[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1995, Kevan Brumfield was convicted of the murder of a Louisiana police officer and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, which held the execution of mentally retarded criminals violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, Brumfield filed for post-conviction relief on the basis that he was mentally retarded. Brumfield also requested funds to help develop his Atkins claim. The Louisiana state court found that Brumfield was not entitled to an Atkins hearing because Brumfield did not present enough evidence to establish he was mentally impaired. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied his appeal without explanation.
Brumfield next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and argued that the state courts had erred in failing to give him a full Atkins hearing. He also requested funding to enable him to fully present his claims, which was granted. A federal magistrate found that, while the state court had correctly ruled that Brumfield's initial evidence regarding his mental retardation was not adequate for the court to have granted Atkins relief, the additional funds enabled Brumfield to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation. The federal magistrate subsequently recommended that the district court admit Brumfield's new evidence when determining his habeas claim; the district court did so and ruled in favor of Brumfield by forbidding Louisiana from executing him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the state court's ruling on Brumfield's Atkins claim constituted a decision on the merits, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prevented the district court from reviewing the decision unless the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because the state denied Brumfield additional funds to develop his case due to his failure to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation, the decision was not a violation of Brumfield's constitutional due process rights nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the state trial court’s decision that Brumfield did not present sufficient evidence of mental impairment was an unreasonable determination of the facts, and therefore the federal district court could review the state court’s decision. The state court’s decision rested on its determination that Brumfield’s IQ score was not low enough to prove that he had subaverage intelligence and that Brumfield did not show that his adaptive skills were impaired. However, an IQ test has a margin of error that, if applied to the score in this case, would place Brumfield in the category of subaverage intelligence; therefore, the state court could not definitively preclude the possibility that Brumfield satisfied this criterion, and to hold otherwise was unreasonable. Additionally, the factual record presented to the state court provided sufficient evidence to question Brumfield’s adaptive skills. Because Brumfield only needed to raise reasonable doubt regarding his intellectual capacity to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the state court’s decision that Brumfield did not meet that low threshold was unreasonable.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that judicial precedent establishes that, as long as the factual record supports the state court’s decision, a federal court cannot rule that decision unreasonable simply because it would have concluded differently. In this case, the record showed that Brumfield’s IQ score was not low enough for him to be declared of subaverage intelligence and that he did not have impaired adaptive skills because he had a normal capacity to learn when given time for repetition. Because the factual record supported the state court’s determination that Brumfield was not intellectually disabled based on the relevant state standards to prove intellectual disability, the determination was reasonable. Justice Thomas also wrote that Brumfield’s claim could not succeed based on the argument that the state court’s decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, which is a high standard that requires the habeas petitioner to show that the state court confronted a set of facts “materially indistinguishable” from a Supreme Court case and nonetheless reached a different conclusion. In this case, Brumfield could not show that the Supreme Court had ever decided a case with facts materially indistinguishable from this one, and the state court’s decision was in line with existing precedent; therefore the state court’s decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. also joined Justice Thomas’ dissent in part and wrote separately to note that Justice Thomas’ inclusion of the life story of the victim’s son in his dissent should not be considered a part of the legal analysis.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Tony Henderson was a former United States Border Patrol Agent who was charged with, among other crimes, distribution of marijuana. On June 9, 2006, two days after he was arrested, Henderson voluntarily turned 19 firearms over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which he argued was for "safekeeping as a condition of the bond." He later pled guilty to his narcotics charges.
In 2008 and 2009, Henderson requested that the FBI return his firearms so that he could transfer them to a purported buyer, but the FBI refused to do so. Henderson then moved the district court to allow him to transfer the firearms to the 2009 buyer or his wife. The magistrate judge recommended denial of the motion because Henderson was a convicted felon, and the district court adopted the recommendation. Henderson appealed and argued that, because he had not been given notice that his guilty plea would disqualify him from firearm ownership, he is entitled to relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that a court may order the transfer of a felon’s lawfully owned firearms to a third party as long as the court is satisfied that the defendant will neither use them nor direct their use. While a felony conviction does not prevent the felon from owning firearms, it prohibits both actual and constructive possession of firearms, so a court may not order a transfer to a third party if the felon will continue to exert authority over the firearms in a manner that amounts to constructive possession. However, if the transfer to a third party represents merely a sale or disposition of the firearms, the prohibition on possession is not implicated, and the court may order the transfer.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
During her candidacy for County Court Judge in Hillsborough County, Florida, Lanell Williams-Yulee personally solicited campaign contributions. She stated that she served as the "community Public Defender" – although her title was "assistant public defender" – and inaccurately stated in the media that there was no incumbent in the judicial race for which she was running.
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Williams-Yulee and alleged that her actions during the campaign violated the rules regulating The Florida Bar. A referee was appointed who suggested that Williams-Yulee receive a public reprimand. Williams-Yulee appealed the referee's finding, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Williams-Yulee violated bar rules for directly soliciting funds for her judicial campaign. Williams-Yulee appealed and claimed that The Florida Bar rule prohibiting a candidate from personal solicitation of funds violated the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that rules limiting speech in charitable solicitation contexts have typically been subjected to strict First Amendment scrutiny because such speech often deals with issues of public concern in precisely the manner the First Amendment was meant to protect. Therefore, the government may only restrict the speech of a judicial candidate when the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The Court held that the restriction in this case serves the compelling state interest of preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and is sufficiently narrowly tailored to that interest. Although Williams-Yulee claimed that the rule’s underinclusivity was evidence that it was not sufficiently narrowly tailored, First Amendment jurisprudence does not require that a state take an all-or-nothing approach to regulating problematic speech.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the Court’s doctrine of tiers of scrutiny, such as the strict scrutiny applied in this case, should be viewed as a guideline rather than a mechanical test.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which she argued that there was no need to apply an exacting standard of scrutiny to a state’s endeavor to distinguish between political and judicial elections. Therefore, states should be granted broad latitude to regulate judicial elections, particularly with respect to campaign finance issues, as vast amounts of spending in judicial elections threatens the appearance and reality of an independent judiciary. Justice Breyer joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment protects all speech unless widespread and longstanding tradition permits its regulation, which is not the case here. Because the rule in question presumptively violates the First Amendment, the Court can only uphold it if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. In this case, there is no evidence that banning personal requests for contributions in a judicial election increases public faith in judicial integrity, and the rule bans much more speech than would be narrowly tailored to serve such an interest. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the First Amendment protections of speech should especially apply in an electoral context and that the majority opinion erred in its application of strict scrutiny analysis because the rule in question was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent to emphasize that the rule in question fails the test of strict scrutiny.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Learjet, Inc. and other retail buyers of natural gas (Learjet) sued Oneok, Inc. and other energy trading companies (Oneok) for artificially increasing energy prices during the 2000–2002 energy crisis in violation of several states' antitrust laws. Learjet claimed that Oneok reported false data and engaged in "wash sales," which are prearranged sales in which traders execute a trade on an electronic trading platform, and then immediately offset that trade by executing an equal and opposite trade. Oneok moved to dismiss Learjet's claims and argued that the claims were pre-empted by the federal Natural Gas Act (NGA). The Natural Gas Act regulates interstate, wholesale natural gas trade, but it does not apply to retail sales of natural gas. The district court granted Oneok's motion to dismiss and held that Learjet's claims were pre-empted by the NGA because Oneok's actions affected wholesale prices as well as retail prices. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, because Learjet suffered harm in retail transactions, which the NGA does not regulate, Learjet's claims were not pre-empted.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, because the Natural Gas Act (NGA) was carefully drawn so as not to dilute state power, the courts can only find that the NGA pre-empts a claim when that claim falls within a pre-empted field as enumerated by judicial precedent. In this case, because the state laws at issue are directed at practices affecting the retail rates of natural gas prices, and those are the claims the respondents raised, the state laws control and the NGA did not pre-empt the claims. Because the petitioners in this case did not argue that the state laws conflict with the NGA, the Court did not address the question of conflict pre-emption.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution only allows federal laws to pre-empt state ones when the federal law falls within one of Congress’ enumerated powers. Therefore, the potential pre-emptive scope of the NGA may be impermissibly broad, though the majority opinion in this case stayed within the limits prescribed by precedent.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion unnecessarily introduced uncertainty into precedent that has interpreted the NGA as pre-empting state law claims on issues that the federal government already exclusively regulates. Additionally, the majority opinion lacked any precedential support for its view that there are situations in which state regulation of federally regulated activity is acceptable and could not justify the sort of case-by-case analysis that it espouses. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
B&B Hardware (B&B) sells a fastener product in the aerospace industry under the trademark "Sealtight," which it registered in 1993. Hargis Industries (Hargis) sells self-drilling screws under the mark "Sealtite" in the construction industry. After Hargis applied to register its mark in 1996, B&B opposed the application and sued Hargis for infringement. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) eventually determined that there was a likelihood of confusion between the two marks and denied Hargis' application. On appeal, the district court held that, because the TTAB is not an Article III court, it need not give deference to the TTAB decision and refused to admit the decision into evidence. A jury then found in favor of Hargis. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that, since the Eighth Circuit uses a slightly different likelihood of confusion test from the TTAB, the TTAB did not decide the same likelihood of confusion issues presented to the district court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, when a single issue is before a court and an administrative agency, preclusion often applies. When parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate an issue of fact and an administrative agency acting in a judicial capacity properly resolves the issue, re-litigation is precluded unless Congress has indicated otherwise. The Court determined that nothing in federal trademark law prohibited issue preclusion, although a party could seek judicial review of an agency’s decision. The Court also held that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (TTAB) decision met the ordinary elements for claim preclusion: the likelihood-of-confusion standards for registration and infringement are the same; there was no reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of the agency’s procedures, and parties are likely to treat both contested registration and infringement seriously.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that, when contested registrations are decided upon a comparison of trademarks in the abstract and separate from their marketplace usage, the issue of likelihood of confusion would not be precluded.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that decisions by administrative agencies should not qualify for issue preclusion. Historically, federal courts had been hesitant to preclude issues determined by administrative tribunals. Justice Thomas noted that Congress authorized the TTAB to determine the respective rights of trademark registration only, not to decide questions of infringement, and that Congress included a provision allowing judicial review. Therefore, Congress likely did not intend preclusion to apply. Finally, Justice Thomas argued that allowing an administrative agency, part of the Executive Branch, to decide central issues in private claims may effect an unconstitutional transfer of judicial power. Justice Antonin Scalia joined the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Jesse Busk and Laurie Castro were former employees of Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Integrity), a company that provides warehouse space and staffing to clients such as Amazon.com. Busk and Laurie both worked in warehouses in Nevada filling orders placed by Amazon.com customers. At the end of each day, all the workers were required to pass through a security clearance checkpoint where they had to remove their keys, wallets, and belts, pass through a metal detector, and submit to being searched. The whole process could take up to 25 minutes. Similarly, up to ten minutes of the workers' 30-minute lunch period was consumed by security clearance and transition time. In 2010, Busk and Castro sued Integrity and argued that these practices violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as well as Nevada state labor laws.
The district court granted Integrity's motion to dismiss and held that time spent clearing security was non-compensable under the FLSA and that the shortened meal periods were not relevant to the FLSA because the plaintiffs did not argue that they performed work-related duties during their lunch periods. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. While the Court of Appeals agreed that the shortened lunch periods were not relevant to the FLSA, the Court of Appeals held that the district court should have assessed the plaintiffs claims that the security clearances were "integral and indispensable" to their work in order to determine if that time was compensable.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held that the time spent by warehouse workers undergoing security screenings is not compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Portal-to Portal Act exempted employers from liability for claims dealing with activities that are preliminary or postliminary to the principle activities that an employee is employed to perform. The screenings in this case are not a principle activity and were not integral to the employees' duties; therefore the screenings are not compensable.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which she stated that the screenings are not integral or indispensable activities because the employee could dispense with them without impairing his ability to perform the principle activity safely and effectively. Justice Elena Kagan joined the concurring opinion.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Plaintiffs were investors who bought Omnicare securities in a December 15, 2005 public offering. At the same time, Omnicare offered 12.8 million shares of common stock and made related filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings were incorporated into a Registration Statement. The plaintiffs sold all the securities by January 31, 2006. Plaintiffs brought suit under §11 of the Securities Act of 1993 claiming Omnicare materially misled or omitted material information on the registration statement because they were engaged in illegal activities that included kickback arrangements with pharmaceutical manufacturers and submitting false claims to Medicare and Medicaid. Plaintiffs further allege that Omnicare failed to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which resulted in a substantial overstatement of the company's revenue affecting the 2005 public offering.
The original suit filed in the district court had multiple claims from which this case arose, but all were dismissed in favor of Omnicare. The claims were dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to plead that the defendants had knowledge of wrongdoing when they materially falsified information on the registration statement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissals except one filed under §11 for materially misleading or omitting material information because that claim was filed under a strict liability statute which did not require pleading to knowledge of wrongdoing. The Court held that plaintiffs had met their burden for making a prima facie case under §11 and remanded the case to district court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held a statement of opinion, even if shown to be objectively false, cannot constitute an untrue statement of fact because of the different nature between opinions and facts. Facts are intended to express certainty; opinions are not. Therefore, an opinion can only constitute an untrue statement of fact if a plaintiff can show that the entity which put forth the opinion does not actually hold the stated opinion. Because the determination of whether a statement is misleading depends on a reasonable investor’s perspective, the Court remanded the case in order for the lower court to determine whether Omnicare omitted facts that a reasonable investor would find misleading.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he emphasized that a statement of opinion, which does not convey additional facts, only implies two facts: (1) that the speaker genuinely believes the opinion; and (2) that the speaker believes his/her basis for the opinion is sufficient. Only if a plaintiff can show that one of these two implications is false may a statement of opinion, which does not convey additional facts, constitute an untrue statement of fact.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Brian Wynne and his wife are Howard County, Maryland residents who own stock in Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (Maxim), a company that provides health care services nationally. Maxim's income is "passed through" to its owners, and the owners are then taxed individually. In 2006, Maxim filed income tax returns in 39 states and allocated a share of taxes paid to each shareholder. The Wynnes claimed the share of Maxim's income taxes that they paid as a credit against their Maryland individual income tax, which includes Maryland state taxes and Howard County taxes. The Comptroller of Maryland determined that the Wynnes had incorrectly calculated their county tax credit by including the taxes they had paid to other states and issued an assessment for the remaining tax owed. The Wynnes appealed to the Hearings and Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office, which noted that the wrong county tax rate had been applied initially and revised the assessment, but nonetheless affirmed that the tax credit was limited to Maryland state taxes and not applicable to Howard County taxes.
The Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax Court and argued that the limitation violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Tax Court rejected the Wynnes' argument and affirmed the revised assessment. The Wynnes then appealed to the Maryland Circuit Court for Howard County. The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that the county tax without a credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Comptroller appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals and argued that the Commerce Clause was not implicated by the county tax. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court by finding that the county tax implicates the dormant Commerce Clause because it affects the interstate market for capital and business investment and the overlapping power to tax income from such sources. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the county tax without a credit violated the Commerce Clause because the county tax is not fairly apportioned, since taxpayers who earn income from interstate activities would be taxed at higher rates than taxpayers who earn income exclusively in Maryland while the tax covers income earned wholly outside of Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals also held that the county tax is discriminatory against interstate commerce since it favors businesses that do business primarily in Maryland.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibited a tax scheme like Maryland’s, which discriminates against interstate commerce without Congressional approval. This decision is directly in line with previous dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court held that, to be permissible under the dormant Commerce Clause, a tax scheme must satisfy the “internal consistency test,” which asks whether the tax scheme in question would disadvantage interstate commerce if it were applied identically in every state. If so, then the tax is unconstitutional. Because Maryland’s tax scheme fails the internal consistency test, it is therefore unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the dormant Commerce Clause does not exist in the Constitution. The Constitution explicitly gives the federal government the power to regulate interstate commerce, but it does not say anything about prohibiting state laws that burden interstate commerce. The supposed doctrine also lacks a governing principle as well as internal consistency. Justice Scalia also noted that following precedent would require the tax in this case to be held unconstitutional only if it discriminated against interstate commerce on its face and was indistinguishable from a tax the Court had previously held unconstitutional. Because those factors are not met in this case, the tax should be upheld. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that laws passed by the same legislators that ratified the Constitution would have violated the dormant Commerce Clause under the majority’s analysis. Therefore, that reading of the dormant Commerce Clause, assuming it exists at all, cannot be correct. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissent in which she argued that the dormant Commerce Clause does not prevent the operation of a tax scheme when the discriminatory effect is the result of the combination of two otherwise-lawful tax schemes, as is the case here. Although Maryland chooses not to offer tax credits for taxes paid out of state, it is still entitled to tax that income. Justice Ginsburg also noted that the Court has not rigidly enforced the “internal consistency test” and need not do so here. Justice Scalia and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Clyde Reed, pastor of Good News Community Church (Good News), rented space at an elementary school in Gilbert, Arizona, and placed about 17 signs in the area announcing the time and location of Good News' services. Gilbert has an ordinance (Sign Code) that restricts the size, number, duration, and location of certain types of signs, including temporary directional ones, to prevent improper signage. After Good News received an advisory notice from Gilbert that it violated the Sign Code, Good News sued Gilbert and claimed that the Sign Code violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court found that the Sign Code was constitutional since it was content-neutral and was reasonable in light of the government interests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that, even though an official would have to read a sign to determine what provisions of the Sign Code applied, the restrictions were not based on the content of the signs, and the Sign Code left open other channels of communication.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the restrictions were subject to strict scrutiny because they were content-based restrictions, or restrictions that were applied differently depending on the message of the sign. Because these restrictions were content-based on their face, the Court need not examine justifications or the government’s motives in determining whether the restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. Despite the Town of Gilbert’s argument that the restrictions do not single out a specific nonprofit or church but restrict all, the Court stated that the First Amendment prohibits censorship of all speech on a whole topic. The Court also held that the restrictions cannot survive strict scrutiny because they had no compelling interest in adding restrictions to only a certain type of sign.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that this decision does not preclude towns from continuing to regulate signs, but it does stop them from restricting them in an unconstitutional manner. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that content discrimination should have been the consideration and legal analysis, and that this case did not trigger strict scrutiny. The presumption against constitutionality is too strong to use automatically and was unnecessary in this case as there was another, more appropriate method of analysis available. In her separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that constantly using strict scrutiny to judge government-regulated communication is too restrictive and would water down the meaning of strict scrutiny. The risk that the government will limit the public’s ability to debate ideas with these regulations is very low and does not warrant strict scrutiny. In this case, the restrictions were not brought on by any reason or need, and so they did not pass any level of scrutiny. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Breyer joined in the concurrence in the judgment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2006, Gregory Warger was involved in an automobile collision with another car driven by Randy Shauers. Warger filed suit against Shauers for damages resulting from the crash, and Shauers filed a counter-suit. After an initial mistrial, a jury found for Shauers. Warger appealed on the basis that, following the verdict, Warger's attorney had been contacted by a jury member who expressed concern that the jury foreperson had improperly gained the sympathy of the other jurors by informing them all that her daughter had been in a similar type of automobile accident and that the verdict would have had a negative impact on her life had she been found responsible. Warger claimed that the foreperson's alleged misconduct should result in a new trial because it was improper outside influence, which tainted the jury's verdict, and because it was evidence that the foreperson had lied during jury selection.
The district court ruled that the concerned jury member's statement was inadmissible based on Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which bars the testimony of a juror concerning any statements made during the jury's deliberations for purposes determining the validity of a verdict, with an exception for testimony regarding whether an improper outside influence was used to persuade any juror. Specifically, the court ruled that the past life experiences of the foreperson did not constitute improper outside influence. While 606(b) does not explicitly bar juror testimony for the purposes of proving dishonesty by a potential juror during jury selection, in this case the evidence was barred by 606(b) because it was based on statements the foreperson made during the jury's deliberations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that a plain reading of Rule 606(b) precludes the use of juror testimony when a party is seeking a new trial on the basis of juror dishonesty during voir dire. Prior to Congress' enactment of the rule, judicial precedent had established the inadmissibility of testimony of jury misconduct for the purpose of impeaching a verdict, and the legislative history of Rule 606(b) indicates that Congress intended the rule to apply broadly. The Court also held that the rule did not raise any issue of constitutionality because juror impartiality continued to be assured by either party's ability to bring forward evidence of juror bias at any time before the verdict is rendered.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners (Board) is a statutorily created agency that regulates the practice of dentistry. It is composed of six dentists⎯who are elected by other dentists in North Carolina⎯one dental hygienist, and one consumer member. The Board may bring an action in the North Carolina Superior Court to enjoin the conduct of any individual the Board suspects of engaging in the unlawful practice of dentistry.
In 2003, non-dentists began offering teeth-whitening services to consumers in mall kiosks and salons across the state. After dentists complained, the Board sent 47 cease and desist letters to 29 non-dentist teeth-whiteners. The non-dentists ceased offering the service, and manufacturers and distributors of over-the-counter teeth-whitening products exited the North Carolina market.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) subsequently charged the Board with violating the Federal Trade Act by excluding the non-dentists. An Administrative Law Judge found that the Board had engaged in unfair competition and enjoined the Board from issuing any more cease and desist letters; the FTC upheld that ruling on appeal. The Board petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the FTC decision and argued that, as a state agency, it was exempt from federal antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals declined to review the case and held that, when a state agency is operated by market participants who are elected by other market participants, the agency is a private actor and subject to federal antitrust laws.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, because the Board was made up of market participants, the Board could only claim immunity from federal anti-trust actions if the Board were subject to active supervision by the State. Under the Court's decision in Parker v. Brown, when a state acts to regulate activity within its boundaries, that regulation is immune from federal anti-trust actions. However, when the regulatory action is undertaken by an entity made up of non-state actors, courts must ensure the regulatory action is attributable to state policy. Courts must determine whether the state has clearly authorized to the entity to regulate and whether the entity is subject to active supervision from the state. While an entity may be excused from the active supervision requirement in some situations, such as when the entity is electorally accountable, none of these considerations applied to the Board. Because the Board was not subject to active supervision from the state, the Board could not claim immunity from federal anti-trust actions.
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. authored a dissent in which he argued that the case should be controlled by Parker v. Brown, and thus the Court should limit its inquiry to whether or not the Board constituted a state agency. Because the Board is a state-created agency, empowered by the state to regulate dentistry within the state, the Court should have found the Board was immune from federal anti-trust actions. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Edison International is a holding company for electric utilities and energy interests. Since 1999, Edison International and its related benefits and investment committees (collectively, Edison) have offered retail-class mutual funds as part of its 401(k) employee benefits plan, even though otherwise identical institutional-class funds that charged lower fees were available. Those mutual funds also give a portion of the fees collected back to plan service providers, including Edison's, which thereby reduces Edison's administrative costs.
In 2007, Glenn Tibble and other Edison employees (Employees) sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which requires fiduciaries of an employee benefit plan to administer the plan prudently for the exclusive benefit of the participants. The Employees argued that the continued inclusion of the higher-cost funds in the benefit plan was a "continuing violation" of ERISA. Edison argued that ERISA's statute of repose, which bars claims filed more than six years after the date of the last action which constituted a part of the violation, prevented Employees' claim. The district court granted summary judgment for Edison and held that there was no "continuing violation" theory under ERISA. The court stated that the act of designating an investment for inclusion started the six-year period, and since Edison had not made any misstatements or actively concealed any breach following the initial inclusion, the six-year period had passed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the nature of the fiduciary duty under trust law creates a continuing obligation to monitor trust investments and remove imprudent ones. Because this continuing duty is separate from the initial duty to choose investments carefully, violation of the continuing duty counts as a breach of the fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). As long as the breach of the continuing duty occurred within six years of the filing of the lawsuit, ERISA’s statute of repose does not bar the claim.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Alabama imposes a 4% sales tax on the gross receipts of retail businesses and a 4% use tax on storage, use, or consumption of tangible personal property. Accordingly, rail carriers that purchase diesel fuel within the state are subject to a 4% sales tax. However, motor and water carriers that purchase fuel in Alabama pay an excise tax of $0.19 per gallon.
In 2008, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) sued the Alabama Department of Revenue for violating the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1974 (4-R Act), which targeted local and state taxation schemes that discriminated against rail carriers. CSX argued that the sales tax was discriminatory because it required the rail carriers to pay more than their competitors for purchasing diesel fuel in the state. The district court dismissed the case and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal by citing precedent that held that a railroad could not challenge its competitors' exemptions from a sales tax as discriminatory under the 4-R Act. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, overturned the ruling, and remanded the case. On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and issued an order holding that the state's sales tax does not discriminate against rail carriers for the purposes of the 4-R Act, because the amount that motor carriers paid was roughly equal to that paid by rail carriers. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and held that the tax is discriminatory because the state had not offered sufficient justification for exempting CSX's competitors from the sales tax.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Unanswered, and yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the appellate court correctly examined the railroad's situation in relation to its comparison class of competitors in the transportation industry. The Court also held that, in determining whether discrimination occurred, a court must look at the state's tax scheme as a whole rather than just the challenged provision. A provision may seem discriminatory when examined in isolation, but the tax code as a whole may subject a competitor to a comparable tax. Because the appellate court did not examine the state's justifications for its tax regime, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether discrimination in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1974 occurred.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion's definition of discrimination was overly broad and could lead to inconsistent applications of the statute. Because the railroad was unable to prove that the tax "targets and singles out" the railroad as compared to other taxpayers, there was no discrimination. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On April 29, 2010, Sergeant Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff's Department observed Maynor Javier Vasquez driving north on I-77 with a broken brake light. When Darisse pulled over the vehicle, he noticed another man, Nicholas Heien, lying under a blanket in the backseat. Darisse spoke with the two men, felt that their stories did not match up, and was concerned that Heien had not gotten up from the back seat. Darisse asked for permission to search the vehicle. Heien agreed, and Darisse found a bag containing 54.2 grams of cocaine in the car.
A grand jury indicted Heien for two counts of trafficking cocaine. Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, and the trial court denied the motion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable because North Carolina law only required one working brake light. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that when an officer's mistake of the law is reasonable, it may give rise to the "reasonable suspicion" required for a traffic stop of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. That North Carolina Supreme Court sent the case back to the state Court of Appeals.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's judgment. A dissenting judge, however, stated that the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling created "fundamental unfairness" because it held citizens to the traditional rule that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" while allowing police to be ignorant of the law. Based on this dissent, Heien again appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court which rejected Heien's appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when an officer has made a reasonable factual or legal mistake. Because Fourth Amendment jurisprudence turns on the question of reasonableness, governing officials have traditionally been allowed leeway to enforce the law for the community's protection. As long as the mistake of fact or law in question was reasonable, the Fourth Amendment does not hold such mistakes to be incompatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion. However, the Court also held that those mistakes must be objectively reasonable; an officer cannot gain the benefits of Fourth Amendment reasonableness through a sloppy or incomplete knowledge of the law.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Elena Kagan emphasized that the majority opinion's analysis was limited to when the mistake of law in question is an objectively reasonable one. Justice Kagan also wrote that the test to determine whether an officer made an objectively reasonable mistake is much more stringent than the one to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the concurring opinion.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has traditionally focused on the officer's factual conclusions rather than understanding of the law. Expanding leeway allowed to police officers with respect to their factual assessment to the meaning of the laws they are meant to enforce runs the risk of eroding the Fourth Amendment's protections. In the absence of any evidence that holding police officers to this standard would prevent effective enforcement of the law, mistakes of law should not be considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2002, Manachem Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to parents who are United States citizens. Manachem's parents requested that the U.S. State Department record his place of birth on his passport as "Israel," in accordance with Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 (Act). The State Department refused and instead issued Manachem a passport that listed "Jerusalem" as his place of birth. His parents sued the Secretary of State on his behalf and sought the enforcement of Section 214(d). The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that it presented a non-justiciable political question. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, reversed that holding and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that Section 214(d) "impermissibly intereferes" with the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign states. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed and held that the section goes beyond the scope of Congress's passport power to affect United States foreign policy, which is a realm the Constitution reserves for the executive branch.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority holding that the federal statute unconstitutionally usurped the President’s power to recognize foreign nations as it relates to passports. The Court held that, although the Constitution does not explicitly address the issue of recognition of foreign nations, the Reception Clause in Article II of the Constitution—which states that the President will receive foreign ambassadors—grants the President the power to recognize foreign states. The fact that Article II also vests the President with the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors gives the President further control over recognition decisions. Although Congress has a role to play in other aspects of foreign policy, often by granting the President’s formal recognition practical effect, Congress has no such power to initiate international diplomacy without involving the President. Because the question of whether the American government recognizes a foreign nation must have only one answer, the President’s power is assumed to be exclusive, and therefore Congress cannot act in a manner that contradicts Executive branch policy regarding recognition. The Court also held that precedent and history support the view that the formal recognition power belongs exclusively to the President. Because the Executive branch has maintained a neutral position by not recognizing any nation’s sovereignty over Jerusalem, the federal statute in question unconstitutionally infringes on the President’s recognition power.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that this case presented a political question beyond the purview of the judiciary, but because precedent precluded political resolution, he joined in the majority opinion.
On a second issue -- whether the statute unconstitutionally usurped the President's power to recognize foreign nations in relation to consular reports -- the Court answered 5-4 in the affirmative with Justice Clarence Thomas joining the dissenters arguing that the federal statute in question was an unconstitutional usurpation of the President’s recognition power with regard to passports but not consular reports of birth abroad. The historical record indicates that any residual foreign affairs powers that were not explicitly allocated were assumed to be vested in the President. While passport regulation has traditionally been an executive function and falls squarely within the residual foreign affairs power reserved to the President, the consular reports are part of the naturalization powers that are granted to Congress. Therefore, the enforcement of the statute in question as it relates to passports would violate the separation of powers doctrine, but it may be constitutionally applied to consular reports of birth abroad.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, in order for the President to constitutionally ignore the express will of Congress, the President must be exercising a power that the Constitution “conclusively and preclusively” granted to the Executive branch. Because the history and the precedent regarding the power to recognize foreign states is at best conflicting, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Constitution does not conclusively and preclusively grant the President the power to recognize foreign states. Even if the President did have that power, the statute in question would not be unconstitutional because an optional passport designation does not amount to official recognition. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that, to the extent that the Constitution grants the President the power to recognize foreign states, the power is not exclusive. The Constitution grants Congress such a power in the form of its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Regardless, the statute in question does not implicate the recognition power; it merely directs the State Department to make an accommodation regarding a geographic description that is in line with similar accommodations the State Department already offers. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Gregory Holt (also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad) was an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Corrections and a practicing Salafi Muslim. He sought an injunction and temporary relief from the enforcement of the Arkansas Department of Corrections' grooming policy, which allowed trimmed mustaches and quarter-inch beards for diagnosed dermatological problems but otherwise no facial hair. Holt argued that growing a beard was a necessary part of the practice of his religion, that the grooming policy significantly burdened his ability to do so, and that the grooming policy was therefore a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Holt was willing to limit his beard to a length of one-half inch as a form of compromise with the policy.
The district court granted temporary relief but then dismissed the complaint upon being presented with evidence of the other ways in which Holt was allowed to practice his religion and the extent to which the grooming policy was necessary to maintain prison security. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Arkansas Department of Corrections policy on beards violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). The Court held that, while providing substantial protection of religious exercise, RLUIPA allows prison officials to test the sincerity of religious beliefs to prevent these from being used for illicit conduct. In this case, Holt met the standard for accommodation established in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. —that an accommodation must be based on a sincerely held religious belief—because he was neither slight nor idiosyncratic with the tenets of Islam. Further, the Court held that the district court erred in suggesting that Holt's other religious privileges demonstrated a reasonable accommodation of Holt's beliefs. The prison officials had the burden to prove that preventing inmates from growing beards furthered a compelling government interest and that this policy was the least restrictive means of interference, but the Court held that prison officials did not satisfy that burden in this case because other steps could be taken to ensure quick identification and an inability to hide contraband.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that, while RLUIPA does not require prison officials to refute every less restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest, Arkansas officials responded inadequately to the Holt's objections. However, Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority opinion's dismissal of the explanations of the prison officials. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she objected to the majority opinion's use of the Hobby Lobby decision, because in this case the requested accommodation would not affect the religious beliefs of others.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On February 23, 2007, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski refinanced their Eagan, Minnesota, home by borrowing $611,000 from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The Jesinoskis received a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) disclosure and a Notice of the Right to Cancel, which gave them until midnight on February 27, 2007, to rescind the loan. The Jesinoskis did not exercise their right to cancel the loan, and they used the money to pay off several consumer debts. On February 23, 2010, the Jesinoskis attempted to rescind the loan and argued that they did not receive sufficient copies of the TILA disclosure and the Notice of the Right to Cancel. After the request to rescind the loan was denied, the Jesinoskis sued Countrywide Home Loans for failure to rescind their loan on February 24, 2011.
Countrywide Home Loans sought a judgment on the pleadings and argued that the Jesinoskis did not file their suit within the three-year time period allowed by TILA. The Jesinoskis argued that, because they attempted to rescind the loan within the three-year time period, their suit fulfills that requirement and should be allowed to proceed. The district court found in favor of Countrywide Home Loans; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that the three-year period required by the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is satisfied when the borrower notifies the lender of his intent to rescind the loan within that period, even if a lawsuit has not yet been filed. The plain language of TILA specifies that a borrower need only notify the creditor of his intent to rescind the loan; it does not require the borrower to file a lawsuit. Although common law recession traditionally requires the borrower to return what was borrowed (as would result from a lawsuit), modern jurisprudence does not require that a statute be interpreted as implementing its common law analog.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating Samuel Johnson based on his involvement in an organization called the National Social Movement. Later in 2010, Johnson left that group to found the Aryan Liberation Movement. In November of that year, Johnson told an undercover FBI agent that he manufactured napalm, silencers, and other explosives for the Aryan Liberation Movement in addition to possessing an AK-47 rifle, several semi-automatic weapons, and a large cache of ammunition. In April 2012, Johnson was arrested at a meeting with his probation officer and admitted to possessing some of the previously mentioned weapons.
A grand jury charged Johnson with six counts of firearm possession, three of which relied on his classification as an "armed career criminal." This classification was based on the fact that he had three prior felony convictions that the district court designated as "violent felonies"—attempted simple robbery, simple robbery, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Johnson was then subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. Johnson argued that the convictions in question should not be considered violent felonies and that the ACCA was unconstitutionally vague. The district court held that the felony convictions in question were in fact violent felonies and that Johnson was an armed career criminal for the purposes of the mandatory minimum sentence required by the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Criminal Career Act (ACCA)—that defines a “violent felony” as one involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”—is unconstitutionally vague. Judicial precedent has held that laws that do not give ordinary people fair notice of what conduct is punished or can be enforced arbitrarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because the residual clause of the ACCA gives no guidelines for how the court can assess whether the conduct in question poses a “serious potential risk of physical injury” and therefore qualifies as a violent felony, the residual clause allows for unpredictable and arbitrary enforcement in violation of the Due Process Clause. The Court also held that it was not bound to follow precedent that upheld the residual clause because subsequent cases had shown that the judicial interpretation of the clause was not sufficiently predictable.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague under both a categorical approach and a records-based approach. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the case does not need to be resolved on Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause grounds; instead, the ACCA should not apply in this case because unlawfully possessing a short-barreled shotgun does not constitute a violent felony. Because the elements of the offense and records of convictions for possessing a short-barreled shotgun do not support the contention that the offense is inherently dangerous, the risk of harm is too remote from the conduct for the offense to constitute a violent felony. Therefore, the majority opinion did not need to nullify the residual clause in order to hold that Johnson should not be punished under the ACCA. Justice Thomas also argued that the field of vagueness jurisprudence has expanded to the point where it is used to invalidate democratically enacted laws and is now potentially beyond the bounds of due process jurisprudence.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that a statute is unconstitutionally vague only when it is vague in all of its applications. Because the residual clause of the ACCA can be construed in a manner that makes it constitutional by reading its language in the context of similar language in state and federal laws that direct a court to make fact-specific determination, the residual clause does not violate the Due Process Clause. Additionally, judicial precedent has upheld the residual clause, and this case presents no reason to overturn that precedent. Because the residual clause is constitutional and Johnson’s previous convictions constitute violent felonies, Justice Alito argued that the ACCA can be properly applied to his case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On October 30, 2012, Brandon W. Owens filed a class action petition in state court that alleged that Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company and Cherokee Basin Pipeline underpaid the members on the class on royalties they were owed from wells. The petition alleged that this underpayment constituted a breach of contract and sought damages without specifying an amount.
On December 5, 2012, the defendants removed the case from state court to federal district court and cited that federal jurisdiction existed under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). CAFA requires that three elements be established for a class action case to fall under federal jurisdiction: at least one plaintiff and one defendant must be citizens of different states, the class must consist of at least 100 members, and the amount in controversy must exceed $5 million. The defendants in this case claimed that they met the requirements for removal to federal court under CAFA because the amount in controversy exceeded $8 million, but did not include specific evidence in the notice of removal. The federal district court held that defendants had not provided evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million in the notice of removal and therefore remanded the case back to state court.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court should not have remanded the case because requiring the party requesting the removal to produce evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million creates an evidentiary burden. The Court of Appeals held that that such evidence is wholly unnecessary unless the removal is contested. A party requesting that a case be removed to federal court need only allege that the grounds for removal exist and need only prove those allegations if they are contested.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a defendant's notice of removal to federal court must only include a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal jurisdictional threshold, not evidentiary proofs. Because the requirements for a notice of removal track those for a normal pleading, the defendant seeking removal should similarly be allowed to allege in good faith that the amount in controversy is sufficient. Evidence only becomes necessary in response to a plaintiff's contestation of the removal.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the only issue properly before the Court was whether the appellate court abused its discretion. Because the majority opinion addressed the district court's analysis, it presumed the basis for a lower court's decision, which violates previously established standards of review. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Elena Kagan, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that the Court did not have the jurisdiction to review the appellate court's decision because the Court can only review "cases" that were before an appellate court. This case does not qualify for such review because it was never before the court seeking a remedy or redress for legal injury; instead, the appellate court denied the application for permission to appeal a remand order.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In 1990, Stephen Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider-Man toy that was set to expire in May 2010. Kimble claimed that he discussed the idea with the president of Marvel Enterprises Inc., and that he would be compensated for use of his ideas. Although no agreement was reached, Marvel produced a toy that was similar to Kimble's design. In 1997, Kimble sued for patent infringement, and the parties settled in 2001, with Marvel agreeing to purchase the patent and pay royalties to the petitioner without an expiration date. The case was subsequently dismissed. In 2006, Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro Inc. that gave it the right to produce the toy. Disagreements arose between Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments, and Kimble claimed that the original patent would be infringed if royalties were not paid. Kimble sued Marvel in Arizona state court, and the case was then removed to the federal district court.
The magistrate judge determined that settlement agreement was a "hybrid" agreement, in which patent and non-patent rights were inseparable, and that the Supreme Court decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. applied. In that case, the Court ruled that, when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser was not obligated to continue these payments beyond the expiration date of the patents because doing so would over-compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extend the patent monopoly beyond the intended time limit. On recommendation of the magistrate, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and ruled that the settlement agreement transferred patent rights, but that it was unclear if non-patent rights were transferred. Kimble appealed and argued that the settlement agreement transferred both patent and non-patent rights and that, while royalty payments ended for the patent, they did not end for the toy itself. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the precedent established in Brulotte v. Thys Co.—that a patentee cannot receive royalty payments after the patent has expired—should be upheld because there was no sufficient reason to overturn it. Patent law jurisprudence has typically struck down statutes that overly limit free access to formerly patented inventions, and the Brulotte decision was in line with these cases. Because no subsequent legal developments have made the rule announced in that decision obsolete and it has remained workable, there is no reason to overturn the decision. The Court also noted that Congress had ample opportunity to enact a statute that forecloses the Brulotte rule but has not done so.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, because the Brulotte rule impermissibly interferes in parties’ abilities to negotiate licensing agreements that reflect the true value of the product, the decision has no precedential weight and should be overturned. The Brulotte rule represents a poor interpretation of the Patent Act and promotes economic inefficiency, so the decision lacks the support of legal standing as well as public policy, and therefore the Court should not uphold it. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On July 19, 1988, Houston Police Officer Elston Howard was in the midst of arresting the clerk of an adult bookstore when Robert Mitchell Jennings entered the store intending to rob it. Jennings shot Officer Howard four times and then proceeded to rob the store. The trial court jury subsequently convicted Jennings of capital murder. In the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Jennings' long criminal history as an aggravating factor. The defense called the jail chaplain to testify to his opinion that Jennings was not "incorrigible," and the defense did not present any further evidence of mitigating factors.
In 1996, Jennings filed a state habeas petition and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment phase because his attorneys had failed to contact his family to provide evidence of a disadvantaged background and had failed to find and present a 1978 psychological report that suggested that Jennings had a "mild organic brain dysfunction." The state court held that Jennings' attorneys had conducted a sufficient investigation into his background, and that their decision not to introduce this testimony and evidence was a reasonable trial strategy. The state court recommended that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals deny the request for habeas relief, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acted accordingly.
In 2009, Jennings filed a federal habeas petition with the district court. The district court granted the petition and held that Jennings had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to present evidence of his disadvantaged background and possible mental incapacities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Jennings' counsel's decision not to pursue these avenues of argument was a legitimate trial strategy. The Court of Appeals also held that a federal habeas petitioner must file a certificate of appealability in order to respond to arguments concerning the state's appeal.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, when an appellee does not cross-appeal, he may urge a defense of his judgment on alternative grounds without filing a certificate of appealability unless doing so would enlarge his rights or lessen those of his adversary as provided by the previous judgment. In this case, allowing Jennings to urge a defense of his judgment did not materially affect either his rights or those of the state. The Court held that this rule provides sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent a proliferation of frivolous habeas claims. Additionally, the statutory language that created the certificate of appealability requirement only dealt with the taking of appeals, not with a defense of a judgment from which an appeal has already been taken. Therefore, that requirement was not relevant in cases such as this one.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that Jennings' argument in defense of a previous judgment constituted a cross-appeal because it altered the grounds on which he could obtain relief. Because the argument was essentially a cross-appeal, a certificate of appealability should be required. Adhering to this standard rule not only aligns with previous habeas corpus jurisprudence but also prevents a rise in the number of frivolous appeals. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On August 17, 2007, John L. Yates and his crew prepared his fishing vessel for a commercial fishing trip into federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico. On August 23, 2007, Officer John Jones, a field officer with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission who was empowered to enforce federal fisheries laws, boarded the vessel and noticed red grouper fish that appeared to be smaller than the requisite 20 inches. Officer Jones measured the grouper that appeared smaller and found a total of 72 fish that measured under 20 inches. Officer Jones placed these fish in wooden crates, issued Yates a citation, and informed Yates that the National Marine Fisheries Service would seize these fish upon the vessel's return to port. Contrary to Officer Jones' directions, Yates instructed his crew to throw the fish in question overboard and replace them with larger fish. When the vessel returned to port and the fish were measured on August 27, Officer Jones suspected that Yates had disposed of the fish he had measured.
Yates was charged with destruction and falsification of evidence. At trial he argued that the fish thrown overboard were not actually undersized because Officer Jones had measured the fish with their mouths closed, which shortens the length of fish. The district court found Yates guilty of disposing of undersized fish and therefore in violation of a statute that makes it a crime to destroy or conceal "a tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence" a governmental investigation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the four-justice plurality. The Court noted that the broad dictionary definition of "tangible objects" would cover fish, but held that the term must be read in the financial context of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which was enacted as a reaction to the Enron scandal and contained the specific provision Yates was charged with violating. In this context, the Court held that the term was ambiguous because the caption of the section in question, "Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy," and the title of the section in which it was originally placed, "Criminal penalties for altering documents," indicated that Congress was referring only to financial records. Additionally, the section's placement amongst other sections that prohibited specific actions cuts in favor of narrow construction. The Court argued that reading the section to apply to all physical objects would create significant overlap with another section. The words immediately surrounding "tangible object" — "falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or] document" —indicated that Congress intended to restrict the term to related objects. Finally, the Court held that any statutory ambiguity in criminal proceedings should be resolved in favor of the defendant.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the plurality's holding should be narrowly construed. He contended that the statute's list of nouns, its list of verbs, and its title, all working in conjunction, indicated that "tangible object" should be limited to something similar to records or documents.
Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the term "tangible object" should be given its ordinary meaning and therefore subsumes all things that possess physical form, including fish. She noted that the use of the word "any" before "tangible object" demonstrated a congressional intent for broad application. Justice Kagan also pointed out that the section's language tracked the language in other statutes that had been interpreted to include all physical objects. This section's legislative history showed that it was enacted to close a loophole created by another section and therefore did not create any unnecessary overlap. Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Sandoz, Inc., (Sandoz) and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Mylan) submitted Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to produce and market generic versions of Copaxone, a drug used to treat Multiple Sclerosis. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the manufacturer of the original drug, sued Sandoz and Mylan and used two different types of claims that are based on different ways to use molecular weight to distinguish between polymer samples. The district court did not distinguish between the different methods of using molecular weight and held that the claims were not indefinite as Sandoz and Mylan argued. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Sandoz and Mylan products infringed on Teva's patent.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not error in holding that the patents were infringed, but that some of the claims had not been effectively shown to be definite.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a federal appellate court could only overturn a district court's finding of fact if those findings were determined to be "clearly erroneous." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) established this standard without any exceptions, and there was no reason to create one in this case. Because the construction of a patent claim is essentially a factual determination, it should be governed by this well-established standard. Therefore, while an appellate court may still review a lower court's construction of a claim de novo, to overturn the lower court's ruling, the appellate court must find that the lower court has made a clear error with respect to the findings of fact.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the construction of patent claims deals with questions of law, so Federal Rule of Procedure 52(a)(6), which only applies to questions of fact, is not the controlling standard. Instead, the appellate court was correct to apply a de novo standard of review, which increases uniformity. Justice Thomas wrote that a district court's determination is factual in nature when it deals with the historical fact of the case, as in the case of contracts and deeds, while it is a legal conclusion when it defines rules applicable beyond the specifics of the case at hand, as in the case of statutes. Based on this definition, the construction of patent claims should be considered a question of law. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
In July 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) learned of a potential plot to hijack US planes and briefed the Federal Air Marshals accordingly. Not long after that briefing, the TSA notified the Marshals that all missions on flights from Las Vegas would be cancelled until August. Federal Air Marshal Robert J. MacLean became concerned that the TSA was not appropriately responding to the threat and creating a danger to the flying public, so he contacted an MSNBC reporter about the situation in an attempt to create a public controversy. MSNBC published an article, and several members of Congress joined in criticizing the decision to cancel the missions. That decision was then rescinded. In 2004, MacLean appeared disguised on NBC Night News, and some TSA employees recognized his voice. During the course of the investigation that followed, MacLean revealed his role in the 2003 MSNBC article. This contact was deemed to be an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security information, and MacLean was removed from his position.
MacLean challenged the determination that he disclosed sensitive security information before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MacLean argued that the information about the cancellation of missions was not classified at the time he received it and could not be retroactively classified. The Court of Appeals held that the TSA had simply applied regulations already in force in 2003 to determine that information should fall under that classification. MacLean also challenged his removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) and argued that his actions were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). The Board determined that MacLean's actions did not fall under the WPA because they were explicitly prohibited by law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's ruling and held that MacLean's actions were not explicitly prohibited by law under the WPA.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the language that Congress used in the exception within the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) that allows for prosecution of disclosures "specifically prohibited by law" is significant. Because Congress used the phrase, "law, rule, or regulation" in other places in the WPA, the fact that the exception only addressed disclosures "specifically prohibited by law" indicated that Congress did not intend for the exception to apply to disclosures prohibited by regulations such as the TSA regulation in question. The Court rejected the government's argument that it should prevail because disclosures like MacLean's were specifically prohibited and "gravely endanger[ed] public safety." The Court noted that these concerns were legitimate but held that they must be addressed by Congress or the President.
Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the Homeland Security Act explicitly prohibited the type of disclosure at issue. Therefore, Congress intended to prohibit these types of disclosures because it passed the Homeland Security Act, which required the TSA to enact regulations to prevent such disclosures. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in this dissent.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 focuses on preserving the equal representation of voters in different legislative voting districts. In 2012, the Alabama legislature redrew Alabama’s electoral districts with the goal of creating districts with a population deviation of only 1%, as opposed to the 5% courts traditionally allow when evaluating redistricting efforts. Alabama also tried to maintain the existing percentage of minority voters in each electoral district. Petitioners sued in district court and argued that Alabama’s redistricting violated the Voting Rights Act and amounted to racial gerrymandering that had negative impacts on the equal representation of racial minorities in multiple electoral districts. The district court held that the petitioners had failed to prove that Alabama used race as a “dominant and controlling” factor in redrawing its electoral districts and also that Alabama’s goal of maintaining the minority population percentages in existing districts was “narrowly tailored” to a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to address the district court’s application of existing legal principles.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the district court improperly considered evidence of statewide racial effects as a claim that the state used race as a factor when redrawing all of the boundary lines, when the actual allegations were that the racial gerrymandering took place in a few select electoral districts. Next, the Court held that the evidence suggested that the Caucus had standing to sue because it appeared to have members in every electoral district in the State of Alabama; the Court directed the Caucus to provide membership information sufficient to support this inference on remand. The district court also erred by considering Alabama’s goal of obtaining a 1% population deviation among districts as a relevant factor to determine whether race was a “predominate” factor in redrawing the electoral districts rather than considering the traditional goals of the Voting Rights Act. Finally, the Court rejected the district court’s holding that Alabama’s gerrymandering satisfied strict scrutiny. In application, Alabama’s interest in maintaining a particular population percentage of minority voters in each district did not equate to the Voting Rights Act’s goal of preventing “retrogression in respect to racial minorities’ ‘ability . . . to elect their preferred candidates of choice’; therefore, using a race as a factor to meet Alabama’s extraneous goals was not justified. The Court vacated and remanded the district court’s decision for further consideration consistent with its holding and additional evidence.
Justice Antonin M. Scalia authored a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority decision reached beyond the record because the Caucus’ complaint failed to adequately address the issues of standing and whether the allegations were a statewide claim or a select electoral district claim. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court’s quest to obtain “the best racial quota” was an ill-begotten one, and that Alabama’s task of complying with the convoluted goals of the Voting Rights Act was nearly impossible given all of the competing laws, jurisprudence, policies, and procedures.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Commil USA, LLC (Commil) holds a patent on a method to implement short-range wireless networks. Commil sued Cisco Systems, Inc. (Cisco) and alleged that Cisco performed the patented method and induced its customers to infringe by performing the patented method. Cisco argued that Commil's patent was invalid for indefiniteness, non-enablement, and lack of written description. The district court found for Commil and awarded more than $70 million in damages. Cisco appealed and argued that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the standard for inducement was negligence and precluded the submission of evidence of Cisco's good-faith belief that Commil's patent was invalid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that the standard for induced infringement is actual knowledge or willful blindness, and therefore that a good-faith belief of patent invalidity was a defense to claims of induced infringement.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, although precedent established that liability for induced infringement required knowledge, infringement and validity are separate matters, and the knowledge requirement does not extend to patent validity. To permit a defense of belief in invalidity “would conflate the issues of infringement and validity.” Because a patent is presumed to be valid, if belief in invalidity were a defense to induced infringement, then the force of that presumption would be lessened significantly. Additionally, the Court held that allowing a good-faith belief in the patent’s invalidity to be a defense would burden the courts by creating increased litigation regarding the recognition of such invalidity. Therefore, a defendant’s good-faith belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to a claim of induced infringement.
Justice Antonin Scalia authored a dissenting opinion in which he argued that good-faith belief in a patent’s invalidity is a defense to induced infringement because knowledge of infringement is a requirement for induced-infringement liability, and there can be no infringement (and hence no knowledge of infringement) of an invalid patent. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
On September 26, 2008, Larry Whitfield and Quanterrious McCoy attempted to rob the Fort Financial Credit Union in Gastonia, North Carolina. After their robbery attempt was foiled by the bank's security system, the two fled. McCoy was later found hiding under a van, while Whitfield entered the Parnell residence and attempted to contact a getaway vehicle. Mary Parnell was subsequently pronounced dead of a heart attack. Whitfield was arrested nearby and signed a confession admitting to breaking into several homes as well as the attempted bank robbery.
A grand jury indicted McCoy and Whitfield on several counts relating to the failed robbery, but only Whitfield was indicted for forcing someone to accompany him and killing that person while trying to avoid being apprehended for the commission of a crime. Whitfield moved to dismiss this charge and argued that it was unconstitutionally vague and that the prosecution was required to prove that he intentionally caused Parnell's death. The district court denied the motion. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Whitfield guilty of the additional charge, it only needed to find that his actions were the proximate cause of Parnell's death, and it did not include a minimum limit on the degree of accompaniment necessary. Whitfield objected to the instruction and the court overruled the objection. Whitfield was found guilty, but on the additional charge he was found guilty of forcing Parnell to accompany him, not of killing her. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Whitfield's conviction and remanded the case for rehearing on the issue of whether or not the district court constructively amended the indictment in its jury instructions. On remand, the district court again found Whitfield guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that forced accompaniment occurs when a person requires another to "go with" him, even when that movement occurs over a short distance such as within the same building. While the word "accompany" indicates movement over distance, that distance needs only be from one place to another, and therefore can be relatively short. The Court held that a plain reading of the word "accompany" does not connote movement over a substantial distance, and the statute should not be read in such a manner.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Richard Sharif and others entered into distributorship contracts with Wellness International Network (WIN) for the sale of health and wellness products. Sharif and others later sued WIN and claimed that WIN was running a pyramid scheme. The district court granted summary judgment for WIN and awarded $655,596.13 in attorney's fees as a sanction against Sharif and his co-plaintiffs for ignoring some of WIN's discovery requests. WIN attempted to discover Sharif's assets, but Sharif ignored all attempts until he was held in civil contempt for discovery violations and arrested. In 2009, Sharif filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. WIN filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court and claimed that Sharif had continuously concealed property and information pertaining to his assets. The bankruptcy court found in favor of WIN and ordered Sharif to pay WIN's attorney's fees along with other sanctions.
Sharif appealed to federal district court, but before he filed his first brief, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, which held that a bankruptcy court lacked the authority to enter a final judgment on a state-law counterclaim against a creditor. Sharif subsequently attempted to advance an argument based on Stern, but the district court did not allow it. Instead, the district court held that such an objection can be waived and that Sharif's failure to bring up to argument earlier constituted an implied waiver. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The Court of Appeals held that an objection based on Stern cannot be waived and that the bankruptcy court only had the authority to enter a final judgment on some of WIN's claims.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
No, and Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, as long as the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent, Article III of the Constitution allows bankruptcy courts (which Congress created pursuant to Article I) to adjudicate claims that would normally be heard by an Article III court. Because Congress created the bankruptcy courts for a limited purpose and gave them limited power subject to the control of the judiciary, there is no separation of powers problem with the bankruptcy courts exercising the powers Congress delegated to them, which include the ability to adjudicate non-bankruptcy claims when the parties consent. The Court also held that judicial history regarding the right to an Article III judge clearly states that the right can be waived; therefore a bankruptcy judge can adjudicate the type of state law claim at issue in this case as long as Article III courts retain supervision. Additionally, nothing in the Constitution requires that the waiver of the right to an Article III judge be express. As long as the litigant is aware of the right to an Article III judge, voluntarily trying the case before a non-Article III judge constitutes a waiver.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the majority opinion did not need to decide the issue of whether consent to non-Article III adjudication may be implied by actions.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion should have decided this case solely based on the fact that a bankruptcy court has the authority to adjudicate the state law claims at issue here because they deal with determining what assets constitute the bankruptcy estate, which is the necessary starting point of any bankruptcy case. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that a litigant cannot consent to adjudication outside of what Article III allows because to do so would violate the constitutional separation of powers. Despite the practicality of allowing more issues to be adjudicated outside of Article III courts, the constitutional protections of the power of the judiciary must be respected. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that, while an individual can waive constitutional rights, an individual cannot consent to violations of the Constitution. Therefore, an individual can waive the right to have a claim heard before an Article III court only if the claim in question is within the jurisdiction of a non-Article III court. Because the state law claims in this case do not fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, an individual cannot consent to have them adjudicated outside of an Article III court.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Telecommunications service provider T-mobile South, LLC (T-mobile) submitted an application to construct a 108–foot cell tower resembling a man-made tree (monopine) in Roswell, Georgia. The location of the site, though planned inside a vacant lot, would be in an area zoned for single-family residences within a well-established residential neighborhood. Following an outpouring of public opposition to the tower, Roswell's Planning and Zoning Division recommended that the Mayor and city council, who ultimately approve applications after a public hearing, impose certain conditions before approving the application. Specifically, the Planning and Zoning Division recommended that T-Mobile should relocate the site to another part of the property, erect a fence around the tower, and plant pine trees to shield it from residential owners' view. At the public hearing, city council members voted to deny the application.
Two days later, Roswell sent T-Mobile a letter notifying the company that the application was denied and referred the company to the minutes of the public hearing. T-Mobile sued Roswell and claimed that the city had not provided substantial evidence that would support a denial of the application. T-Mobile also alleged that, by prohibiting T-Mobile from building the structure, Roswell violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA). The district court did not rule on the substantial evidence question and instead held that Roswell had not met the "in writing" component of the TCA, which required the government to state the reason(s) for denying an application. The district court ordered Roswell to grant the permit, and Roswell appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Roswell had met the "in writing" requirement by issuing a written denial and referring to the minutes of the hearing for the reasoning.


[Unknown Act > Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 does not require localities to provide reasons for their denial of construction applications in the written denial notification as long as the reasons appear in some other sufficiently clear written record. While the language of the Act requires localities to provide reasons for the denial of an application, it does not specify how those reasons should be presented. However, the reasons for denial must be made available at essentially the same time as the notice of denial. Because the reasons for denial in this case were issued 26 days after the date of the written denial, the Court held that the City of Roswell did not comply with the requirements of the Telecommunications Act.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that a court should be able to uphold a decision as long as the locality's logic can be reasonably followed, even if all of the reasons are not explicitly stated. If a locality has erred, a court should uphold its decision if the error was harmless, and it should generally remand the case to be reconsidered by the locality.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the City of Roswell fully complied with every requirement of the Telecommunications Act: it issued its decision in writing and provided reasons for that decision in a written record. The majority opinion's timing requirement does not exist in the text of the statute and therefore should not be valid. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent to express his concern that the majority opinion created a requirement that does not exist in the text of the statute.


[Unknown Act > Facts]
Anthony Elonis was convicted under 18 U. S. C. §875(c), which criminalizes the transmission of threats in interstate commerce, for posting threats to injure his coworkers, his wife, the police, a kindergarten class, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent on Facebook. The district court instructed the jury that a "true threat," which falls outside the scope of First Amendment speech protections, requires an objective intent to threaten. Elonis appealed and argued that "true threats" require a subjective intent to threaten. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Elonis' conviction and held that a subjective intent standard would fail to protect individuals from the fear of violence which the "true threat" exception was created to prevent.