[Unknown Act > Facts]
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100 picketed Connell Construction Co., a local building contractor. The union wanted Connell to sign an agreement promising only to subcontract mechanical work to Union members. Connell sued to enjoin the picketing. Connell signed the agreement with the union under protest, and amended its complaint to allege antitrust violations. The district court held that the agreement was exempt from federal antitrust laws under a provision of the National Labor Relations Act. Also, federal labor laws pre-empted state antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Maybe. Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote the 5-4 majority opinion affirming on state law pre-emption, but reversing on federal antitrust exemption. The Supreme Court held that the agreement was not exempt because it imposed a direct restraint on competition. The Court remanded because the question of whether the agreement violated the Sherman Act was not fully briefed or argued.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that Congress did not intend to impose antitrust sanctions for this type of activity. Justice William O. Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan, and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice William O. Douglas also wrote a dissent, asserting that only federal labor law applied because Connell based its argument on the fact that they were coerced into signing the agreement.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The University Drive-In Theater in Jacksonville, Florida had a screen that was visible from nearby public streets. The theater showed an R-rated film containing female nudity, which violated a Jacksonville city ordinance that prohibited the showing of films containing nudity if the film was visible from a public area. Richard Erznoznik, the theater's manager, was charged with a Class C offense under the ordinance. He challenged the ordinance in Duval County Circuit Court, which upheld the statute. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court struck down the Jacksonville ordinance. While individuals did have a right to not be exposed to offensive films, the ordinance singled out "some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others," Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for the majority. Since the "offended viewer readily can avert his eyes" from the films shown, Jacksonville's distinction between films with nudity and films without nudity was unconstitutional. Under Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, "government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." The ordinance was "broader than permissible" in trying to protect children from exposure to nudity and "invalid" as an attempt to prevent traffic accidents. Justice William O. Douglas authored a concurring opinion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Catherine Jackson had received electricity from Metropolitan Edison at her home. Her service was terminated in September 1970 due to a lack of payment. Jackson opened another account under the name of another resident, James Dodson. Metropolitan Edison investigated her residence on October 6, 1971 and service was again terminated without notice on October 11. Jackson sued in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. She sought damages for the termination and an injunction to continue her service. The court dismissed her suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the court affirmed the Third Circuit and held that Metropolitan Edison's termination of Jackson's service did not qualify as state action. Rehnquist reiterated that private actions are "immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court acknowledged that Metropolitan Edison was heavily regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, but this regulation did not make Metropolitan Edison part of the state. Additionally, the Court cited Nebbia v. New York in declining to rule on whether all actions by businesses that provided essential public services qualified as state action.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Peggy Strickland and Virginia Crain were sophomores at Mena Public High School in Mena, Arkansas. They heard about a school meeting where both parents and students would be present and decided to spike the punch with alcohol. Ten days later, Mrs. Curtis Powell, a teacher at the high school, learned of the prank and confronted the girls. The girls confessed based on the understanding that she would handle their punishment. The next day, the teacher informed the girls that the principal, P. T. Waller, heard about the incident and she would not be able to help them unless they confessed to the principal. The girls did so, and Mr. Waller suspended them for two weeks pending a decision by the school board. The school board voted to suspend the girls for the rest of the semester. The girls, their parents, and their counsel were present at a subsequent meeting to ask the board to reconsider the suspensions. The board denied the request.
Strickland and Crain sued the members of the school board, administrators, and the school district of Mena, Arkansas for damages resulting from their suspension, which they claimed violated their right to due process. The jury could not reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. The district court directed a verdict for the school board because there was no evidence of malice toward the girls. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the common law doctrine of immunity for public school officials provided immunity from liability if the school board acted in good faith. To impose a penalty of liability for such a decision would make the board vulnerable to intimidation. The Court also held that, to prove the board acted in bad faith, the evidence must show that the school board members knew or should have known that their actions would violate the constitutional rights of the students. Given the information available to the school board at the time of the decision, the Court found that the school board acted in good faith. The Court also held the United States Court of Appeals went beyond its purview by reinterpreting the school board statute.
Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote on opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed that the case should be remanded but argued that the majority’s opinion placed too high a burden on school board officials by equating ignorance of the law with malicious intent. He cited recent split decisions on the part of the Court as evidence that even knowledge of the law did not necessarily lead to an understanding of a clear course of action. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Stephen Wiesenfeld and Paula Polatschek were married in 1970. Polatschek had worked as a teacher for the five years prior to their marriage and continued teaching after they were married. Her salary was the principle source of the couple’s income, and social security contributions were regularly deducted from her salary. In 1972, Polatschek died in childbirth, which left Wiesenfeld with the care of their newborn son. Wiesenfeld applied for social security benefits for himself and his son, and was told that his son could receive them but that he could not. Social Security Act provides benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father that are available to both the children and the widow. The benefits for a deceased wife and mother, however, are only available to the children.
In 1973, Wiesenfeld sued on behalf of himself and similarly situated widowers. He claimed that the relevant section of the Social Security Act unfairly discriminated on the basis of sex and sought summary judgment. A three-judge panel of the district court granted Wiesenfeld’s motion for summary judgment


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the social security benefits for the surviving spouse and children is to enable the surviving spouse to properly care for the children, regardless of the gender of the parent. Gender-based discrimination regarding these benefits is therefore both illogical and counter-productive.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the gender-based classification of the social security benefits does not serve any legitimate government interest. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the concurring opinion. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that the majority’s opinion overreached the bounds of the question by ruling on whether the statute violated the Fifth Amendment. He argued that the statute does not serve a valid legislative purpose and could be overturned on that basis alone.
Justice William O. Douglas did not participate in either the discussion or the decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) set fixed commission rates for stock transactions less than $500,000. Richard A. Gordon, on behalf of a class of independent investors, sued the New York Stock Exchange and member firms claiming fixed commission rates and exorbitant membership fees violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the New York Stock Exchange, holding that the authority of the SEC provided immunity from antitrust claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the unanimous opinion. The Supreme Court held that the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 impliedly repealed any applicable antitrust laws. The Act authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission as the sole regulator for the New York Stock Exchange. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence, stating that the SEC has actively exercised its authority so commission rates are monitored in the way Congress intended. Justice Potter Stewart also wrote a concurrence, emphasizing that rules fixing commission rates are only immune from antitrust laws if the rules are necessary to make the Securities and Exchange Act work.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The respondents represent a class of current and past employees of the Albemarle Paper Co. paper mill in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, who claimed to have suffered from racially discriminatory hiring and promoting practices. In 1966, after filing a race discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the respondents sued Albemarle Paper Co. and the plant’s labor union, Halifax Local 425, and sought permanent injunctive relief against any plant “policy, practice, custom, or usage” that violates Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. In 1970, the plaintiffs moved to add a class demand for backpay.
At trial, the court found that the plant’s seniority system was racially segregated and ordered the plant to implement a new system. The court did not award backpay because the company did not act in bad faith and respondents added the demand four years after the action was initiated. The court also did not enjoin Albemarle’s use of pre-employment tests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the district court should have awarded backpay and enjoined the use of the pre-employment tests.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that backpay should be awarded based on a court’s discretion. The decision in this case should be considered in light of the goals of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Because the prospect of a backpay award could ensure the use of equal employment practices, it serves the purposes of the Act and should be awarded in this case. Finding that the employer did not act in bad faith is not a sufficient reason to deny backpay. The Court also held that district courts have the authority to award backpay based on the legislative history surrounding the Act, regardless of when the demand was added to the action. The Court held that nothing in the Act precluded the use of employment tests, but only if they can be proven to be reasonable measures of job performance. Based on the Guidelines issued by the EEOC, the Albemarle tests do not reasonably measure job performance. Because Albemarle has been revising their testing procedures throughout the appellate process, the Court left determining the appropriate relief to the lower court on remand.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that there was no legal bar to awarding backpay under Title VII of the Act, and only extremely unusual circumstances would prevent the awarding of backpay when liability has been established. He also argued that, although the backpay demand can be added to the action at any point, the district court can consider whether adding it later prejudiced Albemarle’s case in any way. In his concurring opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that, in most cases, the awarding of backpay is at the discretion of the trial judge and should be governed by equity considerations. He also wrote that a lack of “bad faith” was not enough evidence to refuse to award backpay, though there are situations where the refusal would be appropriate.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in judgment. He argued that an employer’s good faith was a relevant issue in a court’s discretionary decisions. He also argued that the Guidelines were theories regarding employment testing and its accuracy, and they should not be considered too rigidly.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that, under the majority opinion’s standard, awarding backpay was unnecessary in this case, as Albemarle was already changing their policies. He also argued that the use of the EEOC Guidelines to determine whether the employment tests were constitutional was unreasonable because the Guidelines carry no legislative weight.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On August 21, 1971, Ralph Feola, along with Enriquito Alsondo, Henry Rosa, and Michael Farr, planned to sell a kilo of powdered sugar in place of heroin to customers who, unbeknownst to them, were undercover cops. If the sale did not go well, the four planned to attack the buyers and take the money. Agent Hall and Agent Lightcap posed as customers and the deal was in progress when they found themselves under attack. They countered the attack, and Feola, Alsondo, Rosa, and Farr were arrested for conspiracy to assault and assaulting federal agents in the commission of their duties.
At trial in the district court, the jury instructions specified that knowledge of the agents’ true identities was not a necessary element to prove the conspiracy charge. When the respondents appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction on the assault charges, but reversed the conviction on the conspiracy charges.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, given the legislative history of the statute, Congress clearly intended it to afford “maximum protection” to federal officers. This purpose was best satisfied with a looser understanding of intent. The Court held that this ruling was not unfair to the defendant because it did not make a previously legal action illegal. Intent to assault is criminal, regardless of the intended victim. The Court also held that the burden for proving conspiracy was not any higher than the burden for proving the element of the crime itself.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent where he argued that the precedent established by state laws makes the knowledge of an officer’s identity an essential element of the crime of assaulting one. Without such knowledge, the crime should be treated as an assault on a private citizen. He also argued that the statute’s specification regarding an assault on a federal agent during the “performance of his official duties” requires that the perpetrator be aware of the federal agent’s official status. Justice William O. Douglas joined the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On May 6, 1968, Roger Corpus was shot and killed in his apartment. The police obtained the name of Richard Brown, who was identified as an acquaintance of the victim, though not a suspect. On May 13, 1968, detectives arrested Brown and searched his apartment without probable cause and without a warrant. The detectives read Brown his Miranda rights and proceeded to question him. During the questioning, Brown confessed to assisting in Corpus’ murder. Later, Brown was questioned again after being read his Miranda rights a second time. He substantially repeated his account of the murder.
Prior to his trial, Brown moved to suppress the two statements based on the fact that his arrest was illegal and the statements were taken in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found Brown guilty. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment but did not accept the State’s argument that the arrest was legal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that Miranda warnings are not sufficient to remove the taint of an illegal arrest from statements made in custody. The Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment were meant to work together, so that even if a statement is found to be voluntary as required by the Fifth Amendment, it could still be the result of an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment and therefore inadmissible. Because Brown’s arrest was illegal and the statements clearly stemmed from that arrest, the Court held that the statements were inadmissible.
Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment and wrote that the Miranda warnings do not circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part. He argued that the admissibility of Brown’s statements should be considered in the context of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. He also argued that the case should be remanded because the trial court made no determination regarding probable cause for the original arrest. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence in part.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Schick, a master sergeant in the Army, was convicted of murder in a military court and sentenced to death in 1954. President Eisenhower intervened and commuted his sentence in 1960, reducing it to life imprisonment without parole.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court dismissed Schick's claim that Eisenhower's action was invalid because it imposed a condition not authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Tracing the development and Court's interpretation of the President's powers to commute sentences, Chief Justice Burger argued that since the pardoning power is an enumerated one, any limit on it must be found in the Constitution. Thus, its use does not depend on statutes such as those found in the military code.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In December 1967, the Silver Bridge at Point Pleasant, West Virginia, collapsed and killed 43 people, including Melvin Cantrell. Joseph Eszterhas, a reporter for the local newspaper the Plain Dealer, was assigned to cover the story. He decided to focus on the Melvin Cantrell’s funeral and the impact of his death on his family. Five months later, he returned to do a follow-up piece and spoke to the Cantrell children when their mother, Margaret Cantrell, was not present. The article appeared on August 4, 1968 and contained a number of admitted inaccuracies concerning the family and the status of their home.
Margaret Cantrell and her children sued under the “false light” theory of invasion of privacy. After the jury heard plaintiff’s case, the judge removed the demand for punitive damages because Cantrell had failed to present evidence that the falsehoods stemmed from actual malice. The defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the judge denied. The jury found the defendants guilty and awarded compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the district judge should have granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the district judge adequately instructed the jury that liability could only be imposed if the jury determined that the false statements were made knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the truth. Because no one objected to the instructions, the Court held that it did not have to consider whether this was an acceptable standard for “false light” cases. The Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in overturning the case. The Court of Appeals based its analysis on the concept of “actual malice” as defined in New York Times v. Sullivan, while the district judge based his analysis on the common law standard of malice. The Court held that the district judge should not have directed a verdict for Forest City Publishing Co. because there was sufficient evidence in the case to prove Forest City Publishing Co. was aware of the falsehoods.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent and argued that the imposition of legal analysis differentiating common law malice from actual malice infringes on the freedom of the press by making that freedom contingent upon a jury’s opinion. He argued that such a stance could result in a more timid press that would not report stories accurately for fear of facing a libel suit.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order under their emergency powers limiting the time railroad cars could stay at a holding location. The order was issued without notice or a hearing. If a railroad shipper held a car for longer than that time, they would lose the privilege to reconsign the contents of the car and were subject to a tariff from the point of origin to the holding point and from the holding point to the ultimate destination. A three-judge district court held the ICC did not have the power to issue the order because it was not suspending any rule or regulation. This case was heard on direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote the unanimous opinion reversing the district court. The Supreme Court held that the ICC did have the power to issue the order in an emergency and the order was in line with the ICC’s purpose. The order and tariff were not an unreasonable means of expediting movement of rail cars.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Quality Manufacturing Company fired an employee after she refused to meet with the company president without a union representative. The shop chairlady and assistant chairlady were also fired for trying to represent the employee at the meeting and for filing a grievance. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that these discharges constituted unfair labor practices because the employee reasonably believed that disciplinary action would occur at the meeting. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the ruling was an impermissible departure from prior NLRB precedent.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan wrote for the 6-3 majority, reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that, while it was a departure from prior precedent, the NLRB ruling was permissible. Denying her a union representative interfered with her individual rights as a union employee.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissent, stating that the NLRB had not explained its decision to depart from precedent so he would remand to the NLRB for further explanation. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a dissent, asserting that representation in meetings was a matter Congress left to decide during the bargaining process. Justice Potter Stewart joined Justice Powell’s dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The State of Iowa denied Linda Alcala and several other pregnant women welfare benefits for their unborn children. The Department of Social Services stated that although those children would be eligible for benefits once born, while unborn they do not fit the Social Security Act’s definition of “dependent children” as required by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The pregnant women sued, arguing that the denial of benefits conflicted with federal Social Security standards and violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that unborn children were “dependent children”, but did not reach the 14th Amendment arguments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, Undecided. In a 7-1 decision, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the legislative history surrounding the Social Security Act did not provide a basis for including unborn children in the definition of “dependent children”. While some states had adopted welfare plans that included unborn children, it was not required in order to comply with federal law. The Court also remanded the case for consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment issues.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that the legislative history is inconclusive. Also, the long-standing administrative practice of providing unborn children with AFDC benefits when a state legislates for it prove that unborn children are included in the definition of “dependent children”. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On January 3, 1957, Kenneth Donaldson was committed on the petition of his father, following a brief hearing before a county judge. Twelve days later, he was admitted to Florida State Hospital and soon thereafter diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. The committing judge told Donaldson that he was being sent to the hospital for “a few weeks”. Instead, he was confined for almost fifteen years.
When Donaldson was admitted in 1957, J.B. O’Connor was Assistant Clinical Director of the hospital; O’Connor was also Donaldson’s attending physician until he transferred wards on April 18, 1967. John Gumanis was a staff physician for Donaldson’s ward. Donaldson was denied grounds privileges by Gumanis and confined to a locked building with sixty closely-quartered beds. As a Christian Scientist, Donaldson refused to take any medication or to submit to electroshock treatments. According to Donaldson, he received cognitive therapy from O’Connor no more than six times. In essence, the hospital provided Donaldson with subsistence-level custodial care, and a minimal amount of psychiatric treatment. Donaldson challenged his continued commitment several times, but each challenge was denied with little explanation.
In February 1971, Donaldson charged O’Connor and other members of the hospital’s staff under § 1983 with intentionally and maliciously depriving him of his constitutional right to liberty. Evidence at trial showed that the staff had the power to release a mentally ill, committed patient if he was not dangerous to himself or others, but that the staff did not exercise this power. The jury trial found in favor of Donaldson, assessing both compensatory and punitive damages against O’Connor and Gumanis. O’Connor appealed his case separately, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court rejected O’Connor’s argument that the trial court improperly barred the jury from finding that O’Connor acted in good faith. The jury instruction was valid because it explicitly stated that the defendants’ reasonable belief that Donaldson’s confinement was proper would preclude damages. Any reliance on state law would fall under this consideration of O'Connor's good faith intentions.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. While the trial court properly instructed the jury on the relevance of O’Connor’s good faith intentions, Justice Stewart held that the Fifth Circuit must determine if the trial court properly instructed the jury on O’Connor’s reliance on state law. Justice Stewart acknowledged that the state cannot constitutionally confine a non-dangerous, mentally ill person capable of living outside of a mental health facility. He noted, however, that neither the trial court nor the Fifth Circuit acted with knowledge of the Court’s most recent decision on the scope of state officials’ qualified immunity, Wood v. Strickland. Under that decision, the relevant question for the jury was whether O’Connor knew his actions would deprive Donaldson of his constitutional rights, or whether he maliciously deprived him of his constitutional rights. The Court remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit to be reconsidered with this test in mind.
Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred. He argued that the Fifth Circuit should consider Donaldson’s consistent refusal of medical treatment to be taken into account in considering the respondent’s good faith defense. Chief Justice Burger also would have ordered the Fifth Circuit to consider the hospital staff’s potential reliance on Donaldson’s repeated unsuccessful attempts to seek release through the Florida court system.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Gurley Oil Co. owned five gas stations in Mississippi and purchased gas tax-free out of state. Gurley added both federal and state excise taxes on to the retail price of the gasoline. Mississippi imposed an additional 5% tax on the “gross proceeds” of all gas sales. Mississippi did not permit Gurley to deduct the state and federal excise taxes from the “gross proceeds” before calculating the 5% tax. Gurley paid the tax under protest, but sued for a refund. They alleged that not allowing a pretax deduction of the excise taxes was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Gurley argued that the company was just a collector of taxes paid by the consumer, so those taxes were not actually part of his gross receipts. The chancery court dismissed the suit and the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice William J. Brennan wrote the unanimous opinion. The Supreme Court held that the 5% tax is on Gurley, not the consumer. Retailers traditionally pass the economic burden of taxes on to consumers, but that does not mean the legal responsibility for the tax has shifted. Because the tax fell on Gurley, he was not unconstitutionally deprived of his property. The court also held that the 5% tax did not violate equal protection because there was no claim of discriminatory enforcement. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1960, the government of the Republic of Cuba confiscated the businesses of several Cuban cigar manufacturers. The Republic named “interventors” to take over and run the businesses. The interventors continued to ship cigars to foreign purchasers, including in the U.S., and some purchasers mistakenly paid money owed to the original owners for cigars shipped before the takeover. The interventors refused to return the money. The original owners fled to New York and sued the purchasers for trademark infringement and compensation for money paid to the interventors for past shipments. The district court held that the 1960 intervention was an “act of state” so U.S. courts had no power in the matter. Under the act of state doctrine, the courts of a sovereign cannot question the acts of another sovereign within its own borders. The court did, however, have power over the amounts mistakenly paid for pre-intervention shipments. The purchasers were entitled to set off their mistaken payments against amounts due for post intervention shipments. One purchaser, who was entitled to more than it owed, received an affirmative judgment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the 1960 act was an “act of state”, but also held that the interventor's refusal to pay back the mistaken payments was also an act of state. The purchasers could still set off the amount they were entitled to against the amount they owed, but the court reversed the ruling for the one purchaser who received an affirmative judgment.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower judgment. The Supreme Court held that the record contained no evidence to support an act of state. There was no statute, decree or order by the Cuban Government refusing to pay, only a statement by the interventor’s counsel during trial. The interventors did not possess governmental power just because the Cuban government appointed them. The affirmative judgment for the one purchaser was restored.
Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a concurrence, expressing that even in cases involving purely political matters, the courts must decide for themselves whether abstention is necessary, and it was not necessary in this case. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, agreeing that the act of state doctrine did not bar the judgment in favor of the purchasers.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that the interventor’s refusal to pay over the mistaken funds was an act of state regardless of the lack of an express decree by the Cuban government. Justice William J. Brennan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
It was long the rule in admiralty cases arising from collision or stranding that, when both parties were negligent, the sum of the damages to both should be split evenly between them. The Supreme Court endorsed this "rule of divided damages" in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickenson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).
On a clear night, in 8-10 foot seas and 45 knots of wind off Rockaway Point, the Mary A. Whalen, a coastal tanker carrying fuel oil to New York from New Jersey, went astray. Unable to locate the breakwater light, her master attempted a U-turn, stranding her upon a sand bar. The light had failed. Its maintenance was the U.S. Coast Guard's responsibility. The tanker's owner sued in federal district court, which found negligence on the parts of both the vessel (75%) and the Coast Guard (25 %). Even though only the ship owner suffered damages, the district court applied the rule of divided damages, assessing both parties equal shares. They cross-appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed per curiam.
Abstract prepared by Professor J.P. Jones


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that in such cases liability should be allocated with reference to the comparative degrees of fault on the part of each party. "We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property damage in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for such damages is to be allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of their fault."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Earl Foster began working for Dravo Corp. in 1965. In 1967, he worked the first nine weeks of the year before being called for military service. He served for 18 months before returning to Dravo to work the last 13 weeks of 1968. Under his collective bargaining agreement, employees earn full vacation benefits if they work at least 25 weeks per year. Under the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), veterans returning to civilian jobs are entitled to their job at the same level of seniority, status and pay as when they left. Foster did not receive vacation benefits for 1967 and 1968, so he sued in district court, arguing that he would have received those benefits had he worked for Dravo while he was in the military.
The district court ruled in favor of Dravo, holding that the vacation benefits did not accrue automatically with continued employment and so were not tied to seniority. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case to determine whether Foster should receive partial vacation benefits for the time he worked in 1967-68.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, Maybe. In a unanimous decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Supreme Court held that Foster was not entitled to full vacation benefits because the benefit did not accrue automatically as a result of continued employment. The Court also held that the MSSA does not guarantee partial vacation benefits for time worked, but Foster’s collective bargaining agreement may. The court of appeals properly remanded the case to district court to determine whether Foster is entitled to partial vacation benefits under his collective bargaining agreement. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Southeastern Promotions was a theatrical production company that requested to use the Tivoli Theater in Chattanooga, Tennessee to present the musical "Hair." "Hair" was a controversial musical that contained obscenities and nudity. The Tivoli was privately owned, but was leased to the city of Chattanooga. The city rejected Southeastern's request based on the controversial content in the production. Southeastern challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that Chattanooga's denial of its request violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court ruled for Chattanooga and found that the musical contained obscene content that was not constitutionally protected. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that Chattanooga's denial of the Southeastern's request was a "prior restraint," an attempt to censor speech and prevent it from reaching the public. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated that though prior restraints were not necessarily unconstitutional, "the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable." Chattanooga's "procedural safeguards were lacking" in dealing with those risks and placed the burden on Southeastern to ensure that the musical could be produced. This was inconsistent with Freedman v. Maryland, and therefore unconstitutional. Justice William O. Douglas dissented in part and concurred in the result in part.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Using marked money, police officers made an undercover heroin buy from a third party who, upon taking money from the officers, entered "Mom Santana's" house and emerged with heroin. Officers then arrested the third party and returned to Santana's house where they identified themselves as police officers, entered the house after Santana fled into it from the porch, and, after ordering her to empty her pockets, discovered some of the marked money. The search was done without a warrant.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court upheld the search. Relying on the the Court's decision in United States v. Watson (1976), Justice Rehnquist argued that by standing on her porch when the officers arrived, Santana was "not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy." Since the police had probable cause to arrest and search her at that point, their behavior was consistent with the Court's Watson precedent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A Nebraska state trial judge, presiding over a widely publicized murder trial, entered an order restraining members of the press from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police. The judge felt that this measure was necessary to guarantee a fair trial to the accused.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Court agreed with the trial judge that the murder case would generate "intense and pervasive pretrial publicity." However, the unanimous court held that the practical problems associated with implementing a prior restraint on the press in this case would not have served the accused's rights. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that"a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A flyer identifying "active shoplifters" was distributed to merchants in the Louisville, Kentucky area. The flyer included a photograph of Edward C. Davis III, who had been arrestedon a shoplifting charge. When the charge was dismissed, Davis brought an action against Edgar Paul, the Louisville chief of police. Davis alleged that the distribution of the flyer had stigmatized him and deprived him of his constitutional rights.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that Davis had not been deprived of any constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. The Court also emphasized that constitutional privacy interests did not cover Davis's claims. The Court argued that the constitutional right to privacy was limited to matters relating to "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." The publication of records of official acts, such as arrests, did not fall under the rubric of privacy rights.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A 1971 statute enacted in Maryland authorized the payment of state funds to any private higher education institute that met a set of minimum criteria and refrained from awarding “only seminarian or theological degrees.” The grants were noncategorical, but they could not be used for sectarian purposes, as per a 1972 provision. At the end of every fiscal year, the institution that received the aid must report all financial transactions and identify the nonsectarian expenditures within those transactions.
Four Maryland taxpayers sued to challenge the constitutionality of the statute and argued that the statute benefited certain church-affiliated institutions that are constitutionally ineligible for this form of aid under the First Amendment. The district court applied the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman ― which asks whether the state aid has a secular purpose, a primary effect other than the advancement of religion, and doesn’t excessively entangle the state in church affairs ― and determined that the statute was constitutional.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
A 1971 statute that allocated Maryland taxpayer money to private religiously-affiliated schools for “nonsectarian” purposes did not violate the First Amendment. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the 5-4 majority opinion. The Court held that the law passed the “Lemon Test” from the Court’s decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman. The majority concluded that funds given to private, religiously-affiliated schools would not become wrapped up in religious uses simply because they were presented to a religious school. As such, there was no violation of the First Amendment.
Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the three-part test the Court established in Lemon v. Kurtzman was unnecessary to determine whether a statute violates the First Amendment. As long as there was a secular legislative purpose and the primary effect of the statute was not to advance or inhibit religion, there was no need to examine whether the statute would lead to an excessive entanglement of the state with religion. In this case, everyone agreed that the purpose of the legislation was secular and that the primary effect was not to promote religion, so the statute was constitutional. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence in the judgment.
In his dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that, because the funds were not “ear-marked” at payment, they were essentially general subsidies of public funds to religious institutions, which was precisely the type of entanglement between religion and the state that the First Amendment was enacted the prevent. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that government funds provided to religious institutions could incentivize such institutions to alter their missions and therefore act as a deterrent to the goals of the religious institution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Following his conviction for first-degree murder, and subsequent imposition of a death sentence, Roberts challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana's death penalty scheme. This scheme mandated the death penalty's imposition, regardless of any mercy recommendation, whenever the jury found that the defendant demonstrated a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while in the commission of at least one of five different narrowly defined types of homicide. The sentencing scheme also required juries, in all first-degree murder cases, to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second degree murder even if no evidence existed to support such verdicts.
This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Proffitt v. Florida , and Woodson v. North Carolina .


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. By mandating the death penalty's imposition for certain crimes, Louisiana's sentencing scheme fails to afford juries the constitutionally required opportunity to consider any mitigating factors presented either by the circumstances of the crime or the individual offender's character. The Supreme Court also held that by requiring jurors to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second-degree murder, even if no evidence exits to support such verdicts, Louisiana's sentencing scheme encourages them to disregard their oaths by recommending a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel that the death penalty is inappropriate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Michelin Tire Corporation (MTC) operated a warehouse in Gwinnett County, Georgia, in which products imported from France and Nova Scotia were stored for later distribution. The County levied a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on the goods (a percent of the property's value). MTC claimed that the contents of the warehouse were constitutionally free from state taxation because they were in their original containers. The county declared that the products were subject to the tax because they had been sorted and arranged for sale.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court affirmed the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court, finding the tax to be valid. The Court stated that the Framers of the Constitution had adopted the Import-Export Clause to give the federal government a source of revenue and the superior position to regulate such foreign trade. This was to overcome the problems under the Articles of Confederation where states lacked uniformity in import regulation, burdening inter-state trade. The property tax was consistent with the Import-Export Clause because it did not (1) interfere with the Federal Government's regulation of foreign commerce (2) deprive the Federal Government of its exclusive right to revenues from imposts and duties on imports (3) interfere with the free flow of goods between the states. It taxed the use of the property and was not based on the origin of the goods.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On August 17, 1972, a postal inspector received information from an informant that the respondent, Henry Ogle Watson, was in possession of stolen credit cards. The informant had provided the inspector with reliable information in the past, and, later that day, provided the inspector with a stolen card. The inspector asked the informant to arrange another meeting with Watson to deliver more stolen cards. At the meeting on August 23, when the informant gave the signal, officers revealed themselves and arrested Watson. The officers read Watson his Miranda warning and searched him but did not find the cards on his person. They asked to search his car, and Watson gave them permission. In the car, officers found two stolen cards. Watson was then charged with four counts of possessing stolen mail. Prior to the trial, Watson moved to suppress the cards by claiming his arrest was illegal because there was no warrant, and that the search of his car was involuntary because he was not informed that he could withhold consent. The motion was denied and Watson was convicted.
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the arrest was unconstitutional because the postal inspector had sufficient time to obtain a warrant but failed to do so. The Court of Appeals also held that the subsequent search was coerced and hence unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that postal inspectors have the power to execute an arrest without a warrant when there is probable cause. Congress has granted this power to several federal agencies, not just the postal service. Because Watson’s arrest was constitutional, the search of his car was not the product of an illegal arrest. The Court held that there was no evidence that Watson was coerced into agreeing to the car search.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote that there was established historical precedent for warrantless arrests. He also argued that interpreting the Fourth Amendment as always requiring a warrant prior to arrest would severely and negatively impact effective law enforcement. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the arrest occurred with probable cause, in broad daylight, in a public place and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment. He also held that the majority’s decision in this case does not set any precedent regarding under what circumstances an officer may make a warrantless arrest in a private place.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent and argued that the majority’s opinion grants police broad powers to make warrantless arrests and breaks with precedents already set regarding the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. He argued that the majority’s opinion goes beyond the bounds of the case in question and misinterprets common law history. He wrote that the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect people, not places, and that the interests of the people would be best served with a warrant requirement. The warrant requirement would not unduly burden the police because there is no reason to assume that it would cause any delay in an arrest, unless exigent circumstances are present, in which case the arrest may be made without a warrant. He also argued that the government did not meet its burden to show that Watson’s consent was not coerced. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.
Justice John Paul Stevens took no part in the discussion or decision in this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Mitch Miller was charged of carrying alcohol distilling equipment and whiskey on which liquor tax had not been paid. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) issued subpoenas to two of Miller's banks, The Citizens & Southern National Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank of Byron requesting records of Miller's accounts. The banks complied with the subpoenas, and the evidence was used during Miller's trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Miller was convicted and appealed his conviction alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in his favor.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that Miller had no right to privacy in his bank records. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell asserted that the "documents subpoenaed are not [Miller's] 'private papers'," but instead, part of the bank's business records. Consistent with Hoffa v. United States, Miller's rights were not violated when a third party - his bank - transmitted information that he had entrusted them with to the government.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Mary Alice Firestone filed for divorce from her husband, an heir to the Firestone Tires fortune. He counterclaimed alleging “extreme cruelty and adultery”. The court granted the divorce with an ambiguous decree that did not specify the grounds. Time Magazine printed an article reporting that Firestone’s extreme cruelty and adultery caused the divorce. Firestone requested a retraction, but Time refused. Firestone sued Time, Inc. for libel in Florida state court. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Firestone for $100,000. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-2 vote, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion vacating the lower judgment and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the actual malice standard for media reports on public figures did not apply. Firestone was not a public figure as defined by prior precedent. The Court also held the Florida judgment invalid because the court awarded damages without determining fault. Justice Lewis Powell wrote a concurrence, stating that the ultimate question is whether Time exercised reasonably prudent care in light of the ambiguous divorce decree. Justice Potter Steward joined in the concurrence


[Unknown Act > Facts]
George Eldridge, who had originally been deemed disabled due to chronic anxiety and back strain, was informed by letter that his disability status was ending and that his benefits would be terminated. Social Security Administration procedures provided for ample notification and an evidentiary hearing before a final determination was made, but Eldridge's benefits were cut off until that hearing could take place. Eldridge challenged the termination of his benefits without such a hearing.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an 6-to-2 decision, the Court held that the initial termination of Eldridge's benefits without a hearing did not violate due process. The Court noted that due process was "flexible" and called for "such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." The Court found that there were numerous safeguards to prevents errors in making decisions to terminate disability benefits and argued that "[a]t some point the benefit or an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society, in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In this complicated case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Acting on behalf of prescription drug consumers, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council challenged a Virginia statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for licensed pharmacists to advertise their prescription drug prices. On appeal from an adverse ruling by a three-judge District Court panel, the Supreme Court granted the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy review.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-to-1 opinion, the Court held that the First Amendment protects willing speakers and willing listeners equally. The Court noted that in cases of commercial speech, such as price advertising, freedom of speech protections apply just as they would to noncommercial speech. Even speech that is sold for profit, or involves financial solicitations, is protected. The Court concluded that although the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy has a legitimate interest in preserving professionalism among its members, it may not do so at the expense of public knowledge about lawful competitive pricing terms.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Massachusetts enacted a law specifying consent requirements for unmarried minors seeking abortions. William Baird, on behalf of an abortion counseling organization, Parents Aid Society, filed a class action under the Fourteenth Amendment challenging the statute against state Attorney General Frances Bellotti and all district attorneys within the state. Baird argued that the statute created a parental veto. Parental vetoes were ruled unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. The federal District Court struck down the law. Bellotti appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, contending that the District Court should have abstained until a decision on the statute by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court held that the District Court should have abstained and vacated the judgment. There was ambiguity in whether the Massachusetts statute created a "parental veto," which under Planned Parenthood v. Danforth affected the constitutionality of the statute. Since the Supreme Judicial Court's ruling would have resolved the ambiguity, the District Court should have abstained.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1968, Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc. (Brada Miller) agreed to lease a tractor and trailer operated by its employee-driver, H. L. Hardrick, to fellow licensed motor carrier Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. (Transamerican) for a shipment from Detroit, Michigan, to Kansas City, Missouri. The agreement stated that Transamerican assumed control and responsibility for the operation of the equipment during the lease and that Brada Miller agreed to indemnify Transamerican from any and all claims related to any negligence on the part of Brada Miller or its employees. On the way to Kansas City, the truck collided with another car in Illinois. The injured driver sued both Brada Miller and Transamerican in federal district court and alleged that the accident was caused by Hardrick’s negligence.
Transamerican settled with the driver for $80,000 and then sued Brada Miller seeking indemnification for the settlement amount and costs of litigation. The district court held that the indemnity clause was unenforceable because it was contrary to public policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Brada Miller. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed and held that the indemnification clause was an attempt to circumvent regulations promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that required carriers to exert actual control and responsibility over leased equipment and borrowed drivers.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the indemnification provision did not contravene ICC regulations designed to prevent motor carriers from sharing operating authority in order to evade safety requirements and limit each carrier’s liability to the public. The Court noted that the indemnity clause likely increases public safety as it holds the lessor accountable for its own negligence.
Justice William O. Douglas concurred in the judgment, but declined to write separately.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After the applications of two blacks were rejected by the District of Columbia Police Department, the two men filed suit against Mayor Walter E. Washington. The men alleged that the Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, discriminated against racial minorities. They claimed that the test was unrelated to job performance and excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the procedures and written personnel test did not constitute racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the Clause was designed to prevent official discrimination on the basis of race; laws or other official acts that had racially disproportionate impacts did not automatically become constitutional violations. The Court reasoned that the D.C. Police Department's procedures did not have discriminatory intent and were racially neutral measures of employment qualification.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Following his Florida conviction for first-degree murder and the imposition of the death penalty, Proffitt challenged the constitutionality of both his death sentence, alleging it was a "cruel and unusual" punishment, and Florida's capital-sentencing procedure, alleging is was arbitrary and capricious insofar as it permitted judges rather than juries to act as sole sentencing authorities.
This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Roberts v. Louisiana , and Woodson v. North Carolina .


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and no. The Court held that the death penalty was not a "cruel and unusual" punishment per se, and that Florida's capital-sentencing procedure was not unconstitutionally arbitrary and/or capricious. Although empowering trial judges with sole sentencing authority, the statutory procedure tightly prescribed their relevant decision-making process. The procedure requires sentencing judges to focus on both the crime's circumstances and the defendant's character by weighing eight statutory aggravating factors against seven statutory mitigating factors. Furthermore, sentencing judges are required to submit a written explanation of their death-sentence finding for the purpose of automatic review by Florida's Supreme Court. Such strict requirements sufficiently safeguard against the presence of any constitutional deficiencies arising from an arbitrary and/or capricious imposition of the death penalty.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Michael McCrary and Colin Gonzales were black children who were denied admission to Bobbe's School. Gonzales was also denied admission to Fairfax- Brewster School. McCrary and Gonzales's parents filed a class action against the schools, suspecting the denials were due to their children's race. A federal district court ruled for McCrary and Gonzales, finding that the school's admission policies were racially discriminatory. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and no. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held that Section 1981 prohibited the racially discriminatory policies of the schools. While the schools were private, Jones v. Alfred Meyer Co. held that Section 1981 applied to "purely private acts of racial discrimination." Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart described the school's admission policies as "classical violation[s] of Section 1981." While the Court acknowledged the right to free association of parents to send their children to schools that "promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable," it was not entitled the constitutional protection. Additionally, the Court cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters and the right of the State "reasonably to regulate all schools."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
American Mini Theaters opened two theaters that showed adult movies in the city of Detroit. Two city ordinances enacted in 1972 prohibited the opening of adult theaters within 1,000 feet of other buildings with "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of any residential district. American Mini sued city officials challenging the ordinances on two grounds: that the ordinances imposed an undue burden on First Amendment rights and that ordinances violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. A federal district court ruled in favor of the city, a decision that was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appeals court concluded that the ordinances posed a prior restraint based on content and that the ordinances ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and no. In a 5-4 opinion, the court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that Detroit's ordinances were reasonable, and although erotic material could not be completely suppressed, Detroit had adequate reasons to restrict the distribution of such material. Justice John Paul Stevens doubted that Voltaire's observation – "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" – applied to pornographic films. This prompted a stinging rebuke from Justice Potter Stewart who maintained that the free expression is neither defined nor circumscribed by popular opinion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Jules Hutton was a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informant that made the acquaintance of Charles Hampton. According to the government, Hampton told Hutton that he could acquire heroin and was willing to sell it. Hutton replied that he would find a buyer and orchestrate a sale. Hampton and Hutton arranged two appointments with DEA agents posing as buyers. At the second appointment, Hampton was arrested. According to Hampton, he was unaware that he was selling heroin. He claimed that Hutton provided him with the drugs and that Hutton had told him they were counterfeit. Since the government, through Hutton, had provided him with the drugs, he had been entrapped and was therefore not guilty. Hampton was convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, alleging entrapment and a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-3 decision, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. Writing for the majority, Justice William H. Rehnquist relied on the Court's earlier opinion in United States v. Russell in that the "defense of entrapment was not available where...a Government agent supplied a necessary ingredient in the manufacture of an illicit drug." While Hampton's case involved distribution and not manufacture, Hampton was still "predisposed to commit the crime." As opposed to the Government inducing Hampton to commit the crime, "the police, the Government informant, and [Hampton] acted in concert." Therefore, no violation of due process occurred.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The respondent, Donald Opperman, left his car unattended in a prohibited parking space in violation of local ordinances in Vermillion, South Dakota. He received two parking tickets from local police officers, and as a result, his vehicle was subsequently inspected and impounded. At the impound lot, a police officer observed personal items in the dashboard of the car and unlocked the door to inventory the items using standard procedures. In the unlocked glove compartment, the officer found marijuana in a plastic bag. Opperman was arrested later that day and charged with possession of marijuana. He was convicted but the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed on appeal and concluded the search was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Mr. Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger delivered opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that police can inventory a vehicle that has been lawfully impounded, even without a warrant. Inventory procedures for impounded vehicles are taken in order to protect the owner’s property and to protect police from claims of stolen items as well as potential danger. Therefore, the search of an impounded vehicle is considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Louis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion agreeing that the Constitution allows inventory searches, as long as the search is not done in order to find evidence that could lead to criminal charges.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, with whom Justice William J. Brennan Jr. and Justice Potter Stewart join, wrote a dissent arguing that the search of an automobile without a warrant clearly violates the Fourth Amendment. A routine inventory is no excuse to violate the privacy of the automobile’s owner.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Martinez-Fuerte and others were charged with transporting illegal Mexican aliens. They were stopped at a routine fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants on a major highway not far from the Mexican border.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, these routine stops with brief questioning do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing for the 7-to-2 majority, said: "The defendants note correctly that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.... But the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion."
Prepared by Michael Brandow.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder by a California court. Powell sought relief in federal district court by filing a writ of federal habeas corpus. Powell claimed that the search that uncovered the murder weapon was unlawful and that the evidence should have been inadmissible at trial. This case was decided together with Wolf v. Rice.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that where states had provided opportunities for full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, the Constitution did not require the granting of federal habeas corpus relief. The Court also held that any additional benefits from considering search and seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review would be small in relation to the costs. The Court found that the Fourth Amendment values protected by the exclusionary rule would not be significantly enhanced in such situations and that deterrence of police misconduct was unlikely to increase.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The state of North Carolina enacted legislation that made the death penalty mandatory for all convicted first-degree murderers. Consequently, when James Woodson was found guilty of such an offense, he was automatically sentenced to death. Woodson challenged the law, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Proffitt v. Florida , and Roberts v. Louisiana .


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the North Carolina law was unconstitutional. The Court found three problems with the law: First, the law "depart[ed] markedly from contemporary standards" concerning death sentences. The historical record indicated that the public had rejected mandatory death sentences. Second, the law provided no standards to guide juries in their exercise of "the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live and which shall die." Third, the statute failed to allow consideration of the character and record of individual defendants before inflicting the death penalty. The Court noted that "the fundamental respect for humanity" underlying the Eighth Amendment required such considerations.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After his conviction by a Texas trial court for murder and the imposition of the death penalty, Jurek challenged the constitutionality of both his death sentence, alleging it was a "cruel and unusual" punishment, and the state's capital-sentencing procedure, alleging it would result in arbitrary and "freakish" imposition of the death penalty.
This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Proffitt v. Florida , Roberts v. Louisiana , and Woodson v. North Carolina .


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court held that the death penalty was not per se a "cruel and unusual" punishment. Furthermore, the capital sentencing procedure in Texas was not unconstitutional on the theory that it would result in arbitrary and freakish impositions of the death penalty. While death penalty sentencing systems which permit juries to consider only aggravating, and no mitigating, circumstances are unconstitutional, Texas' sentencing system is not like this. Under its sentencing scheme, Texas juries may consider whatever evidence of mitigating circumstances there may be - thus allowing them to ponder not only why the death penalty should be imposed, but also why it should not. These options sufficiently focus the juries' attention on the defendant's unique circumstances and character, thus meeting constitutional requirements of particularity.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1961, Morris Hasson, a Los Angeles grocery store manager, was shot and killed during a robbery attempt. Paul Imbler was convicted of the murder after three eyewitnesses identified him as the gunman. After the trial, the prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Richard Pachtman, wrote to the Governor of California and described newly discovered evidence that undermined the testimony of one of the eyewitnesses. In light of the letter, Imbler challenged his incarceration in state court, where his petition was denied, and later in federal court. The federal district court found that Pachtman had knowingly used false testimony during the trial and suppressed evidence favorable to Imbler, so the district court ordered Imbler released from prison. Imbler then filed an action against Pachtman in federal court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows a party to recover damages from any person who acts “under color of state law” to deprive another of a constitutional right. The district court held that Pachtman was immune for civil liability for acts done in his capacity as prosecutor and dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that prosecutors have the same absolute immunity under Section 1983 that they had under common law in malicious prosecution suits. In both situations, there are similar public policy concerns related to the need for prosecutorial independence. The Court declined to consider whether a prosecutor was entitled to similar level of immunity for actions taken in the role of an administrator or investigator.
Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for the knowing or reckless presentation of false testimony, but that absolute immunity should not shield claims against a prosecutor for the unconstitutional suppression of evidence. Justice White argued that the denial of immunity would encourage prosecutors to turn over more information than necessary, which would be beneficial to the judicial process overall. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the opinion concurring in the judgment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Teachers at the Hortonville Joint School District went on strike when negotiations over employment contracts broke down. Wisconsin law prohibited strikes by public employees. The School District invited the teachers to return to work several times, and a few teachers accepted the offer. After about two weeks of striking, the school board set disciplinary hearings for the teachers who continued to strike. An attorney for the teachers indicated that the teachers wished to be treated as a group and argued that the school board was not sufficiently impartial to be able to exercise discipline over the teachers. The attorney argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required an independent, unbiased decision maker. The school board still voted to terminate the teachers, but invited them to reapply for their jobs. One teacher did so and returned to work. The remaining teachers were replaced.
The fired teachers sued the school district in Wisconsin state court alleging that their termination violated their due process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, holding that due process was not violated because the teachers admitted to being on strike in violation of state law after receiving adequate notice and a hearing. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Due Process Clause required the teachers' conduct and the school board’s decision to be evaluated by an impartial decision maker.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause did not guarantee the teachers an independent review of the decision to terminate them. The fact that the school district had negotiated with the teachers earlier and had knowledge of the events surrounding the strike did not make them incapable of giving the teachers due process.
Justice Potter Stewart dissented, arguing that the case should be remanded for a determination of whether the school board must consider the reasonableness of the strike considering its own actions, or whether it is free to exercise its discretion when deciding to terminated teachers. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Robert Murgia, although he was in excellent physical and mental health, was forced to retire at age fifty according to state law. Murgia had been a uniformed officer in the state police force. Murgia successfully challenged the mandatory retirement law in district court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the right of governmental employment was not per se fundamental, and that uniformed state police officers over 50 did not constitute a suspect class under the Clause. Applying a rational relationship test, the Court reasoned that the statute was sufficiently justified as a means of protecting the public "by assuring physical preparedness of [the] uniformed police." The Court noted that while the law may not have been the best means to accomplish this purpose, it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment merely because of its imperfections.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On April 8, 1971, Richard Mosley was arrested in Detroit in connection with robberies that had occurred at two local restaurants. Mosley was taken to police headquarters, where he was informed of his Miranda rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present. After Mosley signed the police department’s constitutional rights notification certificate, Detective James Cowie began to question Mosley, but he immediately stopped when Mosley said that he did not wish to speak about the robberies. A few hours later, Detective Hill brought Mosley out from his cell to question him about the recent murder of a man named Leroy Williams, and Mosley was again informed of his Miranda rights. At first Mosley denied any involvement, but after being informed that another man had named him as the shooter, he made statements implicating himself in the murder. During the second interrogation, he never asked for a lawyer or refused to answer questions. Mosley was subsequently charged with first-degree murder. Mosley moved to suppress his incriminating statement and argued that Detective Hill’s interrogation and eventual use of his incriminating comment violated his Miranda rights. The trial court denied his motion, and he was found guilty and given the mandatory sentence of life in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and held that the trial court’s failure to suppress Mosley’s statement was a per se violation of Mosley’s Miranda rights. The Michigan Supreme Court denied further review.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The re-initiation of interrogation after a suspect has invoked his right to silence is not a per se violation of Miranda rights, as long as the suspect’s invocation of his rights is honored. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the decision for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the Miranda rule, which requires an immediate cessation of questioning if the individual in custody wishes not to speak, does not clearly establish the circumstances under which questioning may be resumed. The Miranda rule could bar the police from questioning the individual again in regards to any subject, or it could require a complete break from any current questioning but allow for re-initiation of another round of questioning at a later time. The Court held that Miranda only required that the suspect’s right to refuse to answer questions be honored. In this case, the Court held that Mosley’s invocation of his right to silence had been honored because the interrogation ceased as soon as he stated he did not wish to continue, he was read his rights again before interrogation was re-initiated, and a significant amount of time passed between the two interrogations.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that, to keep from unnecessarily hindering the fact-finding process, only confessions made as “the result of involuntary waivers” of judgment should be excluded in regards to a trial.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority’s ruling degraded the protection of self-incrimination rights that the Miranda decision represented because it allowed for police officials to sidestep the Miranda protections. Justice Brennan also noted that individual states have the power to establish greater protections of the Miranda rights than those set by the majority opinion. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
General Electric Co. offered its employees a disability plan for non-occupational sicknesses and accidents, but the plan did not cover disabilities from pregnancy. The respondents, a class of female employees of General Electric Company, sued their employer for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the plan violated the Act, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that employers have the right to exclude any condition from a disability plan with a reasonable basis. The Court referred to a previous decision, Geduldig v. Aniello, which dealt with a similar case under the Equal Protection Clause. In that case, the Court held that the pregnancy exclusion divided the employees into two groups, one that was solely female and the other that contained both sexes, so the distinction is not primarily sex-based. The Court applied the same analysis to this case. Because the disability plan was not worth more to men than it was to women, it did not discriminate based on sex.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that this particular case had no impact on the general evidence necessary to prove a discrimination case under Title VII.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part where he argued that he agreed with the majority’s opinion on the merits of this case but did not agree in any inference that this case would affect overall Title VII decisions.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the majority examined the policy in isolation, when it should have considered the policy in light of General Electric Co.’s history of downgrading the role of women in the workforce. Under that framework, the policy was clearly not gender-neutral. He also argued that the political background for this issue indicated that pregnancy exclusions in disability pay drastically affected women’s abilities to remain in the workforce. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.
In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the Geduldig case should not be the basis for this decision, because the Equal Protection Clause did not contain the word “discrimination.” He found that the language of Title VII required a different analysis than the one the majority used.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Seven prisoners in the custody of the California Department of Corrections sued the United States District Court for the Northern District Court of California and alleged the manner in which the California Adult Authority determined the length and conditions of punishment for convicted criminal offenders violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants argued that two sets of documents, the Adult Authority files and the Prisoners’ files, which contained personal information, were irrelevant, confidential, and privileged information that should not be admissible into evidence. The district court ordered the production of the documents; however, the court limited the number of people associated with the prisoners who could examine those documents and only allowed access to the counsel and no more than two investigators designated by the counsel. The defendants filed a writ of mandamus requesting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacate the decision to compel discovery, but the appellate court denied the petition because the prisoners had no absolute privilege that would allow them to avoid production of the documents at issue. However, the petitioners were allowed to have their request for in camera review, or private review, considered.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that since less extreme alternatives for modification of the challenged discovery orders were available, the writ of mandamus was inappropriate. A writ of mandamus should only be issued in extraordinary circumstances when there are no other adequate means to secure relief. In this case, adequate alternatives existed, such as the prison officials’ opportunity to assert a separate privilege more specifically and have their request for in camera review considered.
Justice John Paul Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
About a year after the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, the State of Missouri passed a law regulating abortions in the state. Planned Parenthood of Missouri and two doctors who supervised abortions at Planned Parenthood sued to prevent enforcement of certain parts of the law. The challenged parts of the law: (1) define “viability” as the “stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support systems”; (2) require a women submitting to an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy to sign a consent form certifying that she was not coerced; (3) require written consent from the woman’s spouse during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless the abortion will save the mother’s life; (4)require parental consent if the woman is younger than 18; (5) require physicians to exercise professional care in preserving a fetus life or risk being charged with manslaughter; (6) declare an infant who survives an abortion attempt as a ward of the state, depriving mother and father of parental rights; (7) prohibit saline amniocenteses after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; and (8) require reporting and record keeping for facilities and physicians that perform abortions.
The district court upheld all of the provisions except 4, holding that it was overbroad because it did not exclude the stage of pregnancy before the fetus is viable. The Supreme Court head this case on direct appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes in part. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the majority opinion, reversing in part and remanding. The Court followed the three-trimester framework laid out in Roe v. Wade. The Supreme Court held that provisions 1, 2 and 8 were constitutional. Provisions 3 and 4 were unconstitutional because the state cannot delegate the authority to prevent an abortion to anyone but the physician and the woman during the first trimester of pregnancy. Provision 5 was unconstitutional because it required physicians to preserve the life of the fetus at any stage of pregnancy. Provision 7 was unconstitutional because it failed to regulate in reference to the mother’s health, and instead was designed to prohibit most abortions after 12 weeks. The Court refused to consider provision 6.
Justice Potter Stewart concurred, expressing that the mother’s consent provision was constitutional because not prevents a state from ensuring that the abortion decision is made knowingly and voluntarily. The parental consent provision was unconstitutional places a potential prohibition on abortion for women under 18. The spousal consent provision was also unconstitutional because the woman’s right to make the decision outweighed a father’s right to associate with his offspring. Justice Lewis F. Powell joined in the concurrence.
Justice Byron R. White concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the physician care provision was constitutional because the state can require a physician to preserve the life of a fetus once it is viable. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in Justice White’s opinion.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that prohibiting saline amniocenteses was unconstitutional because it essentially prohibited abortions after the first trimester. The parental consent provision was constitutional because the state has an interest in protecting the welfare of its young citizens.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Jurek v. Texas , Roberts v. Louisiana , Proffitt v. Florida , and Woodson v. North Carolina .


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A New Hampshire law required all noncommercial vehicles to bear license plates containing the state motto "Live Free or Die." George Maynard, a Jehovah's Witness, found the motto to be contrary to his religious and political beliefs and cut the words "or Die" off his plate. Maynard was convicted of violating the state law and was subsequently fined and given a jail sentence.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that New Hampshire could not constitutionally require citizens to display the state motto upon their vehicle license plates. The Court found that the statute in question effectively required individuals to "use their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message." The Court held that the State's interests in requiring the motto did not outweigh free speech principles under the First Amendment, including "the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster. . .an idea they find morally objectionable."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In _Milliken v. Bradley (1973) _, the Court ruled that an inter-district desegregation plan in the city of Detroit was impermissible and remanded the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court ordered remedial education programs be instituted within the Detroit school district, and that the State of Michigan would bear half the costs of the remedial programs. The state of Michigan challenged the District Court order, which was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court affirmed the District Court order, emphasizing "equitable principles" in the construction of desegregation plans set forth in Brown v. Board of Education (1955) _. The Court relied on _United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education in that "matters other than pupil assignment must on occasion be addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of prior segregation" and numerous lower court decisions providing for remedial programs. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger asserted that the District Court order "does no more than" what was accepted in Ex Parte Young. The burden to eliminate the effects of segregation rested on state officials, consistent with Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Board of Education. Therefore, the District Court's order did not violate the Eleventh Amendment. Justice Thurgood Marshall authored a concurring opinion. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. concurred in the judgment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Richard M. Nixon resigned as President of the United States on August 9, 1974, leaving in government custody approximately 42 million pages of documents, 880 reels of tape recordings of conversations, and other materials. Soon after, Nixon executed a depository agreement with the Administrator of General Services Administration providing for the storage of these materials near Nixon’s California home; this agreement also specified that certain of the materials would be destroyed at Nixon’s discretion.
Shortly after this agreement was publicized, the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act became law. The act directed the Administrator to take custody of Nixon’s presidential materials, assign government archivists to screen materials for items that were personal or private in nature, preserve materials with historical value, and make materials available for use in judicial proceedings. The act also directed the Administrator to promulgate regulations allowing eventual public access to the materials.
The day after President Ford signed the act into law, Nixon challenged its constitutionality in district court, claiming that it violated 1) the principle of separation of powers, 2) Nixon’s presidential privilege, 3) Nixon’s privacy interests, 4) Nixon’s First Amendment associational rights, and 5) the bill of attainder clause. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the act. The district court dismissed Nixon’s compliant, holding that his constitutional challenges were without merit.