[Unknown Act > Facts]
Wayne Thomas Carter, Melvin Johns, and Kimberly Thompson were arrested after a police officer observed them through a window bagging cocaine in Thompson's apartment. During the trial in Minnesota state court, the defendants moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence. They argued the officer's initial observation was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Subsequently, they were all convicted on state drug charges. The Minnesota trial court held that because they were not overnight social guests they were not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the court held that the officer's window-based observation was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the state intermediate appellate court held Carter did not have standing for an objection to the officer's action because his use of the apartment for drug purposes removed any legitimate expectation of privacy. The court also affirmed Johns' conviction . The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. It held that the defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place and that the officer's observation constituted an unreasonable search. Minnesota sought a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court held, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, that people who visit someone's home for a short time do not have the same protection against unreasonable police searches and seizures as do the residents or their overnight guests. Short-term visits for commercial transactions are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that nothing in the case served to show that Carter was accepted into the household.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., an investment fund, purchased approximately $75 million in unsecured notes (Notes) from Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A., (GMD) a Mexican holding company involved in a tool road construction program sponsored by the Government of Mexico. Four GMD subsidiaries guaranteed the Notes. After GMD fell into financial trouble and missed an interest payment on the Notes, Alliance accelerated the Notes' principal amount and filed suit for the amount due in Federal District Court. Alliance requested a preliminary injunction restraining GMD from transferring its assets alleging that GMD was at risk of insolvency, or already insolvent, that it was preferring its Mexican creditors by its planned allocation to them of its most valuable assets, and that these actions would frustrate any judgment that Alliance could obtain. Alliance sought monetary damages and no lien or equitable interest was claimed. The District Court issued the preliminary injunction and ordered GMD to post a $50,000 bond. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court lacked the authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing defendants being sued by creditors from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of the creditor's contract claim for monetary damages because such a remedy was historically unavailable from a court of equity. Allowing federal courts to grant creditors such injunctions "could radically alter the balance between debtors' and creditors' rights," Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, and "might induce creditors to engage in a race to the courthouse...which might prove financially fatal to the struggling debtor."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
This case is the second tier of a patent infringement action. College Savings Bank, a New Jersey chartered bank, markets and sells certificates of deposit designed to finance college costs. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity, administers a tuition prepayment program. In addition to its original patent infringement action, College Savings filed an action alleging that Florida Prepaid violated section 43 of the Lanham Act by making misstatements about its tuition savings plans in its brochures and annual reports. The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) subjects states to suits brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for false and misleading advertising. The District Court granted Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The court rejected arguments from College Savings and the United States that Florida Prepaid had waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in interstate marketing and administration of its program after the TRCA made clear that such activity would subject it to suit; and that Congress's abrogation of sovereign immunity in the TRCA was effective, since it was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "the federal courts are without jurisdiction to entertain this suit against an arm of the State of Florida." Justice Scalia concluded that "the sovereign immunity of the State of Florida was neither validly abrogated by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the State's activities in interstate commerce." Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Stephen G. Breyer expressed the view that Congress possesses the authority to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity where necessary and proper to the exercise of a congressional power under the Constitution's Article I. Justice John Paul Stevens filed his own dissenting opinion and joined that of Justice Breyer.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Mary Forsyth, the beneficiary of a group health insurance policy issued by Humana Health Insurance of Nevada, Inc., received medical care at a hospital owned by Humana Inc. Humana Insurance agreed to pay 80 percent of Forsyth's hospital charges over a designated deductible. Forsyth bore responsibility for the remaining 20 percent of the charges. Forsyth complained that the hospital gave Human Insurance large discounts on their portion of the hospital charges. Thus, Humana Insurance paid the hospital significantly less than the actual 80 percent of the original bill and, in turn, Forsyth paid significantly more than her 20 percent of the hospital charges. Forsyth alleged that Humana Insurance and Humana Inc. had violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through fraudulent activity. The District Court ruled in favor of Humana, citing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which prevents acts of Congress from encroaching on state insurance law unless the act specifically relates to insurance. The Court of Appeals reversed and adopted a "direct conflict" test for determining when a federal law "invalidate[s], impair[s], or supersede[s]" a state insurance law. Under such a test, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar Forsyth's suit because the Act does not preclude application of a federal statute prohibiting acts that are also prohibited under state insurance laws. The Act and Nevada law only provided for different damages to be collected.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, announce by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that because RICO advances states' interests in preventing insurance fraud, and since RICO does not encroach on Nevada law, the McCarran- Ferguson Act did not block Forsyth's recourse to RICO in this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After pulling Sandra Houghton's friend over during a routine traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer noticed a needle in the driver's shirt pocket. Upon learning that the needle was used for drugs, the officer searched the car and Houghton's purse, where he found more drug paraphernalia. Houghton challenged her subsequent arrest on drug charges, alleging that the officer's search of her purse was unconstitutional. On appeal from an adverse appeals court ruling, overturning a favorable trial court decision, the Supreme Court granted Wyoming certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court held that so long as there is probable cause to search a stopped vehicle, all subsequent searches of its contents are legal as well. The Court added that such searches are especially warranted if aimed at looking into objects or personal belongings capable of concealing items that are the object of the search.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorneys David Conn and Carol Najera, prosecutors in the retrial of the Menendez brothers, learned that Lyle Menendez had written a letter to Traci Baker, in which he may have instructed her to testify falsely at the first trial. After being subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury and to produce any correspondence that she had received from Menendez, Baker responded that she had given all of Menendez's letters to her attorney, Paul L. Gabbert. When Baker appeared as directed before the grand jury, accompanied by Gabbert, Conn directed police to secure a warrant to search Gabbert for the letter. While Gabbert was being searched, Najera called Baker before the grand jury for questioning. Gabbert brought suit against the prosecutors contending that his Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession without unreasonable government interference was violated when the prosecutors executed a search warrant at the same time his client was testifying before the grand jury. The Federal District Court granted Conn and Najera summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals held that Conn and Najera were not entitled to qualified immunity on Gabbert's Fourteenth Amendment claim because their actions were not objectively reasonable. The court concluded that Gabbert had a right to practice his profession without undue and unreasonable government interference.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "[a] prosecutor does not violate an attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession by executing a search warrant while the attorney's client is testifying before a grand jury." Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[w]e hold that the 14th Amendment right to practice one's calling is not violated by the execution of a search warrant, whether calculated to annoy or even to prevent consultation with a grand jury witness." Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Aurelia Davis sued the Monroe County Board of Education (the "Board"), on behalf of her fifth grade daughter LaShonda, alleging that school officials failed to prevent Lashonda's suffering sexual harassment at the hands of another student. Davis claimed that the school's complacency created an abusive environment that deprived her daughter of educational benefits promised her under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX). On appeal from successive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Davis certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court began by noting that because there is an implied private right to education under Title IX, private damage actions may lie against schools that act with deliberate indifference to harassment that is severe enough to prevent victims from enjoying educational opportunities. The Court added that Title IX's prohibitions against harassment in school are clear enough to have served proper notice to school boards in general and the Board in particular. As such, consistent with the Spending Clause, the Title IX guidelines that Congress attached to its school funds obligate all recipient schools to comply or face the pain of legal action. The Court also observed that the Board acted with deliberate indifference, since it ignored several complaints by Davis, and that the harassment in question was serious and systematic.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. provides home health care services to Medicare beneficiaries. Under the Medicare Act, providers seeking reimbursement for covered health services submit a yearly cost report to a fiscal intermediary, usually a private insurance company. The intermediary then issues a Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR) determining the provider's reimbursement. The Act allows the provider up to 180 days to appeal a reimbursement determination to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. The provider also has up to three years to ask the intermediary to reopen a determination of the Board. Your Home Visiting Nurse submitted cost reports for 1989 to its intermediary and did not appeal the reimbursement decision. However, within three years Your Home Visiting Nurse asked its intermediary to reopen its 1989 reimbursement determination on the ground that "new and material" evidence demonstrated entitlement to additional compensation. The intermediary denied the request. Your Home Visiting Nurse appealed the denial to the Board, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that lacked it jurisdiction to review an intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Your Home Visiting Nurse then brought action in Federal District Court, seeking review of the Board's dismissal and of the intermediary's refusal to reopen. The District Court agreed that the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the refusal to reopen. Moreover, it rejected Your Home Visiting Nurse's contention that the federal-question statute or the mandamus statute gave the District Court jurisdiction to review the intermediary's refusal directly. Subsequently, the court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the Board does not have jurisdiction to review a fiscal intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Moreover, the Court held that the federal-question statute and mandamus statute do not entitle Your Home Visiting Nurse to judicial review of the intermediary's reopening decision.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Amanda Mitchell and others were indicted for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Mitchell was charged with one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. Mitchell pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count during her sentencing hearing. Before accepting her plea, the District Court told Mitchell that she faced a mandatory minimum of 1 year in prison for distributing cocaine and a 10-year minimum for conspiracy if the government could show the required 5 kilograms. The court also explained to Mitchell that by pleading guilty she would be waiving her right "at trial to remain silent." At Mitchell's sentencing hearing, the District Court found, after hearing testimony that included some of Mitchell's codefendants, that Mitchell's alleged drug sales of 1 1/2 to 2 ounces of cocaine twice a week for year and a half put her over the 5-kilogram threshold. Mitchell did not testify to rebut the Government's evidence about drug quantity; however, her counsel argued the quantity of cocaine attributable to her for sentencing purposes. The District Court ruled that as a consequence of Mitchell's guilty plea, she had no right to remain silent about her crime's details; found that the codefendants' testimony put her over the 5-kilogram threshold, thus mandating the 10-year minimum; and noted that her failure to testify was a factor in persuading the court to rely on the codefendants' testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that in the federal criminal system, a guilty plea does not waive the self-incrimination privilege at sentencing and that a sentencing court may not draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence in determining facts relating to the circumstances and details of the crime. "Treating a guilty plea as a waiver of the privilege at sentencing would be a grave encroachment on the rights of defendants," wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court. Justice Kennedy continued that "by holding [Mitchell's] silence against her in determining the facts of the offense at the sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise of the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination." Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the dissenting minority, expressed the view that, while the Court properly held Mitchell did not waive her privilege, she "did not have the right to have the sentencer abstain from making the adverse inferences that reasonably flow from her failure to testify."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996) which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunity the probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After decades of litigation, Fibreboard Corporation and a group of plaintiffs' lawyers reached a "Global Settlement Agreement" of its asbestos personal-injury liability. Subsequently, a group of named plaintiffs filed the present action in Federal District Court, seeking certification for settlement purposes of a mandatory class that comprised three certain groups. Intervening objectors argued that the absence of a "limited fund" precluded Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provides that "an action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of... (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." The court ruled that both the disputed insurance asset liquidated by the global settlement, and, alternatively, the sum of the value of Fibreboard plus the value of its insurance coverage, as measured by the insurance funds' settlement value, were relevant "limited funds." The Court of Appeals affirmed both the class certification and the adequacy of the settlement. The appellate court approved the class certification, under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), on a limited fund rationale based on the threat to other class members' ability to receive full payment from the manufacturer's limited assets.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "applicants for contested certification [of a mandatory settlement class on a limited fund theory under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)] must show that the fund is limited by more than the agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants belonging within the class by a process addressing any conflicting interests of class members." "The record on which the District Court rested its certification of the class for the purpose of the global settlement did not support the essential premises of mandatory limited fund actions. It failed to demonstrate that the fund was limited except by the agreement of the parties, and it showed exclusions from the class and allocations of assets at odds with the concept of limited fund treatment and the structural protections of Rule 23(a) explained in [Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor]," concluded Justice Souter.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires designated states and political subdivisions to obtain federal pre-clearance before giving effect to changes in their voting laws. Hispanic voters, residing in Monterey County, California, filed suit in federal court claiming the county had failed to obtain the required pre-clearance for a series of ordinances changing the method for electing county judges. A three-judge District Court ultimately dismissed the case because the section of the Voting Rights Act that requires pre-clearance did not cover California. Moreover, California had passed legislation requiring the voting changes forged by Monterey County.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the county is covered by the Act's pre-clearance requirement, but the state was not. Justice O'Connor wrote, "We conclude that the county is required to seek pre-clearance before implementing California laws that effect voting changes in that county."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Benjamin Lee Lilly, his brother Mark Lilly, and Gary Barker were arrested after stealing liquor and guns and abducting Alex DeFilippis, who was later shot and killed. Under police questioning, Mark admitted stealing liquor, but claimed that Benjamin and Barker stole the guns and that Benjamin shot DeFilippis. When Virginia called Mark as a witness at Benjamin's subsequent criminal trial, Mark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court then admitted his statements to the police as declarations of an unavailable witness against penal interest. The court overruled Benjamin's objections that the statements were not against Mark's penal interest because they shifted responsibility for the crimes to Barker and Benjamin, and that their admission would violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Subsequently, Benjamin was convicted of the DeFilippis murder and other crimes. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied because Mark's statements fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. The court also held that the statements were reliable because Mark knew that he was implicating himself as a participant in numerous crimes and because the statements were independently corroborated by other evidence at trial.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the admission of Mark's confession violated Benjamin's Confrontation Clause right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." All nine justices voted to overturn the Virginia Supreme Court's decision that had allowed such hearsay testimony under an exception for statements made against penal interest. Justice Stevens wrote for a plurality that the confession could not be considered "sufficiently reliable as to be admissible without allowing [the defendant] to cross-examine him." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Stephen G. Breyer wrote concurring opinions.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Carole Kolstad sued the American Dental Association (ADA) for gender discrimination, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, when it promoted a man instead of her. At trial, the District Court denied Kolstad's request for punitive damages based on a showing that the ADA acted with "malice" and "reckless indifference" to her federally protected rights. When the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, Kolstad appealed and the Supreme Court granted he certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a complicated split opinion, the Court held that if an employee can show their employer knowingly acted in violation of federal law then punitive damages may be sustained. The Court explained that the "malice" or "reckless indifference" standard applied to the relationship between employers and federal law, and is not a characterization of the severity threshold that the discrimination itself must meet. In other words, if an employer maliciously or recklessly violates a federal anti-discrimination law, regardless of the severity of their discriminatory acts, them punitive damages may be imposed. The Court remanded Kolstad's case for renewed consideration of her employer's state of mind during the alleged violations.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Before starting his job as a truck driver for Albertsons Inc., Hallie Kirkingburg underwent an eye examination during which he was erroneously certified as meeting basic Department of Transportation (DOT) visual standards. Two years later, in 1992, the error of Kirkingburg's earlier diagnosis was discovered during a routine physical examination. Kinrkingburg was told that he had to obtain a DOT waiver if he wanted to continue driving. Before he could do so, however, Albertsons fired him for failing to meet minimum visual requirements and refused to rehire him even after he obtained the waiver. Kirkingburg challenged his dismissal under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On appeal from an adverse Ninth Circuit Court ruling reversing a favorable district court finding, the Supreme Court granted Albertsons certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that not all individuals who suffer some sort of physical difficulty are per se "disabled" under the ADA. Instead, those who believe they suffer from a disability must prove their claim on a case-by-case basis by showing that their alleged disability substantially impacts on a major life activity. Moreover, such impact could be mitigated by the availability of artificial aids, such as medications or technical devices, and the body's own corrective measures. As such, Kirkingburg's visual limitation was not reflexively covered under the ADA and so his challenge was inappropriate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1995, Sylvester Mosley was arrested after robbing two banks in eleven days. At the first bank, Mosley displayed a "HOLD UP" sign and asked the teller "Can I have all your money?" At the second bank, Mosley told the teller "This is a holdup, open your bottom draw and give me all your big bills." Because he merely asked for the money, Mosley asked the trial judge to instruct the jury that it could find him guilty of larceny as a lesser-included offense of robbery. Mosley argued that the federal bank robbery statute, 18 USC 2113(a), requires that the robber take the money "by force or violence, or intimidation." The court denied the motion, finding that Mosley had intimated the tellers. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that larceny could not be considered a lesser offense of robbery because an element of larceny is intent and intent is not contained in the robbery definition.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court did not answer the question. In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the order granting the writ of certiorari and dismissed the petition. The Court was "advised that [Sylvester Mosley] died in Springfield, Missouri, on November 16, 1998."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
UNUM Life Insurance Company of America (UNUM) issued a long-term group disability policy to Management Analysis Company (MAC) as an insured welfare benefit plan governed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The policy provides that proof of claims must be furnished to UNUM within one year and 180 days after the onset of disability. John E. Ward, a California MAC employee, became permanently disabled in May 1992. Ward informed MAC of his disability in late February or early March 1993. UNUM received proof of Ward's claim on April 11, 1994. Ward was notified that his claim was denied as untimely because his notice was late under the terms of the policy. Ward then filed suit under ERISA's civil enforcement provision to recover the disability benefits provided by the plan. Ward argued that, under California's common-law agency rule, an employer administering an insured group health plan should be deemed to act as the insurance company's agent; therefore, his notice of permanent disability to MAC, in late February or early March 1993, sufficed to supply timely notice to UNUM. The District Court rejected Ward's argument and ruled in favor of UNUM, citing ERISA's preemption clause, which states that ERISA provisions "shall supersede ... State laws" to the extent that those laws "relate to any employee benefit plan." In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that Ward might prevail under California's "notice-prejudice" rule, under which an insurer cannot avoid liability although the proof of claim is untimely, unless the insurer shows it suffered actual prejudice from the delay.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that California's agency rule is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that California's common-law agency rule "would have a marked effect on plan administration," adding that it would force employers to take on a role for which they had not volunteered. Further, the Court held that California's notice-prejudice rule is not preempted by ERISA because it is a "law ... which regulates insurance." Thus, Ward's insurance claim may go forward even though he filed for benefits after the deadline because UNUM did not suffer any prejudice from the delay. "By allowing a longer period to file than the minimum filing terms mandated by federal law, the [California] rule complements rather than contradicts ERISA and the regulations," wrote Justice Ginsburg.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Jacinto Rodriguez-Moreno and others were hired by a drug distributor to find a drug dealer who stole cocaine from the distributor while holding captive the botched deal's middleman, Ephrain Avendano. In pursuit of the dealer, Rodriguez-Moreno took Avendano from Texas to New Jersey to New York to Maryland. In Maryland, Rodriguez-Moreno took possession of a revolver and threatened to kill Avendano. However, Avendano escaped and called the police. Rodriguez-Moreno was then arrested. Rodriguez-Moreno was charged in a federal District Court with, among kidnapping and other violations, using and carrying a firearm in relation to Avendano's kidnapping, in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1), which proscribes using or carrying a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence." Rodriguez-Moreno moved to dismiss the firearm count for lack of venue. Rodriguez-Moreno argued that the only place where the Government had proved he had actually used a gun was Maryland and, therefore, venue was proper only in Maryland. The court denied the motion and a jury found Rodriguez-Moreno guilty of the count. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied a "verb test," under which a violation of section 924(c)(1) is committed only in the district where a defendant "uses" or "carries" a firearm. Thus, the New Jersey court venue for the firearm count was improper.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "[v]enue in a prosecution for using or carrying a firearm 'during and in relation to any crime of violence' in violation of section 924(c)(1) is proper in any district where the crime of violence was committed." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "A kidnapping...does not end until the victim is free. It does not make sense...to speak of it in discrete geographic fragments....[I]t does not matter that respondent used the revolver...only in Maryland because he did so 'during and in relation to' a kidnaping that was begun in Texas and continued in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland." Justice Antonin Scalia, with joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented, expressing the view that the crime defined in 924(c)(1) could be "committed only where the defendant both engages in the acts making up the predicate offense and uses or carries the gun." Moreover, Justice Scalia argued, because the accused's use of the gun occurred only in Maryland, venue was proper only there.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Everett Hadix and other prisoners in the Michigan prison system filed a class action lawsuit against prison officials claiming that the conditions of their confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Thereafter, Hadix and the officials entered into a consent decree to remedy the situation. In 1987, the District Court ruled that Hadix was entitled to attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring of compliance with the decrees. The court established specific market rates for awarding fees. By April 26, 1996, the effective date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the market rate was $150 per hour. The PLRA limited the size of fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits to a maximum hourly rate of $112.50. When first presented with the issue, the District Court concluded that the PLRA cap did not limit attorney's fees for services performed in these cases prior to, but that were still unpaid by, the PLRA's effective date. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Next, fee requests were filed with the District Court for services performed during a period encompassing work performed both before and after the PLRA's effective date. The District Court reiterated its earlier conclusion. The Court of Appeals held that the PLRA's fee limitation does not apply to cases pending on the enactment date because if it did, it would have an impermissible retroactive effect, regardless of when the work was performed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 "limits attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA's effective date, but does not limit fees for monitoring performed before that date." "To impose the new standards now, for work performed before the PLRA became effective, would upset the reasonable expectations of the parties," Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court. All nine justices agreed that the PLRA should apply to services performed after the law's effective date. However, the Court split over whether the new fee limits contained in the law apply to work performed after April 26, 1996, in cases begun before that date. A 7-2 majority said that the new limits do apply to such cases. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens dissented from that part of the Court's conclusion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act on 1995 prohibits Bossier Parish, Louisiana from enacting any change in a "voting qualification[,] prerequisite[,] standard, practice, or procedure" without first obtaining preclearance from either the Attorney General or the District Court. Following the 1990 census, the District Court granted Bossier Parish preclearance to redistrict. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471, vacated the court's judgment and remanded for the court to question whether the section 5 purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent. The District Court again granted preclearance. The court found that there was no evidence of discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. The court left open the question of whether section 5 prohibits preclearance of a plan enacted with such a purpose.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that section 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. "As we have repeatedly noted, in vote-dilution cases [section 5] prevents nothing but backsliding, and preclearance under [section 5] affirms nothing but the absence of backsliding," wrote Justice Scalia. Justices David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the opinions of Justices Souter and Stevens. "Now executive and judicial officers of the United States will be forced to preclear illegal and unconstitutional voting schemes patently intended to perpetuate discrimination," argued Justice Souter.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Nathaniel Jones was indicted on federal offenses for using a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence and carjacking. Federal law prescribed varying prison terms based on the extent of the carjacking crime. Specifically, it imposed a maximum of 25 years for crimes resulting in serious bodily injury, but not-more-than-fifteen-years and life sentence clauses were included in the law. The Magistrate Judge explained to Jones that he faced a maximum of fifteen years on the carjacking charge. Based on the Magistrate's judgment, the District Court's instructions to the jury rested on the fact that the government only had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a carjacking had occurred to convict Jones for up to fifteen years. Subsequently, the jury found Jones guilty. However, a later report showed one of the carjacking victims had sustained a serious injury to the head as a result of the carjacking. Thus, the District Court imposed a twenty-five year sentence on Jones. The court rejected Jones' arguments that a serious bodily injury had neither been pleaded in the indictment nor proved before the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It held that a serious bodily injury was a sentencing factor, not an element of an offense.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law established three separate offenses by the specification of elements, each of which must be charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Land patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 (the Acts) reserve all rights to the coal contained in the subject properties to the United States. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe has equitable title to coal within its reservation lands. These lands contain large quantities of coalbed methane gas (CBM gas), now considered a valuable energy source, within the coal formations. In 1981, the Department of the Interior issued an opinion that concluded that the reservation of coal under the Acts did not encompass CBM gas. Energy companies then entered into leases with landowners holding title under the Acts to produce CBM gas. The Tribe field suit against the Amoco Production Company and others, royalty owners and producers under the oil and gas leases covering that land, and various federal entities, seeking a declaration stating CBM gas to be coal reserved by the Acts and therefore belonging to the Tribe. The District Court disagreed and concluded that the plain meaning of the term "coal" was limited to the solid rock substance and did not include the CBM gas. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Acts' use of the term "coal" was ambiguous, and ambiguities in land grants must be resolved in favor of the sovereign. Therefore, the Acts' reservation of coal included the CBM gas.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that, "[t]he term 'coal' as used in the 1909 and 1910 Acts does not encompass CBM gas;" therefore, CBM gas is not included in the reserved coal rights. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "[t]he common understanding of coal in 1909 and 1910 would not have encompassed CBM gas, both because it is a gas rather than a solid mineral and because it was understood as a distinct substance that escaped from coal as the coal was mined, rather than as part of the coal itself." Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that Congress, at the time the Acts were passed, would have assumed that the coal owner had dominion over and responsibility for the CBM gas. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Two months after officers observed Tyvessel Tyvorus White using his car to deliver cocaine, he was arrested at his workplace on unrelated charges. At the same time, the arresting officers seized his car, without securing a warrant, because they believed that it was subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. During a subsequent inventory search, the police discovered cocaine in the car. White was then charged with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Florida law. At White's trial on the drug charge, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, arguing that the car's warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, thereby making the cocaine the "fruit of the poisonous tree." After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court denied the motion. On appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The court also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure of an automobile under the Act violated the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court answered that the warrantless seizure did violate the Fourth Amendment, quashed the lower court opinion, and remanded. The court reasoned that although the police developed probable cause to believe a violation of the Act had occurred, this alone did not justify a warrantless seizure.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband. Thomas wrote: "Although the police here lacked probable cause to believe that [White's] car contained contraband, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under Florida law. ... [T]he need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away...is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure." In dissenting, Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concluded that the seizure was not reasonable without a warrant.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Michael A. Haddle, an at-will employee for Healthmaster, Inc., filed suit in federal court alleging his employer, along with 2 previous Healthmaster, Inc. officers, Jeanette Garrison and Dennis Kelly, conspired to have him fired in retaliation for obeying a federal grand jury subpoena and later testifying in a criminal trial against Healthmaster, Inc. for Medicare fraud. Haddle claimed his employers' acts had had "injured [him] in his person or property" in violation of federal law, specifically the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The District Court, relying on precedent, dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The precedent the court cited held that an at-will employee discharged pursuant to a conspiracy proscribed by the Act has suffered no actual injury because he has no constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that such interference may give rise to a claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. "The kind of interference with at-will employment relations alleged here is merely a species of the traditional torts of intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Sun-Diamond Growers of California (Sun-Diamond), an agricultural trade association, was charged with violating a federal statute that prohibited the giving of anything valuable to a present, past, or future official "for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official." Sun-Diamond's indictment alleged that it gave illegal gratuities to former Agriculture Secretary Michael Espy while he was considering two matters in which Sun-Diamond had a vested interest. The indictment, however, did not claim a connection between the gratuities in question and either of the matters under Espy's review. Based on this lack of connectivity, Sun-Diamond challenged its indictment but lost in district court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reserved part of the district court decision and the government appealed. Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that to sustain conviction for federal bribery there must be a clear quid pro quo link between the gratuity received and performance of a specific past, present, or future "official" act. The Court reasoned that a statutory interpretation that punished the giving of any gifts to public officials would not fit comfortably with the legislation's spirit and traditions. The Court noted that the giving of gratuities to officials, by virtue of their position, is not the same as bribery of officials for the performance of specific conduct.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Jonathan Zimring, on the consolidated behalf of two female patients with mental disabilities, challenged Tommy Olmstead, the Commissioner of Georgia's Department of Human Resources, for the Georgia Regional Hospital's (GRH) decision to keep the two women in psychiatric isolation. Zimring argued that under Title II of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the women had to be moved to the most communally integrated setting possible. Defending GRH's decision, Olmstead argued that although the women were medically cleared for a more integrated treatment setting, financial constraints and the need to fundamentally alter treatment programs prevented this from happening.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court began by noting that the question in this case was still ripe even though the two women at issue were placed in communal care since their controversies were initiated. The Court then found that the ADA required the placement of patients with mental disabilities in "integrated settings" when they are medically cleared for such settings, they themselves express a desire for such settings, and the resources for such a transfer are available. The Court added that financial constraints might be significant if the state can show that allocation of resources to one patient will cause harm to others. The case was remanded for a better analysis of GRH spending priorities.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Police officers of the city of West Covina lawfully seized Perkins Lawrence's personal property from his home. The officers left a notice form specifying the facts of the search, its date, the searching agency, the date of the warrent, the issuing judge and his court, the persons to be contacted for information, and an itemized list of the property seized. The officers did not leave the search warrant number. Lawrence filed suit after attempts to obtain the seized property failed. The District Court ultimately ruled in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It held that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that Lawrence be provided a detailed notice of state procedures for the return of seized property and the information to be able to invoke the procedures, along with the information he was already provided. This meant the search warrant number must be furnished or at least the method for obtaining it.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a decision authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause does not require police officers to provide property owners with information on how to recover their property in a lawful seizure. The Due Process clause only requires that officers inform property owners that something they own has been seized. Justice Kennedy said the property owner could turn to public sources to learn about the procedures available.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act (Act) provides that once an employer's liability for an employee's injury has been established, then either the self-insured employer or insurer (collectively insurers) is responsible for paying for the employee's "reasonable" and "necessary" medical treatment. In 1993, this system was amended to allow insurers to withhold payment for disputed treatments, pending the outcome of an independent utilization review. Ten employees and two organizations representing employees that had received benefits under the Act filed suit against state officials, the self-insured school district of Philadelphia, and a number of private insurance companies. Their complaint alleged that the state and private defendants, acting under color of state law, had deprived them of property in violation of due process.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No to both. A finding of state action requires both that the deprivation be caused by actions taken under state law and that the deprivation be fairly attributable to the state. While the alleged deprivation in this case was clearly taken pursuant to state law, the decision of private insurers to withhold medical payments for disputed treatment is not fairly attributable to the state. Mere creation of a new dispute resolution mechanism by the state does not constitute state encouragement or authorization. Nor has Pennsylvania delegated to private insurers powers that were exclusively those of the state, as Pennsylvania has simply authorized insurers to do what they would do in the absence of regulation: dispute payment of unreasonable and unnecessary treatment. Further, under Pennsylvania law no due process protection attaches to payment of disputed medical expenses before the reasonableness and necessity of those expenses is determined. The Act does not entitle an employee to payment of all medical treatment, but only that treatment which is reasonable and necessary. In order to assert a protected property interest a worker must demonstrate not only that his or her employer was liable for a work related injury, but also that the treatment for which payment is sought was reasonable and necessary. In this case the plaintiffs had only established their initial eligibility for treatment, not that treatment was reasonable and necessary.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Hunt (517 US 899), declaring North Carolina's 12th district to have been unconstitutionally drawn, the state made a new districting plan in 1997. Acting on behalf of other residents, Martin Cromartie again challenged the new make-up of the 12th district as the product of racial gerrymandering. However, even before an evidentiary hearing, a three-judge District Court granted Cromartie summary judgment. Hunt appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that despite strong evidence of racial gerrymandering, the North Carolina General Assembly's motivations were in dispute. As such, further inquiry was warranted on this alone. Moreover, since accusations of racial gerrymandering rise to the level of being constitutionally significant, they must be evaluated with strict scrutiny. Therefore, the dismissal of such serious accusations with a summary judgment was erroneous.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out and the vehicle overturned. One passenger died in the accident and several others were severely injured. Subsequently, the Carmichaels brought a diversity suit against the Kumho Tire Company and others, claiming that the tire was defective. A significant part of the Carmichaels' case turned on the testimony of Dennis Carlson, Jr., an expert in tire failure analysis. Carlson intended to testify to support the Carmichaels' conclusion that a defect in the tire's manufacture or design caused the blow out. To support this conclusion, Carlson used a methodology that was partly disputed. Kumho moved to exclude Carlson's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact..., a witness qualified as an expert...may testify thereto in the form of an opinion." The Federal District Court granted the motion, excluded Carlson's testimony, and entered summary judgment for Kumho. The court found that Carlson's methodology was insufficiently reliable. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that a federal trial judge's "gatekeeping" obligations under the Federal Rules of Evidence were limited to scientific context, and not Carlson's testimony, which the court characterized as skill-or experience-based.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a federal trial judge's "gatekeeping" obligation applies not only to "scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "makes no relevant distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized knowledge. It makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony." The Court concluded that this interpretation of Rule 702 would insure that an expert witness's testimony rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. The Court also concluded that the District Court's determination that Carlson's methodology was not reliable was within the court's discretion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Colorado practices an initiative-petition process in which citizens can make laws directly through balloting initiatives. Acting on behalf of ballot petitioners, the American Constitutional Law Foundation (Foundation) challenged the constitutionality of six limitations imposed by Colorado on the petitioning process. After mixed rulings in both trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review three of the six original restrictions. The first required petition circulators to be registered voters. The second required them to wear identification badges with their names, status as "volunteer" or "paid," and if the latter then their employer's phone number. The third required initiative proponents to report names, addresses, and registration voting counties for all paid circulators, as well as salary per petition signature, and each circulator's total salary. Proponents also had to report, on a monthly basis, all proponent names, names and addresses of circulators, circulators' monthly salary and debt totals, and the name of each proposed ballot measure.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court found the name, badge, and disclosure requirements to be unconstitutional. Weighing Colorado's need to protect the integrity of the initiative-petition process against the burdens that its guidelines placed on political expression, the Court found that the latter outweighed the former. Noting that the appellate court upheld a requirement that each circulator submit an affidavit setting out, among several particulars, his or her name and address, the Court explained that the vital information sought by the three additional restrictions at issue was already being secured either directly or indirectly.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1976, Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company acquired Marathon Petroleum Norge (Norge) and Marathon Petroleum Company (Norway) (MPCN). Following the acquisition, Norge assigned its license to produce gas from the North Sea's Heimdal Field to MPCN, which then contracted to sell 70 percent of its share of the Heimdal gas production to a group of European buyers, including Ruhrgas AG. MPCN's sales agreement with Ruhrgas and the other European buyers provided that disputes would be settled by arbitration in Sweden. In 1995, Marathon Oil Company, Marathon International Oil Company, and Norge sued Ruhrgas in Texas state court, asserting state-law claims of fraud, tortious interference with prospective business relations, participation in breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. Ruhrgas removed the case to the District Court, asserting three bases for federal jurisdiction. Ruhrgas then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the parties. Marathon moved to remand the case to the state court for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the category of claim in the suit. The District Court granted Ruhrgas' motion. Noting that Texas' long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the court addressed the constitutional question and concluded that Ruhrgas' contacts with Texas were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that, in removed cases, district courts must decide issues of subject-matter jurisdiction first, reaching issues of personal jurisdiction only if subject-matter jurisdiction is found to exist.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that in cases removed from a state court to federal court there is "no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy requiring the federal court to adjudicate subject-matter jurisdiction before considering a challenge to personal jurisdiction." Customarily, however, a federal court would first resolve doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter. Justice Ginsburg wrote, "[w]here...a district court has before it a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the alleged defect in subject matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The National Federation of Federal Employees, a federal employees' union, proposed to include a provision obligating the Interior Department to negotiate midterm matters not in the original contract between the union and the Agency. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, that created the Federal Labor Relations Authority, requires federal agencies and their employees' unions to negotiate in good faith to arrive at a collective bargaining agreement. Initially, the Authority held that the good-faith bargaining clause did not extend to union-initiated proposals during the term of the basic contract. The Court of Appeals did not agree and, in turn, the Authority reversed its decision. The Interior Department refused the proposal on the ground that union-initiated midterm bargaining is inconsistent with the Statute. The Authority then ordered the Agency to comply with the bargaining.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute gave the Federal Labor Relations Authority power to determine whether parties must engage in midterm bargaining. Justice Breyer wrote, "Congress delegated to the authority the power to determine -- within appropriate legal bounds...whether, when, where and what sort of midterm bargaining is required."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Naomi Marquez, part-time actress, auditioned successfully for a role in a television series produced by Lakeside Pictures. Pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement, Lakeside contacted the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) to confirm that Marquez met the "union security clause" of the agreement that requires union "membership" as a condition for employment. The clause stated one must be a member "in good standing." Subsequently, Marquez was denied the part because she had not paid her dues. Marquez filed suit alleging SAG breached its duty of fair representation with its union security clause. First, Marquez argued she should have been made aware of her established legal right not to join the union, but only to pay for its representational activities. Second, Marquez claimed that the clause required repetitious thirty-day previous work periods every time motion picture employment ceased. The District Court summarily ruled against Marquez because the clause followed the National Labor Relations Act; therefore, it did not breach its duty of fair representation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on the first claim, but held the second claim was in the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled collective bargaining contracts do not have to spell out what it means to be "in good standing." Justice O'Conner noted that requiring membership to be specified in a contract would force all terms to be specified. There would be no limit.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Shareholders sought to appeal from a federal District Court settlement of a stockholder derivative suit. The suit arose out of claims that managers conspired with rival sellers thereby exposing the corporation to criminal and treble-damages liability. The Court of Appeals held that shareholders who had not intervened and were not parties to the derivate action could not appeal an unsatisfactory settlement. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court did not answer the question. An equally divided Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1992, the District Court sentenced Manuel D. Peguero to 274 months of imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to federal drug charges. During sentencing, the court did not inform Peguero of his right to appeal the sentence. In 1996, in a later motion for habeas relief, Peguero claimed that the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(2) by failing to advise him of his right to appeal. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that, although it failed to advise Peguero of his right, he knew of his right when the sentencing hearing occurred. Thus the court, rejecting Peguero's claim that any violation of Rule 32 is enough to vacate a sentence, held that he was not entitled to relief because he was aware of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that a Rule 32 violation was subject to harmless-error review and concluded that the rule's purpose had been served since Peguero was aware of his right to appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that "a district court's failure to advise the defendant of his right to appeal does not entitle him to habeas relief if he knew of his right and hence suffered no prejudice from the omission." Noting the importance of the rule and acknowledging that the omission was an error, Justice Kennedy stated "[t]rial judges must be meticulous and precise in following each of the requirements of Rule 32 in every case." The Court concluded that Rule 32 violations do not entitle defendants to relief in all circumstances, rather only when the defendant is prejudiced by the court's error.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Mary E. Zurko, and others, applied for a patent upon a method for increasing computer security. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) patent examiner concluded that Zurko's method was obvious in light of prior art and, therefore, denied the application. The PTO's review board, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, upheld the examiner's decision. Zurko sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In reviewing PTO's decision to deny Zurko's patent application, the Federal Circuit analyzed the PTO's factual finding using a "clearly erroneous" standard of review, which generally governs appellate review of district court findings of fact (court/court review), rather than the less stringent standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permit a court to set aside agency findings of fact found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found the PTO's factual finding to be clearly erroneous. The Federal Circuit then heard the matter en banc. After examining relevant precedents, the en banc court concluded that its use of the stricter court/court standard was legally proper. The Solicitor General, representing the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Q. Todd Dickinson, sought certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit must use the framework set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act when reviewing PTO findings of fact. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that, "[A] close examination of the...cases reviewing PTO decisions do not reflect a well-established court/court standard." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, dissented, noting that at the time of the enactment of the APA judicial review of fact-finding by the PTO under the "clearly erroneous" standard was an "additional requiremen[t]...recognized by law."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association issued a $93 million loan to 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the debtor's principal asset, part of a Chicago office building. When the debtor defaulted on the loan, the bank began foreclosure. LaSalle filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code. The debtor's purposed reorganization plan called for only previous equity holders to contribute new capital in exchange for the debtor's entire ownership of the reorganized entity. The Bank of America objected. The bank's objection prevented confirmation of the plan. LaSalle resorted to a judicial "cramdown" process for imposing the plan on Bank of America. The cramdown process requires a reorganization plan to be fair and equitable with respect to the creditors so a judge will authorize it. Bank of America argued the plan violated the cramdown's "absolute priority rule," which prevents debtor's equity holders from receiving ownership when claims will not be paid in full and, thus, the plan should have been denied. Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court approved the plan. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled a debtor's prebankruptcy equity holders may not, over the objections of creditors, contribute new capital and receive ownership in the debtor's reorganized entity if no one else has been given a chance to come up with an alternative reorganization plan.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), states receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) can pay the benefit amount of another State's TANF program to residents who have lived in the State for less than 12 months. When California announced it would enforce this option, Brenda Roe brought this class action, on behalf of other first year residents, challenging the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement. On appeal from successive adverse rulings in the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Rita Saenz, the Director of California's Department of Social Services, certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to travel in three ways by: allowing citizens to move freely between states, securing the right to be treated equally in all states when visiting, and securing the rights of new citizens to be treated like long-time citizens of a state. The Court explained that by paying first-year residents the same TNF benefits they received in their state of origin, states treated new residents differently than others who have lived in their borders for over one year. As such, enforcement of the PRWORA power unconstitutionally discriminated among residents.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permit victims of intentional employment discrimination, whether within the private sector or the federal government, to recover compensatory damages. Thereafter, Michael Gibson filed a complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleging that the Department had discriminated against him by denying him a promotion on the basis of his gender. The Department found against Gibson. Afterwards, however, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) awarded Gibson the promotion plus backpay. Later Gibson filed suit, in the District Court, seeking compensatory damages and a court order for the Department to comply with the EEOC's order. Subsequently, the Department voluntarily complied with the EEOC's order, but it opposed Gibson's claim for compensatory damages. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Gibson's complaint. On appeal, the Department supported the District Court's dismissal with the argument that Gibson had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in respect to his compensatory damages claim; therefore, he could not bring that claim in court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals rejected the Department's argument. The court viewed the EEOC as lacking the legal power necessary to award compensatory damages. Consequently, there was no administrative remedy to exhaust.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission possess the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they discriminate in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the dissenting minority, expressed the view that that the EEOC could not have awarded compensatory damages against the United States under Title VII because the statute did not authorize such awards in explicit terms. Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, it did not provide the required waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Under the Census Clause (Art. I, Sect. 2, Cl. 3), Congress is authorized to conduct a census of the American public every 10 years. Among other purposes, the census provides a basis for apportionment of congressional districts. Under the Census Act, Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary). When the Census Bureau (Bureau) announced plans to use two new forms of discretionary statistical sampling in the 2000 census, various United States residents, counties, and the House of Representatives challenged the constitutionality of the new sampling methods in two separate suits. On direct appeals from three-judge district courts enjoining the use of the new sampling methods, the Supreme Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes with regard to the Census Act. The Court began by noting that the plaintiffs in the joined cases had good standing to bring their challenges because they stood to suffer a decrease in the number of their congressional representatives and a corresponding dilution of voting strength. The Court then added that the disputed Amendment to the Census Act, authorizing the discretionary use of statistical sampling, did not alter the Act's older statutory prohibition against the use of sampling. Consequently, the Court struck down the sampling provision on statutory grounds and avoided the constitutional question.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Louis Jones, Jr., kidnapped Private Tracie Joy McBride at gunpoint from the Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas. After sexually assaulting McBride, Jones killed her with repeated blows to the head from a tire iron. The Federal Government charged Jones with kidnapping resulting in the victim's death, in violation of 18 USC section 1201(a)(2), an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. Pursuant to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, the government sought the death sentence. A jury found Jones guilty. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty at Jones's sentencing hearing. The District Court imposed the death sentence in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The court refused Jones' request to include in the jury instructions an instruction that in the event of a jury deadlock concerning what sentence to impose -- either death or life imprisonment without possibility of release -- the District Court would impose no less of a sentence than of life imprisonment without possibility of release. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Jones was not entitled to an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not require such an instruction and the Court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to require such an instruction in every capital case. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "in a capital sentencing proceeding, the Government has 'a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.' [A] charge to the jury of the sort proposed by petitioner might well have the effect of undermining this strong governmental interest." Furthermore, the Court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury had been led to believe that Jones would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that the jury could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that, "'[a]ccurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a [jury's] determination of whether a defendant shall live or die.' That 'indispensable prerequisite' was not satisfied in this case."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After stopping him for speeding, an Iowa police officer issued Patrick Knowles a citation and conducted a full search of his car without probable cause or Knowles' consent. When his search turned up a "pot pipe" and some marijuana, the officer arrested Knowles on state drug charges. Knowles challenged these on grounds that because he was not arrested at any time prior to the search, the search was unconstitutional. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Knowles certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that full-stopped car searches can only be conducted when the safety of the officers is at risk. One significant indication of such danger is when an officer arrests the subject as a reaction to possible or actual threat. In the present case, no serious danger accompanied the stop of Knowles car as evidenced by the officer's initial decision not to arrest Knowles or even issue him a ticket. As such, regardless of its uncovered contents, the subsequent search violated the "search incident to arrest" power and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unlawful search and seizures.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
At the time of his hiring by United Parcel Service (UPS) to a mechanics position that required him to drive commercial trucks, Vaughn Murphy was misdiagnosed as meeting Department of Transportation (DOT) health guidelines. When UPS discovered that Murphy's blood pressure exceeded DOT requirements, they fired him. Murphy challenged his dismissal as a form of discrimination prohibited under Title I of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Following defeat in trial and appellate courts, Murphy appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the determination of whether one is "disabled" under the ADA must be made in light of available mitigating circumstances. In the present case, the Court did not find Murphy "disabled" since he could function normally with the help of blood pressure medication. Moreover, although no longer able to serve as a commercial truck driver for UPS, Murphy could still work as a mechanic - the position for which he was officially hired. The Court concluded that in order to be designated as "disabled" an employee must be unable to perform more than just one task.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Verdan Technology, Inc.,, a prime contractor, failed to pay Blue Fox Inc., a subcontractor, for work completed on a construction project for the Department of the Army. Under the Miller Act, a contractor working on any public building or public work of the US must post a bond for possible defaults. However, the Army treated the work agreement as a "services contract," and removed Verdan's bond requirements. When Verdan failed to pay Blue Fox, it directly sued the Army. Blue Fox sought an "equitable lien" on any funds from the Verdan contract not paid to Verdan, or any funds available or appropriated for the completion of the project, and an order directing payment of those funds to it. The District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter, and thus ruled in favor of the Army because the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not apply to Blue Fox's claim. The Court of Appeals held that the APA waives immunity for equitable actions, thus allowing Blue Fox's equitable lien.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that "unless waived by Congress, sovereign immunity bars subcontractors and other creditors from enforcing liens on government property or funds to recoup their losses." The APA prohibits people and companies with grievances from suing the government for monetary damages. Blue Fox's lien was ruled "merely a means to the end of satisfying a claim for the recovery of money."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
While the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides asylum to aliens who can demonstrate that they will be persecuted if deported, it does not protect aliens who commit "serious nonpolitical crimes" before their arrival in the United States. After burning busses, assaulting passengers, and vandalizing private property in his native Guatemala, Juan Aguiree fled to and, sought asylum in, the United States. Despite Aguirre's claims that his acts constituted political protest, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) overturned an administrative court's finding in favor of asylum. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed as it found the BIA's analysis deficient in three parts: it failed to balance the severity of Aguirre's offenses against the threat of political persecution; it failed to qualify the atrocities of Aguiree's acts in comparison with others it faced in the past; and it did not consider whether Aguree's acts were politically necessary or successful. When the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court noted that withholding of deportation is mandatory if an alien establishes that it is more likely than not that he or she will suffer political persecution if deported. The Court added that the BIA was not required to balance the severity of the acts in question against threats of political persecution, compare the actions with others, or pronounce on their political success or necessity. Likelihood of political persecution is the overarching issue when considering an alien's deportability, followed by a determination of whether the crimes at issue were serious and nonpolitical.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Garret F., a minor and student in Cedar Rapids Community School District, requires a wheelchair and is dependent upon a ventilator. He requires assistance in attending to his physical needs during the school day. The school district declined to accept financial responsibility for Garret's services in order for him to be able to attend school. The school district believed it was not legally obligated to provide one-on-one care. An Administrative Law judge concluded that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) required the school district to provide "school health services," which are provided by a "qualified school nurse or other qualified person," but not medical services, which are limited to services provided by a physician. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed despite arguments from the school district that such one-on-one care is too costly and too involved to be considered anything but medical in nature.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that if the services in question are "related" to keeping the child with disabilities in school and able to access educational opportunities available to others IDEA funded school districts must provide such services. The Court added that although the nature and cost of providing certain IDEA "related services" is not determinative of whether their financial burdens must be met, potential financial burdens shall inform any decision governing their provision. In the present case, the benefits of providing Garret with his needed care outweighed the burdens.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Del Monte Dunes sought to develop property it owned within the jurisdiction of the city of Monterey. Monterey continuously denied Del Monte Dunes' proposals to develop the property. Each rejection was followed by stricter and more rigorous demands for a smaller, less intrusive development. After years of rejection, Del Monte Dunes decided Monterey would not allow development under any circumstances. Del Monte Dunes sued the city in federal court under 42 USC Section 1983, alleging that the denial of their final proposal was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, Del Monte Dunes claimed, the continuous demands constituted regulatory abuse. The District Court submitted Del Monte Dunes case to the jury. The judge instructed the jury to find for Del Monte Dunes if the jurors found Del Monte Dunes had been denied every economically viable use for its property or if the city's decision to reject the development did not directly advance a legitimate public purpose. The jury found for Del Monte Dunes on the equal protection and abuse claims, and it awarded monetary damages. The city prevailed on the due process claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings despite the city of Monterey's objection to the use of a jury in government land-use regulation cases. It found no errors in the use of the jury or the jury's decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held, in an opinion authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, that property owners who file a Section 1983 civil rights suit seeking compensation for an alleged taking of their property can have a jury trial in some circumstances. "[T]he disputed questions were whether the government had denied a constitutional right outside the bounds of its authority, and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages." Justice Kennedy then added: "These were questions for the jury."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A federal criminal statute, 21 U.S.C. section 848(a), proscribes any person from engaging in "continuing criminal enterprise (CCE)," which is defined as involving a violation of federal drug statutes where such a violation was part of a "continuing series of violations." Eddie Richardson, who had organized and managed the Chicago street gang called the Undertaker Vice Lords in order to sell drugs, was charge with a CCE violation. At trial, Richardson proposed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree not only that he committed some "continuing series of violations" but also that the he committed each of the individual "violations" necessary to make up that "continuing series." In other words, the proposed instruction would have required the jury to unanimously agree on which three acts constituted the alleged series of violations. The judge rejected Richardson's proposal and, instead, instructed the jurors that they must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses, but did not have to agree as to the particular offenses. Subsequently, the jury convicted Richardson. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's jury instruction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a jury in a "continuing criminal enterprise" case is required to agree unanimously not only that accused committed continuing series of violations, but also which specific violations made up the continuing series. Looking to the language of the statute, Justice Breyer concluded that in the law "each 'violation' amounts to a separate element" and that combined with a "tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law," calls for juror unanimity. In dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed the view that the Court's decision "rewards those drug kingpins whose operations are so vast that the individual violations cannot be recalled or charged with specificity."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On January 26, 1996, Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. (Michetti), filed a complaint in Alabama state court seeking damages for an alleged breach of contract and fraud by Murphy Bros., Inc. (Murphy). Michetti did not serve Murphy then, but three days later it faxed a "courtesy copy" of the complaint to a Murphy vice president. Michetti officially served Murphy under local law by certified mail on February 12, 1996. On March 13, 1996, 30 days after service but 44 days after receiving the faxed copy of the complaint, Murphy removed the case under 28 U. S. C. ?1441 to the Federal District Court. Michetti moved to remand the case to the state court on the ground that Murphy filed the removal notice 14 days too late under 28 U. S. C. ?1446(b), which specifies that the notice "shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the [complaint]." Michetti asserted that the removal was untimely because the notice had not been filed within 30 days of the date on which Murphy's vice president received the facsimile transmission. The District Court denied the remand motion on the ground that the 30-day removal period did not commence until Murphy was officially served with a summons. On an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, instructing the District Court to remand the action to state court. The court held that the defendant's receipt of a faxed copy of the filed initial pleading sufficed to commence the 30-day removal period, emphasizing the statutory words "receipt...or otherwise."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 decision, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a named defendant's time to remove a state-court action to a federal court is triggered by the simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, "through service or otherwise," after and apart from service of the summons, but not by the mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service. Justice Ginsburg wrote for that Court that, "[i]t would take a clearer statement than Congress has made to read its endeavor to extend removal time...to effect so strange a change_to set removal apart from all other responsive acts, to render removal the sole instance in which one's procedural rights slip away before service of a summons."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In a New York State court, Tsui Yuan Tseng alleged El Al Israel Airlines subjected her to an intrusive security search resulting in assault and false imprisonment before a flight from New York to Tel Aviv. Tseng alleged that psychic or psychosomatic personal injuries followed the incident, but no bodily injury occurred. El Al moved the case to federal court. The District Court dismissed the case due to the Warsaw Convention treaty. Convention provisions describe air carrier liability for international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods. Bodily injury, baggage or goods destruction, loss, or damage, and damage caused by delay are compensable under the Convention. Psychic or psychosomatic injury is not covered. Thus, Tseng's claim was not justicible. Moreover, New York tort law prevents El Al from liability suits covered under the Convention. The Court of Appeals held, in reversing, that the Convention drafters did not intend to remove all liability from an airline carrier, that the Convention does not shield routine operating procedures from the laws of signatory nations, and that the Convention precludes recourse to local law only when an incident is not exclusively covered. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the Convention would create uniformity because doing so would supplant applicable laws.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that the Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when her claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention. In her opinion, Justice Bader wrote, "[w]e would be hard put to conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject air carriers to the distinct, non-uniform liability rules of the individual signatory nations."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians ceded land in present-day Minnesota to the U.S. in an 1837 treaty. In return, the U.S. granted the Mille Lacs Band certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded land. An 1850 Executive Order by President Taylor ordered the removal of the Mille Lacs Band and revoked their usufructuary rights. An 1855 treaty set aside reservation lands for the Mille Lacs Band, but did not mention their rights. The Mille Lacs Band sued, seeking a declaratory judgment stated that they retained their usufructuary rights and an injunction to prevent the state's interference with those rights. The District Court ultimately ruled that the Mille Lacs Band retained their usufructuary rights under the 1837 treaty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The courts rejected arguments that the 1850 Executive Order abrogated the usufructuary rights guaranteed by the 1837 treaty and that Minnesota's entrance into the Union in 1858 extinguished any Indian treaty rights under the "equal footing doctrine."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians does have usufructuary rights that were guaranteed to them by the 1837 treaty. After an examination of the historical record, the Court held that the 1850 Executive Order was ineffective to terminate Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights, that the Mille Lacs Band did not relinquish its 1837 treaty rights in the 1855 treaty, and that the Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights were not extinguished when Minnesota was admitted to the Union.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Franois Holloway, a.k.a. Abdu Ali, was charged with several federal offenses, including carjacking. Federal law defines carjacking as "tak[ing] a motor vehicle ... from ... another by force and violence or by intimidation" "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." Holloway's accomplice testified that there was no intent to harm the drivers of the cars, just steal their vehicles. However, he said he would have used his gun if he had been given a "hard time." The District Court judge instructed the jury that the requisite intend under law may be conditional. Moreover, the government would satisfy this condition if it had proved to them that the defendant intended to cause death or bodily harm if the drivers refused to turn over their cars. Subsequently, the jury found Holloway guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that a conditional intent to harm was within a reasonable interpretation of the legislative purpose of the carjacking law.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law applies to carjacking crimes committed with "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands. "The intent requirement...is satisfied when the government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car," wrote Justice Stevens.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
While working for Policy Management Systems (PMS), Carolyn Cleveland suffered a stroke. Ultimately, she lost her job but was awarded Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits because she claimed she was unable to work due to her stroke-induced disability. A week before her SSDI award, Cleveland challenged her termination by PMS as a violation of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). PMS defended itself by stating that Cleveland's SSDI award negated her ADA suit, because her receipt of SSDI funds proved she was not terminated in spite of an ability to perform her duties. On appeal from adverse rulings in both the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Cleveland certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that SSDI and ADA claims do not conflict in such a way as to automatically bar anyone from raising them jointly. The Court explained that when determining SSDI eligibility, the significant ADA question of whether someone would have been capable of performing their job if "reasonable accommodations" had been made by their employer, is not considered. As such, the "reasonable accommodation" issue is left open for resolution during an ADA claim. The Court added that any inconsistencies between ADA and SSDI claims are even more trivial if the ADA claim is brought prior to an actual SSDI award - as Cleveland did. Even in clear cases, where a contradiction would seem to lie between the two claims, alleged victims must still have the opportunity to present their cases.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association (Association) wanted to run advertisements for lawful private casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi. The Association challenged the government's prohibition against such radio-and television-based advertising. After suffering defeat in both trial and appellate courts, the Association appealed and the Supreme Court granted them certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court found the advertising restrictions unconstitutional insofar as they applied to Louisiana-based advertisers - where the gambling activities being promoted are legal. The government failed to demonstrate that its restriction would alleviate harmful gambling practices to any material degree. Instead, the Court noted, the regulations in question provided only ineffective and remote support for the government's concerns, since all sorts of other gambling activities would continue unaffected. Thus, the government restrictions unfairly singled out a specific form of speech for regulation while leaving others untouched.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a plurality ruling, Justice John Paul Stevens delivered an opinion for a majority on several key points. The Court held that Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and provided law enforcement officials too much discretion to decide what activities constitute loitering. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that the ordinance's definition of loitering as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose" does not give people adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if a person does not violate the law until he refuses to disperse. "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty."