[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
"
No, no, no, no, and no. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that the act did not violate any of Nixon’s relevant constitutional rights. Justice Brennan first determined that the district court correctly limited the scope of its review to the constitutional consequences of the archival screenings because the Administrator had not yet promulgated any regulations.
Justice Brennan rejected Nixon’s claim that the act violated the constitutional separation of powers, focusing on whether the act prevented the executive branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. He noted that the act placed custody of the materials in officials also of the executive branch, and that the materials could only be released if that action was not barred by some applicable executive privilege.
Justice Brennan rejected Nixon’s claim that presidential privilege barred archival scrutiny of the materials. He noted that presidential immunity was generally qualified, and that the screening constituted a very limited intrusion by executive branch personnel into executive matters. Moreover, the intrusion was justified by a clear public interest in preserving materials for legitimate historical and governmental purposes.
Justice Brennan held that the act did not violate Nixon’s right to privacy. He weighed the potential intrusion into Nixon’s privacy against the public interest in subjecting the materials to archival screening. He noted that only a small fraction of the materials in question related to personal matters, and that the act provided procedures for the expressed purpose of minimizing intrusions into Nixon’s private and personal matters.
Justice Brennan held that the act did not violate Nixon’s right to associational privacy under the First Amendment. He acknowledged that Nixon as President was the head of the national Republican Party and that the First Amendment closely protects involvement in partisan polities. Here, however, archival screening was apparently the least restrictive means of meeting the compelling government interests promoted by the act.
Finally, Justice Brennan rejected Nixon’s argument that the act was a bill of attainder that legislatively determined guilt and inflicted punishment on Nixon without provision of the protections of a judicial trial. He concluded that the act did not impose any punishment traditionally judged to be prohibited by the bill of attainder clause, that the act was justified by Nixon’s plan to eventually destroy some of the materials, and that the legislative history did not indicate an intent to punish Nixon.
Justice Byron White concurred in part and in the judgment. With respect to the bill of attainder issue, Justice White argued that it was sufficient to demonstrate that the act did not impose any punishment on Nixon. He questioned the majority’s assumption that the government’s interest in historical preservation could be important enough in itself to entitle it to Nixon’s private communications.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred. He outlined the history of bill of attainders, pointing out that they were generally directed at formerly powerful political actors. Here, however, the facts provided a legitimate justification for the specificity of the act.
Justice Harry Blackmun concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He described his posture as essentially similar to that of Justice Louis Powell, but did not share his view that the President Carter’s agreement with the position of the Administrator was dispositive of the separation-of-powers issue.
Justice Louis Powell concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Powell emphasized the uniqueness of the situation leading to the act’s signing, and the importance of safeguarding the materials. Regarding the separation of powers issue, Justice Powell considered it dispositive that President Carter represented through his Solicitor General that the act serves the executive.
Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented. He argued that the act was an unconstitutional congressional violation of separation of powers. He highlighted the historical importance of presidential freedom from control or coercion by Congress, and characterized the act as an attempt by Congress to exercise the executive power to control executive materials, some of which were confidential.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
andtheimportanceofsafeguardingthematerials.Regardingtheseparationofpowersissue,JusticePowellconsidereditdispositivethatPresidentCarterrepresentedthroughhisSolicitorGeneralthattheactservestheexecutive.ChiefJusticeWarrenBurgerdissented.Hearguedthattheactwasanunconstitutionalcongressionalviolationofseparationofpowers.HehighlightedthehistoricalimportanceofpresidentialfreedomfromcontrolorcoercionbyCongress,andcharacterizedtheactasanattemptbyCongresstoexercisetheexecutivepowertocontrolexecutivematerials,someofwhichwereconfidential.
Justice William Rehnquist dissented, characterizing the question as whether congress has the right to seize the official papers of an outgoing president as he is leaving the inaugural stand. He emphasized the importance of candid and open discourse in the executive branch and the potential effect of the act on the free flow of information to and from the President. He rejected the majority’s balancing of the violation of separation of powers against the public interests allegedly furthered by the act.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
East Cleveland's housing ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. Part of the ordinance was a strict definition of "family" which excluded Mrs. Inez Moore who lived with her son and two grandsons.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The four justices in the plurality held that the ordinance violated Moore's rights as it constituted "intrusive regulation of the family" without accruing some tangible state interest. Justice Stevens joined in the judgment and argued that the ordinance was invalid because, by regulating who could live with Moore, it constituted a taking of property without just compensation.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On February 18, 1974, three enrolled Couer d’Alene Indians—William Davison, Gabriel Francis Antelope, and Leonard Davison—broke into the home of 81-year-old Emma Johnson, robbed her, and killed her. Because the crimes were committed on an Indian reservation, the three were subject to federal prosecution under the Major Crimes Act. They were indicted by a grand jury and tried for burglary, robbery, and murder. Leonard Davison and Antelope were found guilty on all three charges, and William Davison was found guilty of second-degree murder.
The defendants appealed and argued that their convictions under federal law were the result of unlawful racial discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions and held that the defendants were placed at a “racially based disadvantage.”


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the law and the courts have treated American Indian tribes as unique entities, and this treatment has been upheld against claims of racial discrimination. The Court also held that Congress has the authority to legislate over reservation territory, and as long as the Congressional legislation is fair, it does not violate Equal Protection to try individuals under the federal laws rather than the state.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The North Carolina Department of Correction (“DoC”) had custody of approximately 10,000 prisoners housed in 80 prison units in 67 different counties. The only unit having a writ room and some semblance of a legal library was the Central Prison in Raleigh. Robert Smith, Donald W. Morgan, and John Harrington were all inmates in the DoC’s custody. In consolidated cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the state of North Carolina failed to provide its prisoners with proper legal facilities. They argued that this violated their right of access to the courts guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, ordering the responsible state officials to submit a proposed plan to provide library facilities for the use of indigent prisoners seeking to file pro se habeas or civil rights actions, or to provide some acceptable substitute. The court suggested that the state could fulfill its obligations by making legal counsel or assistance available, but did not mandate this approach. In response, the state proposed to construct seven new law libraries within the prison system, to expand the facilities at Central Prison, and to provide all inmates with access to these libraries upon request.
The plaintiffs protested that the plan was inadequate, but the court rejected their objections. It held that North Carolina was not constitutionally required to provide legal assistance as well as libraries. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but held that the plan failed to provide female prisoners with the same access as male prisoners.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the constitution required the North Carolina Department of Correction to provide prisoners with legal assistance as part of prisoners’ right of access to the courts. Justice Marshall emphasized that prisoners have a well-established right of adequate, effective and meaningful access to the courts. He wrote that this access generally required states to shoulder affirmative obligations to provide meaningful access, including paying for trial counsel for indigent clients.
Justice Marshall acknowledged that habeas corpus and civil rights complaints only needed to set forth facts giving rise to the complaint, but rejected North Carolina’s argument that law libraries or legal assistance were not essential to frame those complaints. A typical client would expect any lawyer preparing either complaint to research the law to determine whether an actionable claim existed. Justice Marshall rejected the state’s argument that inmates were ill-equipped to use the tools of the trade of the legal profession.
Justice Marshall also rejected North Carolina’s interpretation of Ross v. Moffitt, where the Court held that prisoners’ right to appointed counsel in appeals to criminal cases was limited. Here, the Court was concerned with prisoners seeking new trials, release from confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights. Justice Marshall noted that adequate law libraries were only one constitutionally acceptable method of assuring meaningful access to the courts. Finally, he rejected the state’s argument that the district court exceeded its powers by ordering North Carolina to devise a remedy for the violation.
Justice Louis Powell concurred, emphasizing that the majority’s holding did not pass on the kinds of claims that state or federal courts were constitutionally required to hear.
Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented. He could not determine the source of the constitutional right of access to the courts, or of the requirement that the states foot the bill for assuring that access for prisoners. Chief Justice Burger noted that the right of prisoners to collaterally attack convictions was derived from federal statutes and not from the constitution itself.
Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger. He characterized the majority’s opinion as a reiteration of the reasoning in Younger v. Gilmore, where the Court also failed to identify a constitutional source for prisoners’ right of access to the courts. He emphasized that lawful imprisonment properly resulted in a retraction of prisoners' rights.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Dianne Rawlinson applied to be a prison guard with the Alabama Department of Corrections. The Department had a minimum height and weight requirement of 120 pounds and 5 feet 2 inches. Rawlinson did not meet the minimum weight requirement, so the Department refused to hire her. Rawlinson sued on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated women under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination. While this suit was pending, the Alabama Board of Corrections adopted a rule banning women from working in “contact positions” that require close physical proximity to inmates. Rawlinson amended her complaint to challenge the new rule as well. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of Rawlinson. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, No. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion affirming in part and reversing in part. The Supreme Court held that the height and weight requirements violated Title VII because Rawlinson showed that the requirement excluded 41% of females in the nation, and the Department was unable to show that the requirement was job-related. The “contact position” ban was a bona fide occupational qualification, however, so Title VII did not prohibit it. The Court held that having women in these positions would create substantial security and safety problems. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, agreeing that the “contact position” ban relates to a bona fide occupational qualification, but stating that the district court should have analyzed the height and weight requirement in more depth. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a partial dissent, agreeing that the height and weight requirements violated Title VII, but expressing that the ban on women in “contact positions” is also prohibited. Justice William J. Brennan joined in the concurrence. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that showing that the general height and weight statistics do not establish a valid case. Rawlinson also hadn’t proved she was denied employment under the “contact position” rule because she didn’t meet the height and weight requirement in the first place.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A St. Louis policy prohibited non-therapeutic abortions in the city's two publicly run hospitals.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court held that St. Louis could enact a "policy choice" to refuse to provide publicly financed hospitals for nontherapeutic abortions even though it provided facilities for childbirth. Relying on its reasoning in Maher v. Roe (1977), the Court distinguished between a state interfering with a protected activity and simply encouraging an alternative activity. Since the state did not deny women the right to have an abortion, the law was consistent with the Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A New Jersey statute prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste into the state, except for garbage for swine feed. The City of Philadelphia challenged the statute, alleging it was unconstitutional under the Commerce clause of Article I and pre-empted by the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the statute. Congress then passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Perhaps and not addressed. In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that the pre-emption question "should be resolved before the constitutional issue." Since that question "depends primarily on statutory and not constitutional interpretation" of the 1976 Act, the case was remanded to the New Jersey Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1974, Erlich Anthony Coker, serving a number of sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault, escaped from prison. He broke into a Georgia couple's home, raped the woman and stole the family's car. The woman was released shortly thereafter, without further injuries. The Georgia courts sentenced Coker to death on the rape charge.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the death penalty was a "grossly disproportionate" punishment for the crime of rape. The Court noted that nearly all states at that time declined to impose such a harsh penalty, with Georgia being the only state that authorized death for the rape of an adult woman. Because rape did not involve the taking of another human life, the Court found the death penalty excessive "in its severity and revocability."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In regulating the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of Arizona restricted advertising by attorneys. Bates was a partner in a law firm which sought to provide low-cost legal services to people of moderate income who did not qualify for public legal aid. Bates and his firm would only accept routine legal matters (many of which did not involve litigation) and depended on a large number of patrons given the low financial return from each client. In assessing their concept of legal services, Bates's firm decided that it would be necessary to advertise its availability and low fees.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court found that the rule violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Blackmun argued that commercial speech does merit First Amendment protection given the important functions it serves in society, such as providing consumers with information about services and products, and helping to allocate resources in the American system of free-enterprise. The Court held that allowing attorneys to advertise would not harm the legal profession or the administration of justice, and, in fact, would supply consumers with valuable information about the availability and cost of legal services.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In the wake of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion opponents turned to state and local legislators in an effort to curb the practice of abortion. This case involved a Pennsylvania law which restricted Medicaid-funded abortions only to indigent women in situations in which a doctor determined the procedure was medically necessary.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court held that states could exclude nontherapeutic abortions from coverage under their Medicaid programs. Justice Powell argued that in its provisions, Title XIX of the Social Security Act made no specific reference to abortion nor did it require states to fund every medical procedure which could possibly fall under its umbrella. Powell made clear however that the federal statute did give states the option to fund therapeutic abortions if they chose to do so.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted a regulation that required all apples shipped into the state in closed containers to display the USDA grade or nothing at all. Washington State growers (whose standards are higher than the USDA) challenged the regulation as an unreasonable burden to interstate commerce. North Carolina stated it was a valid exercise of its police powers to create "uniformity" to protect its citizenry from "fraud and deception."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court voted unanimously that the North Carolina regulation was an unconstitutional exercise of the state's power over interstate commerce. Although the regulation was facially neutral, it had a discriminatory impact on the Washington growers while shielding the local growers from the same burden. The regulation removed the competitive advantage gained by the Washington apples from stricter inspection standards. The regulation produced a leveling effect that works to the local advantage by "downgrading" apples from other states unjustly. Therefore, the regulation places an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The U.S. Attorney General sued Hazelwood School District, alleging a “pattern or practice” of discrimination against African Americans in hiring teachers. This violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The government provided statistical evidence of the number of African American teachers hired. The district court entered summary judgment for Hazelwood, finding that the government’s evidence did not establish a pattern or practice of discrimination. The court compared the number of African American teachers hired to the number of African American students in the school district. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the proper statistical comparison is between the number of African American teachers on staff and the number of qualified African American individuals in the relevant labor market. The relevant labor market included St. Louis and the county where Hazelwood was located.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, yes. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for an 8-1 majority, vacated the Eighth Circuit judgment. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals used the correct statistical comparison, but erred in determining the relevant labor market. The court of appeals also failed to consider that Hazelwood may have been able to rebut some of the statistics with evidence of its hiring practices post Title VII. The Court remanded the case for further consideration of the relevant labor market. Justice William J. Brennan concurred, stating that the case was properly remanded so the parties could address the statistical data with more care. Justice Byron R. White also concurred, writing that the government should have produced evidence of the racial makeup of Hazelwood’s applicant pool to compare with the racial makeup of those hired.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that the government proved discrimination through statistical data, historical evidence, and evidence relating to specific acts. The school district failed to rebut that proof.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1962, GTE Sylvania Incorporated (Sylvania) enacted a plan that limited the number of franchises in any given geographical area to which they would sell televisions. Three years later, Sylvania franchised a San Francisco area company, Young Brothers, which was located only one mile from one of their existing franchises, Continental T.V., Inc. (Continental). Continental protested that the Young Brothers franchise violated Sylvania’s new location restrictions. When Sylvania ignored their protests, Continental tried to acquire more Sylvania televisions to sell in a new retail location in Sacramento. Sylvania already had retailers near Continental’s new Sacramento location and declined to supply them with more televisions, so Continental withheld payments they owed Sylvania under an existing franchise agreement.
Continental sued in district court and alleged that Sylvania’s franchise agreements, which placed location-based restrictions on the sale of their products, violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Sherman Act). A jury found that Sylvania’s location restrictions violated the per se rule established in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co. that prohibited manufacturers from “restrict[ing] and confin[ing] areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.” Sylvania appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which declined to apply the per se rule. Instead, the appellate court distinguished this case from Schwinn, applied a reasonableness rule, and held that Sylvania’s restrictions “had less potential for competitive harm than” other invalidated restrictions.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the per se rule established in Schwinn applied to this case. However, the Court found that the Schwinn rule was outdated and overbroad; therefore, the Court overturned the rule in favor of a reasonableness standard. That standard considered whether the franchise agreement was an unreasonable restriction of competition and whether it had any redeeming virtue. The Court ruled that the appellate court properly applied this reasonableness rule and upheld Sylvania’s restrictions.
Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment but arguing that the Court should not have gone as far as to overturn the per se rule.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented and argued that the Court should not have overturned the per se rule and should have rejected Sylvania’s restrictions.
Justice William H. Rehnquist did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Robert Williams escaped from a mental hospital and lived at the Des Moines YMCA. Soon thereafter, a 10-year-old girl disappeared from the YMCA while at her brother’s wrestling match. A boy in the parking lot saw Williams carrying a large bundle to his car with two “skinny and white” legs in it. The next day, police found Williams’ abandoned car about 160 miles east of Des Moines. Williams soon turned himself in to police in Davenport, Iowa. Williams said he would tell police the whole story once he saw his lawyer in Des Moines. Williams spoke with a local attorney and reiterated his intention to confess when he saw his attorney in Des Moines. Davenport police promised not to question Williams during the drive to Des Moines. During the drive, however, the detective, knowing that Williams was deeply religious, told Williams that the girl’s family wanted to give her a “Christian burial” and suggested that they stop to locate the body. As a result of the officer's pointed statements, Williams made incriminating statements and ultimately led police to the girl’s body. He was indicted for first-degree murder.
At trial, Williams moved to suppress all evidence relating to the car ride conversation, arguing that the questioning violated Williams’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The judge denied the motion, and a jury found Williams guilty. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Williams petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The court granted the writ, finding that speaking to Williams during the drive violated his right to counsel, and the evidence in question was wrongly admitted at trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion, affirming the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held police denied Williams his Sixth Amendment rights because the adversary proceeding had already began. The detective’s statements eliciting incriminating statements amounted to an interrogation, entitling Williams to counsel. The Court also held that Williams had not waived his right to counsel.
Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred, writing that the detective who gave the "Christian burial" speech knowingly set out to violate Williams’ constitutional rights. The nature of the crime was not an excuse for the detective’s behavior. Justice Lewis F. Powell also concurred, stating that the record clearly showed that Williams had not waived his rights. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, expressing that the state had promised not to question Williams before he reached Des Moines, and the state could not dishonor that promise made to Williams’ lawyer.
:
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, writing that Williams validly waived his right to counsel, and even if he had not, the disclosures he made were voluntary and uncoerced. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the record showed Williams knowingly and intentionally waived his rights. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a separate dissent, stating that there was no interrogation, and he would remand the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the Williams made the incriminating statements voluntarily. Justices Byron R. White and William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Hugo Zacchini performed a "human cannonball" act, in which he was shot from a cannon into a net 200 feet away. A free-lance reporter for Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. recorded the performance in its entirety without consent and it aired on the nightly news. Subsequently, Zacchini sued Scripps-Howard, alleging the unlawful appropriation of his professional property. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in favor of Scripps-Howard. While recognizing that Zacchini had a cause of action for the infringement of his state-law right to publicity, the court found that Scripps-Howard was constitutionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for some nonprivileged purpose.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Byron R. White, the Court held that Scripps-Howard's constitutionally privileged free speech did not extend to broadcasting Zacchini's entire performance without his permission. Noting that Zacchini's interest in the case was similar to a patent or copyright, in which he was seeking to obtain the benefit of his work, the Court emphasized that the broadcast of an entire act was categorically different from reporting on an event in so far as it posed a substantial threat to the economic value of the performance. "Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent," wrote Justice White. Justice Louis F. Powell, Jr., joined by Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall, dissented, arguing that the recording was genuinely treated as news and as such Scripps-Howard was constitutionally privileged. Justice John Paul Stevens also dissented.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In the wake of Roe v. Wade, the Connecticut Welfare Department issued regulations limiting state Medicaid benefits for first-trimester abortions to those that were "medically necessary." An indigent woman ("Susan Roe") challenged the regulations and sued Edward Maher, the Commissioner of Social Services in Connecticut.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Connecticut law placed no obstacles in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion, and that it did not "impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe." The Court noted that there was a distinction between direct state interference with a protected activity and "state encouragement of alternative activity consonant with legislative policy." Holding that financial need alone did not identify a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court found that the law was "rationally related" to a legitimate state interest and survived scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On March 6, 1975, federal prosecutors indicted Eugene Lovasco for the possession of stolen firearms and for dealing in firearms without a license. The indictment alleged that Lovasco committed the offenses between July 25 and August 31, 1973—more than 18 months before the prosecutors filed the indictment. Lovasco moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the delay was unnecessary and prejudicial to his defense, as two of his witnesses had died in the interim. The district court found that the government had collected all of the necessary information to indict Lovasco within a month of the alleged commission of crimes and granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies only after a person has been accused of a crime and that the pre-indictment delay did not deprive Lovasco of due process, though the lapse of time somewhat prejudiced his defense. The Court held that the deaths of the witnesses did not outweigh the government’s interest in fully investigating crimes before bringing charges against the accused.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court should have accepted the lower court’s finding that the delay was unnecessary and unreasonable rather than accept as fact the government’s unsworn statements that the delay was due to good-faith investigative efforts.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1972, the state legislature enacted the New York State Controlled Substances Act. The Act required doctors to fill out forms for potentially harmful prescription drugs. The prescribing doctor kept one copy, while another copy was sent to the dispensing pharmacy and a third copy was sent to the state department of health. The forms included personal information such as the patient's name, address, and age.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court held that the requirements of the Act did not on its face violate a "constitutionally protected 'zone of privacy.'" The Court found that the statutory scheme evidenced "a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy" and that the "remote possibility" of potential abuses of data accumulation and disclosure were not sufficient to establish an invasion of any rights or liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Complete Auto Transit was a Michigan corporation doing business in Mississippi. Complete shipped cars into the state where they were distributed for sale. Mississippi imposed a tax on transportation companies for the "privilege of doing business" in the state. The tax was applied equally to businesses involved in intra-and interstate commerce.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
A unanimous Court found the tax valid. Businesses involved in interstate commerce should assume a just share of the state tax burden. The Court's decision established four criteria to be met for a state tax to be valid and not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. The tax must be (1) on an activity connected to the state, (2) fairly apportioned to be based on intrastate commerce, (3) nondiscriminatory, and (4) related to state services provided. These criteria are only valid if Congress has not imposed conflicting regulations.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Act), which gave the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power to enact regulations to limit the amount of pollution that manufacturing plants could discharge. In exercising that power, the Administrator of the EPA created groups made up of similar plants and prescribed a specific pollution limitation to each of the different groups. These regulations granted existing plants some leeway for complying with the prescribed pollution limit. Petitioners, eight inorganic chemical manufacturing plants, sued the EPA in district court and alleged that it had overstepped its statutory authority by promulgating regulations organized by categories, instead of issuing specific pollution limits for each plant. Petitioners also argued that the EPA regulations for plants that had not yet been built violated the provisions of the Act because they did not allow for any variance from the prescribed limit. The district court found that the Act gave appellate courts jurisdiction to review pollution regulations and removed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court rejected petitioners’ arguments regarding the categorical limits but held that the EPA must provide new plants the same variance allowances with which the existing plants were provided.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, yes, yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the language of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act unambiguously allowed the EPA to enact regulations creating categorical limits on pollution, while allowing existing plants to vary slightly from the prescribed limit. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the EPA must create a limit for each individual plant via a permit system because such a system would impose a heavy burden on the EPA to be intimately familiar with the circumstances of more than 42,000 manufacturing plants. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellate court had jurisdiction to review the pollution restrictions as a whole and was not limited to reviewing only the individual variance allowed for each plant. Although the restrictions for existing plants allowed for variance from the prescribed pollution limit, the Court held that the language of the Act showed a clear congressional intention to charge the EPA with setting absolute prohibitions on pollution. Therefore, the EPA could set exacting pollution standards for newly constructed plants that did not allow for any variance.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. took no part in the consideration of these cases.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On October 1, 1970, Assistant Principal Solomon Barnes applied corporal punishment to Roosevelt Andrews and fifteen other boys in a restroom at Charles R. Drew Junior High School. A teacher had accused Andrews of tardiness, but Andrews claimed he still had two minutes to get to class when he was seized. When Andrews resisted paddling, Barnes struck him on the arm, back, and across the neck.
On October 6, 1970, Principal Willie J. Wright removed James Ingraham and several other disruptive students to his office, where he paddled eight to ten of them. When Ingraham refused to assume a paddling position, Wright called on Barnes and Assistant Principal Lemmie Deliford to hold Ingraham in a prone position while Wright administered twenty blows. Ingraham’s mother later took him to a hospital for treatment, where he was prescribed cold compresses, laxatives and pain-killing pills for a hematoma.
Ingraham and Andrews filed a complaint against Wright, Deliford, Barnes and Edwart L. Whigham, the superintendant of the Dade County School System; the complaint alleged the deprivation of constitutional rights and damages from the administration of corporal punishment. They also filed a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all students in the Dade County schools. At the close of Ingraham and Andrews’ case, the defendants successfully moved to dismiss the third count because the plaintiffs showed no right to relief. The court also ruled that the evidence for the first two counts was insufficient to go to a jury. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed. The Fifth Circuit held that the punishment of Ingraham and Andrews was so severe that it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments and that the school’s corporal punishment policy failed to satisfy due process. Upon rehearing, the en banc court rejected this conclusion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It held that due process did not require that students receive notice or an opportunity to be heard and that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not forbid corporal punishment in schools.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and no. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Lewis Powell, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not prevent corporal punishment in public schools. While acknowledging the general abandonment of corporal punishment as a means of punishing criminals, Justice Powell looked to the common law history of similar punishment in schools and discerned no trend towards its elimination. Rather, common law suggested that teachers could legally impose reasonable, non-excessive force on their students. He also noted that the Court previously limited the application of the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” language to criminal punishment. Justice Powell reasoned that Ingraham and Andrews had less need for similar Eighth Amendment protection because they attended an open institution subject to more public scrutiny.
Justice Powell also held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of procedural due process was satisfied by Florida law. Florida recognized students’ common law right to be free from excessive corporal punishment in school, mandating that teachers and administrators exercise prudence and restraint in administering physical punishment. Unreasonable or excessive punishment could result in criminal or civil liability for the responsible teacher or administrator.
Justice Byron White dissented, joined by Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens. Justice White rejected the majority’s holding and reasoned that if some types of extreme corporal punishment violate the Eighth Amendment when used against criminals, similar punishment cannot be imposed on students for obviously lesser infractions.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Leon Goldfarb was a widower who applied for survivor's benefits under the Social Security Act. Even though his wife Hannah had paid Social Security taxes for 25 years, his application was denied. To be eligible for benefits under 42 U.S.C. Section 402, he must have been receiving half his support from his wife at her time of death. Section 402 did not impose this requirement on widows whose husbands had recently passed away. Goldfarb challenged this statute under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The District Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the District Court in holding the statute unconstitutional. Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. described this situation as "indistinguishable" from the one in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, where a similar statute was invalidated. In this case, a female worker's family was less protected than the family of a male worker. The court rejected the "archaic and overbroad" generalizations that a wife is more likely to be dependent on her husband than a husband on his wife. These "old notions" of gender roles were not sufficient to justify the different treatment of widows and widowers, and which was therefore in violation of the Due Process Clause.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, while allowing legitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from either their mothers or fathers, allowed illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers. Consequently, Deta Trimble, the illegitimate daughter of Sherman Gordon, was unable to inherit her father's estate when he died intestate. After losing her challenge to Section 12 in the Illinois Supreme Court, Trimble appealed to the Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Section 12 was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Applying the "rational relationship" test under the Clause, the Court emphasized that such a standard was not a "toothless" one. The Court then rejected the argument "that a State may attempt to influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships." The Court also noted that it was likely that Trimble would have inherited a substantial part of Gordon's estate had he written a will before his death.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC) contracted with the Village of Arlington Heights ("Arlington") to build racially integrated low-and moderate-income housing. When MHDC applied for the necessary zoning permits, authorizing a switch from a single-to a multiple-family classification, Arlington's planning commission denied the request. Acting on behalf of itself and several minority members, MHDC challenged Arlington's denial as racially discriminatory. On appeal from an adverse district court decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted Arlington certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Perhaps. After finding that MHDC had proper federal standing, since it acted on behalf of black plaintiffs who stood to suffer direct and measurable injuries from Arlington's denial, the Court held that it failed to establish Arlington's racially discriminatory intent or purpose. While indicating that Arlington's zoning denial may result in a racially disproportionate impact, the evidence did not show that this was Arlington's deliberate intention. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further consideration.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Congress provided in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act that reapportionment plans of several states were to be submitted to the U.S. attorney general or the District Court of the District of Columbia for approval. Several districts in New York were restructured to create districts with a minimum nonwhite majority of 65 percent. A Hasidic Jewish community was split in two by the reapportionment. The community claimed that the plan violated their constitutional rights because the districts had been assigned solely on a racial basis.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court found that the reapportionment plan was valid under the Constitution. Neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment prohibit per se use of racial factors in districting and apportionment. Also, a reapportionment plan does not violate the same Amendments by using numerical quotas to establish a certain number of black majority districts. Although New York deliberately increased nonwhite majorities in several districts, there was no "fencing out" of the white population in the county from electoral participation. The reapportionment did not underrepresent the whites relative to their share of the population. The Court found that New York could use apportionment plans to attempt to prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted at the expense of the white populations.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1971, Wesley Ward was charged with selling two sadomasochistic publications at his store in violation of the Illinois obscenity statute. The statute defined material as obscene if its predominant appeal was “a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion” and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters. Ward waived his right to a jury trial, and was found guilty based on the two publications and the testimony of the police officer who purchased them at the store. Ward was sentenced to one day in jail and a $200 fine. While Ward’s appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. California, which confirmed that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment, but acknowledging that official regulation should only cover “works which depict or describe sexual conduct” and such conduct must be specifically defined in the applicable law. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Ward’s conviction. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the publications were obscene and the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the Illinois statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ward because an earlier Illinois Supreme Court decision made it clear that the statute reached sadomasochistic materials. Sadomasochistic materials could be prohibited under a state obscenity statute, even though they were not in the examples of sexually explicit representations made in the Miller decision, because those examples were not intended to be an exhaustive list. The Illinois statute was not overbroad because previous Illinois Supreme Court decisions provided guidelines in line with Miller.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr dissented, arguing that the Illinois statute was overbroad and unconstitutional on its face. Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens also dissented, writing that the majority opinion abandoned the specificity prong of the Miller test. Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In the spring of 1972, Ernest Dobbert’s son was found wandering outside a Holiday Inn in Jacksonville, Florida, with apparent signs of a beating. He told a circuit court judge that his injuries were the result of beatings from his father, that his brother and one of his sisters had been killed by his father, and that his other sister was kept locked in a closet at home. The judge issued a warrant for Dobbert’s arrest, and Dobbert fled Jacksonville. In October 1973, Dobbert was arrested in Texas and extradited to Florida for trial. The Florida death penalty law in place when the children were killed, which gave the jury ultimate authority in deciding to impose the penalty, was found unconstitutional before Dobbert’s trial. It was replaced by a new law where the jury gave an advisory recommendation, but the judge made the ultimate decision.
Before his trial, Dobbert applied to the Supreme Court of Florida for a constitutional stay of trial, arguing that applying the new death penalty law violated the ex post facto and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. His application was denied. Dobbert also moved for a change of venue from Duval County based on the publicity his trial was receiving. The trial judge took the motion under advisement and later denied it. Dobbert was convicted of the first-degree murder of his daughter, second-degree murder of his son, and the torture and abuse of his two other children. At his sentencing hearing, the jury recommended life imprisonment, but the trial judge, acting under the authority granted to him by the Florida statute governing the death penalty, overruled the jury and sentenced Dobbert to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, despite the fact that the Florida laws governing the death penalty changed during the time period the crimes in question were committed, the changes were procedural and better for the sentencing system. The Court also held that Florida’s previous death penalty statutes, although found unconstitutional before Dobbert’s trial, served as a warning to Dobbert’s that Florida could impose the death penalty. Additionally, Dobbert failed to provide evidence that his trial was affected by the trial judge’s dismissal of his motion for a change in venue.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a concurring opinion and argued that the changes in the Florida death penalty statutes altered the system in favor of defendants, and therefore Dobbert’s constitutional rights were not violated.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment that violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment in all circumstances. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. In a separate dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that, since the previous Florida death penalty statutes were found to be constitutionally invalid, they cannot be considered a fair warning. He also argued that Dobbert would not have faced the death penalty if tried slightly earlier, and it showed “capricious action” on the part of the government to subject him to the death penalty. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
New York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The repeal violated the Constitution. Justice Blackmun argued that the states could have implemented a less drastic solution to encourage people to use commuter train services in lieu of driving their cars. (State leaders thought the increase in bridge fares that would occur with the agreement's repeal would cause this to occur.) Furthermore, since the need to facilitate mass transportation in the New York metropolitan area had been a concern long before 1962, the states could not justify their action as a response to unforeseen circumstances.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
J. W. Gamble was a prisoner in the Huntington Unit of the Texas prison system, also known as the “Walls Unit.” On November 9, 1973, a 600-pound bale of cotton fell on Gamble while he was working in a textile mill during a work assignment in Huntsville, Texas. He continued to work for several hours, but later became stiff and requested a pass to the unit hospital. The hospital gave Gamble a checkup for a hernia and sent him back to his cell, but later his pain became so intense that he was forced to return to the hospital. A nurse gave Gamble two pain pills, and a hospital doctor later examined him but gave him no further treatment. On November 10th, a different doctor examined Gamble, prescribed him painkillers and placed Gamble on a cell-pass cell-feed routine that mostly confined him to his cell.
That same doctor later took Gamble off the cell-pass cell-feed routine, concluding that he was able to engage in light work. The prison administrative office soon placed Gamble in “administrative segregation” -- essentially solitary confinement -- for refusing to work. Gamble remained in solitary confinement through January of the next year, although he complained that his back pain was as intense as on the first day he was injured. On December 6, a different doctor examined Gamble and diagnosed him with high blood pressure; the previous doctor never detected this condition. Gamble refused to work several more times over the next few months, and was repeatedly disciplined for doing so. When Gamble began experiencing pain in his chest on a regular basis, he was hospitalized and treated, but the prison denied him later requests for treatment. In all, medical personnel treated Gamble seventeen times.
On February 11, 1974, Gamble signed a pro se complaint alleging that the prison subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth. The district court dismissed Gamble’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed, noting that the prison failed to diagnose Gamble’s back injury by giving him an X-ray, that the prison provided no real treatment for Gamble’s back injury, and that Gamble was essentially placed in solitary confinement due to substandard medical care.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and yes. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the prison’s treatment of Gamble did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Justice Marshall acknowledged that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required the Texas government to provide medical care for prisoners; he also determined, however, that a negligent or inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care did not constitute medical mistreatment under the Constitution.
Justice Marshall then considered whether Gamble’s complaint stated a claim, construing the pleadings of his inartfully written pro se complaint liberally. He focused on the fact that medical personnel treated Gamble on seventeen occasions in a three-month period. Justice Marshall argued that the form of medical treatment was a classic example of a matter for medical judgment; as a consequence, the doctor’s decision not to order an X-ray or provide additional medication did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Thus, the Fifth Circuit erred in reversing the district court’s dismissal of Gamble’s claim.
Justice Harry Blackmun concurred in the Court’s judgment.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that Court should have asked whether it could say with assurance and beyond any doubt that no set of facts could be proved that would entitle Gamble to relief. He questioned the Court’s decision to grant certiorari, noting that any constitutional questions presented by Gamble’s case were already resolved by other circuit courts. Finally, Justice Stevens argued that the majority improperly considered the defendants’ subjective motivations in determining whether or not their actions were crude or unusual.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
An undercover police officer bought drugs from a narcotics vendor. The officer saw the vendor up close for several minutes. The officer described the vendor to another officer who obtained a photograph of Nowell A. Brathwaite and gave it to the first officer. The officer identified the Brathwaite as the narcotics vendor. At trial, the photograph was admitted as evidence and the officer again identified Brathwaite as the vendor. A jury convicted Brathwaite of possession and sale of heroin. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed. Brathwaite then filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus in district court. The district court dismissed the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the officer’s identification was unreliable and the method of identification from a single photograph was unnecessarily suggestive.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that a suggestive identification procedure does not automatically require excluding the evidence if the identification is reliable, considering the totality of the circumstances. With the circumstances in this case, the identification was reliable. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred, writing that rules to protect against convictions based on unreliable identifications are better developed by the legislative process.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing for a per se exclusionary rule for unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and Carolyn Whitener, a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case.
In striking down the Oklahoma law, the Court established a new standard for review in gender discrimination cases. More demanding than the lowest standard for review -- rational basis -- but less demanding than the highest standard -- strict scrutiny, the majority articulated an in-between standard -- intermediate scrutiny.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Fred Doyle was a certified teacher and employee of the Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education from 1966 until 1971. In 1969, he was elected president of the Teachers’ Association during a period of tension between the board and the Teacher’s Association. Doyle was also involved with a series of incidents beginning in 1970 where he allegedly behaved inappropriately toward students and other staff members; in one incident, Doyle made obscene gestures to two students. Finally, in February 1971, Doyle conveyed the substance of an internal memorandum regarding a proposed staff dress code to a disc jockey at WSAI, a Cincinnati radio station. The disc jockey promptly announced the dress code as a news item.
One month later, the superintendent of the school district recommended that the board not renew Doyle’s contract, along with the contracts of nine other teachers. The board adopted the superintendent’s recommendations. In response to Doyle’s request for an explanation, the board stated that Doyle displayed a “lack of tact in handling professional matters,” and cited both the call to the disc jockey and the obscene gestures Doyle made toward students. Doyle brought a § 1331 federal question action against the board for reinstatement with damages, claiming that the board’s refusal to rehire him violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
While the district court found that all of the incidents occurred, it held that Doyle was still entitled to reinstatement with backpay. The court concluded that Doyle’s call to the radio station was protected by the First Amendment and that the call played a substantial part in the board’s decision not to rehire Doyle, a violation of Doyle’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit affirmed in a short per curiam opinion.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and no. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist held that the school district was not entitled to sovereign immunity, which generally extended to the states themselves and to state officials in their official capacities. He reasoned that the board was more akin to a municipal corporation, given its independent power to issue bonds and levy taxes.
While acknowledging that Doyle’s claims were not defeated by the fact that he lacked tenure and that his call to the station was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the board’s consideration of the call in itself violated Doyle’s rights. He questioned the “substantial part” rule used by the district court, expressing concern that it might prevent employers from properly and thoroughly assessing employees’ performance when employers are aware of protected conduct. Instead, Justice Rehnquist held that the district court should have also determined whether the board showed by a preponderance of evidence that it would have reached the same decision if it had not considered Doyle’s phone call to the radio station.
Finally, although the school district argued that it was not a “person” for purposes of a § 1983 claim, Justice Rehnquist declined to answer whether Doyle’s § 1331 federal question claim was limited by the terms of § 1983. He noted that Doyle demonstrated a proper federal question and claimed more than $10,000 in damages, given the potential value of his reinstatement.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1971 Ora Spitler McFarlin presented a petition for sterilization of her mildly mentally disabled daughter, Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman, to Judge Harold D. Stump. Judge Stump concluded sterilization was in Sparkman’s best interests due to her mental capabilities and approved the petition. The operation was performed, although Sparkman was unaware of the true nature of the surgery. Two years later, after Sparkman married, she discovered that the sterilization explained her inability to become pregnant. Sparkman sued Judge Stump for violating her right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that although the approval of the petition by Judge Stump was erroneous, he had jurisdiction to consider the petition and was entitled to judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment and concluded that Judge Stump did not have jurisdiction to approve the petition and that he did not have judicial immunity.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the law vested the district court judge with the power to entertain and act upon the petition for sterilization, and he is therefore immune from damages liability even if his approval of the petition was in error. The Court held that a judge could only be deprived of immunity when he acted in clear absence of jurisdiction. In this case, the court had general jurisdiction over the petition for sterilization, therefore, Judge Stump’s approval was a judicial act, and he was immunized from liability.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, in which he argued that the scope of judicial immunity was a limited liability for judicial acts. Because approval of a petition for sterilization is not a function normally performed by a judge, it is not a judicial act. In a separate dissent, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. argued that a judicial officer acted in a manner that precluded all resort to appellate or other judicial remedies and that the judge should not be entitled to immunity.
Justice William J. Brennan Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The National Bank of Boston, along with two other national banks and three corporations, wished to spend money to publicize their opposition to a ballot initiative that would permit Massachusetts to implement a graduated income tax. The Attorney General of Massachusetts informed the organizations that he intended to enforce a state statute that prohibited such organizations from making contributions to influence the outcome of a vote that does not materially affect their assets and holdings. The organizations sued and argued that the statute violated their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the constitutionality of the statute.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the right to attempt to influence the outcomes of elections is one of the primary rights the First Amendment was meant to protect. If this form of speech came from a person rather than a corporation, there would be no question about whether it was protected speech. The Court also held that its previous decisions regarding the First Amendment rights of corporations emphasized the role that such speech played in creating public discussion.
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that the Massachusetts risked stifling the speech of organizations who use the corporate form to ensure mass communication with the public. He also argued that the statute could easily interfere with the First Amendment protection of the freedom of speech, since many newspapers and other news sources are part of large media conglomerations.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the majority’s opinion vastly underestimates the importance of state regulation of competing First Amendment interests, especially given the disproportionate economic power of corporations. Since corporations are funded by the money of investors, Justice White argued that it was the state’s duty to ensure that shareholder money was being used for its primary purpose: to make money, not pursue unrelated political objectives. The statute ensured that shareholders’ money is not funding political initiatives they would not individually support. He pointed out that the statute did not prevent the individuals who make up the corporations from communicating their views to the public on an individual basis.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that corporations are, and had always been, considered artificial persons under the law, and therefore not granted the rights of natural persons. Since the right of political expression is not necessary for a corporation to function economically and could be detrimental to the overall political sphere, he argued that the statute was justified.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Edna Smith Primus was a practicing attorney who worked for a private law firm and was also affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a non-profit organization. She received no compensation for her work with ACLU. In her capacity as a lawyer at the private firm, Primus discovered women were being sterilized. Primus spoke to a group of the sterilized women to advise them of their legal rights and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit. One of these women, Mary Etta Williams, decided she wanted to sue her doctor over her sterilization. Primus then informed Williams through a letter of the ACLU’s offer of free legal representation. Shortly after, Williams visited the doctor who sterilized her, signed a release of liability, and notified Primus she no longer intended to sue.
A few months later, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Board) filed a complaint that charged Primus with solicitation in violation of the Canons of Ethics, a code of professional conduct for lawyers. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in accordance with the Board’s panel recommendation, found Primus in violation of regulations regarding solicitation. Primus appealed and argued that the disciplinary action violated the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that South Carolina’s application of disciplinary action for the attorney’s solicitation activity violated the First Amendment’s protection of political expression and association as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, Primus’ actions were an expression of the political beliefs and civil liberty objectives of the ACLU, rather than actions personal financial gain. Therefore, reaching out to the sterilization victim was not a misrepresentation or invasion of privacy.
Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the states should decide which lawyers shall be admitted to or released from the Bar, and that the disciplinary action in this case does not violate the Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On October 28, 1974, Officer Barry Headricks of the Tucson Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad allegedly arranged to purchase a quantity of heroin from Rufus Mincey. Later, Officer Headricks knocked on the door of Mincey's apartment, accompanied by nine other plainclothes officers. Mincey’s acquaintance, John Hodgman, opened the door. Officer Headricks slipped inside and quickly went to the bedroom. As the other officers entered the apartment -- despite Hodgman’s attempts to stop them -- the sound of gunfire came from the bedroom. Officer Headricks emerged from the bedroom and collapsed on the floor; he died a few hours later.
The other officers found Mincey lying on the floor of his bedroom, wounded and semiconscious, then quickly searched the apartment for other injured persons. Mincey suffered damage to his sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of his right leg; a doctor described him as depressed almost to the point of being comatose. A detective interrogated him for several hours at the hospital, ignoring Mincey’s repeated requests for counsel. In addition, soon after the shooting, two homicide detectives arrived at the apartment and took charge of the investigation. Their search lasted for four days, during which officers searched, photographed and diagrammed the entire apartment. They did not, however, obtain a warrant.
The state charged Mincey with murder, assault, and three counts of narcotics offenses. Much of the prosecution’s evidence was the product of the extensive search of Mincey’s apartment. Mincey contended at trial that this evidence was unconstitutionally taken without a warrant and that his statements were inadmissible because they were not made voluntarily. In a preliminary hearing, the court found that Mincey made the statements voluntarily. Mincey’s motion to suppress evidence taken from his apartment was also denied, and he was convicted on all charges. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was constitutional because it was a search of a murder scene, and that Mincey’s statements were admissible for impeachment purposes, reversing the murder and assault charges on other grounds.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and yes. In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that the extensive, warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was unreasonable and unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Stewart wrote that warrantless searches were per se unreasonable with a few specific exceptions, and rejected Arizona’s argument that the search of a homicide scene was one of these exceptions.
Justice Stewart rejected Arizona’s contention that Mincey forfeited his right to privacy in his home by shooting Officer Headricks. He pointed out that this argument assumed Mincey’s guilt, also writing that the fact of Mincey’s arrest did not remove his right to privacy in his home. Justice Stewart also rejected Arizona’s argument that the search of the homicide scene was justified by emergency circumstances or by vital public interest in prompt investigation of the scene. He wrote that there were no exigent circumstances allowing the search, and held that the seriousness of the alleged crime did not create those circumstances.
Justice Stewart also held that Mincey’s statements were inadmissible because they were not made voluntarily. He looked to the circumstances, focusing on Mincey’s physical state during Detective Hust’s interrogation. Mincey was in the intensive care unit, barely conscious, heavily encumbered by medical equipment, and completely at Detective Hust’s mercy. Justice Stewart also focused on Mincey’s repeated statements that he did not want to speak without a lawyer.
Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred, joined by Justice William Brennan. Justice Marshall emphasized the practical difficulties created by denying petitioners a federal habeas remedy for Fourth Amendment violations arising out of state criminal convictions.
Justice William Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that the warrantless search was unconstitutional, but argued that the majority failed to defer to the trial court’s determination that Mincey’s statements were voluntary.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Roger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor, fathered a child. A court ordered him to pay child support. Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. His application was denied by County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a state statute on the ground that Redhail owed more than $3,700 in child support.. Redhail filed a class action in federal district court against Zablocki and all Wisconsin county clerks. The court ruled in Redhail's favor. Zablocki appealed to the United States Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court held that Wisconsin's statute violated the Equal Protection Clause and reaffirmed that marriage was a fundamental right. In the majority opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court emphasized marriage as part of the right to privacy found in the Fourteenth Amendment as identified in Griswold v. Connecticut. While the state has an interest in ensuring that child support obligations were fulfilled, this statute only regulated those who wished to be married and did not justify the restriction on the right to marriage as found in Loving v. Virginia.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1972, the Alaska Legislature passed the Local Hire Under State Leases Act which required "all oil and gas leases [and other activities related to this industry] to which the state is a party" include provisions for the preferential hiring of Alaska residents over non-residents. To administer the law, residents were issued residency cards which they were to present to potential employers when seeking jobs. Hicklin and others did not qualify for employment under the Alaska residency standard.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The unanimous Court held that the Alaska Local Hire Act violated the Constitution. Citing past decisions of the Court, Justice Brennan argued that the Alaska law did not meet the strict standard of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, namely, that discrimination against non-citizens of a state is only allowed when those non-citizens "constitute a peculiar source of evil at which the statute is aimed." Since no evidence indicated that non-residents were the major cause of state unemployment or any other evil, there was no justification for the law.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Paul Lewis Hayes was charged with forgery, an offense which carried a two-to-ten-year prison sentence. During plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered to pursue a five year sentence if Hayes would plead guilty. However, the prosecutor also stated that he would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Crime Act if the defendant did not register this plea. (Hayes had two prior felony convictions on his record.) If found guilty under this law, Hayes would be imprisoned for life. Hayes did not plead guilty and the prosecutor followed through on his promise.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court held that the defendant's due process rights were not violated in this case. Justice Stewart spent some time describing the important role that plea bargaining plays in the nation's legal system, a role that has been accepted by the Supreme Court in cases such as Blackledge v. Allison (1977) and Brady v. United States (1970). This acceptance, in turn, implies that the prosecutor has a legitimate interest in persuading a defendant to relinquish his or her right to plead not guilty. Threatening a stiffer sentence is permissible and part of "any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas," Stewart declared.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York, sued their employers for depriving them of their constitutional rights. The employers required pregnant women to take unpaid leaves of absence before there was any medical reason to do so. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the forced leaves of absence in the future, as well as back pay for those that had already occurred.
The district court found that such policies were unconstitutional but held that the city had immunity from paying the back wages. The district court also held that the motion for an injunction was moot because the organizations removed the policy in the intervening time. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and specifically the Sherman Amendment, indicated that municipalities could be liable for the infringement of constitutional rights. Additionally, by 1871 there was a clear legislative and precedent-based history for municipal corporations — such as a school board — to be considered a “person” for the purpose of lawsuits and liability. The Court held that this liability only existed when the constitutional infringement was the direct result of an official policy.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that the Court’s decision to overrule Monroe v. Pape was an unusual but crucial one. The Court was able to rely on the precedents that established the liability of school boards for suits dealing with civil rights issues such as segregation. Given these precedents, the decision in this case allowed the Court to correct an error and create a more consistent stance on municipal liability.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the sections of the Court’s opinion that explain the decision and not in those that serve purely as background.
Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that there were too many precedents that supported the immunity of municipalities to summarily dismiss with this decision. Since this decision represents such a huge departure from the previous understanding of municipal immunity under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Court should require evidence “beyond doubt” that the previous decision was incorrect. The majority based its decision primarily on the debate surrounding a rejected amendment to the Act, which he argued is not strong enough evidence to overrule Monroe v. Pape. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
During school hours on January 23, 1974, the principal of the Chicago Vocational High School saw Jarius Piphus, then a freshman, standing on school property sharing an irregularly shaped cigarette with another student. The principal saw a pack of the cigarettes change hands and believed he smelled marijuana. When the principal approached, the students immediately discarded the cigarette. The students were suspended for the customary 20 days for violation of the school drug policy, despite their protests that they had not been smoking marijuana. A few days later, Piphus, his mother and sister, school officials, and representatives from a legal aid clinic met to discuss the suspension, not to determine whether or not Piphus had violated the school drug policy. Piphus and his mother sued the school official in federal district court for violating Piphus’ Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $3000 in damages.
On September 11, 1973, Silas Brisco, a sixth grader at Clara Barton Elementary School in Chicago, received a 20-day suspension for wearing an earring to school in violation of school policy. The previous year, the school principal had enacted a policy banning earrings, as he believed they were associated with gang affiliation. When asked to remove the earring, Brisco refused and stated it was a symbol of black pride. Brisco and his mother sued the school officials in federal district court for violating Brisco’s right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and $5000 in damages.
The two cases were consolidated for trial and the district court held that their suspensions violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that the schools were not entitled to immunity, but the court did not award damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to reconsider questions of relief and damages.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is to compensate people for injuries caused by the deprivation of civil rights, which means that compensation cannot occur without proof of injury. However, the definition of injury must be adapted to fit the civil rights in question. The Court held that due process could cause distress even when conducted properly, so there must be evidence of an actual injury to justify compensation. The Court also held that proof of actual injury was not required to award nominal damages not to exceed one dollar.
Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the result.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A Landmark Communications newspaper, The Virginian Pilot, published an article regarding the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's investigation into a state judge. The article, which was accurate, violated a Virginia law that prohibited the release of information from Commission hearings. Landmark was indicted by a grand jury, had its motion to dismiss denied by the trial court, convicted without a jury trial and fined. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Landmark's conviction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Court ruled 7-0 reversing the Supreme Court of Virginia. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger authored the majority opinion. Speaking for six members of the Court, Burger recognized the need for confidentiality in the Commission's proceedings. However, the disclosure of information from the Commission hearing by the Pilot served a public interest consistent with New York Times v. Sullivan. Therefore, the state interest did not "justify encroaching on First Amendment guarantees" in the form of the criminal punishment. Justice Potter Stewart wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
During a Writers Guild of America strike, certain supervisor union-member employees continued to work as representatives for collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustments for their employers, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. These union members undertook no writing functions, as the writing contract was the basis for the strike. The union charged those members for violating several strike rules for crossing the picket line, issued threats to get them to stop working and imposed hefty penalties. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the National Labor Relations Act (Act) protected the actions of the union members and that the union violated the Act by disciplining members. The Board ordered the union to cease and desist its actions against said members. The Administrative Law Judge held that unions cannot discipline a representative responsible for collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment during a strike. Respondents applied to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review, and the Board applied to enforce its order. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s ruling that only supervisory tasks were undertaken and denied enforcement of the Board’s order.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, if the sanctions imposed may adversely affect the supervisor’s performance of his collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment tasks and coerce or restrain the employer. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Act may intrude upon the union’s right to resort to sanctions to effectuate a strike, but it provides for a level playing field for both negotiators during a strike..The Court also held that no writing-related work was undertaken, so the union had violated the Act by disciplining the union members in question.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he argued that barring a union from imposing sanctions against members weakens a collective strike and upsets the balance between labor and management in management’s favor. Therefore, the majority’s opinion is inconsistent with the structure of the Act. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On January 21, 1970, Tyler’s Auction, a furniture store in Oakland County, Michigan, caught fire shortly before midnight. The building was leased to Loren Tyler, who ran the business with Robert Tompkins. When Fire Chief See arrived on the scene, he was informed that two plastic containers of flammable liquid were found in the building. After determining that arson possibly caused the fire, See called Police Detective Webb. Webb arrived and took pictures, but the smoke and steam forced him to postpone his investigation. Around 4 a.m., the fire was extinguished and the personnel left the premises. The containers were turned over to Webb. Webb did not have a warrant for any of the entries into the building or the removal of the containers.
The next morning, See returned to the scene with Assistant Chief Somerville, whose job was to determine the “origin of all fires that occur in the Township.” They conducted a cursory examination and left. An hour later, Somerville returned with Webb, and the two discovered evidence of arson. The men did not have warrants for these entrances or seizures of evidence. Over the course of multiple visits beginning on February 16, Sergeant Hoffman of the Michigan State Police Arson Section conducted an investigation and secured further evidence of arson that played an important role in the trial.
At trial, the respondents objected to the introduction of this evidence, but the judge admitted it, and they were convicted. The Court of Appeals of the State of Michigan held that the constitutional protections against illegal searches and seizures did not pertain to arson investigations of burned premises and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the illegal searches and seizures had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that any search for administrative purposes, such as to find evidence of a crime, requires a warrant. There are circumstances that require law enforcement agents to act without a warrant, such as when firemen enter a burning building. Once in the building for that purpose, the firemen may seize evidence of arson that is in plain view without obtaining a warrant. The Court also held that determining the cause of the fire is part of a fireman’s job, so firemen may remain in a building without a warrant after a fire has been extinguished for “a reasonable amount of time” to investigate. The Court held that the initial entry and the investigation on the following morning were constitutional, but the subsequent entries and seizures of evidence were not.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the Court’s finding that the entries of February 16 and beyond were illegal searches, but disagreed with the Court on the meaning of the Warrant Clause. He argued that a warrant is necessary when there is probable cause and the search must be unannounced to be effective. If there is no reason for such a confrontation, the Warrant Clause requires that the property owner be given fair warning of the search.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the Court applied the “reasonable amount of time” criterion too broadly in this case. He argued that there was no reason to consider the reentry of the premises the following morning a continuation of the original warrantless entry. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion.
Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that reasonable searches of commercial premises do not require a warrant. The record showed that Tyler did not object to the searches as they were occurring, and therefore obviously considered them reasonable. Since Tyler no longer used the building after the fire, providing him fair notice would not have served a purpose either.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Following a failed attempt by the Department of Agriculture to revoke or suspend his commodity futures commission company's registration, Arthur Economou sought damages against Earl Butz and several other federal administrative officials for wrongful initiation of administrative proceedings. On appeal from an adverse district court finding of absolute immunity for state officials, the New York Court of Appeals reversed as it found that federal administrators were only entitled to qualified immunity. Butz appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 4-to-5 opinion, the Court began by noting that absent exceptional circumstances federal executive officials are only entitled to qualified immunity, since such officials must abide by constitutional and statutory scope-of-power limitations. Federal officials who perform adjudicatory, or other similar prosecutorial functions, cannot, however, be held liable for mere "good faith" judgment errors. The Court reasoned that the risk of making unconstitutional determinations is outweighed by the need to preserve independent judgement, through grants of absolute immunity to judges and other similarly situated decision makers. The Court concluded that the similarity between the type of decision-making required of federal prosecutors and other administrative agents is sufficiently strong to warrant an extension of absolute immunity to the latter for decisions made in the course of their official conduct.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Maryland observed oil producer-operated stations receiving favorable rates from producers and refiners. In response, Maryland passed a statute prohibiting oil producers or refiners from operating gasoline stations within the state and requiring producers and refiners extend temporary price cuts to the stations they supplied. Exxon challenged the statute in Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, which ruled the statute invalid. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the ruling.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and no. In a 7-1 decision, the Court affirmed the Maryland Court of Appeals. Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens cited Ferguson v. Skrupa establishing that the purpose of the judiciary is not to "weigh the wisdom of legislation," and therefore did not concern due process. Additionally, since all gasoline sold in Maryland came from out-of-state refineries, Maryland's statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The court acknowledged that while the price-cut provision conflicted with the purposes of the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts, the hypothetical situations of price discrimination presented were "speculative" and insufficient to invalidate the act. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not take part in consideration or decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Edmund Foley applied for a position as a New York state trooper. Although Foley was a legally admitted resident alien, state officials refused to permit him to take the examination. New York authorities relied on a statute providing that "no person shall be appointed to the. . .state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United States."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the states had an "historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions" and that the New York statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Noting that states need only to show some rational relationship between a valid state interest and a classification involving aliens, the Court held that the police function was "one of the basic functions of government" and thereby the province of actual United States citizens.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Ballew was found in violation of a misdemeanor for exhibiting an obscene motion picture film. In the Criminal Court of Fulton County, a jury of five persons was selected and sworn to hear the case.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Court found that a trial by jury of less than six members violated the accused's right to a trial by jury as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Blackmun reasoned that small juries foster poor group deliberation. Group memory of the details of testimony, the ease with which group compromises can be made, and the desire of the group to be self-critical and reflective are all hindered as the size of the jury decreases. Blackmun also relied on statistical studies to claim that the risk of jury error increased with smaller juries.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1967, Congress appropriated funds to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to build the Tellico Dam. In 1973 Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which protected certain species classified as “endangered”. The Secretary of the Interior declared the Snail Darter endangered. The area of the Tellico Dam was its “critical habitat”. Although the multi-million dollar project was almost completed, the project predated the ESA, and Congress continued to appropriate funds to the project after the ESA passed, Hiram Hill sued to enjoin the completion of the Dam in order to protect the Snail Darter. He argued that completing and opening the dam would violate the ESA by causing the extinction of the snail darter. The district court refused to grant the injunction and dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to issue a permanent injunction against any activities that would modify or destroy the Snail Darter’s critical habitat.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the majority opinion affirming the injunction. The Supreme Court held that Congress’ continued appropriation of funds did not imply that the Dam project was exempt from the ESA. The operation of the Tellico Dam would wipe out the Snail Darter's habitat, so an injunction was the proper remedy. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissent, stating that the ESA does not apply to any project that is completed or substantially completed when the threat to the endangered species arose. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent, arguing that the ESA did not prohibit the district court from refusing to grant an injunction.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1970, Congress imposed an annual registration tax on all civil aircraft that fly in the navigable airspace of the United States. The state of Massachusetts owned and utilized a helicopter for the purpose of patrolling highways and fulfilling other police duties. When Massachusetts refused to pay the tax, the federal government collected it from the state's accounts, plus interest and penalties. Massachusetts then sought a refund of the money collected.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court held that so long as charges did not discriminate against state functions, were based on fair approximations of uses of the system of navigable airspace, and were structured to produce revenues that did not exceed the total cost of the benefits to be supplied to national airsystem, there could be no basis for claims that the National Government was "using its taxing powers to control, unduly interfere with, or destroy" Massachusetts' ability to perform "essential services." The Court emphasized its reluctance to enlarge the scope of state immunity from federal taxation.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Several faculty members of the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School expressed dissatisfaction with the clinical performance of Charlotte Horowitz, a medical student. The Council of Evaluation (Council), a faculty-student body that recommends various actions including probation and dismissal, recommended Horowitz only advanceto her last year on a probationary status. In the middle of the following academic year, the Council concluded that Horowitz should not be considered for graduation at the end of the year and would be dropped as a student unless the Council saw a radical improvement. Horowitz failed to show improvement, her surgery rotations rated “low satisfactory,” and the Council recommended dismissal from the university. A committee composed solely of faculty members and the Dean, the final decision-makers, approved the decision. Horowitz sued and claimed that the procedure leading to her dismissal violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court concluded that Horowitz had been afforded all the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision by holding that Horowitz had not been afforded procedural due process prior.