’s petition, finding that Italy was the baby’s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky’s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc.
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights “under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal.” To determine the child’s habitual residence, a court must look “to the place in which the child has become ‘acclimatized,’ or as a back-up inquiry, “shared parental intent.” Because the child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in the district court’s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit (en banc) affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, a child’s “habitual residence” depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an actual agreement between the parties. Such a determination is subject to review for clear error.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the Court that was unanimous in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined in part and concurred in the judgment. The text of the Convention does not define “habitual residence,” but the accompanying explanatory report states that a child habitually resides where she is at home. No single fact is dispositive of all cases; instead, courts must make a fact-driven inquiry “sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense.”
The Court found unpersuasive Monasky’s argument that an actual agreement between the parents on where to raise their child was required to determine the child’s habitual residence. None of the treaty partners interpret the treaty that way, and to do so would run counter to the principle that the inquiry is an intensely fact-driven one.
Turning to the question of the standard of review, the Court found that because the question of habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact that is heavily fact-laden, a determination by a trial court should be entitled to deferential clear-error review.
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas would have decided this case principally on the plain meaning of the treaty’s text—which leads to the same outcome.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), owned by African American actor and comedian Byron Allen, and the National Association of African American-Owned Media, an entity created by Allen, sued Comcast over the latter’s decision not to carry ESN’s channels. ESN alleged that Comcast’s decision not to carry ESN’s networks was based, at least in part, on racial animus against ESN, which is the only 100% African American-owned multi-channel media company in the United States. At the time of Comcast’s decision, several other large distributors— including Charter Communications, Time Warner Cable, DirecTV, and AT&T—had also declined to enter into carriage agreements with ESN.
The district court dismissed ESN’s original complaint and several subsequent amended complaints against Comcast and other defendants for failure to plead facts that state a plausible claim for relief. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit held in a related case involving Charter Communications that “mixed-motive claims are cognizable under § 1981,” meaning that “even if racial animus was not the but-for cause of a defendant’s refusal to contract, a plaintiff can still prevail if she demonstrates that discriminatory intent was a factor in that decision.” Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that ESN had stated a valid Section 1981 claim based on its assertions that the carriers had entered into contracts with “white-owned, lesser-known networks during the same period.”
The Ninth Circuit declined petitions for rehearing en banc.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
A plaintiff who sues for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must show—in all parts of the lawsuit—that race was the actual cause of her injury. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court noted from the outset that normally, a plaintiff suing for an injury must prove actual causation (also called “but-for” causation), and that burden of proof remains constant throughout the life of the lawsuit. The Court rejected Entertainment Studios Network (ESN)’s argument that § 1981 creates an exception to these default principles, finding that the statute’s text and history, as well as the Court’s precedent, support reading it as following the normal rules. Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows for a “motivating factor” causation test, the history of that statute is unique and does not apply to § 1981. Because § 1981 follows the usual rules, a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, the plaintiff would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which she noted her disagreement with a strict but-for causation standard in discrimination cases such as this one but acknowledged the Court’s own precedent otherwise. Justice Ginsburg further clarified that she rejected (and the Court did not resolve) Comcast’s narrow view of the scope of § 1981, that it applies only to the final decision whether to enter a contract and not to earlier stages of the contract-formation process.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Ritzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property from Jackson Masonry, but the sale was never completed. Ritzen claims that Jackson breached the contract by providing erroneous documentation about the property just before the deadline, while Jackson claims Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding to purchase the property by the deadline.
Ritzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court, and just before trial, Jackson filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of the litigation under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Ritzen filed a motion to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ritzen did not appeal the denial. Instead, Ritzen brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Jackson, finding that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract.
After this adverse ruling, Ritzen filed two appeals in the district court. The first appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s order denying relief from the automatic stay (which Ritzen did not appeal at the time). The second appeal arose from the bankruptcy court’s determination that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. The district court ruled against Ritzen on both appeals; the first appeal was untimely filed, and the second one failed on the merits.
Ritzen appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reviewed the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under the abuse of discretion standard and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Ritzen had missed two deadlines: the contract deadline, leading to its breach, and the appeal deadline, leading to its waiver of appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
A bankruptcy court’s order unreservedly denying relief from the automatic stay constitutes a final, immediately appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the majority opinion on behalf of the unanimous Court.
The Court first looked to its own precedent in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496 (2015), in which it held that a bankruptcy court’s order rejecting a proposed plan was not final because it did not conclusively resolve the relevant “proceeding.” Bankruptcy court orders are final only when they definitively dispose of discrete disputes within the bankruptcy case. Applying that reasoning to the facts of this case, the Court found that a bankruptcy court’s order unreservedly granting or denying relief from a bankruptcy’s automatic stay conclusively resolves a discrete dispute and thus qualifies as an independent “proceeding” within the meaning of §158(a).


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in 1986 as a legal immigrant but was removed in 1998 due to felony drug convictions. In September 2016, Guerrero filed a motion to reopen, claiming that the 2014 decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Abdelghany rendered him eligible to seek relief under former Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c). The immigration judge denied Guerrero’s motion to reopen, finding it not timely filed. Given that Abdelghany was decided in 2014, the immigration judge found the two-year delay in filing the motion to reopen indicated Guerrero had not diligently pursued his rights as required for equitable tolling.
On appeal, the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. And the BIA agreed with the immigration judge that equitable tolling did not apply to extend the 90-day deadline. Guerrero argued that he could not have filed his motion to reopen until the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations if he establishes “that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”).
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that equitable tolling did not apply. Within the Fifth Circuit, under Penalva v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2018) the question whether a litigant acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling is a factual question, not a question of law, and thus is not reviewable.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The phrase “questions of law” in the Immigration and Nationality Act’s Limited Review Provision, 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(D), includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Stephen Breyer concluded that the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the petitioners’ “factual” due diligence claims for equitable tolling purposes.
The Court first looked to the statute’s language, finding that nothing there precludes the conclusion that Congress used the term “questions of law” to refer to the application of a legal standard to settled facts. Courts repeatedly refer to mixed questions of law and fact as “questions of law.” The Court then considered the principle of statutory construction favoring judicial review of administrative action, finding that principle supported interpreting the court of appeals as having appellate jurisdiction in cases such as this one. Next the Court looked at the language immediately surrounding the phrase at issue, finding a “zipper clause,” which consolidates judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.” The Court then turned to the statutory history and relevant precedent, finding that they too supported an interpretation of “questions of law” as including the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined all but one subpart. Justice Thomas argued that despite being presented with a narrow question, the Court’s decision answers a much broader question and “effectively nullifies a jurisdiction-stripping statute” by disregarding the text and structure of the statute.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
This case arises out of a complex procedural history involving a patent dispute between several parties and concerns not the merits of the proceedings but a procedural aspect of it.
The America Invents Act created “inter partes review” as a way of challenging a patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. One provision, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), precludes the institution of inter partes review more than one year after the petitioner “is served with a complaint” alleging infringement of the patent. The parties disagree over whether this one-year time bar applies when the underlying patent infringement suit has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, held that it does apply. The court rejected the argument that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice restores the parties to their positions as though no legal proceedings had ever begun, concluding instead that a defendant served with a complaint remains “served” even if the civil action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and thus does such a dismissal does not toll the statute of limitations.
Further, 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) provides that “the determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” Notwithstanding this provision, the en banc Federal Circuit held that a decision to institute an inter partes review after finding that the § 315(b) time bar did not apply was appealable.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Section 314(d) precludes judicial review of a Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute inter partes review upon finding that §315(b)’s time bar did not apply. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the 7-2 majority opinion for the Court.
The text of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), as well as the Court’s decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. __ (2016), preclude a party from arguing on appeal that the agency should have refused “to institute an inter partes review.” A challenge under § 315(d) constitutes an appeal of the agency’s decision “to institute an inter partes review” and thus falls within the general prohibition of § 314(d). The majority (though without Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito) found further support for this understanding in the statute’s purpose and design, which is “to weed out bad patent claims efficiently.” The Court found Click-to-Call’s claims to the contrary unpersuasive.
Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined in large part, arguing that the majority’s decision allows a “politically guided agency” to take the rightful property of an inventor and immunizes the agency’s action from judicial review.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Congress, in order to persuade the nation’s health insurance industry to provide insurance to previously uninsured or uninsurable persons, the legislation creating the Affordable Care Act provided that insurance losses over a designated percentage would be reimbursed, and comparable profits would be turned over to the government.
In reliance on the government’s commitment to reimburse them, the nation’s insurance industry provided the designated health insurance. However, when some carriers experienced significant losses, the government refused to appropriate the funds to pay the statutory shortfall and prohibited existing funds from being used for this purpose. As a result, the insurers did not receive reimbursement.
Several of these insurance carriers filed suit against the government seeking reimbursement. The courts denied them the relief they sought, in part relying on the “cardinal rule” disfavoring implied repeals, which applies with “especial force” to appropriations acts and requires that repeal not to be found unless the later enactment is “irreconcilable” with the former.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The insurance carriers in this case have a right to payment under the “Risk Corridors” program of the Affordable Care Act, Congress did not repeal the obligation of the federal government to pay the carriers, and the carriers can sue for payment under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for an 8-1 majority. First, the Court considered whether the Risk Corridors program, Section 1342 of the Affordable Care Act, obligated the federal government to pay participating insurers the full amount calculated by the statute. Congress may create an obligation directly through statutory language, which it did through the Risk Corridors program, in plain language. Thus, the legal duty of the government became a legal liability when the insurance carriers participated in the health care exchanges.
Second, the Court considered whether Congress impliedly repealed the obligation by passing appropriations riders. The Court first noted its “aversion to implied repeals,” especially in the context of appropriations. For an implied repeal, the government must show more than merely the failure to appropriate sufficient funds, which it did not do here.
Finally, the Court considered whether the insurance carriers properly brought suit under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims. Although the federal government is immune from suit unless it unequivocally consents, it waived immunity for certain damages suits in the Court of Federal Claims through the Tucker Act. A claim falls within the Tucker Act’s immunity waiver if: (1) the claim “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained,” (2) the obligation-creating statute does not provide its own detailed remedies, and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act does not provide an avenue for relief. In this case, the Court found that the insurance carriers’ claim satisfied this test and was thus properly brought under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims.
Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined the majority opinion except as to the part discussing the legislative history of the appropriations riders.
Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority’s decision “infers a private right of action” where Congress did not expressly create one. Specifically, Justice Alito questioned the test the Court has used (and used in this case) to determine whether a claim may be brought against the United States under the Tucker Act.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is a compilation of Georgia statutes accompanied by various annotations, “consisting of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor’s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references.” Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions “shall be merged with annotations,” Georgia law says that the annotations themselves do not have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., an operating division of the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state exercises pervasive supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia.
Public.Resource.Org (PRO) is a non-profit organization with a mission of improving public access to government records and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the print version of the OCGA and its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely accessible to the public. It also distributed digital copies to Georgia legislators and other organizations and websites.
The Commission sent PRO several cease-and-desist letters on the grounds that publication infringes on the State of Georgia’s copyright in their work, but PRO persisted. The Commission sued PRO in 2015 in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief. PRO acknowledged its publication and dissemination of the OCGA but denied that the State of Georgia holds an enforceable copyright in the Code. The district court ruled for the Commission, finding that because the annotations of the OCGA lack the force of law, they are not public domain material. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that because of the way they are written and integrated into the “official” code, the annotations in the OCGA are attributable to the constructive authorship of the People and are thus intrinsically public domain material. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined the identity of the public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created—finding that each of these markers supported the conclusion that the People were constructively the authors of the annotations.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Under the government edicts doctrine, the annotations beneath the statutory provisions in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated are ineligible for copyright protection. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion.
Under the government edicts doctrine, judges cannot be authors of the works they produce in the course of their official duties, regardless of whether the material carries the force of law. The same reasoning applies to legislators and the works they produce. The “animating principle,” amply supported by precedent, is that “no one can own the law.”
First, the Court considered whether the annotations are created by legislators. Although the annotations were prepared by a private company, the work-for-hire agreement provides that Georgia’s Code Revision Commission is the sole “author” of the work. Because of the way it is created, receives funding and staffing, and operates, the Commission is an “arm” of the Georgia Legislature with “legislative authority” that includes “preparing and publishing the annotations.” This link is bolstered by the fact that the Commission brought this lawsuit “on behalf of and for the benefit of” the Georgia Legislature and the State of Georgia.
Then, the Court considered whether the annotations are created in the course of legislative duties. Although the annotations are not enacted into law through bicameralism and presentment, the Court cited a decision by the Georgia Supreme Court holding that the preparation of the annotations under Georgia law constitute an act of “legislative authority.”
The Court found unpersuasive Georgia’s arguments to the contrary. First, Section 101 of the Copyright Act, which lists “annotations” among the kinds of works eligible for copyright protection, refers only to annotations that represent an original work of authorship, which the annotations cannot be when legislators are the authors. Second, the fact that the Copyright Act excludes from copyright protection works by federal officials but does not mention state officials does not lead to the negative inference that state officials must be eligible to be authors. Neither the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, a non-binding administrative manual, nor the overall purpose of the Copyright Act, supports Georgia’s position.
The Court pointed out that if it adopted Georgia’s position and allowed “everything short of statutes and opinions” to be copyrightable, then “States would be free to offer a whole range of premium legal works for those who can afford the extra benefit.” That outcome would force many people “to think twice before using official legal works that illuminate the law we are all presumed to know and understand.”
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined and Justice Stephen Breyer joined in part. Justice Thomas argued that the Court should leave to Congress the decision whether to exclude state legislators from copyright authorship and that the majority misunderstands the word “author.”
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined, arguing that the annotations are not created in a legislative capacity because of key differences between judges and legislators.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Gregory Dean Banister was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. He filed a habeas petition asserting numerous constitutional violations, which the district court denied on the merits on May 15, 2017. He also requested a certificate of appealability (COA), which the district court also denied in the same order.
On June 12, 2017, Banister filed a motion to “amend or alter” the judgment of the district court pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the court denied on the merits on June 20, 2017.
On July 20, 2017, Banister filed a notice of appeal and an application for a COA, which the district court “considered” despite its previous order denying the COA, but again denied on July 28, 2017. Banister then sought and received from the Fifth Circuit an extension of time to file a COA application. He filed a petition for a COA with the Fifth Circuit on October 11, 2017, and the court denied his petition, citing lack of jurisdiction, on May 8, 2018. The Fifth Circuit held that Banister’s purported 59(e) motion was, in fact, a successive habeas petition, which would not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), the Fifth Circuit noted that “alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief.”


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a habeas court’s judgment is not a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), so Banister’s appeal was timely. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for the 7-2 majority.
To determine what “second or successive application” means, the Court first turned to historical habeas doctrine and practice and the purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which governs federal habeas proceedings. In Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257 (YYYY), decided before AEDPA, the Court held that Rule 59(e) applied in habeas proceedings. Although the language of the rule has since changed, those changes did not narrow the scope of that rule. In the fifty years since the adoption of the Federal Rules, only once has a court dismissed a Rule 59(e) motion as impermissibly successive, resolving all other cases on the merits. When Congress passed AEDPA, it gave no indication it intended to change this understood meaning of a successive application, nor do its purposes suggest such a change in meaning.
The Court pointed out that its decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), applied to Rule 60(b) and that Rule 60(b) is substantially different from Rule 59(e) in critical ways. While Rule 60(b) is a means of attacking a habeas court’s judgment, a Rule 59(e) motion is a one-time effort to point out alleged errors in a just-issued decision before taking a single appeal.
Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, arguing that because a Rule 59(e) motion asserts a habeas claim, it must be viewed as a “second or successive habeas petition” and be treated as such.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Since it was ceded to the United States in 1898, Puerto Rico has accumulated substantial debt, in large part due to its ambiguous legal status as a protectorate of the United States and the economically detrimental policies the United States has enacted over the decades. Exacerbated by a series of governmental financial deficits and a recession, Puerto Rico’s debt crisis came to a head in 2015, when its governor announced that the Commonwealth was in a “death spiral” and was unable to pay its debt. In June 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act of 2016 (PROMESA), which gave him authority to appoint a seven-member Financial Oversight and Management Board that would have control over Puerto Rico’s budget and would negotiate the restructuring of its $125 billion indebtedness. President Obama appointed the seven-member board in August 2016 based on lists supplied by Republic and Democratic lawmakers.
A number of creditors and elected officials of Puerto Rico have been dissatisfied with the board and its decisions and brought a lawsuit challenging President Obama’s authority to appoint the board members. The challengers alleged that the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that the Senate confirm high-level federal officers and that the board members were within the scope of this Clause. The federal district court in Puerto Rico ruled against the creditors, finding the board is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth government established pursuant to Congress’s plenary powers under the Territorial Clause and that the board members are not “Officers of the United States.”
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that the Territorial Clause does not supersede the application of the Appointments Clause in an unincorporated territory and that the board members are “Officers of the United States” because: (1) they occupy “continuing positions,” (2) exercise “significant authority” that is the same or more than that exercised by other officers the U.S. Supreme Court has found to be “Officers of the United States,” and (3) exercise their authority “pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Moreover, these officers are “principal” officers subject to the Appointments Clause because they are answerable to and removable only by the President and are not directed or supervised by others who were appointed by the President with Senate confirmation.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Appointments Clause constrains the appointments power as to all officers of the United States, including those who exercise power in or in relation to Puerto Rico, but the Clause does not restrict the appointment or selection of the members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board. Based on this conclusion, the Court had no reason to address the second question presented. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the opinion of the Court that was unanimous in the judgment.
The Appointments Clause of the federal Constitution is intended to allocate between the President and the Senate responsibility for selecting officers to hold high federal positions. Because of this purpose, the Appointments Clause should apply to all officers of the United States, even those with powers and duties related to Puerto Rico.
However, the Appointments Clause does not restrict the appointment of local officers that Congress vests with primarily local duties. When an officer has primarily local duties, he is not an officer of the United States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. The Board members have primarily local powers and duties, exemplified by the fact that the power of the Board is backed by Puerto Rico law rather than federal law. Indeed, the Board’s duty is to oversee the fiscal and budgetary development of Puerto Rico and to initiate bankruptcy proceedings in the interests of Puerto Rico. Consequently, the Appointments Clause does not constrain the appointments power as to the Board members.
Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment but based on interpretation of the “original public meaning” of the phrase “Officers of the United States” within the Appointments Clause.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment to explore issues the Court did not (and did not need) to address regarding the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. Specifically, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the history of that relationship calls into question whether the Board members may be territorial officers of Puerto Rico when “they are not elected or approved, directly or indirectly, by the people of Puerto Rico.”


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Named plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against U.S. Bank and other over alleged mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan between 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage in prohibited transactions with a subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded in 2008.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted in part. However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim that the defendants engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2014, with the parties still in litigation, the plan became overfunded; that is, it contained more money than was needed to meet its obligations. The defendants raised the argument that the plaintiffs had not suffered any financial loss and moved to dismiss the remainder of the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a concrete interest in any monetary relief the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue in federal court because, win or lose this case, they would still receive the exact same monthly benefits they are already entitled to receive. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority.
As participants in a defined-benefit plan (as opposed to a defined-contribution plan, such as a 401(k)), the plaintiff retirees receive a fixed payment each month, notwithstanding any changes to the value of the plan or the investment decisions of the plan’s fiduciaries. As such, the poor decisions by the fiduciaries did not cause any actual injury to the plaintiffs in this case. Without concrete injury, the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the fiduciaries’ actions.
Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas joined the majority in full but wrote separately to opine that the Court’s precedents on standing unnecessarily complicate the issue by requiring the Court to engage with petitioners’ analogies to trust law.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court’s decision precludes pensioners from bringing a federal lawsuit to stop or cure retirement-plan mismanagement until their pensions are on the verge of default. She cautioned that this outcome conflicts both with common sense and long-standing precedent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Petitioner Noris Babb worked as a pharmacist for the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Bay Pines, Florida, since 2004. While there, she helped to develop the Geriatric Pharmacotherapy Clinic (GPC), which serves older veterans with diseases or disabilities common to individuals of advanced age with military service. In 2009, Pharmacy Management gave Babb an advanced scope (full practice authority) to prescribe medications without a physician, which was necessary for her position. In 2010, the VA rolled out a nationwide treatment initiative similar to the GPC Babb had helped develop. Against recommendations by Human Resources and despite requests from doctors, Pharmacy Management rejected applications by several current module pharmacists—all females over 50—and granted applications of two pharmacists under 40.
Two of the female pharmacists who were denied advancement filed Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, and Babb provided statements and testified in support of their EEO claims. The pharmacists claimed that their non-selection purportedly for lack of advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination and that any justification for denying advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination as well.
Babb alleged that as a result of her participation in the EEO process, she was denied opportunities to participate in the new program and that Pharmacy Management required her to agree to a schedule that was unworkable for her department. Unable to meet this requirement, Babb’s advanced scope was removed and was consequently disqualified from promotion. A female pharmacist under 30 without an advanced scope was selected for the promotion.
Babb brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) alleging that she was the victim of gender-plus-age discrimination and that the VA retaliated against her for participating in protected EEO in violation of those laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the VA. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Babb argued that the district court erred in part by not allowing her to prove that illegal discrimination or retaliation was a “motivating factor” behind the VA’s refusal to promote her. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding itself bound by precedent that federal sector employees’ claims under ADEA and Title VII require that the plaintiff show discrimination or retaliation is a “but for” factor in the adverse personnel action.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), requires that age not be taken into consideration at all in making personnel actions, but if age is a but-for cause of the personnel action, that fact may be important in determining the remedy to which the plaintiff is entitled. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. The relevant provision provides “All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.” The Court found the plain meaning of the statute supports the reading that age does not need to be a but-for cause of an employment decision for there to be a violation. To reach this conclusion, the Court focused on several phrases as well as the syntax of the sentence. This interpretation is also consistent with the Court’s precedent interpreting the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the ADEA’s private-sector provision, and Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision because the language in those provisions is “markedly” different. The Court noted, however, that but-for causation is important in determining the appropriate remedy. For example, the plaintiffs cannot obtain compensatory damages without showing that age discrimination was a but-for cause of the employment decision. Remedies must be tailored to the injury, and the injury is measured in part by the causal relationship.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, pointing out that the Court’s decision does not foreclose claims arising from discriminatory processes (as distinct from decisions) and that the same provision may also permit damages remedies even when the federal government engages in “nondispositive” age discrimination.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court’s reading of the statute is too broad and “disrupts the settled expectations of federal employers and employees.”


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Outokumpu operates a steel plant in Alabama that contains three “cold rolling mills,” which are required for manufacturing and processing certain steel products. In November 2007, while Outokumpu’s plant was under construction, the company’s predecessor, ThyssenKrupp, entered into three contracts with F.L. Industries (“Fives”) to provide three different-sized mills. Each of these three contracts contains an arbitration clause that, among other things, requires that arbitration take place in Dusseldorf, Germany, and that the forum apply the substantive law of Germany.
The contracts define the parties to each as Outokumpu and Fives and provide that any mention of either party also includes any subcontractors of that party; appended to the contracts is a list of subcontractors, including petitioner GE Energy Conversion France SAS (“GE Energy”), formerly known as Converteam SAS.
Fives contracted with GE Energy to provide three motors for each of the three mills, for a total of nine motors, which were manufactured in France and delivered and installed in Alabama between 2011 and 2012. By June 2014, the motors began to fail, and by August 2015, motors in all three mills failed. It came to light that Fives and GE Energy had entered into a separate agreement with another party that designated Fives to represent the interests of all three parties in the event of a dispute.
Outokumpu filed a lawsuit against GE Energy in Alabama state court in 2016, and GE Energy removed to federal court and moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court granted GE Energy’s motion to compel and dismissed the action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed and remanded as to the motion to compel, holding that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards requires that the arbitration agreement be signed by the parties before Court or their privities, and only under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (which does not expressly restrict arbitration to the specific parties to an agreement) can parties compel arbitration through the doctrine of equitable estoppel.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not conflict with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines that permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not “alter background principles” of state law, including doctrines like equitable estoppel, which authorizes contract enforcement by a nonsignatory. Chapter 2 of the FAA provides that “Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that [Chapter 1] is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention.” The relevant provision of the Convention states that courts of a contracting state “shall...refer the parties to arbitration” when the parties to the action entered into a written agreement to arbitrate and one of the parties requests the referral.
The Court then considered whether state-law equitable estoppel doctrine permitted under Chapter 1 conflicts with the Convention, concluding that it does not. Most importantly, the text of the Convention is silent as to whether nonsignatories may enforce arbitration agreements under domestic doctrines such as equitable estoppel; this silence is dispositive of the matter. This understanding is consistent with the history of the Convention as well as the post-ratification understanding of signatory nations.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to note that the application of domestic doctrine like equitable estoppel must be rooted in the principle of consent to arbitrate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
This case arises from the scandal that became known as “Bridgegate.” Defendants William E. Baroni, Jr. and Bridget Anne Kelly conspired to create major traffic jams in Fort Lee, New Jersey, after Fort Lee’s mayor refused to endorse the 2013 reelection bid of then-Governor Chris Christie. The defendants and others limited motorists’ access to the George Washington Bridge, the world’s busiest bridge, for four days during the first week of Fort Lee’s school year, resulting in extensive traffic delays.
In 2015, a grand jury indicted Baroni and Kelly for their roles in the scheme. Each was charged with seven counts, including conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally misapply property of an organization receiving federal benefits, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the substantive offense underlying that conspiracy, 18 U.S.C § 666(a)(1)(A). A jury convicted the defendants on all counts. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction as to four of the seven, including the two at issue here. In support of its conclusion, the court reasoned that the defendants had defrauded the Port Authority of its property by citing a “traffic study” as the purpose for the lane closures rather than their “real reason” of political payback.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Baroni and Kelly could not have violated the federal-program fraud or wire fraud laws because the scheme did not aim to obtain money or property. Justice Elena Kagan authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. First, the Court looked to the language of the federal wire fraud statute and the federal-program fraud statute, finding those statutes “limited in scope to the protection of property rights.” Thus, the government needed to prove not only that Baroni and Kelly engaged in deception, but that the object of that deception was money or property. Taking control of the lanes of the bridge does not constitute taking of government property because under Court precedent, a scheme to alter a regulatory choice does not amount to taking of property. Similarly, causing increased costs of compensating traffic engineers and back-up toll collectors is an incidental product and not the “object of the fraud,” as required by the statute.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Marcel and Lucky Brand are competitors in the apparel industry, and this dispute arises over Marcel’s allegation that Lucky Brand is infringing on its “Get Lucky” trademark through its use of “Lucky” on its merchandise in violation of an injunction entered in an earlier action between the two parties.
In 2003, the two parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a trademark dispute in which Lucky Brand agreed not to use “Get Lucky” and Marcel agreed to release certain claims it might have in the future arising out of its trademarks. The two parties contest the scope of Marcel’s release of claims, with Marcel contending that it only released claims as to infringement that occurred prior to the 2003 execution of the agreement and Lucky Brand arguing that it released any future claim Marcel may have in relation to any trademark registered prior to the execution of the agreement. Further litigation ensued.
In litigation between the two parties over substantially the same trademark disputes, Lucky Brand argued for its interpretation of the 2003 settlement agreement. It moved to dismiss on the basis that because the marks at issue were registered prior to the settlement agreement, Marcel released any claim alleging infringement of those marks. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it was premature to determine which claims were subject to release in the 2001 agreement. However, the district court noted that Lucky Brand was “free to raise the issue . . . again after the record is more fully developed.” Lucky Brand raised the defense again in its answer and as an affirmative defense, but not again during the litigation. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for Marcel, declaring that Lucky Brand infringed on Marcel’s “Get Lucky” trademark and enjoining Lucky Brand from using the “Get Lucky” mark. Lucky Brand did not appeal.
In 2011, Marcel filed another lawsuit against Lucky Brand alleging that the latter continued to use “Lucky Brand” mark after the injunction. Lucky Brand moved for summary judgment on the basis that Marcel’s claims were precluded by res judicata in light of the final disposition of the previous action. The district court agreed, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding the allegedly barred claims “could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.” On remand, Marcel filed a second amended complaint, which Lucky Brand moved to dismiss on the sole basis that the 2001 agreement barred Marcel’s claims. The district court granted the motion and rejected Marcel’s argument that Lucky Brand was precluded from raising those claims.
The Second Circuit vacated, concluding that the doctrine of claim preclusion (or more precisely, defense preclusion) applied in situations as this one and that it barred Lucky Brand from invoking its release defense again in this action.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Because the trademark action at issue challenged different conduct—and raised different claims—from an earlier action between the parties, Marcel cannot preclude Lucky Brand from raising new defenses, including a defense that Lucky Brand failed to press fully in the earlier suit. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for the unanimous Court.
“Res judicata” is a term that comprises two doctrines of preclusion. First, issue preclusion (also known as “collateral estoppel”) precludes a party from litigating an issue actually decided in a prior case and necessary to the judgment. Second, claim preclusion (also known as “res judicata”) prevents parties from raising claims that could have been raised and decided in a prior action, even if they were not actually litigated. Courts define the “same claim” as meaning the claims arise from the same transaction, or involve a “common nucleus of operative facts.” In this case, the Court found the two suits “were grounded on different conduct, involving different marks, occurring at different times.” The 2005 claims arose from Lucky Brand’s alleged use of “Get Lucky,” while the 2011 claims arose from other alleged uses of the word “Lucky,” not the phrase “Get Lucky.” As such, they did not share a “common nucleus of operative facts,” and claim preclusion therefore cannot apply.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Petitioners Kendra Espinoza and others are low-income mothers who applied for scholarships to keep their children enrolled in Stillwater Christian School, in Kalispell, Montana. The Montana legislature enacted a tax-credit scholarship program in 2015 to provide a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donate to private, nonprofit scholarship organizations. Shortly after the program was enacted, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated an administrative rule (“Rule 1”) prohibiting scholarship recipients from using their scholarships at religious schools, citing a provision of the state constitution that prohibits “direct or indirect” public funding of religiously affiliated educational programs.
Espinoza and the other mothers filed a lawsuit in state court challenging Rule 1. The court determined that the scholarship program was constitutional without Rule 1 and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department and reversed the lower court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The application of the Montana Constitution’s “no-aid” provision to a state program providing tuition assistance to parents who send their children to private schools discriminated against religious schools and the families whose children attend or hope to attend them in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion on behalf of the 5-4 majority.
The Court first noted that the Free Exercise Clause “protects religious observers against unequal treatment” and against “laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of religious status.” In this case, Montana’s no-aid provision excluded religious schools from public benefits solely because of religious status. As such, the law must be subject to strict scrutiny review; that is, the government must show that its action advances “‘interests of the highest order” and that the action is “narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.” Montana’s interest in this case—which the Court described as creating greater separation of church and state than the federal Constitution requires—does not satisfy strict scrutiny given its infringement of free exercise. Because the Free Exercise Clause barred the application of Montana’s no-aid provision, the Montana Supreme Court lacked the authority to invalidate the program on the basis of that provision.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, opining that the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause (not at issue in this case) hampers free exercise rights.
Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Gorsuch each filed their own separate concurrences. Justice Alito argued, as he did in dissenting from the Court’s decision earlier this term in Ramos v. Louisiana, that original motivation should have no bearing on the present constitutionality of a provision of law, yet even without that consideration, the majority reached the correct conclusion in this case. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court’s characterization of the Montana Constitution as discriminating based on “religious status” and not “religious use,” is dubious at best.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the Montana Supreme Court’s decision does not place a burden on petitioners’ religious exercise and thus does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court’s precedents establish that neutral government action is not unconstitutional solely because it fails to benefit religious exercise.
Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined in part. Justice Breyer argued that the majority’s approach and conclusion risk the kind of entanglement and conflict that the Religion Clauses are intended to prevent. Instead, Justice Breyer opined that the Court’s decision in Locke—upholding the application of a no-aid provision in Washington State based on the conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause permitted Washington to forbid state-scholarship funds for students pursuing devotional theology degrees—controlled the outcome in this case, in which the no-aid provision was “materially similar.”
Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a separate dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court in this case resolved a constitutional question not presented, thereby violating “Article III principles older than the Religion Clause” itself. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor continued, the Court answered incorrectly that question it should not have addressed in the first place.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Petitioner Romag Fasteners, Inc., sells magnetic snap fasteners for use in wallets, handbags, and other leather goods. Respondent Fossil designs, markets, and distributes fashion accessories, including handbags and small leather goods. In 2002, Fossil and Romag entered into an agreement to use Romag fasteners in Fossil’s products, and Fossil’s manufacturers purchased tens of thousands of Romag fasteners between 2002 and 2008. In 2010, the president of Romag discovered that certain Fossil handbags sold in the United States contained counterfeit snaps bearing the Romag mark. Romag sued Fossil in 2010 for patent and trademark infringement. Romag alleged that Fossil knowingly adopted and used the Romag mark without Romag’s consent.
A jury found that Fossil had infringed Romag’s trademark and patents but that none of the violations were willful. The jury awarded Romag trademark damages under two theories: over $90,000 in profits “to prevent unjust enrichment” and over $6.7 million in profits “to deter future trademark infringement.” For the latter award, the jury found that Fossil had acted with “callous disregard” for Romag’s trademark rights. However, the district court struck the jury’s award, finding that “a finding of willfulness remains a requirement for an award of defendants’ profits in this Circuit.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that within the Second Circuit, a showing of willfulness was required for an award of profits. Romag petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In light of its decision in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 580 U.S. __ (2017), that affected the patent infringement claims in this case, the Court granted the petition, vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision, and remanded the case. On remand, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the district court’s judgment declining to award Fossil’s profits.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Section 35 of the Lanham Act does not require a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit to show that a defendant willfully infringed the plaintiff’s trademark as a precondition to an award of profits. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion of the Court on behalf of the 8-1 majority.
The plain language of Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) does not require a plaintiff alleging a claim under § 1125(a) to show willfulness. Rather, the statute mentions “willfulness” only in connection to § 1125(c). The Court declined to read into the statute words that are not there, particularly since Congress included the term “willfulness” elsewhere in the very same statutory provision.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan to note that while willfulness is a “highly important” consideration in awarding profits under Section 35 of the Lanham Act, it is not an “absolute precondition.”
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, to highlight a distinction, supported by the weight of authority, between “willful” infringement and “innocent” infringement—a distinction she criticizes the majority of being “agnostic” about.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
United Western Bancorp, Inc. (UWBI) was in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings when it received a tax refund check from the Internal Revenue Service that was the result of net operating losses incurred by one of UWBI’s subsidiaries (United Western Bank). UWBI and its subsidiaries had entered into a tax allocation agreement in 2008 that was the source of the present ownership dispute. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) alleged that, as receiver for the Bank, it was entitled to the federal tax refund that was due because the refund stemmed exclusively from the Bank’s business loss carrybacks. Simon Rodriguez, in his capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of UWBI, initiated a bankruptcy adversary proceeding against the FDIC, alleging that UWBI owned the tax refund and thus that it was part of the bankruptcy estate.
The bankruptcy court agreed with Rodriguez and entered summary judgment. The FDIC appealed to federal district court, which reversed the bankruptcy court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. Under federal common law, “a tax refund due from a joint return generally belongs to the company responsible for the losses that form the basis of the refund.” Applying this rule and noting that the agreement’s intended treatment of tax refunds mandates the same result, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the tax refund at issue belonged to the Bank and thus that the FDIC, as receiver for the Bank, was entitled to summary judgment.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In an opinion authored by Justice Gorsuch, a unanimous Court held that state law is “well equipped to handle disputes involving corporate property rights.” Federal common law should only exist to “protect uniquely federal interests” the Court explained. “Nothing like that exists here” it continued. While the federal government potentially has a sufficiently unique interest in rules governing the receipt of taxes from corporate entities, the court elaborated, it questioned the strength of any interest in how a tax refund, once received, is distributed among the members of that entity. The Court found that neither federal courts that have applied federal common law to this question nor the FDIC as the advocate for federal common law in this case had ever articulated a sufficient unique federal interest to justify the existence of federal common law on this point.
The Court did not decide whether the outcome of the particular dispute before it would have been different if decided under the applicable state law rather than erroneously under the federal common law it deemed improper. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal for that determination.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides in relevant part that a person who has three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. In recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a “categorical” approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a “violent felony” within the ACCA. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a “serious drug offense” as well.
Eddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses—five for sale of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had “knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance,” that is, that the substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular’s Florida convictions would qualify as a “serious drug offense” because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances.”