[Unknown Act > Facts]
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), plan administrators must provide all plan participants with a "summary plan description" (SPD), as well as a "summary of material modifications" when material changes are made to the plan. After CIGNA converted its traditional defined benefit pension plan to a cash balance plan, it issued a summary plan description to plan participants. In 2001, Janice Amara, one of the participants, filed a class-action lawsuit, claiming that CIGNA failed to comply with ERISA's notice requirements and SPD provisions. The U.S. District Court for the District Connecticut found for Amara, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the SPD misrepresented the terms of the plan itself.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order, finding that while the district court did not have authority under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA to reform CIGNA's pension plan, it did have authority to do so under another provision, Section 502(a)(3). In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court noted that "although §502(a)(1)(B) did not give the District Court authority to reform CIGNA's plan, relief is authorized by §502(a)(3), which allows a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary 'to obtain other appropriate equitable relief' to redress violations of ERISA 'or the [plan's] terms.'" Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas concurred only in the judgment. Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not take part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A North Carolina boy identified as J.D.B. was 13-year-old special education student in 2005 when the police showed up at his school to question him about a string of neighborhood burglaries. The police had learned that the boy was in possession of a digital camera that had been reported stolen.The boy was escorted to a school conference room, where he was interrogated in the presence of school officials. J.D.B.'s parents were not contacted, and he was not given any warnings about his rights under the 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, such as the right to remain silent or to have access to a lawyer. J.D.B. confessed to the crimes, but later sought to have his confession suppressed on the basis that he was never read his Miranda rights. He argued that because he was effectively in police custody when he incriminated himself, he was entitled to Miranda protections. In December 2009, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it could not consider the boy's age or special education status in determining whether he was in custody, and because he was not in custody, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. A divided Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the state court to determine whether the youth was in custody when he was interrogated. (1966). "It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis," Sotomayor wrote for the majority. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. "The Court's decision in this case may seem on first consideration to be modest and sensible, but in truth it is neither, Alito writes. "It is fundamentally inconsistent with one of the main justifications for the Miranda rule: the perceived need for a clear rule that can be easily applied in all cases. And today's holding is not needed to protect the constitutional rights of minors who are questioned by the police."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Michelle Ortiz, a former inmate, filed suit against several state and prison officials in an Ohio federal district court for violating her civil rights. While Ms. Ortiz served her sentence, she was sexually abused by a corrections officer on two consecutive nights. Prior to the second incident, Ms. Ortiz complained to prison officials, but was told "that the man was leaving," "this was his nature," and he "is just an old dirty man." The corrections officer assaulted her on the following night. At trial, the jury found in favor of Ms. Ortiz against two of the prison officials – Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the case. The court noted that while courts do not normally review the denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits, a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an exception to the general rule. The court reasoned that Ms. Jordan's conduct did not violate Ms. Ortiz's Eight Amendment right to humane conditions because Ms. Jordan was not "deliberately indifferent" to Ms. Ortiz's plight.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, which held that a party may not appeal a denial of summary judgment after a district court has conducted a full trial on the merits. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a special concurrence, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2005, Santa Clara County, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reports, alleging that pharmaceutical companies have systemically overcharged hospitals and clinics, making them pay millions of dollars more than necessary for prescription drugs. The Inspector General's report also argued that the government is ill-equipped to ensure that clinics are being charged correctly. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, but in March 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg that health care providers cannot sue drug makers for overcharging public hospitals for prescription drugs. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
David Henderson filed a claim for monthly compensation with the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office based on his need for in-home care. The Regional Office denied the claim. Mr. Henderson appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Office. He then filed a notice of appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims fifteen days after the expiration of the 120-day appeal period set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). The court of appeals denied the claim. The court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction because Mr. Henderson's notice of appeal was out of time and was not subject to equitable tolling.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. The majority held that the deadline for filing a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court does not have jurisdictional consequences. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Bayer Corp. withdrew the cholesterol-lowering drug, Baycol, from the market in August 2001 because of its alleged role in serious side effects and the deaths of some patients using the drug. Keith Smith and Shirley Sperlazza filed a lawsuit in West Virginia state court in 2001, seeking class certification for Baycol users throughout the state. Meanwhile, a separate putative West Virginia class action, filed was removed to federal court and consolidated as part of a multidistrict litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. In August 2008, the court denied certification on grounds that plaintiffs could not litigate economic loss claims as a class.
Counsel for Smith and Sperlazza later received a notice declaring that their case in West Virginia state court was bound by that ruling. They appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court order in January 2010.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's opinion in a unanimous decision by Justice Elena Kagan. "In enjoining the state court from considering Smith's class certification request, the federal court exceeded its authority under the 'relitigation exception' to the Act," Kagan wrote.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A class of Chase Bank ("Chase") credit card holders sued Chase in a California federal district alleging the bank violated the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). The investors argued that Chase violated the act when it increased interest rates retroactively after the credit account was closed as a result of a late payment to the bank. The district court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding in part that Regulation Z of TILA required a creditor, like Chase, to provide contemporaneous notice of interest rate increases that occurred because of customer default. Here, Chase failed to provide such notice.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor who held that at the time of the transactions at issue, Regulation Z did not require Chase to provide McCoy with a change-in-terms notice before implementing the agreement term allowing it to raise his interest rate.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Jason Ransom filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Nevada in 2006 and proposed a plan to make $500 monthly payments over a period of 60 months. The chapter 13 trustee and two creditors objected to confirmation of the plan, arguing that $500 per month was not Ransom's projected disposable income as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. They argued that Ransom improperly included a deduction against income for "vehicle ownership expense" of $471. The trustee and creditors claimed that the deduction should be disallowed and that the monthly payment should be increased. The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the trustee and refused to confirm the plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, agreeing to hear the appeal on this interlocutory issue, affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, Justice Elena Kagan, in her first opinion for the Court, ruled that a debtor who does not make loan or lease payments could not take the car-ownership deduction. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The owner of a patent for a computer language, i4i Limited Partnership brought suit against Microsoft Corp., alleging that the custom XML editor in certain versions of Microsoft Word, Microsoft's word-processing software, infringed i4i's patent. The jury found Microsoft liable for willful infringement, rejecting the company's argument that the patent was invalid, and awarded $200 million in damages to i4i.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied Microsoft's motions for a new trial. And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court order, finding that Microsoft needed to offer "clear and convincing evidence" to overcome the traditional presumption that patents approved by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are valid.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. "Section 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence," Sotomayor wrote. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alito, in which he "join[s] the Court's opinion in full" but added that "I write separately because, given the technical but important nature of the invalidity question, I believe it worth emphasizing that in this area of law as in others the evidentiary standard of proof applies to questions of fact and not to questions of law."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Marcus Sykes pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana enhanced Sykes' sentence under the ACCA after determining that he had previously been found guilty of three violent felonies.
In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that "fleeing police in a vehicle in violation of Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(A) is sufficiently similar to ACCA's enumerated crimes in kind, as well as the degree of risk posed, and counts as a violent felony under ACCA."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Felony vehicle flight, as proscribed by Indiana law, is a violent felony for purposes of ACCA," Kennedy wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he wrote: "the majority errs by implying that the 'purposeful, violent, and aggressive' test may still apply to offenses 'akin to strict liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes.'" Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which he chastises the majority for an "ad hoc judgment that will sow further confusion." Justice Elena Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "Vehicular flight comes in different varieties, and so too the statutes that criminalize the conduct," Kagan wrote. "Because petitioner Marcus Sykes was convicted only of simple vehicular flight, and not of any flight offense involving aggressive or dangerous activity, I would find that he did not commit a 'violent felony' under ACCA."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The case arose over a licensing dispute between Stanford University and pharmaceutical firm Roche Molecular System over the ownership of patents used in the company's HIV test kits. Stanford School of Medicine professor Mark Holodniy developed the technology behind the kits. As a researcher at the university, patents from his work would normally be automatically assigned to Stanford. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to retain the rights to research funded by federal grants. But Holodniy also signed a contract with Cetus Corp., a company that later sold its line of business to Roche, that give the company the patent to anything that resulted from their collaboration. In February 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the university lacked standing to maintain patent infringement claims against Roche.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a decision by Chief Justice John Roberts. "The Bayh-Dole Act does not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such inventions," Roberts wrote for the majority. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, noting that while she agrees with them majority that "the appropriate disposition is to affirm. Like the dissent, however, I understand the majority opinion to permit consideration of these arguments in a future case." Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He argued that the case should have been remanded to the Federal Circuit for further argument.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A California federal district court convicted Ruben Flores-Villar under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") of being a deported alien found in the United States. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Flores-Villar argued that the relevant provisions of the INA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of age and gender. The provisions impose a five-year residency requirement, after age fourteen, on United States citizen fathers but not mothers, whose residency requirement is merely one year. The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's holding in Nguyen v. INS which did not deal precisely with the provisions before the court, but held that other more onerous residency requirements for fathers but not mothers in the INA did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that the provisions challenged by Mr. Flores-Villar also did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and affirmed the judgment of the district court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Without answering the question, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an unsigned per curiam opinion. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2002, the Jicarilla Apache Nation of New Mexico sued the federal government for allegedly mismanaging financial interests and funds, which are held in trust for the tribe's benefit. The tribe is seeking access to attorney-client communications about the trust operation. The Court of Federal Claims denied a petition by the United States to vacate its orders requiring the government to produce the documents.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "The fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege does not apply to the general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes," Alito wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the majority decision "rests on false factual and legal premises and deprives the Nation and other Indian tribes of highly relevant evidence in scores of pending cases seeking relief for the Government's alleged mismanagement of their trust funds." Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Jose Tolentino was pulled over for playing his music too loudly. The officer ran a check on Tolentino's DMV files and discovered that not only was his license suspended, but it had also been suspended at least 10 times prior. Tolentino was arrested and charged with first-degree aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. He pleaded guilty in exchange for five years' probation. He later appealed, claiming his driving record should have been suppressed, because the police stop and subsequent DMV record search were illegal. The Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court, disagreed and upheld his sentence.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a per curiam opinion, the case was dismissed as improvidently granted.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
French-based SEB S.A. sells home cooking products in the United States through an indirect subsidiary, T-Fal Corp. SEB owns a patent for a type of deep fryer with an inexpensive plastic outer shell. The improvement of the patent was to separate the shell from the fryer pan to allow for the less expensive material. Hong Kong-based Pentalpha Enterprises, a subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances, a British Virgin Islands corporation, began selling its deep fryers to Sunbeam Products Inc. in 1997. The company developed the product after purchasing an SEB deep fryer and copying its features. Though Pentalpha solicited and received a "right-to-use study" from a U.S. attorney citing no infringement of any patent, the company had failed to notify the attorney of the copying. SEB filed a lawsuit against Sunbeam and the companies settled. Though Pentalpha was aware of that litigation, it subsequently sold the same deep fryers to Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co. In 1999, SEB sued Montgomery Ward, Global-Tech, and Pentalpha for infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which ruled against Pentalpha. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision and further held that "deliberate indifference" to potential patent rights satisfies the knowledge requirement for induced infringement.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court holding in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "Induced infringement under §271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement," Alito wrote for the majority. Justice Anthony Kennedy dissented, contending that the majority is "incorrect in the definition it now adopts; but even on its own terms the Court should remand to the Court of Appeals to consider in the first instance whether there is sufficient evidence of knowledge to support the jury's finding of inducement."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A 2004 Bush administration antiterrorism initiative extended background checks required for many government jobs to contract employees, including scientists and engineers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a research facility operated by the California Institute of Technology under a contract with NASA. Twenty-eight lab employees, who do not have security clearances and are not involved in classified or military activities, filed suit over what they considered to be overly intrusive background checks. A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered the background checks halted while the case continued. The divided court later declined an en banc review.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The court reversed the lower court decision and upheld the background checks that NASA uses for employees of companies working under contract in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas also filed his own concurring opinion. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Glen Milner, a member of an organization dedicated to raising community awareness about the dangers of Navy training exercises near Puget Sound, sued the Department of the Navy in a Washington federal district court under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") to obtain the release of Navy documents relating to the effects of explosions at several locations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that documents relating to the effects of explosions constituted internal personnel rules and regulations of the agency which are subject to exemption from disclosure by the FOIA. The court reasoned that such documents are "predominantly" for internal agency use that present a risk, that if disclosed, would circumvent agency regulation.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in an 8-1 opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. The majority opinion held that "because Exemption 2 encompasses only records relating to employee relations and human resources issues, the explosives maps and data requested here do not qualify for withholding under that exemption."
Justice Samuel Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which he agreed with the judgment but noted: "I write separately to underscore the alternative argument that the Navy raised below, which rested on Exemption 7(F) and which will remain open on remand. " Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, backing the decision of the appeals court and writing that in this case, "I would let sleeping legal dogs lie."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Watchmaker Omega S.A. sued Costco Wholesale Corp. when it bought a shipment of the Swiss-made watches from another importer and sold them for below Omega's suggested retail price. Omega contends that Costco's sale infringes on their copyright of the Omega logo on the back face of the watch. Meanwhile, Costco argues that Omega is precluded from bringing a copyright action after a sale due to the Doctrine of Exhaustion, or "first sale" rule, under which certain rights are "exhausted" after a sale of the copyrighted good.
A judge on the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California backed Costco, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the first-sale doctrine did not apply to imported goods manufactured abroad.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court deadlocked 4-4, which means that the appeals court ruling against Costco stays in place, though the case sets no new high court precedent because it ended in a tie. The tie was possible because Justice Elena Kagan recused herself in the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Donald Bullcoming of New Mexico was sentenced to two years in prison for a felony aggravated DWI/DUI. The State introduced a blood alcohol test (blood draw) that was taken from Bullcoming under a search warrant issued following his refusal of the breath alcohol test. Bullcoming argued that the laboratory report of his blood draw results was testimonial evidence subject to the Confrontation Clause.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and upheld the trial court's ruling that the forensic report was a business record. The court ruled that a blood alcohol report is admissible as a public record and that it presented no issue under the Confrontation Clause because the report was non-testimonial. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted discretionary review, but while the case was pending, this U.S. Supreme Court issued its 2009 decision in Melendez-Diaz v.Massachusetts, clarifying that forensic laboratory reports are testimonial and therefore the Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits. In applying the Melendez-Diaz ruling, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the blood alcohol report was testimonial evidence, but it was admissible even though the forensic analyst who performed the test did not testify.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The Confrontation Clause does not permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification, made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial, through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of the test reported in the certification," Ginsburg wrote, adding: "The accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification." Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined all but Part 4 of the opinion; Justice Clarence Thomas joined all but Part 4 and Footnote 6. Sotomayor concurred in part, writing: "I agree with the Court that the trial court erred by admitting the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) report. I write separately first to highlight why I view the report at issue to be testimonial—specifically because its 'primary purpose' is evidentiary—and second to emphasize the limited reach of the Court's opinion." Meanwhile, Anthony Kennedy dissented, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel Alito. "Far from replacing live testimony with 'systematic' and 'extrajudicial' examinations, these procedures are fully consistent with the Confrontation Clause and with well-established principles for ensuring that criminal trials are conducted in full accord with requirements of fairness and reliability and with the confrontation guarantee."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Sarah Greene filed a lawsuit against Bob Camreta, a caseworker with the Oregon Department of Human Services, and Deputy Sheriff James Alford, contending they interviewed her daughter without a warrant, probable cause or parental consent. The girl's father, Nimrod Greene, was arrested for allegedly molesting a 7-year-old boy. The boy's mother told police that Sarah Greene had complained that she "doesn't like the way Nimrod makes (his daughters) sleep in his bed when he is intoxicated and she doesn't like the way he acts when they are sitting in his lap." After interviewing one of the girls, Camreta concluded that she had been sexually abused and had the girls removed from the home. Nimrod was charged with sexually assaulting the boy and one of his own daughters. After a mistrial, he accepted a plea bargain in which he maintained his innocence but admitted there was enough evidence to convict him. Greene insisted the allegations were lies, and the daughter who was interviewed later recanted her statements. District Court Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the lawsuit. In December 2009, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed, allowing Greene to pursue her Fourth Amendment claims against both defendants.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Supreme Court declined to address the Fourth Amendment question in the case. "We conclude that this Court generally may review a lower court's constitutional ruling at the behest of a government official granted immunity. But we may not do so in this case for reasons peculiar to it. The case has become moot because the child has grown up and moved across the country, and so will never again be subject to the Oregon in-school interviewing practices whose constitutionality is at issue," Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the majority. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion and Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. "I agree with the Court's conclusion that this case is moot and that vacatur is the appropriate disposition; unlike the majority, however, I would go no further," Sotomayor wrote. "The majority suggests that we must decide whether Camreta has a 'right to appeal' in order to vacate the judgment below. But that view does not accord with our past practice." Meanwhile, Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. "The correct solution is not to override jurisdictional rules that are basic to the functioning of the Court and to the necessity of avoiding advisory opinions," Kennedy argued.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In April 2008, a federal court jury found Frantz DePierre guilty of distributing cocaine. He was also found guilty of distributing more than 50 grams of cocaine base, which carries a 10-year minimum sentence. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the sentence, citing its past precedent. The opinion also notes that the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits also interpret the statute the same way.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Cocaine base "means not just 'crack cocaine,' but cocaine in its chemically basic form," Sotomayor wrote for the court. Justice Antonin Scalia declines to join Section III-A, which is the portion of the opinion that discusses legislative history.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Police officers in Lexington, Ky., entered an apartment building in pursuit of a suspect who sold crack cocaine to an undercover informant. The officers lost sight of the suspect and mistakenly assumed he entered an apartment from which they could detect the odor of marijuana. After police knocked on the door and identified themselves, they heard movements, which they believed indicated evidence was about to be destroyed. Police forcibly entered the apartment and found Hollis King and others smoking marijuana. They also found cash, drugs and paraphernalia. King entered a conditional guilty plea; reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from what he argued was an illegal search.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that exigent circumstances supporting the warrantless search were not of the police's making and that police did not engage in deliberate and intentional conduct to evade the warrant requirement. In January 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower court order, finding that the entry was improper. The court held that the police were not in pursuit of a fleeing suspect when they entered the apartment, since there was no evidence that the original suspect even knew he was being followed by police.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Samuel Alito. "The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment," Alito wrote for the majority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, contending that "the Court today arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in drug cases. "


[Unknown Act > Facts]
An accident severed four fingers off the right hand of Robert Nicastro who was operating a recycling machine used to cut metal. A British company manufactured the machine and sold it through its exclusive U.S. distributor. Nicastro sued J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., the British company, and its U.S. distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., in New Jersey state court for product liability. The state supreme court reversed a trial court's dismissal, finding that the foreign company had sufficient contacts with the state.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court in a plurality opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Although the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an extensive opinion with careful attention to this Court's cases and to its own precedent, the 'stream of commerce' metaphor carried the decision far afield," Kennedy wrote. "Due process protects the defendant's right not to be coerced except by lawful judicial power." Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, concurred in the judgment, writing: "I do not doubt that there have been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by our precedents. But this case does not present any of those issues. So I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day consequences." Meanwhile, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. "Inconceivable as it may have seemed yesterday, the splintered majority today 'turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors market it.'"


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Clifton Terelle McNeill was sentenced to 300 months imprisonment after he was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and 240 months imprisonment for unlawful possession with intent to distribute approximately 3.1 grams of crack cocaine.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina determined McNeill to be an armed career criminal and then departed upward from the United States Sentencing Guidelines to sentence McNeill to the maximum sentence applicable. McNeill contends that he is not eligible for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the drug-related convictions upon which the district court relied do not qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit affirmed the district court order.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. "A federal sentencing court must determine whether 'an offense under State law' is a 'serious drug offense' by consulting the 'maximum term of imprisonment' applicable to a defendant's prior state drug offense at the time of the defendant's conviction for that offense," Thomas wrote.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Investors in Matrixx Inititiatives, Inc. ("Matrixx") filed suit against the company in an Arizona federal district court for violations of federal securities laws. The investors alleged that Matrixx failed to disclose that one of its products, Zicam nasal spray/gel, caused anosmia (the loss of the sense of smell) in numerous customers. The district court dismissed the case holding that the investors failed to alleged "materiality" in their claim because their evidence was not "statistically significant."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the investors had pled sufficient facts going to the issue of materiality in order to avoid dismissal. The court reasoned that whether facts are statistically significant, and thus, material, is a question of fact that should ordinarily be left to the trier of fact – usually the jury. Here, the district court erred when it took liberties in making that determination on its own.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The court ruled that the materiality of a pharmaceutical company's non-disclosure of adverse event reports in a securities fraud action does not depend upon whether there is a statistically significant health risk.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
1950, Montana, Wyoming and North Dakota signed the Yellowstone River Compact, which spelled out how the states would share water. In 2007, Montana sued Wyoming, alleging farmers and other water users along the Powder and Tongue rivers were being harmed by Wyoming's excessive water use. Attorneys for Wyoming argued that much of the water used by the state's residents and businesses was not covered by the 1950 agreement.
Special Master Barton Thompson issued an interim report, finding that Montana had grounds to sue over Wyoming's expanded use of water since 1950. However, Thompson rejected Montana's claim that Wyoming should be held liable for increased water use due to irrigation improvements. Meanwhile, North Dakota, also a member of the Yellowstone compact, was named as a second defendant in the original lawsuit. But Montana officials have said its inclusion was a formality and that they have no disagreement with their eastern neighbor.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In an opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court agreed with the Special Master who found that "Montana's allegation fails to state a claim because more efficient irrigation systems are permissible under the compact so long as the conserved water is used to irrigate the same acreage watered in 1950." Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, arguing that the "court's analysis substitutes its none-too-confident reading of the common law and the compact's definition of 'beneficial use.'" Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In January 2005, Vinton, Louisiana Police Chief Billy Ray Vice, who was seeking re-election to his post, sent fellow candidate Ricky Fox an "anonymous" letter trying to blackmail him into dropping out of the race. A month later, someone accused Fox of uttering a racial slur and, at Vice's instigation, filed a false police report regarding Fox's alleged use of the term. Fox brought a civil rights suit against Vice and the town in state court in December 2005, asserting both state and federal claims, and the case was removed to federal court in January 2006. Separately, in April 2007, Vice was tried and found guilty of extortion in state criminal court for the anonymous letter. In 2007, in response to a motion filed by the defendants, Fox admitted that he had failed to properly present any federal cause of action, so the district court dismissed Fox's federal claims with prejudice and remanded the remaining state law claims to state court. The district court then granted the defendants' motion for attorneys' fees, finding that Fox's federal claims were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. Fox appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and in a split decision the appeals court affirmed the district court's order.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. "When a plaintiff's suit involves both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, a court may grant reasonable fees to the defendant, but only for costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims," Kagan wrote.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Eric Thompson and his fiancée-then-wife, Miriam Regalado, worked for North American Stainless, the owner and operator of a stainless steel manufacturing facility in Carroll County, KY. Regalado filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in September 2002, alleging that her supervisors discriminated against her based on her gender. On February 13, 2003, the EEOC notified North American Stainless of the charge. Slightly more than three weeks later, North American Stainless terminated Thompson's employment. Thompson filed a complaint, which alleged that he was fired in retaliation for Regalado's EEOC charge. Retaliating in that way, Thompson asserted, violated section 704(a) of Title VII, which forbids an employer to "discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has... made a charge ... under this title." The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Thompson's complaint, holding that Title VII "does not permit third party retaliation claims." A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court order. But the court of appeals granted the employer's petition for rehearing en banc. A splintered en banc court upheld the dismissal of Thompson's complaint.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, which held that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct, including Thompson's cause of action. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On December 11, 2006, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic terminated Kevin Kasten's employment. Mr. Kasten filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") in a Wisconsin federal district court alleging that he was retaliated against for filing complaints about the legality of the location of Saint- Gobain's time clocks. Mr. Kasten alleges that the location of the time clocks prevented employees from being paid for time spent donning and doffing their required protective gear. Saint-Gobain motioned for summary judgment arguing that purely verbal complaints, like those made by Mr. Kasten, were not protected activity under the FLSA. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that unwritten, purely verbal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. The majority held that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to a complaint, whether oral or written. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. "The retaliation provision contemplates an official grievance filed with a court or an agency, not oral complaints—or even formal, written complaints — from an employee to an employer," Scalia argued. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2006, the Tohono O'odham Nation of Southern Arizona filed a complaint against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the United States government handled $2.1 billion in transactions for the nation between 1972 and 1992 and "has never fulfilled its duty to provide a true and adequate accounting' of the trust funds. The lawsuit also alleged "gross mismanagement" by the federal government. One day later, the tribe filed a similar complaint against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims seeking monetary damages for the earnings shortfall in its trust accounts. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the lawsuit because a similar claim was being heard by a different court in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1500. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the CFC's dismissal of the case, concluding, "the Nation's complaint in the Court of Federal Claims seeks relief that is different from the relief sought in its earlier-filed district court action."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "The Court of Appeals was wrong to allow its precedent to suppress the statute's aims," Kennedy wrote for the majority. "The conclusion that two suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are based on substantially the same operative facts allows the statute to achieve its aim." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which she argued: "To avoid both duplication and the running of the statute of limitations, the CFC suit could be stayed while the companion District Court action proceeds." Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Eight states, New York City and three land conservation groups filed suit against four electric power companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority, five entities that they claimed were the largest sources of greenhouse gases. The lawsuit alleged that the utility companies, which operate facilities in 21 states, are a public nuisance because their carbon-dioxide emissions contribute to global warming. American Electric Power Co. and the other utilities argued that the courts should not get involved in the issue. The companies contended that only the Environmental Protection Agency can set emissions standards. A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York initially threw out the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said it could continue.
The states in the lawsuit are: California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. The Open Space Institute, the Open Space Conservancy and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire also are plaintiffs. The other utilities are Cinergy Co., Southern Co. Inc. of Georgia, and Xcel Energy Inc. of Minnesota.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The Clean Air Act and the EPA action the Act authorizes displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants."
Justice Samuel Alito concurred in part and in the judgment, writing: "I agree with the Court's displacement analysis on the assumption (which I make for the sake of argument because no party contends otherwise) that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act adopted by the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA is correct." Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not take part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Betty Dukes, a Wal-Mart "greeter" at a Pittsburg, Calif., store, and five other women filed a class action lawsuit in which they alleged that the company's nationwide policies resulted in lower pay for women than men in comparable positions and longer wait for management promotions than men. The certified class, which in 2001 was estimated to comprise more than 1.5 million women, includes all women employed by Wal-Mart nationwide at any time after December 26, 1998, making this the largest class action lawsuit in U.S. history. Wal-Mart has argued that the court should require employees to file on an individual basis, contending that class actions of this size – formed under Rule 23(b) of the federal rules of civil procedure — are inherently unmanageable and unduly costly. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has three times upheld the class certification.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Here, proof of commonality necessarily overlaps with respondents' merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination. The crux of a Title VII inquiry is 'the reason for a particular employment decision,' and respondents wish to sue for millions of employment decisions at once," Scalia wrote. "Without some glue holding together the alleged reasons for those decisions, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members' claims will produce a common answer to the crucial discrimination question." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. "Whether the class the plaintiffs describe meets the specific requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) is not before the Court, and I would reserve that matter for consideration and decision on remand," Ginsburg wrote.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In January 2007, Michael Turner appeared in Oconee County, S.C., Family Court because he was behind in his child support obligation. He did not have an attorney, and he was not asked whether he needed or wanted representation. He presented some evidence of his inability to work, but the court made no finding as to Turner's indigent status. The judge held him in contempt and sentenced him to one year in jail. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Turner's argument for court-appointed counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Stephen Breyer. "We conclude that where as here the custodial parent (entitled to receive the support) is unrepresented by counsel, the State need not provide counsel to the noncustodial parent (required to provide the support), " Breyer wrote for the 5-4 majority. "But we attach an important caveat, namely, that the State must nonetheless have in place alternative procedures that assure a fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support order." Meanwhile, Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined in full by Justice Antonin Scalia and in part by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt proceedings."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
As a member of the U.S. Army Reserves, Vincent Staub was required to attend occasional weekend training as well as a two-week training program during the summer. Staub was also a lab technician at Proctor Hospital in Peoria, Ill. He was fired in 2004 and later filed a lawsuit claiming that his supervisor was out to get him as a result of disapproval of his military service. He won $57,640 in damages at trial. But a more senior executive, not the supervisor, ultimately decided to fire Staub. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the decision-maker shared the supervisor's anti-military bias.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous decision announced by Justice Antonin Scalia. "If a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable," wrote Scalia. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in the judgment but wrote that he would hold employers liable if the person making the firing decision "merely rubberstamps" a biased supervisor's recommendation or when the decision-maker is "put on notice that adverse information about an employee may be based on antimilitary animus but does not undertake an independent investigation of the matter."
Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress sought to open up the local telephone markets to competition by requiring incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share their equipment and services with competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). Under early interpretations of the law, incumbent-constructed entrance facilities had to provide at-cost access to the competitors. In AT&T Inc. unit Michigan Bell Telephone Co.'s interpretation, the FCC's Triennial Review Remand Order in 2005 created a means to charge for the use of the facilities, and the company announced plans to do so.
Competitor carriers complained to the Michigan Public Service Commission, and it ruled that the entrance facilities should still be provided at cost. Michigan Bell sued in federal court and won. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the lower court in a decision by Justice Clarence Thomas. "The FCC has advanced a reasonable interpretation of its regulations — i.e., that to satisfy its duty under §251(c)(2), an incumbent LEC must make its existing entrance facilities available to competitors at cost-based rates if the facilities are to be used for interconnection — and this Court defers to the FCC's views," Thomas wrote. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, noting: "I would reach the same result even without benefit of the rule that we will defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations." Meanwhile, Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The saga continues in the long-running inheritance dispute over the estate of a deceased Texas billionare. J. Howard Marshall's will left nearly all his money to his son, E. Pierce Marshall, and nothing to (now deceased wife) Anna Nicole Smith, aka Vickie Lynn Marshall. The younger Marshall died in 2006 and Smith died of a drug overdose in 2007. Smith had previously fought the will, claiming that her husband promised to leave her more than $300 million. Howard K. Stern, Smith's former attorney and boyfriend, has continued the legal battle on behalf of Smith's estate. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Marshall was mentally fit and under no undue pressure when he wrote a will leaving nearly all of his $1.6 billion estate to his son and nothing to Smith.
The Supreme Court will revisit the estate battle four years after the justices sent the case back to lower courts for further review. In the earlier case, the court only addressed whether or not federal courts can rule on Smith's claims.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Conclusion: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Although the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on Vickie's counterclaim, it lacked the constitutional authority to do so," the chief justice wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. The majority "fails to follow the analysis that this Court more recently has held applicable to the evaluation of claims of a kind before us here, namely, claims that a congressional delegation of adjudicatory authority violates separation-of-powers principles derived from Article III," Breyer wrote.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Arizona enacted a campaign finance law that provides matching funds to candidates who accept public financing. The law, passed in 1998, gives an initial sum to candidates for state office who accept public financing and then provides additional matching funds based on the amounts spent by privately financed opponents and by independent groups. In 2008, some Republican candidates and a political action committee, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, filed suit arguing that to avoid triggering matching funds for their opponents, they had to limit their spending and, in essence, their freedom of speech.
The U.S. District Court for District of Arizona found the matching-funds provision unconstitutional. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the case, saying it found "minimal" impact on freedom of speech.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a decision by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Arizona's matching funds scheme substantially burdens political speech and is not sufficiently justified by a compelling interest to survive First Amendment scrutiny," the chief justice writing for the majority, noted that the holding does not contend that the First Amendment forbids all public financing. Meanwhile, Justice Elena Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. "The First Amendment's core purpose is to foster a healthy, vibrant political system full of robust discussion and debate," Kagan argued, adding: "Nothing in Arizona's anti-corruption statute, the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, violates this constitutional protection. To the contrary, the Act promotes the values underlying both the First Amendment and our entire Constitution by enhancing the 'opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people.'"


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2005, Duryea police chief Charles Guarnieri filed a discrimination lawsuit against the Pennsylvania borough, alleging that council members retaliated against him because he had successfully challenged a 2003 decision to fire him. Guarnieri had challenged his firing through arbitration and was reinstated to his position as chief in 2005. His suit alleged that council then issued 11 employment directives, which he claimed placed humiliating restrictions on him, to retaliate against him. He further alleged the borough improperly withheld overtime pay from him and had improperly delayed issuing health insurance benefits. A jury heard the case in April 2008 and awarded Guarnieri $45,358 in compensatory damages and $52,000 in punitive damages. The borough appealed, arguing the evidence did not support the verdict. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the overall verdict entered by a federal jury, but it overturned the panel's award of $52,000 in punitive damages. The ruling differs from decisions by all 10 other federal circuits and four state supreme courts.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "A government employer's allegedly retaliatory actions against an employee do not give rise to liability under the Petition Clause unless the employee's petition relates to a matter of public concern," Kennedy wrote. "The Third Circuit's conclusion that the public concern test does not limit public employees' Petition Clause claims is incorrect." Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, writing: "Even where a public employee petitions the government in its capacity as sovereign, I would balance the employee's right to petition the sovereign against the government's interest as an employer in the effective and efficient management of its internal affairs." Meanwhile, Justice Antonin Scalia dissented in part: "I find the proposition that a lawsuit is a constitutionally protected 'Petition' quite doubtful."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of "violent video games" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute "obscenity" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection." Justice Samuel Alito concurred in judgment, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts. Alito noted that he disagreed "with the approach taken in the Court's opinion. In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We should make every effort to understand the new technology." Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer filed separate dissents. Adhering to his strict understanding of the Framers' intent with the Constitution, Thomas wrote: "The Court's decision today does not comport with the original public understanding of the First Amendment." Breyer argued that the California statute met current constitutional standards.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Prison Law Office in Berkeley, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit in April 2001 on behalf of Marciano Plata and several other prisoners, alleging that California prisons were in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which bans "cruel and unusual punishment." Following a lengthy trial, a special panel of three federal judges determined that serious overcrowding in California's 33 prisons was the "primary cause" for violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court ordered the release of enough prisoners so the inmate population would come within 137.5 percent of the prisons' total design capacity. That amounts to between 38,000 and 46,000 inmates being released.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of special panel in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "The court-mandated population limit is necessary to remedy the violation of prisoners' constitutional rights and is authorized by the PLRA," Kenney wrote for the 5-4 majority. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, in which he admonished the majority for affirming "what is perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation's history: an order requiring California to release the staggering number of 46,000 convicted criminals." Justice Samuel Alito filed a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, in which he wrote that the "Constitution does not give federal judges the authority to run state penal systems."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Police arrested Willie Gene Davis after a traffic stop. He subsequently gave a false name to the officers. After discovering his real name, the officers arrested him, handcuffed him and put him in the police car for giving false information to a police officer. Then they searched the vehicle and found a gun in his jacket. He was charged and convicted for possession of an illegal weapon. Following a jury trial, Davis was convicted and sentenced to 220 months in prison. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that while the search was illegal the evidence found in the vehicle was still admissible.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule," Alito wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the judgment only. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The Court finds a new 'good faith' exception which prevents application of the normal remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation, namely, suppression of the illegally seized evidence," Breyer notes, adding: "At this point I can no longer agree with the Court. A new 'good faith' exception and this Court's retroactivity decisions are incompatible."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A Texas state court convicted Henry Skinner of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mr. Skinner brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the prosecuting attorney in a Texas federal district court alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated when the district attorney refused to allow him access to biological evidence for DNA testing. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that circuit precedent established that Mr. Skinner's claim was not cognizable as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, but instead must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in which the majority found that Skinner had "properly invoked § 1983."
Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel Alito. Thomas cautioned: "Allowing such challenges under § 1983 would undermine Congress' strict limitations on federal review of state habeas decisions. If cognizable at all, Skinner's claim sounds in habeas corpus."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Nevada law requires elected officials to disqualify themselves when they are asked to vote on matters that touch on ''commitments in a private capacity.'' In 2006, a member of the Sparks City, Nevada Council, Michael A. Carrigan, disclosed that his campaign manager was a consultant to a business seeking to develop a casino, before voting its way in a land-use matter. The Nevada Commission on Ethics later ruled that the vote was improper and censured Carrigan.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that decision, saying it violated the First Amendment and citing the Supreme Court's decision last year in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. ''Voting by an elected public officer on public issues is protected speech under the First Amendment, '' Justice Michael Douglas wrote for the majority.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "The Nevada Ethics in Government Law is not unconstitutionally overbroad," Scalia wrote for the unanimous court. Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which he noted: "the opinion does not, and on this record should not, consider a free speech contention that would have presented issues of considerable import, were it to have been a proper part of the case." Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing: "I concur in the judgment, but I do not agree with the opinion of the Court insofar as it suggests that restrictions upon legislators' voting are not restrictions upon legislators' speech."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Charles Andrew Fowler shot and killed Christopher Todd Horner for trying to interfere with his plan to rob a bank with four other men. Horner had approached Fowler's accomplices as they sat in a stolen Oldsmobile, decked out in black clothes and gloves. Fowler, who had stepped out of the car to use cocaine, snuck up behind Horner, grabbed his gun, forced him to get on his knees and shot him in the back of the head. One of Fowler's accomplices later implicated him in the murder, and a jury convicted Fowler of killing Horner with the intent to prevent him from communicating information about a federal offense. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus 10 years. Fowler claimed the government failed to prove that a federal investigation would have been likely, and that Horner would have transferred the information to a federal officer or judge. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Stephen Breyer. "The Government must show that there was a reasonable likelihood that a relevant communication would have been made to a federal officer," Breyer wrote. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he wrote that "although I agree the case should be remanded for the Eleventh Circuit to consider whether the objection to sufficiency of the evidence was preserved or whether the District Court committed plain error, I would hold that there was insufficient evidence to support Fowler's conviction." Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. The majority opinion " veers off course when it goes on to hold that the prosecution was required to show that, if Officer Horner had not been killed, there was a 'reasonable likelihood' that his information would have reached a federal officer," Alito wrote.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Harvey Sossamon, a Texas inmate, sued the state of Texas and various state officials in their official and individual capacities in a Texas federal district court. In part, he argued that he was denied access to the prison's chapel and religious services in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). The district court dismissed the claim.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Sossamon could not sue Texas officials in their individual capacities under the RLUIPA. The court reasoned that because the Act was passed pursuant to Congress' Spending Power and not its Fourteenth Amendment Power, it did not create a cause of action for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacities. As to official-capacity lawsuits, the Fifth Circuit held that regardless of whether RLUIPA creates such a cause of action, it is barred by Texas's sovereign immunity.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. "States, in accepting federal funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages under RLUIPA," Thomas wrote for the 6-2 majority. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Stephen J. Breyer. "Our precedents make clear that the phrase 'appropriate relief' includes monetary relief," she argued. "By adopting a contrary reading of the term, the majority severely undermines the 'broad protection of religious exercise' Congress intended the statute to provide." Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research ("Mayo") and the University of Minnesota ("University") sued the United States in a Minnesota federal district court seeking a refund for taxes paid under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA"). They argued that payments made to doctors in their residency qualify for FICA's student exemption. The district court agreed and awarded judgment in favor of Mayo and the University.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the residents in this case did not qualify for the FICA exemption. The court reasoned that Treasury Regulation 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10) excludes "full-time employees" from the FICA student exemption. Here, the resident doctors were full-time employees and, therefore, were excluded from the FICA exemption.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. writing for a unanimous Court, upheld the Treasury Department's rule that treats medical residents as full-time employees, and therefore not exempt from the payment of payroll taxes is a valid interpretation of federal law. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the decision.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A California state court convicted Scott Lynn Pinholster of double murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, he petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial. The district court upheld Pinholster's conviction but granted habeas relief on his death sentence. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.
During rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the District Court’s grant of habeas relief, holding that the denial of habeas relief during the guilt phase was appropriate, but not during the penalty phase. The court noted that Strickland v. Washington requires trial counsel to investigate mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Here, the court reasoned that Pinholster's counsel failed meet to meet his obligations.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. Limiting "review to the state-court record is consistent with our precedents," Thomas wrote for the 5-4 majority. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a partial dissent in which he contended that "I do not join Part III, for I would send this case back to the Court of Appeals so that it can apply the legal standards that Part II announces to the complex facts of this case." Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan, dissented in full. "Some habeas petitioners are unable to develop the factual basis of their claims in state court through no fault of their own," Sotomayor argued.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, "notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. The Court held that the First Amendment shields those who stage a protest at the funeral of a military service member from liability. Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which he wrote that while he agreed with the majority's conclusion in the case, "I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point." Justice Samuel Alito filed a lone dissent, in which he argued: "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
First Derivative Traders, individually, and on behalf of various Janus Capital Group ("JCG") shareholders sued JCG and its investment advisor subsidiary Janus Capital Management ("JCM") in the Colorado federal district court (subsequently transferred to the Maryland federal district court) alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. They argued that JCG and JCM unlawfully made misleading statements in prospectuses about various Janus funds, most notably that it did not permit "market timing" of the funds – the practice of rapidly trading in and out of a mutual fund to take advantage of inefficiencies in the way the funds are valued. The district court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that investors stated a claim against JCG and JCM by asserting that both were responsible for making misleading statements about the funds' prohibition of market timing. The court reasoned that JCG investors would have inferred that, even if JCM had not itself written the alleged misstatements about JCG's practice of market timing, JCM must have at least approved of the statements.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. "Because the false statements included in the prospectuses were made by Janus Investment Fund, not by JCM, JCM and JCG cannot be held liable in a private action under Rule 10b–5," Justice Thomas wrote. Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. "The majority has incorrectly interpreted the Rule's word 'make,'" Breyer argued. "Both language and case law indicate that, depending upon the circumstances, a management company, a board of trustees, individual company officers, or others, separately or together, might 'make' statements contained in a firm's prospectus—even if a board of directors has ultimate content-related responsibility."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Customers brought a class action lawsuit against AT&T Mobility LLC in a California federal district court. They alleged that the company's offer of a free phone to anyone who signed up for its service was fraudulent to the extent the company charged the new subscriber sales tax on the retail value of each free phone. AT&T moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause contained within its contract of service. The district court denied the motion.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that (1) the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") did not expressly or impliedly preempt California law governing unconcionability.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a decision by Justice Antonin Scalia. The 5-4 majority held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts "state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives." Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. "The Court is wrong to hold that the federal Act pre-empts the rule of state law," wrote Breyer.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A Michigan trial court convicted Richard Perry Bryant of second degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. On appeal, Mr. Bryant challenged the admission of the victim's statements at trial for violating his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The victim stated that Mr. Bryant shot him, but died shortly thereafter. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements that the victim made to police before his death were testimonial and their admission violated Mr. Bryant's right to confrontation. The court reasoned that the victim's statements were made in the course of a police interrogation whose primary purpose was to establish or prove events that had already occurred, not to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency. Therefore, the lower court held that the statements were "testimonial" for the purposes of the enhanced confrontation protections set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington and should not have been admitted against Mr. Bryant at trial because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the victim prior to his death.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in a majority opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The court held that the identification and description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were "not testimonial statements because they had a 'primary purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.' Therefore, their admission at Bryant's trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause." Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
In a strongly-worded dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia criticized the majority opinion for distorting "our confrontation clause jurisprudence and leav[ing] it in a shambles. Instead of clarifying the law, the court makes itself the obfuscator of last resort." The majority, he continued, "creates an expansive exception to the confrontation clause for violent crimes." In a separate dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg agreed with Scalia, but observed a "well-established exception to the confrontation requirement: The cloak protecting the accused against admission of out-of-court testimonial statements was removed for dying declarations."
Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2006, pilot Stanmore Cooper disclosed that he was HIV-positive to Social Security officials in order to receive medical benefits but withheld his status from the Federal Aviation Administration. But the Social Security Administration then turned over his medical records to the FAA, which revoked his license. Cooper filed suit against the agency for emotional distress for mishandling his medical records. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the exchange of records was improper and that Cooper has standing to sue.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-3 decision written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court held that the Privacy Act's "actual damages" provision only allowed Cooper to recover for proven pecuniary or economic harm. Justice Alito cited the Court's rule that legislatures must unequivocally express waivers of sovereign immunity, and that any ambiguities in the statutory text must be construed in favor of immunity. He investigated the use of the term "actual damages" in various federal statutes, determining that it does not have a consistent legal meaning. Justice Alito inferred that congress may have intended "actual damages" to refer to pecuniary damages; under this interpretation, Privacy Act victims would have to show pecuniary loss or be barred from recovery. He also noted that congress did not make a separate Privacy Act provision for "general damages," often defined as non-pecuniary damages.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer. She rejected the majority's strict interpretation of the sovereign immunity canon and argued that the traditional tools of statutory interpretation provided a better explanation of congress' intent. Looking to the text, to prominent secondary source definitions, and to the historical context of the act, Justice Sotomayor determined that congress intended "actual damages" to be synonymous with compensatory damages, which are not limited to pecuniary damages; it used the term "actual damages" to limit recovery to damages proven by evidence on record.
Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Anthony Cooper was convicted of shooting a woman in the thigh and buttocks after missing a shot to her head. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the conviction after Cooper claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. His lawyer told him not to take a plea offer, thinking that there could not be a finding that Cooper intended to murder his victim. But Cooper was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other charges. The appeals court said the incorrect advice equals unconstitutional ineffective assistance and ordered Cooper released. But Michigan officials argue that Cooper got a fair trial and that the verdict should not be thrown out because of his lawyer's mistake.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the majority opinion, vacating the Sixth Circuit judgment and returning the case for reconsderation. The Court held that the Michigan court applied the wrong standard when it rejected Cooper's claim to ineffective assistance of counsel. The proper test under Strickland v Washington is whether, absent the ineffective counsel, a defendant would have accepted an offered plea that was less severe than his eventual sentence, and the trial court would have accepted the terms of that plea. The majority also held that the proper remedy is not specific performance of the original plea. On remand, the prosecution should re-offer the plea and, if the defendant accepts it, the trial court can decide how to amend the original sentence.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, stating that there is no right to habeas relief when counsel's advice caused a defendant to have a full and fair trial. A criminal defendant has no right to a plea bargain, so rejecting the plea did not deprive Cooper of any procedural right. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the Scalia dissent. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent except for Justice Scalia's assertions that the majority's decision elevates the plea bargain to a constitutional right. Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote a separate dissent criticizing the majority's "opaque discussion of the remedy...."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2004, the Federal Communications Commission said that TV stations could be fined for indecency violations in cases when a vulgarity was broadcast during a live program. That happened on Fox in 2002 and 2003 when Cher and Nicole Richie cursed during award shows and were not bleeped.
 The FCC never actually fined Fox, but the network took issue with the regulatory agency setting the stage for future fines and challenged the fleeting-expletive rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC's rules were "unconstitutionally vague" and had a "chilling effect."


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for seven members of the court, vacated the lower judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that the FCC's standards, as applied to the broadcasts in this case, were vague. The FCC did not give proper notice to broadcasters that they would be fined for fleeting expletives, so the practice violated due process. However, Justice Kennedy carefully noted that the Court did not decide whether the practice violated the First Amendment or that the indecency policy itself was unconstitutional. Only the way the policy was applied in this case was unconstitutionally vague. The FCC is free to modify its policy in light of this decision.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, stating her belief that FCC v. Pacifica was wrong when it was decided. Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1975, the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (ISDA) became law. Among other things, the ISDA directs the Secretary of the Interior, at the request of any Indian tribe, to enter into contracts which permit tribal organization to administer federal programs that would otherwise be directly administered by the Secretary. The ISDA further requires the Secretary to pay the tribe's reasonable contract support costs, or the costs that the tribe would incur operating the program that the Secretary would not incur. The payment of these costs was made subject to the availability of appropriations, and Congress had imposed a statutory cap on the appropriations available to pay such costs.
Ramah Navajo Chapter entered into multiple ISDA contracts for the administration a number of federally funded programs. The Ramah Navajo Chapter originally filed suit against the Secretary in 1990 on behalf of all BIA tribal contractors under the ISDA to challenge the methodology that Interior's Office of the Inspector General used to set indirect cost rates. In 1999 the district court granted the plaintiffs leave to add a new claim for the alleged underpayment of contract support costs due to insufficient appropriations. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court eventually granted summary judgment for the government, rejecting tribal demands for contract support costs in excess of the express statutory caps on the funds available to pay such costs.
The tribes appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed. The appeals court held that the government could be required to pay all of the contract support costs requested by every tribal contractor, even in excess of the statutory cap, because Congress appropriated sufficient funds to satisfy the demands of any single contractor considered in isolation. The government appealed the appellate court's decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 majority opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor affirmed the Tenth Circuit decision. Despite the statutory cap within the ISDA, the government must pay each tribe's support costs in full. The Court stressed that the government's contractual obligation under the ISDA should be treated like any other contract. Even if a particular agency exhausts legally available funds that were originally appropriated to satisfy a particular contract, the government is still obligated to fulfill its entire financial obligation within the contract. The tribe was entitled to rely on the government's promise of payment, rather than run the risk that the ISDA lump-sum appropriation may not cover the full cost of all contracts.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. dissented, focusing on the current restrictions on governmental payment of support costs. Once the allocated funds were appropriated to the specific ISDA contracts, the money in the broader pool of funds became unavailable, relieving the government of any further contractual obligation. Since the situation in this case is hardly a typical government contracts case, it should not be resolved using typical contract principles. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On August 5, 2008, Joel Perez and Carlos Cruz drove to a Shell station in Arlington Heights, Illinois, with Cruz at the wheel. They met with Alejandro Diaz, who was working with Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") officials. Diaz instructed them to meet him at a different location to complete the deal. Instead, Perez walked to a nearby Denny's, where Alexander Vasquez waited for him in the driver's seat of a black Pontiac Bonneville. Perez got into the passenger seat of the Bonneville and called Cruz, telling him that he was not willing to follow Diaz. Cruz walked to the Denny's where he was introduced to Vasquez. Diaz called Cruz to ask why they were not following him. Cruz informed him that they wanted to complete the deal in the Denny's parking lot, telling him, "We got the money here." Vasquez echoed this statement.
Diaz contacted his DEA handler, Agent James Chupik. Law enforcement agents surrounded the parking lot in their vehicles; several officers approached the Bonneville to arrest Vasquez, Cruz, and Perez. Cruz, outside the car, raised his hands in surrender. Vasquez, however, immediately put the Bonneville into reverse, striking two squad cars. He then shifted gears and headed for an agent. Agent Chupik stepped in front of the Bonneville and commanded Vasquez to stop, but was forced to dive out of the way. The Bonneville headed west on the eastbound lanes of Algonquin Road.
Several minutes later, police found the Bonneville abandoned in a Walmart parking lot. A bystander told the police that he saw two men run from the vehicle into a McDonald's. Vasquez and Perez ran into the McDonald's, through its kitchen, then split up. Arlington Heights police officers quickly apprehended them, however. They found a cell phone on Vasquez and several cell phones on the ground near Perez; records indicated several calls between Vasquez's cell phone and both phones apparently belonging to Perez. Police impounded the Bonneville, and later found $23,000 in cash hidden in a secret compartment.
A federal grand jury indicted Vasquez with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and with attempting to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. At trial, Agent Chupik testified that he instructed Diaz to have Cruz and his "customers" meet Diaz at a gas station in Arlington Heights. In a transcript of the call between Cruz and Diaz, however, Cruz only referred to a single customer. Vasquez's counsel attempted to impeach Agent Chupik on this point, but the judge found the difference to be trivial, limiting Vasquez's right to cross-examination and to refresh Agent Chupik's memory with the transcript. The government introduced Vasquez's previous drug conviction into evidence to demonstrate Vasquez's intent; he was convicted for dealing drugs with Perez in 2002.
Vasquez called Perez's wife Marina as a witness to testify. Marina Perez testified that she called Vasquez before the events in question to ask him to pick up Joel Perez at the site of the failed drug deal, implying that Vasquez was there by coincidence. In response, the government introduced transcripts and audio recordings of conversations between Marina Perez and her husband as evidence of bias. These indicated that Marina Perez spoke to her husband about a possible plea deal; Marina Perez also mentioned that Vasquez's attorney had told her that, "everybody is going to lose." The trial judge allowed these transcripts and recordings to be admitted to show Marina Perez's bias and for the truth of their contents.
The jury found Vasquez guilty on the charge of conspiracy but not guilty on the charge of attempting to possess cocaine.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
betweenMarinaPerezandherhusbandasevidenceofbias.TheseindicatedthatMarinaPerezspoketoherhusbandaboutapossiblepleadeal;MarinaPerezalsomentionedthatVasquez'sattorneyhadtoldherthat,"everybodyisgoingtolose."ThetrialjudgeallowedthesetranscriptsandrecordingstobeadmittedtoshowMarinaPerez'sbiasandforthetruthoftheircontents.ThejuryfoundVasquezguiltyonthechargeofconspiracybutnotguiltyonthechargeofattemptingtopossesscocaine.
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held that Vasquez's previous drug conviction was properly introduced into evidence. The court rejected Vasquez's claim that the police's search of the Bonneville violated his Fourth Amendment rights, noting that Vasquez abandoned the car, and that the police had probable cause to believe that the money for the drug transaction was in the Bonneville. The court also rejected Vasquez's claim that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to elicit testimony through the cross-examination of Agent Chupik. The trial court found the distinction between "customers" and "customer" to be trivial, and the court held this finding to be within the trial court's discretion.
In a split decision, the court turned to the testimony of Marina Perez, holding that the evidence of conversations between Marina Perez and Vasquez's counsel were properly admitted to show bias and inconsistency with prior statements. While noting that the judge improperly instructed the jury that the recordings could be considered as evidence of the truthfulness of their contents, it held this instruction to be a harmless error. It pointed to other overwhelming evidence of Vasquez's guilt, including his attempt to escape capture and his previous conviction for drug dealing. It held that the jury would have convicted Vasquez absent the introduction of the transcripts and recordings in question.
Judge David Hamilton dissented on this point alone, describing the recordings as prejudicial and inadmissible. He reminded the majority that the error is only harmless if the court is convinced Vasquez would have been convicted absent the error. He used a different test than the majority, looking to whether or not the error contributed to the conviction. He noted that Vasquez was never directly recorded or mentioned by name in any of the recordings, and that government agents were not aware of his involvement until his arrest. Judge Hamilton argued that Marina Perez' testimony about Vasquez was thus plausible evidence of innocence without the recordings on record.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Unanswered. After argument, the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Cheryl Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Mich., for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act when they fired her after she became sick in 2004. After several months on disability, Perich was diagnosed and treated for narcolepsy and was able to return to work without restrictions. But she said the school at that point urged her to resign and, when she refused, fired her.
Perich filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in her favor and authorized a lawsuit against the school. Attorneys representing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School argued that the "ministerial exception" under the First Amendment should apply in their client's case. The exception gives religious institutions certain rights to control employment matters without interference from the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned that ruling and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial on the merits. The court held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in nature, and therefore the ministerial exception did not apply.