[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and yes. In an opinion written by Justice William J. Brennan, the Court held unanimously that Massachusetts Citizens for Life’s flyers violated FECA’s prohibition on expenditures. He pointed to the general definitions section of FECA, where ‘expenditures’ included the provision of anything of value made for the purpose of influencing a federal election. Justice Brennan also looked to the legislative history and determined that Congress did not intend to abandon its restrictions on expenditures to support candidates. Justice Brennan rejected MCFL’s argument that it did not expressly advocate for a candidate, noting that the flyers exhorted readers to vote for specific ‘pro-life’ candidates.
In a 5-4 majority, Justice Brennan also held that FECA was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL’s flyers. While acknowledging that FECA’s requirements were not an absolute restriction on MCFL’s First Amendment rights, he argued that they were a substantial restriction. He noted that MCFL was forced to comply with several burdensome requirements only because it was a corporation; these requirements potentially created a disincentive for engaging in political speech. Justice Brennan held that the state’s compelling interest in restricting corporate spending on elections did not extend to MCFL because 1) MCFL was formed for an exclusively political purpose, 2) it had no shareholders, and 3) it was not formed by a business corporation or labor union. He noted that even if FECA’s disclosure requirements no longer applied, MCFL was still required to identify anyone contributing over $200.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred with both of the majority’s holdings. She emphasized that the significant burden on MCFL arose from FECA’s additional organizational restrictions, and not from its higher disclosure requirements.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, dissented on the constitutionality of FECA. While acknowledging that the threat from corporate political activity varied depending on the characteristics of a particular corporation, he argued that these were distinctions in degree and not differences in kind. He described the majority’s three-part test as legislative in character.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE) is a union that represents railroad workers across the country, specifically the employees of Maine Central Railroad, a subsidiary of Guilford Transportation Industries (Guilford). After Guilford acquired Maine Central in 1981, Maine Central had to lay off 300 of the 400 employees that BMWE represented. The collective bargaining agreement between the two expired in 1984, before the parties were able to reach a satisfactory new agreement. For the following year, the parties attempted to reach a settlement using the procedures set out by the Railroad Labor Act (RLA), but they exhausted those options. On March 3, 1986, BMWE began a strike against Maine Central that expanded to encompass the other Guilford subsidiaries. Upon receiving information that other railroad companies were assisting Guilford, BMWE began picketing other railroads’ lines. On April 9, Burlington Northern Railroad Company sought and received a temporary restraining order from the district court to stop the picketing. Six other railroad companies filed petitions in the same court and received temporary restraining orders on April 11. On April 23, the district court consolidated the cases entered a preliminary injunction against BMWE.
The Court of Appeals reversed based on the understanding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents the use of injunctions to halt labor dispute protests. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not have the jurisdiction to enter the injunction and ordered it to dismiss the petitioners’ claims.
While these judicial procedures were pending, on May 16, 1986, the President issued Executive Order No. 12557, which convened an emergency board to investigate the dispute and report back to the President after 30 days. During that period the parties had to maintain the status quo that existed before the dispute. Congress also convened an advisory board that recommended that Congress enact legislation that would bind the parties to the recommendation of the President’s emergency board. Congress did so, and the President signed it into law.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly to prevent courts from distinguishing between primary and secondary actors for the purposes of labor immunity in labor disputes. Additionally, since Congress did not provide any clear way to distinguish between primary and secondary actors in such cases, the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to make decisions based on a distinction that lacks a legislative basis. The Court also held that Congress meant the term “labor dispute” to be broad, so the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not only refer to employers who are substantially aligned with the primary employer.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The state of Illinois required all who sell or scrap motor vehicles or parts to obtain licenses. That law also required anyone with a license to allow police to inspect their records at any time without a warrant. Albert Krull, George Lucas, and Salvatore Mucerino operated a wrecking yard. During a routine records inspection, police found four stolen cars on the lot. The men were arrested and charged with several criminal violations of Illinois motor vehicle laws. The next day, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the law that allowed police officers to inspect records without a warrant.
Krull moved to suppress evidence found during the search because the law that police officers relied on was now unconstitutional. As a general rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search is excluded at trial. Illinois argued that because the police officer acted in good faith, the evidence was admissible. The trial court granted Krull’s motion. The state appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded. On remand, the trial court maintained its original position and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply because the officer acted in good faith. The officer’s reliance on the unconstitutional law was objectively reasonable when he conducted the search. Excluding the evidence in this case would not support the policy behind the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct. The Court followed United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897 (1984) where police conducted a search with a warrant that they later found out was defective.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a dissent, stating that United States v. Leon qs distinguishable from this case. She also asserted that the rule the majority adopted was inconsistent and difficult to apply. Justices William J. Brennan and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, joining in Justice O’Connor’s dissent, but expressing that her discussion of prior precedent was unnecessary.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The 1984 Bail Reform Act allowed the federal courts to detain an arrestee prior to trial if the government could prove that the individual was potentially dangerous to other people in the community. Prosecutors alleged that Salerno and another person in this case were prominent figures in the La Cosa Nostra crime family.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court held that the Act was constitutional because when the government's interest in protecting the community outweighs individual liberty, pre-trial detention can be "a potential solution to a pressing societal problem." The Act only applied to a specific list of serious offenses, placed heavy burdens on the government to prove that the arrestee posed significant threats to others, and did not prevent the accused from enjoying a speedy trial. The Court also dismissed Salerno's argument that the Act violated the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Until 1984, the statutes governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) allowed a family to exclude one member if that person had an income or is receiving benefits that would reduce the amount of government aid. In 1984, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which removed the option of excluding a family member. The new law required that the filing unit include all income from all members of the family. This might reduce the family’s total income by reducing the benefits the family is eligible to receive.
In 1970, Beaty Mae Gilliard, who had been receiving benefits from North Carolina through the AFDC since 1962, gave birth to her seventh child. Because Gilliard was receiving child support from the child’s father, the state deducted the child support from the benefits she was eligible for as the parent of an eight-person family. Gilliard sued, and the district court agreed with her reading of the statute that she was allowed to exclude the child who was receiving child support from her filing unit because the seven-person family benefits were greater than what she would receive from the eight-person family benefits minus the child support. The district court awarded class relief to anyone in Gilliard’s position. When North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with the 1984 Act, Gilliard and other members of the class filed a motion to reopen the case and obtain relief. The district court concluded that the new statutory scheme adopted by the 1984 Act violated the Due Process and Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the 1984 Act supported the federal government’s dual interests of reducing the deficit and distributing aid to needy families in the fairest way possible. Because some families receive income from sources other than the government, the Court held that it was reasonable for the government to be able to provide more aid to those families that have no other means of support. Based on the rational basis for this decision, the 1984 Act did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court also held that the 1984 Act did not violate the Takings Clause because the amount of money the child receives does not change, regardless of the amount of money the family as a whole receives from the government. The government is not taking anything away from the child without compensation, the type of government action the Takings Clause was meant to prevent.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that the government’s actions unduly harm the parent-child relationship. Because an increasing number of children live in a single-parent household headed by the mother, forcing the children to forego the financial support of the father in order to live with the mother and receive her government benefits can cut children off from a relationship with their fathers. He argued that the 1984 Act places an undue burden on the child and the familial relationship, which requires a higher level of scrutiny than merely proving the decision was a rational one. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice Harry A. Blackmun also wrote a dissent stating that he agreed with Justice Brennan’s arguments.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International violated club policy by admitting three women into its active membership its charter was revoked and it was expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in reversing a lower court decision, found that Rotary International's action violated a California civil rights act prohibiting sexual discrimination.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary's membership, the Court found that the relationship among the club's members was not of the intimate or private variety which warrants First Amendment protection. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued that because many of Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are conducted in the presence of strangers, and because women members would not prevent the club from carrying out its purposes, there was no violation of associational rights. Furthermore, even if there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that minimal infringement would be justified since it "serves the State's compelling interest" in ending sexual discrimination.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Prior to this act, tribal land was allotted to individual tribal members in trust. Individual owners would hold the land in trust and could convey the land to their heirs. If a tribal member who held land in trust died without a will, the land would be divided among all of the heirs of that tribal member. This eventually lead to heirs inheriting very small fractional interests in land. The Indian Land Consolidation Act contained a provision which would transfer certain minimal fractional interests in land away from the individual heirs and back to the tribal governments.
Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, and Eileen Bissonette were enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and were heirs or devisees of Tribe members who died in 1983. Each had inherited a fractional interest in land which they would lose to the tribal government under the Indian Land Consolidation Act.
Irving, Seed, and Bissonette filed suit in the district court claiming that the provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act resulted in taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court held that the statute was constitutional and that the complainants had no vested interest in the property of the decedents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court. It held that the complainants had standing and that the statute did violate the Fifth Amendment. The Secretary of the Interior appealed the appellate court's decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court affirming the appellate court's decision. The Court held that the section of the Indian Land Consolidation Act which transferred ownership of fractional land interests to the respective tribe constituted an unconstitutional seizure of property without just compensation. The Court also held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the provision.
Justice William J. Brennan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun joined. Justice Brennan emphasized that the ruling would not limit the Court's opinion in Andrus v. Allard, and that the property rights and expectations specific to this case made this case unusual.
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Lewis F. Powell joined. He stated that the Court's decision effectively limited Andrus v. Allard to its facts.
Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Byron White joined. He stated that Congress had failed to afford the affected Native Americans due process by failing to provide any opportunity to order their affairs in light of the new law.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
After its Maryland synagogue was painted with anti-Semitic slogans and symbols, the Shaare Tefila Congregation brought a suit charging the white defendants with racially discriminatory interference with property rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1982. The Maryland District Court dismissed the claims, maintaining that white-on-white violence was not racially discriminatory.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Court unanimously ruled that Jews can state a claim of racial discrimination since they were among the peoples considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of U.S.C. Section 1982. The statute "was intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." The Jewish people most certainly suffered such discrimination and so were not barred from their claim simply because both they, like the defendants, were Caucasian.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Justice Scalia held, in a 5-4 opinion, that the Coastal Commission could only place conditions on the Nollans’ development permit to rebuild their home where those conditions substantially furthered government interests that would justify denial of the permit entirely. Because the Nollans’ request to rebuild their home did not further the government’s interest in overcoming a perceived psychological barrier to using the beach, the condition was a regulatory taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Paula Hobbie worked for Lawton and Company, a Florida jewelry shop. She joined the Seventh-day Adventist Church and informed her employer that she could not work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday since it was her new church's Sabbath day. Lawton soon dismissed her for refusing to work Friday evening and Saturday shifts. Hobbie filed for unemployment compensation with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. Lawton objected to paying benefits, claiming that she did qualify since she had been dismissed "for misconduct connected with her work." The Bureau of Unemployment Compensation agreed and denied her benefits. Hobbie claimed that this violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. She unsuccessfully appealed the decision in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for an 8-1 court. Referring to its similar decisions in Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., the Court maintained that a state cannot deny unemployment benefits to an employee dismissed for having religious conflicts with the employer. This violates the Free Exercise Clause by pressuring religious adherents to modify their religious views in order to retain work or benefits. The state cannot do this without a compelling interest. The Court did not find it relevant that Hobbie converted after she began working, and did not consider the fact that she still qualified for partial benefits a satisfactory remedy.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On September 23, 1978, Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda motorcycle while riding down Highway 80 in Solano County, California. His motorcycle collided with a trailer and killed his passenger and wife, Ruth Ann Moreno. A year later, Zurcher filed a liability suit alleging that the sudden loss of air and subsequent explosion of his rear tire caused the accident. His complaint named Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, as a defendant. Cheng Shin sued its co-defendant, Asahi Metal Industry Company, the Japanese manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly. Zurcher's claim was eventually settled, which left the suit against Asahi still outstanding.
Asahi filed a motion with the superior court to quash the summons by arguing that the court had no jurisdiction over the company. The Court denied the motion because Asahi does business internationally and therefore should be subject to international laws. The Court of Appeal of the State of California ordered the Superior Court to grant the motion because it was not reasonably foreseeable for Asahi products to end up in California. The Supreme Court of the State of California reversed and held that Asahi placed its components in a "stream of commerce" with the awareness that some of those components ended up in California.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that the state must show that the defendant company purposefully established "minimum contacts" by directing products toward a particular state. Although Asahi placed its products in a stream of commerce that eventually led to California, there was no evidence that the company marketed or in any way anticipated sales in California. The Court also held that the jurisdiction of the California court would be unreasonable for Asahi, given the distance and the fact that this dispute is purely between Asahi and Cheng Shin. The state of California had only a slight interest in this case that did not outweigh the burden on Asahi.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the decision of the Court that the California jurisdiction would place an unfair and unreasonable burden on Asahi, but he disagreed with the holding that Asahi did not purposefully interact with the California market. He argued that the ""stream of commerce"" is both predictable and profitable for companies, and the benefits of sales balance the potential burden of litigation. Justices Byron R. White, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence in part and in the judgment.
 In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the examination of whether or not Asahi had established ""minimum contacts"" was unnecessary. The test of minimum contacts only becomes relevant once a reasonable burden has been established. He also argued that the Court misapplied the test by not recognizing that such a high volume of Asahi parts reaching California can only be the result of purposeful business. Justices Byron R. White and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the partial concurrence and concurrence in judgment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Ardith McPherson was a clerical employee in the Harris County, Texas constable's office. After hearing on the office radio that there had been an attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, McPherson, who thought she was alone with one other office worker, stated "if they go for him again, I hope they get him." Another co-worker overheard the comment and reported it to the Constable, Walter H. Rankin. Rankin subsequently fired McPherson.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Rankin's interest in discharging McPherson was outweighed by her rights under the First Amendment. The Court held that McPherson's statement, when considered in context, "plainly dealt with a matter of public concern." The Court found that there was no evidence that McPherson's speech interfered with "the efficient functioning of the office" and that her private comment had not discredited the office. The Court also noted that McPherson did not serve a "confidential, policymaking, or public contact" role, diminishing the impact of her speech on the agency's proper functioning.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Al-Khazraji, a professor and U.S. citizen born in Iraq, filed suit against his former employer and its tenure committee for denying him tenure on the basis of his Arabian race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The District Court held that while Al-Kharzraji had properly alleged racial discrimination, the record was insufficient to determine whether he had been subjected to prejudice.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held that persons of Arabian ancestry were protected from racial discrimination under Section 1981. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Byron R. White maintained that section 1981 encompassed discrimination even among Caucasians. Justice White noted that history did not support the claim that Arabs and other present-day "Caucasians" were considered to be a single race for the purposes of section 1981. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in a separate concurrence, added that "Pernicious distinctions among individuals based solely on their ancestry are antithetical to the doctrine of equality upon which this nation is founded."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Currently unavailable.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Currently unavailable.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. To investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. During the search, which was done without a warrant, an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. The officer moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view" doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. However, critical to this doctrine, argued Scalia, is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special operational necessities" be done with probable cause. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a "reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the equipment was stolen, the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were charged with the assault of Cynthia Knighton and the murder of her four-year-old son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott. Despite Marsh’s objections, she and Williams were tried jointly. The prosecution entered Williams’ confession into evidence, although the confession was redacted to prevent any mention of anyone other than Williams and Martin being involved in the crime. In his closing argument, the prosecution admonished the jury not to use Williams’ confession against Marsh but linked her testimony to events in the confession. The judge also instructed the jury not to use the confession against Marsh. Marsh was convicted, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied the appeal.
Marsh filed a writ of habeas corpus and argued that the introduction of the confession violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. The district court denied the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that not only did the jury receive instructions not to consider the confession in assessing Marsh’s guilt, but also the confession was redacted so that there was no incriminating evidence regarding Marsh’s actions. Without the implication that the evidence in the confession was incriminating, Marsh’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated. The Court also held that joint trials, while not necessarily in either defendant’s best interests from the perspective of the Confrontation Clause, are a necessary part of the justice system.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent and argued that the Confrontation Clause regulates the introduction of any evidence from which the jury could infer the defendant’s guilt. Given the presentation of the confession in this case, the jury could only infer that Williams’ confession also enumerated Marsh’s guilt. He also argued that the legal system’s interest in joint trials from an efficiency standpoint should not outweigh the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In February 1958, Master Sergeant James Stanley volunteered to participate in a military program ostensibly testing the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical warfare. He spent a month at the Army’s Chemical Warfare Laboratories and during that time was secretly administered doses of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). As a result of his exposure to LSD, Stanley began experiencing hallucinations, memory loss, impaired performance of his job, and he engaged in domestic violence without remembering it later. He was discharged from the Army in 1969. In 1975, Stanley received a letter from the military asking for his cooperation in a study to determine the long-term effects of LSD and referring to his previous “voluntary” involvement in the 1958 tests. This letter was the first notification that Stanley received regarding the true purpose of the 1958 tests. He sued the government under the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) and argued that there had been negligence in the administration, supervision, and subsequent monitoring of the drug testing program.
The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and held that the government was not liable for negligence that occurred while Stanley was on active duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed but also held that the district court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On remand, Stanley amended his complaint to include claims that unknown officers violated his constitutional rights and argued that the constitutional claim did not fall under the service exception to the FTCA. The district court again dismissed the claim under the FTCA and rejected the government’s argument that the same exception barred Stanley’s constitutional claims. The government moved for partial final judgment because Stanley had not named individual defendants. Stanley filed a second amended complaint that named individual defendants, but before the court ruled on it, the Supreme Court decided Chappell v. Wallace, which held that enlisted military personnel may not file constitutional claims. The district court held that the Chappell decision did not bar Stanley’s constitutional claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that recent precedent did not require Stanley’s FTCA claim to be barred.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes, yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not have the jurisdiction to consider Stanley’s FTCA claims because they were not a part of the order that was originally appealed. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals took an unnecessarily narrow view of the Chappell decision by limiting it to an even greater extent than the FTCA waiver of governmental liability. Because the government is protected from suits arising from activities that occurred during the course of service under the FTCA, there is no reason to assume that the precedent set by the Chappell decision would provide less protection.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that members of the armed forces deserve the same constitutional protections from the government as those enjoyed by ordinary citizens. Previous federal immunity jurisprudence was based on the specific circumstances surrounding events and that the individuals named in the suit should be required to demonstrate absolute immunity. He also argued that the Chappell decision only barred constitutional claims when military discipline would suffer. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In her separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued that both the Chappell decision and the FTCA exception prohibit civilian courts from considering suits that arise as the result of military service. However, because Stanley’s FTCA claims arise as the result of his involuntary conclusion in a military test, his claims should be allowed to proceed.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen were inmates in New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison. The prison classified inmates depending on the security risk each posed. Due to their classification, Shabazz and Mateen were assigned to a prison job outside of the main prison building and were not allowed to return to the main prison building during the workday. Because of these restrictions neither men, both of whom were practicing Muslims, were able to attend Juamu’ah, a weekly religious service held on Fridays.
The two men sued the prison and argued that the work policies infringed on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The federal district court found in favor of the prison and held that the prison policies plausibly advanced the goals of security, order, and rehabilitation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling and held that the prison was required to show that there was no other reasonable method by which the inmate’s religious rights could be accommodated without creating actual security problems.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, while prisoners do not forfeit their constitutional rights after being convicted of a crime, being incarcerated does place necessary limitations on those rights. Because of the particular interests and dangers involved in prisons and the prison administration’s everyday experience with the operation of a prison, courts should largely defer to prison administrators on questions of policy or regulation. Therefore, even when an inmate alleges that a prison policy infringes on his or her constitutional rights, the policy is valid as long as it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective, as the policy in this case was. The Court also held that a prison is not required to adopt any alternative policy that may have “undesirable results,” as determined by the prison.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that a prison must demonstrate that the restrictions imposed on inmates were necessary to further an important governmental interest. He also argued that there should be a varying level of scrutiny depending on the nature of the right being asserted, rather than the general standard of deference in the majority opinion. Because the prison policy in the case in question acts as a complete ban that prevents some Muslim prisoners from attending Juamu’ah, an obligatory and important religious ceremony, the prison should be required to show the policy was necessary and no less extreme measures could serve the same purpose. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent,


[Unknown Act > Facts]
By passing the the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Act), the Pennsylvania Legislature empowered the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to regulate underground coal mining that damaged structures on the surface. When implementing the Act, DER prevented coal miners from removing more than 50% of coal from mines located beneath buildings. Historically, coal miners acquired rights to "mining estates" separate from the property owned on the above "surface estates." The Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, a group of miners, complained that the Act created a "support estate" that effectively took away its property without compensation. Keystone relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon to allege that this state action violated the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected both allegations and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of a 5-4 court. Like in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court's decision depended upon the "particular facts" of the mining regulation in question. Unlike in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court found a valid public purpose behind the present Act and determined the Act would not make it impossible for the miners to profitably conduct business. Therefore the decision in Pennsylvania Coal did not apply. To refute alleged Takings Clause violations, the Court established that "the support estate has value only insofar as it is used to exploit another estate." Then the Court conducted a factual review of the effects of the new regulation. It concluded that "[b]ecause petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all the coal in their mineral estates, the burden the Act places on the support estate does not constitute a taking." The Court also dismissed alleged Contract Clause violations because the state acquired no property for itself, but rather used its police power to implement regulation which served valid public interests.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A Louisiana law entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held that the law violated the Constitution. Using the three-pronged test that the Court had developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) to evaluate potential violations of the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan argued that Louisiana's law failed on all three prongs of the test. First, it was not enacted to further a clear secular purpose. Second, the primary effect of the law was to advance the viewpoint that a "supernatural being created humankind," a doctrine central to the dogmas of certain religious denominations. Third, the law significantly entangled the interests of church and state by seeking "the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Using electronic beepers and aerial photography, police tracked certain drug making supplies to Ronald Dale Dunn’s ranch. The ranch had a fence surrounding the perimeter as well as several interior fences. Law enforcement officers entered the property without a warrant and crossed several fences to get near Dunn’s barn. The barn was about 60 yards away from Dunn’s house and a fence separated the two buildings. Police smelled phenylacetic acid and heard a motor running in the barn. Police approached the barn but did not enter. The officers did shine a flashlight through netting above the door and observed what looked like a drug laboratory. The officers made several similar visits, not entering, but looking into the barn, before obtaining a warrant to search the barn and Dunn’s house. During this search, police seized chemicals and equipment use for making drugs.
At trial, Dunn unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. A jury convicted him on federal drug charges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the barn was “within the curtilage” of Dunn’s house, so the police officers’ warrantless visits to the barn violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals judgment and remanded in light of Oliver v. United States. This time, the court of appeals found that the warrantless searches of the barn violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the barn and the area around it lay outside the protected area of curtilage around Dunn’s house. The barn was separated from the house by a fence and was a substantial distance away from the house, the officers had other data that lead them to suspect Dunn, and Dunn did little to protect the barn from observation. Even if Dunn did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search still did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers never entered the barn. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, writing that the officers perception of the way Dunn used the barn was not as important as the way the barn actually was used.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented, arguing that the barn was within the area of protected curtilage, and the officers violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy because the barn was an essential part of Dunn’s business. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Ricky and Raymond Tison, brothers, conspired with several other family members to help their father, Gary, escape from prison. Gary was serving life in prison for murdering a guard during a previous escape attempt. Smuggling in a cooler full of guns, the Tisons helped Gary and his cellmate Randy escape. The group made a safe exit, but a few days later their car got a flat tire. They decided to flag down and steal a passing car. The group ordered the family of four out of the car while they transferred their belongings. When Ricky and Raymond went to get the family some water, Gary and Randy shot the family multiple times, killing them all. Ricky and Raymond did nothing to help the family. They continued to run with Randy and Gary until the chase ended in a shootout with police. Gary died in the desert of exposure before the police found him, and another brother died in the shootout. Ricky, Raymond, and Randy faced four counts of felony murder through accomplice liability. All three received the death penalty.
The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the sentences, holding that while the Tisons had not specifically intended to kill the family, they conspired with known killers and did nothing to aid the family when they had the chance. The Court held that the son’s anticipation that lethal force might be used in their endeavor satisfied the “intent” requirement for the death penalty.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, vacating the lower judgments. The Supreme Court remanded to determine whether the Tisons acted with a reckless indifference to human life. The Court held that anticipating lethal force is not enough to satisfy the “intent to kill” requirement, but the Tisons major participation in the felony along with a reckless indifference to human life may be.
Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, expressing that this case illustrates how arbitrary capital sentencing is. The death penalty is always cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul Stevens joined the dissent in part.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Ronald Calder was a native of Iowa working in Puerto Rico, He was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. After posting bail, he fled to his home state. Puerto Rico submitted a petition to Branstad, Iowa's governor at the time, to extradite Calder for court proceedings. Branstad refused.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Court overturned its decision in Kentucky v. Dennison (1861) which had rendered federal courts powerless to enforce the Extradition Clause. The unanimous Court concluded that the precedent in Kentucky was "the product of another age" and "fundamentally incompatible with more than a century of constitutional development."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
This case concerned the retrospective application of judge-made rules. Specifically, the Court had to decide whether a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, combined with his call to the jury clerk, violated the black petitioner's right to an impartial jury. The Court was called upon to decide whether the previous decision in Batson v. Kentucky was applicable to pending litigation but not final when Batson was decided. This case was decided together with Brown v. United States.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court held that after a new rule had been decided in a particular case, "the integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review." The Court reasoned that selective application of new rules violated the principle of treating similarly situated defendants on an equal basis. The Court also refused to make an exception to the rule of retroactivity in cases where there was a "clean break" with past precedent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Transportation Agency, Santa Clara, California promoted Diane Joyce to road dispatcher over Paul Johnson. Both candidates were qualified for the job. As an affirmative action employer, the Agency took into account the sex of the applicants in making the promotion decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court affirmed the promotion procedures of the Agency. Justice Brennan argued that it was not unreasonable to consider sex as one factor among many in making promotion decisions, and that the Agency's actions did not create an absolute barrier to the advancement of men (a quota system did not exist).


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Pennzoil Co. obtained a jury verdict of $10.53 billion in a Texas state court suit. The suit alleged that Texaco Inc. tortiously induced a third party to breach its contract to sell stock to Pennzoil. Before the court entered a final judgment, Texaco sued in federal district court alleging that the Texas court proceedings violated its rights under the Constitution and several Texas statutes. Pennzoil argued that the district court should abstain from hearing the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Younger held that a federal court must abstain from hearing challenges to a state court proceeding while that proceeding is still underway. The district court did not abstain and granted a preliminary injunction. The court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter and that Texaco was likely to succeed in its suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the district court had jurisdiction, but should not have evaluated the claims that were discussed in the state trial. Meanwhile, the state court proceedings continued, and reduced the judgment to $8.53 billion


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have followed Younger and abstained from issuing an injunction until the state court proceedings concluded. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, writing that a federal court need not abstain when it does not have to decide any issue litigated in the state court. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the concurrence.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment, arguing that the district court did not have to abstain, but Texaco’s constitutional claims were without merit. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence. Justice Marshall separately concurred in the judgment, writing that venue was improper because the issues before the district court were inextricably linked to the Texas court proceedings. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the judgment, arguing that the district court should have abstained because unsettled questions of state law existed. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment, arguing that Younger did not apply. Justice Marshall joined in the concurrence.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
William Bourjaily was arrested after receiving a quantity of cocaine in a parking lot from Angelo Lonardo. At Bourjaily's trial, the government introduced statements Lonardo made in a telephone conversation with an informant regarding a "friend" who had questions about the cocaine. The district court, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, found that the government had established that a conspiracy existed between Bourjaily and Lonardo, and that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No; preponderance of the evidence; and no. When the existence and membership of a conspiracy are disputed, the traditional standard applies: the party offering the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) must prove these preliminary facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule 104(a) provides that, in determining preliminary questions concerning admissibility, the court "is not bound by the rules of evidence" (except those with respect to privileges). Therefore, hearsay, including the statements sought to be admitted, can be considered. Finally, since the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is rooted firmly in precedent, no independent inquiry into reliability is required by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Two federally recognized Indian Tribes had reservation land within Riverside County, California where they conducted bingo and card games open to non- Indians. The gambling industry provided employment to many Indians on the reservation, and most clients were non-Indians. The State of California wanted to apply state gambling laws to reservation gaming and Riverside County wanted to apply local ordinances. Together, these laws would ban the card games and put charitable organizations in charge of bingo games. The Tribes claimed that the imposition of gambling laws by the state government violated their sovereignty. They brought suit against the state of California and Riverside County in federal district court. The district court ruled that neither the state nor the county had the authority to regulate gambling on reservation land. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. State laws require the consent of Congress in order to apply to Indian reservations. While the federal government consented to states enforcing criminal laws on reservation land, gambling regulations are types of civil law and therefore not enforceable. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 did not grant states the authority to regulate gambling either. Although the Act incorporated certain state gambling laws into federal laws regulating gambling on reservations, this did not grant states authority to enforce the new federal laws on reservations. Absent explicit permission for regulation, states can only enforce laws on reservations if their interests in regulation outweigh the interests of the federal government and tribal authorities. In this case, gambling provided revenue critical to the economic self-sufficiency of the reservation. Accordingly, the federal government's interest to ensure Indian self-government outweighed state concerns about organized crime developing because of unregulated reservation gaming.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Congress, acting indirectly to encourage uniformity in states' drinking ages, was within constitutional bounds. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of "the general welfare," and that the means chosen to do so were reasonable. The Court also held that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss of highway funds was not unduly coercive.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Robert P. Groetzinger spent sixty to eighty hours a week placing bets on dog races. He had no other form of employment, and the winnings from these wagers were his only form of income. His net gambling loss for 1978 was $2,032. Groetzinger reported his loss in his tax return but did not compute it in his adjusted gross income. The Internal Revenue Service determined Groetzinger was subjected to the minimum tax since his gambling loss was an item of tax preference according to the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. The Internal Revenue Service sued Groetzinger and the tax court held that he was in the “trade of business” of gambling, which meant that no part of his gambling losses subjected him to a minimum tax. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that a taxpayer’s gambling activity does constitute a “trade or business” under the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. Since Groetzinger was in the “trade or business” of gambling, no part of his gambling losses was an item of tax preference subjecting him to a minimum tax. The Court held that the term “trade or business” has a broad definition within the statute. While a mere hobby does not constitute as a trade or business, activity with continuity and regularity with the purpose of making a profit or income is, so Groetzinger’s gambling activity qualifies.
Justice Byron R. White delivered a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the 1982 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code made it clear that gambling was not a trade or business. Although the relevant year for this case is 1978, the later provisions indicate that the legislature did not intend to include gambling activity in constituting as a trade or business. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
John Booth was convicted of the murders of an elderly couple and chose to have the jury determine his sentence instead of the judge. A Maryland statute required that a victim impact statement "describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his family" be included in the pre-sentence report in felony cases. In this case, the victim impact statement described the victims, the impact of the crime on their family, and the family members' opinions of the defendant and the crime.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. The Court found that the victim impact statement created "a constitutionally unacceptable risk" and violated the Eighth Amendment. Justice Powell argued that in a capital case, the jury's sentencing task is based on the defendant as a unique individual and not on the character or impact of the crime on the victim's family. Allowing the content of a victim impact statement to influence the jury could lead it to choose the death penalty for reasons which "were irrelevant to the [defendant's] decision to kill," thus diverting attention from the facts of the crime. Furthermore, concluded Powell, introducing the "emotionally-charged opinions" of family members into the process would erode the "reasoned decisionmaking" which is crucial in capital cases.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
One of the types of fees that Pennsylvania used to finance the cost of its highway maintenance was lump-sum annual fees, also known as flat taxes. In 1980, Pennsylvania increased the fee for an identification marker required of every truck over a certain weight from $2 to $25, but exempted trucks registered in Pennsylvania from the fee _ the marker fee was "deemed" to be included in the registration fee that local truckers had to pay. In 1982, the marker tax was reduced to $5, but a new tax was introduced, taxing trucks by the axle. The axle tax applied to all trucks weighing more than 26,000 pounds, but the registration fee for Pennsylvania trucks was reduced in an amount calculated to offset that new tax for most trucks. These flat taxes were contested in two state court cases on the ground, inter alia, that they violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Since Pennsylvania-based trucks travel, on average, about five times as many miles in Pennsylvania as out-of-state trucks, the cost of the flat taxes was approximately five times as high per mile of road use for out-of-state vehicles as for local vehicles. For that reason, the lower courts in Pennsylvania found that both the marker tax and the axle tax violated the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered both cases together and reversed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the flat taxes violated the basic principle that the Commerce Clause created an area of trade free from interference by the states. One problem with the flat taxes is that they do not pass the "internal consistency" test, which is to say that they could not be applied by every state without interfering with free trade. If many states adopted them, truckers would pay more to go through those states than to drive the same distance in only one state. This would disrupt the market for interstate transportation services. In addition, because the cost to out-of-state truckers is approximately five times as heavy per mile, the taxes have a discriminatory effect. It is no defense that Pennsylvania's registration fee is fairly high, conferring a competitive advantage to trucks based in other states; the solution to that problem is to lower the level of the registration fee. It is also no defense to describe the flat taxes as user fees because such fees are acceptable only insofar as they are neither discriminatory nor excessive. Finally, Pennsylvania cannot appeal to administrative convenience because it has shown itself capable of administering taxes that reflect the quantity of highway use.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Baltimore police officers obtained a warrant for the apartment of Lawrence McWebb and “the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” When they obtained and executed the warrant, the police mistakenly believed that there was only one apartment on the third floor. By the time they discovered there were two apartments, the police were already in the process of searching the apartment of Harold Garrison. During that search, police discovered heroin. Garrison was tried and convicted of violating Maryland’s Controlled Substances Act. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the heroin discovered during the search, but the trial court denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the description of the place to be searched and the items to be seized in the original warrant was not unduly general given the information available to officers at the time. The fact that the officers found more information later did not invalidate the original warrant. The Court also held that the execution of the warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers proceeded only based on the knowledge they had and stopped their search immediately when they discovered their error.
In Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s dissent, he wrote that the Fourth Amendment values protection of the home above all else, and the actions of the police in this case violated the expectation of privacy. He argued that Court precedent required warrants to be specific when dealing with multi-tenant residences. He also found that the police officers’ mistake was not a reasonable one when there were several indicators that each floor of the building had multiple occupants. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Vickie Rock was charged with manslaughter for the death of her husband, Frank Rock. Vickie and Frank had argued after Frank refused to let Vickie eat pizza and prevented her from leaving the apartment to get something else to eat. As the fight escalated, Vickie picked up a handgun and at some point Frank received a fatal gunshot wound to the chest. The police arrived and arrested Vickie. Because Vickie was unable to recall the shooting in any detail, on the advice of her attorney, she submitted to hypnosis in an attempt to refresh her memory. During one session, Vickie recalled that her finger had not been on the trigger and the gun had discharged accidentally when Frank had grabbed her arm. A gun expert examined the gun and found that it was defective and prone to fire when dropped or hit, even without the trigger being pulled, supported this revelation.
Because an Arkansas rule of evidence prohibited the admittance of any evidence obtained through hypnosis, the trial court barred Vickie from testifying to her memory of the shooting because it had been “hypnotically refreshed.” She was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Vickie appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed her conviction. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that, in the absence of a general consensus on the accuracy of evidence obtained through hypnosis, case-by-case inquiry into the accuracy of the evidence would be too burdensome on courts. In this case, the exclusion of Vickie Rock’s hypnotically refreshed memory did not infringe on her constitutional rights because her right to testify in her own defense was only limited by generally applicable rules of evidence intended to exclude confusing or misleading evidence.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment protect the right of the individual to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial. Because the Arkansas rule was a blanket ban, it did not allow a trial court to consider the particular circumstances of individual cases. Although Arkansas has a state interest in preventing unreliable testimony from being admitted into evidence at trial, that interest does not justify a blanket ban on testimony that may be reliable in an individual case. Therefore the exclusion of the hypnotically refreshed testimony, without exploring the reliability of the testimony, infringed on the petitioner’s Constitutional right to testify in her own defense.
In his dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that an individual’s right to present evidence has always been subject to reasonable restrictions. Because Arkansas’s rule excluding evidence obtained by hypnosis is a reasonable attempt to ensure the reliability of evidence, he argued that it was appropriate to defer to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Justice Byron R. White, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Two affiliate organizations of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints operated Deseret Gymnasium, a non-profit facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. These affiliates were the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB) and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). Arthur Frank Mayson worked for the Gymnasium for sixteen years as an engineer, but CPB and COP fired him when he failed to obtain a certificate authorizing him to attend the Church's religious temples. He filed a class-action lawsuit in District Court alleging that CPB and COP violated Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by dismissing him from nonreligious employment because he did not satisfy certain religious conditions. In response, CPB and COP claimed that Section 702 of the Act, as amended in 1972, exempts religious organizations from the Act's ban in Section 703 on religious discrimination. Mayson then claimed that Section 702 violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by allowing religious organizations to practice discriminatory hiring for nonreligious jobs. The District Court agreed that Mayson's job was nonreligious. It also held that Section 702 violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed religious adherents exclusive participation in nonreligious activities.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Establishment Clause forbids the government from using state mechanisms to advance a religion. Section 702 passed a three-part test the Court established in Lemon v. Kurtzman for determining whether a state action violates the Establishment Clause. To be valid, the state action must first promote a "secular legislative purpose." The Court found that Section 702 satisfied this criterion, since it ensured that the government would not determine for religious organizations what they could count as religious activities. Second, the state action can neither "advance nor inhibit religion." The Court held that for a violation of this standard to occur, the "Government itself must have advanced religion through its own activities and influence." In this case, the government allowed for a church to advance its religion but did not directly intervene. Third, the state action must not "entangle" church and state. By allowing religious organizations to employ whom they pleased, they state became less entangled in religion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Joseph Griffin, who had previously been convicted of a felony, was convicted in a Wisconsin state court of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and obstruction of an officer. He was put on probation. According to Wisconsin law, probationers are in the legal custody of the State Department of Health and Social services and must abide by that department’s rules and regulations of the department. One of the regulations permits the probation officer to search the probationer’s home without a warrant as long as there are “reasonable grounds” to believe illegal substances are in the premises. These grounds include: information provided by an informant, the reliability of that information and the informant, and the officer’s own experience with the probationer.
Griffin’s probation officer received information from a detective that there might be guns in Griffin’s apartment. When the police searched Griffin’s apartment, they found a handgun and Griffin was charged with the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Griffin moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The trial court denied the motion and Griffin was convicted. Griffin appealed on the grounds that the evidence from the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence is “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted in accordance with a regulation that is a reasonable response to the “special needs” of a probation system. Supervision of probation is necessary to ensure the restrictions are followed and that the probation serves as a period of rehabilitation; therefore the state may depart from the usual warrant requirements. The “reasonable grounds” standard to search a probationer’s residence is an appropriate substitute for warrant requirements in this special situation, and in this case, the information received from the detective provided those reasonable grounds.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1979, the County of Los Angeles passed an ordinance which prohibited construction or reconstruction on land which had been devastated by a flood one year earlier. The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned a campground which was affected by this ordinance and it was not allowed to reconstruct buildings on this land which the flood had destroyed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
The Court held that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Noting that the fate of the Church's property had been in limbo for over six years (the suit which it had filed in 1979 had been denied a hearing as late as October of 1985), Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that, because the church was unable to use its property during this time, a "taking" of the property had occurred. Thus, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the government to exercise one of a number of "options" such as amending the regulation or fair payment for the use of the property in order to protect the Church's constitutional rights.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1981, officials at a hospital, including Executive Director Dr. Dennis O'Connor, suspected improprieties in Dr. Ortega's management of a residency program. The officials conducted an investigation of Ortega, which included multiple searches of his office and seizure of a number of items. The items were later used in proceedings before the California State Personnel Board to impeach the credibility of witnesses that testified on Dr. Ortega's behalf.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that "the realities of the workplace" made some expectations of privacy among public employees unreasonable when the intrusion was by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official. Work-related searches, the Court found, were "merely incident to the primary business of the agency," and a warrant requirement would "seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business." The Court thus held that a standard of "reasonableness" was sufficient for work-related intrusions by public employers.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On June 3, 1982, Attina Cannaday, David Gray, and Dawn Bushart woke up Ronald Wojcik and Sandra Sowash in their Biloxi apartment and forced them to leave at knifepoint. They brought Wojcik and Sowash in Wojcik’s van to a remote wooded area. Grey raped Sowash at knifepoint in the van, but she later escaped. At sunrise, Ronald Wojcik’s body was found with nineteen stab wounds to the head, hands, upper body, and back. Later that month, David Randolph Gray was indicted in Harrison County, Mississippi on a capital charge for the stabbing death of Ronald Wojcik while committing the felony of kidnapping.
During the jury selection process, the potential jurors were questioned individually. After the judge denied the prosecutor’s for-cause motions, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove eight panel members who expressed any degree of uncertainty in their ability to cast a vote in a case potentially involving the death penalty. The voir dire oath of panelist H.C. Bounds was confused, but she ultimately stated that she was capable of voting to impose the death penalty. The judge eventually excused Bounds for cause, however, implying that he had improperly denied the prosecutor the use of for-cause motions for the other panelists.
The jury convicted Gray of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi divided on whether Gray’s death sentence was invalid because the exclusion of Bounds violated Gray’s right to a fair and impartial jury. It ultimately affirmed Gray’s sentence despite the violation of Mississippi state procedure created by the trial court’s failure to follow voir dire guidelines in its dismissal of Bounds.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court held that the exclusion of Bounds was a reversible constitutional error not subject to harmless-error review. He wrote that the state could only exclude jurors who would frustrate the administration of capital sentencing schemes by not following their oaths. Justice Blackmun noted that the Mississippi Supreme Court unanimously agreed that Bounds was qualified to sit as a juror.
Justice Blackmun rejected Mississippi’s argument that the trial judge restored a peremptory challenge to the prosecutor to use against Bounds, pointing out that the trial judge explicitly stated that Bounds was removed for cause. He also rejected the state’s argument that the trial judge remedied an erroneous denial of a for-cause motion by granting an erroneous motion. Justice Blackmun reasoned that the court’s error was no less a constitutional violation because the trial judge may have improperly deprived the prosecution of peremptory challenges. He wrote that the relevant question was not whether the court excluded a prospective juror erroneously, but rather whether the composition of the jury panel could have been affected by the court’s error.
Finally, Justice Blackmun rejected Mississippi’s argument that the exclusion of Bounds was a harmless technical error because it did not have prejudicial effect. He argued that courts could not say with confidence that an erroneous exclusion for cause of a scrupled, eligible, venire member was an isolated incident.
Justice Louis Powell concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed with the plurality’s reliance on real-world factors such as the prosecutor’s use of the peremptory challenges, arguing that the reasons for the prosecutor’s use of those challenged was irrelevant.
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Byron White, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. He argued that Bounds would have been excluded if the trial court properly granted the prosecutor’s for-cause motion, and thus the composition of the jury was ultimately unaffected.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Gene Arline could no longer teach elementary school because she had tuberculosis, a contagious disease. The superintendent of schools in Nassau County, Florida dismissed her after it became clear that her illness was recurrent. The school system did not grant her financial relief. Arline claimed in a federal district court that this violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits state-funded programs from denying relief to applicants solely because they are handicapped. The school conceded it dismissed her solely because of her illness, but contended that a contagious disease like tuberculosis did not qualify her as handicapped. The court ruled that the Act did not define contagious illnesses as handicaps, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It found that Arline was "otherwise qualified" to teach except for her illness, and ruled that this qualified her for handicapped benefits.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for a 7-2 court. The Court relied on the qualification criteria for "handicapped status" provided by the Department of Health of Human Services (HHS), which Congress authorized to implement the Act. HHS made it clear that the Act covers illnesses that cause a "record of impairment" upon a patient's "major life activities." The Court found that both the "contagious effects of a disease" and "the disease's physical effects" can impair the patient's ability to work. The Act intended to cover "those who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired," since both conditions can prevent a patient from finding work.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The City of San Jose enacted a rent-control ordinance in 1979 in an attempt to alleviate the problem of skyrocketing rent prices due to the growing shortage of and the increasing demand for housing. Part of the ordinance allowed a Mediating Hearing Officer to consider as one factor "hardship to a tenant" when evaluating rent increases imposed by landlords.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. The Court held that the ordinance was rationally crafted to protect the financial investments of landlords while simultaneously preventing tenants from becoming victims of burdensome rent increases. The City argued the ordinance satisfied a need. This view was uncontested and, according to Justice Rehnquist, represented a "legitimate and rational" means to protect "consumer welfare."


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On April 6, 1983, federal law enforcement agents tailing Michael F. Murray and James D. Carter for suspicion of illegal drug activities saw the two drive large vehicles into a warehouse in South Boston. When Murray and Carter left, the agents saw a tractor-trailer rig and a large container. The agents arrested Murray and Carter and lawfully seized their vehicles, which contained marijuana. Several agents then returned to the warehouse, forced entry without a search warrant, and found numerous wrapped bales of what was later confirmed to be marijuana. The agents did not disturb the bales and kept the warehouse under surveillance until they obtained a search warrant. In applying for the search warrant, the agents did not mention the unwarranted entry or the information they had obtained. Approximately eight hours later, the agents obtained the warrant, entered the warehouse, and seized the bales along with the notebooks indicating the destinations of the marijuana.
Before the trial, Murray and Carter moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warehouse and argued that the warrant was invalid because it was based on information obtained in the previous unwarranted entry. The district court denied the motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 4-3 plurality. The Court held that evidence that would be excluded under the Fourth Amendment is admissible if it comes from an independent source. If the police obtained information unlawfully but the evidence in question comes from an untainted source, it is still admissible. Because the officers in this case obtained a lawful warrant without relying on the information they obtained illegally, the evidence seized in the warranted entry can be considered to have come from an independent source and therefore not subject to exclusion.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the independent source exception is limited to cases in which the evidence in question stemmed from a wholly independent source. He argued that courts must keep in mind the incentives that police officers have to hide the use of illegal methods in obtaining evidence, and they must use a high standard of proof when determining whether evidence came from a truly independent source. Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that court decisions that incentivize police officers to obtain evidence through illegal means moves further away from the true meaning of and protections offered by the Fourth Amendment.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy did not participate in the decision or discussion of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1982, the New Jersey Legislature overrode the Governor's veto and enacted a statute requiring the state's public school teachers to permit students to observe a minute of silence before the start of each school day. A group of New Jersey public school teachers, students, and parents sued the New Jersey Department of Education, its Commissioner, and two township boards of education. The suit alleged that the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. After the named defendants and the New Jersey Attorney General refused to defend the statute, Alan J. Karcher, the Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly, and Carmen A. Orechio, the President of the New Jersey Senate, intervened as defendants on behalf of the Legislature. The district court ruled against them and declared the "minute-of-silence" statute unconstitutional. Karcher and Orechio appealed the ruling in their official capacities as presiding officers of the Legislature. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and shortly thereafter, Karcher and Orechio lost their respective officer positions. They subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, but the successors to their offices indicated to the Court that they were withdrawing the appeal on behalf of the Legislature. The plaintiffs argued that the withdrawal of the appeal ended the controversy and that the Court no longer had jurisdiction to review the case, according to Article III of the Constitution. Karcher and Orechio countered that they should be permitted to continue the appeal in their capacities as legislators and representatives of the legislative body that enacted the statute. Alternatively, they argued that the Court should vacate the judgment of the lower court upon their dismissal as appellants. They contended that New Jersey law does not authorize presiding legislative officers to represent the Legislature in litigation, and they argued that their loss of presiding officer status rendered the judgment unappealable.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No and No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that once the individuals left their offices, the authority to pursue the lawsuit on behalf of the Legislature passed to their successors. Because Karcher and Orechio’s successors withdrew the appeal, there was no longer an active case or controversy, so the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case under Article III. The Court further held that the appellants' intervention and participation in the lawsuit as president and speaker did not entitle them to appeal as individual legislators. The Court rejected both theories that Karcher and Orechio offered in support of vacating the lower court's judgment and noted that the first argument appeared to be wrong as a matter of New Jersey State law and directly contrary to Karch and Orechio's representations to the district court. The Court also held that the loss of Karcher and Orechio's right to appeal from the appellate court's ruling did not render the case unreviewable, instead it was their successors' refusal to pursue the appeal that caused the judgment to become final.
Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed with the Court that Karcher and Orechio lost their authority to appeal on behalf of the New Jersey Legislature when they were no longer presiding officers of the General Assembly and Senate. Rather than hear this matter, Justice White argued that the Court should have reversed its prior order denying a motion by parents and school teachers to intervene as appellants before the Court. In his opinion, the parents and school teachers likely had standing to defend the law while the right of individual legislators to intervene in a non-representative capacity to defend legislation remained an open question, even after the Court's ruling in this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1983, Robert Fulmer and Louis Molitoris — who have IQs of 67 and 60, respectively — were discovered working on the Kozminski dairy farm in Chelsea, Michigan. Ike Kozminski, his wife Margarethe, and his son John used the labor of Fulmer and Molitoris seven days a week, for approximately 17 hours a day since they brought the men to the farm. Margarethe picked up Fulmer from the side of road in 1967, and by doing so took him away from a farm where he previously worked. Ike Kozminski found Molitoris living on the streets in Ann Arbor in the early 1970s and brought him to the farm to work. At first, the men received $15 per day, and later they received no pay at all. Although both men were in their sixties, they had the mental capacity of children between 8 and 10 years old. The Kozminskis told Fulmer and Molitoris that they could not leave the farm, and on one occasion John Kozminski threatened Molitoris with institutionalization. They also failed to provide the men with adequate nutrition, housing, and medical care, and told them not to contact their families or any other outsiders.
Eventually, a herdsman who worked for the Kozminskis became concerned for the welfare of Fulmer and Molitoris and alerted the authorities. County officials removed the men, and the Kozminskis were tried in federal district court for holding Fulmer and Molitoris in involuntary servitude. Based on jury instructions that included forms of coercion other than purely physical, the jury found the Kozminskis guilty. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the convictions on the grounds that the District Court’s definition of involuntary servitude was too broad.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that precedent had established that the type of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment is limited to that “enforced by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion.” Involuntary servitude had never before been extended to cover labor compelled by the use of psychological coercion. The government’s use of a broader interpretation makes the criminal nature of the action dependent on the victim’s state of mind, which cannot always be foreseen. The mental state of the victim is only relevant in determining whether or not the physical or legal coercion was effective.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that the Court unnecessarily narrowed the definition of the involuntary servitude. He argued that there are many different methods of coercion that can all be equally effective in reducing the victim to a state of involuntary servitude. The proper understanding of the term is defined by the conditions of servitude that the Thirteenth Amendment was meant to eradicate: conditions similar to those of slaves before the Civil War. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in this concurring opinion.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment. He argued that the attempt to define “involuntary servitude” based on hypothetical situations is irrelevant to the legal issues at hand. Rather, he found that the statute was written to be decided on a case-by-case basis. In this case, the defendants were rightfully convicted on the basis of jury instructions, but Justice Stevens agreed with the Court of Appeals finding that expert testimony was erroneously admitted. Therefore, he agreed with judgment of the Court that the case should be remanded. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence in the judgment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Following the death of US Marine helicopter pilot David A. Boyle, Delbert Boyle sued the helicopter's manufacturer ("Sikorsky") for defectively designing its copilot emergency escape hatch. On appeal from a state-law based jury verdict favoring Boyle, the Court of Appeals found that Sikorsky could not be held liable under Virginia tort law for any design flaws since it met the requirements of the "military contractor defense." Boyle appealed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to4 decision, the Court held that despite the absence of specific legislation immunizing government contractors from liability for design flaws, questions of their liability are of unique federal concern. As such, to the extent that it holds military contractors liable for design flaws, state law may significantly conflict with federal interests thereby requiring its displacement. The Court added that in the instant case, such displacement is appropriate since the United States approved the helicopter's specifications, the equipment met those specifications, and Sikorsky warned the government of possible dangers in the helicopter's use. Finally, since the Court of Appeals' use of the "military contractor defense" failed to specify if a reasonable jury could have found for Boyle, the Court vacated its judgment and remanded.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
A federal grand jury subpoenaed Randy Braswell, president of Worldwide Machinery Sales Inc. and Worldwide Purchasing Inc., to produce the corporations’ books and records. Braswell refused to produce the documents, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The district court ruled against Braswell, holding that the “collective entity doctrine”, which treats corporations differently from individuals for Fifth Amendment purposes, applied. The court rejected Braswell’s argument that the doctrine does not apply where the corporation is so small that it is merely the individual’s alter ego. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion affirming. The Supreme Court held that corporations are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. An agent of the corporation holds the official records of the corporation in their representative, and not individual, capacity so the personal privilege is not applicable. Allowing corporations a privilege against self-incrimination would be detrimental to enforcement of government regulations and prosecution of white-collar crime.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Education of the Handicapped Act contains a provision, known as the "stay-put" provision, which provides that a handicapped child shall remain with his or her current educational placement pending completion of any review proceedings, unless the parents and state or local educational agencies agree to removal.
John Doe was a student at the Louise Lombard School, a developmental center for disabled children. Doe had a disability which caused him considerable difficulty in controlling his impulses. On November 6, 1980, Doe was teased by a fellow student and responded by attacking the student and kicking out a school window. Doe was subsequently suspended pending expulsion proceedings. After unsuccessfully protesting the suspension by letter, Doe brought an action against school authorities under the Education of the Handicapped Act. Jack Smith was another handicapped student whose disability caused behavioral problems. Smith engaged in disruptive behavior and was eventually suspended indefinitely pending a hearing. Smith brought an action in district court essentially identical to the one brought by Doe. After learning of Doe's action Smith joined Doe's suit.
The handicapped students asked the district court to enter an order requiring the school to allow the students to return to their own schools. The district court granted the handicapped students' request and issued a permanent injunction, an order which prevented the school district from indefinitely suspending a student for disability-related misconduct. The school authorities appealed, and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. The school authorities appealed the appellate court's decision.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes and Yes. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice William J. Brennan, held that since the Act covered individuals from ages 3 to 21, the claim of a 24-year-old who was no longer in school was moot, but that the claim of a 20-year-old was not moot. The Supreme Court further held that the "stay-put" provision of the Education of the Handicapped Act prohibited state or local school authorities from excluding disabled children from the classroom even for dangerous or disruptive conduct resulting from their disabilities. The Supreme Court thereby affirmed the lower court's opinion.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist concurred and wrote separately on the mootness issue. He agreed with the court's determination but emphasized that he would go further in relaxing the test of mootness, particularly when events giving rise to mootness occurred after certiorari was granted.
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissent which Justice O'Connor joined. He stated that the controversy was moot because it was unlikely that the 20-year-old plaintiff would return to public school.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
For many years, Mark Erick Wheat allegedly participated in a far-flung marijuana distribution operation, acting mainly as an intermediary by receiving and storing shipments of marijuana in his home then distributing them around the region. Juvenal Gomez-Barajas and Javier Bravo were also allegedly involved in the operation. Attorney Eugene Iredale represented Gomez-Barajas and Bravo at trial. The trial court acquitted Gomez-Barajas on drug charges that overlapped with charges against Wheat, but Gomez-Barajas pleaded guilty to tax evasion and illegal importation of merchandise to avoid a second trial. At the beginning of Wheat’s trial, however, the court had not yet accepted Gomez-Barajas’ plea and he was free to withdraw it.
On August 22, 1985, Bravo pleaded guilty to one count of transporting 2,400 pounds of marijuana. Immediately after the proceedings, Iredale informed the court that Wheat contacted him to hire him as additional counsel; Gomez-Barajas and Bravo waived any objection. The United States expressed concern about the possibility of conflict arising from Iredale’s representation of both Iredale and Gomez-Barajas. The government pointed out that if Gomez-Barajas withdrew his plea, it was likely Wheat would be required to appear at his trial as a witness. In that event, Iredale would not be allowed to cross-examine Wheat. Further, it was possible that Bravo would be required to appear at Wheat’s trial as a witness as well.
Although Wheat emphasized his right to his choice of counsel under the sixth amendment, the district court denied his motion for a substitution of counsel. Wheat was convicted of conspiracy to possess 1,000 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute and five counts of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. It held that the district court correctly balanced the sixth amendment’s rights to choice of counsel and to a defense by an attorney free of conflicts of interest.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that the possible conflict of interest was sufficient to justify denying Wheat’s motion to take on Iredale as his attorney. Justice Rehnquist noted that the Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel was limited in several ways; for example, a party could not hire a lawyer who had a previous or ongoing legal relationship with the opposing party. He also noted that the Court previously recognized that the representation of multiple defendants by the same lawyer created special dangers of conflict of interest, although it was not a per se constitutional violation.
Although Wheat insisted that the waivers by all defendants cured any problems from multiple representations, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the federal courts had an independent interest in fair and ethical criminal trials. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that courts had the latitude to decline defendants’ waivers where the potential for a conflict of interest existed. Here, the persons Iredale wished to represent were allegedly three conspirators at various levels in a complex drug distribution operation, and there remained a possibility that either Bravo or Gomez-Barajas could be a witness at Wheat’s trial. Thus, Justice Rehnquist held that rejecting Wheat’s motion was within the district court’s discretion.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He argued that the majority granted unwarranted deference to the district court’s discretion, and that the potential for a conflict of interest in the case did not outweigh Wheat’s Sixth Amendment right to his choice of counsel.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Harry Blackmun. He emphasized that Wheat’s prior counsel planned to remain available to assist with his defense. Hence, the question was actually whether Wheat had the right to the additional counsel of his choice.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The United States Forest Service was considering building a paved roadway that would cut through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. It was also considering timber harvesting in the area. A study commissioned by the Forest Service reported that harvesting the Chimney Rock area would irreparably damage grounds that had historically been used by Native Americans to conduct religious rituals. After the Forest Service decided to construct a road, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association took action against Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Forest Service was free to harvest the lands. Though the government's actions would have severe adverse effects on the Indians' practice oftheir religion, those effects were only incidental and did not constitute an attempt to coerce Native Americans to act in violation of their beliefs. The Court reasoned that government could not operate "if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires," and that the First Amendment did not give any one group veto power over public programs that did not actually prohibit the free exercise of religion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Alfred Smith and Galen Black worked at a private drug rehabilitation clinic. The clinic fired them because they used a hallucinogenic drug called peyote for religious purposes while worshipping at their Native American Church. The Oregon Employment Division denied them unemployment compensation because it deemed they were fired for work-related "misconduct." The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that this violated their religious free exercise rights provided by the First Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed.