[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected (i.e. vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Sandra K. Forney applied for Social Security disability benefits. A Social Security Judge determined Forney was minimally disabled, but that she was not disabled enough to qualify for benefits. Consequently she was denied her disability claim. The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council denied Forney's request for review. Forney then sought judicial review in federal District Court. The District Court found that the final determination was inadequately supported by the evidence and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. Forney appealed the remand order to the Court of Appeals. She contended that the agency's denial of benefits should be reversed outright. The Court of Appeals did not hear her claim, however, for it decided that Forney did not have the legal right to appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a person seeking Social Security disability benefits may appeal to a federal Court of Appeals when a District Court remands the case to the agency for further proceedings.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
At Vincent Edwards, Reynolds A. Wintersmith, Horace Joiner, Karl V. Fort, and Joseph Tidwell's trial for "conspiring" to "possess with intent to...distribute [mixtures containing two] controlled substances," the jury was instructed that the Government must prove that the conspiracy involved measurable amounts of "cocaine or cocaine base (crack)." After the jury returned guilty verdicts, the District Judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioners' illegal conduct involved both cocaine and crack. On appeal, the petitioners argued that their sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack, because the word "or" in the jury instruction meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine. The United States Sentencing Guidelines treats cocaine more leniently than crack. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the judge was authorized to determine for sentencing purposes whether crack, as well as cocaine, was involved in the offense-related activities." Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "[t]he Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this one to determine both the amount and the kind of 'controlled substances' for which a defendant should be held accountable -- and then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind. Consequently, regardless of the jury's actual, or assumed, beliefs about the conspiracy, the Guidelines nonetheless require the judge to determine whether the 'controlled substances' at issue -- and how much of those substances -- consisted of cocaine, crack, or both."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Hidalgo County agreed to take federal prisoners into its custody in return for federal money. During this agreement, Brigido Marmolejo, the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Texas, and Mario Salinas, his deputy, accepted money and two watches and a truck respectively, from Homero Beltran-Aguirr, a federal prisoner housed in the county jail, in exchange for permitting his girlfriend to visit him. Ultimately, Salinas was charged with one count of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC section 1962(c), one count of conspiracy to violate RICO, section 1962(d), and two counts of bribery, section 666(a)(1)(B). The jury convicted him on all but the substantive RICO count. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 666(a)(1)(B) does not require the Government to prove the bribe in question had a demonstrated effect upon federal funds. Additionally, the Court held that, to be convicted of conspiracy to violate RICO under section 1962(d), the conspirator need not himself have committed or agreed to commit the two or more predicate acts, such as bribery, requisite for a substantive RICO offense under section 1962(c). Justice Kennedy reasoned that section 666(a)(1)(B)'s "expansive, unqualified language, both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered" did not support the position that federal funds must be affected for a violation to occur.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) imposes recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon political committees which receive more than $1,000 in "contributions" or which make more than $1,000 in "expenditures" in a year "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." Certain assistance does not count toward the expenditure cap if it takes the form of a "communication" by a "membership organization or corporation" "to its members" as long as the organization is not "organized primarily for the purpose of influencing [any individual's] nomination... or election." A complaint filed by a group of voters asked the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to order the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to make public the information that FECA demands of political committees. Ultimately, the FEC found that AIPAC was not a political committee because its major purpose was not the nomination or election of candidates. The en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the FEC's major purpose test improperly interpreted FECA's definition of a political committee.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that voters seeking information, to which they believe FECA entitles them, have standing to challenge the FEC's decision not to bring an enforcement action. Because FECA seeks to address the voters' injury, the failure to obtain relevant information, Justice Breyer concluded that the voters had prudential standing. Furthermore, because the voters' inability to obtain information constitutes an "injury in fact," continued Justice Breyer, the voters had standing under Article III. The Court did not address the FEC's major purpose test, allowing the FEC to address the issue under newly proposed rules. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1983, a partnership mortgaged its interest in the Louisiana equivalent of a leasehold estate on a parcel of real property in New Orleans to Regions Bank of Louisiana. The partnership then granted a second mortgage to Mary Anna Rivet, Minna Ree Winer, Edmond G. Miranne, and Edmond G. Miranne, Jr. Later, the partnership filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of the estate to the Bank, which sold the property. Rivet filed suit in Louisiana state court, alleging that the transfer of the property without satisfying their rights under the second mortgage violated state law. The Bank removed the action to federal court, contending that federal-question jurisdiction existed because the prior Bankruptcy Court orders extinguished Rivet's rights. Denying Rivet's motion to remand, the District Court granted the Bank summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that removal is proper where a plaintiff's state cause of action is completely precluded by a prior federal judgment on a federal question.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a defense claim of preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment provides no basis for removal and emphasized that the claim is properly made in state proceedings. Differing the case from a removable case governed by a preemptive federal statute, Justice Ginsburg wrote that the "prior federal judgment does not transform the plaintiff's state-law claims into federal claims but rather extinguishes them altogether."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
18 USC section 922(g)(1) forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any firearm. Section 924(e) requires that a three-time violent felon who violates section 922(g)(1) receive an enhanced sentence. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender's civil rights have been restored, "unless such... restoration... expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms." In 1993, Gerald Caron was convicted of possessing six rifles and shotguns in violation of section 922(g). The District Court enhanced Caron's sentence based, in part, on three Massachusetts convictions. In vacating his sentence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a Massachusetts law that permitted Caron to possess rifles, but not handguns, had restored his civil rights. On remand, the District Court found that, because Massachusetts law allowed Caron to possess rifles, section 921(a)(20)'s "unless clause" was not activated. The Court of Appeals reversed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Massachusetts treats [Caron] as too dangerous to trust with handguns, though it accords this right to law-abiding citizens. Federal law uses this state finding of dangerousness in forbidding [Caron] to have any guns." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "the unless clause is activated if a restoration of civil rights 'expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms.' Either the restorations forbade possession of 'firearms' and the convictions count for all purposes, or they did not and the convictions count not at all. The unless clause looks to the terms of the past restorations alone and does not refer to the weapons at issue in the present case. So if the Massachusetts convictions count for some purposes, they count for all and bar possession of all guns."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Randall Ricci owns Rudeway Enterprises, a telemarketing business. After the Arlington Heights police department determined that Ricci lacked the required business license and that one of Ricci's employees had an outstanding warrant, officers went to Rudeway Enterprises to arrest the employee. While arresting the employee, the officers also searched Ricci's business papers without a warrant. Subsequently, Ricci was arrested for violating Section 9-201 of the Village of Arlington Heights Code of Ordinances, which makes it unlawful to operate a business without a license. Ultimately, Ricci filed a claim that the officers violated his civil rights by subjecting him to a full custodial arrest for committing a fine-only offense. The District Court dismissed the claim. Finding the arrest reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court of Appeals rejected Ricci's argument that a full custodial arrest for violation of a fine-only ordinance is constitutionally permissible only if the violation involves a breach of the peace.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court did not answer the question. The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed. Representatives of three of the passengers (petitioners) sued KAL for damages for their decedents' pre-death pain and suffering. While their suit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. In Zicherman, the Court held that the Warsaw Convention permits compensation only for legally cognizable harm and that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) supplies the applicable U.S. law where an airplane crashes on the high seas. DOHSA allows certain relatives of a decedent to sue for their own pecuniary losses, but does not authorize recovery for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Subsequently, the District Court granted KAL's motion to dismiss petitioners' nonpecuniary damages claims on the ground that DOHSA does not permit recovery for such damages. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that general maritime law provides a survival action for pain and suffering damages.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "[b]ecause Congress has chosen not to authorize a survival action for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, there can be no general maritime survival action for such damages." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that the "comprehensive scope of DOHSA is confirmed by its survival provision, which limits the recovery in such cases to the pecuniary losses suffered by surviving relatives. The Act thus expresses Congress' 'considered judgment' on the availability and contours of a survival action in cases of death on the high seas. For this reason, it cannot be contended that DOHSA has no bearing on survival actions; rather, Congress has simply chosen to adopt a more limited survival provision."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1989, following the Chicago Landmarks Commission's preliminary determination that two of the International College of Surgeons and the United States Section of the International College of Surgeons' (ICS) buildings qualified for protection under the city's Landmarks Ordinance, the city enacted a Designation Ordinance creating a landmark district that included the buildings. After ICS applied for and was denied a permit to demolish all but the facades of the buildings, it sought judicial review of the Commission's decisions, alleging the ordinances and the manner in which the Commission conducted its proceedings violated the Federal and State Constitutions. Chicago removed the case to federal district court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision in favor of the city, ruling that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction of a case containing state law claims for on-the-record review of local administrative action.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that a case containing claims that local administrative action violates federal law, but also containing state law claims for on-the-record review of the administrative findings, can be removed to federal district court. The Court reasoned that the landowners' actions fell within the District Court's original jurisdiction over federal questions and that the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. "Because neither the jurisdictional statutes nor our prior decisions suggest that federal jurisdiction is lacking in these circumstances, we now reverse," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent, in which Justice John Paul Stevens joined.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
David and Linda Beach refinanced their Florida house in 1986 with a loan from Great Western Bank. In 1991, they stopped making mortgage payments. In 1992, Great Western began foreclosure proceedings. While the Beach's acknowledged their default, they alleged that the bank's failure to make disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act gave them the right under federal law to rescind the mortgage agreement. The Florida trial court rejected that defense, holding that any right to rescind had expired in 1989 under federal law which provides that the right of rescission shall expire three years after the loan closes. The state's intermediate appellate court affirmed, as did the Florida Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled no such defense could be raised after the three-year deadline of the federal Truth in Lending Act expires.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Randolph K. Reeves was charged with two counts of felony murder for the sexual assault and murder of Janet Mesner and Victoria Lamm, both of Lincoln, Nebraska. Under Nebraska law, felony murder is a form of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of certain felonies, including sexual assault. A conviction for felony murder renders a defendant eligible for the death penalty; however the jury does not charge the defendant because capital sentencing is a judicial function. In his trial Reeves requested the jury be given other options rather than just felony murder. The trial court judge denied Reeves's motion and he was subsequently convicted on both counts. A three-judge panel sentenced Reeves to death. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. After exhausting his state remedies, Reeves filed a federal habeas corpus petition that the trial court's failure to give the requested instructions was unconstitutional. The District Court granted relief on an unrelated due process claim. The Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's decision, but held that a constitutional error had occurred.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and no. The Court held 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, that (1) in capital cases, a state trial court is not required, under the Constitution, to instruct the jury on offenses that are not lesser included offenses of the charged crime under state law; and (2) the Nebraska trial court did not commit federal constitutional error in failing to give the requested jury instructions as to second-degree murder and manslaughter.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1992, Robert Joiner, after being diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer, sued General Electric Co. in Georgia state court, alleging that his disease was promoted by workplace exposure to chemical "PCBs" and their derivatives, including polychlorinated dibenzofurans (furans) and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxins). Ultimately, Joiner provided the District Court with expert witnesses' depositions that testified that PCBs, furans, and dioxins can promote cancer and that this was the likely cause of his cancer. The court granted GE summary judgment, reasoning that there was no genuine issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins and that his experts' testimony had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of Joiner's expert witnesses. The appellate court applied a stringent standard of review to reach its conclusion.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that abuse of discretion, the standard ordinarily applicable to review of evidentiary rulings, is the proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert scientific evidence. Additionally, the Court held that the proper application of the correct standard of review indicates that the District Court did not err in excluding the expert testimony at issue. "The Federal Rules of Evidence," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "leave in place the 'gatekeeper' role of the trial judge in screening such evidence. A court of appeals applying 'abuse of discretion' review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
While living on the federal Army base Fort Polk, Debra Faye Lewis was charged with the murder of her four year-old daughter. Under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which provides that "whoever within... any [federal enclave], is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable... within the jurisdiction of the State... in which such place is situated, ...shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment," Lewis' indictment charged a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. Lewis was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the ACA did not apply because Congress made Lewis' acts punishable as federal second-degree murder. The appellate court, however, affirmed Lewis' conviction because the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that, because the ACA does not make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute part of federal law, the federal second-degree murder statute governs Lewis' crime. Because the federal second-degree murder statute does not mandate a life sentence, but rather provides for a sentence of "any term of years or life," Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that Lewis was also entitled to resentencing. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
An indictment returned in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri charged Vickie S. Cabrales with various charges of money laundering. The incident alleged that Cabrales deposited $40,000 with the AmSouth Bank of Florida, of which she later withdrew $38,000. The money was traceable to illegal cocaine sales in Missouri. Cabrales moved to dismiss the indictment for improper venue. Because the money-laundering activity occurred entirely in Florida, the court dismissed two of the three counts against Cabrales. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that Article III, the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 required that a person be tried where the charged offense was committed. The court also noted that laundering alleged in the indictment occurred entirely in Florida and that the Government did not assert that Cabrales transported the money from Missouri to Florida.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Missouri is not a place of proper venue for the money-laundering offenses with which Cabrales is charged. Rejecting the Government's "continuing offense" argument, under which Cabrales would have been triable in more than one place, the Court noted that the laundering transactions occurred only in Florida, making venue in Missouri improper. The Court also reasoned that if the Government could link Cabrales to the drug-trafficking activity, then she could be prosecuted for those violations in Missouri with her money laundering in Florida shown as overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1996, Keith Schacht filed a state-court suit against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections and several of its employees (defendants), in their "personal" and in their "official" capacity, alleging that his dismissal violated the Federal Constitution and federal civil rights laws. After removing the case to federal court, the defendants asserted that the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the claims against the Department and its employees in their official capacity. The District Court granted the individual defendants summary judgment on the "personal capacity" claims and dismissed the claims against the Department and the individual defendants in their "official capacity." On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the removal had been improper because the presence of even one claim subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar deprives the federal courts of removal jurisdiction over the entire case.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a State's claim of an Eleventh Amendment bar to a plaintiff's claims against the state places those claims beyond the power of the federal courts to decide, but that the State may remove the case to a federal court and that the court can decide the nonbarred claims. "A State's proper assertion of an Eleventh Amendment bar after removal means that the federal court cannot hear the barred claim. But that circumstance does not destroy removal jurisdiction over the remaining claims in the case before us. A federal court can proceed to hear those other claims, and the District Court did not err in doing so," concluded Justice Breyer. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides an expedited review process for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases in States that meet certain conditions. California officials stated that they believed they qualified for Chapter 154. Troy Ashmus, a state prisoner sentenced to death, filed a class action suit, which included all capital prisoners in California whose convictions were affirmed on direct appeal after June 6, 1989, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve uncertainty over whether Chapter 154 applied. Holding that California did not qualify for Chapter 154, the District Court enjoined the State from invoking the Chapter in any proceedings involving class members. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit and that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "this action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief is not a justiciable case within the meaning of Article III." "If the class members file habeas petitions, and the State asserts Chapter 154, the members obviously can litigate California's compliance with Chapter 154 at that time. Any risk associated with resolving the question in habeas, rather than a pre-emptive suit, is no different from risks associated with choices commonly faced by litigants," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice David H. Souter joined.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Alida Star Gebser, a high school student in the Lago Vista Independent School District ("Lago Vista"), had a secret sexual affair with one of her teachers. At the time, Lago Vista had no official procedure for reporting sexual harassment nor any formal anti-harassment policy, as required by federal law. One day, after the two were discovered having sex, the teacher was arrested and fired. Claiming she was harassed in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (the "Amendments"), providing that no person "be subjected to discrimination" under any federally funded education program or activity, Gebser sought damages against Lago Vista. On appeal from a decision affirming a district court's ruling in favor of Lago Vista, the Supreme Court granted Gebser certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that two minimal criteria must be met in order for an aggrieved party to recover sexual harassment damages under the Amendments. First, the party must show that a school district official, with the ability to institute corrective measures, knew of the forbidden conduct. Second, a showing must be made that despite having knowledge of the forbidden conduct, the educational establishment deliberately failed to respond in a proper manner. The Court concluded that Lago Vista never showed indifference to Gebser's relationship since it never knew, either formally or informally, of its existence. Accordingly, Lago Vista was not liable for sexual harassment damages.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Following Douglas Buchanan's conviction for the capital murders of his father, stepmother, and two brothers, the prosecutor sought the death penalty based on Virginia's aggravating factor that the crime was vile. The trial court instructed the jury that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Buchanan's conduct was vile, "then you may fix the punishment...at death," but "if you believe from all the evidence that...death...is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment...at life imprisonment." Buchanan sought four additional instructions on particular mitigating factors and a general instruction on the concept of mitigating evidence. The court denied Buchanan, refusing to single out certain mitigating factors to the sentencing jury. The jury returned with a verdict for the death penalty.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the concept of mitigation generally and on the four mitigating factors did not violate Buchanan's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that the court's instructions, by directing the jury to base the decision on "all the evidence," afforded the jurors an opportunity to consider mitigating evidence and did not constrain the manner in which the jury was able to give effect to mitigation. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, "'there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors in [Buchanan's] case understood the challenged instructions to preclude consideration of relevant mitigating evidence offered by [Buchanan].'" Justices Stephen G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg disagreed in a dissent by Justice Breyer.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Under the Medicare Act a hospital may obtain a reimbursement for certain graduate medical education (GME) programs for interns and residents by preparing certain reports. The GME Amendment, section 9202(a), of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985 directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine, for a hospital's cost reporting period starting during fiscal year 1984, the amount "recognized as reasonable" for GME costs. The Amendment then directs the Secretary to use the 1984 amount, adjusted for inflation, to calculate a hospital's GME reimbursement for subsequent years. The Secretary's "reaudit" regulation permits a second audit of the 1984 GME costs to ensure accurate reimbursements in future years. A reaudit of Regions Hospital significantly lowered the Hospital's allowable 1984 GME costs. Subsequently, the Hospital challenged the validity of the reaudit rule. Ultimately, the District Court granted the Secretary summary judgment, concluding that the rule reasonably interpreted Congress' prescription and that the reauditing did not impose an impermissible "retroactive rule." The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the reaudit rule is a reasonable interpretation of the GME Amendment and that it is not impermissibly retroactive. Given that the timing of the "recognized as reasonable" determination is silent and thus ambiguous, the Court concluded that, because it reflects a reasonable interpretation of the law, the reaudit rule merits the Court's approbation. "The Secretary's reaudit rule brings the base-year calculation in line with Congress' pervasive instruction for reasonable cost reimbursement," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Richard Trest sought a writ of habeas corpus that would cancel the sentence he was serving in Louisiana for armed robbery. The District Court rejected his claim. Trest appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but before hearing the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as a "procedural default." The Court of Appeals ruled that Trent had failed to meet the deadline for filing his federal claims in state court. Though Louisiana had not raised the issue, the Fifth Circuit felt compelled to dismiss the case on its own initiative. Trest appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Fifth Circuit had incorrectly believed that it was required to decide the "procedural default" issue sua sponte - that is, without prompting from one of the parties.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. A Court of Appeals is not required to raise an issue of procedural default on its own initiative. In a unanimous opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer observed: "We are not aware of any precedent stating that a habeas court must raise such a matter where the State itself does not do so." The Court held that it was the State's duty to raise issues of procedural default, but did not rule on the question of whether the Court of Appeals retained the option of ruling on the issue sua sponte.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
erry Campbell, a white man, was indicted for second-degree murder by a grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana. Campbell moved to quash the indictment by citing a long history of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons in Evangeline Parish. No African-American had served as a foreperson for the past 16 years despite the fact twenty percent of the registered voters were black. Campbell claimed such practices violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. A Louisiana trial judge denied Campbell's challenge, holding that he lacked standing as a white man complaining about the exclusion of African-Americans from serving as forepersons. The Louisiana Court of Appeal overruled the trial judge and decided Campbell had standing. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Without reaching the merits, the Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that "a defendant has standing to litigate whether his conviction was procured by means or procedures which contravene due process." A white defendant could assert the right of the grand jury to be free of discrimination because racial discrimination in jury selection casts doubt on the integrity of the entire trial process.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
John Hudson was chairman of the First National Bank of Tipton and the First National Bank of Hammon. Hudson used his position to regain bank stock he had used as collateral on defaulted loans through a series of bank loans to other parties. Upon investigation the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) found that the loans were made in violation of several banking statues and regulations. The OCC fined and debarred Hudson for the violations. Later, he faced criminal indictment in federal District Court for violations tied to those same events. Hudson objected, arguing that the indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit eventually found for the Government in light of United States v. Halper on the grounds that the original proceedings were civil in nature and not so disproportional to the proven damages to the Government as to qualify as a form of criminal punishment.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Circuit's decision based on the distinction made in United States v. Ward between criminal and civil punishments. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to non-criminal penalties, even if the purpose of the penalty is to punish the offenders and deter future offenders. Since the first punishment handed down by the OCC - a Federal Banking Agency, not a court - was not a criminal punishment, the subsequent indictments were upheld.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Aloyzas Balsys was subpoenaed by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to testify about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his subsequent immigration to the United States. Fearing prosecution by a foreign nation, Balsys refused the subpoena by claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court ruling granting OSI's subpoena enforcement petition, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that although resident aliens are entitled to the same Fifth Amendment protections as citizen "persons" the risk of their deportation is not sufficient to sustain a self-incrimination privilege intended to apply only to the United States government. The Court explained that since the Fifth Amendment does not bind foreign governments, and that would not be subject to domestic enforcement of immunity-for-testimony deals, one could not assert a self-incrimination protection against possible prosecution at their hands.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The U.S. holds in trust the Oklahoma land that the federally recognized Kiowa Tribe owns. In 1990, the then-Chairman of the Tribe's Business Committee signed a promissory note in the Tribe's name in order to purchase stock from Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. The note states that it was signed on tribal lands and provides that nothing in it subjects or limits the Tribe's sovereign rights. After the Tribe defaulted, Manufacturing Technologies sued the Tribe in state court, claiming that the note was executed and delivered beyond tribal lands. The Tribe moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Denying the motion, the trial court entered judgment for Manufacturing Technologies. In affirming, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that Indian tribes are subject to suit in state court for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from civil suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a reservation. Noting that an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity, Justice Kennedy deferred to Congress, which has not abrogated a tribe's immunity from civil suits on contracts. In a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the Court should consider "whether a tribe is immune from a suit that has no meaningful nexus to the Tribe's land or its sovereign functions."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
New York Tax Law section 631(b)(6) denies only nonresident taxpayers a state income tax deduction for alimony paid. In 1990, Christopher Lunding and his wife, residents of Connecticut, were required to pay higher taxes on their New York income when the State denied their attempted deduction of a pro rata portion of the alimony Lunding paid a previous spouse. Lunding commenced suit, asserting that section 631(b)(6) discriminates against New York nonresidents in violation of the Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held that section 631(b)(6) was adequately justified because New York residents who are subject to taxation on all of their income regardless of source should be entitled to the benefit of full deduction of expenses, while personal expenses of a nonresident taxpayer are more appropriately allocated to the State of residence.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that, in the absence of a substantial reason for the difference in treatment of nonresidents, section 631(b)(6) violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause by denying only nonresidents an income tax deduction for alimony payments. "The alimony obligation may be of a 'personal' nature, but it cannot be viewed as geographically fixed in the manner that other expenses, such as business losses, mortgage interest payments, or real estate taxes, might be," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act entrusts the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) with discretion to award financial grants to the arts. The NEA's broad decision guidelines are: "artistic and cultural significance," with emphasis on "creativity and cultural diversity professional excellence," and the encouragement of "public education and appreciation of the arts." In 1990, Congress amended the criteria by requiring the NEA to consider "artistic excellence and artistic merit taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." After suffering a funding rejection, Karen Finley, along with three other performance artists and the National Association of Artists' Organizations, challenged the NEA's amended statutory review proceedings as unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. After consecutive district and appellate court rulings in favor of Finley, the Supreme Court granted the NEA certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an 8-to-1 opinion the Court held that, unlike direct sovereign regulation of speech, Congress enjoys wide latitude when setting spending priorities which may indirectly affect certain forms of expression. The funding of one activity believed to be in the public interest, to the exclusion of another, does not constitute viewpoint discrimination. Moreover, the statutory funding guidelines were not impermissibly vague since they involved selective subsidies rather than criminal or regulatory prohibitions. The Court noted that while the amended regulations may add some measure of imprecision to the existing guidelines, they do so to an already highly subjective selection process, made so by the inevitable nature of the subject matter with which it deals.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 39. Chapter 39 holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement in the public schools. The State Commissioner of Education may select from various sanctions, including the appointment of a master or a management team and the contracting out of services, when a school district falls short of Chapter 39's accreditation criteria. Under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Texas submitted Chapter 39 to the United States Attorney General for a determination whether any of the sanctions effected voting and thus required preclearance. Ultimately, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights cautioned that such sanctions implementation might violate section 5. Subsequently, Texas sought a declaration District Court that section 5 did not apply to such sanctions. The court concluded that Texas's claim was not ripe.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Texas's claim is not ripe for adjudication. The Court's holding turning on the fact that Texas did not indicate any school district in which an application of Chapter 39 was "foreseen or even likely." Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that, "we find it too speculative whether the problem Texas presents will ever need solving; we find the legal issues Texas raises not yet fit for our consideration, and the hardship to Texas of biding its time insubstantial."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Both a judgment lien and federal tax liens encumbered the real property of Francis Romani's Pennsylvania estate, worth $53,001, following his death. The estate's administrator sought a county court's permission to transfer the property to the judgment creditor. The Government objected to the conveyance, arguing that 31 USC section 3713(a), which provides that a Government claim "shall be paid first" when a decedent's estate cannot pay all of its debts, prioritized its payment. Nevertheless, the court authorized the conveyance. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The court concluded that Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 modified the Government's preference and recognized the priority of many state claims over federal tax liens.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that section 3713(a) does not require that a federal tax claim be given preference over a judgment creditor's perfected lien on real property. Justice Stevens reasoned that section 3713(a) has been limited by Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, which provides that says a federal lien for back taxes is not valid until the government files proper notice with state or local officials. Accordingly, Justice Stevens wrote that the Tax Lien Act "represents Congress' detailed judgment as to when the Government's claims for unpaid taxes should yield to many different sorts of interests... in many different types of property... specifically crafted for tax collection purposes." Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act provides that that "federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district." The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) interprets section 9 to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple, unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond of occupation. Under this interpretation, the NCUA approved a series of charter amendments adding several unrelated employer groups to the membership of AT&T Family Federal Credit Union, which now has approximately 110,000 members nationwide only 35% of whom are employees of AT&T and its affiliates. Subsequently, a number of private actors brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the NCUA's decision was contrary to law because section 109 unambiguously requires that the same common bond of occupation unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union and members of the new groups did not share a common bond of occupation with AT&T Family Federal Credit Union's existing members. Ultimately, the District Court held that the private interests lack standing to challenge NCUA's decision and the Court of Appeals reversed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that banks and professional associations have prudential standing under the APA to seek federal-court review of the NCUA's interpretation of section 109. By the same majority, the Court also held that the NCUA's interpretation of section 109, under which a common bond of occupation must unite only the members of each unrelated employer group, is impermissible. After concluding that the banks and professional associations' interests fall within the "zone of interests" protected by section 109, Justice Thomas wrote that the NCUA's interpretation "has the potential to read ["shall be limited"] out of the statute entirely."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1983, Margaret Kawaauhau sought treatment from Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury. Later, Geiger cancelled Kawaauhau's transfer, by other physicians, to an infectious disease specialist. Ultimately, Kawaauhau required that her right leg be amputated below the knee. In the subsequently malpractice suit, a jury awarded Kawaauhau approximately $355,000 in damages. Geiger, who carried no malpractice insurance, ultimately filed for bankruptcy. Kawaauhau requested the Bankruptcy Court to hold the malpractice judgment nondischargeable under 11 USC section 523(a)(6), which provides that a "discharge [in bankruptcy]... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt... for willful and malicious injury... to another." The court held the debt nondischargeable. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that section 523(a)(6)'s exemption from discharge is confined to debts for an intentional tort, so that a debt for malpractice remains dischargeable because it is based on negligent or reckless conduct.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that "debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of [section 523(a)(6)]." Therefore, the debt is dischargeable. Justice Ginsburg wore for the Court that "[t]he word 'willful' in [section 523(a)(6)] modifies the word 'injury,' indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. Had Congress meant to exempt debts resulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead 'willful acts that cause injury.' Or, Congress might have selected an additional word or words, i.e., 'reckless' or 'negligent,' to modify 'injury.'"


[Unknown Act > Facts]
During a routine check of departing international flight passengers, customs officers discovered $357,144 on the person of Hosep Bajakajian. In addition to charging him, under 31 U.S.C. Section 5316, of attempting to leave the United States with an unreported sum in excess of $10,000 cash, the government also sought forfeiture of the entire $357,144 under 18 U.S.C. Section 982 providing that the deliberate violation of Section 5316 shall result in the forfeiture of "any property involved in such an offense." After having its forfeiture claim rejected in both a district court and the Ninth Circuit, as excessively unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted the government certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that the government's ability to extract fines is limited by the Excessive Fines Clause. The forfeiture of currency, when ordered for a violation of a reporting statute, is a punitive measure which constitutes a "fine" under the Eighth Amendment. Noting the importance of making punishments proportional to their crimes, the Court reminded that currency transportation is generally permissible. Bajakajian's failure to do so within statutory reporting guidelines was neither related to other illegal activity nor did it result in loss to the government. Therefore, forfeiture of the entire sum would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After the local rent control administrator ordered Edward S. Cohen to refund $31,382.50 in excessive rents he had charged Hilda de la Cruz and other tenants, Cohen sought to discharge his debts under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The tenants filed an adversary proceeding, arguing that the debt Cohen owed to them was nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, which excepts from discharge "any debt ... for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by ... actual fraud." The tenants also sought treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The Bankruptcy Court ruled in their favor, finding that Cohen had committed "actual fraud" within the meaning of ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code and that his conduct violated the New Jersey law. The court, therefore, awarded the tenants treble damages totaling $94,147.50, plus attorney's fees and costs. The District Court affirmed, as did the Court of Appeals, which held that debts resulting from fraud are nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, and that the award of treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) in this case was therefore nondischargeable.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, The Court ruled that because Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge all liability arising from fraud, treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) awarded on account of the debtor's fraud fall within the scope of the exception. Justice O'Connor wrote, "The bankruptcy code has long prohibited debtors from discharging liabilities incurred on account of their fraud, embodying a basic policy...of affording relief only to an honest but unfortunate debtor."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), a private-sector labor organization, represents pilots employed by Delta Air Lines. The collective-bargaining agreement between ALPA and Delta includes an "agency shop" clause that requires nonunion Delta pilots to pay ALPA a monthly service charge for representing them. 153 Delta pilots challenged in federal-court action the manner in which ALPA calculated agency fees. Under ALPA policy pilots who object to the fee calculation may request arbitration proceedings. When 174 Delta pilots filed objections to the agency-fee calculation, the ALPA treated the objections as requests for arbitration. The arbitrator sustained ALPA's calculation. The District Court concluded that the pilots seeking to challenge the fee calculation must exhaust arbitral remedies before proceeding in court. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found no legal basis for requiring objectors to arbitrate agency-fee challenges when they had not agreed to do so.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled the nonunion pilots cannot be forced to go through arbitration. "Unless they agree to the procedure, agency-fee objectors may not be required to exhaust an arbitration remedy before bringing their claims in federal court," wrote Ginsburg.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Under an 1834 compact between New York and New Jersey, Ellis Island was deemed part of New York. It was later determined, by the Supreme Court, that New Jersey would have sovereign rights over all submerged lands on its side of the Hudson River. During the time Ellis Island was used to receive immigrants, the Federal Government filled around the island adding some 24.5 acres to its original size over 42 years. When immigration was diverted from Ellis Island in 1954, New York and New Jersey asserted rival sovereignty claims over the Island's filled portions. New Jersey finally invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to solve the matter once and for all time.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court held that the 1834 compact between the two states, although granting New York sovereignty over Ellis Island, did not support an inference that any portions added to the island's New Jersey side would also belong to New York. The lack of meets and bounds descriptions in the compact indicated that it merely applied to Ellis Island as it existed in 1834, and did not contemplate ownership of expanded portions. Moreover, the Court noted that under the common law doctrine of avulsion, sudden shoreline changes have no effect on boundaries. Thus, since New Jersey had sovereignty over previously submerged portions of Ellis Island, it would retain such sovereignty when these portions were filled until raised above the water line on its side of the Island.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The site of a chemical manufacturing plant was polluted over many years. During much of the time, the companies running the plant were wholly owned subsidiaries of, first, CPC International Inc. (CPC), and later Aerojet- General Corp (Aerojet). By 1981, the federal Environmental Protection Agency had undertaken to have the site cleaned up. To recover some of the money spent, the U.S. filed an action under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2). Section 107 allows the U.S. to seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from, among others, "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility." The first phase of the trial concerned only liability, and focused on whether CPC and Aerojet had "owned or operated" the facility.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, unless the corporate veil may be pierced. But a corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of the facility itself may be held directly liable in its own right as an operator of the facility.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
When questioned by federal agents as to the receipt of gifts or money from a company whose employees were members of the union in which he was an officer, James Brogan falsely answered "no." Brogan was subsequently indicted on federal bribery charges and the making of false statements within a federal agency's jurisdiction. Brogan challenged his conviction, arguing that false statements which merely deny wrongdoing, and do not impede federal functions, are protected under the Fifth Amendment. On appeal from an appeals court judgment upholding an adverse district court ruling, the Supreme Court granted Brogan certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the imposition of criminal liability for false statements is not limited only to those falsehoods that pervert governmental functions - it applies to statements "of whatever kind." Moreover, even if the "exculpatory no" doctrine did apply to statements that do not impede federal functions, Brogan would not benefit from it since his falsehoods were intended to prevent federal agents from uncovering the truth. The Court concluded by noting that a literal reading of federal laws which prohibit the "exculpatory no" defense is consistent with the Fifth Amendment, since the Framers never intended to confer a privilege to lie.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
8 USC section 1326(a) makes it a crime, punishable by up to two years in prison, for a deported alien to return to the United States without special permission. In 1998, Congress added subsection (b)(2), which authorizes a maximum prison term of 20 years for "any alien described" in subsection (a), if the initial "deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony." In 1995, Hugo Almendarez-Torres pleaded guilty to violating section 1326. Ultimately, the District Court sentenced Almendarez- Torres to 85 months' imprisonment. The court rejected his argument that, because his indictment failed to mention his aggravated felony convictions, the court could not sentence him to more than the maximum sentence authorized by section 1326(a). In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision which permits the imposition of a higher sentence when the unlawfully returning alien also has a record of prior convictions.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that subsection (b)(2) of 8 USC section 1326(a) is a penalty provision, which authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist, and does not define a separate crime. "[W]e note that the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism," wrote Justice Breyer, "[t]hat subject matter -- prior commission of a serious crime -- is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine." Therefore, neither subsection (b)(2) nor the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment required that the government charge a prior aggravated felony conviction in the alien's indictment for the imposition of a sentence more than 2 years.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1991, Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., terminated agreements licensing several television series, including "Who's the Boss," "Silver Spoons," "Hart to Hart," and "T. J. Hooker," to three television stations owned by C. Elvin Feltner after the stations' royalty payments became delinquent. Columbia sued Feltner after his stations continued to broadcast the programs for copyright infringement. After winning partial summary judgment as to liability on its copyright infringement claims, Columbia attempted to recover statutory damages under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act. The District Court denied Feltner's request for a jury trial and awarded Columbia statutory damages following a bench trial. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that neither section 504(c) nor the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on statutory damages.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, despite section 504(c) of the Copyright Act's silence, the Seventh Amendment provides the right to a jury trial, which includes a right to a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages. Applying a historical Seventh Amendment analysis, Justice Thomas concluded that "there is clear and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff." "As a result, if a party so demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of statutory damages under [section 504(c)] in order 'to preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury,'" wrote Justice Thomas.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Janet Scott-Harris filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, the city's mayor, Daniel Bogan, the vice president of the city counsel, Marilyn Roderick, and others, alleging that the elimination of the city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. The jury found the city, Bogan and Roderick liable on the First Amendment claim. The First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city, but affirmed the judgments against Bogan and Roderick. The court held that although Bogan and Roderick had absolute immunity from civil liability for their performance of legitimate legislative activities, their conduct in voting for and signing the ordinance that eliminated Scott-Harris's office was motivated by considerations relating to a particular individual and was therefore administrative rather than legislative in nature.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Local legislators are entitled to the same absolute immunity from civil liability under Section 1983 for their legislative activities as are federal, state and regional legislators. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act itself, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. The acts at issue here were clearly legislative, and the ordinance itself bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to permit a beneficiary of an employer's group health plan to elect continuing coverage when he might otherwise lose that benefit because of a "qualifying event," such as the termination of employment. In 1993, when Moore Medical Corporation fired James Geissal, it told him that COBRA gave him the right to elect continuing coverage under Moore's health plan. Later, Moore informed Geissal that he was not entitled to COBRA benefits because he was already covered by a group plan through his wife's employer. Geissal then filed suit against Moore, alleging that Moore was violating CORBA by renouncing an obligation to provide continuing coverage. Ultimately, a Magistrate Judge concluded that an employee with coverage under another group health plan on the date he elects COBRA coverage is ineligible for COBRA coverage under 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i), which allows an employer to cancel such coverage as of "the date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of the election... covered under any other group health plan." The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that an employer may not deny COBRA continuation coverage under its health plan to an otherwise eligible beneficiary because he is covered under another group health plan at the time he elects COBRA coverage. "It is undisputed that both before and after James Geissal elected COBRA continuation coverage he was continuously a beneficiary of [his wife's employer's] group health plan," wrote Justice Souter, "[b]ecause he was thus covered before he made his COBRA election, and so did not 'first become' covered under the [his wife's employer's] plan after the date of election, Moore could not cut off his COBRA coverage under the plain meaning of [section 1162(2)(D)(i)]."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Internal Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurers to fully deduct "loss reserves," or unpaid losses. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 altered the deduction formula. Under the Act, increases in loss reserves that constitute "reserve strengthening," or additions to the loss reserve, were excepted from a one time tax benefit because it would result in a tax deficiency. Treasury regulation and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue interpreted the law to say that any increase in loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then determined Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with the government's interpretation. It held reserve strengthening referred only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss reserves.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the IRS interpretation of reserve strengthening seemed a "reasonable accommodation." It was fair and unabusive. Furthermore, the language of the provision was broad enough to embrace all increases in the reserves.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1980, Wayne K. Pfaff developed a new type of computer chip socket for Texas Instruments (TI). In early April 1981, TI confirmed they would order and use Pfaff's socket. No actual socket was made until July 1981. Pfaff applied for a patent in April 1982. A patent was not granted on Pfaff's socket until 1985. After the patent was issued, Pfaff sued Wells Electronics, who had developed a competing socket, for patent infringement. Pfaff claimed that Wells' socket infringed upon six of his patent's claims. The District Court held that Wells' socket violated three of Pfaff's patent claims. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Pfaff had sold the socket to TI more than a year before he applied for a patent. Thus, Wells' socket did not infringe on Pfaff's under the Patent Act of 1952, which states that no one can patent an invention that has been on sale for more than one year before filing a patent application.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled federal patent law does not permit patents to be granted if an invention has been on sale for more than one year in this country before the patent application is filed. Moreover, a patent is on sale when a commercial sale offer has been made and when the inventor has made the invention, prepared drawings, or described the invention enough to be produced.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After Darren Boerckel's state convictions of rape, burglary, and aggravated battery were affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The petition asked for relief on six grounds: (1) that Boerckel had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights; (2) that his confession was not voluntary; (3) that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (4) that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest; (5) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (6) that his right to discovery of exculpatory material was violated. In denying the petition, the District Court found that Boerckel had procedurally defaulted his first three claims by failing to include them in his petition to the Illinois Supreme Court. In reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeals concluding that Boerckel had not procedurally defaulted those claims because he was not required to present them in a petition for discretionary review to the Illinois Supreme Court in order to satisfy 28 U. S. C. Sections 2254(b)(1), (c), the exhaustion requirement. Under the exhaustion requirement federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted their claims in state court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 decision, delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review when that review is part of the State's ordinary appellate review procedure. Justice O'Connor wrote for the court that "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the state's established appellate review process." Inmates can use federal habeas petitions as shortcuts only if their state's highest court does not allow them to raise all claims before it, she said.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Immediately after the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Act) changed patent laws to abrogate state's sovereign immunity, College Savings Bank (College) filed a patent infringement suit against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity. Florida Prepaid asked that College's suit be dismissed and that the Act be declared unconstitutional, based on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (517 US 44) which upheld state sovereign immunity. The United States joined College looking to uphold the Act's constitutionality. After agreeing with College, the District Court denied Florida Prepaid's dismissal motion. When the Federal Circuit affirmed, Florida Prepaid appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court began by noting that there was no doubt that the Act intended to abrogate states' immunity from patent infringement. The Court then added that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause give Congress the power to curtail state sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims. The Court reasoned that although the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to pass "appropriate legislation" to protect parties from being deprived of property without due process, this in itself does not permit the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Only a showing of a consistent pattern of state patent violations, and a lack of adequate legal remedies to address such violations, would justify a limited effort to suspend a state's sovereign immunity. Since College made no such showing, and since the Act's language was overly broad in its scope, the Court dismissed College's suit and declared unconstitutional corresponding segments of the Act.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Stanley I. Jacobson and other retired employees of Hughes Aircraft Company were beneficiaries of Hughes Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan. Jacobson and the others claimed in their class-action lawsuit that Hughes violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the federal pension protection law, when it amended the plan twice in response to a $1.2 billion dollar surplus. ERISA requires that some of the surplus be distributed to cover employees when a pension plan is terminated. Hughes' first amendment to the plan established an early retirement program that provided significant additional retirement benefits to certain eligible active employees. The second amendment disallowed new participants from contributing to the plan. Jacobson and others argued that Hughes had terminated one plan and started another by stopping its pension plan contributions. Thus, the company had used the plan's surplus to benefit new employees at the expense of the retirees. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court by finding that the early retirement program and noncontributory benefit structure were prohibited by the ERISA.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held Hughes did not violate the ERISA by establishing an early retirement program and creating a noncontributory benefit structure for new participants. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, said the plan amendments "did not affect the rights of pre-existing plan participants and Hughes did not use the surplus for its own benefit."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Over several years, the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs contracted with Blaze Construction Company to build, repair, and improve roads on several Indian reservations located in Arizona. When the various contracts expired, the Arizona Department of Revenue issued a tax deficiency assessment against Blaze for its failure to pay Arizona's transaction privilege tax, the tax levied on the gross receipts of companies doing business in the state, on the proceeds from its contracts with the Bureau. Blaze protested the assessment and prevailed in administrative proceedings. On review, the Arizona Tax Court granted summary judgment for the Department. In reversing, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that federal law pre-empted the tax's application to Blaze. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied review.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a "State generally may impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon a private company's proceeds from contracts with the Federal Government, regardless of whether the federal contractor renders its services on an Indian reservation." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "[a]bsent a constitutional immunity or congressional exemption, federal law does not shield Blaze (a federal contractor) from Arizona's transaction privilege tax."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Two U.S. District Judges, William M. Acker, Jr., and U. W. Clemon, who maintain their principal offices in Jefferson County, Alabama, resisted payment of a state-approved, county-authorized occupational tax on the ground that it violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. The county instituted collection suits in Alabama small claims court against the judges, who removed the suits to the Federal District Court under the federal officer removal statute. The federal court denied the county's motions to remand and granted summary judgment for the judges, holding the county tax unconstitutional under the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine to the extent that it reached federal judges' compensation. The en banc Court of Appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Jefferson County's initial petition for certiorari and remanded for further consideration of whether the Tax Injunction Act deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its prior en banc decision. Certiorari was granted again to consider whether the removal from state court to federal court was unauthorized by the federal officer removal statute, the Tax Injunction Act issue, and the merits of the case.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, yes, and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Jefferson County may impose an occupation tax on the U.S. District Judges, for "Jefferson County's tax operates as a nondiscriminatory tax on the judges' compensation, to which the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 consents when it allows States to tax the pay that federal employees receive if the taxation does not discriminate against [that] employee because of the source of the pay or compensation." Further, the Court held that the case was properly removed under the federal officer removal statute because the Jefferson County tax effects the judges' "performance of federal judicial duties in the county and risks interfering with the Federal Judiciary's operation in violation of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine." The Court also concluded that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar federal-court adjudication of the matter.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States provides importers a partial exemption from duties otherwise imposed for articles which were assembled abroad, but that were not enhanced abroad, except by operations incidental to the assembly process. A regulation issued by the United States Customs Service deems permapressing operations to be an additional step in manufacture, not part of or incidental to the assembly process. The Haggar Apparel Company sought a refund for duties imposed on a collection of its men's trousers that it had shipped to the U.S. from an assembly plant in Mexico. The trousers' pre-treated fabric had been cut in the U.S. and then shipped to Mexico, along with the thread, buttons, and zippers necessary to complete the garments. Under the HTSUS, had the trousers only been sewn and reshipped they would have been eligible for the duty exemption that Haggar sought. However, Haggar also permapressed the trousers by baking them in an oven at the Mexican facility before shipping them to the U.S. The Customs Service claimed that the baking was a process in addition to assembly and denied the duty exemption. Haggar contended that the baking was simply part of the assembly process. Subsequently, Haggar filed suit, seeking the refund, in the Court of International Trade. The court declined to treat the Customs Service's regulation as controlling and ruled in Haggar's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court did not expressly answer the question. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court vacated and remanded the case. The Court concluded that the regulation in question was subject to further analysis. Additionally, the Court held that if the regulation was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, then it required judicial deference in the Court of International Trade.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
James T. Goldsmith, an Air Force major, defied an order from a superior officer to inform his sex partners that he was infected with HIV and to take measures to block any transfer of bodily fluids during sexual intercourse. Goldsmith was convicted by general court-martial under several counts and sentenced to six years' confinement and partial forfeiture of salary. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Goldsmith sought no review of the decision in the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) and his conviction became final. Subsequently, the Air Force notified Goldsmith that it was taking action to drop him from the rolls under a newly enacted statute. Goldsmith then petitioned the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act, which authorizes courts established by Congress to "issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions," to redress the unrelated alleged interruption of his HIV medication during his incarceration, but did not immediately contest his removal from the Air Force rolls. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to act. On appeal to the CAAF from this determination, Goldsmith first asserted the claim that the Air Force's action to drop him violated the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution. He argued that the statute had been enacted after the date of his court-martial conviction and that the action would inflict successive punishment based on the same conduct underlying his first conviction. The CAAF granted his petition for extraordinary relief to redress the interruption of his HIV medication and relied on the All Writs Act in enjoining the President and other officials from dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that because the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' resort to the All Writs Act was neither in aid of its strictly circumscribed jurisdiction to review court-martial findings and sentences nor "necessary or appropriate" in light of a servicemember's alternative opportunities to seek relief, that court lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction against dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls. Justice Souter's opinion emphasized the alternative avenues of relief available to Goldsmith.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The 1996 Telecommunications Act (Act) fundamentally altered local telephone markets by ending the monopolies traditionally given to local exchange carriers (LECs) by states and subjecting LECs to a host of duties meant to facilitate market entry. Among these was the imposition of an obligation on incumbent LECs to share their networks with competitors. Following the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) issuance of regulations implementing the Act's guidelines, AT&T challenged their constitutionality on behalf of itself and other existing phone service providers.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a complicated split opinion, the Court held that the FCC has rulemaking authority to uphold those provision of the Act in question. Despite the local nature of some of the LECs involved, the Court emphasized their interconnectivity with regional and national carriers. As such, the FCC could also reach local LEC markets and regulate their competitive business practices. Such regulatory authority would include the ability to tell LECs what portions of their services they had to share with new competitors, allow new competitors to use local networks without having to own them, and forbid incumbent LECs from separating their network elements before leasing them to competitors.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Wanda Johnson was run over by a truck in May 1992 and was rushed to the Humana Hospital-University of Louisville, Kentucky, now Galen of Virginia, Inc. After about six weeks at Galen, during which time Johnson's health remained in a volatile state, Galen's agents arranged for her transfer to the Crestview Health Care Facility in Indiana. Johnson was transferred to Crestview in July, and upon arrival her condition deteriorated significantly. Johnson was taken to the Midwest Medical Center where she remained for many months and incurred substantial medical expenses as a result of her deterioration. Jane Roberts, Johnson's guardian, then filed a federal action under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), alleging violations of Section 1395dd(b) of the Act. Section 1395dd of the Act places obligations of screening and stabilization upon hospitals and emergency rooms that receive patients suffering from an "emergency medical condition." The District Court granted summary judgment for Galen on the ground that Roberts had failed to show that "either the medical opinion that Johnson was stable or the decision to authorize her transfer was caused by an improper motive." In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that in order to state a claim in an EMTALA suit alleging a violation of Section 1395dd(b)'s stabilization requirement, a plaintiff must show that the hospital's inappropriate stabilization resulted from an improper motive such as one involving the indigency, race, or sex of the patient.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Section 1395dd(b) of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act contains no expressed or implied "improper motive" requirement. According o the Court's opinion, "there is no question that the text of Section 1395dd(b) does not require an "appropriate stabilization, nor can it reasonably be read to require an improper motive."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The California Dental Association (CDA), a nonprofit association of local dental societies, provides its members with insurance and financing arrangements, and engages in lobbying, litigation, marketing, and public relations for members' benefit. Members agree to abide by the CDA's Code of Ethics, which prohibits false or misleading advertising. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought a complaint against the CDA, alleging that the CDA's guidelines restricted two types of truthful, non-deceptive advertising: price advertising and advertising relating to the quality of dental services and therefore had violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that the FTC had jurisdiction over the CDA and found a violation of section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC adopted most of the ALJ's factual findings and held that the price advertising, as well as the non-price, restrictions were violations of the Sherman and FTC Acts under an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis. In affirming, the Court of Appeals sustain the FTC's jurisdiction and concluded that an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was proper in this case.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the FTC's jurisdiction extends to associations like the CDA, which provide substantial economic benefit to their for-profit members, but that because the disputed anti-competitive efforts were not obvious, more than the abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis, performed in this case, was required. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that, "[n]onprofit entities organized on behalf of for-profit members have the same capacity... to engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair and deceptive acts." Justice Souter, however, concluded that the Court of Appeals should have used a less-abbreviated standard of review to determine whether the FTC's invalidation of the CDA's rules was justified.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Bashar Amer, Aiad Barakat, Julie Mungai, Amjad Obeid, Ayman Obeid, Naim Sharif, Khader Hamide, and Michel Shehadeh, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), were marked for deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The PFLP is characterized by the government as an international terrorist and communist organization. The resident aliens filed suit alleging the Attorney General and other federal parties had targeted them for deportation because of their affiliation with a politically unpopular group, in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. Initially, the District Court enjoined the deportation proceedings. During the case, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). The IIRIRA restricts judicial review of the Attorney General's "decision or action" to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act." Reno then filed motions arguing that the IIRIRA deprived the courts of jurisdiction over the aliens' selective-enforcement claim. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision on the merits.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the IIRIRA deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over the selective-enforcement claim. Justice Scalia wrote, "[a]s a general matter -- and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present case -- an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Ceasar Wright worked as a longshoreman. He belonged to the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, a union that supplied workers to the South Carolina Stevedores Association (SCSA). In 1992, Wright sustained a worked-related; he sought compensation for permanent disability under federal law. In 1995, Wright returned to Longshoremen's Association to be referred for work. When the stevedoring companies, to which he was referred, discovered that he had previously settled a claim for permanent disability, they informed the union they would not accept Wright for employment. Under the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Longshoremen's Association and the SCSA, Wright was not qualified to perform longshore work if he was permanently disabled. Wright chose not to file a grievance under the CBA, but instead to file a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). He alleged the stevedoring companies and the SCSA had discriminated against him by refusing him work. The District Court dismissed the case because Wright had failed to pursue the grievance procedure -- arbitration -- provided by the CBA. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the CBA's arbitration clause did not require Wright to use the arbitration procedure for the alleged violation of the ADA. In his opinion, Scalia wrote that the CBA did not contain a waiver of the employee's right to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment discrimination.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1995, Laura and Arlinda Neztsosie, and others, filed separate lawsuits in the Navajo Tribal Courts, claiming damages for injuries suffered as a result of El Paso Natural Gas Corporation's and Cyprus Foote Mineral Company's uranium mining operations. El Paso and Cyprus Foote, defendants in those suits, each filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing their tribal court claims. The District Court denied preliminary injunctions except to the extent that the Neztsosies sought relief in the Tribal Courts under the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act provides certain federal licensees with limited liability for claims of "public liability" arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident, converts such actions into federal claims, grants federal district courts removal jurisdiction over such actions, and provides the mechanics for consolidating the actions and for managing them once consolidated. The District Court left the determinations whether the Act applied to the Neztsosies' claims to the Tribal Courts. On El Paso's and Cyprus Foote's consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decisions not to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing non-Price-Anderson Act claims and to allow the Tribal Courts to decide whether the Neztsosies' claims fell under that Act. Further, although the Neztsosies had not appealed the partial injunctions, the Court of Appeals moved on its own to reverse them.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that requiring a district court to stay its hand while a tribal court determines its own jurisdiction, or the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion, does not apply in this case, which if brought in a state court would be subject to removal. "By the Price-Anderson Act's unusual preemption provision Congress expressed an unmistakable preference for a federal forum, at the behest of the defending party," wrote Justice Souter.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Alabama requires each corporation doing business in that state to pay a franchise tax based on the firm's capital. A domestic firm, organized under the laws of Alabama, has leeway in controlling its own tax base and tax liability. A foreign firm, organized under the laws of a State other than Alabama, does not have similar leeway to control its tax base. In 1986, the Reynolds Metals Company and other foreign corporations sued Alabama's tax authorities, seeking a refund of the foreign franchise tax they had paid on the ground that the tax discriminated against foreign corporations in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected Reynolds' claims, holding that the special burden imposed on foreign corporations simply offset a different burden imposed exclusively on domestic corporations by Alabama's domestic shares tax. During the Reynolds case, the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others brought a suit asserting similar Commerce and Equal Protection Clause claims. The Alabama trial court agreed with South Central Bell that the tax substantially discriminated against foreign corporations, but nonetheless dismissed their claims as barred by res judicata in light of the State Supreme Court's Reynolds decision. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Alabama franchise tax was unconstitutional. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that, "Alabama law gives domestic corporations the ability to reduce their franchise tax liability..., while it denies foreign corporations that same ability. And no one claims that the different tax rates for foreign and domestic corporations offset the difference in the tax base. The tax therefore facially discriminates against interstate commerce and is unconstitutional unless the State can offer a sufficient justification for it." The Court concluded the State could not justify the tax. The Court also held that the State Supreme Court's decision was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee because the South Central Bell case was unrelated to the court's prior judgement and thus could not be bound by it. Furthermore, the Court rejected the State's argument that the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1993, a magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the search of Paul and Erma Berger's Montana ranch for evidence of the taking of wildlife in violation of federal law. Later, a multiple-vehicle caravan consisting of government agents and a crew of photographers and reporters from CNN proceeded to the ranch. In executing the warrant, the federal officers allowed the media crew to accompany and observe them. Subsequently, the Berger's filed suit, asserting that the officials, special agents of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and an assistant United States attorney, had violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court concluded that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, as no clearly established law protecting individuals from the commercial recording of a search of their premises existed at the time. The Court of Appeals reversed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that, although the agents did violate the Fourth Amendment, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The opinion stated that "police violate the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners when they allow members of the media to accompany them during the execution of a warrant in their home. We also hold there that because the law on this question before today's decision was not clearly established, the police in that case were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." Justice John Paul Stevens, concurring and dissenting in part, argued that the constitutional rule recognized had been clearly established long before 1992.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Commonwealth of Virginia charged Tommy David Strickler with capital murder and related crimes. Strickler's counsel did not file a pretrial motion for discovery of all possible exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland because an open file policy gave him access to all of the evidence in the prosecutor's files. At Strickler's trial, Anne Stoltzfus gave detailed eyewitness testimony about the crimes and Strickler's role as one of the perpetrators. The prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory materials in the police files, consisting of notes taken by a detective during interviews with Stoltzfus, and letters written by Stoltzfus to the detective, that cast serious doubt on significant portions of her testimony. The jury found Strickler guilty and he was sentenced to death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. In subsequent state habeas corpus proceedings, Strickler advanced an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to file a motion for disclosure of all exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution or in its possession under Brady. In response, the Commonwealth asserted that such a motion was unnecessary because of the prosecutor's open file policy. The trial court denied relief and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Strickler then filed a federal habeas corpus petition and was granted access to the exculpatory Stoltzfus materials. The District Court vacated Strickler's capital murder conviction and death sentence on the grounds that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose those materials and that he had not, in consequence, received a fair trial. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Strickler had procedurally defaulted his Brady claim by not raising it at his trial or in the state collateral proceedings. Ultimately, the court concluded that the claim was, in any event, without merit.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, yes, and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that although Strickler demonstrated cause for his failure to raise a Brady claim, Virginia did not violate Brady by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to him. Further, the Court held that Strickler received a fair trial in the absence of the exculpatory evidence and did not show a "reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence would have been different had these materials been disclosed," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court.