[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Social Security system was meant to be a form of long-term social insurance that has to constantly adapt to the demands of a changing workforce, which prevents it from fitting within the framework of the right to accrued property. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only bars government action that is arbitrary or lacking in rational justification, neither of which is true in this case. The Court also held that the termination of benefits was not punitive but rather the “denial of a non-contractual government benefit.”
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that, because Nestor had been paying into the Social Security fund before he began receiving benefits, the government’s termination of his benefits was effectively depriving him of his property without just compensation. He also argued that both the deportation and termination of Nestor’s benefits, based solely on the fact that he was a member of the Communist Party 20 years previously when it was not illegal to do so, imposes an ex post facto law on him. In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas argued that receiving Social Security benefits is a right earned by years of working and paying into the system, which Nestor did. The deprivation of those rights is a punishment that should only be reserved for those convicted of a crime. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the deprivation of Social Security benefits for certain offenses constituted a punishment without judicial trial in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Republic Steel Corporation, International Harvester Company, and Interlake Iron Corporation operated steel mills on the banks on the Calumet River. Their manufacturing processes produced industrial waste. Water containing waste was recycled back into the river. Most of the solid waste was separated and disposed of, but liquid and small particles were dumped into the river. Over time, these small particles reduced the river depth from 21 feet to less than 9 feet in some places. The Rivers and Waters Act prohibits the “creation of any obstruction....to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.” The statue does allow for certain exceptions authorized by the Secretary of the Army. The United States sued the steel companies for creating an obstruction by dumping their industrial waste. The district court granted an injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the waste deposits did not constitute an “obstruction” under the Act and even if it did, an injunction was not permitted.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, yes. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the deposits were an obstruction within the meaning of the act and were not exempt. The Court also held that the district court was authorized to issue an injunction against the steel companies.
Justice John M. Harlan dissented, arguing that the majority incorrectly interpreted the Rivers and Waters Act. He argued that “obstruction” only referred to certain kinds of obstruction, not including industrial waste. Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice Charles E. Whittaker, and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In April of 1953, Daniel J. Sentilles, an engineer specializing in marine refrigeration, left the port of Santa Mara, Colombia, aboard the S.S. Montego to assist the ship in transporting bananas to Miami, Florida. The ship experienced rough waters during the journey, and on one occasion, Sentilles was knocked off his feet and washed across the deck by a large wave. The next day he developed a cough and other flu-like symptoms that persisted for several days. From Miami, he traveled to New Orleans, where he was treated for an acute case of pulmonary tuberculosis. Sentilles sued the owner of the S.S. Montego, the Inter-Shipping Corporation (“Shipping”), in federal district court under the Jones Act, which regulates U.S. shipowners. Sentilles argued that the accident aboard the S.S. Montego activated or aggravated a dormant tuberculosis infection. At trial, three medical specialists suggested that the accident could have caused the tuberculosis flare-up. A jury found in favor of Sentilles and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On appeal, Shipping argued that the evidence did not justify the jury’s conclusion. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted Shipping’s argument and reversed the judgment. Sentilles argued that the appellate court applied an improper standard of review by failing to consider the reasonableness of the judgment reached by the jury.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the testimony of the medical specialists supported the reasonableness of the judgment in favor of Sentilles. The Court noted that the role of the appellate court is not to independently review the evidence, but rather is limited to considering the reasonableness of decisions reached in the lower tribunal.
Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the Court’s opinion. Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote a concurring opinion in which he noted that the record contained evidence that the accident actually caused the tuberculosis. In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Potter Stewart disagreed with the Court’s standard of review and instead reversed the appellate court upon an independent examination of the record. He also argued that the Court should not grant certiorari to cases in which the sufficiency of the evidence is the sole question before the Court.
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent in which he agreed with Justice Stewart’s conclusion that the Court should not hear these types of cases. Rather than deciding the case, Justice Frankfurter argued that the Court should have dismissed its writ of certiorari after the parties’ oral arguments.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The owners and a majority of the patrons of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which forbids shopping on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown on Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously been open for business on Sundays, on which it conducted about one- third of its weekly business. In 1962, the Massachusetts’ Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open and doing any labor, business, or work on Sunday. The Crown Kosher Super Market argued this provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it does not respect their religious practices. The federal district court held that this provision is unconstitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the provision does not prohibit the free exercise of religion.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The court held that statutes requiring stores to stay closed on Sundays do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the statute in question does not prohibit the free exercise of religion. A statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause simply because in practice it results in some inequality. The Court also concluded the statute was not for religious purposes, as the defendants contested.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered a dissenting opinion arguing the Sunday closing statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because one religion is economically disadvantaged by it. In his separate dissent, Justice Potter Stewart agreed with Justice Brennan’s dissent and added that making a citizen chose between his faith and economic survival is a cruel choice as well as unconstitutional.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1943, Peter Meyer took out life insurance policies in his own name worth $50,000. He pledged his insurance policies to Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Ohio as collateral security for a loan. This gave the bank the right to satisfy its claim out of the 'net proceeds of the policy when it becomes a claim by death.' After Peter Meyer pledged the policies to the bank, the United States determined that he owed $6,159.09 plus interest in unpaid taxes. The United States filed notice of tax lien on July 11, 1955.
Peter Meyer died on December 28, 1955, owing $26,844.66 to Huntington National Bank. Ethel Meyer, the petitioner and Peter Meyer's widow, was named executrix of his estate and received $441.21, representing the remainder of the full cash surrender from Peter Meyer's insurance policies after payment to the bank.
The United States brought suit against Ethel Meyer under 26 U.S.C.A. 6321 and 6322, arguing that it should be compensated for the full tax lien by marshalling the funds already paid to Huntington National Bank. At trial, Ethel Meyer argued that she owed nothing to the government because she was not personally liable for Peter Meyer's tax lien. She also argued that the tax lien did not and could not attach to the net proceeds of the cash surrender because those proceeds would be exempt under New York Insurance Law.
District court Judge Edmund Palmieri held that the government was entitled to recover the full tax lien through the insurance policy's full cash surrender. The court relied on United States v. Behrens, where the court ordered a defendant to pay both a bank lien and tax lien from the same cash surrender. Although most of Peter Meyer's cash surrender was pledged to the bank for the payment of loans, this did not preclude the government from collecting on its full tax lien first. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed in a per curiam ruling. The court agreed that Behrens controlled the case.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Thomas Whittaker, writing for the majority in a 6-3 decision, held that New York state law controlled the case; New York exempted the net proceeds of insurance policy cash surrenders from attaching to tax liens. There was not clear guidance in federal law on this matter, whereas New York law protected the cash surrender in question. As the priority of liens is then determined by "first in time first in right," the United States did not have a right to marshal the cash surrender to recover its tax lien because the bank's debt had priority.
Justice Byron White, joined by Justices John Harlan and Potter Stewart, dissented. He argued that federal law should control the case to avoid inconsistent results in different states; once a tax lien has attached to a taxpayer's interests, federal law then determines the priority of liens. He also disputed the majority's interpretation of New York law, and did not find a clear, consistent policy of protecting the net proceeds of insurance policies' cash surrenders from creditors.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In August 1958 William H. Burton, an African American, entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority, and was denied service solely because of his race. The Parking Authority is a tax-exempt, private corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating the city's parking facilities, and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions from the city. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and maintained the premises at its own expense. Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court concluded that the restaurant, as a recipient of assistance by the parking authority, benefited from the city's aid and constituted an financially integral and indispensable part of the state. As such, the Court found that the restaurant and the parking authority were so physically and financially intertwined that the private entity's conduct could be imputed to the government. Thus, it’s discrimination could be considered state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Whittaker, dissented. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate dissenting opinion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc. obtained a patent for a “convertible folding top with automatic seal at rear quarter.” The folding top included a flexible top fabric, supporting structure, and a sealing mechanism. None of those parts were individually patented. Convertible Top sued Aro Manufacturing Co., Inc. for direct and contributory patent infringement for manufacturing and selling replacement fabric designed to fit the patented device. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of Convertible Top and enjoined Aro from further manufacture or distribution of the fabric replacements. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Charles E. Whittaker, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that because Convertible Top did not patent the fabric top individually, there was no direct patent infringement. With no direct infringement, there could be no contributory infringement. The patent only covered the combination of parts that made up the folding top, not each individual part that made up that top. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred, writing that the other concurring opinion and the dissenting opinion were unnecessarily confusing.
Justice William J. Brennan concurred in the result, arguing that there was no infringement because the cost of the replacement top in comparison with the device as a whole was so small made replacing the top a permissible repair instead of a reconstruction. Justice John M. Harlan dissented, arguing that the replacement of an unpatented part in a patented device is a forbidden reconstruction of the device. This constitutes direct patent infringement. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Peter Chaunt, a Hungarian native, came to the United States in 1921 at the age of 22. He became a U.S. citizen in 1940, one year after filing a petition for naturalization with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). In 1953, the Government filed a complaint, which alleged that Chaunt had concealed and misrepresented his arrest record in his application for citizenship, and sought to revoke his naturalization. The district court held that Chaunt had concealed his membership in the Communist Party and three arrests in Connecticut for distributing handbills, violating park regulations, and committing a breach of the peace. All of the arrests occurred more than ten years prior to Chaunt’s naturalization. The district court cancelled the order granting citizenship to Chaunt, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Government failed to show by “clear, unequivocal and convincing” evidence that Chaunt either concealed facts warranting a denial of citizenship or that their disclosure would have led to the discovery of other facts warranting a denial of citizenship. The arrests did not justify revocation of Chaunt’s citizenship because each arrest occurred outside the statutory requirement of demonstrated good moral character for five years prior to a petition for naturalization, and the charges did not involve moral turpitude. Noting Chaunt’s disclosure of his employment with the International Workers’ Order, an organization purportedly controlled by Communists, the Court declined to find that disclosure of the arrests might have led the INS to discover that Chaunt once served as a district organizer of the Communist Party in Connecticut.
Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act only requires that the Government prove that Chaunt’s conduct blocked an investigation that might have resulted in the rejection of his application. He argued that the Government satisfied this test by showing that Chaunt intentionally concealed his arrest record because the INS could have rejected his application if it had discovered this misconduct prior to the court’s naturalization order. Justice Charles E. Whittaker and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Knetsch purchased annuity savings bonds from Sam Houston Life Insurance Company. In return, the company gave Knetsch loans and an annuity contract that would produce monthly annuity payments upon maturity. However, Knetsch kept borrowing from the insurance company in amounts that kept the net cash value of the annuity so low that it could produce no financial benefit other than tax deductions. Knetsch claimed payments to the insurance company as interest paid on indebtedness. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions and determined a deficiency amount for each of the two years in question. After paying the deficiency, Knetsch brought suit to obtain a refund in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The court ruled in favor of United States, holding that the transaction was a sham because it did not create "indebtedness" and, therefore, there was "no commercial economic substance" beyond the tax deductions. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote for the majority affirming the lower court's decision that the transaction was a sham. The loans the insurance company gave Knetsch were essentially rebates for a substantial portion of the interest payments and the small amount kept by the company was its fee for providing a "façade of loans" to be used to provide tax deductions. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, saying that as long as a transaction is allowed within the limits of insurance policies it should be recognized by the Internal Revenue Service, and any remedy should be left to the legislature.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In an opinion authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the majority brushed aside First Amendment issues and declared that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.
Justices Black and Douglas concurred.
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment but agreed fully with Part I of Justice Harlan's dissent and expressed no view as to the merits of the constitutional issue.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, wrote a dissenting opinion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
An act of the Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty-eight sided figure. The effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and place them in a district where no whites lived.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
A state violates the Fifteenth Amendment when it constructs boundary lines between electoral districts for the purpose of denying equal representation to African Americans.
The unanimous Court held that the Alabama legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter admitted that states are insulated from judicial review when they exercise power "wholly within the domain of state interest." However, in this case, Alabama's representatives were unable to identify "any countervailing municipal function" the act was designed to serve. The Court believed that the irregularly shaped district was drawn with only one purpose in mind: to deprive blacks of political power.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Frank Wilkinson was summoned to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for questioning before a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The subcommittee was investigating Communist propaganda in the southern United States. Wilkinson refused to answer any questions, including whether he was a member of the Communist Party. He did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and argued instead that the subcommittee had no authority to interrogate him. Wilkinson also argued that he was only called before the subcommittee because of his public opposition to the Un-American Activities Committee. Wilkinson was incited and convicted for contempt of Congress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, Yes. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 5-4 majority affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the subcommittee’s investigation was clearly authorized by Congress. The question of whether Wilkin was a member of the Communist Party was relevant to the inquiry so Wilkinson was obligated to answer. The reasons why Wilkinson was called before the committee were irrelevant to the decision.
Justice Hugo L. Black dissented, arguing that an investigation of those who criticize the Un-American Activities Committee is unconstitutional. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent. Justice Douglas dissented separately, arguing that Congress did not authorize the type of investigation that took place. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black joined in the dissent. Justice William J. Brennan dissented, arguing that the primary purpose of questioning Wilkinson was to expose him for the sake of exposure, rather than to aid lawmaking. Justice Douglas joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Roy R. Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland, but he could not receive his commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God as the Maryland Constitution required. He sued for his commission in the Maryland Circuit Court on the grounds that the requirement violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court rejected his claims and the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that such a requirement places the state of Maryland firmly on the side of those people who believe in God and are willing to state their belief. With this requirement, Maryland effectively aids religions that profess a belief in God at the expense of any other form of belief or disbelief. The First Amendment expressly prohibits a state from taking this position. Although the candidate has the option of not pursuing public office rather than declaring a belief in God, the test is an unconstitutional encroachment on the freedom of religion. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On October 29, 1958, thirteen police officers, including Frank Pape, arrived at James Monroe's Chicago apartment at 5:45 A.M. The officers broke down the door, forced Monroe and his wife to stand naked in their living room, and ransacked the apartment. Afterwards, James Monroe was escorted to police quarters and held for ten hours on "open" charges while he was interrogated about a murder. The police did not have a warrant for the search or the arrest, and refused Monroe permission to call his attorney.
Monroe brought a complaint against each of the Chicago police officers individually and against the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not liable under the Civil Rights Act nor for acts committed in performance of governmental functions. All defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that there was no cause of action under the Civil Rights Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and No. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that the city police officers, in conducting an unreasonable search and seizure, had committed an action which was under the color of law, and that the police could be held liable individually under the Civil Rights Act. However, the majority further held that a municipality could not be liable under the Civil Rights Act. So, the court reversed the lower court's opinion insofar as it dismissed the Civil Rights Act claim against the police officers.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote a concurring opinion which Justice Potter Stewart joined. In his opinion, Justice Harlan discussed the difficulties in explaining the distinction between authorized or unauthorized deprivations of constitutional rights.
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent arguing that a police officer who acts outside the law loses his authority under the law, making a state tort claim against individual officers more appropriate than a claim under the Civil Rights Act.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1944, Congress authorized the construction of a dam on the Roanoke River and for that purpose sought to acquire a 1,840-acre easement from the 7,400-acre estate surrounding the Dan River, a tributary of the Roanoke River. The Virginia Electric Company owned 1,540 acres of the property in question that had been purchased from the estate owner in 1907 and would be part of the government’s easement. In 1951, the government reached an agreement with the estate owner to purchase the easement for one dollar and to officially acquire the land through a condemnation proceeding. The Virginia Electric Company, whose land was about to be taken in the easement, intervened to contest the issue of just compensation.
The district court awarded a substantial compensation to the Virginia Electric Company, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the decision in United States v. Twin City Power Company that held that the amount of compensation should not take into account the value of the land for water power purposes. On remand, the district court appointed commissioners to evaluate the value of the land and awarded $65,520 in compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the land the government was taking for easement had market value, and the Fifth Amendment prevents the government from taking private property without compensation. The Court also held that the district court’s method of determining the value of the land was correct, but the determination of how much of that compensation is due to the Virginia Electric Company was not correct. The district court granted compensation based on the maximum possible value rather than the actual value based on land use.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the owner of the easement did not have rights to anything that gained value from the flow of the stream. However, the owner did have the rights to anything that was considered “property” under the Fifth Amendment and deserved to be justly compensated when the government takes that.
Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that compensation should be based on the value the land the owner had at the time the government took it. Because the Virginia Electric Company only owned that land in the hope that it would gain permission from the government to build a dam, the land had no value to the company when it was taken. He argued that the Fifth Amendment required compensation only based on what value the owner had lost rather than what the government has gained. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan provided past examples in which the Court had intervened to correct constitutional violations in matters pertaining to state administration and the officers through whom state affairs are conducted. Brennan concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and others raised in this case merited judicial evaluation.
Justices Douglas, Clark, and Stewart filed separate concurring opinions.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Paul and Pauline Poe, a married couple, decided to use contraceptives to prevent a fourth pregnancy after their first three children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought to obtain access to contraceptives in order to forestall a second pregnancy that could be life-threatening. Since the late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited the distribution and use of medical advice on contraceptives, although these laws were not regularly forced.. The Poes and Doe argued that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Frankfurter, chose to dismiss the case because it involved the threatened and not actual application of the Connecticut law. Since there was no immediate injury, there was no standing to confer jurisdiction.
In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the plaintiffs should not be forced to break the law to get this vital information, even though the statutes are not regularly enforced. Courts should not require an actual arrest or prosecution before they review the constitutional rights at issue.
Justices Harlan II, Stewart, and Black all dissented in separate opinions.
Justice Brennan concurred.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Abraham Braunfeld owned a retail clothing and home furnishing store in Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was prohibited by his faith from working on Saturday, the Sabbath. The Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open for business on Sundays. Braunfeld's store was not one of those types allowed to be open. He challenged the law as a violation of the religious liberty clauses because he needed to be open six days a week for economic reasons and was prohibited from doing so by a tenet of his faith and the blue law.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania blue law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute; however, the freedom to act (even in accordance with religious convictions) is not totally free from government restrictions. The Court found that the Sunday Closing Law had a secular basis and did not make any religious practices unlawful. The blue law is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the state can accomplish its secular goal of providing a uniform day of rest for all through other means. That an indirect burden, such as economic sacrifice, may be a result of the statute, does not make the blue law unconstitutional.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Bruce Boynton, an African American law student, bought a Trailways bus ticket from Washington, D.C. to Montgomery, Alabama. The bus route went through Richmond, Virginia, where there was a 40-minute stop scheduled. Boynton entered the segregated restaurant in the bus station and sat on the side reserved for white customers. Both a waitress and a manager requested that Boynton move to the other side of the restaurant, and he explained that he was an interstate bus passenger and refused. A police officer arrived and arrested Boynton. He was tried, convicted, and fined for unlawfully remaining on the premises after being forbidden to do so.
Boynton appealed his conviction to the Hustings Court in Richmond where he filed a motion to dismiss and argued that his constitutional rights were violated. The Hustings Court denied the motion. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 should be interpreted to ban all forms of segregation by race in any type of public transportation.
Writing for the 7-2 majority, Justice Hugo L. Black concluded that, because the bus carrier provides the services of the terminal and its restaurant to the interstate passengers, these services must be subject to the same discrimination prohibitions as the transportation itself. Since the Interstate Commerce Act prohibits racial discrimination during travel, the same restrictions apply in the stations during stops.
Justice Charles E. Whittaker, joined by Justice Tom C. Clark, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the restaurant was owned and operated by a private owner unaffiliated with the bus company. Without evidence that the bus company had control over the operation of the restaurant, there was no reason to hold the restaurant to the discrimination prohibitions laid out by the Interstate Commerce Act.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Several employes of a discount department store sold a few items, such as floor wax and loose-leaf notebooks, to customers on a Sunday. By doing so, they violated Maryland's blue laws which only allow certain items, such as drugs, tobacco, newspapers and some foodstuffs, to be sold on Sundays.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court found that the blue laws did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the employees allege only economic injury and not infringement on their own religious practices. The Court also found that the blue laws did not violate the division between church and state. Sunday closing laws started out to facilitate church attendance in colonial America; however, the present Maryland laws are based on secular rather than religious state interests. The laws are to improve the "health, safety, recreation, and general well-being" of citizens. The present purpose of the laws is to provide a uniform day of rest for all. The fact that this day is of particular significance for various Christian sects does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In June, 1957, a Utah court entered a judgment against Harold Kesler for negligently operating a motor vehicle. When Kesler failed to pay the judgment for over sixty days, the judgment’s creditors, following Utah’s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (UMVSRA), filed the unpaid judgments with Utah’s Department of Public Safety. As a result, the Department suspended Kesler’s driver’s license and vehicle registration until he paid his judgment.
In December, 1959 Kesler, who had still failed to pay the judgment, filed for bankruptcy in federal bankruptcy court. Although this released him from his judgment debts, the Department refused to restore his driver’s license and vehicle registration. The Department claimed that, under the UMVSRA, a bankruptcy proceeding will not release debts for negligently operating a motor vehicle.
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, affirmed the law and refused to both restore his license and to invalidate Utah’s law. A direct appeal to the United States’ Supreme Court followed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the Court held that Utah’s law did not violate the Supremacy Clause. First, Justice Frankfurter noted that the states had compelling interests in promoting highway safety within their jurisdictions, citing to various measures taken to encourage safe driving throughout the United States. He also noted that most of these statutes did not allow drivers to discharge judgments against them for driving violations in bankruptcy. Justice Frankfurter held that, although the Bankruptcy Act relieved an individual’s obligations to pay certain debts, it did not remove the negative consequences that a state may place on those debts. To that end, a state may decide that, in order to promote safe driving, a judgment must be paid before an individual may regain driving privileges. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in part, but felt that the appeal was not properly before the Court. Chief Justice Earl Warren, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the initial three-judge panel at the District Court was improper and that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Finally, Justice Hugo L. Black, in his dissenting opinion argued that Utah’s statute took away rights conferred to all United State’s citizens under the Bankruptcy Act and, therefore, violated the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Western Union Telegraph Company, headquartered and incorporated in New York, processed money orders between people living in different states. This case concerns money orders between payors in Pennsylvania and payees in other states. Over the years, Western Union accumulated a large sum of money from payees who never claimed the money sent to them. Pennsylvania law states that when property goes unclaimed for seven years and the whereabouts of the owner are unknown, that property escheats to the state. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania started proceedings to escheat the unclaimed money. Western Union argued that Pennsylvania provided insufficient service of process, and had no power to protect Western Union from other states who might attempt to escheat the same money. The Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, No answer. In a unanimous decision, Justice Hugo L. Black wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the lower judgment violated due process because Pennsylvania had no power to protect Western Union from other states making similar claims over the same money. In fact, the state of New York had already done just that. The Court also held that the U.S. Supreme Court is authorized by Article 3, §2 of the Constitution to resolve dispute between states. The Court stated that the service question was irrelevant because Pennsylvania didn’t have the power to enforce the judgment anyway.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurrence, disagreeing with the Court’s reasoning, and stating the New York was clearly entitled to the property involved.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In early December of 1957, Mark Coppedge broke into a pharmacy and stole property, including a check writer and a batch of blank money orders that he filled in, forged, and cashed. He was tried and convicted in district court a year later, but he appealed his conviction based on information that corrupted the jury. A newspaper published an article regarding a witness who was too afraid of Coppedge to testify, which was information relayed to the judge while the jury was out of the room, and the jury should not have known. Coppedge petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for permission to appeal in forma pauperis, which would free him from the obligation to pay court costs. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-2 majority. The Court held that, since the Constitution guarantees the right to an appeal, the indigent petitioner must be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis if there is evidence of a legitimate issue to be considered on appeal. Additionally, the Court held that it is the responsibility of the legal system to ensure fair and speedy justice, which can often be difficult for poor defendants to access. Granting the in forma pauperis petition eliminates some of the hearings necessary for the case of a poor defendant to make it through the system and allows for increased efficiency.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the American justice system considers criminal appeals to be a right, and therefore the in forma pauperis provisions are not meant to be an extra obstacle to the appeals process. He also argued that, at times, the arguments to determine whether an appeal is frivolous could lead courts to make a determination on the merits before the appropriate time, which truncated the appeals process. He suggested that petitions for in forma pauperis appeals be accepted “as a matter of course” to remove such confusion. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.
Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent where he argued that the majority’s decision essentially overturned previous rulings by placing the burden on the government to prove the frivolity of the defendant’s appeal. He argued that the majority’s decision overstepped its bounds by remanding the case to the lower court, because the lower court had already found the case to be frivolous and dismissed the appeal. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent.
Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Byron R. White did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Don Gilmore was the primary owner and managing officer of three different franchises of General Motors in California. In 1955, Don Gilmore and his wife, Dixie Gilmore, divorced. The trial court determined that the divorce was absolute without alimony for Dixie, which meant that Don successfully protected his assets from Dixie's claims that his assets were community property. Don's legal expenses totaled about $40,000 for the taxable years of 1953 and 1954. The Internal Revenue Code allows deductions from gross income for "ordinary and necessary expenses incurred during the taxable year for the conservation of property held for the production of income."
Gilmore sued in the Court of Claims to recover alleged overpayment of income taxes related to the legal expenses incurred during the divorce. The Court of Claims held that the legal expenses were attributable to Gilmore's successful resistance of his wife's claims to certain assets and were therefore deductible for federal income tax purposes. However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that these expenditures were personal or family expenses and therefore not deductible. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question in the administration of the tax laws.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John Marshall Harlan delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the origin and character of a claim with respect to expense incurred, rather than its potential consequences for the taxpayer, controls the basic test of whether an expense is classified as business or personal; therefore legal expenses are deductible as expenses incurred for conservation of property held for production of income. Dixie Gilmore's claims stemmed from the marital relationship and not from income-producing activity; therefore the claims in this case were personal, rather than business, expenses.
In their dissenting opinion, Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the majority opinion based its analysis on an unjustly narrow interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code. They argued that the legal expenses in this specific case should be considered business expenses.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Olga Zdanok and other individual employees of Glidden Company(Glidden) sought to recover damages for breach of collective bargaining agreement in New York state court, and then Glidden removed the case to federal district court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Judge J. Warren Madden, an active judge on the Court of Claims at the time, granted the employees damages. Glidden argued that the guarantee in Article III of the Constitution that judges should hold their offices during good behavior meant that Judge Madden displayed a lack of appropriate judicial independence.
Previous judicial precedent had established that the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the United States Court of Claims were neither confined in jurisdiction nor protected in independence by Article III of the Constitution, but that there were created by other powers Congress possessed under Article I. Congress had since enacted statutes explicitly including the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Article III of the Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-2 majority. The Court held that the judges, including retired judges, of the United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are constitutionally protected in tenure and compensation under Article III of the Constitution. Congressional declarations made it clear that those judges are protected under Article III, although such clarification was relatively recent. The Court held that it was not strictly bound to follow past precedent but was able to reconsider cases in which Congressional declarations have negated the previous holdings.
Justice Byron R. White and Justice Felix Frankfurter did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In a number of consolidated cases from Louisiana, several defendants were convicted of disturbing the peace by sitting at lunch counters that were reserved for patrons of a different race and refusing to leave. Defendants alleged that their convictions were based upon no evidence of guilt and, therefore, denied them of due process of the law. Defendants were denied post-conviction relief in the state courts, and the Court granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, a state cannot apply its criminal statutes on disturbing the peace to non-violent protestors staging a sit-in to express opposition to segregation by race.
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the convictions violated defendants' rights to due process of law guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court found no evidence that defendants' quiet, peaceable sitting at the counter that would have supported a finding that their conduct would have foreseeably disturbed the public. The Court acknowledged that the state courts might have construed the statute more broadly to permit a finding of imminent public commotion caused by peaceful and orderly conduct. Nonetheless, the Court found no evidence to support a finding of disturbing the peace.
Justice William O. Douglas concurred on the ground that restaurants operating under a public license, though private enterprises, were public facilities in which a state may not constitutionally enforce a policy of racial segregation.
Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred in the judgment on the ground that the records in the present cases contained no evidence of disturbance or alarm in the behavior of the public.
Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the judgment on the grounds that the defendants' conduct, insofar as it occurred with the implied consent of the management, was a form of expression within the range of protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment which could in no event be punished by the state under a general breach of the peace statute; and that, in any event, the Louisiana statute, as applied, was unconstitutionally vague and uncertain.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Francisco Mendoza-Martinez (Martinez) was an American by birth with dual Mexican citizenship. Martinez admitted that to avoid the draft, in 1942, he left the United States for Mexico and did not return until November, 1946. As a result of his deliberate absence, Martinez entered a guilty plea in 1947 to violating Section 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (the "Act") and served 366 days in prison. Five years after his release, Martinez was issued an arrest and deportation warrant premised on a violation of Section 401(j) of the Act which divested draft dodgers of their U.S. citizenship. Following a dismissal of his appeal from the Attorney General's special inquiry decision stripping him of his U.S. citizenship, Martinez challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(j) in District Court but was defeated. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding the district court decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. This case was decided together with Rusk v. Cort.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court began by sustaining the validity of the Government's second action against Martinez since it addressed his lost of citizenship rather than revisiting his self-confessed draft evasion. The Court added, however, that although citizenship duties entail military service, the Government cannot divest citizens of their citizenship as a result of draft evasion alone. The imposition of such a drastic penalty, in the context of a reflexive statutory scheme, violates constitutional due process by denying subjects procedural safeguards such as the opportunity to experience a more incremental penal structure.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The State of Alaska threatened to enforce its anti-fish trapping law against two local Native American tribes. The federal government had not designated a reservation for the tribes. The tribes depended on the salmon they trapped for survival and received permits to use the traps from the Army Corps of Engineers and the United States Forest Service, as well as favorable regulations from the Secretary of the Interior. The president of the Kake Village Council was arrested while trying to moor a trap. The tribes sued to enjoin Alaska from enforcing the anti-trapping law. The district court dismissed the suit and the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 8-1 decision Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote for the majority affirming the Alaska court. The Supreme Court held that there was no statutory authority granting the Secretary of the Interior the power to regulate contrary to state law. In addition, the permits did not trump state law. In order to prevent undue hardship, the Court ordered that the Native American tribes be allowed to continue using the traps through the end of the 1962 fishing season. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a partial dissent, agreeing that the Alaska law should prevail, but disagreeing with allowing the tribes to continue to use traps through the end of the 1962 season.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A Florida statute automatically exempted women from jury duty and did not place women on jury lists. Women could, however, volunteer and register for jury duty. After an all-male jury convicted Mrs. Hoyt for murdering her husband, she appealed the decision to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Court upheld the conviction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the statute was based on a reasonable classification and was therefore constitutional. Noting that women were "still regarded as the center of home and family life," the Court found that the states could relieve them from the civic responsibility of jury duty unless they themselves determined that such service was consistent with their own "special responsibilities." The Court held that the case was distinct from other cases involving racial discrimination in jury selection, and that male-female disproportions on jury lists carried no constitutional significance.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The general maritime law of the United States has long obliged ship owners to indemnify seamen against expenses of injury or illness suffered while on the job aboard ship. An ill or injured seaman is entitled to "maintenance and cure," that is, to compensation by his employer for the expenses of his medical treatment and subsistence (i.e., room and board) while convalescing ashore. (Until 1982, a seaman could obtain free medical attention from the US Public Health Service. In such a case, the USPHS effectively relieved the seaman's employer of the duty of cure.)
At discharge, after two voyages on S.S. National Liberty, seaman Clifford Vaughan got a hospitalization certificate from the master, N.J. Atkinson. Vaughan then spent three months in a USPHS hospital and two years as an outpatient undergoing treatment for tuberculosis. The ship owner ignored Vaughan's request for maintenance as an outpatient. For a while before obtaining clearance to return to duty, Vaughan worked ashore as a cab driver. Later, he sued unsuccessfully in federal district court for maintenance and for damages from the ship owner's failure to promptly pay, including his attorney's fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and yes. In a 5-2 opinion for the Court, Justice William O. Douglas held that allowing offset would encourage callous ship owners to refuse maintenance and cure. Moreover, courts in admiralty have adequate equity power to treat attorney's fees as damages from failure to pay maintenance (and cure) when it was a willful breach of duty.
Justice Potter Stewart, joined by Justice John Marshall Harlan II, dissented. While there should be no duty to mitigate, wages should be offset when actually earned. The duty to pay maintenance and cure was created to make the seaman whole, not afford him a windfall.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
William Douglas and Bennie Will Meyes, two indigent men, were arrested and charged with thirteen felonies, including armed robbery and assault with intent to commit murder. A single public defender represented both defendants. The public defender asked the trial court for a continuance because he was unprepared, there was a conflict of interest between the two defendants, and Douglas requested a new attorney. The judge denied the request for a continuance. The defendants then requested that the public defender be removed from the case. The judge granted that request but denied their request to appoint a new attorney. The defendants completed the trial without any representation. A jury found the defendants guilty of all thirteen felonies.
The defendants appealed. The Second District Court of Appeals for California’s Third District did not appoint counsel to represent the defendants, because, based on their review of the record, appointing counsel would add no benefit to the defendants’ case. Following this decision, that court affirmed the trial court’s decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, the trial court’s refusal violated the defendants’ equal protection rights. Justice William Douglas delivered the opinion of a 6-3 majority. The Court held that California’s treatment of defendants changed depending on whether the defendant could afford counsel. Indigent defendants, potentially with “hidden merit” in their appeals, could not meaningfully appeal convictions when courts conducted reviews without input from the defendant’s attorney. When indigent defendants, unable to afford attorneys, were forced to show preliminarily merit for their appeal before a court appoints counsel, they were denied due process. Instead, California’s practice amounted to rich v. poor discrimination.
Justice Tom C. Clark dissented and argued that, because over 96% of prison appeals frivolously clog the court systems, California’s procedure balances defendants’ rights with state needs. Justice John M. Harlan, joined by Justice Potter Stewart, wrote a separate dissent. They argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause, should have governed this issue. Because California adequately balanced state and defendant rights, the state did not violate the Due Process Clause.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Police arrested Hom Way for possession of heroin. While under arrest, Way told police that a man named “Blackie Toy” once sold him an ounce of heroin at his laundry on Leavenworth St. Later that day, police found a laundry run by James Wah Toy. Nothing on the record identified Toy as “Blackie Toy”, but police arrested him anyway. Police then went to Toy’s house where they arrested Johnny Yee and found several tubes containing less than one ounce of heroin. Police also arrested Wong Sun. Police interrogated the men and wrote statements in English for them to sign. Both men refused, citing errors in the statements. At trial in U.S. District Court, Toy and Sun were convicted on federal narcotics charges. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court and remanding for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the police did not have probable cause to justify the arrests. With regard to Toy, the court should exclude all evidence found during the search because they are the “fruits” of an unlawful search. The unsigned statement was not corroborated, so it gave no basis for conviction. Sun’s unsigned confession and evidence against him were admissible.
Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent, stating that the arrests were lawful and there was no reason to grant Sun a new trial. Justices James M. Harlan, Potter Stewart, and Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
When Brown Shoe Company bought Kinney Company Inc., the United States sued Brown for antitrust violations of the Clayton Act. The United States argued that the merger would substantially lessen competition in the shoe manufacturing and sales industries. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ruled in favor of the United States. The court ordered Brown to divest itself of all Kinney stock and assets and to operate Kinney as separately as possible pending complete divestiture. The court gave Brown 90 days to come up with a plan for complete divestiture. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal under the Expediting Act, which allows direct appeal of final district court judgments.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the unanimous opinion of the court affirming the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s judgment was final, despite the pending plan for divestiture. The Court also held that the district court's findings on the effect of the merger on competition were correct. Justice Tom C. Harlan wrote a concurrence, stating that the effect of the merger was much broader than the district court found. Justice John M. Harlan dissented in part, concurring in the judgment, but finding that the district court’s judgment was not final, so direct appeal was not proper. Justices Byron R. White and Felix Frankfurter did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Federal Tobacco Inspection Act provides uniform standards for classification and inspection of tobacco. The regulations under the Act require sellers to identify type 14 tobacco with a blue tag. The Georgia Tobacco Identification Act requires sellers to mark the same type of tobacco with a white tag. Several owners and operators of tobacco warehouses in Georgia sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia to enjoin enforcement of the Georgia law. The three judge court granted the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Court held that Congress had the power to regulate tobacco sales through the Commerce Clause. By enacting the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act, Congress preempted the states from regulating in that area of commerce, so the identification provision of the Georgia Tobacco Identification Act is invalid. Justice Hugo L. Black dissented, writing that Congress did not intend to preclude this area of regulation with the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act. The Georgia statute was valid because it did not conflict with the federal act. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On August 24, 1954, William Link sued Wabash Railroad company over injuries he received when his car ran into a Wabash Railroad train at a crossing. After six years of motions, a pretrial hearing was set for October 12, 1960. On October 11, 1960, Link’s attorney contacted the Wabash Railroad attorney to inform him that he was doing work in Indianapolis and would miss a deposition that was set to happen before the hearing. The next morning, Link’s lawyer called the courthouse to notify the judge that he was detained in Indianapolis filing papers for a case before the Iowa Supreme Court. He said he could not make it to court that day but was available both of the next two days. Two hours after the pretrial was supposed to start, the court found that Link’s lawyer had not provided a sufficient reason for missing the hearing and dismissed the case “for failure to prosecute the action.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the decision of the 4-3 majority. The Court held that a court has the right to clear its calendar of cases that have been dormant because of inaction on the part of the plaintiff without any motion from the defense. This right has long been understood as one of the inherent powers of the court and no law explicitly restricts it. The Court also held that there are circumstances where a lack of a chance for argument does not violate the right to due process. In this case, the plaintiff voluntarily chose a lawyer with potential time conflicts, and both sides had plenty of notice about the hearing.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent where he argued that the majority’s decision essentially punished the plaintiff by forcing him to accept the loss of his property without due process. He found that the court’s decision relied solely on the lawyer’s failure to appear, rather than any other want of prosecution in the history of the case. Instead, the lawyer’s attempts to contact the court and reschedule the hearing clearly indicated a desire to continue the prosecution of the case. He also argued that to punish the client for the sins of the lawyer placed an enormous and unfair burden on the client to oversee the work of his attorney. Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the dissent.
Justice William O. Douglas also dissented.
Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Byron R. White did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company were both large distributors of milk products based in Chicago, Illinois. Each company sold dairy products to retail stores under a plan that gave independent stores discounts on the list prices based on the volume of the independent stores' purchases, up to a specified maximum discount. The dairies granted grocery chain stores a flat discount, without reference to the volume of their purchases, at a rate substantially higher than the maximum discount available to independent grocery stores.
The government brought a Section 2(a) Clayton Act suit against The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company, seeking an injunction against selling milk products at prices which discriminated between the independent groceries and the chain groceries. Each company conducted its own cost study in an attempt to demonstrate that the differences in pricing between independent groceries and chain groceries were due to actual cost differences. The cost studies demonstrated that it was less costly on average to sell to chain stores. So, the dairy companies argued that the price discrimination was justified by the cost justification proviso of the Clayton Act.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the Government's suit, concluding that the cost differences demonstrated by the two companies' cost studies were sufficient to justify the price discrimination. The United States appealed the District Court's decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, Justice Tom C. Clark, wrote the opinion of the Court reversing and remanding the lower court's decision. Writing for himself and five other justices, Clark maintained that the cost studies submitted by the two dairy companies did not satisfy their burden of showing that their respective discriminatory pricing plans reflected only a due allowance for cost differences. Clark recognized that eliminating class pricing would be impractical, but emphasized that customer classifications could not be arbitrary and that members of a class must have such similarity as to make the averaging of the cost of dealing with the class a valid and reasonable indication of the cost of dealing with any specific member of the class. Since Borden and Bowman did not show sufficient homogeneity within the class of chain groceries or within the class of independent groceries, the price discrimination between the two classes was illegal under the Clayton Act.
Justice William O. Douglas voted with the majority and wrote a concurring opinion, which emphasized the purpose of the anti-trust acts. Douglas stated that the Clayton Act should be read in a way that preserves as much of traditional free enterprise as possible, by controlling practices such as unfair discounting, which could lead to unfair competitive advantage and monopoly.
Justice Marshall Harlan dissented. Harlan stated that the cost studies submitted to the district court were adequate under the accepted principles of the law in this field. He agreed with the District Court's conclusion that the studies were conscientiously prepared and appeared to justify the price discrimination arising from the discount practices. As such, Harlan would have affirmed the lower court's opinion.
Justice Felix Frankfurter took no part in this decision.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Maurice A. Hutcheson, a president of a labor union, refused to answer eighteen questions before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. Although Hutcheson appeared to be concerned about the state using his words against him in a pending state criminal trial, he specifically waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, he argued that the Committee only wanted to expose his wrongful acts, and that this exposure would violate his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the Committee's questions acted as a "pretrial" of the state charges.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found the union president guilty of contempt of Congress. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment. Hutcheson appealed the appellate court's decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 4-2 decision Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority and concluded that the Committee's questions were not outside the scope of the Senate investigation, nor were the Committee's questions asked simply to expose the union president's criminal acts. The fact that state prosecutors could have used the answers to the questions in a pending state criminal trial did not violate Due Process. The Court did not allow the union president to attempt to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because he had explicitly waived it in the Committee hearing.
Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissent stating that the opinion forced the union president to choose between invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, answering the questions truthfully and aiding state prosecutors, committing perjury, or refusing to answer and face contempt.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The New York State Board of Regents authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. A group of organizations joined forces in challenging the prayer, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected their arguments.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The state cannot hold prayers in public schools, even if participation is not required and the prayer is not tied to a particular religion.
In an opinion authored by Hugo L. Black, the Court held that respondent's decision to use its school system to facilitate recitation of the official prayer violated the Establishment Clause. Specifically, the policy breached the constitutional wall of separation between church and state. The Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition of laws establishing religion meant that government had no business drafting formal prayers for any segment of its population to repeat in a government-sponsored religious program. The Court held that respondent's provision of the contested daily prayer was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment on the ground that the state's financing a religious exercise violated the First Amendment.
Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that no "official religion" was established by permitting those who want to say a prayer to say it.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The NAACP was prosecuted for violating a Virginia statute which banned "the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the activities of the NAACP amounted to "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit." NAACP-initiated litigation was "a form of political expression" and not "a technique of resolving private differences," argued Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who authored the majority opinion. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented, joined by Justices Potter Stewart and Tom Clark.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A jury found defendant guilty under a California statute that criminalized being addicted to narcotics. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant sought further review from the United States Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 6-2 decision authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that laws imprisoning persons afflicted with the "illness" of narcotic addiction inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court likened the law to one making it a criminal offense "to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease," and argued that the state could not punish persons merely because of their "status" of addiction. The Court noted that the law was not aimed at the purchase, sale, or possession of illegal drugs.
While joining the Court's opinion, Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion, elaborated the reasons why the statute was regarded as imposing a cruel and unusual punishment.
Justice Harlan concurred on the ground that the trial court's instruction permitted the jury to find defendant guilty on no more proof than that he was present in California while he was addicted to narcotics, and hence authorized punishment for a bare desire to commit a criminal act.
Justice Clark dissented, primarily on the ground that, properly construed, the statute provided a treatment rather than a punishment.
Justice White also dissented, expressing the view that it was within the power of the state to confine the defendant by criminal proceedings for the use of narcotics or for regular use amounting to habitual use.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On April 30, 1956, the Chicago Police Department arrested John E. Hodges on charges of armed robbery. On May 2, 1956, two members of the District of Columbia Police Department traveled to Chicago and interrogated Hodges for about an hour before producing a written statement. Hodges was returned to Washington, D.C., indicted, and pled guilty. Hodges later withdrew his plea and entered a plea of not guilty. On April 15, 1957, Hodges went to trial and was found guilty. He did not appeal.
Three months later, Hodges filed a motion in district court to vacate his sentence, arguing that his confession was coerced and should not have been admitted into evidence at trial. The motion was denied without a hearing. Hodges appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court determined that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted. The Court held that the district court was not required to hold a hearing because Hodges was not entitled to relief.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent and argued that the petitioner has a right to relief because he was essentially denied his right to appeal within the 10-day period following his conviction.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) received much criticism from state legislators as it pushed ahead with litigation to combat segregation. The State of Florida, in 1959, established a Legislative Investigation Committee to study what were called "subversive organizations." Gibson, president of the Miami branch of the NAACP, was subpoenaed before the committee and asked to produce a membership list of his organization. He refused and was found in contempt.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a close decision, the Court found that Gibson's rights had been violated. In his opinion, Justice Goldberg recognized the important right of states to inform themselves on "legitimate and vital interests." However, even though inquiring about the actions of a group such as the Communist Party may have been one of these legitimate interests, argued Goldberg, Florida did not prove that a "substantial connection" between the Miami NAACP and Communist Party activities existed. Thus, a "compelling and subordinating governmental interest" would not have been served by forcing Gibson to disclose his group's membership list.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Standard Oil Co. and two employees, Fong Foo and Robert Knupp were tried for conspiracy and concealing material facts within the jurisdiction of a governmental agency. The group allegedly falsified tests on goods manufactured at Standard Oil’s plant. Before the government finished presenting their case, the district court judge directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal for all parties on all counts. He then entered formal judgments of acquittal on the grounds of improper conduct by the Assistant U.S. States Attorney and a lack of credibility in the testimony of government witnesses. The United States filed for a writ of mandamus from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, asking the court of vacate the judgments and order a new trial. The court granted the writ, holding that the district court did not have the power to direct the judgment of acquittal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Court held that vacating the acquittal and granting a new trial violated petitioners’ constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Justice John M. Harlan concurred, agreeing that double jeopardy barred a second trial, because the trial court did not base its decision solely on the Assistant U.S. Attorney’s misconduct. Justice Tom C. Clark dissented, arguing that the district court had no power to direct a verdict of acquittal. Justice Charles E. Whittaker did not participate


[Unknown Act > Facts]
John Joseph Killian was an employee at the Allen-Bradley Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a member of Local 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America. From October of 1952 to February 28, 1953, Killian served as an officer of Local 1111. On December 9, 1952, the president of Local 1111 ordered all officers to come to the union office to execute affidavits stating that they were not members of the Communist Party, in accordance with the Taft-Hartley Act.
As early as the fall of 1949, Killian was a member of the Communist party group on the campus of the University of Wisconsin and in the city of Madison, Wisconsin. Killian held a number of the group’s meetings in his home. Government witness Sullivan transferred his Communist Party membership to Madison in October 1949; Killian contacted him in his role assigning individuals to Communist Party groups or cells. In November of 1951, Killian and others formed a Communist Party cell to operate within the Allen-Bradley plant. Killian suggested to a government witness and co-worker, Ondrejka, that both should become stewards of Local 1111 to advance party aims within the union; both subsequently became officers and participated in union meetings.
Killian was charged with making false statements in an affidavit. At trial, both Sullivan and Onrejka testified that they joined the Communist Party at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On cross-examination, Sullivan and Ondrejka testified that the FBI paid them monthly amounts for their services, and were reimbursed for expenses incurred in Communist Party activities. Killian moved for production of all statements given by Sullivan and Ondrejka to the FBI, with a particular focus on reports made by Ondrejka of his reimbursable expenses and receipts signed by Ondrejka; Killian requested this evidence to impeach the witnesses’ testimony. Killian also moved to strike both Sullivan and Ondrejka’s testimony. The government instead offered to produce a list showing the dates and amounts of payments to Ondrejka and whether each payment was for services or expenses. Killian refused this substituted evidence, and the district court denied Killian’s motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Killian's conviction, holding that the district judge properly excluded the requested reports and receipts because they were not related to the direct testimony of the witnesses.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, yes, and yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Charles E. Whittaker, the Court held that the district court must determine whether the documents requested by Killian were destroyed in good faith and in accord with normal practice, as suggested by the United States. If so, Killian would not be entitled to a new trial, because this would suggest that the information contained on the receipts was finally recorded elsewhere and already in evidence. The United States claimed that only two of Ondrejka’s receipts related to his testimony and that this information was contained in Ondrejka’s narrative statements; Justice Whittaker instructed the district court to make a final judgment for the government if it finds that this claim was true.
Justice Whittaker rejected Killian’s objection to the jury instruction’s subjective definition of membership in the Communist Party. He reasoned that the very nature of claimed membership in a secret or underground organization precludes the existence of objective proof of membership. Justice Whittaker also rejected Killian’s argument that the Communist Control Act (CCA) -- from which the jury instructions were largely drawn -- was unconstitutional. He noted that Killian was charged with lying about being a Communist in an affidavit, not with being a member of the Communist Party, the status prohibited by the CCA.
Justice Whittaker held that the district court properly defined “affiliation” for its jury instruction. He cited several decisions in the circuit courts using similar definitions of "affiliation" with the Communist Party. He rejected Killian’s narrow definition of “affiliation”, wherein the government would have to show that Killian was a member of an organization working with the Communist Party. He held that the district court’s definition was reasonable and properly outlined, vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the district court.
Justice Hugo Black dissented. He argued that compelling union officers to swear they are not Communists violated the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of belief and political association. He noted that test oaths are historic weapons against religious and political minority.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Black. Justice Douglas argued that the jury could find Killian guilty only if he committed illegal acts in connection with his role in the Communist Party. As the record contained no evidence of Killian committing an illegal act, his conviction should have been reversed.
Justice William J. Brennan dissented. He took issue with the majority’s interpretation of “membership”, and would have required evidence of some objective act of association and admission, understood as such by the party and by Killian.
"


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Herbert Goldblatt owned 38 acres of land within the Town of Hempstead (town) and often used the land for his business of mining sand and gravel. During excavation, water filled the crater, which widened and deepened. The town expanded around the excavation and later enacted a series of ordinances to regulate mining excavation within its limits. In 1958, the town amended an ordinance to prohibit excavation below the water table and impose a duty refill any excavation currently below the level. In 1959, the town sued Goldblatt for not complying with the ordinance. Goldblatt argued the ordinance is unconstitutional because it was not regulatory but rather represented the town confiscating his property without compensation. The Court of Appeals of New York held for the Town of Hempstead, allowing them to enforce the prohibition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Thomas C. Clark delivered the opinion of the 7-0 majority. The court held that regulation ordinances that take property previously used for personal profit are constitutional if the regulations are reasonable within due process of the law. The ordinance in this case was a valid exercise of the town’s police powers since it was passed as a safety measure to protect the general public of the town; therefore, the regulations are reasonable and do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Byron R. White took no part in the decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In accordance with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the Secretary of Agriculture promoted milk-marketing orders in the New York/New Jersey region that included compensatory payment provisions. The provisions in question required those who buy milk elsewhere and bring it into the region to pay the farmers who supply that region a “compensatory payment.” The petitioners were milk processing plant operators in Pennsylvania who challenged the validity of the “compensatory payment” provisions by arguing that they failed notice requirements and conflicted with other provisions of the Act that required uniform prices. The district court held these provisions to be invalid, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and upheld the validity of the provisions as authorized by the Act.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The compensatory payment provisions were invalid as inconsistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the Agricultural Market Agreement Act of 1937. Justice John M. Harlan, II delivered the opinion of the 6-1 majority. The Court held the Secretary of Agriculture exceeded his authority by creating the “compensatory payment” provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937. The provisions essentially forced non-regional milk producers to subsidize regional milk producers, which interfered with the competitive advantage the the cheaper, non-regional milk producers would naturally have. The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended it to prevent this type of creation of economic barriers to protect the prices of regional products. Therefore, the provisions conflicted with Congress’ intent and were invalid.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court should have affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding the Secretary of Agriculture. Black explained that the Secretary did not overreach, and he should be given the authority to impose the provisions at issue in order to protect farmers.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Six individuals were indicted and convicted for refusing to answer pertinent questions before a grand jury. Each of the individuals moved to squash the conviction because they were not told what the subject of the inquiry was, so had no basis for determining what questions were pertinent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the convictions.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-2 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the majority reversing the lower court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the convictions could not stand because the grand jury failed to identify the subject of the inquiry at the time the individuals refused to answer questions. Justice William J. Brennan did not participate in the decision with respect to #10.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence stating that the investigation was to determine Communist infiltration in the press and that that investigation was unconstitutional. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent stating that the indictments were valid. Justice John C. Clark joined in Justice Harlan’s dissent and wrote a separate dissent criticizing this decision as a departure from previous law. Justices Byron R. White and Felix Frankfurter did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Chicago police arrested and detained Frank Townsend, a drug addict, in connection with a murder. After several hours of questioning, Townsend began going into withdrawal and asked for a doctor. A doctor gave him a medicine Townsend alleges was a "truth serum." While under the influence of the medication, Townsend confessed to the murder. Townsend alleged that the medicine caused his confession and, therefore, was not admissible at trial. Defendants disputed most of the facts surrounding the confession. The Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois admitted the confession at a trial by jury. The jury found Townsend guilty and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction.
Townsend subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The District Court denied the writ without a hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the District Court's inquiry should be limited to undisputed portions of the record.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, when the facts are in dispute and the petitioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in state court. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Earl Warren wrote for the majority. At the state level, several crucial facts, such as whether or not the medicine given to Townsend was a "truth serum," were not determined. The record did not provide sufficient information to make an accurate determination. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court was careful to note that it did not rule on the truth of the allegations in the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that the District Court had made sufficient factual determinations and a new hearing was unnecessary. Justice Tom C. Clark, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A Kansas statute made it a misdemeanor to enter into contracts for "debt adjusting" (a practice in which a debtor agrees to pay a monthly fee to an adjustor who then makes payments to the debtor's creditor). Skrupa was in business as a "Credit Advisor" and engaged in this practice. A lower court held that the Kansas statute was an "unreasonable regulation of a lawful business" and struck it down.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court and affirmed Kansas's right to regulate debt adjusting. The unanimous decision held that the question of whether the law was wise or reasonable was a legislative and not a judicial one. Justice Black argued that the lower court's ruling relied on old law; the Court had moved out of the business of using the "vague contours" of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down laws which it had deemed economically unwise. Those were issues for state and national legislatures to address and not the courts. As long as state regulations do not offend a "specific federal constitutional prohibition" or a "valid federal law," they are legitimate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the State of Georgia used a county unit system for counting votes in primary elections. Under this system, the candidate who received the highest number of votes in a county would receive all of that county's unit votes. The overall winning candidate would then have to receive a majority of the county unit votes statewide. This system ended up giving rural counties a majority of the unit votes, even though rural counties made up only about a third of the population as of the 1960s.
In 1962, James O'Hear Sanders, a voter in Georgia's most populous county, brought suit against several representatives of the Georgia State Democratic Executive Committee and the Secretary of State of Georgia. Sanders claimed that the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Seventeenth Amendment. As a voter within one of the urban counties, Sanders claimed his vote had less of an influence on the nomination of candidates than that of a rural voter. A special three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with Sanders and held that the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause. However, the district court did not outlaw the county unit system entirely. The State appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William O. Douglas, in an 8-1 majority opinion, vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case with directions. The Court held that the weighing of votes through the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by giving more voting power to residents of particularly small rural counties. Unlike the district court, the majority held that the county unit system was impermissible in its entirety. The Court reasoned that the longstanding concept of political equality requires elections to be governed by the rule of "one person, one vote." Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented, arguing that the case should be sent back for trial to establish a fully developed record for the Court to review.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
S. H. Kress and Company operated a general variety store on Main Street in Durham, North Carolina. On the first floor, Kress had a stand-up counter where it served food and drinks to both black and white customers. On the basement floor, however, Kress operated a luncheonette department with signs posted stating that it was for employees and invited guests only.
On May 6, 1960, seven students tried to seat themselves at the luncheonette counter. Five, including John Thomas Avent, were black students at North Carolina College for Negroes in Durham. The other two were white students at Duke University. All seven were involved with civil rights student organizations to varying degrees. Before each sat down, the store’s manager W. K. Boger spoke with the students individually. He told them that the luncheonette department was for employees and invited guests only, and asked them to leave. Both white students, however, were only asked to leave when it became clear they were sitting with one or more black customers. When the students refused to leave, Boger called an officer of the Durham police department, who arrested the students and charged them with trespassing.
At trial, Boger testified that it was Kress’ policy to refuse service to black customers at the luncheonette department, and to refuse service to white people in the company of black people. The district court convicted all seven defendants of trespassing. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the ruling. Noting that North Carolina had no laws mandating the separation of white and black customers in restaurants, the court upheld proprietors’ common law right to exclude individuals on the basis of race.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the North Carolina Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decisions in Peterson v. City of Greenville and Patterson v. Alabama In Peterson, the Court held that states cannot use trespass laws to enforce discrimination mandated by a segregation ordinance. In Patterson, the Court held that it is bound to consider changes in law which supervene after a judgment is entered.
Justice John Harlan dissented in part. He pointed out that the City of Durham had a restaurant segregation ordinance in effect, but that the North Carolina Supreme Court proceeded under the assumption that no such ordinance existed. He would have instead remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this fact.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Under Pennsylvania law, public schools were required to read from the bible at the opening of each school day. The school district sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The district court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, even after the statute had been amended to permit a student to excuse himself.
The Court consolidated this case with one involving Maryland atheists who challenged a city rule that provided for opening exercises in the public schools that consisted primarily of reading a chapter from the bible and the Lord's Prayer. The state's highest court held the exercise did not violate the First Amendment. The religious character of the exercise was admitted by the state.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Public schools cannot sponsor Bible readings and recitations of the Lord’s Prayer under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
In an opinion authored by Justice Clark, the majority concluded that, in both cases, the laws required religious exercises and such exercises directly violated the First Amendment. The Court affirmed the Pennsylvania decision, and reversed and remanded the Maryland decision because the mandatory reading from the bible before school each day was found to be unconstitutional.
Justice Stewart dissented, expressing the view that on the records it could not be said that the Establishment Clause had necessarily been violated. He would remand both cases for further hearings.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On the evening of December 19, 1957, Spokane police officers arrested Raymond L. Haynes near a gas station that had just been robbed. Haynes admitted to the robbery as officers drove him to the police station, and he signed a written confession after he was told that he could not call his wife until he signed it. At trial, Haynes argued that the confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary and coerced. The judge admitted the confession into evidence, and the jury found Haynes guilty. Haynes appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Spokane police officers extracted an involuntary confession from Haynes by threatening to hold him without allowing him to contact his family. The Court also held that such tactics were unnecessary because the police had sufficient evidence to charge Haynes with robbery even without the confession.
Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent in which he distinguished the officers’ refusal to allow Haynes to call his wife from the voluntariness of the confession. The oral confession that Haynes made within the first ninety minutes of his arrest bolstered Justice Clark’s view that the signed written confession was also voluntary. Justice Clark argued that the officers’ treatment of Haynes did not amount to threats or inducements and that Haynes was an unlikely candidate for coercion given his age, intelligence, and prior criminal record. Justice John M. Harlan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony breaking and entering. When he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a right to assistance of counsel applies to criminal defendants in state court by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court held that it was consistent with the Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own. The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is a fundamental and essential right made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions and requires courts to provide counsel for defendants unable to hire counsel unless the right was competently and intelligently waived.
Justice Douglas, while joining the Court's opinion, elaborated, in a separate opinion, the relation between the Bill of Rights and the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justices Clark and Harlan concurred in separate decisions.